18:2513/07/2009
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Dmitry Babich) - "There has been no change on the gas supply market." In the past few months, this phrase has brought for the EU, Ukraine and Russia more anxiety than calm, because no change means that the question over the supply of Russian natural gas to the EU this coming winter has not been settled.
In early July, the EU's Gas Coordination Group met in Brussels to examine the level of preparedness of the EU and the Energy Community (EnCT) to face a possible gas supply disruption in the coming weeks or months. It established that the gas storage situation in Ukraine remained uncertain, and that it was still unclear who would finance Ukraine's acquisition of the required amount of gas.
Russia is fed up of lending money to the Yushchenko government, which only pokes insults at Russia, and has proposed that the EU provide several billion dollars to the "democratic" Ukrainian government.
Unwilling to part with such a large sum, Europe asked if Ukraine could save itself, or if half of the required sum would suffice.
Kiev and Moscow argue that democracies in a market economy cannot be saved without investment. To paraphrase Vladimir Lenin, any democracy is worth something only if someone can pay for it. In the case of Ukraine, it could be a permanent EU agency such as the European Commission. Its president, Jose Manuel Barroso, has been conducting endless meetings on the issue with his colleagues and pondering over the problem alone, but has so far not approved the allocation of funds to Ukraine.
Mr. Barroso is acting unwisely from the viewpoint of European values and ideology. Why not give money to the young Ukrainian democracy, which has been calling, in unison with some East European EU members, for the need to fight "Russian imperialism"?
However, one can also understand the European Commission president's stance, as such allocations may never be recouped. If West European companies pay in advance for the gas that Russia has not yet supplied to Ukraine, who can guarantee that they will receive the contracted gas?
European companies, which have had negative experience of dealing with Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, refuse to believe the two again.
The Ukrainian president and prime minister, the current darlings of the European public, have promised to transit the Russian gas. But they may quarrel again, with Yushchenko again sanctioning searches in the office of Ukraine's national oil and gas firm Naftogaz, as he did last spring, or even halting Russian gas and thereby stopping its transit to Europe.
In this situation, the European Commission has reminded the EU countries of "the need to fill storage units and seek further regional arrangements before any possible new disruption occurs." As of late June, EU storage units contained 4.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas less than in June 2008, according to Swiss investment bank UBS.
Kiev paid for Russian gas supplies in May and June at the last possible moment. Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov said that Ukraine planned to dramatically increase gas purchases in July.
Ukraine, which consumed 33 million cu m (mcm) of gas per day in mid-June, has contracted 120 mcm for July.
Does it have enough money to pay for the contracted amount? Ukraine "scraped and scratched" to pay $300 million for gas in June, but Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has recently said that her government was planning to increase the authorized capital of Naftogaz to $2.45 billion.
Ms. Tymoshenko has also said in an interview that Ukraine needs $4.2 billion to buy the required 16 bcm of gas for the country's underground storage facilities, while President Yushchenko said $1.6-$2 billion would suffice.
Which of them is lying?
The European Commission is keeping silent, but Russian sources in Brussels say that even the most tolerant Eurocrats are losing patience with the Ukrainian leaders.
A solution was proposed to the European Commission five years ago. According to it, the EU, Russia and Ukraine should set up a consortium to ensure the transit of Russian natural gas across Ukraine. Unveiled in 2002, the idea of the consortium was an unwanted child for the EU, because it does not conform to its ideology. How can Europe work with Russia and not against it, helping the "new imperialist," which is seeking to restore its former influence in the ex-Soviet countries, in a joint project?
As a result, the consortium kicked the bucket.
Making another go at this policy, the EU signed a separate agreement with Ukraine last spring to modernize its gas transportation system. But its enthusiasm waned when the question of paying for the project was raised.
Maybe it is considering cooperation with the "gas imperialist" ahead of the winter colds?
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
July 13, 2009
INDIA:Army court-martials its first woman officer
Mon, Jul 13 04:45 PM
Source: Hindustan Times, India
For the first time in the Indian Army's history, a military court on Saturday ordered the court martial of a woman officer for disobeying orders, levelling false allegations against her superiors and communicating service matters to the media. Captain Poonam Kaur had accused three officers, including her commanding officer and second-in-command, of sexually harassing her last year.
She was then serving with an ASC (Army Service Corps Battalion) at Kalka near Chandigarh. The judge advocate, who helped conduct the General Court Martial in Patiala, was also a lady officer.
Ironically, three years ago she had accused a senior officer of molesting her in Nagrota near Jammu. But for Captain Kaur (in her mid 20s) to be dismissed, the military court's verdict has to be confirmed by the general officer commanding-in-chief, Western Command as the matter comes under his purview.
Even after the sentence is confirmed, she could seek relief from a high court or the newly constituted Armed Forces Tribunal. A court of inquiry conducted before the court martial had slapped 21 charges on Captain Kaur - whose father is a retired army havaldar -of which 11 were dropped, as there was no evidence to substantiate them.
The charges levelled against her included wrongfully getting married accommodation allotted and having an improper relationship with her driver.The Indian Air Force had for the first time dismissed a woman officer - Flying Officer Anjali Gupta-for indiscipline three years ago.
There are around 1,100 women (excluding lady doctors) among 35,377 officers in the army, some 750 out of 10,563 officers in the air force and 260-odd among 7,336 naval officers.
Rahul Singh
Source: Hindustan Times, India
For the first time in the Indian Army's history, a military court on Saturday ordered the court martial of a woman officer for disobeying orders, levelling false allegations against her superiors and communicating service matters to the media. Captain Poonam Kaur had accused three officers, including her commanding officer and second-in-command, of sexually harassing her last year.
She was then serving with an ASC (Army Service Corps Battalion) at Kalka near Chandigarh. The judge advocate, who helped conduct the General Court Martial in Patiala, was also a lady officer.
Ironically, three years ago she had accused a senior officer of molesting her in Nagrota near Jammu. But for Captain Kaur (in her mid 20s) to be dismissed, the military court's verdict has to be confirmed by the general officer commanding-in-chief, Western Command as the matter comes under his purview.
Even after the sentence is confirmed, she could seek relief from a high court or the newly constituted Armed Forces Tribunal. A court of inquiry conducted before the court martial had slapped 21 charges on Captain Kaur - whose father is a retired army havaldar -of which 11 were dropped, as there was no evidence to substantiate them.
The charges levelled against her included wrongfully getting married accommodation allotted and having an improper relationship with her driver.The Indian Air Force had for the first time dismissed a woman officer - Flying Officer Anjali Gupta-for indiscipline three years ago.
There are around 1,100 women (excluding lady doctors) among 35,377 officers in the army, some 750 out of 10,563 officers in the air force and 260-odd among 7,336 naval officers.
Rahul Singh
PAKISTAN: Strategic reorientation
Source: The News, Pakistan
WebLink: http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=187773
Monday, July 13, 2009
By Talat Masood
There comes a time in the history of nations when leaders have to take fundamental decisions to change course. History is replete with such examples. Deng Xiaoping decided to shift focus from ideological Puritanism of the Maoist era to developing national economy and giving it the highest priority. He had no qualms in abandoning the deep seated doctrines of communist system and borrowing the model of capitalist economies and adapting it to local conditions. To achieve this goal, foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with neighbours was crafted and close economic and trade relations with US and the West were developed. This paradigm change ushered in unprecedented prosperity and China progressed more in the last 30 than in the previous 1,000 years. India’s landmark decision, taken under the able stewardship of Dr Manmohan Singh in 1989 as finance minister, to move away from a highly centralised socialist economy to a free market transformed the face of India. This coupled with its strategic partnership with US and a proactive foreign policy including a cooperative relationship with China has facilitated India’s rapid economic growth. In both these cases leadership focused on the centrality of economic growth as a key factor and rightly expected it would strengthen other elements of national power. Indeed through this pragmatic strategic shift leaders of two countries populated by over a billion people each were able to achieve national cohesion and internal stability. We have another example of late President De Gaulle, who realising the extreme debilitating affects of protracted Algerian war took the courageous decision to withdraw from Algeria. France since then has not looked back.
Pakistan today is facing one of its greatest challenge and literally standing on a precipice. It is battling against multiple major insurgencies and struggling to cope with wide spread violence that has taken deep roots in society. And to keep its distressed economy afloat it is shackled to the IMF. There is no doubt external circumstances have contributed to where we are, but we cannot absolve ourselves for the erroneous policies pursued, especially in the last four decades. It is crucial that civilian and military leadership undertakes a major review of our strategic posture.
Given the crisis prone relationship between India and Pakistan and the Indian force deployment and postures Pakistan had to position the bulk of its forces to face India. Pakistan’s relatively narrow geophysical shape is such that our major cities and communication lines are too close to the border and vulnerable. But all this has to be reviewed in the present context. First, it would be madness on the part of India to attack Pakistan. History also bears out that it is Pakistan that initiated the 1948, 1965 and Kargil adventure. Second, India cannot ignore Pakistan’s nuclear capability and the consequences of initiating a conflict. Third, India is committed to its economic development and has global ambitions and would not like to be distracted in a military conflict. Fourth, it is in the interest of the international community that India and Pakistan normalise their relationship.
In any case Pakistan’s immediate threat is internal and the external threat of India can be far better neutralised and in all likelihood diminish once we are internally more stable and democratically strengthened.
Moreover, urgency in tackling the internal threat stems from several factors. First, if the US and NATO forces are unable to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan or if they make a political compromise of sorts then it will give a big boost to Taliban on our side. This brings the point that time is not on our side.
Army for obvious reasons is avoiding fighting on multiple fronts and for this reason had not engaged operationally Mullah Nazir and Gul Bahadur. And probably would have preferred a status quo with them, but the ambush laid by insurgents in Mullah Gul Bahadur’s area of influence forced the Army to respond. Nonetheless focus has to remain on Baitullah Mehsud and defeating or neutralising him is crucial as other Taliban leaders would be hedging their positions depending on how the fortunes of counterinsurgency operations swing in this area. Success in South Waziristan thus acquires added significance. The tactical advantage that the Army enjoyed in Swat is not available in South Waziristan. Swat is landlocked and the Army was able to close in from all sides- Buner, Shangla, Dir and Malakand and squeeze the militants. South Waziristan borders Afghanistan and North Waziristan and on both sides there are tribes that are willing to support the insurgency and share a common ideology.
The threat from Taliban is total. Taliban are a threat to the economy, politics, Constitution and indeed to our way of life. More significantly, Taliban are a threat to the world, including that to China and the Muslim world.
As regards controlling the jihadi outfits of LeT and LJ and others are concerned these are now not only militant organisations but also a significant part of our social structure. They in guise of other names are operating in Kashmir earthquake relief camps, in IDPs and spread across the country performing social services. Needless to mention, that there are many supporters of theirs in media and other branches of civil society and government.
In this environment strategic redirection would be a Herculean undertaking and require a minimum generational effort. It has to be a well thought out process having a national consensus. Military power alone will not be able to prevail. Apart from the military operations the government will have to have a comprehensive plan to address the basic causes that have given rise to militancy. For achieving enduring solutions high priority has to given to governance, that includes maximum attention on education, health, improving economy, providing justice and security and reducing inequalities.
In the months to come Pakistan faces fateful choices. We will need all the prudence and inner strength to carve our future otherwise militant and extremist forces will shape it for us.
The writer is a lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net.pk
WebLink: http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=187773
Monday, July 13, 2009
By Talat Masood
There comes a time in the history of nations when leaders have to take fundamental decisions to change course. History is replete with such examples. Deng Xiaoping decided to shift focus from ideological Puritanism of the Maoist era to developing national economy and giving it the highest priority. He had no qualms in abandoning the deep seated doctrines of communist system and borrowing the model of capitalist economies and adapting it to local conditions. To achieve this goal, foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with neighbours was crafted and close economic and trade relations with US and the West were developed. This paradigm change ushered in unprecedented prosperity and China progressed more in the last 30 than in the previous 1,000 years. India’s landmark decision, taken under the able stewardship of Dr Manmohan Singh in 1989 as finance minister, to move away from a highly centralised socialist economy to a free market transformed the face of India. This coupled with its strategic partnership with US and a proactive foreign policy including a cooperative relationship with China has facilitated India’s rapid economic growth. In both these cases leadership focused on the centrality of economic growth as a key factor and rightly expected it would strengthen other elements of national power. Indeed through this pragmatic strategic shift leaders of two countries populated by over a billion people each were able to achieve national cohesion and internal stability. We have another example of late President De Gaulle, who realising the extreme debilitating affects of protracted Algerian war took the courageous decision to withdraw from Algeria. France since then has not looked back.
Pakistan today is facing one of its greatest challenge and literally standing on a precipice. It is battling against multiple major insurgencies and struggling to cope with wide spread violence that has taken deep roots in society. And to keep its distressed economy afloat it is shackled to the IMF. There is no doubt external circumstances have contributed to where we are, but we cannot absolve ourselves for the erroneous policies pursued, especially in the last four decades. It is crucial that civilian and military leadership undertakes a major review of our strategic posture.
Given the crisis prone relationship between India and Pakistan and the Indian force deployment and postures Pakistan had to position the bulk of its forces to face India. Pakistan’s relatively narrow geophysical shape is such that our major cities and communication lines are too close to the border and vulnerable. But all this has to be reviewed in the present context. First, it would be madness on the part of India to attack Pakistan. History also bears out that it is Pakistan that initiated the 1948, 1965 and Kargil adventure. Second, India cannot ignore Pakistan’s nuclear capability and the consequences of initiating a conflict. Third, India is committed to its economic development and has global ambitions and would not like to be distracted in a military conflict. Fourth, it is in the interest of the international community that India and Pakistan normalise their relationship.
In any case Pakistan’s immediate threat is internal and the external threat of India can be far better neutralised and in all likelihood diminish once we are internally more stable and democratically strengthened.
Moreover, urgency in tackling the internal threat stems from several factors. First, if the US and NATO forces are unable to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan or if they make a political compromise of sorts then it will give a big boost to Taliban on our side. This brings the point that time is not on our side.
Army for obvious reasons is avoiding fighting on multiple fronts and for this reason had not engaged operationally Mullah Nazir and Gul Bahadur. And probably would have preferred a status quo with them, but the ambush laid by insurgents in Mullah Gul Bahadur’s area of influence forced the Army to respond. Nonetheless focus has to remain on Baitullah Mehsud and defeating or neutralising him is crucial as other Taliban leaders would be hedging their positions depending on how the fortunes of counterinsurgency operations swing in this area. Success in South Waziristan thus acquires added significance. The tactical advantage that the Army enjoyed in Swat is not available in South Waziristan. Swat is landlocked and the Army was able to close in from all sides- Buner, Shangla, Dir and Malakand and squeeze the militants. South Waziristan borders Afghanistan and North Waziristan and on both sides there are tribes that are willing to support the insurgency and share a common ideology.
The threat from Taliban is total. Taliban are a threat to the economy, politics, Constitution and indeed to our way of life. More significantly, Taliban are a threat to the world, including that to China and the Muslim world.
As regards controlling the jihadi outfits of LeT and LJ and others are concerned these are now not only militant organisations but also a significant part of our social structure. They in guise of other names are operating in Kashmir earthquake relief camps, in IDPs and spread across the country performing social services. Needless to mention, that there are many supporters of theirs in media and other branches of civil society and government.
In this environment strategic redirection would be a Herculean undertaking and require a minimum generational effort. It has to be a well thought out process having a national consensus. Military power alone will not be able to prevail. Apart from the military operations the government will have to have a comprehensive plan to address the basic causes that have given rise to militancy. For achieving enduring solutions high priority has to given to governance, that includes maximum attention on education, health, improving economy, providing justice and security and reducing inequalities.
In the months to come Pakistan faces fateful choices. We will need all the prudence and inner strength to carve our future otherwise militant and extremist forces will shape it for us.
The writer is a lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net.pk
A new challenge on the nuclear front
Source: The Hindu, India
Siddharth Varadarajan
The G8 decision on enrichment and reprocessing-related trade is a wake-up call for the Indian establishment.
The government needs to realise that the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist
India should have pressed its case when the Bush administration announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sale
It is one thing to try and spin one’s way out of domestic criticism but if the Manmohan Singh government really believes the recent G8 ban on sensitive nuclear technology sales is no big deal then the situation is much more alarming than I first thought.
Two weeks before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s scheduled arrival date in New Delhi, the State Department spokesman said that the U.S. hoped India would be in a position to identify the physical sites where American companies will get to locate their multi-billion dollar nuclear reactors. The final reprocessing arrangements and procedures have yet to be negotiated but the U.S. is keen to mark its territory. Yet, the Indian government baulks from publicly expressing its concern about the manner in which Washington is going about unilaterally seeking to alter the terms of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement under which those reactors will be sold to us in the first place.
Not only that, senior officials who should know better have sought to downplay the significance of last week’s G8 statement on nonproliferation. When reporters sought a government reaction on the interim ban the eight countries announced on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items and technology sales to India, Pakistan and Israel, what they got were comforting but spurious arguments.
Prior to September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group — the 45-nation cartel of nuclear exporters — had a blanket ban on all nuclear sales to these three countries, currently the only ones still outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But on September 4, 2008, the NSG agreed to the U.S. proposal to exempt India from this ban. This U.S. proposal was part of the full civil nuclear energy cooperation commitments the White House made in exchange for getting India to agree to separate its military and civilian nuclear programmes and place the latter under international safeguards.
The letter and spirit of the July 2005 joint statement has since been reflected in three legally binding texts — the Indo-U.S. bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (the ‘123 agreement’), India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NSG decision of 2008, all of which reflected a carefully-crafted balance of rights and obligations.
Even though the July 2005 agreement spoke of “full civil nuclear cooperation,” the U.S. was never keen to allow India access to sensitive nuclear items and technology. After a series of tough exchanges, however, Indian negotiators were able to secure restrictive but enabling language on ENR in the 123 agreement and Hyde Act, the U.S. domestic law to which bilateral nuclear commerce is wedded. The battle resumed in the run up to the NSG meetings last year but in the end India secured a clean exemption allowing it safeguarded access to every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. This clean exemption has now been negated by the U.S.-instigated G8 ban on ENR. As have the restrictive but enabling clauses of the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement, neither of which spoke of NPT adherence as a condition of supply.
The government needs to realise the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist. Nor will it get what it wants internationally by remaining silent in the hope that some benign invisible hand will deliver India what it wants. The kind of unilateralism and reversibility Washington has pushed at L’Aquila and is pushing in the NSG goes against the letter and spirit of the Indo-U.S. agreement. India should have strongly pressed its case last year itself, when the Bush administration publicly announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sales. It should have told the U.S. this was not acceptable. And it should have worked with NSG members like Russia, France, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Turkey and Kazakhstan who have either strong commercial interests in nuclear commerce with India or are opposed to tighter ENR rules for their own specific reasons. None of this was done. In May 2009, the NSG troika visited New Delhi for consultations. One wonders how vigorously India’s views on the matter were put across.
After falling asleep at the wheel, official sources have begun floating a number of explanations for why there is no need for the country to be unduly concerned about what has happened at the G8. Let us consider each one in turn.
The general U.S. push towards restricting ENR sales move was not unexpected.
Well, if it was not unexpected, the country would like to know what was done to deal with these well advertised American intentions. It is not as if India did not successfully handle rollback attempts during the negotiations from 2005 to 2008.
India is not a part of G8 and could not have known about the contents of the declaration in advance.
India has strong friendships with several G8 countries, including some without a strong attachment to the U.S. position. Given Washington’s declared intention of getting the NSG to freeze India out of fuel cycle trade and the fact that the G8 tends to form a ginger group within the NSG whenever new rules are discussed, it should have been obvious that the matter would come up in L’Aquila. Some proactive lobbying with France or Russia might have ensured a less damaging decision.
G8 decisions are not necessarily binding.
G8 statements promising tender, loving care for Africa may not be binding but the group takes its nonproliferation decisions extremely seriously.
The G8 has been discussing tighter ENR rules since 2004. India is not a specific target.
True, but the July 2005 agreement was premised on a break with the world as it was up to 2004, with only two categories of states: NPT and non-NPT. First the U.S., and then the NSG, acknowledged that India could not be clubbed together with the two remaining non-NPT states. Its nonproliferation record, strategic weight, economic heft and political responsibility meant the world was better off with India inside the ‘regime’ than outside. L’Aquila has revived the notion of India being just another outlier. That is why the G8 Nonproliferation Statement actually begins with an explicit call for countries not party to the NPT to “accede without delay”. Not only was such a call not made at the Toyako summit last year but the G8 actually endorsed the need for a “more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation with India.”
India is only bound by what it has agreed with the NSG.
True, but the NSG is on the verge of changing its guidelines and India has also pledged to accept and abide by any changes. The time to actively engage is now, when the new rules are being debated, and not after they are adopted.
India needs time to study the NSG proposal that the G8 has adopted before it jumps to conclusions.
When the NSG discussed the issue of new rules for ENR trade in November, consensus was established on a broad range of criteria even as some proposals — like the requirement that a state adhere to the Additional Protocol before it can buy ENR equipment — remained “bracketed.” The G8 has decided to implement the non-bracketed “clean text” as an interim measure. With the NSG consisting of 45 countries, it would be astonishing if India did not already know what was in this “clean text.”
L’Aquila is an unpleasant wake-up call, a reminder to India that it must remain vigilant as it moves forward to implement its agreements on civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S. and the rest of the world. Let us not pretend that a rollback on ENR isn’t being attempted. Let us acknowledge it and find ways to deal with the challenge. Though the rollback attempt began during the Bush administration, the new administration is clearly committed to it.
The time for resting on the laurels of last year’s victory at the NSG has long ended.
Siddharth Varadarajan
The G8 decision on enrichment and reprocessing-related trade is a wake-up call for the Indian establishment.
The government needs to realise that the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist
India should have pressed its case when the Bush administration announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sale
It is one thing to try and spin one’s way out of domestic criticism but if the Manmohan Singh government really believes the recent G8 ban on sensitive nuclear technology sales is no big deal then the situation is much more alarming than I first thought.
Two weeks before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s scheduled arrival date in New Delhi, the State Department spokesman said that the U.S. hoped India would be in a position to identify the physical sites where American companies will get to locate their multi-billion dollar nuclear reactors. The final reprocessing arrangements and procedures have yet to be negotiated but the U.S. is keen to mark its territory. Yet, the Indian government baulks from publicly expressing its concern about the manner in which Washington is going about unilaterally seeking to alter the terms of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement under which those reactors will be sold to us in the first place.
Not only that, senior officials who should know better have sought to downplay the significance of last week’s G8 statement on nonproliferation. When reporters sought a government reaction on the interim ban the eight countries announced on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items and technology sales to India, Pakistan and Israel, what they got were comforting but spurious arguments.
Prior to September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group — the 45-nation cartel of nuclear exporters — had a blanket ban on all nuclear sales to these three countries, currently the only ones still outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But on September 4, 2008, the NSG agreed to the U.S. proposal to exempt India from this ban. This U.S. proposal was part of the full civil nuclear energy cooperation commitments the White House made in exchange for getting India to agree to separate its military and civilian nuclear programmes and place the latter under international safeguards.
The letter and spirit of the July 2005 joint statement has since been reflected in three legally binding texts — the Indo-U.S. bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (the ‘123 agreement’), India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NSG decision of 2008, all of which reflected a carefully-crafted balance of rights and obligations.
Even though the July 2005 agreement spoke of “full civil nuclear cooperation,” the U.S. was never keen to allow India access to sensitive nuclear items and technology. After a series of tough exchanges, however, Indian negotiators were able to secure restrictive but enabling language on ENR in the 123 agreement and Hyde Act, the U.S. domestic law to which bilateral nuclear commerce is wedded. The battle resumed in the run up to the NSG meetings last year but in the end India secured a clean exemption allowing it safeguarded access to every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. This clean exemption has now been negated by the U.S.-instigated G8 ban on ENR. As have the restrictive but enabling clauses of the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement, neither of which spoke of NPT adherence as a condition of supply.
The government needs to realise the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist. Nor will it get what it wants internationally by remaining silent in the hope that some benign invisible hand will deliver India what it wants. The kind of unilateralism and reversibility Washington has pushed at L’Aquila and is pushing in the NSG goes against the letter and spirit of the Indo-U.S. agreement. India should have strongly pressed its case last year itself, when the Bush administration publicly announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sales. It should have told the U.S. this was not acceptable. And it should have worked with NSG members like Russia, France, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Turkey and Kazakhstan who have either strong commercial interests in nuclear commerce with India or are opposed to tighter ENR rules for their own specific reasons. None of this was done. In May 2009, the NSG troika visited New Delhi for consultations. One wonders how vigorously India’s views on the matter were put across.
After falling asleep at the wheel, official sources have begun floating a number of explanations for why there is no need for the country to be unduly concerned about what has happened at the G8. Let us consider each one in turn.
The general U.S. push towards restricting ENR sales move was not unexpected.
Well, if it was not unexpected, the country would like to know what was done to deal with these well advertised American intentions. It is not as if India did not successfully handle rollback attempts during the negotiations from 2005 to 2008.
India is not a part of G8 and could not have known about the contents of the declaration in advance.
India has strong friendships with several G8 countries, including some without a strong attachment to the U.S. position. Given Washington’s declared intention of getting the NSG to freeze India out of fuel cycle trade and the fact that the G8 tends to form a ginger group within the NSG whenever new rules are discussed, it should have been obvious that the matter would come up in L’Aquila. Some proactive lobbying with France or Russia might have ensured a less damaging decision.
G8 decisions are not necessarily binding.
G8 statements promising tender, loving care for Africa may not be binding but the group takes its nonproliferation decisions extremely seriously.
The G8 has been discussing tighter ENR rules since 2004. India is not a specific target.
True, but the July 2005 agreement was premised on a break with the world as it was up to 2004, with only two categories of states: NPT and non-NPT. First the U.S., and then the NSG, acknowledged that India could not be clubbed together with the two remaining non-NPT states. Its nonproliferation record, strategic weight, economic heft and political responsibility meant the world was better off with India inside the ‘regime’ than outside. L’Aquila has revived the notion of India being just another outlier. That is why the G8 Nonproliferation Statement actually begins with an explicit call for countries not party to the NPT to “accede without delay”. Not only was such a call not made at the Toyako summit last year but the G8 actually endorsed the need for a “more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation with India.”
India is only bound by what it has agreed with the NSG.
True, but the NSG is on the verge of changing its guidelines and India has also pledged to accept and abide by any changes. The time to actively engage is now, when the new rules are being debated, and not after they are adopted.
India needs time to study the NSG proposal that the G8 has adopted before it jumps to conclusions.
When the NSG discussed the issue of new rules for ENR trade in November, consensus was established on a broad range of criteria even as some proposals — like the requirement that a state adhere to the Additional Protocol before it can buy ENR equipment — remained “bracketed.” The G8 has decided to implement the non-bracketed “clean text” as an interim measure. With the NSG consisting of 45 countries, it would be astonishing if India did not already know what was in this “clean text.”
L’Aquila is an unpleasant wake-up call, a reminder to India that it must remain vigilant as it moves forward to implement its agreements on civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S. and the rest of the world. Let us not pretend that a rollback on ENR isn’t being attempted. Let us acknowledge it and find ways to deal with the challenge. Though the rollback attempt began during the Bush administration, the new administration is clearly committed to it.
The time for resting on the laurels of last year’s victory at the NSG has long ended.
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