June 18, 2005

The European Union's Proposed Intelligence Service

The Maastricht Treaty seized the opportunity in 1991 to catalyze the European Union intelligence-sharing process when the Treaty laid the foundations for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.) including the eventual framing of a common defense. In addition, on November 14, 1995, in Madrid, assessments were investigated and promises made to contribute towards enhancing European security and intelligence arrangements with the conclusion that the development of intelligence cooperation was important for operational capabilities.

Most important, at the British-French Summit at St. Malo in 1998, it was stated that intelligence was fundamental to the success of the European Union, and that it must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for the analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning without unnecessary duplication. This notion was also reinforced in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 in order to create a policy of planning and an early warning unit.

Moreover, intelligence and security analysts in the European Union member states who promote the idea of a European common intelligence policy argue that intelligence collaboration is already taking place successfully around the world: in the E.U. Satellite Center in Spain; the Situation Center at the United Nations in New York; and the informal gathering of the Club of Berne in Switzerland. However, the toughest challenge for the European Union has been the highly sensitive area of intelligence-sharing. The European Union has decided that from January 1, 2008, any information available in one country should be available in all other 25 member states.

The Role of an Intelligence Service within the European Union Mechanism

Improving intelligence cooperation is a top priority but, in the long-term, the root causes of conflicts must be understood and addressed. An emerging intelligence service in the European Union should have as its most important task the analysis of overtly gathered information and preparing it for use by policymakers. A first step towards improving intelligence sharing was the establishment of the Joint Situation Center (SITCEN) for intelligence analysis within the Council Secretariat. One of its goals is to bring together experts from both the intelligence and security services.

How a European Union intelligence service might fit in the overall European Union mechanism and what its shape and role might be is a prospective challenge for the member states in the coming decades. Eventually, by establishing an intelligence service, Europe might be able to foresee a situation which could be threatening to the European Union states such as a crisis in the Balkans or prospective religious turmoil or biochemical attacks to terrorist acts; the Council of Ministers should be involved as well by informing appropriately their national intelligence services.

Since the Council of Ministers is the official decision-making body of the European Union, it should receive reports and analyses from the European Union intelligence service. However, the problem here is that a minister of foreign affairs might have difficulties and conflicts in dealing with the foreign affairs of his own country and that of the European Union at the same time. Of course, there are ways around this; for instance, the creation of a Committee on European Intelligence could refer directly to the European Union Commission.

On the other side, the European Parliament would be the one to approve the budget of the European Union intelligence service. In the U.S., Congress is also responsible for the approval of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. The European Parliament could in the future also become the institution to provide oversight over the European Union's intelligence service operations comparable to U.S. Congressional oversight over the intelligence community in the United States.

Since the European Union member states address the possibilities of a future European Army, even if it remains simply a peacekeeping facility, it can be reasoned that they should also address the creation of an intelligence policy. Reduced duplication and closed cooperation among the member states offers an opportunity for efficient intelligence cooperation.

Analyzing the Reasons for a European Union Intelligence Service

The European Union as an entity has become an increasingly important factor on the Continent since the revival of the European Community through the Single European Act (S.E.A.) signed in 1986. S.E.A. is the official name for the 1992 program for the opening up of borders among its members. The European Union, together with the United States and the United Nations, has also become a force of some importance outside the European continent.

But the instability of the North African region, as well as in the former Soviet states, will affect the enlarging European Union. Islamic fundamentalism is reemerging in the North African states, alongside an increase in terrorism. Southern European Union member states such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are facing the effects of demographic trends (via illegal immigration).

The European Union's interior and justice ministers were clearly reluctant to hand over any major national intelligence function to a European government at a time when ad hoc arrangements among the major national intelligence services in the European Union -- and with the United States -- are currently in the forefront in the campaign against al-Qaeda and related Islamic extremist groups.

Eventually, the European Union's interior and justice ministers did agree on closer cooperation on certain security issues, and discussed the appointment of a new counter-terrorism coordinator. An important point of agreement between the ministers at the meeting was to "create a clearinghouse, where for the first time investigating judges, police, and intelligence services can direct sensitive information which would become available in real time to all members."

The various forms of cooperation so far have been based on the secret services of the major countries. Owing to this fact, it is not surprising that small states deprived of their own effective intelligence services, which would be capable of recognizing and neutralizing terrorist threats, are insisting on the creation of a European intelligence organization. Those small states are also unsatisfied with the present cooperation with the states bearing such services. On the other hand, the countries with effective intelligence services, such as the so-called "Big Five" (Italy, U.K., Germany, France and Spain) which together with the Netherlands and Sweden participate in SITCEN, are against revolutionary changes in the present system of intelligence cooperation in the European Union.

Moreover, the Belgian and Austrian governments have suggested creating a European Union intelligence service modeled on the Central Intelligence Agency in order to fight terrorism; the interior ministers from the top five European countries were unwilling to agree on how to share intelligence with all 25 members and other states. And the European Union's past unwillingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism has caused strain, in particular with Washington, because of U.S. demands to collect personal data on airline passengers.

The next step in the process of creating an intelligence service in Europe would be to distribute tasks according to the operational and informational capacities of a given national service. For instance, French intelligence has been traditionally interested in Africa, and Spain in South America, while new members in the European Union are to some extent experienced with the former U.S.S.R. countries as well as the Balkans and the Middle East. It would also be possible to make of wider use by the European Union's analytical and intelligence units of the following: information and non-governmental analyses as well as research centers, private, scientific and related to economics, which rely upon open source intelligence.

Overcoming Obstacles to the Development of the European Union Intelligence Structure

European intelligence cooperation to date has been hampered by emphasizing national sovereignty over shared intelligence. The cooperation that does exist has been largely confined to imagery collection and analysis using the European Union Satellite Center. Imagery intelligence is a necessary capability, but an effective European Union intelligence service will also require cooperation in signals intelligence and human intelligence, and be able to integrate them in all-source intelligence products.

The second obstacle to integration is the fear of spoiling privileged relationships. Many N.A.T.O. countries have individual intelligence sharing agreements with the United States. The French, determined to reduce their dependence on U.S. intelligence capabilities, are the driving force behind the drive for European autonomy. France developed the Hellios system with Spain and Italy, and has struggled to obtain German cooperation in the Hellios 2 program. Leading the intelligence gathering assets are the Helios series satellites which are optical reconnaissance satellites providing photographic images down to approximately one-meter resolution. The Helios system is a joint French, Italian, and Spanish venture and provides data initially to the three participant states.

Institutional obstacles also stand in the way of increased intelligence cooperation. Intelligence organizations generally believe that no other organization's analysis is as reliable as their own, which leads them to place more faith and confidence in their own work. These organizations also tend to view international relations as a zero-sum game, and may not agree with a cooperative approach to security and defense integration. Furthermore, the conservative nature of intelligence agencies, coupled with the bureaucratic lethargy of the European Union, will also act to slow European intelligence cooperation.

Conclusion

After the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the concept of considering a European intelligence service becomes more complicated. E.U. member states will be more hesitant to share intelligence among other member states under a central intelligence network in the European Union institution.

Nevertheless, a lack of knowledge about potential conflicts on the European continent could be more costly than maintaining a viable European Union intelligence structure. The eastern and southern peripheries of Europe are regions with considerable instability.

The Balkan and Persian Gulf crises have been sufficiently traumatic to convey the message that if the European Union is serious about achieving the objective of a common foreign, security, and defense policy, the requirement for a common European Union intelligence policy is critical.

The main tasks of this intelligence structure would be gathering information from the E.U. states' intelligence services and analyzing it independently. This analysis would allow the intelligence organization to advise the Commission and the Council on foreign relations and security issues for prospective conflicts.

Report Drafted By:
John M. Nomikos


SOURCE : The Power and Interest News Report (PINR)

US Role in Operation Storm in Croatia

US Role in Storm

Author: Ivo Pukanic

Source: Nacional, Croatian weekly magazine

http://www.nacional.hr/index3e.php?broj=2005-05-24&kat=english&id=516

May 24, 2005

Thrilled with Operation Flash, President Clinton gave the go ahead for Operation Storm
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The United States was actively involved in the preparation, monitoring and initiation of Operation Storm: the green light from President Clinton was passed on by the US military attache in Zagreb, and the operations were transmitted in real time to the Pentagon

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Considering that the US was much more interested in the situation in BiH than in Croatia, they asked Croatia to permit them to install a military base with ummanned aircraft. The United States not only monitored the complete Operation Storm, but they also actively participated with the Croatian Military in its preparation, and in the end directly initiated the operation. The green light from the White House and then President Clinton for Operation Storm was passed on by Colonel Richard C. Herrick, then US military attaché in Zagreb. Several days prior to the commencement of Operation Storm, Herrick visited Markica Rebiæ in Zagreb. Rebiæ, Miroslav Tudjman, then director of HIS and Miro Medimurac, then head of SIS, held the most intensive communications with the American military and intelligence agencies. As such, in 1996, Rebiæ was awarded the Meritorius Service Medal by Peter Galbraith, then US Ambassador to Croatia.

Herrick passed on the message that the US had no opposition to the beginning of Operation Storm, that the operation had to be ‘clean and fast’ and had to be completed in 5 days time. As Nacional has learned, Rebiæ was surprised that such an important political and military message would be passed on through those channels, and following Herrick’s visit, he immediately informed the state administration of the message in writing, and there is certain record of this today in the archives. As such, it is important to note the Ambassador Peter Galbraith was completely left out of the chain of ‘command’, and that this message came directly from President Clinton, Anthony Lake (then National Security Advisor) and Willian Perry (then Defense Secretary) via Rebiæ to Minister Gojko Šušak and President Tudjman.

This was the climax of the cooperation between the US and Croatia, which began to develop in 1992 at the beginning of the Serbian-Muslim war. In 1995, Clinton was preparing for his re-election, and Bob Dole was the Republican candidate who had requested that Congress remove the arms embargo for the Muslims in BiH. For Clinton, the Balkans became an important issue due to internal matters in the US and his stay in the White House. In their strategy to resolve the crisis, they decided to use Croatia to attack the Serbian forces in BiH, and therefore the Split Declaration was signed by Izetbegoviæ and Tudjman, which permitted the entry of HV forces under the leadership of Ante Gotovina into BiH for the purposes of cooperation with Army BiH. In order to realize that operation, HV had to climb the Dinarid mountains above Knin and liberate the city and Krajina through Operation Storm, and then immediately transfer their troops into BiH in order to pressure the Serbs and force Miloševiæ to sign the Peace Accord in Dayton.

This was a battle against the clock for Clinton, for he needed a quick solution to the crisis in order to halt Dole’s initiative and to prove himself before his voters as a decisive president who could resolve such great crises such as the one in the former Yugoslavia, the horrors of which were shown daily on CNN and other American TV stations. In order to keep the English and French off his back, Clinton bypassed the classical diplomatic channels, in order to be able to claim that he had not participated if the operation were to go sour. However, considering that the operation, led by Richard Holbrook on his behalf, ended successfully, and the men emphasized their success in their respective books.

The first contact at the highest intelligence levels began in 1992, when James Clapper was director of DIA (the Defense Intelligence Agency). His men in Croatia were Colonel Richard Herrick and his assistant Ivan Šaraè. Šaraè was a fourth order [master] sergeant, the highest rank for a non-commissioned officer. Of Croatian descent, he emigrated to the US when he was 17 years old. After a few years, he enlisted in the army and was sent to Zagreb at the beginning of the war there as he was familiar with the circumstances and knew the language. Colonel Herrick was a construction engineer, however, over time he climbed the ladder in the American military and became one of Clapper’s most trusted men.

Quickly a sort of ‘trade’ between the two agencies began. Croatia gave DIA Russian 500 kg underwater mines and the most modern Russian torpedos as well as the encryption codes used by the Yugoslav Army and the Russian army. These weapons were transferred to the US via the Split airport. When the transport was conducted, the entire airport was closed off. Hercules C-130s landed in the night, the arms were loaded and transferred to the US or one of their European bases under the greatest security measures. Also, the Croatian agency revealed the location of a chemical weapons factory in Bijelo polje near Mostar which the Serbs had transferred to Serbia. This was a well-concealed factory which was unknown even to General Bienefeld, who was the greatest expert for chemical weapons in Croatia. With the help of samples found, the American experts were able to uncover all the types of toxins produced there which had possibly been sold to Iraq or other potential enemies of the US. This was only the beginning of cooperation, by which the US immediately delivered wiretapping equipment aimed at monitoring Serbia and Montenegro, a system which could simultaneously record 20,000 telephone conversations. This cooperation was conducted with the US NSA.

Prior to Storm, the operations Summer 94 and Summer 95 had to be carried out. In planning the operations of bringing Croatian troops above Knin, the US assisted in the intelligence part of the operations. In order to precisely plan the penetration into the Bosnian mountains inland of Knin, much information was needed on the movement of Serbian troops, their communication system, codes and establishment of shelling points.

Considering that the US was much more interested in the situation in BiH than in Croatia, they asked Croatia to permit them to install a military base with ummanned aircraft. The basic condition was that this be the best-kept secret, so that it would not appear that the US had taken sides in this war. The island of Brac was selected, as it could be well protected. There all the equipment and personnel led by the CIA experts, with the long-range unmanned aircraft which could cover the entire territory of BiH to the Serbian corridor on the Sava River. The entire Krajina region in Croatia was also in its range. At that time, no one had any idea what was going on and what was being hidden on the island of Brac. Nor did the US allies, the Germans, have any idea. They sent their military attaché there on 1 January 1994. He hired a rent-a-car and drove the outer fence of the base and began taking pictures, thinking that the alertness in the base had faltered on New Year’s Day. However, he was quickly spotted by SIS and arrested. Only when he was brought into Gotovina for questioning was it learned that this was the German military attaché in Zagreb, Hans Schwan.

After this incident, the entire base was transferred to Šepurina near Zadar, and a triple line of defense placed around it. Equipment was brought in from the US overnight, and from Šepurina, the unmanned aircraft could cover every corner of Krajina and BiH. The Americans had a silent agreement with HV to hand over all the photos of the terrain and the Serbian troops, while the images were transferred via satellite in real time to the Pentagon. Three US and three Croatian officers monitored the situation at all times.

Prior to Operation Flash, which was supposed to serve as a dress rehearsal for Storm, at exactly midnight, six hours prior to the beginning of the operation, Herrick and Šaraè were called into the police and were informed that the planned action would begin in a few hours time. In the Police Ministry, at exactly midnight, the staff of Operation Flash was formed, which was transferred to the Defense Ministry at 6 a.m. When the staff was moved, the American military attaché moved with it. He constantly requested updates and sent them directly to Clinton in the White House. Each morning, the American President was informed of the preparations and every part of the operation. The Americans were thrilled by the way Flash was carried out, they realized that this model of cooperation with the Croatians was ideal, and could be decisive in the battle against Miloševiæ in BiH and could ultimately result in removing him from power. The Pentagon coordinated the entire action via Richard Herrick, and the CIA activities were coordinated by Marc Kelton, head of the CIA branch in Zagreb, who cooperated closely with Miroslav Tudjman, then head of HIS.

At the time Storm was under preparation, the Americans supplied HV with intelligence on the movements of Serbs in Krajina and the movements of YNA on the eastern borders of Croatia. They feared that Miloševiæ would launch a counter-attack with two tank brigades in eastern Slavonia if the Croats launched an attack on Knin. Through intensive monitoring of communications between Belgrade and Knin, and within Serbia, they came to the conclusion that there would be no counter-attack. It was risky that the Serbs might launch an attack from Knin itself when Gotovina and his units arrived on the Dinarid mountains above the city. Had the unmanned aircraft and monitoring showed offensive maneuvers by the troops, Storm would have begun ten days earlier.

In the wee hours of 4 August 1995, the Croatian units were issued the command to turn off all telecommunications devices between midnight and 4 am. Later it was learned that the Americans had used that time to electronically intercept and destroy the Serbian telecommunications devices.

HV was left with one hour, from 4-5 AM to use their radio ties to coordinate the operation. Just prior to Storm, the American military attaché was again called to the operation staff. Ivan Šaraè was again with him. One or two days prior to Storm, Herrick, who had prepared Storm with the Croatian officers and gave the operation the green light on Clinton’s behalf, was replaced by Colonel John Sadler. At exactly midnight, they arrived at the operative staff and from there followed all the events in the field. This time, the entire Operation was transmitted in real time via satellite to the Pentagon, where these images remain archived today. The signal transmitted to the signal by the Americans was also received by HV, and with the help of those images, the firing upon Serbian positions and the military base near Knin could be monitored to within millimeters. In addition to electronically destroying the Serbian communications, the US military also acted militarily against the Serbian positions, when it fired on the anti-aircraft battery near Knin from American combat planes that flew over the battle area. That news was released only once, on the 6 o’clock news. Afterwards, the US sharply condemned this, and that news was never repeated. No one believed the official American explanation for the rocket attack, and today the general perception is that this was direct US assistance to HV, only that even ten years after Storm this must not be admitted, due to US-British relations, as Britain had a completely different perspective on how to resolve the Balkan issue. And it still does today.

The US was thrilled with the how fast and clean the operation was conducted, and with its outcome, which permitted the lightning fast entry of HV into BiH and penetration all the way to Banja Luka and, finally, Belgrade’s consent to sign the Dayton Accord. The American control and satisfaction of the complete operation was later confirmed in the statements that the operation was carried out properly, and as such, the US-Croatian cooperation in intelligence and military matters intensified. General Colonel Patrick Hughes, Clapper’s successor as director of DIA, visited Croatia, intensified cooperation in the sector of electronic monitoring of Serbia and Montenegro, other intelligence was swapped, MPRI began its intensive training of the Croatian military and Rebiæ was decorated for his efforts.

The first word that Croatian officers might have to stand trial for the events during Storm was heard in 1997. The US immediately responded and requested on a dozen occasions in discussions with the Hague Prosecutor that Storm, as a militarily-clean operation, be left alone, as Nacional has learned from a high-ranking diplomatic source. At that time, there was a problem concerning the extradition of Mladen Naletiliæ Tuta to the Hague, and the US promised Croatia that the Hague would not raise charges for Storm if they handed Naletiliæ over. Naletiliæ was extradited, and Carla Del Ponte outwitted the American administration and began with her demands that the Croatian generals be investigated as suspects in Storm. The US was dismayed but was not allowed to show this, trying to resolve the matter through quiet diplomacy instead, which to this day has not succeeded. Therefore it would be a step in the right direction for the Hague to request that the Pentagon hand over all the images recorded by the ‘Predator’ unmanned aircraft during and after Storm.

Furthermore, for the interests of truth, all of the high ranking American military and intelligence officers involved in the entire operation, which ended the war in the Balkans and removed Miloševiæ from power, should be called to testify in the Hague. Those responsible for the crimes which took place after the operation are known, and they are the ones which should stand before the court, as they should have eight or nine years ago. Had these men been tried then, Carla Del Ponte today would have no aces up her sleeve, and Croatia would not have the problems it has, with the entire operation proclaimed a ‘criminal operation’ and the entire state administration of the time a ‘criminal organization’.

South African Intelligence unlisted telephone database contains 795,000 data entries

The South African Intelligence unlisted telephone database contains 795,000 data entries with these categories: http://cryptome.org/sa-unlisted.zip ( Database)
Surname
Initials
Telephone Number
10 Digit ID Number
National ID Number
Postal Address
Building
Street Name
Street Number
Suburb Name
Town name
Postal Code

A writes:

This Windows Access Document format of the South African unlisted landline numbers (2003 – 2004) complied by the state telecommunications carrier, Telkom, is that used by the local intelligence agencies both as a research tool and the means of recording the communication identity of their field agents, office workers and cut-out fronts for businesses and administration. Foremost are those with the prefix coding (Pretoria: 012; Johannesburg: 011; Cape Town: 021 and Durban: 031) but occur through out. These agencies are:

National Intelligence Agency (domestic intelligence including Counter Espionage, under control of Billy Masetla. Formerly led by Vusi Mavimbela, presently taken up employ in the private firm Vilapanda Investments, see below).

South African Secret Service (foreign intelligence effort) directed by Hilton ‘Tim’ Dennis.

National Intelligence Co-coordinating Committee (national co-coordinator of all statutory intelligence agencies, answers to Intelligence Minister, Ronnie Kasrils, regarded as competent).

The nine Provincial Intelligence Intelligence Coordinating Committees (PICOC).

Military Intelligence (South African National Defence Force) run by Lt. Gen. Mudau, aka Motau, aka Mtondo (sobriquet).

Presidential Intelligence Unit (answers to tasking and reportage to the State President, Thabo Mbeki.

South African Revenue Service (SARS) Taxation investigation body headed by Ivan Pillay.

Special Investigations Unit (Scorpions) headed for disbandment after closely directing an investigation into alleged irregularities by the deputy state president, Jacob Zuma, during a national armaments purchase.

Criminal Intelligence Service (South African Police Services – SAPS) headed by Jackie Selebi (commissioner) and Raymond Lalla (management).

Within the intelligence community are included commercially active, defunct apartheid ‘securocrats’ who run private firms like:

Rams Security.

Orion Professional Management (Andre Oosthuisen).

Palto (Paul Stemmet).

Stallion Security.

Omega security.

Strategic Concepts (Sean Cleary, apartheid diplomat and spin-doctor to the last Administrator of South African occupied Namibia: UK spook connected).

Executive Outcomes (defunct South African mercenary business headed by Eben Barlow, now linked to Vusi Mavinbela).

AIN (Warren Goldblatt).

and are likely to have a working access to the database, as do the establishment businesses with their own security and intelligence capacities, namely

Kusela Security Solutions (a ruling party, African National Congress (ANC) aligned venture).

African Legends Oil (Mpho Scott: ANC origin).

Ukupha Security (Paul Langa: ANC origin).

Chubb Security (traditional security firm).

ADT Security (traditional security firm).

Coin Security Group (traditional security firm).

Glencore (Marc Rich).

Securocor (Gray Security Services: active throughout Africa).

Anglo American / De Beers (traditionally run by British MI5 retirees, now by Apartheid Security Policemen).

Imvume (Sandi Mjali: ANC origin).

Vilapanda Investments (Tokyo Sexwale: ANC origin).

Foreign security companies selling intelligence expertise to both government and private industry are present as are fronts for declared foreign intelligence agencies; and covert groupings such as the Mossad’s Bloom ring based in northern Johannesburg. Israel is presumed to have a working understanding with Anglo American, De Beers and Glencore security elements.

The formally incorporated firms with open dealing and a certain access to the unlisted directory in which some of their employees have taken out ex-directory lines are:

Control Risks (UK)

Tyco International (UK)

CIEX (UK)

United Technologies Corporation (USA)

Kroll (USA)

Siemens (Germany)

Thomsons (France)

Most of the database details are those of ordinary South Africans who wish to preserve their anonymity for myriad reasons and civil servants who think themselves vulnerable in the public view such as assessors for SARS, the Auditor General and a few investigators on Parliamentary oversight committees.

The database in Microsoft Access 97 MDB-format, 111MB:
sa-unlisted.zip (39.6 MB Zipped)
http://cryptome.org/sa-unlisted.zip


Downloads of the database may cripple Cryptome. Mirrors of the file on machines with more power would be appreciated. Send URLs to jya [at] pipeline.com.

The file creation and modification times and dates are by Cryptome. The file was converted to Access 97 and was then re-sorted on surnames from telephone numbers.

All the world's intelligence agencies have access to similar "unlistings" and probably share them through burgeoning international-cooperative data interception laws implemented by the transcontinental telecom industries, no matter the data-protection and privacy commissioners' futile efforts to limit the profligate intrusions.

This South African list aptly gives "unlisted" data on some of those official and commercial parties doing the snooping and those for whom the snoops snoop lawfully and unlawfully.

But as A. noted, most of the list is composed of data on persons who believe their data is protected by their telecom provider who deceptively sells the unlisting as a privacy promise.

Report on the Death of Italian Secret Service Agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq

Series: Italian Government Documents and Publications
Publisher: Italian Government
Date of publication: 02.05.2005
Format: PDF
Pages: 52


Description: This is the classified report of the Italian investigation into the shooting of intelligence agent Nicola Calipari at a US roadblock in Baghdad on 4 March 2005. The report examines the events that led to Calipari's death on his mission to free kidnapped Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena

DOWNLOAD

http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10665_290_it.pdf

The downfall of Putin’s enemy , success of German foreign intelligence

Erich Schmidt-Eenboom: „The downfall of Putin’s main domestic enemy has been a success of German foreign intelligence“

Erich Schmidt Eenboom is a well-known journalist and a recognized secret service expert for Europe, North America and the middle east. He is an author of numerous books to the topic, among them, “the Federal Intelligence Service Schnueffler without nose" (1993), “the Schattenkrieger. Klaus Kinkel and the Federal Intelligence Service" (1995) and “Undercover. The Federal Intelligence Service and the German journalists" (1998), Also he is head of research institute for peace policy - Forschungsinstitut f?r Friendenspolitik (Upper Bavaria).

He makes comments to Irina Borogan / Agentura.Ru / on very specific attitudes between the Russian and German secret services which have developed during Putin's presidential board:

- What’s your opinion about last spy scandal in Hamburg when Alexandre Kuzmin representative of Russian consulate had to go home? It is true, that chief of BfV personnaly visited chief of SVR Sergei Lebedev for asking him to take away Kuzmin? What do you think why this scandal can’t spoil relations between Russian and German secret services?

- During the cold war Mr. Kuzmin would have been expelled as a persona non grata without more ado. The reported fact that the chief of the BfV Mr. Fromm travelled to Russia to ask for the withdrawel of Kuzmin shows a special relationship between German and Russian intelligence services. But the relations are not as good as those with Germany’s old Nato-partners because if an officer of the CIA or British MI6 undertakes unfriendly activities in Germany there would be a secret bid to take him away.

From an intelligence point of view the “scandal” isn’t a scandal - only business as usual including the German-American attempts to recruit Kuzmin as a mole in GRU. That’s why the relations can not be spoiled by a few isolated cases especially if there is a political umbrella of strategic partnership.

- These relations seem to be very close. We see so many spy scandals in Germany related to Russian intelligence (In october 2003 Germans found two GRU moles, September 2004 – Parliament Comission was looking Russian mole in BND after book of Norbert Juretzko etc). But there is an impression these scandals don’t influence relations between special services. For example in 2000 BND director visited Chechnya, and it was very unusual, as I understand. In 2003 German counterintelligence has warned about opportunity of acts of terrorism of the Chechen terrorists in the Europe (and it was very profitable for Russia). What’s a nature of these relations?

- Indeed, the relations between the BND and its Russian partners – code-named SEQUOIA - are very good and getting better and better since in 1991 the exchange of legal representatives in the embassies was arranged. At first there were some irritations on the Russian side because Mr. Kretschmann, former chief of station in the Netherlands until 1982, in London from 1986 on and the first legal representative of the BND in Moscow wasn’t able to speak the Russian language. He was sacked in 1992 after failing to foresee the coup despite the fact that he as a member of the liberal party in Germany had the support of foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher.

Don’t mix up the mole cases. In the case when Volker Foertsch (until 1998 head of the security division of the BND and before for many years working against the Soviet Union) was said to be a mole I do not trust Norbert Juretzko – a former BND captain convicted for fraud. In my opinion an old boys network (former KGB-general Yurij Dosdrov and others) tried to take revenge for VIKTOR – the KGB colonel who spied for the BND with the case officer Mr. Foertsch from the early 70’s to 1985 – and to disrupt the BND.










On the other hand SWR and perhaps more GRU are spying in Germany especially in the field of economic espionage with about 130 intelligence officers. But the BND is doing the same in Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Remember the case when Christopher Lez – a teacher from the George-Marshall-Center in Bavaria – in September 2000 was arrested in Moscow, delivered to Minsk and there sentenced to 7 years in prison for being the German head of a spy network all over Eastern Europe. So no side can blame the other for doing the espionage job. Despite strategic cooperation the “Game of the Foxes” – as Ladislav Farago called the intelligence war in the 40’s – still goes on and also all the rabbits between Portugal and Poland, between Sweden and Romania try to play the same old game.
At the top level of the German and Russian intelligence services we found in the same time strong cooperation and support including the German warnings about Chechen terrorism you mentioned. And more. According to the Paris based INTELLIGENCE chancellor Gerhard Schr?der handed a BND report to Vladimir Putin, when the latter visited Berlin on February 10, 2003. This report contained the results of an investigation from the company IWR, which in behalf of the BND has been looking for the money of the former East German communist party, which disappeared shortly before Germany’s reunification. During this investigation IWR stumbled across the name of the Russian firm Avisma und the Menatep bank, main shareholder in Yukos. The report also detected money-laundering operations by Platon Lebedev and Alexej Golubovich, two cronies of Khodorkovski, and gave Russian officials the opportunity to put Lebedev under arrest in July and jail his boss in September. In this way the downfall of Putin’s main domestic enemy has been a success of German foreign intelligence.

- Has BND got any special opportunities in Chechnya? May be Russian and German secret services have any special joint antiterrorism programm?

- At first, BND traditionally has special opportunities in Afghanistan and some other Islamic countries which are important to analyze and fight terrorism in Russia. For example Al Zarqawi – deputy of Bin Laden and top terrorist in Iraq – recruited fighters in a camp near Herat (Afghanistan) for the rebels in Chechnya in summer 2000 and bought weapons for his operations from Chechnya. And Zarqawi’s accomplice in the Pankisi valley in Georgia Abu Ingila developed poison and chemical weapons there for the use against Russians. So the main German contribution to Russian counter-terrorism in Chechnya is providing facts on former Afghan “freedom fighters” hired by the CIA in the 80’s. When Mr. Hanning – then and now director of the BND – visited Chechnya in 2000 it was only the culmination of an ongoing cooperation.

Beside this the BND has some contacts to Chechen opposition groups in their exile.

Call it a program or not: German and Russian services exchange information on terrorism on a daily basis. Typically Mr. Kaundinya – from 1992 until 1998 the second chief of station in Moscow and now in New Delhi - was after his duty in the Russian capital for two years the head of counter-terrorismn in Pullach (Headquarters of BND).

- Btw, what do you think, why Al-Qaeda cells used Germany (Hamburg) as operative base for preparing 9/11? Not France, where are traditionnaly so many muslims, or Italy, but Germany? Is it a problem of BfV?

- Not to forget Spain as current trials show. At the time of Cold war Germany was the host nation for a lot of different Islamic groups: Algerians from the FIS, Persians who fled from the Shah and then those who left the country after the revolution in 1979, Afghan people from every wave after the political system changed there up to the Hizbollah. There was a silent arrangement that they could use Germany as a rest room as long as their activities are no threat for their host nation. After 9/11 the situation changed not without some American pressure. Instead of only keeping an eye on them they are now under strict control and some preventive pressure.

- How do you estimate level of competency of BfV now? I know in Cold war BfV was very weak. Has this situation changed?

- In some ways the BfV in its early years was a Disneyland-Gestapo concentrated on anti-communist activities in every field from counter-espionage (due to the moles in the organization without success) to propaganda (with some more success in the domestic area). The counter-espionage experts checked which postman might be a communist and they called it intelligence.

Despite the problems with the federalist structure of the 16 offices for the protection of the constitution and despite the insufficient information exchange with European partners by now the BfV seems to be successful in controlling the domestic terrorist threat.

- You are one of most respectable experts in Echelon problem and SIGINT, what do you think, why this subject now is not so popular as five years ago? What’s going on around Echelon and other attempts of Western governments to introduce total listening now?

- When the European parliament started the campaign against ECHELON supported by specialists as Duncan Campbell it was an attempt to stop or limit the activities of the anglo-saxon Big Brother. Governments in Western Europe gave some support to these efforts because they fear that it’s impossible to keep their own secrets - as seen in 2003 when the National Security Agency tapped all communication lines of the countries in the anti-Iraq-war-coalition.

But the “victims” of the signal intelligence of the United States are prevented by their own growing capacities and interests in this field from taking legal steps on the international stage to forbid such activities.

- Mr. Schmidt-Eenboom, your activity is well known in our country but we know nothing about you personally – as example there are some rumours you are former Stasi colonel. Is it true? Can you describe your biography?

I was born in 1953 in northern Germany. In 1973 I joined the German army and in my officer`s training course studied Science of Education and History at the Bundeswehr university in Hamburg. After 12 years of service in some anti-aircraft-artillery units I left the army in 1985 and began to work for the Forschungsinstitut f?r Friedenspolitik, a research institute of the peace movement.

I published various articles and books dealing with the strategy, infrastructure and troop force composition in NATO. Since May 1990 I have been Director of the Institute and concentrated my work on intelligence and security services in Europe, Japan and North America.

I’m always amused to hear that some people argue I must have been a former intelligence officer either in BND or in the MfS. That’s because they can’t imagine that investigative journalism is able to find out so many secret affairs.

- You had very active and oppositional position in Kosovo conflict and Balcan wars, have you got any problems with German services?

- I had problems for some years when in 1993 my book “Schn?ffler ohne Nase” appeared and in 1995 the next book on the former foreign minister and BND director Klaus Kinkel called “Der Schattenkrieger” (The Shadow Warrior) with a main point on the Balcan wars and their secret past history. But all the legal affairs with the BND and former BND officers have been without any success for them. For some years now the problems of phone tapping and slander are away and its possible to discuss affairs with former high ranking BND officers.

- Have you got any plans to publish your books in Russian?

- It’s my publisher’s task to look for translation. In 2004 I published together with Peter F. and Michael M?ller the book “Gegen Freund und Feind” (Against Friends and Enemies) in the Rowohlt publishing company. The work is the most comprehensive study on German foreign intelligence between 1947 and 2003. I think its worth stimulating public interest in Russia and we are open for any offer.


Courtesy : http://www.agentura.ru

The radicalisation of Muslim youth in Europe : Testimony of Claude Moniquet

The radicalisation of Muslim youth in Europe: The reality and the scale of the threat

Testimony of Claude Moniquet, Director General of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center

April 27, 2005

Hearing of the Committee on International Relations / Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging threats /

United States House of Representatives
1) An overview of the problem

For various reasons, it is quite difficult to draw a general view of Islamic extremism in Europe. This question has not yet been really addressed by academics, and we lack scientific data. Even the real number of Muslims living in Europe is open to question. For instance in France, various figures are circulating: 4 million, 5 million, 6 million or more.

But we could reasonably say that, without any doubt, the problem is real. Some concrete signs underline this reality:
Before 2000, it was extremely rare to see a public demonstration by Islamists in the streets of Europe. Since September 11, we have seen this kind of street
demonstration in countries like France and Belgium. Thousands of people took part in those demonstrations, for Instance one at the beginning of 2004 in Paris, to protest the law banning the Islamic veil from public schools;
Ten years ago, the Islamic veil was mainly worn by older women. Now at least half of the female Muslim population wear the veil. In some municipalities in France, the figure is about 80%. From field investigation we know that in most cases those girls and women didn’t really choose to wear the veil but were “forced” to do so by family or community pressure. In some European cities, a Muslim girl who refuses to wear the veil leaves herself open to insults, physical aggression, sexual harassment and even collective rape. In France, those aggressions happen regularly;
Before the end of the nineties, Islamist political parties didn’t exist in Europe. Now you can find them in France or Belgium. Of course, they're still small parties, with no representation in Parliament. But, to take the case of Belgium, in May 2003 the “Parti de la Citoyenneté et Prospérité” (PCP, “Party of Citizenship and Prosperity”) which advocates a radical Islam, won more than 8 000 votes in Brussels. If we reckon that approximately 200 000 Muslims live in Brussels, that means that approximately 4% of those people gave their vote to the PCP. Now, If we consider only old enough to vote, the figure is more than 4%. Last but not least, if we consider that most of the votes were registered in the same municipality, where approximately 50 000 Muslims live, that means that between 10 and 16% of those people gave their vote to a party advocating radical Islam;
Police and intelligence services know that fundamentalist and hate preaching are common in many mosques;
Youth associations acting as front organisations for the Muslim Brothers are extremely popular;
Since 2000 the number of anti-Semitic aggressions has dramatically increased;
these acts – hundreds of which have been recorded over the last 4 years – are mainly the work of young Muslims;
In schools attended by young Muslims, some kinds of teaching are becoming more and more difficult. For instance it’s quite impossible to teach the history of the Shoah; in biology, young men and girls openly question the theory of the origin of life and the evolution of species and humanity;
In the same schools there is frequently a de facto sexual segregation. For instance, in a class room it is common to see the boys grouping themselves in one part of the room and girls in the other;
In hospitals, the refusal of treatment by a man on a woman or by a woman on a man is becoming more and more common;
The Islamic presence in European prisons, where the Muslim population is frequently in the majority, is a reality observed in various countries;
Since September 11, hundreds of suspected terrorists have been arrested in Europe (in France, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands etc). But each week police arrest new suspects. This demonstrates that the number of people willing to go from ideas to action is growing;
Last but not least, dozens if not hundreds of young people – some very young – have been recruited since the summer of 2003 and sent to Iraq;

But the exact scale of the threat is still difficult to determine. The French domestic intelligence service, les Renseignements Généraux, has tried to establish a formula to calculate the number of fundamentalists in a given population. Based on an extensive screening of the French scene, the formula is as follows: normally, in a given Muslim population, we’d find an average of 5% of fundamentalists. And, of those 5%, 3% could be considered as dangerous. That means, if we take France and a Muslim population of 6 million people, we’d have 300 000 fundamentalists. And, of those fundamentalists, 9 000 are potentially dangerous.

The most exposed countries are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. Outside the European Union, Bosnia is at high risk.

Obviously, it is in those countries that we’ll find the highest number of Muslims. That doesn’t mean, of course, that the average Muslim population is fundamentalist or dangerous. Most Muslims, even if the trend of a return to the religion is clear and massive, want to live a normal and decent life. But of course, the presence of a large Muslim community offers both better statistical chances of recruitment and places to hide.

But countries that don’t have a large Muslim community are still not immune. I was told very recently that in Slovakia -- where there is virtually no Muslim community --, a propaganda and financing cell of Hezbollah is in place at the University of Bratislava.
2) The causes of Islamic extremism in Europe

The causes of Islamic extremism in Europe are many and various.

First; Muslim communities vary from one country to the next. In France, for instance, most Muslims are of Algerian descent, and as you know Algeria was a French colony for more than 130 years. In 1962, Algerian communities were established in France, and the number of Algerians grew as more came to Europe to find jobs and a better life.

After a few years, in the seventies, the French government authorized the “regroupement familial” (the reunion of families) and so hundreds of thousands of new immigrants were transplanted into France. In Belgium, Germany and Italy Muslim immigration was not traditional, but was brought about for economic reasons: in the sixties, heavy industry and construction sites needed a work force that was extremely difficult to recruit locally. That was the beginning of immigration in those countries.

When we speak of immigration, we use the concepts of First, Second and Third generation. The First generation is made up of people who initially came to Europe to work. They are now aged 60 or more. The Second generation is made up of the children of those people. They were born outside Europe and came at a very young age, or they were born in Europe. They are aged between 30 and 50. The Third generation is made up of the children of the Second generation. They were born in Europe and they are less than 30 years old.

Sadly we must observe that, historical or not, Muslim immigration was not welcomed in Europe. Racism and exclusion were a reality, and with the beginning of economic decline in the seventies, and the slowing of European economy, problems increased.

So today, parts of the Second and Third generations make no effort to integrate into European society and adopt European humanist values. But it has to be pointed out that, until very recently (in fact in the nineties) absolutely nothing was done to help them integrate. This is the European reality and the European shame. We must live with it and we are paying for it.

To be brief, we had no problems with the First generation. Most of the problems until the very recent past were concentrated in the Second generation, and we had no real intelligence on what was going on with the Third generation. But over the last three to five years, we have been receiving a lot of very negative signals from the Third generation. For instance: violence at school, the rejection of “European values” such as

sexual equality, etc.

There is not, obviously, a single explanation for the appearance of Islamic extremism in Europe. We could, nevertheless, try to work towards an explanation:
The lack of integration and racism lead to some Muslims feeling excluded from the society in which they live;
Some "lifestyles” (for instance polygamy or the birth rate) reinforce the rejection of the Muslim community by European society:
The economic and social crisis hit the Muslim communities very hard. If average unemployment in France or Belgium is around 10%, it is commonly 20% within Muslim communities and even 40% among Muslim youth – the famous “Third generation”. This reinforces the feeling of exclusion;
Democracy, globalisation and a communication culture give people in Europe direct access to information. Events in Bosnia, Somalia, Chechnya, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lead some young Muslims to create what the French sociologist Farid Khosrokhovar called “an identity of vicarious humiliation”. Feeling excluded in the country they're living in, they develop a kind of empathy with all the “Muslim victims in the world” and convince themselves that their own exclusion and the “persecution” of their brothers have the same roots: the rejection of Islam by the Western world;
Most Muslim clerics, even those who are not radicals, come from abroad and are frequently trained in Saudi Arabia or by Saudi clerics. They have no real knowledge of the societies in which their followers live and, often, as shown by investigations in France and the Netherlands, they don’t speak the local language. So they cannot take a role in easing tensions or helping integration;
Many European Muslims reject these clerics, accusing them of preaching an “Islam of the rich” and turn to non-official mosques. But this could be a bad idea: in what we call the “Islam of cellars and garages” (after the places where these informal communities meet) clerics are for the most part self-proclaimed. Their knowledge of religion is extremely questionable;
In all the countries concerned radical clerics took advantage of the above facts to advocate a radical Islam and to attack western values, or European and U.S. policy which they denounce as “anti-Muslim” or pro-Zionist;
They are helped by the presence in Europe (in the universities and high schools) of refugees who fled their native country because of repression for their Islamist activities. In the universities we find cells of Islamist or terrorist movements such as the Muslim Brothers, Hezbollah or Hamas, Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian or Turkish groups etc.
Some of the existing groups were created out of solidarity with “persecuted Muslims” in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia etc. In most cases, these movements were not spontaneous but were launched and manipulated by front organisations for the Muslims Brothers;
The “last generation” of European Islamism was born with the war in Iraq in 2003. This very young generation is starting to show up in various judicial inquiries into terrorist activities;
3) The reality of the threat

The threat is very real and is both political and terrorist.

On the political level, Islamists are trying to subvert western society by contesting humanist values such as sexual equality, freedom of religion, freedom of speech etc.

They advocate the creation of religion-based political parties, they advocate the creation of Sharia tribunals to judge civil and personal matters etc. They know, of course that they will not win those battles, but their hope is to create or deepen the cultural and social divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. The idea in doing so is to radicalise Muslim communities.

On the terrorist level, the Islamists organize logistical and operational cells. Here, we have quite precise facts and figures.

Since September 11, approximately twenty major terrorist attacks have been averted in Europe. Nevertheless, two terrorist actions were successful:
The Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004;
The murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004;
If we take the date of March 11, 2004 as a reference, we see that numerous attacks have been averted:
In April 2004, the action of the Belgian federal police prevented two attacks in preparation, one against a Jewish school in Antwerp, the other against an inauguration ceremony open to the public of a TGV tunnel in the same city;
In spring 2004, still in Madrid, an attack against the National Audience (the highest jurisdiction of the country, where the well known antiterrorist judge Baltazar Garzon works) was averted;
In June 2004, an attack of the GICM in Lisbon targeted several prominent people, among them José Manuel Baroso, president of the European Commission;
The HOFSTAD cell (responsible for the Van Gogh Murder) planned a series of attacks, in particular several targeted murders including that of Somali-born representative Ayaan Hirshi Ali – as well as attacks by booby-trapped vehicle or bomb on Parliament, the security service HQ, Schiphol airport etc. Only the dismantling of the cell following Van Gogh's murder prevented these criminal acts;
In November, 2004, several men were arrested in Germany while preparing the murder of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi;
Terrorists arrested in France as part of the so-called “Iraqi connection” had planned attacks on French soil, particularly on Jewish targets;
Etc.

This brief run-down, and the number and quality of the planned "targets" show clearly that, contrary to general understanding, striking Europe is still an objective for the Jihadists. And it is not only a question here of hitting European countries allied with the United States in Iraq, as too many Europeans think.

The attacks of March 11 were already being prepared in 2000-2001: at that time, the war in Iraq had not started, and Spanish troops were not present on the ground. When the National Audience was targeted, Spain had already withdrawn from Iraq. Besides, France or Belgium are not in Iraq and both condemned American intervention. Attacks were nevertheless planned in those two countries.

The "need" for the Jihadists to attack Europe is not innate in them, but it is bound to the essence of the old continent. Even if differences exist between the United States and Europe, these two entities, with some other countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea) belong to the same "camp" -- that of a "western world" (this qualifier having no ethnocentric character, which is why we can include Asian countries) which shares the same essential democratic values. It is these values which make us the "enemies" of the Islamists. Besides, even if not present militarily in Iraq, many European nations are or were in Afghanistan, and the European Union gave a political undertaking to the new Iraq to help in its reconstruction and stabilization.

These last twelve months also saw a "qualitative" evolution of the threat: more than ever, Islamism is asserting itself as a "mutant virus". Where since 2001 (and even before) security services faced terrorist structures mostly made up of experienced Jihadists, often with Afghan experience in common, between 25 and 40 years old, more and more we now find very young people, who by definition have no "past" in Islamist circles: French Jihadists killed or arrested in Iraq are from 18 to 20 years old; Samir Azzouz, one of the members of the "cell HOFSTAD" was 18 years old at the time of his arrest and was tracked down after he tried to go to fight in Chechnya at the age of 16. What we are now awaiting is the emergence of a new generation of terrorists: kids who were 12 to 15 years old on September 11 2001, and who have taken a year or two to make the same ideological progress that leads to violence, and which took around their elders ten years or more.

These small groups are more and more often made up of people with strong local ties, able thus to count on the solidarity of local communities and families. These groups are also connected to society's marginal groups and crime circles, which increases the danger they represent: "new Jihadists" have no problem getting hideouts, weapons or explosives. They are, despite their youth, initiated into the "underground" and have been used to thwart police traps. Occasionally, they manage even to infiltrate the law as organized crime does: one of the members of the HOFSTAD cell was employed as a translator by the AIVD, Dutch civil intelligence.

Finally, the "new" terrorist cells are even more imbricated than before: the HOFSTAD cell based in the Netherlands prepared its attacks while it was also involved in the economic planning of other attacks in Portugal or Spain. A fall in the average age, links with crime, and internationalization are all causes for anxiety among experts.

The threat against the interests of the United States from European terrorists is also very real. Of course, American interests in Europe (embassies, consulates, military personnel, hotels, American companies) are natural targets for Islamists. But there is more: most of the Second generation people and almost all of the Third generation now hold European passports. So these people can travel freely to the United States or anywhere else they want to. I don’t need to remind you that the September 11 attacks were planned in Germany, Great Britain and Spain. And I don’t need to remind you of the case of Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe-bomber”.
4) Links between European Islamists and Al Qaeda

I think a common mistake is to try to link each and every terrorist attack or plot to Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda had an “historical role” to play: to build an international terrorist coalition uniting dozens of organisations. Now that this has been achieved, an “International Islamist Terror” exists. And it is very effective. Information, arms and funds are exchanged among groups Moroccan, Algerian, Chechen, Pakistani, Saudi, Iraqi and other organisations. Often these organisations collaborate in very sophisticated projects.

The only role of Al Qaeda is to set the general framework of the Jihad, designate targets and give lawful authorization (Fatwa) to act. Of course all those organisations or most of them are or were linked to Al Qaeda at one time or another. They take part in the global Jihad “against the Jews and the Crusaders” but they concentrate also on their own local problems – just as Al Qaeda concentrates mainly for the moment on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and, of course, the United States.

Most of these cells were linked in the past to regional organisations such as the Algerian GIA or GSPC and the Moroccan GICM. But since 2003, with the appearance of the “new Jihadists”, we can see the arrival of new cells which are mostly not connected to those organisations, and are directly implanted in European society.
5) Ability to carry out attacks

All of these groups and cells must be considered able to carry out terrorist attacks. The fact that the majority of attacks in recent years failed means that police and intelligence services are working well, and not that the groups concerned are unable to carry out attacks -- even though we can sometimes see a kind of amateurism in their modus operandi, at the level of the security of the operations they plan to carry out.

More worrying: some of the failed attacks in Europe (in France and in Great Britain) were WMD attacks intending to use chemical products to produce high casualties. The intelligence we have – notably the fact that some suspected terrorists have shown great interest in recent years in nuclear facilities – suggests they are also thinking of using a “dirty bomb”.
6) Europe scores some successes but continues to act in a disorganized manner

Faced with these changes to the threat Europe, as a geopolitical entity, seems hardly any better-armed that it was a year ago. Certainly, the official rhetoric is everywhere the same: the fight against terrorism is a priority and numerous means are being deployed to face it. The reality is sometimes very different. For obvious reasons, I will not dwell on this aspect of things.

At the level of the European Union, progress was certainly made with the appointment of Gijs de Vries as antiterrorism coordinator, but the means he has been given are derisory and his mission essentially symbolic: in reality, antiterrorism remains a matter for the member states. Some work well, but others are not sufficiently aware of the reality of the danger. In any case, a major effort is needed to harmonize legislation and introduce more successful cooperation.
7) The threat will not diminish in the foreseeable future

Since March 11 2004, European intelligence and law enforcement services have been keeping up the pressure. Dozens of arrests have been made in Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and some other countries where GICM (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marrocain) networks were broken up. These arrests prevented several attacks, some of which could have had dramatic consequences.

The paradoxical result of this efficiency in the antiterrorist fight has been to anaesthetize part of European public opinion which, though shaken a year ago by the Madrid bombs, now thinks the threat is behind us "because nothing else has happened". Besides, the massacre of March 11 having been attributed to the fact that Spain was at the time an ally of the United States in Iraq, many people think being a national of a country which is not militarily present in Iraq is a guarantee against terrorism in itself.

Three different elements lead us to believe that the threat will not diminish by in the predictable future.

- The situation in Iraq is still a powerful factor for mobilization

The elections at the end of January marked an important stage in the evolution of Iraq, but the toughest part of the job has still to be done. The stabilization of Iraqi society must be stopped at all costs -- from the point of view of the Jihadists. Europe and NATO are committed to supporting this stabilization. To divert Europe from its commitment by the use of violence, and to isolate the new government and the coalition troops, is a strategic objective for the Islamists;

- Developments in Morocco are of real concern

The most well-established Islamist organisation in Europe -- and the most dangerous -- is at present the GICM. The group suffered losses in Europe and in Morocco, but the battle is far from being over in this country where numerous reforms are still needed to fight terrorism. Developments in Morocco in years to come will have a major influence on the situation in Europe. If terrorism is not eradicated, if it remains vigorous, the consequences will be seen on the old continent, and it would be because of the importance of Moroccan communities established there, within which terrorists can recruit new sympathizers.

- The " new generation " of Islamist terrorism in Europe is only starting to appear

This " new generation " of terrorism which we hinted at above has hardly begun to appear on the terrorist scene. Recruits come from the "Third generation" of immigration, who we know has identity problems and feels itself the victim of imperfect integration.

These problems can push many young people towards violence. We are then confronted with a new situation where diffuse and informal networks of young people who were born in Europe, who know it well and who have scores to settle, could serve as a relay to more structured international organizations, or even try to lead its own "jihad" to take revenge for the real or supposed humiliations felt by these young people. Given the current situation I have tried to describe to you, it's hard to be optimistic. The threat both against Europe and from Europe to the United States will remain at a very high level for the foreseeable future. And I’m afraid that a tragedy will be necessary to force the European authorities to face the reality of the problem and to really address the problem posed by Islamism.

The question, in my view, is no longer “if” a tragedy will happen, but “when” it will happen.

Crouching Tiger, Swimming Dragon

Crouching Tiger, Swimming Dragon
By NAYAN CHANDA

NY Times


FIVE hundred and ninety years after a Chinese fleet cast anchor at Hormuz, the Chinese are back in the Arabian Sea. When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China visited Pakistan last week, one of the many deals he signed was for the deepening of the port at Gwadar, whose Chinese-built facilities symbolize China's return to an area that was, briefly, a playground for its navy.

The port's just completed first phase - three berths that can accommodate very large ships - is relatively insignificant. But its projected size and strategic location have sent ripples of anxiety through Washington, Tokyo and New Delhi about the potential establishment of a permanent Chinese naval presence near the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's oil passes.

For the sake of regional stability, Beijing should forgo any ambitions to use Gwadar for its naval vessels. Yet China has valid reasons to help develop a commercial port that other powers must accept. Its return to the Indian Ocean is the logical outcome of its blazing economic growth, which the West has encouraged, applauded and profited from. A China that depends increasingly on imported oil transported great distances can justifiably seek commercial refueling and repair facilities, just as European powers dependent on far-flung coaling stations for their ships did in the 19th century.

For a brief time in the 15th century, China had the means, but no deep-rooted rationale, for overseas expansion. The Middle Kingdom's maritime glory can be traced to the personal enthusiasm of a single ruler, the Ming emperor Yongle, who dispatched 63 vessels to the Indian Ocean in seven waves. China's first and thus far only blue-water navy consisted of multimasted ships weighing 1,500 tons - Vasco da Gama's weighed only 300 tons - and carried 27,500 men up to the Persian Gulf and Africa's eastern shore.

Aside from battling pirates and pretenders to the throne, the fleet served primarily as a propaganda vehicle for the emperor. Chinese sailors dazzled Asian states with their technological and military prowess, transported barbarian envoys willing to pay tribute to the Son of Heaven, and brought home exotic products, from aphrodisiac rhinoceros horns to live giraffes. But the expeditions ended as suddenly as they had begun. By the time the Portuguese Navy appeared in the Indian Ocean in 1497, the Chinese had already gone home.

This time, China's thirst for energy is dictating its turn to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Since 1993 China has been a net oil importer; as its need has grown to 40 percent of total consumption, so has its dependence on oil from the Middle East. Eighty percent of China's oil imports pass through the Malacca Straits, the closing of which would wreak havoc upon the Chinese economy. To reduce this dependence, China has been working to build alternative supply routes through Myanmar to the south and Pakistan to the west. A road, and eventually a pipeline, from Gwadar could give China an alternative energy route that it urgently needs and spur the development of its westernmost provinces. Hence its plan to provide more than a billion dollars in aid and loan guarantees for building at Gwadar.

China's search for energy security also dovetails, however, with its long-term strategic effort to expand its regional influence and box in India. Analysts see Chinese-operated listening posts in Myanmar's Coco Islands, China's support for a port near Yangon for handling 10,000-ton ships (of which the Burmese have only a few) and another deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in western Myanmar, Chinese aid to the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong and plans to improve Cambodia's Sihanoukville as part of an incremental effort to build a "string of pearls" presence on the Indian Ocean rim.

Many believe it is only a matter of time before the Chinese Navy, much strengthened by recent purchases of ships and technology, arrives in Gwadar. Pakistani officials boast that Gwadar's Chinese connection will help to frustrate India's domination of regional waterways. A Chinese maritime presence in the area would enable the mainland to monitor naval patrols by the United States and protect Chinese sea lines of communication. China Economic Net, an online news outlet sponsored by China's leading business paper, calls Gwadar "China's biggest harvest."

The fact remains, however, that with the exception of the Chinese "fishing trawlers" occasionally found mapping the ocean floor (information needed by submarines), the Chinese Navy has yet to show up. So for now, instead of raining on China's parade at Gwadar, India and the United States should welcome China's contribution to expanded maritime commerce and the additional sense of security that Beijing might derive from it. The port at Gwadar will be a boon to the regional economy; and to deny China's need for a secure oil supply while pumping billions of dollars into China to produce more gas-guzzling cars is both illogical and, in an indirect but palpable way, hostile. China should be left in no doubt, however, that using the Gwadar port for its military would increase tensions and weaken the energy security that it ostensibly seeks. Checking its frigates and submarines at the door would be a good way for China to ensure that others are also able to enjoy the party.

Nayan Chanda, a former editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, isthe editor of YaleGlobal Online.

June 17, 2005

Balochis in North America to Lobby in Capitals and in UN

With calls for freedom in Balochistan , baloch diaspora , younger generation in particular is doing its best along with their older folks ,to make their voice heard in the world capitals . This generation is educated , highly organized and are making a major PR dent in Middle East , Europe using Internet , Radio and other modern communications . Having realised that Balochis are very weak in North America, younger generation is comming forward to form an organization for lobying in US and Canada .

IntelliBriefs sources say their baloch leaders in America are forming an organization called Baloch Society of North America (BSONA) . Their leaders say "the main goal of this Organization will be to Unite and Organize all the Baloch in North America and Lobby for the Baloch Cause in US, Canada and in United Nation. Our Goal is to expose the Paki/Irani Occupation/oppression of Baloch land and to bring the human right violations in Balochistan into the world Notice."

The organization will be a democratic with Balochi and American Democratic traditional Values. There will be Limit for the Terms of Office and everybody will have an opportunity to lead, sources said . "We will use all democratic means to introduce and farther our Baloch cause in North America. Aug 12-14th we will have our First General Body meeting in Washington Dc. This will be the first meeting and we will elect the office bearers. The Logos, banners and the official website is under construction and will be ready by then too." said an activist who lives in US .

We have to wait and watch reaction of Pakistan ,to these new developments that are taking place among Baloch diaspora in world capitals . In Oman , where baloch community is very strong have started talks with influential members . Now with Pakistan as an alley of US in "War on Terror" , and US which do not like to see Chinese presence in strategic Gawadhar Port in Balochistan , will definitely play major role in future. Analysts predict tough times for pakistan in commming years .

Shift in Spying Money to Agents From Satellites Is Sought

By SCOTT SHANE

NYTIMES.com

WASHINGTON, June 14 - Arguing that satellites are consuming too much of the intelligence budget, the House Intelligence Committee is proposing a major shift of financing away from costly space-based spying to bolster the ranks of agents and analysts.

While details and dollar amounts of the cuts to satellite programs are classified, the committee said in a report that the spending recommendations it is sending to the House floor would "significantly reposition funding from technical programs to human intelligence and analysis."

The report, attached to the intelligence reauthorization bill, said the administration's budget request is "weighted far too heavily toward expensive technical systems." The committee called for eliminating "redundant or unjustified technical collection systems" while increasing investment in human intelligence.

The committee said it was proposing more spending on training and infrastructure to support spies, as well as increasing efforts to recruit and train linguists skilled in Arabic, Chinese, Pashto, Urdu and other languages.

"We're out of balance," Representative Peter Hoekstra, a Michigan Republican and chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said in an interview. "Technical intelligence is very expensive and it can be very, very helpful. But we felt we had overlapping and duplicative technical programs, and we believe we're coming up short on humint," or human intelligence.

In a speech on Tuesday, Mr. Hoekstra said some of the programs the committee has marked for "termination" have been plagued with problems for years. Officials from the National Reconnaissance Office, which develops and launches spy satellites, have admitted that the programs have been poorly managed, with flaws in contracting and engineering, he said, but they have told him, " 'Don't worry, Pete, when we get it up in space, it's going to work.' Are you kidding me?"

The scale and pace of the proposed cuts to satellite programs drew a muted protest from the Democratic minority on the Intelligence Committee, led by Representative Jane Harman of California.

"We support the efforts to confront hard choices in technical programs," said a dissenting report signed by eight of the committee's nine Democrats. "However, we think it is unwise to make sudden, drastic cuts to programs absent a more thorough technical review."

Moving too quickly, the Democrats said, could "cause a gap in our capabilities and diminish the industrial base so critical to fielding the technology against current and future threats."

John Pike, an intelligence analyst and the director of GlobalSecurity.org, a private research group, said the reference to "industrial base" was a reminder of the huge stakes in the budget debate for the companies that build satellites and their payloads. "It means they're trying to save some contractor's program from getting cut," Mr. Pike said.

Ms. Harman said her Southern California district is "the intelligence satellite capital of the universe." She said the government has an interest in ensuring the survival of the three companies that make such satellites - the Boeing Company, the Northrop Grumman Corporation and the Lockheed Martin Corporation - because competition among them produces innovation and lower prices.

The Intelligence Committee's proposal appears to reflect the thinking of the presidential commission on intelligence regarding unconventional weapons, which said in its March 31 report that "cost overruns in satellite systems tend to suck resources from the rest of the intelligence budget."

The presidential commission, headed by Charles S. Robb, a former Democratic governor and senator, and Laurence H. Silberman, a senior federal judge, said that "increasingly, there are air-breathing alternatives to satellite surveillance."

The commission listed "tough choices" on satellite systems, which cost billions of dollars and must be planned years in advance of deployment, as one of the major strategic decisions facing the director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte, who took office in April. It said Mr. Negroponte should tackle the issue "early in his tenure."

The debate over the proper balance between satellites, which can take pictures or eavesdrop on communications, and traditional human spying dates to the 1960's. But since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, many intelligence experts have argued that recruiting agents to infiltrate terrorist organizations is of greater value in preventing attacks than anything satellites can do.

"I think there's been a real imbalance," said John F. Lehman, a former Navy secretary and a member of the commission on the Sept. 11 attacks. "Certainly leading up to 9/11 and to a certain extent afterward, there have been the forces of contractors and jobs behind the big technical collection systems."

He said the growth of satellite systems was also driven by the revelation during the 1970's and 80's of abuses and other unsavory actions on the part of Central Intelligence Agency case officers. "There was a feeling that satellites allowed us to get out of the dirty, messy business of spying," Mr. Lehman said.

Jeffrey T. Richelson, who has written several books on intelligence collection, said the committee's report was too vague to determine what programs could face reductions. He said several programs, including one called "Future Imagery Architecture," as well as programs using space-based radar and infrared, were possibilities.

Dr. Richelson said that while spies and satellites are often discussed as alternatives, they work best together. In assessing nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, he said, a satellite picture can raise suspicions of illicit activity and then help guide an agent on the ground to have a closer look.

Sonia Gandhi is nixing the PM's authority, or so it appears.

1. Why she had to take a charter Plane instead of commercially availabel plane
2. She has misused ececutive previlege .
3. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh cancelled attendance at G-77 . Is he providing escort service to Sonia Gandhi ?
4. According to protocol, the Prime Minister can only see off the President, vice-president, or visiting foreign dignitary, usually not less than head of government. So what was he doing at the airport when Sonia was leaving?

Plane trouble

Sonia Gandhi is nixing the PM's authority, or so it appears.

From : INDIA REACT

16 June 2005: If the two Ambani brothers, Mukesh and Anil, had not been fighting one another so much, Sonia Gandhi perhaps may have been spared the embarrassment of her use of a Reliance Bombardier jet on a trip to Russia, which was splashed all over the papers. It was infernal bad luck for her that the brothers are at each other's neck, because the leak of the story came from one of them, but whoever hired or ordered the aircraft to carry her also did not appreciate the full consequences of it, and they will sting the ruling UPA coalition for a long time.

It is good that the Congress treasurer, Motilal Vora, clarified an advance of Rs 12 lakh was paid to Reliance, and one hopes this is true, because it makes the case a little less black against Sonia and the party. The party can argue that requisitioning an IAF plane was out of question, since Sonia is not entitled to it, and only the Reliance Bombardier fitted the requirements of a long journey, but it still does not answer the question, why did she have to charter any aircraft, if it was not commercially available? Why couldn't she have taken a commercial flight for an essentially private visit to Russia?

The argument that she is not in the government does not hold, because one, she is a public servant, by virtue of being an MP, two, she holds a cabinet minister's rank as chairperson of the UPA's coordination committee, and three, she is president of the Congress, the principal ruling party in the Central coalition government. There is a straightforward case of conflict of interest here. She cannot be associated with or appear to be taking favours of any industrial house, including Reliance. Like Caesar's wife, to use the hated expression, she must be above suspicion. Paid or unpaid, the use of the Reliance Bombardier constitutes a misuse of executive privilege, in a fair reading of executive privilege as applies to her.

The second issue is the foreign minister, Natwar Singh, providing a manner of escort service to her. Natwar apparently cancelled attendance at a G-77 meeting in Doha to accompany Sonia to Russia. This is unacceptable in itself, and generally. The Congress party says that he went with her in her capacity as UPA chairperson, but this does not stand scrutiny. Neither is her visit to Russia official, as it cannot be, and she holds no obvious position in government. She is not in the Union Cabinet, and being de facto prime minister is not the same as being sworn to that job. What official business has Natwar Singh conducted or had planned to conduct in Russia accompanying Sonia Gandhi? There are a lot of trip wires on Sonia's Russia visit, and nothing that the Congress party says or does will explain or justify them. They are plainly unjustifiable.

The last concerns prime minister Manmohan Singh seeing her off to Moscow, at the dead hour of three am, in a bizarre and spectacular breach of protocol. According to protocol, the PM can only see off the President, vice-president, or visiting foreign dignitary, usually not less than head of government. So what was he doing at the airport when Sonia was leaving?

The UPA chairperson argument does not wash, because as one holding a cabinet minister's rank, she comes far below him in the order of precedence, indeed nowhere in comparison. The PM's aides say Manmohan Singh can break protocol, but it is not for him to make or break it. The protocol attaches to his office, to his position, giving it preeminence as head of the government. If Manmohan Singh does not care to be a "prisoner" of protocol, as his aides say, he is free to quit, but the protocol is not for him to breach. Imagine the true horror of a prime minister, the head of government, going to see off his party president. How much more should the prime minister's office be devalued?

It is bad enough that Sonia is considered the power behind the throne, the ultimate arbiter of government policy, at whose pleasure the ministers remain. It is an open secret that Manmohan Singh is not at liberty to hire and fire his ministers. Much as he wants to reshuffle some ministers and drop others, an awaited and hotly-discussed cabinet change last week did not materialise.

And now, we have Mani Shankar Aiyar, the petroleum minister, making extraordinary statements on the doomed Iran-India-Pakistan gas pipeline project in relation to the US, our strategic partner. Mani Aiyar said he was unfazed by the US opposition to the project. "I am unfazed," he said, "especially because my friend and Cambridge college mate, Pakistani foreign minister Khurshid Kasuri, had given a befitting reply in Washington."

What is this Mani Aiyar is running? A college debating society? Why cannot somebody gag him?

All this crumbling of cabinet governance, and the erosion of the prime minister's authority (Intelligence, "PM angry at being ignored by ministers," 13 June 2005), falls into a pattern of systems breakdown. At a camp of young Congress MPs, JNU professors were teaching them how to oppose the BJP. Weren't service rules breached in doing so? For the commissioning of India's largest and super-sensitive naval base, INS Kadamba, in Karwar, defence minister Pranab Mukherjee took along Sonia Gandhi. It is a small mercy that she herself did not inaugurate the naval base as planned.

It is easy but at the same time escapist to blame Manmohan Singh for not standing up and hope for the UPA to end his misery by collapsing from its internal contradictions, but a weak Centre is in no one's interest. And it is the Centre which is growing weak by the daily erosion of the PM's power. The UPA chairperson should realise that she is growingly seen as the one responsible for nixing the PM's authority. Much as her advisors may spin, it brings her no credit, and all the blame.

Israel Air Force Transforms to Engage in War Against Terrorism

Source : http://www.aviationweek.com/

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) went through major changes in recent years, transforming operational tactics and elevating the level of cooperation between the combat forces and the Israel Securities Authority (ISA). This evolution was necessary to improve the continued war against Palestinian terror. Some of the Israel Air Force’s (IAF) insights will be provided today by Brig. General Ido Nehushtan, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, IAF at the Paris Air Show.

“Our combat against Palestinian terror is a conflict between two learning networks. We had to adapt and adjust our systems while the enemy modified their tactics as they learned from our activities and patterns of operation,” said Nehushtan. “A basic lesson we drew was the importance of preemption. We cannot wait until suicide bombers are on their way to the target or rockets are launched at our cities. We proved that the level of terrorist acts was dramatically reduced when we pursued them ranging from where they operate, to where commanders and planners are lurking at their hideouts in the cities. Such engagements require very precise and actionable intelligence, clear proof of the target’s intent, and surgical response with the measured effect necessary to neutralize the target without causing collateral damage.”

Performing in such activities was not what the IAF anticipated. Nehustan explained that the target characteristics of urban warfare, especially air warfare, are very challenging. “This is one of the most complex conflicts we’ve fought in,” said Nehushtan. Unlike general perceptions of “low-tech” threat, the IAF faces stealthy and evasive targets far more complex than conventional military targets. The enemy has the potential to cause considerable harm in many ways. Threats are not restricted to surface-to-air missiles and gunfire, but include risks caused by inadvertent collateral damage that could have strategic implications as well as negative reactions among local and international opinion.

Another challenge is posed by the terrain. “Distinct topographical features make urban warfare significantly more difficult than open terrain,” maintained Nehushtan. Clutter and irregularity of objects make navigation, orientation and coordination problematic. Complex operational restrictions and self-imposed rules of engagement are implemented to safeguard sensitive areas such as schools, hospitals, holy places, etc. In return, terrorists, who rarely abide to “war ethics,” tend to exploit such restrictions to establish “human shields” as they operate in or under civilian occupied buildings. “One can hardly define a clear ‘terrorist infrastructure target’ that can be attacked from the air,” said Nehustan. Such targets may reside in a specific room, which must be attacked from specific angles with highly accurate weapons, developing limited effect, devastating the target itself but without causing damage beyond it.

Such operations depend on actionable intelligence from real-time sensors, providing persistence and fast response to emerging opportunities. “Intelligence is not sufficient in itself. Target behavior is an issue that must also be considered,” stated Nehushtan. “Those under constant pursuit adapt with evasive behavior and expose themselves for very short time fractions. The window of opportunity to strike such targets may last only a few seconds, far below anything the military organization was prepared for in the past.”

Nehushtan considers several key capabilities necessary for effective air operations in urban areas. “Since modern terrorism resides and operates in urban surroundings, one must face it in such environments. Persistence is a key for effective engagement, keeping the enemy constantly on the defensive,” explained Nehushtan. Such activity requires full integration between intelligence, ground, air and special forces to ensure rapid engagement of time-critical targets (within seconds), without causing collateral damage to friendly forces and non combatants. To enable such rapid decisions, the IDF established “short decision cycles” employing highly skilled and experienced representatives from all relevant entities, who are familiar with the area and understand the implications of each mission. They can choose the physical means, location, intelligence opportunity and time for creating an effect without unnecessary damages.

Employing airpower has proved highly effective since mid-2003, after the IAF implemented efficient measures to control the signature and effect of its missions while assuming more responsibility within joint network operations. Adaptations were made to most platforms and weapons, preparing them for superior performance in the new mission profile. “We should be able to choose our means, weapons and effect from a pound to a ton,” said Nehushtan. At the beginning of this conflict the IAF did not have suitable ordnance to strike with required pinpoint precision in such restricted terrain modes. This shortfall, according to Nehushtan, has vanished. “We modified our systems, originally built for full-scale wars, introducing necessary changes and adaptations that now enable our improved performance and capabilities in both high-intensity and low-intensity warfare scenarios.” —Tamir Eshel

How Terrorists hide from patrolling UAVs ?

Paris 2005: Curtains for UAVs: terrorists go domestic to cover narrow streets

UV Online has just watched some revealing video from an Arab TV station in which masked, Kalashnikov-toting gunmen described to an interviewer how they hide from patrolling UAVs by covering narrow streets with curtain material, a classic vignette of asymmetric warfare in which high and low technology go head-to-head and the ‘weaker’ side learns fast and can adapts its tactics daily.

The clip was part of a briefing about air power in urban warfare given by Brigadier General Ido Nehushtan, here in Paris. Brig Gen Nehushtan is the Chief of the Air Staff and Deputy Commander of the Israel Air Force. He is also tipped as its next C-in-C.


Other clips showed terrorists firing rockets and mortars out of windows and holes in walls made for the purpose. They rarely fire from open ground any more because they’ve learned the hard way how easily they become targets. A small, simple but lethal rocket takes two or three minutes to carry up from the basement, set up and fire says Nehushtan, so catching the perpetrators in the act and killing them while not killing the ‘uninvolved’ is extremely difficult, but not impossible he says: ‘If you can shorten the kill chain to 45 seconds to a minute, you are in business, and I believe we can do that.’

June 16, 2005

Satellite phones, detonators seized at IGI airport

Pramod K Singh/ New Delhi

http://www.dailypioneer.com/indexn12.asp?main_variable=front%5Fpage&file_name=story5%2Etxt&counter_img=5

16th June 2005

A huge consignment of high-capacity and activated satellite
phones, wireless sets and large number of detonators to be used by various
terrorist outfits in the Kashmir valley, was seized at the Indira Gandhi
International (IGI) airport on Wednesday. The seizure was made by the
Customs' Preventive Unit. The consignment had landed up at the cargo complex
of the IGI on June 8 from Jeddah in Saudia Arabia and was to be delivered at
Srinagar.


The IGI airport had been put under high alert after the May 22 twin
blasts in the capital.

Intelligence sources said there was a specific input about the
consignment of Thuraya satellite phones and surveillance was maintained.
Security agencies at the IGI were alerted. After the consignment was
off-loaded at the IGI airport, the presence of 40 satellite phones, dozens
of high frequency wireless sets, detonators and powder like substance were
confirmed during packet mapping. The powder-like substance appears to be a
lethal plastic based explosive, the sources added.

The concerned agencies were waiting for its receiver and an intense
investigation was launched to ascertain the identity of those who were the
recipients.

Mohammad Amin Khan, a resident of Srinagar, approached the Customs
officials on Wednesady to claim the consignment. He was immediately taken in
custody for questioning, the sources said.

Pakistan-sponsored terrorist outfits operating in the Kashmir valley
have been using satellite phones to avoid detection, since many of their
wireless and telephonic conversations were intercepted by the security
agencies. Intercepting satellite phone is almost impossible as it could be
used from any location in the world. Most importantly, the signals emanating
from satellites keep changing, thus making it difficult from being
intercepted, the sources maintained.

It may be recalled that the Special Cell of Delhi Police had recovered
a Thuraya satellite phone after it killed two Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
terrorists near Pragati Maidan last month. The investigation had revealed
that the phone was activated somewhere in Middle East and then it was taken
to Pakistan and then further passed over to LeT operatives in the Valley.
The investigations by the counter intelligence agencies were intensified
after this, they said.