August 12, 2005

Abdul Qadeer Khan's Son-in-law held for assulting 2 British Diplomats

Son-in-law of disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan held in connection with an assault on two British diplomats
Media Release
Aug. 12, 2005


Pakistani police have detained the son-in-law of disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in connection with an assault on two British diplomats, police and officials said on Friday.

Businessman Saad Ali Khan is being held in police custody after the Britons -- a woman and a man -- were attacked early on Sunday near the atomic expert's home in an exclusive area of Islamabad, they said.

"Saad Ali Khan is in police custody. A case of beating, intimidation and threats has been registered," a Pakistani police source said on condition of anonymity.

The British High Commission (embassy) in the Pakistani capital said the two victims required medical treatment after the "vicious and unprovoked attack".

"I can confirm that two members of British diplomatic staff were attacked in the early hours of Sunday morning in a residential area of Islamabad," said spokesman Simon Smart. "At present police are investigating."

The spokesman would not comment on reports that the attack may have been linked to tensions caused by the investigation into the July 7 bombings in London.

Three of the four suicide bombers were British nationals of Pakistani origin and at least two visited Pakistan in the months before the deadly blasts, which killed 52 people.

A national hero in Pakistan, where he is regarded as the father of the country's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted in 2004 that he had leaked atomic secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

The 69-year-old is currently under virtual house arrest. Pakistan's military ruler President Pervez Musharraf has refused to allow international investigators to question him.

August 11, 2005

HINDU VOICE DAILY LAUNCHED

From :

The Editor,
Hindu Voice


Dear Friends,

Sometime back a lot of discussions was going on, on the internet, about starting
a Daily newspaper to promote the Hindu cause. Serious efforts were also made by
a few, but the project could not take off and discussions remained only at the
desktop level.

In order to fulfil this long felt need of a Daily newspaper, I have decided to
take the plunge. Hindu Voice Daily will be launched from 19th August 2005. It
will be a English Morning Tabloid, initially with 8 pages, priced at Re.1/- per
copy. Arrangements have been made to distribute the Daily through stalls all
over Mumbai and its suburbs. (Outside Mumbai, it will be available against
subscription, sent by post once in a week - One year subscription Rs.500/-
US$40; 3-year Rs.1,250/- $100; 10-year Rs.4,000/- $300, payable to "Hindu
Voice").

Hindu Voice will be published Daily, i.e. 6 days a weeks (Mon-Sat.), giving news
and views. Hindu Voice Daily, like Hindu Voice Monthly, will be independent,
voicing the concerns of Hindus all over the world. Hindu Voice is not affiliated
with any organisation. But it will work in tandem with all Hindu organisations.

At a time when the word 'Hindu' is a taboo, Hindu Voice will strive to educate
our Hindu brethren of the real meaning of the words like Hindutva,
Fundamentalism, Secularism, Communalism, etc. Hindu Voice Daily will be on the
forefront to awaken the conscience of Hindus, echo Hindu sentiments and
fearlessly represent the Hindu cause.
Hindu Voice is not an opulent product of an affluent Business House, as is the
case with many newspapers. It comes from a commoner, committed to our National
cause. It needs the sustained support of Hindu intellectuals, industrialists,
authors and journalists, for its survival and growth.

By launching the Hindu Voice Daily, I have made a small beginning. Now it is for
the Hindu society at large to make it not only grow but also thrive so that
similar editions can be started from many other centres too (a distant dream)
and the dream of many noble Hindus can become a reality.

You can also contribute news, views and articles to Hindu Voice, sitting at your
home, whether in Mumbai, India or anywhere in the world. While reading your
favourite newspaper, whether English or vernacular, look for news concerning
Hindus. If you feel that a news is of particular interest to Hindus or
Hindustan, just send it to us by email at - hinduvoice@vsnl.net or
hinduvoice@mtnl.net.in. We will publish such news in Hindu Voice, with due
credit to you. This way you will be acting as our Local Reporter, and will be
treated as a part of our editorial team.

Further, if you are finding any article or write-up in any newspapers or any TV
programmes offending Hindu sentiments or national interests (and you will find
lot of them), you can immediately send a rejoinder. Hindu Voice would love to
publish such rejoinder, and expose the anti-national newspaper/TV channel. The
idea is to repay them in their own coin.

Let us abandon our indifferent attitude to problems affecting Hindu society, and
race ahead with faith in our cause. Where there is a will there is a way. What
is there that a Hindu cannot do - if he has the faith?. Come, join me in this
mission.

P. Deivamuthu
Editor, Hindu Voice
4, Alakjyoth, Aarey Road
Goregaon East, Mumbai 400063, India.
Tel: 022-28764418, 28764460, 28742812
Email: hinduvoice@vsnl.net and hinduvoice@mtnl.net.in

Sonia Gandhi should apologize not Manmohan , Now heat is on Modi

Delhi Power circle and political strategists are actively planning their campaign to overthrow Modi , after PM's apology .The PM Manmohan Singh has apologized to the Sikhs on behalf of the Congress ,he (Manmohan Singh) said in the parliament that 4,000 people had been killed in ‘this great national tragedy’ in 1984.

But the people who really should apologize are the Gandhi family , Sonia Gandhi in particular . A Gandhian Congress leader who wished to remain anonymous told IntelliBriefs over phone that "how does it square with the Mahatma's AHIMSA which they claim to represent? "

If at all Manmohan has to apologise , he should apologize to the RSS for blaming the RSS for the anti-Sikh riots in the 1999 elections which he lost. Now the Congress camp is burning midnight oil to plan a strategy to overthrow Mr.Modi , where in the past they have failed , that ired Madam Sonia Gandhi , a source said .

Secular campaign against Modi has failed miserable because of the latest figures revealed in the Rajya Sabha that 254 Hindus and 790 Muslims were killed in the post Godhra riots in Gujarat by (Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal) , contrary to the 2000 figure by Anti-Modi campaigners .

According to our Sources the next target is Gujarat Chief Minister Mr.Narendra Modi, though there is no comparison between the calculated terror let lose by the Congress against the Sikhs, and the reaction to the Godhra massacre.

IntelliBriefs have learnt that both camps ( Hindutva and Congress ) have activated their intelligence network , "IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREPAPRE FOR THE COMING CAMPAIGN AGAINST MODI " , said a hindutva strategist . More serious than the attack on Modi is the equating of anti-Sikh riots with the Gujarat jihad. Godhra was a Jihad that failed, unlike the Moplah Rebellion and the Calcutta Killings which were Jihads that succeeded.

Number of Paramilitary personnel who died while fighting terrorists

The number of Paramilitary personnel who died while fighting terrorists on/close to borders during last three years as disclosed by Junior Home Minister in the parliament :



Ex-gratia @ 7.5 lakhs to those who died in action and @ Rs. 5 lakhs to those killed on duty have been sanctioned.

The compensation, awards etc to paramilitary and military personnel are governed by different set of rules.

FENCING OF THE BORDERS : Why it has not been completed

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
RAJYA SABHA
UNSTARRED QUESTION NO 1823
TO BE ANSWERED ON 10.08.2005


FENCING AT BORDERS .


1823. SHRI PYARELAL KHANDELWAL
CHHATTRAPAL SINGH LODHA


Will the Minister of HOME AFFAIRS be pleased to state:-


(a) whether the work pertaining to fencing of the borders of the country has not been completed;

(b) if so, the reasons therefor;

(c) the total length of fencing in kilometers erected at border till May, 2005; and

(d) by when fencing is likely to be completed in the remaining parts of the borders?


ANSWER


MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

(SHRI S. REGUPATHY)

(a) & (b): The fencing work of the borders has not yet been completed due to following reasons:

(a) Resistance by Bangladesh Rifles to the construction of fencing within 150 yards from international border.

(b) Delay in land acquisition.

(c) Limited working season due to heavy rain.

(d) Difficult terrain.

(e) Water logging for the better part of the year.

(f) Delay in forest clearance.

(c) & (d) : 1948.95 Kms. of fencing along Indo-Bangladesh border and 1752.42 Kms. of fencing along Indo-Pak border has been completed till May, 2005. The work in remaining parts excluding certain stretches in Mizoram Sector is likely to be completed by December, 2006.

INFILTRATION OF TERRORISTS IN DELHI , QUESTION raised IN Indian Parliament

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS RAJYA SABHA
UNSTARRED QUESTION NO 1803
TO BE ANSWERED ON 10.08.2005


1803. SHRI MANGANI LAL MANDAL
V. NARAYANASAMY


Will the Minister of HOME AFFAIRS be pleased to state:-


(a) whether it is a fact that the terrorists killed by the security forces in Ayodhya were living in Kishangarh alongwtih other localities of Delhi;

(b) whether it is a fact that lot of ISI agents and terrorists were arrested in Delhi and Noida region during last few months;

(c) if so, whether Government are finding security lapse since there is a large scale infiltration of terrorists into the capital city of Delhi; and

(d) what specific measures Government are taking to stop the entry of terrorists in Delhi and other surroundings areas?


ANSWER


MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

(SHRI S. REGUPATHY)

(a): One of the terrorists, namely, Yunus Khan who was killed in Ayodhya, is reported to have resided as a tenant in Village Kishan Garh, New Delhi.

(b): Five terrorists have been killed in encounters and 34 terrorists and 2 ISI agents arrested by Delhi Police up to 15th July, 2005. Information about arrest of terrorists in Noida is being collected and will be laid on the Table of the House.

(c): Delhi has a mixed population and a large number of people migrate to Delhi from other States every year and live in Delhi as tenants. Despite the efforts made by Delhi Police, a number of such tenants remain unverified as the house owners fail to inform the local police. As a result of this, anti-social elements/terrorists at times are successful in hiding themselves without being detected.

(d): The steps taken by Delhi Police to prevent entry of terrorists into Delhi include:
(i) sensitization of public through the print and electronic media; (ii) checking of guesthouses, hotels, religious places etc. in certain areas where terrorist elements could take shelter; (iii) checking of tenants, particularly in new and developing areas; (iv) surprise checking of vehicles plying in the city and those arriving from J&K, Punjab etc. at Azad Pur Mandi and Okhla Subzi Mandi; (v) close interaction with the State and Central Police Organizations for exchange of information; etc.

As regards entry of terrorists in surrounding areas of Delhi, necessary action is taken by the local administration of concerned State Governments.

August 10, 2005

India’s long-term benefit

The Friday Times www.TheFridayTimes.com
72 FCC Gulberg 4, Lahore, Pakistan
Ph: 92-42-5763510, Fax: 92-42-5751025,
tft@lhr.comsats.net.pk

August 5-11, 2005 - Vol. XVII, No. 24

India’s long-term benefit
Ejaz Haider

The US-India nuclear pact has come in for a lot of stick in India as well as the United States. This was predictable. American non-proliferationists fear, not without reason, that rewarding India for flouting an international norm will lead to the demise of the non-proliferation regime. But India could not have struck gold without the Bush administration. So we have two sets of interests here, those of the US and of India, and at least at this point some of them converge.

A good starting point on how the US wants to – or should – deal with India in the coming years is contained in Ashley Tellis’ monograph, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). In a nutshell, Tellis, an Indian-American scholar, has recommended that the US prop India up as a major power in the region and the Indian Ocean. Not only can the two countries have economic relations, but Washington, by enhancing India’s nuclear and conventional military prowess, can hope to have India by its side in the new strategic game that is unfolding from the Middle East to West, Central and South Asia to Southeast Asia and onwards to the Far East.

Of course, Tellis is prepared to live with the contradictions of granting India nuclear legitimacy on the basis of the US and Indian interests. India can also be put up as a counter to China, a theme that resonates nicely with most neo-conservative strategic thinkers. Tellis has been efforting to increase the salience of India in the US since 1998 when India tested its nuclear potential. His book on India’s nuclear capability ( India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal ) and the path it will take, his stint as advisor to Ambassador Robert Blackwill and his time at the National Security Council mean he has contributed significantly to the evolving US policy on India.

Of course, much of what has happened, and is likely to happen, is also linked with the Bush administration’s global strategic thinking. In policy terms that thinking is perched on the use of force, both in the pre-emptive and preventive senses. The moral hazards of this policy are clear from the two different cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. While on Afghanistan, the US had a legitimate casus belli , Iraq offered the problem of jus ad bellum . The Bush administration might have tried to pass it off as a pre-emptive war but it was squarely in the category of a preventive war, which bears a heavier moral cross than pre-emption. The UN system did not come to the rescue of the US and, therefore, Washington decided to by-pass the UN with the concept of a "coalition of the willing".

Since the US is not prepared to review its policy of taking the war to the adversary, it requires allies that can help it do things outside the UN framework.

But this is not all. The use of force also means conceiving the deployment and employment of nuclear weapons in a certain role. While states may be deterrable with strategic nuclear assets, non-state actors are not. The 2002 Nuclear posture Review takes care of that by putting forth the concept of "forward deterrence" through the actual battlefield use of tactical nukes. As part of that policy, the Bush administration has successfully steered a bill through the Congress amending the 10-year-long ban on the research and development of TNWs.

This nuclear policy, in tandem with the Bush administration’s use of force, means the administration looks at non-proliferation differently. While it would like to retain the legal impediments that bind the signatories of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, it is now relying more on counter-proliferation through means such as PSI (proliferation security initiative). The current administration does not have much regard for legal niceties such as article VI of the NPT, which required legitimate nuclear-weapon states to move in earnest towards disarmament, and which undertaking was the basis for the decision by the majority of the states to forego nuclear-weapons capability. In its absence, the NPT has merely become a millstone around the ankles of states that seem eager to get rid of that commitment. It is a moot point whether the current combination of legality and coercion without being grounded in the normative framework of non-proliferation will last. But that is another issue.

While the events of September 11, 2001 have played a major part in shaping the policies of the Bush administration, the Republicans in the US were opposed to the direction non-proliferation was taking under President Bill Clinton even before the 9/11 attacks. They sabotaged the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and forced Clinton’s hand into Ballistic Missile Defence. Ultimately, and expectedly, President Bush just walked away from the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty.

The US-Indian deal, from Washington’s perspective, needs to be seen through the strategic prism of the Bush administration. While relations between the two were on the mend since Clinton’s presidency, the dividends India was looking for could not have come without the changes wrought by President Bush.

To recap, among other things, the Bush administration plans to keep the US arsenal; it wants to employ TNWs in the field; it is planning a BMD shield in ‘full-spectrum dominance’ mode, which includes the weaponisation of space (this is being fought by other states at Conference on Disarmament, especially China, which argues that PAROS – Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space – is as important as Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; it has shown that some states can have nuclear weapons while others can’t; the US needs to have India counter China.

From the Indian perspective, the nuclear tests were meant to turn India from being merely important to the US to being urgent for it. Strobe Talbott’s account is ample evidence of how New Delhi played the game. That Indian policy has continued under the Congress-led government.

India did not sign the NPT because it pegged its stand to universal disarmament. It argued that there could not be two sets of states: the privileged and the have-nots. Having tested, it embarked upon the effort to get legitimacy for what it had done. If it could not get into the elite club legitimately, it would gatecrash. Immediately after the tests, some Indian strategists suggested that India should be declared a State with Nuclear Weapons (SNW) if it could not be accommodated in the NPT as an NWS because the treaty accepted a state as a legitimate NWS only if that state had tested nuclear weapons on or before 1964.

The Bush administration has granted that legitimacy to India. It is a foregone conclusion that the US Congress would give a nod to the administration’s decision. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is also likely to agree to the pact, scepticism on that count from detractors, notwithstanding. But the point really is the bilateral nature of the pact. After Israel (and that’s a peculiar case), India is the second country to have this kind of arrangement. In fact, the US-Indian pact is even more significant because India has overtly tested its potential.

The legitimacy aspect of the deal not only allows India to now rest on its capability without having to deal with non-proliferationists in the US and elsewhere – the issue having been settled – but also to enhance its capability further by getting US cooperation on the civilian side of the programme and acquiring dual-technology components. It can now separate its civilian programme from its military programme without having really given guarantees that it would not use the expertise gathered through technological interaction on the civilian side for use on the military side.

Overall, the new framework allows India a prominent place not only in South Asia but also in the Indian Ocean. Some Indian analysts fear that this arrangement would deprive India of its freedom of action. Personally, I don’t think the costs would be higher than the benefits. India needs the push to the status it is hankering after, and it won’t hurt if it comes from Washington. India would like to be able to face up to China without necessarily getting into a confrontation with Beijing. In fact, it is a measure of the success of Indian policy that its crest with the US also comes at a time when it enjoys good relations with China. India is evincing a developing capability, common to big powers, of playing multiple state actors and dealing with conflicting interests.

Most analyses so far have tended to imply that the US attempt to put India up as a counter to China would necessarily lead New Delhi into a conflict with Beijing. That scenario is unlikely, at least in the next ten years (see Ziad Haider, US-China-India – three giants at play ; Indian Express August 2). Even US-China relations, despite talk in America of containing China, will remain stable in the short- to mid-term (see Michael O’ Hanlon, US economic integration with China ; Daily Times , July 31, courtesy LAT).

The scenario will be played along the lines of China coming up as another pole while the US would try to offset that possibility. But it is significant to note that the possibility of a conflict on that score is very remote (unless China was to actually try to take over Taiwan). China is a leading player on the Korean peninsula not only in relation to North Korea but also South Korea, the latter fact generally missed out by most observers predicting a Sino-US confrontation. And the US needs China in that region. Moreover, China’s own US policy is a guarantee against any deviation from the current multi-tiered relationship. To the extent of other states emerging to counter US dominance, China is not the only contender. Other potential candidates are a more integrated European Union and, even, Japan. The EU has faced a setback to its efforts to further integrate and Japan, for now, is happy with US security guarantees. It is for this reason that China seems more conspicuous on the radar screen. In any case, if the Structural Realist theory is anything to go by, as Kenneth Waltz argued, the US efforts at preventing other poles to emerge should fail.

Indeed, if US-Indian relations do blossom further, as they will, the US would be setting the stage for India to emerge as a major power and, eventually, as a pole the US will have to contend with. India knows this and may even forego some immediate benefits for the larger prize a couple of decades down the line.

This situation poses challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. We shall come to them in the coming weeks but suffice to say at this juncture that we must be thankful for the nuclear capability we developed in the teeth of bitter opposition from the world. If our non-proliferation record were better, we might have positioned ourselves to extract more out of our capability. Even so, it guarantees our security in a changing geo-political environment as nothing else does. The only danger is that we may fall prey to the thought that it is the only ingredient of security. That would be disastrous.

Britain : Homegrown Terror

http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/05terror

What did those who bombed London on 7 and 21 July want? The real goals of Islamist terrorism are the provocation of a clash of cultures and the destruction of political integration.

By Olivier Roy

BRITAIN has been astonished to discover that the terrorists responsible for the London bombings on 7 July were British citizens, born there and apparently well integrated. One was even a convert to Islam. Yet that fits the profile of most of the second generation of al-Qaida terrorists that emerged at the end of the 1990s.

Most of those active internationally have a westernised background; they were born in Europe or moved there to study or work. All had a secular upbringing. None were educated in madrasas (religious schools), except for brief periods in the case of the 7 July suicide bombers. In fact they went to ordinary state schools and pursued modern studies. More-over almost all of them became born-again Muslims in the West.

So the British authorities’ perception of the radical Islamist activism that was flourishing in London during the 1990s was fundamentally flawed. They saw it as the product of a diaspora of political refugees who want to change the regime in their countries of origin and who are not inclined to destabilise the country in which they have found refuge. That is true of some genuine political refugees, such as the Algerians of the FIS or the Tunisians of Nahda, whose actions are dictated by the political situation in their home countries.

But radical imams such as Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri, who specifically address second-generation Muslims and play on their sense of alienation and uprootedness, are in quite a different category. For such preachers, no existing country is truly Islamic: the ummah exists wherever there are Muslims. The uprootedness of young Muslims is seen as an advantage, since it removes them from the influence of the cultural and traditional Islam of their parents and countries of origin. These imams want to radicalise young Muslims in their countries of residence and enlist them in a worldwide jihad. And for that, anywhere will do. Let them go to Afghanistan, Kashmir or Yemen (the way that Abu Hamza’s son did), or just stay in London.

The 7 July bombers were probably already radicalised before they went to Pakistan. It was not their brief (and uncertain) stay in a Pakistani madrasa that turned them into suicides, and it seems they did not really pursue any religious studies there. The fact that one was a convert proves that we are not dealing with the reaction of a traditional Muslim community, but with a reformulation in religious terms (Islamic) of the more general revolt of a generation adrift between its culture of origin and westernisation.

The Islam with which such young people identify is not the cultural Islam of their parents or home countries. It is both Salafist and jihadist. Salafists seek to purge Islam of all outside influences, starting with the cultures and traditions of Muslim societies, and restore it to the letter of the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet. Salafism is fundamentally opposed to all cultural or national forms of Islam. By no means all Salafists are jihadists. But contemporary terrorists are jihadists, since they have opted from the outset for armed struggle - a struggle that has taken over the targets of the far left in the 1970s, such as US imperialism - rather than genuine support for specific national liberation movements.

These are young people who have broken mentally with their backgrounds, even if they are often relatively well integrated in social and economic terms. The three London bombers of Pakistani origin were not perceived as radicals by their parents or close acquaintances. They had not cut themselves off from their families. They lived their radicalised existence on the fringes of their home environment. Their families, who do not understand the process of radicalisation, put it all down to brainwashing.

These radicals are not fighting for a specific national cause. They are part of the contemporary global jihad: Bosnia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and now Iraq. Their enemy is the US and the West in general. They are not fighting to establish an Islamic state in Iraq or Palestine. They are not concerned with solidarity networks or fundraising; nor are they involved in the conflicts and practical problems of Muslim populations in Europe. None of them is known to have been active in Muslim trade union, political or communal organisations. Those who have attended mosques have often done so under the patronage of fundamentalist organisations, such as Jama’at ut-Tabligh, which do not advocate political action. So the London terrorists of Pakistani origin did not go to Kashmir or Waziristan to fight the (nationalist) enemy.

But if it is wrong to see them as the avant-garde of a Muslim community radicalised by US action in the Middle East, the question remains: what part do the Middle East conflicts play in the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists? Those conflicts undoubtedly make a strong impact on Muslim public opinion, but are the terrorists motivated by them?

Many people believe Britain and Spain were hit to punish them for their involvement alongside the US in Iraq. The implication is that withdrawal from Iraq would shield those countries from terrorist attacks, just as non-involvement protects countries that have distanced themselves from the US. But this view is contradicted by a number of key factors.

The first is the sequence of events. Attacks by al-Qaida preceded US action. The Americans intervened militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, not before it.

In general, it is easy to demonstrate that Osamabin Laden, whatever he may claim, always takes the initiative rather than reacting to events. He has been an internationalist fighter since the early 1980s and has never concealed his hostility to the West, even when fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. While he was shocked by the Saudi royal family’s appeal to the US in 1991, that changed his attitude to the Saudis (with whom he was previously on good terms), rather than to the US, which he has always hated.

The “near enemy/far enemy” theory (according to which the radicals first sought to change the regimes in the countries of the Middle East and only then began to attack the West on the grounds that it was keeping those regimes in place) does not stand up to chronological examination, except in the case of the small group of Egyptians led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The jihadist militants have always been internationalists, such as al-Qaida’s precursor, Abdallah Azzam, who deliberately abandoned the fight for the liberation of Palestine not because of the strength of the US or Israel but because he considered the nationalistic character of the struggle detrimental to the cause of Islam. As for the present generation of al-Qaida activists, they were radicalised in a context of globalisation and uprootedness, rather than struggle to establish an Islamic state in any given country.

The second factor is the opportunistic nature of Bin Laden’s claims. He has always invoked causes sacred to the Muslim world to justify his actions, even when there are no direct links. He mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 11 September, but no longer refers to it. In 1998 he invoked the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, but there are none there today. Now he talks of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet the police uncovered plans for al-Qaida attacks on Spain after the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.

Bin Laden will always invoke “objective” reasons to gain popularity for his actions among the Muslim masses, but it is not those causes that radicalise the terrorists. The case of Mohammed Bouyeri, who killed the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh, shows that Iraq and Palestine have little to do with it. They are invoked by Bin Laden for purposes of propaganda, not for recruitment, which began before the military interventions and will continue even in the event of military withdrawal.

The third counter-argument is that Iraq has become a new training ground for internationalist jihadists who show no interest in the country. They do not talk of establishing an Islamic state nor do they set up political networks in Europe in support of the just struggle of the Iraqi people. They go to Iraq to wage war on the US and acquire the training and esprit de corps needed to move on to the international dimension. Iraq is serving the same purpose as Afghanistan and Bosnia before it.

More than ever, al-Qaida militants have a global, non-territorial vision of jihad. Their goal is not to liberate the Middle East but to combat the world order as they see it. The young second-generation Muslims radicalised in the run-down suburbs and inner-city slums of Europe are motivated by their own situation, not Iraq. They have not been sent to fight somewhere: they fight where they live and where most of them were born. Nor are they particularly guided by political strategy: there were other attempted bomb attacks in Madrid after the withdrawal of Spanish troops.

Ordinary Muslims undoubtedly see the Middle East conflicts as western aggression and proof of the West’s double standards. But the Muslim population in the West has been concerned to express its opposition in political terms, and has joined together with a European public strongly opposed to the war in Iraq. The joint anti-war demonstrations are tangible proof of the integration of Muslims in the political life of Europe. The protests of ­Europe’s Muslim communities are not couched in terms of religion. They are founded on respect for international law and the rejection of imperialism.

By invoking these conflicts, al-Qaida seeks to acquire legitimacy among Muslims and pose as its avant-garde, whereas it actually recruits on the margins of Muslim society (and on its most westernised fringes at that). Most of all, al-Qaida is concerned to smash the political common front and confine Muslims to a purely religious or ethnic identity that most of them want nothing to do with. It is deliberately out to provoke a clash of cultures, perhaps because, at bottom, the real problem of the radicalised youth is their relation to culture of any kind.

So the war in Iraq is not the prime cause of the radicalisation of terrorists. But, for the same reasons, it is not a means of fighting terrorism. To claim, as Tony Blair does, that there is no link between the London bombings and the presence of British troops in Iraq, is simply to pose the question of the ultimate purpose of the war.

There may have been good reasons for getting rid of Saddam Hussein, and the issue of democracy in the Middle East cannot be ignored by the nationalist left, moderate ­Islamists or European opponents of the war. But to justify the war in Iraq as part of the fight against terrorism is just as nonsensical as to justify terrorism by the war in Iraq. The issues in the Iraq war are the structure of the Iraqi state, the respect of Iraqi nationalism, the constitutional and legal status of Islam, and the meaning of democracy.

The terrorists have no interest in any of these issues, all of which are becoming increasingly confused in the context of a US policy devoid of overall vision.

China: middle kingdom, world centre

China has announced that the yuan will no longer be pegged to the dollar; greater currency flexibility will permit Beijing to use monetary policy to control its economy. And the entry of its enormous labour force into the global economy will change the world balance of trade. China wants to bypass the Japanese-United States alliance in Asia and at the United Nations, and, through asymmetrical diplomacy, become a different kind of world power.

By Martine Bulard

THE meaning of a sentence in Chinese is determined by the order of the words rather than the words themselves. China’s geopolitical strategy operates on the same principle. From Beijing to Shanghai, among government representatives and their prominent advisers, and among academics, there is no escaping the latest catchword: stability.

But to understand its true meaning, it must be seen in the context of a country that is perpetually on the move: where members of the government now travel abroad to an unprecedented extent; where the universities, more open than ever to the outside world, have a new role as government research centres, some of them funded by foreign donors. The Centre for International Studies occupies three ultramodern blocks in the prestigious University of Beida in Beijing, one sponsored by a wealthy Hong Kong businessman, one by an Italian company, and one by a Hong Kong firm. Three architects were employed but the result is a harmonious whole that fits perfectly with its historic setting (1). Opening up does not mean giving up. And stability is not the same as immobility.

The foreign ministry spokesman, Kong, in his office opposite the Feng Lian plaza with its flourishing luxury shops, inaccessible to most Chinese, explains: “China wants above all to promote a stable environment, conducive to development.”Several hundred kilometres away, in the new premises of the Centre for American Studies in the famous University of Fudan in Shanghai, funded partly by the United States Agency for International Development, even the great nuclear expert, Professor Shen Dingli, who usually avoids clichés, cannot escape the obligatory reference to stability. Nothing frightens him more than the possibility of destabilisation in Korea, which has a common border with China, or in the Middle East, which supplies almost half of Beijing’s oil imports.

He explains what has been called the “diplomacy of the status quo”. For Beijing, order, even US order, even relatively unfavourable order, is preferable to chaos, which would thwart China’s plans for growth and global ambitions. Growth is the basis of the social contract with the people that keeps the regime in power through thick and thin. The global ambitions, in the words of Kong, are to restore China “to its proper place on the international stage”. Rather more vocal and active today than yesterday, but much less than it will be tomorrow, as its power increases.

Contrary to the general view, China’s diplomacy is not guided entirely by economic considerations, by the need to satisfy its hunger for raw materials or grain. Of course, ­international relations have a contribution to make in securing energy and food supplies. But the economy is part of a much wider vision China has of its role in the region and the world. The economy is part of the peaceful armoury essential to recognition on the international stage. “Look at the history of the past 500 years,” you are told. Without a strong economy, a nation has no say.

In the recent past, three events have had a significant impact on Chinese thought. The first was Tiananmen Square in 1989, still a taboo subject in the press (2). The trauma has nothing to do with any possible challenge to the regime: opposition parties are still banned, although intellectuals now have more freedom of movement. It is frequently emphasised that the trouble results from the price for Tiananmen that had to be paid to the outside world, starting with the western embargo imposed when the Soviet Union was no longer able to supply Beijing with hi-tech equipment, especially for military purposes.
Extreme mobility

The shock of Tiananmen signalled the beginning of the end of the honeymoon (miyue) with the US, which had lasted for almost 20 years, from the People’s Republic of China replacing Taiwan in the United Nations on 25 October 1971 and President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, to the establishment of a strategic partnership instrumental in China’s development. This period was followed by disappointments, a number of incidents (including the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) and the strengthening of US links with China’s hated and despised competitor, Japan.

The second crucial event was the collapse of the Soviet Union. There were no regrets over the disappearance of this rival communist regime but many academics recall that the USSR wore itself out in a fruitless confrontation with the US and a financially ruinous arms race. According to an anonymous defence expert: “The US presses for competition and an uncontrolled increase in military spending but we should confine ourselves to modernising the weapons required to strengthen our defences.” This counsel of moderation is more show than substance, since military spending already accounts for 2.4% of China’s GDP, but it is worth deploying against the general staff, which would like it to be much higher.

Ultimately, according to Chinese diplomats, it was the division of the world into two camps that proved so costly. While they all deplore the unipolar order represented by the US, none of them wants to return to a bipolar world. There is no question of China becoming the leader of the developing countries, a role that would entail sacrifices.

“We share the wish of many developing countries for the democratisation of the international organisations,” says Kong, whostresses the importance of relations with Africa (3) and Latin America, “but there is no question of our constituting a pole. We must get away from our cold-war mindset and I prefer to speak of shared development. We must establish a habit of negotiation, which implies mutual concessions. The rapid expansion of trade will be accompanied by an increasing number of disputes. We must approach them in a spirit of negotiation” - not a spirit dictated by the system.

The government proposes to participate in the establishment of a multipolar world in which China would one day occupy an important place - in the centre, not at the head. It wants to shine, not dominate. This is not a purely formal distinction (4). At the height of its power, from the 11th to the 17th century, China had the largest fleet in the world, and many real and exceptional ­economic and technological advantages (5), but, unlike the Europeans, it never destroyed peoples or civilisations.

The third crucial event was the Chinese authorities’ response to the financial crisis that rocked Asia in 1997-98. China was the only country to keep exchange controls and resist the pressure from the International Monetary Fund (6), and the only one to retain some chance of growth when all the others, including Japan, were affected by the general slump. Better still, with the yuan tied to the dollar, it helped to establish a degree of stability in a region that was facing financial disaster. It even went so far as to grant low-interest loans or aid to several of the tiger economies that were in trouble.

The next generation that came to power in China built a strategy based on President Hu Jintao’s four nos: “No to hegemony, no to force, no to blocs, no to the arms race” (7). And yes to “confidence building, reducing difficulties, developing cooperation, and avoiding confrontation”. Conscious of its weaknesses set against the US giant and its competitors in Asia, Beijing engages in a highly mobile asymmetrical diplomacy, favouring bilateral relations but also participating actively in regional organisations, seeking to establish economic links with everyone and reduce past territorial tensions.

China and Russia signed an agreement at Vladivostok on 2 June 2005 to settle a dispute over 2% of their 4,300km common border that had poisoned relations since the end of the second world war. As President Vladimir Putin observed during the closing phase of the negotiations: “This is the first time in the history of Sino-Russian relations that the whole of their common border has been legally defined.”

On 11 April 2005 the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, signed a protocol to settle a boundary dispute between the two countries that dates from 1962: Beijing claims a substantial part of the territory of the state of Arunachal Pradesh (90,000 sq km) in northeast India; and in the northwest New Delhi claims Aksai Chin, which is part of Kashmir (38,000 sq km). “The negotiations have only just started,” says Kong, “but this is the first time the question of boundaries has been addressed in an official document.” A historic step, which Beijing would like to consolidate by establishing a free-trade area embracing the demographic giants (see India and China ).

These new relations inevitably affect China’s links with its old allies, notably Pakistan. “Our position on its conflict with India tends to be neutral,” was the view of the deputy director of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies at the University of Beida in Beijing, Yang Baoyun. According to him, Islamabad “had benefited from the tension for many years” but attitudes were beginning to change - as witness the restoration of the bus service across Kashmir, which had been closed for 60 years (8).

Another sign of the peaceful emergence of China is its involvement in the crisis in October 2002 between the US and North Korea, which has declared that it is now ready to produce an atomic bomb. Beijing was the moving force behind the group of six (China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Russia and the US) formed to settle the dispute, and it is doing all it can to cool Pyongyang, stoked by the inflammatory statements of the Bush administration.

The prospect of a nuclear power in the Korean peninsula is not something Beijing relishes, and Yang confidently asserts that, if Pyongyang “were to start tests, we would cut off aid”. But opinion is divided on the question of pressure. Some think aid should be cut, at least to some extent, and they recall that once before, in 2004, a fortuitous technical incident caused an interruption in the flow of oil and forced President Kim Jong-il to resume negotiations (9). Others, like Professor Shen Dingli, take the opposite view, that “to stop aid would destroy all hope and drive [an already disastrous regime] to extremes”.

“Korea is a detestable burden,” says a former diplomat, “a regime in which people are dying of starvation to keep a dynasty in power. But China is stuck. It can neither advance nor retreat.” Sections of the army toy with the idea that nuclearisation is not all that serious and “Korea was and is China’s sentinel” in the event of conflict. Beijing has proved, if not to Washington at least to its neighbours, that it is capable of moving on from its old alliances and engaging in active diplomacy. Consider the moves to strengthen its links with the former ally of the US, South Korea, which fears destabilisation from the North. (Germany’s difficulties in absorbing the east have induced a certain caution about the neighbouring dictatorship (10).)

The real thorn in the Chinese tiger’s side is Japan. Yang is alarmed. “At no time in the past 30 years have relations between us been as bad as they are now,” he says. This was confirmed by everyone we spoke to. Many cited Japan’s refusal to face its own history, the incident of the book that played down Japanese crimes during the occupation of China, and prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine, where war criminals are buried.

China is not always clear and critical about its own history but a visit to the Shenyang museum in northeast China, main focus of the Japanese occupation, helps to explain its feelings about Japan. It contains an account of the murders, tortures and medical experiments carried out by the Japanese armies from 1931, together with recent explicit denials of these events made by prominent Japan­ese personalities (11). Here, as in Beijing, if you mention the anti-Japanese demonstrations in spring 2005, which were mostly orderly student demonstrations, with almost no worker participation, people reply: “What would you say in France if a German leader went to pay his respects at the tomb of some war criminal?”
Washington’s deputy sheriff

Besides the territorial problems over the islands known to the Japanese as the Senkaku and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu, which are of strategic importance to maritime control, the strengthening of the military links between Washington and Tokyo is also a source of concern. According to Professor Kazuya Sakamoto of the University of Osaka, “After 60 years spent keeping its head down, Japan appears destined to supplant Australia as Washington’s deputy sheriff in the Asia-Pacific region and become a pillar of America’s 21st-century security architecture” (12). The revision of the Japanese constitution (13), the decision to send troops to Iraq, and the transfer of US 1st Army Corps command (for operations in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean) from the west coast of the US to Camp Zama, south of Tokyo, lend some credibility to this contention (14). This is the crux of the special triangular relationship between China, the US and Japan.

Washington also supports Japan’s application for admission as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, immediately rejected by China, which is threatening to use its veto. As China’s ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, pointed out in a statement on 26 June 2005: “Japan will have to obtain a consensus in its region before it can think of sitting on the Security Council.” Beijing hopes to win its case with the support of South Korea, which has protested vehemently against Koizumi’s militarist sympathies (15), India, which would like to have a seat on the Security Council, and the African countries with which China has strong economic links.

The mention of Taiwan in the revised version of the bilateral security agreement between the US and Japan (16) was the last straw. Japan had avoided this issue since Sino-Japanese relations were normalised in 1972 and the US had its own formula for dealing with the question - “one country, two systems”. The integration of Taiwan into China “may take a hundred years or more”, ­according to one diplomat, but their separation is impossible, unacceptable to the people, the army and the government.

The tough talk of recent months and the anti-secession law adopted in April 2005 are more defensive than aggressive, intended to draw a line that Taiwan and its allies must not cross. Although it is generally recognised that the political, diplomatic and economic costs of a military operation would be much too high, General Zhu Chenghu did not hesitate to state in July 2005: “If the Americans fire on Chinese territory, we shall be obliged to respond with nuclear weapons.” He was speaking in a personal capacity but the statement has not been denied. Beijing hopes that the 2008 Olympics will mark a turning point for the region and the world, and the government apparently fears that Taipei will declare independence on the eve of the games. Hence the threats, and the attempts to win hearts and minds.

The leaders of the Kuomintang, old enemies who had not set foot in China since 1949 (17), were received in May with great ceremony. Hu Jintao’s recent tour of Latin America, ostensibly to secure supplies of oil (Venezuela), raw materials, grain and soya (Cuba, Mexico, Brazil), was also designed to make it clear to those (notably in Central America) that still have close links with Taipei, that China offers a much bigger market. Meanwhile the Chinese leadership is relying on the 8,000 Taiwanese businessmen who have investments in China to exert pressure on the Taipei government. The Bush administration has finally managed to quell its ally’s passion for independence and Japan is showing more discretion.

But the rivalry persists. A former diplomat said: “There have been times, in the history of the region, when China was strong and Japan was weak, and times when the reverse was the case. Now China and Japan are going to be on an equal footing, and Japan is suddenly thrown off balance.” The old order is in turmoil but a new balance of power has not yet emerged. China is the main Asian supplier of the US, ahead of Japan; it ranks second, just behind Japan, in currency reserves - US treasury bonds - but its gross domestic product is two and a half times lower than Japan’s. It may warn Washington that it will stop acting as banker and will sell dollars, but then Tokyo would immediately come to the rescue.

This unequal balance of power does not preclude competition. While Japan hopes to emerge from its status as a political pygmy and consolidate its role as world leader in Asia (and permanent member of the Security Council, a development that would entail rearmament, to the dismay of all its neighbours, not just China), China wants to assert its role as Asian leader. Hence the rush to join multilateral organisations. Its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 was crucial to its success. It won over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), a cold-war outfit (18), advancing from observer status in 1991 to active participation (19), and getting agreement in November 2004 for the establishment of a free-trade area with Asean (20).

In Central Asia the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) in June 2001 witnessed its commercial objectives, including fuel supplies. The initiative has taken a highly political turn since the war in Afghanistan. China shares Russia’s concern over the establishment of US bases in the region, and the concern of other republics about the movements of people deemed to be Islamic fundamentalists, notably Chinese Muslim Uighurs. The determination to crush opposition, as seen recently in Uzbekistan, leaves China relatively unmoved.
Beijing consensus

In the words of US expert David Shambaugh, “Bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region. As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power” (21). Is it possible to speak of the “Beijing consensus” (22) as a new model for development, as Joshua Cooper Ramo, member of the Council on Foreign Relations in the US and the Foreign Policy Centre in Britain, suggests? Can China become the leading country in an Asian economic and political union? It lacks the necessary economic means: two-thirds of its exports are generated by foreign companies established in Chinese territory, content to assemble products designed elsewhere.

China has cornered a few important niche markets, such as in optical fibres and mobile phones, and it is keen to extend its range by attracting foreign research centres and buying firms to acquire well-known trademarks and reap the benefits of technology transfer. But its growth, strong but still at the mercy of a vulnerable financial system, depends on the Asean countries and Japan for production and on western countries for exports (23). The smallest brush with the US could halt its dynamic progress and be politically explosive.

That does not prevent some experts from dreaming of a Sino-Japanese alliance, like the Franco-German alliance in Europe. Japanese, Chinese and Korean intellectuals were at a colloquium in Beijing (24) at the time of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in spring 2005. A school textbook, produced by historians of the three countries, was published in June. But while the US may be prepared to delegate more of its regional power as a military umbrella, it is unlikely to accept Japan as a strong regional power, much less China.

China wants rapid progress, not chaos. But, as a diplomat explains, “It can only shine if its culture is attractive, as our language once was. It is not enough to be merely a consumer. We must invent our own values, not copy those of the West.” Work is being done but there is no public arena for debate. The danger, as the diplomat says, is that by denying political freedom, “China may be denying itself”.

Source : http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/02china

CIA asked Netherlands not to arrest Pakistani nuclear spy

by RN Security and Defence editor Hans de Vreij, 9 August 2005



Dutch former prime minister Ruud Lubbers has revealed that the country's government wanted to arrest Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan in 1975 and 1986, but did not do so at the request of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Lubber's comments came in an interview broadcast by Dutch public radio on Tuesday, and confirm a report published in The New York Times in 2004.

Abdul Qadeer Khan - generally regarded as the 'father' of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - gained much of his knowledge of uranium enrichment in the Netherlands, where he worked in the mid-1970s. In December last year, the New York Times reported that the CIA had asked the Dutch government on two occasions not to arrest Mr Khan, despite there being serious suspicions about him. Dutch intelligence had concluded in the 1970s that he was more than just a scientist and that he was in fact trying to gain access to Dutch uranium enrichment know-how which was highly advanced at the time.

Confirmation
The New York Times based its story on two sources: one a European diplomat and the other an employee at the US Congress, both of whom wished to remain anonymous. Now, however, in an interview broadcast by Dutch public radio on Tuesday, Ruud Lubbers provided confirmation of these reports concerning AQ Khan. Mr Lubbers was minister of economic affairs in the Dutch government when the question of the Pakistani scientist was brought to his attention. Although there appears to have been sufficient evidence at the time that Mr Khan was engaged in atomic espionage, he was never arrested. According to the reports, this was a deliberate move which came about under pressure from the CIA.

Guilty - not guilty
AQ Khan left the Netherlands at the beginning of 1976, but returned on several occasions subsequently. In 1983, he was tried in absentia on charges of attempted espionage and sentenced to four years in jail, but that judgment was overturned on technical grounds in 1985.

Another opportunity to arrest him presented itself in 1986, but again the CIA allegedly advised the Dutch government not to do so. The reason for this appears to have been that it was thought more information about him and his activities could be obtained if he were allowed to remain at liberty rather than being locked up in a Dutch prison.



Ruud Lubbers, former prime minister of the Netherlands
In the radio interview, Mr Lubbers commented:
"I think that in this case the American intelligence service was practising something which is very normal over there: 'give us all the information, but don't detain him, let him go. We'll follow him and then we'll get more information […] we'll uncover things'."
Even when AQ Khan was outside the Netherlands, Mr Lubbers apparently heard via Dutch intelligence that the CIA didn't want him arrested:
"Then I got the answer that the American intelligence service preferred not to arrest the man, but to follow him."
Embarrassing
Mr Lubbers' revelations are highly embarrassing for the current Dutch government, which said earlier this year that there was no evidence of the CIA having played any role in the decision by the Dutch public prosecution service not to bring new charges against Mr Khan. Current Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner said that when AQ Khan twice visited the Netherlands in 1988, there were no longer any grounds to detain him because the criminal case against him had already been closed.

The disclosures are also embarrassing for the CIA. It's not unusual for an espionage or terrorism suspect to be allowed to remain at large so that, for example, his conversations and communications can be monitored and his network of contacts traced, but if that did indeed happen in the case of AQ Khan, then it did not produce any useful results. Indeed, the knowledge he obtained led to the development of Pakistan's nuclear bomb and that knowledge - together with materials - was later passed on to other countries, including North Korea, Iran and Libya.

Raising questions
Some Dutch parliamentarians have already asked questions following the disclosure by the former prime minister. Mr Lubbers himself commented during the radio interview that the Khan question should be viewed against the background of the Cold War, when the West had reason to support Pakistan because of neighbouring India's close relationship with the Soviet Union. This remark in turn raises the question of whether the US may not, perhaps, have deliberately helped Pakistan develop its nuclear capacity in order to bring about a strategic balance with India, which had already succeeded in producing its own atomic weapon.

Private Interests Inc., formerly known as Congress

According to a new report by Public Citizen, 43 percent of the members of Congress who have left office since 1998 have gone on to a lucrative career in lobbying. That’s 85 former legislators who have shelved the interest of the public in favor of the interest of whoever is writing the checks.

These former public servants are in high demand because of their unrivaled access to the Hill. Former members of Congress, for example, retain access to the House and Senate Floors as well as to members-only restaurants and gymnasiums. These benefits afford them more opportunities to make a case on behalf of their clients.

This means that corporations who employ lobbyists with the right connections are more likely to receive a government contract (or other legislation that suits them)—regardless of whether or not it is in the public interest. Effective lobbyists are, in turn, rewarded handsomely for their services.

Ultimately, this practice eradicates the incentive for a politician to act in the public interest. Why should legislators be afraid of losing an election when they can look forward to a lucrative lobbying career? The only lobbying that legislators should set their sites on is that which they were elected to do: lobbying on behalf of their constituents.

Radioactive Package Shipped Fedex to Pennsylvania

A Federal Express shipment to Pennsylvania tested positive for a deadly radioactive material coming from a contaminated worker at Los Alamos National Laboratory, according to an updated occurrence report obtained by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO). The report sheds further light on a nuclear contamination incident which has also spread to Kansas and Colorado , besides the Lab’s home state of New Mexico . A copy of the report can be viewed here.
http://intellibriefs.com/hsp-FedExpack.pdf

The radioactive package was shipped by Federal Express on July 20 as “a non-hazardous, domestic unclassified shipment” and arrived on July 21 at Bettis Laboratory part of the joint Department of Energy-Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program. As a result, the package could have contaminated Federal Express workers and other packages.

Surprisingly, it took Los Alamos two full days after it discovered the initial contamination incident to notify Bettis Laboratory that it was in possession of an unmarked radioactive package.

“This is another example of sloppy safety and security at Los Alamos ,” said Peter Stockton, a senior investigator at POGO and a former Department of Energy official.

The nuclear contaminant involved, Americium-241, is far more deadly than “normal” plutonium if inhaled, despite rosy depictions by the Laboratory’s public relations office. One speck of the material inhaled can cause cancer. According to one scientist, this particular isotope is about 56 times more deadly than “normal” plutonium.

So far, the Lab has downplayed the risk and kept the public largely in the dark about extent of the nuclear contamination. It is highly unusual to have an off-site radioactive contamination involving workers at Department of Energy facilities. The case of Karen Silkwood was the first such known or admitted incident.

One source says that the Lab has already spent $1 million on the clean up resulting from the contamination incident which took place on July 14. The contamination went undetected for 11 days. As a result, Lab workers unknowingly spread the contaminant multiple places, including locations in three additional states. It is unclear what measures the Lab is taking to discover what other public sites – grocery stores, gas stations, etc – may be contaminated.

The report raises concerns about the Lab’s continuing failure to follow environmental health and safety procedures. Last year, the Lab had 45 major nuclear safety violations. The Lab is already well on track to exceed that number this year.

Los Alamos National Laboratory is run by the University of California . The Project On Government Oversight urged the Department of Energy to start fining the University of California for health and safety violations in a December, 2004 letter which noted that nonprofits are not fined for violations as are for- profit contractors. According to the letter: “As a result, the University [of California ] has avoided paying the millions of dollars in penalties leveled against it, no matter how dangerous the infractions. Without economic incentives to run a safe and secure facility, the University's record has been troubling.”

An initial occurrence report concerning the worker contamination incident was independently obtained by the Albuquerque Journal which reported on it Saturday.

Founded in 1981, the Project On Government Oversight is an independent investigative non-profit whose mission is to expose corruption in order to achieve a more accountable federal government.

Facing the Issue of Succession in Saudi Arabia

The smooth transition of power in Saudi Arabia following the death of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz is unlikely to hide the severe challenges facing the new ruler, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. He will have to navigate a host of problems facing the oil-rich kingdom such as relations with the United States, uncertainties following the surprise election of Mohammed Ahmadinejad as the new president of Iran, galloping oil prices, pressures for reform and growing international terrorism.

However, the real challenges facing Abdullah are domestic and will test his ability to provide decisive leadership to Saudi Arabia. With royal members estimated at more than 5,000 princes and perhaps an equal number of disenfranchised princesses, the House of Saud is in the throws of a host of crises.

Aging Rulers

In recent years, a number of Middle Eastern countries have witnessed a change of leaders and the succession invariably meant the ushering in of second-generation leadership; in countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and Morocco, younger leaders have ascended the thrown. Even in the case of Syria, the death of President Hafez al-Assad led to his son Bashar taking over office. Despite the obvious drawbacks, these leaders represent a younger generation with new aspirations.

Saudi Arabia is not part of this pattern. Succession is still restricted to the sons of its founder King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. Since the founding of the modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, the desert kingdom has had only six rulers; namely Abdul Aziz (1932-53) and his sons Saud (1953-64), Faisal (1964-75), Khalid (1975-82), Fahd (1982-2005) and Abdullah (2005-present).

As a result, each new king is no younger than the earlier one. For example, King Abdullah as well as Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz are between 75 and 90 years of age. At this rate, keeping succession among the sons of the founder will inevitably mean shorter reigns and frequent successions.

Perhaps anticipating this problem, in 1992 King Fahd introduced the basic laws, which among other things proclaimed: "Rulers of the country shall be amongst the sons of the founder and their descendants. The most upright among them shall receive allegiance…" In light of this statement, it may be necessary to implement radical changes in the succession order. For instance, once succession passes over to the grandchildren of founder King Abdul Aziz, who among the hundreds of third-generation princes would be found able and acceptable?

Power Struggle

The internal power struggle within the al-Saud family will likely be shaped by the so-called Sudairi Seven (now six following the death of King Fahd). These six surviving sons of King Abdul Aziz share the same mother and have amassed considerable power and influence. The group includes powerful princes like Sultan, Nayif and Salman. Enjoying and enlisting their unqualified support will be vital for King Abdullah to pursue any part of his agenda. Despite the debilitating stroke King Fahd suffered in 1995, for a decade King Abdullah looked after the day-to-day running of the country as a crown prince. One might even argue that if it were not for the Sudairi factor, King Fahd might have been removed or forced to abdicate in favor of King Abdullah.

Moreover, all three sons of the new king who are politically active have been accommodated in the National Guard headed by King Abdullah. This is perhaps an indication of his limited power base within the family. Therefore, King Abdullah will have to expand his support base by enlisting the support of his other half-brothers and other influential members of the royal family. Any meaningful political reform in Saudi Arabia will have to be within the al-Saud family. Keeping the line of succession among the sons of founder King Abdul Aziz has been difficult.

Next in Line?

Moreover, since 1975, the Saudi monarch has appointed a second deputy prime minister, thereby settling the third prince in line of succession. Upon ascending to the throne, King Khalid named Fahd as crown prince and Abdullah as second deputy prime minister. Following this tradition, in 1982 King Fahd named Prince Sultan as the second deputy prime minister. While King Abdullah followed this pattern and named Prince Sultan as crown prince, he avoided immediately naming anyone to be third in line of succession.

Prince Salman, the younger brother of Prince Sultan, is seen by many as a likely candidate for the number three position. As a member of the Sudairi Seven, he enjoys considerable political clout. But his nomination as the second deputy prime minister would mean overlooking the claims of other powerful princes like Housing Minister Mit'ab bin Abdul Aziz and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abdul Aziz. Moreover, Prince Salman is not young either; he was born in 1936.

Equally Aging Cabinet

In the case of Saudi Arabia, not only are the rulers aging but the same individuals have held key posts in the government for decades. King Abdullah headed the National Guard since 1963 while Prince Sultan, the new crown prince, has been the defense minister since 1962. Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal was first appointed to the position in 1975. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who has recently relinquished his post as Saudi ambassador in Washington, held that position since 1983. His successor, Prince Turki bin Faisal, headed the Saudi intelligence agency between the years of 1978 and 2001.

Similarly, Interior Minister Nayif has been in office since 1975. Deputies in the ministries of defense and interior have been holding their positions for more than two decades. Prince Salman, seen by some as a possible future king, has been the governor of Riyadh since 1962. In short, the consensus and continuity have been stretched to the limits by members of the royal family.

Under the Saudi system, the king also serves as the prime minister. This is likely to create new problems for the rulers. King Abdullah also holds the post of commander of the powerful National Guard, a position he has held since 1962. This has been his principal powerbase within the ruling family. Will he continue to hold onto this position or elevate his Sandhurst-educated son Mit'ab bin Abdullah, who was appointed deputy commander of the National Guard in 1984?

The same question can be asked about new Crown Prince Sultan. Will he continue to be the defense minister or retire in favor of his equally aging younger brother Abdul Rahman, who has been his deputy since 1983?

Pressures for Reform

It is undeniable that there is strong domestic pressure for reform and accountability. The introduction of the nominated consultative council, or Majlis al-Shura, by King Fahd in 1992 was a partial concession to demands for reforms. The national dialogue pursued by King Abdullah in the past few years and his periodic meetings with different segments of the population, and the introduction of local elections early this year were clear indications that the Saudi monarchy has been forced to reform itself. However, as crown prince, Abdullah's room to maneuver was limited and there were suggestions that other princes impeded his ability to pursue the reform process actively.

The assumption of full sovereign powers following the death of King Fahd is unlikely to alter the situation radically since King Abdullah will still have to navigate carefully. His drive for reform will require the consent and support of other powerful princes and this in turn will mean that Abdullah will have to accommodate their demands for key positions.

Likewise, introduction of political reforms similar to those experimented in neighboring states such as Kuwait and Bahrain will not be easy. Principle opposition in Saudi Arabia emanates not from the liberal segments of the population but from the conservative elements who feel that the al-Saud family has deviated from Islam and the puritanical traditions of Wahhabism, an extremist sect within Sunni Islam. For the critics, the ruling monarch is not Islamic enough; therefore, Abdullah will not be able to push forward any political reforms that would alienate the conservative support base.

In the Saudi context, reforms would also mean fighting corruption within the royal household. Despite the simplicity of the funeral and unmarked grave, late King Fahd amassed huge personal wealth estimated to be around US$20-30 billion. The same can be said about Prince Sultan who, as defense minister, presided over one of the most expensive military modernization programs. In contrast to Abdullah's pious and simple lifestyle, the ostentatious lifestyle of many princes -- such as the former ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar -- has attracted considerable attention and criticism both within and outside the country. Reforms aimed at transparency would mean greater accountability of the princes and curtailing their tendencies to mass personal fortunes.

Conclusion

Given the situation, issues of foreign policy are unlikely to be the top priority for Abdullah's Saudi Arabia. Domestic stability, especially the post-Fahd political order, will be high on the agenda. However, despite his popularity among the population and the current prevailing optimism, Abdullah is literally racing against time since his age is working against him. While the challenges before him are truly monumental, the window of opportunity is extremely short. Unlike his predecessors, Abdullah is unlikely to benefit from his appointed crown prince since Sultan suffers from a host of health problems.

Given his popularity and personal reputation, Abdullah enjoys the unique advantage of bringing about radical changes, especially within the royal family, and the ability to bring about an orderly transfer of succession to the next generation. Even if he cannot benefit from such changes, he will have to introduce some radical changes in the government since they will be vital for the long-term stability of Saudi Arabia. He will have to retire some of the aging princes who have been holding the same offices for decades. Without such changes, the al-Saud family will be unable to address a number of challenges facing the country.

The mishandling of the situation or the alienation of powerful princes will undermine Abdullah's ability to prepare the country for the future. At the same time, however, laws of nature will mean that King Abdullah has a much shorter window of opportunity than all of his predecessors. Far reaching structural changes, therefore, will have to come in weeks and months rather than in years and decades.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. P.R. Kumaraswamy


The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

Intelligence Brief: Economic Nationalism

Since the emergence of globalized capitalist markets in the nineteenth century, the trade policies of states have cycled between support of liberalization and adherence to economic nationalism, depending on whether significant domestic interests are winning or losing in international competition.

The majority of economists who argue that free trade increases wealth in the long run and on the whole through the operation of comparative advantage also admit that in the short run some industries and regions are disadvantaged -- often severely -- by shifts in production to more efficient and innovative enterprises. The inevitability of winners and losers in trade competition opens the way for the latter to seek state protection and subsidies, either to allow them to mature into effective competitors or simply to survive.

Attempts to use the state to protect economic interests are normal, and success or failure is mainly dependent on the domestic balance of power, which in large advanced economies is determined by continual face-offs between winning and losing industries and sectors. More general shifts between liberalization and protectionism call into play public opinion, which can deepen and increase the scope of incipient tendencies.

Long the major supporter of trade liberalization in world forums, the United States has recently had to adjust to growing economic nationalism in the U.S. that is likely to result in a slowing and perhaps a reversal of the thrust toward liberalized global markets.

During the week of August 1, Washington found itself on the nationalist side of the trade spectrum when China National Offshore Oil Corporation (C.N.O.O.C.) withdrew its bid for U.S. oil company Unocal, citing "unprecedented political opposition," and Tokyo, acting within the guidelines of a World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) decision against Washington on steel tariffs, moved to impose punitive tariffs on some goods produced in the U.S. Although the Bush administration did not come down on the side of U.S. Congressional opponents of the C.N.O.O.C. bid and proponents of protecting the U.S. steel industry, it did nothing to resist the drift toward nationalism. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Unocal"]

C.N.O.O.C. Withdraws

C.N.O.O.C.'s bid to take over Unocal collapsed after both houses of the Republican-controlled Congress agreed to propose a bill that would require the departments of defense, energy and homeland security to investigate the bid before it was vetted through normal administrative procedures. The Congressional pressure, which promised to delay a successful C.N.O.O.C. takeover, was the result of a full-scale lobbying campaign by Unocal's other suitor -- Chevron -- that gained the support of security hawks as well as legislators in Chevron's constituencies, and spread to lawmakers playing to sentiments of economic nationalism.

The success of Chevron's strategy of throwing the viability of C.N.O.O.C.'s bid into question prompted Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory service, to announce on August 1 that Chevron's lower bid was "not unreasonable" in light of Congressional pressure which "opens the door for adverse developments that could place a C.N.O.O.C. bid in jeopardy." C.N.O.O.C. withdrew its offer the next day, clearing the way for Chevron's takeover.

The two most significant factors in C.N.O.O.C.'s failure were the intensity of Congressional opposition to its bid and the silence of the Bush administration throughout the fray. With powerful U.S. business interests on both sides of the issue, it is likely that the Congressional tilt to economic nationalism and the administration's acquiescence in it were fueled by the mobilization of popular sentiment against China over U.S. job losses, which made Congressional opposition to C.N.O.O.C.'s bid politically expedient and the administration's acquiescence in it politically prudent.

Tokyo Strikes Back

On August 3, Tokyo announced its imposition of punitive tariffs on a range of U.S. goods, including ball bearings and aircraft components, in retaliation for the failure of Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which diverts the proceeds of U.S. tariffs placed on foreign steel that has been determined to have been dumped on the U.S. market directly to domestic U.S. steel producers.

Tokyo had argued successfully before the W.T.O. that the Byrd Amendment violated international trade agreements because it not only penalized Japanese producers, but also rewarded their U.S. competitors. Since the W.T.O. decision, the Bush administration has sought to have the Byrd Amendment repealed, but Congress has dragged its feet. As in the C.N.O.O.C. affair, powerful U.S. business interests are on both sides of the steel tariffs issue, with U.S. steel producers predictably in favor of keeping the Byrd Amendment in force and steel consuming industries in favor of its repeal.

In the case of the Byrd Amendment, the purely economic balance of power would seem to favor the forces for repeal, since steel consumers are more financially powerful and greater in number and political influence than steel producers. Organized as the Consuming Industries Trade Coalition, the consumer interests have made inroads in Congress, but have not achieved success. Their failure is another indication that sentiments of economic nationalism are providing added energy to protectionist interests, giving them victories on issues in which they would have lost or at least have had to compromise in climates of opinion more favorable to trade liberalization.

The Bottom Line

Signs of growing economic nationalism in the U.S. -- where mounting, though still inchoate, popular resistance to liberalization of global markets finds resonance in Congress -- do not portend a radical shift to protectionism, but a normalization of trade policy, in which internationalist and nationalist interests compete for influence in the state.

As rising economic powers throughout the world become more competitive, the U.S. is bound to lose comparative advantage in many industries, setting off moves for protection that will be opposed by industries that gain or maintain advantage.

Look for Washington to lose its role as leader in the drive for open markets and to become a player in a complex international system of markets that remain global but are hedged by restrictions and do not move in the direction of neo-liberal models of "free trade."

The greatest threat to normal bargaining that would set off a decisive tendency toward protectionism would be the mobilization of popular nationalist sentiment that political classes are unable to contain.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein


The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

84 police stations adopt e-beat system in Karnataka , India

Rasheed Kappan

Constables carry radio frequency readers
http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/10/stories/
2005081001700300.htm

BANGALORE: The Googol Beat Book is history in 84 police stations across the city. To monitor the movement and punctuality of night beat policemen, the Bangalore police have now installed Digital Beat Monitoring Systems at all these stations. Introduced first at the Indiranagar police station, this "e-BEAT System" is now part of the high tech gadgetry at 16 police stations in Mysore and 11 in Hubli.

Here's how the system works: Each beat constable is assigned a Radio Frequency Reader (RFR). He carries this to strategic beat locations (beat points), where tags are fixed with unique IDs. The constable places the RFR on the tag, which then stamps its ID, the time and date onto the reader. Once back in his station, the constable downloads the tag data onto a downloader connected to a computer. The schedule ID and the actual visited timings of a beat can be downloaded. This way, a superior can keep track of the constable's beat.

The system has an "officer's facility" to enable usage by senior police officials. The equipment and software are provided by Zygox Software, a city-based software firm. The RFR is recharged whenever the data is downloaded.

Under the earlier manual system, the beat constables used to sign in the Googol Beat Book kept in every police station. The officers were unable to verify the beat location and timing, and had to rely on the constable's data. The e-beat system was mooted following the discovery that the beat books did not always provide the true picture.

Beat plan

The e-beat system helps in planning the beat in advance with allocated readers and tags. With the system, beats can be scheduled and beat points of a Beat Plan maintained, Zygox Software officials told The Hindu . Constables could be assigned to cover a crime at a particular beat point.

Under the Beat Plan, the activity (visiting a beat point), the sequence (order) and the time of the visit are planned. A beat can have different plans associated with it, such as different visiting points during day and night or during sensitive days. The Beat Plans that are planned in advance could be scheduled for a given date. The schedules can then be printed out and handed over to the beat constable concerned.

With the available data, the system can generate a Beat Map, where a beat point can be added, modified or deleted. The police can define the sequence of the beat points, their importance and other details such as address, contact name and phone number. The beat activity and the crime criminal information system of the State Crime Records Bureau can be integrated by associating the crime that has occurred at the respective beat point. A new crime can be associated for a beat point with FIR details, crime type and timings. The previous crime can be assigned to a beat point by fetching the relevant details from the CCIS database.

August 09, 2005

SIKH RIOTS : 'Rajiv told me you’re a heart patient, take rest’

‘Rao told me to protect friends...Rajiv told me you’re a heart patient, take rest’

For the third time, then L-G Gavai has been made the fall guy

MANOJ MITTA

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 8 One man wasn’t surprised at all today, the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi at the time of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. Barely days before the Nanavati Commission report was tabled in Parliament, in an extensive conversation with The Indian Express at his Nagpur residence, P G Gavai was prescient: ‘‘I know I will again be made a scapegoat to shield the higher-ups.’’

Gavai is the highest executive authority to have been blamed by the Nanavati Commission for lapses related to the riots that shook the city for a week after October 31 that year.

Gavai claimed the carnage was not on account of any errors on his part but rather because the Rajiv Gandhi Government at the Centre ‘‘deliberately delayed’’ calling in the Army when the mass killings began on November 1, 1984.

For Gavai, the Nanavati report completes a dubious hat trick. The retired Maharashtra cadre IAS officer said this was the third occasion he had been made the ‘‘fall guy’’.

The first time, he said, was when Rajiv Gandhi summoned him on November 2, 1984, and told him: ‘‘Gavaiji, you are a heart patient and you should now take rest.’’ Though he was advised to proceed on leave, Gavai chose to assume ‘‘moral responsibility’’ and resign the following day, after overseeing Indira Gandhi’s funeral.

Two years later, the Ranganath Misra Commission, while exonerating the Rajiv Gandhi Government — its home minister was P V Narasimha Rao, later to become premier himself — held Gavai should have ‘‘perhaps’’ assumed more than just moral blame and kept open ‘‘the extent of his responsibility’’.

Again in the Nanavati report, the blame for administrative lapses has not gone beyond Gavai, to the Union Home Ministry or even further up. ‘‘Gavai was the person responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Delhi,’’ the Nanavati report says baldly, ‘‘and, therefore, he cannot escape the responsibility for its failure.’’

But Gavai had another view. Though law and order of Delhi came directly under the jurisdiction of the Union Home Ministry, it was convenient for everybody, he alleged, to pin the blame on him. He ascribed this to two reasons: one, he was not a Congress politician, and, two, he belonged to the Scheduled Castes.

Gavai’s chief claim to innocence is that he had asked the then commissioner of Delhi Police, S C Tandon, to call in the Army right on the morning of November 1, when the violence had just begun. But for reasons beyond his control, the Army entered only two of the then six police districts of Delhi by the evening of November 1. It became effective in all districts as late as November 3. By then, hundreds of Sikhs had been slaughtered.

‘‘The sequence of events clearly tells a tale. Political authorities purposely wasted time in keeping with their nefarious design to teach Sikhs a lesson,’’ Gavai told The Indian Express. ‘‘(P V Narasimha) Rao was calling me up to only ask me to protect his friends.’’

When Rajiv Gandhi rebuked him at their November 2 meeting for not having acted swiftly in calling in the Army, Gavai, by his own admission, kept quiet. He saw no point in defending himself: ‘‘Who was I to delay the Army? Those who could have sent the Army had purposely delayed it. When I raised this with the then Army chief, he said these things (deployment) take time. The concern that was shown was all a drama.’’

Gavai regretted that even after 21 years, the Indian state was not prepared to ‘‘face up to the political complicity’’ in the massacre: ‘‘It’s a shame they are still engaged in that drama.’’



URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=75903

Indians are demanding answers from Antonia Sonia Maino Gandhi

The country demands answers to the following questions from Antonia-Sonia-Maino-Gandhi:

This is the latest (posting in Dharmabhoomi.blogspot.com) in the series…exposes a nexus between the Adventists, Super PM Sonia, Dummy PM Manmohan, MHA, Ambassador Ronen Sen, Mavelikara MLA Murali and Kerala CM Chandy, not to leave out Y Samuel Rajasekhar and the hundreds of crypto-christists that are destroying Bharatvarsha. Jesus is fast returning. The likes of Ron Watts are working hard, with his coterie pulling the strings behind scenes. Bharat is now up for grabs. Beware. Congress I (or) Cong Cross I? Read all the wonderful things Antonia is doing to this great country (our Bharath):

Excerpts:
------------------------

**Just make a list of the christists and crypto-christists who have suddenly gained prominence (in India) under super-PM, Antonia’s rule. You will understand the profitability of being a christist in India that has been engulfed by the dark shadows of this most dangerous lady.

**Ron Watts is just one ugly face of the proselytizing church. There are thousands of Ron Watts out there to destroy the social fabric of this (Hindu Nation). And it spells danger for this (Hindu Nation) if a law-breaking proselytizer is seen hob-nobbing with the natural allies like Antonia Maino. And I dread to imagine the consequences of the impending visit to India of the new pope sometime later this year.

**The likes of Ron Watts is just the symptom. The disease is church and Antonia Maino. A virulent combination of a deadly virus called churchianity and a largely unknown strain of bacteria that originally was Antonia Maino and has morphed into a more dangerous strain called Sonia Gandhi. The country is badly in need of two prescriptions. One for therapy and the other for prophylaxis.
Antonia has baptized Congress-I. And let us help her christen it as Cong-Cross-I. Amen.

**Can (any one) stop the onslaught of this virulent strain -- this dangerous duo -- the church and Sonia as it continues to eat through the delicate cellular matrix of this great Hindu society? Add to this, her total silence on Islamic terrorism. To the Hindus, it should become glaringly evident that the proliferating Hallaluja is a serious threat, because in today's context, it really means: Halal-you- yeah.

**The cover of the internal magazine of the Seventh Day Adventists, New South Asia Tidings (Volume 4 Number 3 May/June 2005) features an interesting photo of this meeting. A. J. Tito, the editor, Pastor Eric Kunjur and Ron Watts are seen with Sonia Gandhi.

**The country demands answers to the following questions from Antonia-Sonia-Maino- Gandhi:

**Why did you meet Ron Watts (in 2005) when he has a “Leave the Country” Notice issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2003?
**Were you aware that this foreigner has no business in India except conversions and that the MHA has issued a “Leave the Country” Notice on him in 2003?

**Or will you fake ignorance, like the false number of supporters you claimed before the truth of the real numbers stared at your face and suddenly lost your natural voice so you had to resort to your perceived “Inner voice” that you thought would make you Antonia-Teresa – John-I-Luke-II-Mark-III Brand?

**What is your role in the conversions made by the Seventh Day Adventists under Ron Watts?

**How is it that you are seen with a known absconder?
Were you not provided with the routine intelligence background material (You are under Z "plus" category protection) before you received your visitors, which included Ron Watts, the known law-breaking-foreign national?

**What assurances did you give to Ron Watts and his coterie?

**What was the barter the you agreed with co-christist Ron Watts to sell India to the kingdom of god through rapid conversions?

**Have you assured Ron and Dorothy Watts with Citizenship of India, as is being whispered in the SDA circles?
**Did you order the MHA – the ever-willing Sivaraj Patil, to revoke the “Leave the Country” Notice on Ron and Dorothy Watts? And then the SDA can gleefully tell the High Court that the order has been rescinded and the case can be dismissed etc.,

**Have you "directed" the MHA to revoke the "Leave the Country" Notice on Ron and Dorothy Watts? What grounds are being prepared for such a revocation of the "Leave the Country" Notice on Ron and Dorothy Watts, by the MHA?

**Did you prevail upon Ronen Sen, our Ambassador to USA, to give out 60 passes to the Adventists (one for Ron Watts) to be at the VIP area during the reception President Bush gave to PM Singh at the White House Lawns on the July 18th? (Ron Watts was on the reception party at the White House Lawns)

Young French jihadists trained in camps with the Kashmir

Three members of terrorist networks condemned in France had been dispatched towards the Indian sub-continent



J C.
[ August 08, 2005 ]

Young European islamists accomodated in Pakistan by terrorist organizations before returning, duly embrigadés, on the Old Continent. The course of three of the London terrorists of July 7 will not have surprised the magistrates of the pole Parisian antiterrorist. Since 2002, their investigations established that at least three French, Hassan el-Cheguer, Hakim Mokhfi and Willy Brigitte, passed by the camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let), been dependent on Al-Qaida.


Challenged on June 15, 2002, Hassan el-Cheguer and Hakim Mokhfi, 31 years, were put in examination in the investigation into the network of support for Richard Reid, the British who wanted to explode in flight Paris-Miami in December 2001. They were condemned on last 16 June to four years of prison, including one with deferment. The investigation recalled the Pakistani course of these islamists engaged since the Nineties. They come into contact during 2001 with a Pakistani islamist installed to Paris, Ghulam Rama. This last assistance to gain Pakistan, via London, before leading them to Lahore in an office of recruitment of Lashkar-e-Taiba. They accomplish a long voyage before joining a camp in full mountain of the Pakistani Cashmere. According to services' of information, one would train there in particular kamikazes. On the spot, the young French find militants Pakistani like foreigners. They are devoted to meetings of shootings to the light weapon and sports activities.


A few days after September 11, 2001, the two men set out again for Europe. Placed on phone-tappings, Hassan el-Cheguer entrusts to a young woman, May 4, 2002, which he wants to make "something of large for adding Islam ": "I cannot t'en speak on the telephone, it is hot." Questioned after his interpellation, a few weeks later, the man affirms that he wanted only to impress his interlocutress.


In September 2001, Lashkar-e-Taiba recruits a third French, Willy Brigitte. It joined a camp of the area of Faisalabad where it is exerted, at the sides from abroad of which British and Americans of Pakistani origin, with the handling of the weapons and explosives. With its return in France, in March 2002, it con?e with one of his/her "brothers" islamists whom he returned to contact of other djihadists. In 2003, a British person in charge for the Let sends it in Australia, the ticket being offered him by Pakistani installed in Paris area. Challenged in Australia on October 9, 2003, Willy Brigitte is expelled towards France before being put in examination and is écroué for "criminal conspiracy in relation to a terrorist company". Brigitte is the third djihadist "free-Pakistani". But perhaps not the last. "We do not know, notices a police officer, if the holidays of certain Pakistanais young people of France did not hide stays in the camps".