October 01, 2005

Sufi Jihad? Unmasking Sufi sects deadly face

Sufi Jihad?
May 15th, 2005

The Sufi branch of Islam has enjoyed spectacularly good press in the
West. Hailed as peaceful mystics who believe jihad is a spiritual quest,
nothing violent or unpleasant, Sufism has attracted favorable attention
and converts from all sorts of Westerners, from new agers in Marin
County, California, to East Coast intellectuals. But Sufis are not
necessarily all peace-loving meditative seekers of the divine.

The formation of the "The Sufi Jihadi Squadrons of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir
al-Gilani" in Iraq was recently announced at the jihadist website,
"Jihad Unspun". The Al-Gilani (d.1166) after whom they are named was in
fact a Hanbali Sufi.

Sufi jihadists"(?)-a "Hanbali Sufi"(??)-haven't we been lectured at
great length about the singular evils of "Wahhabism" -rooted in the
Hanbali school of Muslim jurisprudence, epitomized by Ibn Taymiyya (d.
1328)-versus its Islamic "antithesis", the ecumenical tradition of mystical

Notwithstanding the musings of a Muslim journalist and neo-convert from
Bolshevism to Sufi Islam (see his bizarre and treacly "profession of
faith" here, and a clinical description of what this newly described
syndrome represents), Sufism has been linked integrally to the Muslim
institution of jihad war since the 11th century C.E.

Consistent with this nexus between Sufism and orthodox Islam, Sufis
have supported (fervently) the corollary institution of dhimmitude,
replete with all its oppressive and humiliating regulations for non-Muslims.
It is also important to highlight, in contrast, the very flimsy
theological foundation of the much ballyhooed Sufi notion of the so-called
"greater" spiritual jihad. Even the Islamophilic scholar Reuven Firestone
has acknowledged the dubious nature of the hadith ostensibly outlining
this potential interpretation of jihad: [1]

Its source is not usually given, and it is in fact nowhere to be found
in the canonical collections [of hadith]

Of course devout Muslims, and influential 20th century scholars of
Islam like the Shi'ite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), or the
brilliant Sunni ideologue Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), always recognized the
marginal Islamic foundations of this putative Sufi construction in
their seminal writings and lectures, and dismissed it outright. [2]

But what have the most important Sufi theologians and jurists written
on the uniquely Islamic institution of jihad war, and its corollary
institution, dhimmitude, from the Medieval era, through the present? Also,
what has been the role of prominent Sufis or Sufi movements vis a vis
jihad war, and the implementation of dhimmitude?

Al-Ghazali, Medieval Sufism, Jihad and Dhimmitude

Let us begin with a towering figure in Muslim intellectual history,
Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who was born at Tus in Khurasan, near modern
Meshed, Iran, and became a renowned theologian, jurist, and mystic.
Al-Ghazali's early training was as a jurist, and he continued to have an
interest in jurisprudence throughout his career, writing a work the Wadjiz,
dated 1101, i.e., in the last decade of his life. The eminent Islamic
scholar W.M. Watt stresses Al-Ghazali's Muslim orthodoxy. Watt maintains
that Al-Ghazali was [3]

.acclaimed in both the East and West as the greatest Muslim after
Muhammad, and he is by no means unworthy of that dignity.He brought
orthodoxy and mysticism into closer contact.the theologians became more ready
to accept the mystics as respectable, while the mystics were more
careful to remain within the bounds of orthodoxy.

Al-Ghazali, a Sufi orthodox Muslim, and follower of the Shafi'i school
of Islamic jurisprudence, wrote this about jihad war and the treatment
of the vanquished non-Muslim dhimmi peoples, in the Wadjiz: [4]

[O]ne must go on jihad (i.e., warlike razzias or raids) at least once a
year...one may use a catapult against them [non-Muslims] when they are
in a fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set
fire to them and/or drown them...If a person of the Ahl al-Kitab
[People of The Book - primarily Jews and Christians] is enslaved, his
marriage is [automatically] revoked.One may cut down their trees...One must
destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they
decide...they may steal as much food as they need...

[T]he dhimmi is obliged not to mention Allah or His Apostle.Jews,
Christians, and Majians must pay the jizya [poll tax on non-Muslims].on
offering up the jizya, the dhimmi must hang his head while the official
takes hold of his beard and hits [the dhimmi] on the protruberant bone
beneath his ear [i.e., the mandible]. They are not permitted to
ostentatiously display their wine or church bells.their houses may not be higher
than the Muslim's, no matter how low that is. The dhimmi may not ride
an elegant horse or mule; he may ride a donkey only if the saddle
[-work] is of wood. He may not walk on the good part of the road. They [the
dhimmis] have to wear [an identifying] patch [on their clothing], even
women, and even in the [public] baths.[dhimmis] must hold their tongue..

Compare Al-Ghazali's writings, above, to the statements below by two
later, prominent Hanbali jurists, Ibn Qudama (d. 1223), and the much
demonized Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328). First Ibn Qudama: [5]

Legal war (jihad) is an obligatory social duty (fard-kifaya); when one
group of Moslems guarantees that it is being carried out in a
satisfactory manner, the others are exempted.

The jihad becomes a strictly binding personal duty (fard-'ain) for all
Moslems who are enlisted or whose country has been [invaded] by the
enemy. It is obligatory only for free men who have reached puberty, are
endowed with reason and capable of fighting. Jihad is the best of the
works of supererogation. Abu Huraira relates that "The Prophet, when
asked what was the best of all works, replied: Belief in God [and in His
Prophet].- And then? someone asked him. - War for God's cause, then a
pious pilgrimage." Abu Sa'id reports also that the Prophet, when asked
who was the best of all men, replied, "He who fights for God's cause,
personally and with his goods.". It is permitted to surprise the
infidels under cover of night, to bombard them with mangonels [an engine that
hurls missiles] and to attack them without declaring battle (du'a').
The Prophet attacked the Banu Mustaliq unexpectedly, while their animals
were still at the watering-place; he killed the men who had fou!
ght against him and carried off the children into captivity. It is
forbidden to kill children, madmen, women, priests, impotent old men, the
infirm, the blind, the weak-minded, unless they have taken part in the

The chief of State decides on the fate of the men who are taken as
prisoners; he can have them put to death, reduce them to slavery, free
them in return for a ransom or grant them their freedom as a gift. He
must choose the solution most in keeping with the common good of the

The jizya can be demanded only from the Peoples of the Book
(Ahl-al-Kitab) and from Zoroastrians (Magus), who pledge to pay it and submit to
the laws of the community. The Peoples of the Book are understood to
mean the Jews and those who follow the religion of the Torah, as well as
the Christians and those who follow the religion of the Gospel. When
People of the Book or Zoroastrians ask to pay the jizya and to submit to
the laws of the community, one must grant their request, and it is
forbidden to fight them. The jizya is collected at the beginning of each
year. It is set at 48 dirhems for a rich man, at 24 dirhems for a man of
moderate means, and at 12 dirhems for a man of lowly estate. It cannot
be demanded from children who have not reached the age of puberty, from
women, helpless old men, the sick, the blind, or slaves, nor from poor
people who are unable to pay it. An infidel subject to the jizya who
converts to Islam is free of this obligation. When an infidel d!
ies, his heirs are responsible for the jizya.

Ibn Taymiyya: [6]

Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the
religion is God's entirely and God's word is uppermost, therefore
according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be
fought. As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as
women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their
likes, they shall not be killed unless they actually fight with words
(e.g. by propaganda) and acts (e.g. by spying or otherwise assisting in
the warfare).

As for the People of the Book and the Zoroastrians (Majus), they are to
be fought until they become Muslims or pay the tribute (jizya) out of
hand and have been humbled.

Any fair, objective comparison must conclude that relative to the
Hanbali jurists Ibn Qudama and Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Ghazali is at least as
bellicose in his pronouncements on jihad war, and more bigoted and
oppressive in his stated guidelines for the treatment of the vanquished
non-Muslim dhimmis. Furthermore, Al Ghazali's views regarding non-Muslim
dhimmis-which were typical of the prevailing written opinions of Muslim
theologians and jurists during the Abbasid-Baghdadian Caliphate-resulted in
tangible acts of dhimmi persecution, as recorded, for example, in this
contemporary chronicle from Baghdad by Obadyah the Proselyte, in 1100
C.E.: [7]

.the Caliph of Baghdad, al-Muqtadi [1075-1094], had given power to his
vizier, Abu Shuja. [who] imposed that each male Jew should wear a
yellow badge on his headgear. This was one distinctive sign on the head and
the other was on the neck- a piece of lead of the weight of a silver
dinar hanging round the neck of every Jew and inscribed with the word
dhimmi to signify that the Jew had to pay poll-tax. Jews also had to wear
girdles round their wastes. Abu Shuja further imposed two signs on
Jewish women. They had to wear a black and a red shoe, and each woman had
to have a small brass bell on her neck or shoe, which would tinkle and
thus announce the separation of Jewish from Gentile [Muslim] women. He
assigned cruel Muslim men to spy upon Jewish women, in order to oppress
them with all kinds of curses, humiliation, and spite. The Gentile
population used to mock all the Jews, and the mob and their children used
to beat up the Jews in all the streets of Baghdad.When a Jew died, !
who had not paid up the poll-tax [jizya] to the full and was in debt
for a small or large amount, the Gentiles did not permit burial until the
poll-tax was paid. If the deceased left nothing of value, the Gentiles
demanded that other Jews should, with their own money, meet the debt
owed by the deceased in poll-tax; otherwise they [threatened] they would
burn the body.

Finally, in the spirit of Al Ghazali's teachings on jihad war, the
Seljuk and Ottoman jihad campaigns which ravaged neighboring Asia Minor
from the 11th through 15th centuries, were spearheaded by "Ghazi" (from
the word ghazwa or "razzia") movements, "Warriors of the Faith", brought
together under the banner of Islam to fight infidels, and obtain booty.
Incited by pious Muslim theologians-most prominently, Sufi
dervishes-these ghazis were at the vanguard of both the Seljuk and Ottoman jihad
conquests. A.E. Vacalopoulos highlights the role of these dervishes
during the Ottoman campaigns: [8]

.fanatical dervishes and other devout Muslim leaders.constantly toiled
for the dissemination of Islam. They had done so from the very
beginning of the Ottoman state and had played an important part in the
consolidation and extension of Islam. These dervishes were particularly active
in the uninhabited frontier regions of the east. Here they settled down
with their families, attracted other settlers, and thus became the
virtual founders of whole new villages, whose inhabitants invariably
exhibited the same qualities of deep religious fervor. From places such as
these, the dervishes or their agents would emerge to take part in new
military enterprises for the extension of the Islamic state. In return,
the state granted them land and privileges under a generous prescription
which required only that the land be cultivated and communications

Sufi Ideologues in Pre-Modern India

The Sufism practiced on the Indian subcontinent was quite intolerant of
Hinduism, during both the late Delhi Sultanate and early Mughal
periods, as documented by K. S. Lal, a pre-eminent 20th century Indian scholar
of Islam. Lal [9] focuses on the writings of the influential Sufi
cleric Abdul Quddus Gangoh (~1456-1537):

The Muslim Mushaikh [Sufi spiritual leaders] were as keen on
conversions as the Ulama, and contrary to general belief, in place of being kind
to the Hindus as saints would, they too wished the Hindus to be
accorded a second class citizenship if they were not converted. Only one
instance, that of Shaikh Abdul Quddus Gangoh, need be cited because he
belonged to the Chishtia Silsila considered to be the most tolerant of all
Sufi groups. He wrote letters to the Sultan Sikandar Lodi, Babur, and
Humayun to re-invigorate the Shariat [Sharia] and reduce the Hindus to
payers of land tax and jizya. To Babur he wrote, "Extend utmost patronage
and protection to theologians and mystics... that they should be
maintained and subsidized by the state... No non-Muslim should be given any
office or employment in the Diwan of Islam... Furthermore, in conformity
with the principles of the Shariat they should be subjected to all
types of indignities and humiliations. They should be made to pay th!
e jizya...They should be disallowed from donning the dress of the
Muslims and should be forced to keep their Kufr [infidelity] concealed and
not to perform the ceremonies of their Kufr openly and freely. They
should not be allowed to consider themselves the equal to the Muslims."

Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) was an eminent Sufi mystic, connected
with several Sufi orders (including the Naqshbandi order), who
contributed greatly toward the revival of orthodox Islam, following the
heterodox experiments of Akbar's reign (1556-1605). Sirhindi published a
number of tracts and letters promoting his views, which condemned the
ecumenism Akbar had promulgated towards Hindus, in particular. As opposed to
his bigoted views of the Hindus, Sirhindi's ad hominem attack on Jews
must reflect a theological (i.e., Muslim) Judenhass [Jew-hatred], as it
is unlikely he would have had any direct contact with the minute and
remote Jewish communities in pre-modern India.

Shariat can be fostered through the sword..Kufr and Islam are opposed
to each other. The progress of one is possible only at the expense of
the other and co-existence between these two contradictory faiths is
unthinkable..The honor of Islam lies in insulting kufr and kafirs. One
who respects kafirs, dishonors the Muslims. To respect them does not
merely mean honoring them and assigning them a seat of honor in any
assembly, but it also implies keeping company with them or showing
considerations to them. They should be kept at an arm's length like dogs..If
some worldly business cannot be performed without them, in that case only
a minimum of contact should be established with them but without taking
them into confidence. The highest Islamic sentiment asserts that it is
better to forego that worldly business and that no relationship should
be established with the kafirs.The real purpose in levying jizya on
them [the non-Muslims] is to humiliate then to such an extent that!
, on account of fear of jizya , they may not be able to dress well and
to live in grandeur. They should constantly remain terrified and
trembling. It in intended to hold them under contempt and to uphold the
honor and might of Islam.Cow-sacrifice in India is the noblest of Islamic
practices. The kafirs may probably agree to pay jizya but they shall
never concede to cow-sacrifice.The execution of the accursed kafir of
Gobindwal [a Sikh who lead an uprising against the oppressive Muslim rule
of his community] is an important achievement and is the cause of great
defeat of the accursed Hindus.Whatever might have been the motive
behind the execution, the dishonor of the kafirs is an act of highest grace
for the Muslims. Before the execution of the kafirs I had seen in a
vision that the Emperor had destroyed the crown of the head of Shirk.
Verily he was the chief of the Mushriks and the leader of the
kafirs.Whenever a Jew is killed, it is for the benefit of Islam. [10]

Yohanan Friedmann offers this summary assessment of Sirhindi's
attitudes towards the Hindus: [11]

Sirhindi follows up his utter rejection of the beliefs and practices of
Hinduism with an equally outspoken statement of his attitude regarding
the position of the Hindus in the Mughul empire. The honour of Islam
demands the humiliation of the infidels and their false religion. To
achieve this objective, jizyah should be mercilessly levied upon them,
and they should be treated like dogs. Cows should be slaughtered to
demonstrate the supremacy of Islam. The performance of this rite is, in
India, the most important symbol of Islamic domination. One should
refrain from dealing with the infidels unless absolutely necessary, and even
then treat then with contempt. Islam and infidelity are two
irreconcilable opposites. One thrives upon the degradation of the other.
Sirhindi's deep-seated hatred of the non-Muslims can be best illustrated by
his rejoicing at the execution in 1606 of Arjun, the fifth guru of the

Shah Aladihlawi Wali-Allah (1703-1762), was a theologian, pioneering
Persian translator of the Qur'an, Sufi traditionalist, and political
activist. Shah Wali-Allah's letters to Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali
(Durrani), as well as prominent local Muslim leaders urging them to
cooperate with Durrani in undertaking a jihad against the (Hindu) Marathas and
Jats, reveal his persistent efforts to establish a (foreign, if
necessary) and more militant Muslim dynasty within India. Shah Wali-Allah was
thus not only an inspiration for Durrani's invasions of 1756-57 and
1760-61, he was also responsible for helping to organize a confederacy of
Muslim powers against the (Hindu) Marathas in Northern India.

It has become clear to my mind that the kingdom of heaven has
predestined that kafirs should be reduced to a state of humiliation and treated
with utter contempt. Should that repository of majesty and dauntless
courage [Nizam al-Maluk] gird his loins and direct his attention to such
a task he can conquer the world. Thus the faith will become more
popular and his own power strengthened; a little effort would be profoundly
rewarded. Should he make no effort, they [the Marathas] would
inevitably be weakened and annihilated through celestial calamities and in such
an event he would gain no credit.As I have learnt this unequivocally
[from the divine] I spontaneously write to draw your attention to the
great opportunity laid before you. You should therefore not be negligent
in fighting jihad.Oh Kings! Mala a'la urges you to draw your swords
and not put them back in their sheaths again until Allah has separated
the Muslims from the polytheists and the rebellious kafirs and the!
sinners are made absolutely feeble and helpless."

In his testament to [subsequent Caliph] Umar, [then Caliph] Abu Bakr
had informed him that if he feared God, the entire world would be
frightened of him ['Umar]. Sages and declared that the world resembled a
shadow. If a man ran after his shadow it would pursue him, and if he took
flight from the shadow it would still pursue him. God has chosen you
as the protector of the Sunnis as there is no-one else to perform this
duty, and it is crucial that at all times you consider your role as
obligatory. By taking up the sword to make Islam supreme and by
subordinating your own persona needs to this cause, you will reap vast benefits.

We beseech you [Durrani, a Muslim ruler] in the name of the Prophet to
fight a jihad against the infidels of this region. This would entitle
you to great rewards before God the Most High and your name would be
included in the list of those who fought jihad for His sake. As far as
worldly gains are concerned, incalculable booty would fall into the
hands of the Islamic ghazis and the Muslims would be liberated from their
bonds. The invasion of Nadir Shah who destroyed the Muslims left the
Marathas and Jats secure and prosperous. This resulted in the infidels
regaining their strength and in the reduction of the Muslim leaders of
Delhi to mere puppets.

When the conquering army arrives in an area with a mixed Muslim-Hindu
population, the imperial guards should transfer the Muslims from their
villages to the towns and at the same time care for their property.
Financial assistance should be given by governments to the deprived and
the poor as well as to Sayyids and the 'ulama. Their generosity would
then become famous with prompt prayers for their victories. Each town
would eagerly await the arrival of the Islamic army ('that paragon of
bounty'). Moreover, wherever there was even the slightest fear of a
Muslim defeat, the Islamic army should be there to disperse infidels to all
corners of the earth. Jihad should be their first priority, thereby
ensuring the security of every Muslim. [12]

S.A.A. Rizvi's detailed analysis of Shah Wali-Allah doctrine of jihad
concludes: [13]

According to Shah Wali-Allah the mark of the perfect implementation of
the Shari'a was the performance of jihad. He compared the duties of
Muslims in relation to the law to those of a favourite slave who
administered bitter medicine to other slaves in a household. If this was done
forcefully it was quite legitimate but if someone mixed it with
kindness it was even better. However, there were people, said the Shah who
indulged in their lower natures by following their ancestral religion,
ignoring the advice and commands of the Prophet Muhammad. If one chose
to explain Islam to such people like this it was to do then a
disservice. Force, said the Shah, was the much better course - Islam should be
forced down their throats like bitter medicine to a child. This,
however, was only possible if the leaders of the non-Muslim communities who
failed to accept Islam were killed; the strength of the community was
reduced, their property confiscated and a situation was created whic!
h led to their followers and descendants willingly accepting Islam.
The Shah pleaded that the universal domination of Islam was not possible
without jihad and by holding on to the tails of cows.

Shi'ite Sufism and Dhimmitude in Contemporary Iran

Sultanhussein Tabandeh, a modern Shi'ite Sufi leader, wrote an entire
treatise in 1966 decrying various elements of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights that are incompatible with Islamic law: an "Islamic
perspective" on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [14] According
to Professor Eliz Sanasarian of the University of Southern California,
who has analyzed the plight of religious minorities in the Islamic
Republic, Tabandeh's tract became "the core ideological work upon which the
Iranian government.based its non-Muslim policy." His views on
non-Muslims, says Sanasarian, were implemented "almost verbatim in the Islamic
Republic of Iran." [15]

Tabandeh begins his discussion by lauding Shah Ismail I (1502-1524),
the repressive and bigoted founder of the Safavid dynasty, [16] as a
champion "of the oppressed." He then reaffirms the traditional
inferiority of non-Muslims to Muslims, as sacralized by the Shari'a: [17]

Thus if [a] Muslim commits adultery his punishment is 100 lashes, the
shaving of his head, and one year of banishment. But if the man is not a
Muslim and commits adultery with a Muslim woman his penalty is
execution.Similarly if a Muslim deliberately murders another Muslim he falls
under the law of retaliation and must by law be put to death by the next
of kin. But if a non-Muslim who dies at the hand of a Muslim has by
lifelong habit been a non-Muslim, the penalty of death is not valid.
Instead the Muslim murderer must pay a fine and be punished with the lash.
Since Islam regards non-Muslims as on a lower level of belief and
conviction, if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim.then his punishment must not be
the retaliatory death, since the faith and conviction he possesses is
loftier than that of the man slain.Again, the penalties of a non-Muslim
guilty of fornication with a Muslim woman are augmented because, in
addition to the crime against morality, social duty and religion, he h!
as committed sacrilege, in that he has disgraced a Muslim and thereby
cast scorn upon the Muslims in general, and so must be executed.

Islam and its peoples must be above the infidels, and never permit
non-Muslims to acquire lordship over them. Since the marriage of a Muslim
woman to an infidel husband (in accordance with the verse quoted: 'Men
are guardians form women') means her subordination to an infidel, that
fact makes the marriage void, because it does not obey the conditions
laid down to make a contract valid. As the Sura ('The Woman to be
Examined', LX v. 10) says: 'Turn them not back to infidels: for they are not
lawful unto infidels nor are infidels lawful unto them (i.e., in

Sufi Jihad in the Pre-Modern and Modern Northern Caucasus

Daghestan was originally Islamized during the 7th and 8th centuries by
the Arab Muslim jihad conquests of the Umayyads and Abassids. Several
centuries later, a wave of invasions by nomadic Turco-Mongol tribes from
the east, and their imposition of (or mass conversion to) Islam
extended the Muslim population in the northern Caucasus. [18] By the mid-16th
century, Russian Cossacks began to settle the sparsely populated
Chechen lowlands (the slopes of the Terek Range, and the Terek Valley). These
Russian settlers became subjects of Ivan the Terrible in order to gain
protection from ongoing razzias launched by the Crimean Tatars and
Turks. [19] Imperial Russia advanced actively into the Northern Caucasus
and Transcaucasus in 1781, precipitating the anti-Russian jihad of the
Naqshbandi Sufi Sheikh Mansur Ushurma. [20] Following his destruction of
an entire Russian brigade during the battle of the Sunzha River in
1785, Sheikh Mansur, [21]

.called the mountaineers to holy war against the encroaching infidels
and for some years unified practically the whole of North Caucasus, from
the Chechen territory in the west to the Kumyk steppes in the east. His
appeal-at least what we know of it-sounds very much like the appeals to
jihad by Naqshbandi murshids [masters; leaders of Sufi Brotherhoods] of
later date.

From this watershed late 18th century jihad, through the present era,
the Naqshbandi tariqat [Brotherhood] has played a critical role
defending and expanding Muslim dominion, in the face of encroachments by both
Czarist and Soviet Russia. Transforming "half pagan mountaineers into
strict orthodox Muslims", the Naqshbandiya extended Islam into the
animist regions of upper Chechnya and the western Caucasus. [22]. Moreover,
iron-disciplined and dedicated Naqshbandi followers provided such
prolonged, heroic resistance to Czarist Russian conquest, that Bennigsen and
Wimbush argue, quite plausibly,

It can said that the nearly fifty-year-long [19th century] Caucasian
wars made an important contribution to the material and moral ruin of the
Tsarist empire and hastened the downfall of the Romanov monarchy. [23]

During the tragic violence of the revolutionary years of 1917-1921,
which were particularly sanguinary in the northeastern Caucasus, the Sufi
brotherhoods, especially the Naqshbandiya, once again played a pivotal
role. Their ultimate goals in resisting the Communists were consistent
with precepts of jihad, as both a defensive and expansionist ideology:

.to restore a theocratic monarchy governed by the Shari'yat law, the
expulsion of Russians, and the liquidation of 'bad Muslims" who had
committed themselves to the infidel rulers. The following was one of the
sayings of the Naqshbandi Sheikh, Uzun Haji, one of the leaders of the
brotherhood: 'If so God wills, we shall construct a Shari'yat monarchy,
for in a Muslim land there can be no republic. Were we to accept a
republic, we would thereby renounce the Calife, which would be paramount of
[sic] renouncing the Prophet and finally God himself'. And somewhat more
to the point: 'I am weaving a rope to hang engineers, students and in
general all those who write from left to right'

Despite relentless persecution throughout the Soviet era, which
included a massive, brutal deportation of over a million North Caucasian
Muslims to Siberia and Kazakhstan in February, 1944, Soviet specialists in
anti-Islamic propaganda conceded that they had failed to contain the
expansion of Sufi organizations, which emerged even after World War II,

.more powerful and influential than before the War, probably even than
before 1917. V.G. Pivovarov, a leading Soviet sociologist, wrote in
1975: "More than half of the Muslim believers of the Checheno-Ingush
Autonomous Republic are members of a murid [disciple] brotherhood"

Presently, a Sufi Naqshbandi leader , Shamil Basayev, who envisions
himself to be in the mold of legendary 19th century Naqshbandi North
Caucasus jihadists, such as his namesake Imam Shamil, plays a key role in
the ongoing Chechen jihad against the post-Soviet Russian government.
Basayev, it should be noted, not only appears to have Caliphate dreams ,
he orchestrated the brutal Beslan massacre of at least 331
schoolchildren in North Ossetia, September 3, 2004.


Sufism is not an ideological penicillin (let alone a modern,
efficacious therapy given evolving drug resistance!) for what a neo-convert Sufi
Muslim journalist terms the "syphilis" of Wahhabism , nor is the much
maligned Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya the "index case" of Wahhabism,
which itself is deeply and broadly rooted in orthodox Islam. In a very
sympathetic, but informed analysis of Sufism in the former Soviet Union,
Benningsen and Wimbush provided these valid assessments: [26]

Sufism is not a sect, nor is it a heretical or schismatic movement; it
is an integral part of orthodox Islam. [emphasis added] Western
analysts in particular are prone to lose sight of this fact, frequently
alluding to Sufism instead as something foreign to Islam, indeed something
aberrant.the heritage of Sufism [includes] not only in its cultural,
intellectual and mystical aspects, but also.its militant holy war [i.e.,
jihad] tradition, symbolized by the Caucasian Naqshbandiya.[emphasis

Benningsen and Wimbush further warned, with distressingly ignored
prescience (i.e., circa 1985)-seen now in light of the brutal actions of the
Sufi jihadist Shamil Basayev-of the crucial need,

.to begin to understand the Sufi phenomena in the Soviet Union before
events leave us groping for explanations. [27]

Throughout the 20th century, and at present, Sufi ideologues and mass
movements (especially the Naqshbandiya) have been engaged in
defensive-offensive jihad campaigns designed not only to expel real (or perceived)
"colonial powers", but also to create supra-national (regional) shari'a
states, or even a frank Caliphate (i.e., a single unified global
shari'a state). The restored Shi'ite theocracy in Iran, whose contemporary
shari'a-based system of dhimmitude was drafted by a leading
Sufi-Sultanhussein Tabandeh-provides a sobering example of what "Sufi ecumenism"
towards non-Muslims means in practice.

In his hagiography of "the enlightened traditions of Sufism," which, he
claims "stress . respect for all believers, whether Muslim, Christian,
Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or other," as well as a "commitment to mutual
civility, interaction, and cooperation among believers, regardless of
sect," an aforementioned Muslim journalist simply ignores all of the
data presented here on the living legacy of Sufi jihad and dhimmitude.
Regardless of whether his misleading characterizations are deliberately
disingenuous, or just grossly uninformed, their effect is corrosive at a
time when global jihad movements, and the sacralized, manichean bigotry
which motivates them, remain the most profound existential threat to
free and open societies.

Andrew G. Bostom, MD, MS is an Associate Professor of Medicine and
author of the forthcoming The Legacy of Jihad on Prometheus Books.

[1] Reuven Firestone. Jihad-The Origin of Holy War in Islam, Oxford
University Press, 1999, pp. 139-140, note 19.
[2] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. "Islam is not a Religion of Pacifists
(1942)", "Speech at Feyziyeh Theological School (August 24, 1979)", and
"On the Nature of the Islamic State (September 8, 1979)", English
translations in Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism
and the Middle East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 29,
32-36.; Sayyid Qutb. Chapter 4, "Jihaad in the cause of God", in
Milestones, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1993, pp. 53-76.
[3]W.M. Watt. [Translator]. The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali,
Oxford, England, 1953, p. 13.
[4]Al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Kitab al-Wagiz fi fiqh madhab al-imam
al-Safi'i, Beirut, 1979, pp. 186, 190-91; 199-200; 202-203. [English
translation by Dr. Michael Schub.]
[5] Ibn Qudama. Le précis de droit d'Ibn Qudama, jurisconsulte
musulman d'école hanbalite né à Jérusalem en 541/1146, mort à Damas en
620/1223, (Livre XX- "La Guerre Legale"), translated from Arabic into French
by Henri Laoust, Beyrouth (Beirut), 1950, pp.273-276, 281. ["Legal War",
chapter 20, The Summary of Law by Ibn Qudama]. English translation by
Michael J. Miller.
[6] Ibn Taymiyya, from al-Siyasa al-shariyya, translated by Rudolph
Peters in Jihad in classical and modern Islam, Princeton, NJ, Markus
Wiener, 1996, pp. 44-54.
[7] A. Scheiber. "The Origins of Obadyah, the Norman Proselyte" Journal
of Jewish Studies (Oxford), Vol. 5, 1954, p. 37. Obadyah the Proselyte
was born in Oppido (Lucano, southern Italy). He became a priest, and
later converted to Judaism around 1102 A.D., living in Constantinople,
Baghdad, Aleppo, and Egypt.
[8] A.E. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- 1204-1461 The
Byzantine Period, Rutgers University Press, 1970, p. 66.
[9] K.S. Lal. The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India, New Delhi, Aditya
Prakashan, 1992, p. 237
[10] Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Muslim revivalist movements in northern
India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Agra, Lucknow: Agra
University, Balkrishna Book Co, 1965, pp. 247-50; Yohanan Friedmann,
Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: an outline of his thought and a study of his image
in the eyes of posterity. Montreal, McGill University, Institute of
Islamic Studies, 1971, p.74.
[11] Friedmann. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: an outline of his thought.
[12] Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi. Shah Wali-Allah and his times. Canberra,
Australia, Ma'rifat Publishing House, 1980, pp. 294-296, 299, 301, 305.
[13] Rizvi. Shah Wali-Allah and his times, pp. 285-286.
[14] Sultanhussein Tabandeh. A Muslim Commentary on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, English translation by F. J. Goulding, London,
[15] Eliz Sanasarian Religious Minorities in Iran, Cambridge University
Press, 2000, pp. 25, 173, footnote
[16] Tome Pires, Suma Oriental (1512-1515) Haklyut Society
Publications, Vol. I (London, 1944), p. 27.; Raphael du Mans, Estat de la Perse,
1660, ed. Schefer (Paris, 1890), pp. 193-194; cited in, W.J. Fischel,
"The Jews in Medieval Iran from the 16th to the 18th centuries:
Political, Economic, and Communal aspects", Irano-Judaica, Jerusalem, 1982, p.
266; C.N. Seddon (translator), A Chronicle of the Early Safawis [Being
the Ahsanu't-Tawarikh of Hasan-i-Rumlu], 1934, Vol. II, p. xiv.
[17] Tabandeh, A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, pp. 4, 17-19,37
[18] Atlas of Islamic history, compiled by Harry W. Hazard; maps
executed by H. Lester Cooke, Jr., and J. McA. Smiley. Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. 6,8,10,18,22,24.
[19] Y.V. Nikolaev. The Chechen Tragedy. Mineola, NY, Nova Science
Publishers, 1996, p. 7.
[20] Nikolaev. The Chechen Tragedy, p. 7; A. Bennigsen, S.E. Wimbush.
Mystics and Commisars. Sufism in the Soviet Union. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1985, p. 18.
[21] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p. 18.
[22] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p. 19.
[23] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p.19.
[24] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p.24.
[25] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p. 31.
[26] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, pp. 4,159.
[27] Bennigsen and Wimbush. Mystics and Commisars, p. 164.


FBI says it makes mistakes in national security wiretaps


WASHINGTON -- The FBI says it sometimes gets the wrong number when it intercepts conversations in terrorism investigations, an admission critics say underscores a need to revise wiretap provisions in the Patriot Act.

The FBI would not say how often these mistakes happen.

And, though any incriminating evidence mistakenly collected is not legally admissible in a criminal case, there is no way of knowing whether it is used to begin an investigation.

Parts of the Patriot Act, including a section on "roving wiretaps," expire in December. Such wiretaps allow the FBI to get permission from a secret federal court to listen in on any phone line or monitor any Internet account that a terrorism suspect may be using, whether or not others who are not suspects also regularly use it.

The bureau's acknowledgment that it makes mistakes in some wiretaps -- although not specifically roving wiretaps -- came in a recent Justice Department inspector general's report on the FBI's backlog of intercepted but unreviewed foreign-language conversations.

The 38,514 untranslated hours included an undetermined number from what the FBI called "collections of materials from the wrong sources due to technical problems."

Spokesman Ed Cogswell said that language describes instances in which the tap was placed on a telephone number other than the one authorized by a court.

"That's mainly an instance in which the telephone company hooked us up to the wrong number or a clerical error here gives us the wrong number," Cogswell said.

He had no estimate of how often that happens, but said that when it does the FBI is required to inform the secret court that approved the intercept.

The FBI could not say Friday whether people are notified that their conversations were mistakenly intercepted or whether wrongly tapped telephone numbers were deleted from bureau records.

Privacy activists said the FBI's explanation of the mistaken wiretaps was unacceptably vague, and that in an era of cell phones and computers it is easier than ever for the government to access communications from innocent third parties.

"What do you mean you are intercepting the wrong subject? How often does it occur? How long does it go on for?" said James Dempsey, executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology.

David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said technological advances have made it harder, not easier, to "conduct wiretapping in a surgical way" because digital communications often carry many conversations. "It's not like the old days when there was one dedicated line between me and you," Sobel said.

The FBI has acknowledged errors in the past. An FBI memo from 2000, made public two years later, described similar problems in the use of warrants issued by a court that operates in secret under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In 2002, an FBI official said the bureau averaged 10 mistakes a year in such cases.

These warrants are among the most powerful tools in the U.S. anti-terrorism arsenal, permitting secret searches and wiretaps for up to one year without ever notifying the target of the investigation.

The court approved 1,754 such warrants in 2004.

The Patriot Act, passed 45 days after the Sept. 11 attacks, gave the government sweeping powers in terrorism investigations, including allowing the use of roving wiretaps. The authority also applies to espionage and other foreign intelligence cases.

The FBI is not supposed to use material it collects either by mistake or from people who happen to use phones that are tapped legitimately, but that requirement doesn't satisfy some lawmakers.

"They have recorded the information, but they're saying, 'Trust us, we won't listen to what we recorded,"' said Rep. Bobby Scott, D-Va. "People ought to be concerned."

Versions of the Patriot Act renewal that passed the House and Senate during the summer both contain the roving wiretap. It would expire in 10 years under the House-passed bill and four years in the Senate version. Congressional negotiators are expected to hammer out final details of the legislation starting in late October.

The Justice Department fought congressional efforts to require investigators to determine that the target of surveillance actually was using the tapped phone or computer before they listened in. Some lawmakers said such a requirement would reduce the chance that other conversations would be intercepted.

Administration officials argued that safeguards in the law already require the government to discard those conversations. "Such a restriction would make it harder to use multipoint wiretaps in terrorism and espionage investigations than in drug trafficking and other ordinary criminal investigations," assistant Attorney General William Moschella wrote Scott.

MITROKHIN ARCHIVE : They spy, we spy, so what's the big deal?

They spy, we spy, so what's the big deal?
Saturday October 1 2005 19:11 IST

T J S George

KGB's spy money to Indians is a subject that should have produced a yawn in India. Instead it has triggered a furore. Some political parties have protested, others have announced a national agitation. Some newspapers
publish columns of reports while TV channels run profound interviews.

Never has so much been done by so many for so little purpose. For the simple fact is that every nation in the world has fully-funded espionage agencies and it is the business of these spy departments to bribe and blackmail and kidnap and, where necessary, kill in the service of their governments.

India has been a pioneer in the field. Two thousand four hundred years ago, Kautilya provided textbook instructions on how to conduct foreign policy, trick the enemy, carry out assassinations, instigate sedition and engage spies. He even elaborated on the kind of people who were best suited to work as spies. His list: the sharp pupil, the apostate monk, the seeming householder, the poison-supplier, the begging nun.

After Arthasastra was composed (4th Century BC), has one sharp student or begging sanyasin protested against the aspersions cast on them? Yet, hell breaks out when KGB archives reveal that Indira Gandhi's cabinet members and diplomats, the Communist Party and even journalists were regularly funded by Soviet agents.

We should in fact give credit to the Russians and the Americans (the CIA's exploits would dwarf the KGB) for following the civilised practice of making old archival material available to the people. This is an essential ingredient of democracy because, ultimately, the people are the state and there can be no state secret that should be kept permanently hidden from the people.

It is India's drawback that this system of throwing open classified files after a 30-year embargo is frowned upon. we should have used "The Mitrokhin Archive" book as a powerful argument in favour of unclassifying our old files.

Alas, we get only a trickle of information and that comes, not from archives, but the reminiscences written by conscientious bureaucrats. Former Cabinet Secretary B.G. Deshmukh's book published last year gives a vivid account of how RAW was asked to make payment for the training of Rajiv Gandhi's security men in Italy. The money was to be paid to "a certain Italian (who was) named" but problems arose when the Italian insisted that it be delivered in Italian lira. According to Deshmukh, "carrying about a quarter of a million US dollars in Italian currency in a big suitcase was sure to invite trouble" and the idea was given up.

RAW is India's KGB. Or shall we say, India's CIA. And that payment to Italy was not even for patriotic spy work in Italy. Which only shows that if KGB and CIA do a better job in India than RAW does in Russia or America, the fault is ours, not theirs.

India is known as an easy place for foreign spies to work. Often it takes only liquor or a free foreign holiday to buy informants. We have a system where documents of industrial espionage value could be photocopied in dozens in the Prime Minister's office (during P.C. Alexander's era) and naval warfare plans secreted away in the Defence Ministry's high security areas land up in Pakistani hands (most recently).

The Congress and the Communists and the BJP should expend their energies on such shameful lapses and what they reveal about our national character. To complain about other countries doing their jobs is adding to the shame.

Bombings in Indonesian resort island of Bali kill at least 19

Updated at 12:45 on October 1, 2005, EST.

BALI, Indonesia (AP) - At least two bombs exploded almost simultaneously Saturday in tourist areas of the Indonesian resort island of Bali, killing at least 19 people and wounding 51 others, officials said. The blasts came a month after Indonesia's president warned of possible terrorist attacks.

The wounded included at least two Americans.

The blasts at Jimbaran beach and a bustling outdoor shopping centre in downtown Kuta were the work of terrorists, Indonesian President Suslio Bambang Yudhoyono said. He also warned that more attacks were possible.

"We will hunt down the perpetrators and bring them to justice," he said after being briefed by top security officials. He also urged people "to be on alert."

The attacks occurred nearly three years to the day that bombings in Kuta killed 202 people, mostly foreigners. Two of them were Canadians. Those attacks were blamed on the al-Qaida-linked terror group Jemaah Islamiyah.

Western and Indonesian intelligence agencies have consistently warned the group was plotting more attacks. Last month, Yudhoyono said he was especially worried the extremist network was about to carry out more attacks.

Vice-President Yusuf Kalla told the British Broadcasting Corp. it was too soon to identify the bombers. He said Yudhoyono will visit the area Sunday.

Putu Putra Wisada, spokesman at the Sangla Hospital in the capital, Denpasar, said 11 dead were taken to the hospital and 38 other people were admitted with injuries - 28 Indonesians, eight Australians and two Americans.

A receptionist at the Graha Asih Hospital close to Jimbaran Bay said at least eight bodies were in its morgue, and that doctors were treating at least 13 other people.

"It's a horrible scene," said the receptionist, Komang.

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told the Australian Broadcasting Corp. on Sunday that at least one Australian was killed. The nationalities of the remaining dead were not immediately known.

The latest bombs went off at about 7:30 p.m., local time, at two restaurants packed with foreign and Indonesian diners.

I Wayan Kresna said he witnessed the first bomb at a seafood restaurant on Jimbaran beach. He counted at least two dead and said many others were brought to a hospital.

"I helped lift up the bodies," he told the private El Shinta radio station. "There was blood everywhere."

Another explosion hit the three-storey Raja noodle and steakhouse in a bustling outdoor shopping centre of Kuta, about 30 kilometres. Smoke poured from the badly damaged building.

The bomb apparently went off on the restaurant's second floor, and an Associated Press reporter saw at least three bodies and five wounded people there. There was no crater outside the building, indicating the blast was not caused by a car bomb.

The area includes a KFC fast-food restaurant, clothing stores and a tourist information centre.

The exact number of blasts was not clear. Some witnesses said they heard at least two explosions at each location.

Since the 2002 Bali blasts, Jemaah Islamiyah has been tied to at least two other bombings in Indonesia, both in the capital, Jakarta. Those blasts, one at the J.W. Marriott hotel in 2003 and the other outside the Australian Embassy in 2004, killed at least 23.

Committee says Pentagon may collect citizen data covertly

By Greg Miller / Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON -- Pentagon intelligence operatives would be allowed to collect information from U.S. citizens without disclosing their status as government spies under legislation approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee and publicly released this week.

The bill would end a long-standing requirement that military intelligence officers disclose their government ties when approaching an American citizen in the United States -- a law designed to protect Americans from domestic intelligence activities by the Department of Defense.

The provision is one of several sections that would roll back privacy-related protections as part of an effort to improve U.S. intelligence agencies' ability to detect and prevent domestic terrorist plots. Another provision would make it easier for U.S. spy agencies to gain access to sensitive records on U.S. citizens that are held by the government and generally prohibited from being disseminated under privacy laws.

The changes are part of an intelligence authorization bill that calls for what officials described as a "significant" increase in funding for U.S. spy agencies, and would shift money away from controversial satellite programs that many lawmakers consider outdated and unnecessary.

Actual budget numbers are classified, but annual intelligence spending is said to exceed $40 billion. The authorization bill was approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee in closed session last week, but the text of the legislation was not released publicly until Thursday, when the bill was filed with the U.S. Senate.

Although the bill was endorsed unanimously by committee members, two Democrats expressed concern with the privacy provisions in written comments attached to the legislation.

Sens. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Ron Wyden, D-Ore., said they considered the military intelligence provision a mistake. Pentagon operatives "should be required to tell United States citizens in the United States who are not suspected of any wrongdoing that they work for the government," the senators wrote.

They added that they "intend to support changes to this authority as the legislation moves forward."

Supporters of the provision noted that it extends to Pentagon intelligence operatives authority that CIA case officers have. The CIA generally is barred from collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens, but agency officers routinely approach American business executives and overseas travelers to provide information on foreign targets.

The bill states that the terrorism threat highlights "the need for greater latitude to assess potential intelligence sources, both overseas and within the United States." It also stipulates that the changes do not expand the intelligence collection mission of the military, and are designed primarily for "assessment contacts" in which operatives try to learn more about a source before asking him or her to spy.

The provision would mainly apply to the Defense Intelligence Agency, a Pentagon spy service with officers around the world responsible for collecting military-related intelligence from human sources.

Levin and Wyden also expressed concern over a separate provision that would ease protections on personal data government agencies collect on U.S. citizens. The legislation would allow intelligence services to share such data with one another, and request records from domestic agencies that have counterterrorism responsibilities.

Federal privacy laws would continue to restrict sharing of health records collected by the Veterans Administration, for instance, because the agency does not have a domestic security function. But Levin and Wyden contended that the proposed new rules would allow the CIA to obtain sensitive records on U.S. citizens from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division "as long as the records related to a lawful and authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activity."

The senators said they thought it "unwise" to relax such protections. The new rules would expire in four years, requiring congress to re-evaluate the record-sharing program before implementing it permanently.

Critics said the privacy provision erodes protections implemented in 1974 to guard against abuses by the FBI and other agencies in collecting data on U.S. citizens.

"This allows intelligence agencies to go fishing ... for totally unrelated information to flesh out their investigations," said Tim Sparapani, legislative counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. "You'd be surprised how wide a net could be cast with this exemption."

The authorization bill is expected to be considered by the full Senate in October.

Boeing's spy satellite contract up in air

Company reportedly told to stop work on part of project that may go to rival


WASHINGTON -- A high-level review led by John Negroponte, the new intelligence chief, is stirring a major upheaval within the country's spy satellite programs, beginning with an overhaul of a $15 billion Boeing-led program plagued by delays and cost overruns.

In a terse announcement last week, the National Reconnaissance Office, responsible for developing and launching the devices, said only that a Boeing Co. contract to provide the next generation of reconnaissance satellites, known as the Future Imagery Architecture, was being "restructured."

But government officials and outside experts said Negroponte had ordered that Boeing stop work on a significant portion of the project, involving satellites with powerful electronic cameras, under a plan to shift the mission to Lockheed Martin, Boeing's chief competitor.

Under Negroponte's plan, the remainder of the program, involving satellites that use radar for surveillance, would remain with Boeing. But it is not clear whether the proposal goes far enough to answer congressional demands for deep cuts in spending on reconnaissance satellite programs that cost taxpayers billions of dollars and whose value is being questioned by Democrats and Republicans alike.

Members of Congress are calling for major shifts in intelligence spending, by transferring spending from satellites to human spying efforts. The review by Negroponte, who took over in April as the director of national intelligence, suggests some willingness to call for major changes in multibillion-dollar programs that had escaped critical scrutiny.

The details of the satellite programs remain highly classified, and Negroponte's office and the staff of the congressional intelligence committees have generally refused to discuss the new wrangling over the program.

A second showdown is expected in coming weeks over a different satellite program, a $9.5 billion stealth program that the Senate intelligence committee has tried and failed to kill for the last three years, on the grounds that its costs far outweigh the benefits it would deliver.

Sen. Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va., the top Democrat on the Senate committee, said last December that he would seek a closed session of the Senate this year to review a costly technical program if Senate appropriators continued to recommend that it be financed.

Government officials said at the time that Rockefeller was referring to the stealth satellite, which could operate only in clear weather and during daylight hours.

Despite Rockefeller's threat, Senate appropriators are believed to have included money for the satellite in a classified annex to a defense appropriations bill that is scheduled for a Senate vote in coming days.

Pakistan intelligence officials believe Bin Laden moving in rugged border terrain

Source ::: The Peninsula/ by MOBIN PANDIT

Doha-based Pashtun leader Firoz Khan Afridi (right) presenting a copy of Dastar International, a bi-monthly he brings out in Pashtu, to Munir Khan Orakzai, a member of Pakistan’s national assembly, here on Thursday.

Doha: A prominent Pakistani politician from the bordering areas along Afghanistan says local intelligence agencies believe that Osama bin Laden may be regularly moving within these rugged and deceptive terrains to escape detection.

And, if that is true, it may be hard to smoke the Al Qaeda mastermind out, implies the visiting politician, adding that it is impossible to fully comb the region by any army in the world.

Munir Khan Orakzai is one of the 12 members of Pakistan’s national assembly (parliament) from the Federally Administered Tribal Area (Fata) where search operations have been going on for some time to flush out Al Qaeda operatives.

Orakzai, who stayed in Doha earlier, was on a brief visit. Al Qaeda, he said, seemed to have begun recruiting local elements on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan.

The suspicion arises since more than 50 “very prominent” tribal leaders from the area have been shot down by “unidentified gunmen” along with their body guards over the past few years for having backed the state campaign against Al Qaeda.

President Musharraf’s crackdown on terrorists appears to be bearing fruit as in the past 18 months or so, no militancy-related violence has been reported in the country, he said. There have been sectarian clashes, though.

Asked how Al Qaeda militants may possibly be getting sophisticated weapons to fight the army, Orakzai said it was generally believed that they were still left with “stockpiles of weapons the US had provided them to resist the Soviets during Afghan occupation”.

Much of the weaponry was buried underground by Al Qaeda in the bordering areas for future use, so believe people.

Al Qaeda seems to have changed its tactic and gone low-profile in the wake of intensive combing operations being conducted by the Pakistani army and intelligence personnel.

“There is talk that they (Al Qaeda) are recruiting local elements to escape detection and continue with their operations. Foreign Al Qaeda operatives do not seem to be active in the area any more,” said Orakzai.

The Pak-Afghan border is a 1,400-km long stretch full of rugged terrains and one of the most difficult to guard or comb. This is especially true of more than 900-km long border along the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Fata.

The area is mountainous and deceptive and if three armed men hide somewhere, for instance, it is next to impossible for any army to smoke them out without losing at least 200 men.

People on the Pakistani side of the border have gone weary of both Bin Laden and his people and those pursuing them since the local tribes have lost heavily in terms of lives and property since search operations began.

People have though, begun cooperating with the army to help flush out militants, he said.

Fata, that consists of seven agencies and six frontier regions, has a population of six million, while some 25 million people inhabit NWFP. This puts the total Pashtun population in Pakistan at 31 million.

An estimated another 19 to 20 million Pashtuns are on the other side of the border, in Afghanistan.

“We have landed property and relatives on both sides of the border and people still keep moving from one side to the other through permitted routes,” he said.

The entire border is sealed by the Pakistani army, yet the area is so porous, it is difficult to guard it fully and prevent anyone from crossing over.

Fata continues to be a poverty stricken region with a male literacy rate of 16 per cent. Female literacy rate is a shocking three per cent, said Orakzai.

“Our priority is now education. For 52 years there was just one girls college in the entire area. There are 20 now,” he pointed out.

India has many well-known Pashtuns

Doha: India has produced more well-known Pashtuns than Afghanistan and Pakistan put together. Home to a large number of Pashtuns who migrated over centuries from NWFP and Afghanistan, the first Muslim president of India, Zakir Husain, was a Pashtun from Qaemganj in Uttar Pradesh (UP) province. His son-in-law Khursheed Alam Khan is a governor of a state and son, Salman Khursheed, heads the Congress party in UP.

Thespian Dilip Kumar is a Pashtun from Peshawar, and the late Madhubala, cine superstar of the late fifties, was a Pashtun, too.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, who gave Pakistan the nuclear technology, is a Pashtun who migrated from Bhopal in central India in 1947.

Current cine superstars Shahrukh Khan and Salman Khan are from this community and so were the late Amjad Khan and father Jayant. Salman’s father Saleem scripted with Javed Akhtar Hindi blockbuster ‘Sholay’ in the middle of 1970s. And last but not the least, famous Indian cricketer Salim Durrani, was also a Pashtun.

In Qatar, Firoz Khan Afridi is the first Pashtun to have launched four websites on the community and one of them is in English (Khyber.org).

Soon people can expect to access some interesting facts about the community on this web. He has also come out with a Pashtu magazine Dastar International a bi-monthly.

September 29, 2005

Redrawing India's Geostrategic Maps with China and the United States

by Lora Saalman
September 22, 2005

[This comprehensive survey of India's growing military strength and geostrategic relationships involving China, the United States and Russia reveals the interplay between economic and military-nuclear power in a region that is doubly volatile, as the scene of recent nuclear breakthroughs, and rapid changes in military and economy might. Noting the predominantly military character of the U.S.-Indian relationship, and the predominantly economic and resource-driven character of the unfolding China-Indian relationship, Lora Saalman raises important issues of regional development in an era of military insecurity. Japan Focus.]

India has been revising its strategic maps with China and the United States, both literally and figuratively. During early spring of 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao handed Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh a map reformatted to reflect the long-contested region of Sikkim as part of India. By summer, the United States handed India defense, nuclear, and space technology proposals, promising to transform more than just physical territory. Articles in India-based Bharat Rakshak Monitor attribute the warming of Sino-Indian ties as a means to counter the U.S. presence in Asia.[1] China's Party organ People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) asserts that strengthened Indo-U.S. relations are targeted at containing China's rise.[2] In both analyses, China and the United States are portrayed as focusing their strategic concerns squarely upon each other, while India maneuvers to secure political, economic and military benefits.

Yet, there remains a crucial and often missed difference between the Chinese and the U.S. approaches toward engaging India. China's current inducements for India primarily focus on economic integration and energy development. By contrast, the U.S. has made dual-use technology transfer the centerpiece of its engagement strategy. At India's level of technological sophistication, however, U.S. dual-use nuclear, space, and military cooperation promises to enhance India's political weight and military footprint in ways that are more likely to conflict with long-term U.S. strategic goals than with those of China. Rather than encircling China as the People's Daily foresees, the United States may instead be containing its own long-term interests.

China and the United States Engage India

On April 1, 2005, China and India took a symbolic step toward strategic cooperation as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.[3] This joint statement lauded the "global and strategic character" of Sino-Indian relations. It offered economic incentives for expanded cooperation, with the objective of nearly doubling bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2008. The two parties also announced the formation of a China-India Steering Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in education, science, healthcare, tourism, cultural exchange, and agriculture. India and China provisionally resolved the long standing dispute over Sikkim and agreed to cooperate in developing foreign petroleum and natural gas resources.[4]

Only a few months later, on June 28th, India's Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to sign the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship.[5] This agreement set forth detailed measures involving joint military exercises, defense and technology trade, missile defense, and exchanges on defense strategy, and intelligence. On July 18th India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush issued a joint statement, further expanding the scope of the existing India-U.S. Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) and High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG). The United States committed to signing a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, facilitating a U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation, removing Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's Entity List, seeking adjustment of U.S. laws for full civil nuclear cooperation and trade with India, including reactor fuel supplies, and support for India's participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and in the Generation IV International Forum.[6] These proposals are under debate in the U.S. Congress and will require amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, as well as the acquiescence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before full cooperation begins.[7] This time lag offers an opportunity to reflect on the impact of dual-use cooperation on India, China, and ultimately the United States.

U.S. Assistance, Indian Indigenization, and the Impact on China

In spite of emphasizing self-reliance in the wake of sanctions following its 1998 atomic tests, India is not new to foreign assistance.[8] Nor is India a novice in creating linkages between its civilian nuclear and space advances and its nuclear weapon and missile programs. India's initial nuclear test in 1974 utilized plutonium from its Canadian and ostensibly civilian Cirus nuclear reactor, while its 1989 launch of the first Agni ballistic missile comprised technology gained from the U.S. Scout satellite launcher. Similarly, the dual-use technology mentioned under the Indo-U.S. defense framework and joint statement may assist India in its ongoing pursuit of advances in nuclear weapons technology, longer range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Indigenization and Nuclear Assistance

The most significant shift in U.S. policy brought on by the July 18th U.S.-Indian joint statement relates to dual-use nuclear cooperation. India has already managed to parlay decades of Russian, U.S., German, and French assistance into what is now a robust indigenous civilian and military nuclear program. While nuclear power only occupies an estimated 3.3 to 5 percent of India's energy production, India is actively pursuing nuclear power development with important civilian as well as military implications.[9] In October 2004, India launched the commercial phase of its 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam.[10] Four more such fast reactors have been announced for construction by 2020. During April 2005, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) also commissioned an Integral Test Loop (ITL) to simulate the main heat transport system and safety system of the thorium-based Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR).[11]

For uranium-poor and thorium-rich India,[12] the development of thorium-fed fast breeder reactors makes it even less susceptible to the vagaries of international fuel supply and sanctioning. Fast breeder reactors produce more than they consume, offering India a steady and renewable future supply of weapons grade fuel. AHWRs in particular burn thorium/U-233 oxide producing spent fuel that can be reprocessed.[13] India's PFBR at Kalpakkam and its Kamini 40 MWt Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) both breed U-233.[14] While less of a proliferation risk due to its high radioactivity, U-233 has fissile properties comparable to U-235 used for nuclear weapons production.[15] India's recent technical developments suggest that it has made significant strides towards mastering, indigenizing, and expanding the scope of its nuclear fuel cycle.

However, not all components of India's nuclear program are moving forward. David Albright, executive director of the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), and Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, have pointed to India's less than proven track record in successfully operating its fast breeder reactors and reprocessing plants.[16] This is where U.S. technological assistance to India's civilian nuclear program can offer a degree of streamlining for both India's civilian and, by extension, military nuclear programs. Fusion technology, whether garnered through the ITER project or under the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, could help overcome some of India's civilian and military technological gaps.[17] India's alleged failed detonation of a thermonuclear weapon during its multiple 1998 tests is just one such lacuna.[18] Fusion technology not only has applications in thermonuclear weapons, but also could assist in nuclear warhead miniaturization to extend missile launch range and payload capacity. This will enable India to produce a higher nuclear yield and to successfully mount its nuclear weapons on missiles to fly greater distances.

Beyond hypothetical assistance and rhetoric, as of August 30, 2005, the United States has already removed Tarapur (TAPS 1 and 2), Rajasthan (RAPS 1 and 2), and Kudankulam (1 and 2) from the U.S. Entity List, mitigating export licensing requirements.[19] For these particular reactors, assistance will be monitored under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, for other reactors and facilities demarcating the dividing line between civilian and military use will be a tedious, and many Indian and U.S. analysts suggest impossible, process. Although management of the AHWR unveiled in August 2005 has been ostensibly transferred to the civilian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), the unit has the ability to produce U-233 that can be reprocessed for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it was designed by BARC, a known contributor to India's nuclear weapons program.[20] Due to the overlap between India's civilian and military programs, there remains the potential for diversion of technology, equipment, and potentially even materials to nuclear weapons programs.

Nuclear Impact on China

Whether U.S.-assisted or indigenous, India's nuclear advances carry strategic weight for Sino-Indian relations. Both countries espouse a nuclear doctrine based on minimum deterrence. Yet, India continues to engage in fissile material production to augment its stockpile. The 2005 edition of the book Deadly Arsenals has already expanded its Indian weapons estimates to 75-110 nuclear devices.[21] ISIS further provides an indication of India's capabilities for future nuclear arsenal expansion, estimating in August 2005 that India possesses a total of between 13.9 and 14.9 metric tons of civilian and military highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu).[22]

In comparison, China has stopped fissile material production, but is believed to have a sufficient stockpile, estimated at 31.1 civilian and military metric tons of HEU and Pu[23] to double or triple its current arsenal of approximately 400 nuclear weapons.[24] Despite the current differential, there is nothing in the U.S.-India joint statement that suggests India will be constrained in its current fissile material build-up. Any future commitments to a contentious Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty aside, India has repeatedly stated that it will continue to build up its plutonium stockpile until it reaches a level that provides a strategic comfort zone vis-Ã -vis China and Pakistan. If India continues to expand its fissile material stockpile and receives U.S. technological and material transfers, China's willingness and incentive to maintain a freeze on its own fissile material production may erode. This could lead to intensified efforts by China to assist Pakistan's weapons programs, to expand its own arsenal, or both.

In the meantime, China's current nuclear capabilities, stockpile, and arsenal gives it the edge over India. If India maintains its stance of minimum deterrence, it is unlikely to attempt to surpass China's nuclear strength. Instead, U.S. nuclear assistance to India has a greater potential for proliferation ricochet to other countries. Among suppliers, Britain quickly followed the U.S.-India joint statement in July by announcing its decision to modify its own sanctions against India in August.[25] Russia voiced its own approval in September with its sights set on legitimizing its nuclear trade with India and, by extension, Iran.[26] After winning a deal to supply India with 6 submarines and 43 Airbus planes, France also acknowledged and pledged to work within the NSG for "full international cooperation with India in the civilian nuclear field."[27] Pakistan also staked its own claim in September with its ambassador to the United States, a former Army chief, stating that the U.S. deal with India "should leave the door open for other countries that meet the same criteria."[28] As Iran, North Korea, and countless others witness acceptance of and the benefits accrued by a country that has rejected the NPT and tested nuclear weapons, voluntary nuclear freezes on incipient nuclear weapons programs or fissile material production may vanish for more parties than just China.

Indigenization and Ballistic Missile Assistance

Dual-use space technology cooperation under the India-U.S. joint statement will also help India upgrade systems with military potential that were originally established using U.S. and Russian transfers as a base. As early as December 2001, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued a report that India could convert its Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) within a year or two.[29] In May 2003, India launched its second Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), hoisting a 1,800 kg payload, the "heaviest payload ever launched from Indian soil."[30]

India has demonstrated the technical ability in its space program to domestically manufacture cryogenic engines, develop solid-propelled missiles for more rapid deployment, deliver significant payloads, and create staged missiles for longer-range ballistic missile launches. These advances do not make future U.S. assistance obsolete, rather they indicate a much faster rate of absorption, reverse engineering, and improvements if such technology is transferred. U.S. supercomputer technology, which can be used in nuclear weapon and missile design, is just one of the types of transfers that promises to assist India's burgeoning supercomputer industry.[31]

Under Phase I of the NSSP, by the end of 2004, the United States has already agreed to provide India's Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics with a Cray XD1 supercomputer, equipped with 96 computer processors capable of over 422 billion calculations per second.[32] In April 2005, India's Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) also announced a partnership with U.S. company Hewlett Packard to implement High Performance Computing (HPC) solutions at its Computational Mathematics Laboratory (CML).[33] In any number of technologies relating to space and nuclear programs, the United States can offer India technology relating to computer simulations, as well as missile launch, staging, guidance, and range.

Beyond hypothetical developments and rhetoric, in September 2004, the United States removed India's Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the Department of Commerce Entity List.[34] By August 2005, the United States also removed several key ISRO subsidiaries, including ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC), ISRO Inertial Systems Unit (IISU), and Space Applications Center (SAC).[35] ISRO as the parent organization is responsible for the gamut of India's space launch vehicles that possess the same technology as applied in ballistic missile launch, guidance, and tracking. The three ISRO subsidiaries focus on satellite technology, such as high-resolution commercial imaging that can be used in missile targeting accuracy and digital inertial navigation systems that can be used in Post Boost Vehicles (PBVs) to enhance ballistic missile accuracy on reentry. U.S. fusion technology may also be applied to super-conductive magnets employed in strategic military developments in outer space and ballistic missile defense. U.S. technology will contribute to a space program that has tremendous military potential not only in missile development, but also in the weaponization of space.[36]

Ballistic Missile Impact on China

India is highly motivated to expand its missile program, not only to counter threats from its neighbors but also to strengthen its regional competitiveness and boost its scientific and international prestige. China poses a distant strategic threat to India, while Pakistan's barrage of tactical and strategic missile improvements keeps India occupied in an immediate contest. Pakistan's test of its nuclear-capable Babur cruise missile less than a month after India announced mass production of the Brahmos cruise missile is a recent example.[37] Predictably, an Indian Defense Ministry official stated that the Babur looks like a repainted Chinese missile.[38] Prasun K. Sengupta has further alleged in the magazine New Delhi Force that China's state-owned China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp (CPMIEC) transferred this technology to Pakistan's state-owned National Development Complex (NDC).[39] Bilateral Indo-Pakistani competition, which India continues to view as fueled by China, has led the two countries to advance their ballistic missile ranges well beyond each others borders.[40]

One significant measure of India's missile program is its ability to target Chinese cities. In April 1999, India first test-fired its Agni-II, whose range of more than 2,000 km[41] enables it to reach China's ancient capital of Xi'an. With a test launch of the 3,000-3,500 km-range Agni-III anticipated by the end of 2005, India is rapidly approaching the range necessary to reach Beijing with a nuclear payload.[42]

Despite delays and concerns over the speed of its missile development, such as postponement of a test in 2003,[43] India appears ready to make the next leap towards an Agni-III on the basis of indigenous resources. Despite warnings on Indian PSLV capabilities, the ICBM dubbed Surya remains a source of speculation at this stage.[44] U.S. assistance to India's space program, especially in guidance and staging, could play a critical role in enabling it to achieve the next level of accuracy and range, and in acquiring ICBM capabilities that would effectively start to bring not only China but also the U.S. and its allies into range.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Indigenization and Assistance

U.S.-Indian cooperation in the transfer of conventional military hardware and dual-use technology also promises a boost to India's military modernization. The Soviet Union traditionally dominated this trade, providing India with Foxtrot Class submarines in 1968 and a Charlie Class nuclear powered submarine in 1988.[45] Russia continued this trend throughout the 1990s and by April 2004, concluded a lease agreement to supply India two Akula-II class nuclear submarines.[46] Yet there have been increasing reports of Russian submarine mishaps and the quality of Russian naval vessels sold to India has been less than optimal, with the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov requiring significant retrofitting.[47] While still central, the Russian Navy is rapidly becoming an outmoded supplier for India's naval modernization.[48]

Currently, India has a total of approximately 15 submarines, 10 of them diesel-powered, known as the EKM or Sindhu class. Among the missile systems, India has sought to launch the short-range Sagarika or Prithvi-III from a submarine base. Indian analysts boast that the system will offer India a second strike capability against Pakistan while serving as a long-range nuclear deterrent. These analyses suggest an expansion of missile range to 2,500 kilometers.[49] A modest 300 km test in October 2004 suggests, however, that the Sagarika has a long way to go before developing into a long-range strategic nuclear deterrent.[50] Since its inception in 1992, the Sagarika missile program, like India's submarine program, has suffered numerous delays.[51]

India's Sagarika and submarine programs could benefit from U.S. conventional military equipment transfers and space-related technology transfers, invigorating India's pursuit of the final leg of its nuclear triad.[52] However, aside from anticipated naval drills and potential transfer of the outdated USS Trenton,[53] there is little current indication of U.S. support for India's naval programs. In naval terms not much has changed from the Cold War. Although a joint naval exercise is scheduled for late September 2005, U.S. naval sales continue to show a greater inclination toward Pakistan, which is destined, according to a September 2005 media report, to receive two U.S. frigate warships and eight P-3C Orion Patrol aircraft.[54] India remains dependent on Russian assistance as with the Akula-II. The relative lack of U.S. focus on India's naval development may demonstrate that China is not the only country leery of India's ability to dominate the Indian Ocean.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Impact on China

Of all the potential theaters for conflict, the Indian Ocean is the most likely locus of Chinese, Indian and U.S. contention.[55] India's Ministry of Defense report of 2003-2004 pinpointed Chinese development of a blue water navy, enhanced ties with India's neighbors, and growing presence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean as emerging challenges.[56] Access to sea lanes will grow in importance as competition grows for oil and military and trade routes. Deployment of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), especially an intermediate range one, would assist India in gaining depth, flexibility, and second-strike capability in its targeting of Pakistani and Chinese territory. An SLBM could also play a tactical role if short in range and conventional in payload. Yet, India's nuclear submarine and Sagarika program, which both began in the early 1990s, have been slow in meeting the advancing demands of regional development and security. The Sagarika has yet to prove itself as a strategic deterrent with the range to strike within China's borders.

Like India, China has been struggling with building its own submarine fleet with reports of fire, leakage, and accidents. China's submarine force currently consists of four Kilo attack submarines from Russia, an indigenous diesel Song attack submarine, five Han nuclear attack submarines, and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine known as the Xia.[57] The U.S. Department of Defense in its Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China suggests that China's next-generation nuclear submarine programs are likely to receive a "significant amount" of Russian assistance.[58] By contrast, India will have access to not only Russian technology and equipment but also U.S., European, and Middle Eastern sources. The delayed but much-anticipated arrival of the Scorpene submarine from France is just one example.[59] Even if the European Arms Embargo on China were to be lifted, China would continue to face U.S.-initiated obstacles to suppliers.

Despite increased naval competition, India and China are not necessarily on a collision course for resources and access to shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. Chinese and Indian companies are already partners in Sudan's Greater Nile Oil Project.[60] They also plan to cooperate in a joint $4 billion oil pipeline project with Iran following establishment in April 2005 of a Joint Working Group for joint projects in oil exploration and notification.[61] India and China are also actively cooperating in regional energy transport links. India's petroleum minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, following India's recent loss of a bid to China for Kazakhstan's third-largest oil producer PetroKazakhstan Inc. stressed the "need for China and India to adopt a collaborative approach in bidding."[62] China also has the incentive to cooperate with India to avoid a "Malacca Dilemma," through which India or another country blocks China's access to oil imports from the Middle East and Africa.[63] Indeed, India and China are expected to sign memorandums of understanding in November 2005 focusing on oil exploration and development in the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America on behalf of India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) and the Indian Oil Corporation and China's Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).[64] The agreements not only promise to solidify their economic and resource cooperation but indicate the expanded geographic reach of both nations.

Sino-Indian Realities Versus Perceptions

United States conventional military cooperation, combined with missile assistance in the guise of space technology, has the potential to strengthen India's quest for parity with China. In the near-term, however, China is likely to dominate militarily. This assessment is based on qualitative improvements and a defense expenditure that is twice to four times that of India's, depending on whether Chinese or U.S. estimates are used.[65] Despite U.S. efforts to hinder its military growth, China remains engaged in extensive military modernization, with a declared military budget of $29.9 billion for 2004.[66] China has announced increases in military spending nearly every year for more than a decade, with U.S. estimates for China's modernization even higher. These advances, in line with China's rapid economic growth, highlight the difficulties that India will face should it seek to "catch-up" to China.

Depending on which Chinese defense figure is used for comparison, India's own growth in military spending, while a strong 27 percent increase reaching approximately $17.6 billion for the period from 2004 to 2005, is at best a little over half that of China.[67] However, there is one area in which India is rapidly gaining speed: procurement. According to an August 2005 U.S. Congressional Research Service report, India ranked first in the world in the value of arms transfer agreements from all countries by $500 million between 1997 and 2004.[68] In 2004 alone, India ranked first in this area among all developing nations weapons purchasers, with $5.7 billion in such agreements.[69] The U.S. is the world leader in arms sales to developing nations with deliveries estimated at $9.7 billion in 2004.[70] Even if India does not buy U.S. wares, it enjoys the long-term negotiation and planning leverage that China lacks. India's nuclear and missile program quest for indigenization has been supplemented by pursuit of supplier diversification.

In spite of incitements to react, the Chinese government response to the U.S.-Indian joint statement and defense agreement of 2005 has been relatively muted. China has focused more on threats posed by the United States than those created by a well-armed or technologically-advanced India. In fact, Chinese popular and official media portray India as a developing nation that has been duped by the United States. The People's Daily cloaks its views behind unnamed "analysts" (fenxizhe) to say that the U.S.-Indian defense framework and joint statement have expanded U.S. efforts to encircle and contain China.[71] It also lambastes U.S. hypocritical assistance to India, in light of U.S. tandem efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear programs and to pressure Europe to maintain its arms embargo against China.[72]

China adds India to a long list of countries or territories, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, that have been incorporated into expansive U.S. strategic, military and economic frameworks directed toward containing China. China's own policies of establishing regional cooperative groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its growing cooperative relationships with ASEAN and Indian Ocean nations may be understood in part as efforts to create patterns of regional solidarity to forestall this perceived U.S. encirclement. India's observer status in the SCO combined with its attendance at August 2005 Sino-Russian military exercises, euphemistically dubbed "Peace Mission 2005," are indicative of Chinese efforts at inclusive diplomacy, keeping its partners close and potential adversaries even closer: economically, politically, and increasingly militarily.[73]

In 2003, China and India engaged in unprecedented naval exercises as a major step toward military confidence building measures at a time when they were beginning to undertake joint energy programs.[74] Articles on future Indian participation with China and Russia in SCO military exercises also fuel speculation of counterbalancing U.S. hegemony.[75] There is abundant evidence that China seeks to strengthen its economic, political, cultural, and even military ties with India to pre-empt U.S. incorporation of yet another state at its borders. Yet, India and China also share concerns ranging from energy development to trade in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, suggesting that the United States is significant but not the only driving force in their desire to cultivate cooperation over competition.

India has made a major strategic shift in its perceptions of China, from the time when officials such as former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and former Defense Minister George Fernandes cited China as the primary impetus behind India's nuclear tests and Agni missile program.[76] Recognizing the potentially adverse effects on Sino-Indian economic and political relations, Indian authors and politicians alike have been extremely careful to emphasize that cooperation with the United States does not target China. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly stated variations of the following: "We see new horizons in our relations with China. What we have done with the United States is not at the cost of China or any other country."[77]

At the same time, Indian authors are cautious not to exaggerate the warming trend in Sino-Indian relations. While Chinese articles tend to discount the threat posed by India, for Indian strategic analysts China remains a source of concern for perceived designs on regional hegemony. The 1962 India-China conflict still looms in the writings of many Indian analysts. The litany of Indian articles on China's contributions to Pakistan's Babur missile illustrates ongoing perceptions of China using a regional proxy to threaten India. India maintains a complex combination of emulation and distrust when it comes to China.[78] Emulation for China's rate of growth and ability as a developing country to place itself on the geopolitical map. Distrust over China's growing economic and military strength, and expansive diplomacy, focused on discussion of its "real intentions".[79] In addition to the anticipated technological benefits gained from cooperating with the United States, India seeks a counterweight even as it pursues cooperative relations with China.

China also serves as an asset for India in its efforts to cultivate stronger relations and inducements from the United States. U.S. relations with Pakistan and historical assistance to its military programs during the Cold War mark Indian perceptions of questionable U.S. loyalties and unreliability. Even with the economic and technological gains contained in the joint statement with the United States, numerous Indian articles lament that India's defense and arms relationship with the United States is tantamount to selling off the Indian Ocean, relinquishing its nuclear autonomy, and constraining its future fissile material production. India prides itself on preserving its position as an independent actor and continues to be acutely sensitive to discrimination or power politics.[80]

Continued Indian efforts to promote multilateralism with China and Russia, while courting the United States, suggests Indian wariness not only toward China but also toward the U.S.


For both China and the United States, cooperation with India is emblematic of India's growing political, economic and military strength. Among the many goals of issuing a joint statement with India, the United States may have designs on bolstering India vis-Ã -vis China.[81] If this is the case, however, the effect may prove to be the reverse. China has been pushed to accelerate and expand its own incentives, in part, to avoid United States entrenchment in another country on its borders. Similarly, the United States is compelled by China's actions to stifle any move toward a Sino-Indian alliance or Sino-Indian-Russian triangle.[82] In the midst of this array of partnerships, India has been able to diversify its political partners, just as it has diversified its suppliers of technology.

China is but one factor in U.S. technological and military engagement with India. Also present is the realization that many of India's nuclear and missile developments are already indigenous and increasingly beyond U.S. control and sanctions. Concurrently, while a technological innovator, India has also become one of the largest recipients of foreign arms agreements and transfers. The United States is faced with a choice of participating as a supplier or running interference as Russia, Israel, France and other countries attempt to benefit from India's procurement frenzy. Profit motive may be guiding the United States as much if not more than the strategic considerations involving China and regional hegemony.

Regardless of motive, the United States is systematically removing licensing requirements on many firms that contributed to India's nuclear weapons and missile programs. Lifting of these sanctions combined with the joint statement on dual-use technology can only strengthen efforts by other countries defying U.S. and international nonproliferation norms. U.S. dual-use technology is also likely to contribute to assisting India in realizing advanced fusion technology for its nuclear weapons and advances in targeting and staging for its missiles, placing the United States and its allies in nuclear-capable ballistic missile range. Even U.S. anticipation of garnering enhanced Indian support for its agenda abroad is diminished by India's long-standing cooperation with Chinese and Russian multilateral initiatives.

China and the United States have long engaged India's adversaries, while demonstrating reluctance to form strategic partnerships with India. Despite similar early trajectories and lingering ties to Pakistan for both countries, current Chinese and U.S. cooperation with India is distinctly different. China has worked to reduce tension with India by establishing a relationship based on stronger cooperation in the realms of trade, cultural exchange, and energy exploration. Politically and economically, the United States has also created inducements for closer Sino-Indian cooperation. Yet, by making dual-use transfers in nuclear and space technology the core of the United States' other economic, political and strategic inducements to India, the long-term strategic price may be greater than the dollars or short-term political leverage earned. The technology and military hardware provided by the United States promises to expand India's political, strategic and military footprint even beyond China. U.S. interference further strengthens China's incentives to cooperate with India. Rather than pitting India against China, the United States may be setting up India to instead serve as a future strategic counterweight to U.S. interests in Asia and abroad.

[1] "India's China Policy: Importance of a Strategic Framework," in "India Urged to Formulate 'Clear' China Policy to Achieve Strategic Objectives," New Delhi, Bharat Rakshak Monitor, FBIS SAP20050714000091, April 1, 2005.; "The New Chapter of Relationship," in "Editorial Lauds Growing India-China Friendship to Counter US Dominance in Asia," New Delhi Rashtriya Sahara, FBIS SAP20050413000025, April 13, 2005.

[2] Lu Yansong, "Short-sighted Nuclear Deal," in "PRC: RMRB Article Views US-India 'Nuclear Deal,' US Plan to Counter PRC with India, Japan," Beijing, Renmin Ribao, FBIS CPP20050819000088, August 19, 2005.; "RMRB Cites Huanqiu Shibao Article on Washington Drawing India in Against China," Beijing, Renmin Ribao, FBIS CPP20050708000034, July 7, 2005.; Palash Kumar, "AFP: US Feting India to Balance Power in China-Dominated Asia: Analysts," Hong Kong AFP, FBIS JPP20050719000088, July 19, 2005.

[3] "Full Text of Joint Statement of China, India," People's Daily Online, April 13, 2005, available at, accessed on August 13, 2005.; "PM's Statement in the Lok Sabha on the Visits of Chinese Premier and Pakistan President," Indian Embassy, April 20, 2005, available at http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/April/15.htm, accessed on August 13, 2005.

[4] "The Joint Communiqué of the Informal Meeting Between the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of India," Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, June 3, 2005, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn, accessed on August 13, 2005.

[5] "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," United States Embassy, New Delhi-India, June 28, 2005, available at http://newdelhi.unembassy.gov/wwwhipr062905.html, accessed on July 14, 2005.

[6] "India -- USA Joint Statement," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, available at http://www.dae.gov.in/jtstmt.htm, accessed on July 20, 2005.

[7] Sharon Squassoni, "U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 29, 2005, pp. 4, 5.

[8] "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1 January Through 30 June 2002, available at http://www.cia.gov, accessed on August 31, 2005.

[9] "Nuclear Power in India and China," World Nuclear Association, September 2004, available at http://world-nuclear.org, accessed on February 17, 2005.; Aziz Haniffa, "'India Will Consume More Energy to Fuel Economic Growth,'" India Abroad, Vol. 35, No. 46, August 12, 2005, p. A8.

[10] Sunil Saraf, "Prime minister marks beginning of India's commercial breeder," Nucleonics Week, October 28, 2004, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 17, 2005.

[11] "BARC Commissions Integral Test Loop Facility for AHWR: Banerjee," The Press Trust of India, April 12, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.; T. S. Subramanian, "Advanced Heavy Water Reactor Construction Next Year," The Hindu, October 24, 2003, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.

[12] Estimates in the World Nuclear Association online journal suggest that India has approximately six times more thorium than uranium in its domestic mineral deposits. "Thorium," Information and Issue Briefs, World Nuclear Association, November 2004, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf62.htm, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[13] "Thorium," Information and Issue Briefs, World Nuclear Association, November 2004, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf62.htm , accessed on September 7, 2005.

[14] "Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors," Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 16, May 2005, available at http://www.uic.com.au/nip16.htm, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[15] "A 'Proliferation-Proof' Reactor?" NUKEM Market Report 1997, NUKEM Nuclear Technologies, available at http://www.nukem.com/, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[16] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future Directions," Institute of Science and International Security, June 10, 2005, Revised July 8, 2005.; Henry Sokolski, "The India Syndrome -- U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Melts Down," The Weekly Standard, August 1, 2005, pp. 15, 16.

[17] Andre Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni, "ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems," Independent Scientific Research Institute, Switzerland, August 10, 2005.; Sridhar K. Chari, "India on Way to Joining the Fusion Club," The Tribune, August 24, 2005, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com, accessed on August 26, 2005.

[18] "India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S. Believes," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 39, No. 48, November 26, 1998, pp. 1, 9, 10.

[19] "Removal of License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to India of Items Controlled Unilaterally for Nuclear Nonproliferation Reasons and Removal of Certain Indian Entities from the Entity List," Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 167, August 30, 2005, available at http://www.bxa.gov, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[20] "BARC Commissions Integral Test Loop Facility for AHWR: Banerjee," The Press Trust of India, April 12, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.

[21] Aziz Haniffa, "Deadly Arsenals: India, Pakistan Can Have 110 Nuclear Bombs," India Abroad, Vol. 35, No. 47, pp. A1, A7.; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals -- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005.

[22] "Table 2 Plutonium and HEU Holdings by Country, end 2003, in Tonnes," Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts," Institute for Science and International Security, July 22, 2005, Revised August 22, 2005.

[23] Ibid.

[24] "Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2002," The Atomic Scientists Bulletin, available at http://www.thebulletin.org, accessed on September 5, 2005.

[25] "Britain to ease nuclear sanctions against India," Press Trust of India via India Info, August 11, 2005, available at http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/08/11/1108u...ia-nuclear.html, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[26] Abbas Razza Khan, "Russia endorses nuclear pact between US and India," Press Trust of India, September 16, 2005, available at http://www.india-defence.com, accessed on September 16, 2005.

[27] "France Backs India's Nuclear Energy Plans After Winning Sub, Airbus Deal," Yahoo News, September 12, 2005, available at http://news.yahoo.com, accessed on September 13, 2005.

[28] Foster Klug, "Pakistan Wants Civilian Nuclear Deal," The Associated Press via The Washington Post, September 8, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com, accessed on September 8, 2005.

[29] "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December 2001, available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/m...ethreat2001.pdf, accessed on August 11, 2005.

[30] K. S. Jayaraman, "GSLV Launch Helps Move India Closer To Self-Reliance in Space," Space News, available at , accessed on August 25, 2005.

[31] After delivery of Norwegian Norsk Data ND 100 and ND 500 type computers between 1983 and 1984 and arrival of a U.S. Cray XMP-14 supercomputer in 1987, by September 2002 the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) developed the ANUPAM-PIV 64-node supercomputer with a speed of 43 giga flops. In 2003, India's Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) went one giant step further by developing the PARAM Padma which has a speed of one teraflop, a trillion floating point operations per second. "Norsk Data Computers Used in Indian Nuclear Program," Oslo, Dagbladet, May 4, 1990, FBIS JPRS-TND-90-011, accessed on September 7, 2005.; "India's BARC develops fastest supercomputer in the country," Asia Pulse, September 16, 2002, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.; Sharad Purohit, R.K. Arora, S.P. Dixit, N. Mohan Ram, P.K. Sinha, V.C.V. Rao, "PARAM Padma -- A Teraflops Computing System And High Performance Computing in India," Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, 2003, available at http://www.cdac.in/html/ctsf/padma/spurohit.asp, accessed on September 5, 2005.

[32] Indrani Bagchi, "India hopes to get sanctions revoked," Times of India, October 11, 2004, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/880726.cms , accessed on September 11, 2005.; "Foreign Secretary: India Wants 'More Symmetrical Relationship' With US," Mumbai, The Times of India, October 11, 2004, FBIS SAP20041011000006, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[33] "TIFR announces tie-up with HP," in "India: Pune-Base Supercomputer Param 1000 Announces Tie-Up With Hewlett Packard," Chennai, Business Line, April 20, 2005, FBIS SAP20050421000073, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[34] "Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership," Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 2004, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/2004/US-IndiaNextStep.htm, accessed on February 16, 2005.

[35] "Removal of License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to India of Items Controlled Unilaterally for Nuclear Nonproliferation Reasons and Removal of Certain Indian Entities from the Entity List," Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 167, August 30, 2005, available at http://www.bxa.gov, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[36] Indian Air Force Chief Marshal, Srinivaspuram Krishnaswamy stated as early as October 2003 that India has begun "conceptualizing" space weapons command systems and operational command. In November 2003 and again in December 2004, India made a potentially significant step in this direction by signing onto Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), a space platform that could be used for improving the accuracy of its missile systems and expansion into other weapons systems. "IAF Working on Weapon Platforms in Space," The Hindu, October 7, 2003, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 24, 2005.; "India Working on Space Weapons: IAF Chief," The Press Trust of India, available at http://www.rediff.com, accessed on August 29, 2005.; "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and the Indian Space Research Organization on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes," The Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India, November 11-13, 2003, available at http://www.india.mid.ru/summits/01_07.html, accessed on August 31, 2005.; "India and Russia to Revive Glonass," Flight International, December 14, 2004, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[37] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Pakistan's Missile Tests Jolts India," Defense News, August 22, 2005, p. 50.

[38] Ranjit Kumar, "China Gave 'Babar' to Pakistan," in "India: US Military Expert Says Pakistani 'Babar' Missile Imported from China," New Delhi Navbharat Times, FBIS SAP20050823000021, August 23, 2005, August 26, 2005.

[39] Prasun K. Sengupta, "Babur's Flight," in "India: Report Notes China's Involvement in Pakistan's Hatf VII Cruise Missile," New Delhi Force, FBIS, September 9, 2005, SAP20050909000103, accessed on September 10, 2005.

[40] G. Parthasarathy, "Cruise Missiles in Neighborhood -- A Result of Sino-Pak Growing Nexus," Bharat Rakshak, August 29, 2005, available at http://www.bharat-rakshak, accessed on August 30, 2005.

[41] "Proliferation: Threat and Response," Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, available at http://www.dod.gov, accessed on August 28, 2005, p. 24.; Amitabh Mattoo, "Indian Agni-II Missile Said Aimed at China," Calcutta The Telegraph, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.

[42] Rahul Bedi, "New Delhi Reveals Latest Schedule for Missile Tests," Jane's Defense Weekly, November 12, 2003, p. 4

[43] "Indian Defence News," New Delhi, Chanakya Aerospace and Maritime Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1, 2005, FBIS SAP20050623000018, accessed on August 15, 2005.; "Proliferation: Threat and Response," Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, available at http://www.dod.gov, accessed on August 28, 2005, p. 24.

[44] Press reports as early as 1999 suggest an imminent test of India's ICBM. "India to Test New Long-Range Ballistic Missile: Official," AFX News Limited, November 7, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.; "India: Ballistic Missiles Under Development," BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 18, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.

[45] Mark Gorwitz, "The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project -- An Open Literature Analysis," December 1996, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/sub/ssn/ , accessed on August 29, 2005.

[46] "Indian Military Bolstered by Foreign Purchases, Cooperation," JINSA Online, April 23, 2004, available at http://www.jinsa.org, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[47] "No Gorshkov, but Accords Look to the Future," Times of India via Bharat-Rakshak, February 9, 2002, available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[48] "Bellona To Seek Intl Action Over Sunken Russian Sub," Moscow Interfax, FBIS CEP20050830950045, August 30, 2005.

[49] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Salvaging the Sagarika: India Seeks Russian, Israeli Help in Missile Development," Asia and Pacific Rim, Defense News, February 21, 2005, p. 14.

[50] T. S. Subramanian, "Prithvi-III Test Fired for First Time," The Hindu, October 28, 2004, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 11, 2005.

[51] Rahul Roy-Chaudry, "India-Defense: India Developing Sea-Based Missile System," IPS-Inter Press Service, September 29, 1994, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.; "N-Submarine Project Yet to Take Off," The Hindu, October 28, 1998, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.

[52] "New Army 'Doctrine' Ready for Release," India, The Statesman, October 24, 2004, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 11, 2005.

[53] "Navy: Busy Year of War Games Ahead," in "Indian Navy to Join War Games with US, Russia, France," New Delhi, The Asian Age, July 5, 2005, FBIS, SAP20050715000020, accessed on September 7, 2005.; Shashank Sinha, "Indian Navy Interested in USS Trenton," in "Indian Defense Think Tank Says 'USS Trenton' May Be 'Great Asset' for Navy," New Delhi, India Defense Consultants, August 15, 2005, FBIS SAP20050815000054, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[54] "Talks with India Remained Warm for Six Months, Now There is Chilliness: Chief of Naval Staff," in "Pakistan Gets 8 P-3C Orion Aircraft, Two Frigates from US; CNS Lauds US Help," Rawalpindi, Nawa-e Waqt, September 1, 2005, FBIS SAP20050902000048, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[55] China is not the only concern of Indian strategists charting developments in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. driven Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which illicit transfers are interdicted during shipment, has also come under scrutiny. A number of Indian critics have expressed concern that the United States is manipulating their partnership to gain "back door entry" into the Indian Ocean for the PSI, which many deem as already on shaky legal ground given Part VII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. India's own reluctance to fall in line with the United States has been made particularly evident with the omission of PSI from the Indo-U.S. joint statement and India's refusal to join August 2005 U.S.-organized multinational PSI naval exercises in Southeast Asia. Seema Mustafa, "India Surrenders Ocean to US," in "India Said to Surrender Ocean to US in Defense Pact," New Delhi, The Asian Age, FBIS SAP20050706000017, July 2, 2005.; Ranjit Kumar, "India Did Not Join the PSI Military Exercise," in India Stays Away from Joint Naval Exercise to Monitor Illegal Arms Transport," New Delhi, Navbharat Times, August 17, 2005, FBIS SAP20050817000023, accessed on September 7, 2005.

[56] "Annual Report -- 2003-2004," Ministry of Defence, Government of India, available at http://mod.nic.in/reports/MOD-English2004.pdf , accessed on August 15, 2005.

[57] "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China," A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, pp. 23, 24, 33.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Rajat Pandit, "Wait For Scorpene May Soon Be Over," The Times of India, March 16, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 11, 2005.

[60] "China, India Seek Cooperation in Global Oil Quest," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India, April 4, 2005, available at http://www.chinaembassy.org, accessed on August 15, 2005.

[61] "India, China to Set Up Joint Group to Forge Oil Cooperation Deals," New Delhi, The Press Trust of India, August 9, 2005, FBIS SAP20050809000099, accessed on August 10, 2005.

[62] Penny Macrae, "AFP: India Says China Oil Cooperation at Early Stage," Hong Kong Agence France Presse, August 26, 2005, FBIS JPP20050826000017, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 26, 2005.; "China Beats India to Acquire PetroKazakhstan," New Delhi, The Press Trust of India, August 22, 2005, FBIS SAP20050822000064, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 26, 2005.

[63] "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China," A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, p. 33.

[64] "India says China oil cooperation at early stage, will still compete," Agence France Presse, August 26, 2005, available at http://www.yahoo.com, accessed on August 31, 2005.

[65] "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China," A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, pp. 21, 22.

[66] Ibid.

[67] "Defense Expenditure, 2004-2005," Ministry of Defense, Government of India, available at http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/body.htm#as6, accessed on September 8, 2005.

[68] Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 29, 2005, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/52179.pdf, accessed on September 9, 2005.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] "Mei Dui Yin Kaiqi He Da Men -- Yu Lianhe Yindu Ezhi Zhongguo Fazhan," (The United States Opens the Nuclear Door to India -- In a Desire to Contain China's Growth), People's Daily, July 20, 2005, available at http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.

[72] "Mei Yin He Hezuo Shi Yi Zhao Xianqi Hai Shi Yiji Miaozhao?" (Is Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and India a Dangerous or Clever Chess Move?), CCTV.com, July 21, 2005, available at http://bbs.cctv.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.; "Mei Dui Yin Kaiqi He Da Men -- Yu Lianhe Yindu Ezhi Zhongguo Fazhan," (The United States Opens the Nuclear Door to India -- In a Desire to Contain China's Growth), People's Daily, July 20, 2005, available at http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.

[73] "Indian Defence Officials Watch China-Russia Military Exercises," New Delhi, The Press Trust of India, FBIS SAP20050823000109, August 23, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 26, 2005.