RUSSIA-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ENTERS A CHILLY PHASE

Source: SAAG

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

In the last two months events leading to the Indian Prime Ministers official visit on November 11-12 2007 to Moscow seem to suggest that the Russia-India Strategic Partnership may have entered a chilly phase.

Ever since the present Government came into power in 2004, it has been more pre-occupied with its “evolving” strategic partnership with the United States and only routine attention has been paid to India’s “time tested” strategic partnership with Russia.

President Putin’s visit to India in January 2007 as Chief Guest at the Republic Day celebrations and Indian Prime Minister’s visits to Moscow in November 2005 and now on November 11-12, 2007, notwithstanding, no official or media hype was visible.

Russia’s displeasure at the growing involvement of India in the strategic initiatives sponsored by the United States in East Asia do not seem to have gone down well with Russia. The manifestations of the Russian displeasure stand analysed in the Author’s two papers “India’s Strategic Partnership with United States: Reverberations from Russia and China” (SAAG Paper No. 2320 dated 02.08.2007) and “India-US Strategic Partnership: Strategic Reverberations from Russia and China Create Implications for India's Security” (SAAG Paper No. 2423 dated 23.10.2007)

The Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow this November took place in an air of uneasiness preceding the visit. The preparatory visits of the Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister in October 2007 were subjected to Russian protocol displeasure in that traditional calls on the Russian President were put-off on the plea of other official engagements.

The feeling that is becoming inescapable is that the Russia-India Strategic Partnership may have entered a “chilly phase” under this Government.

This paper attempts to examine this emerging trend under the following heads:

Indian Prime Minister’s Official Visit to Moscow (November 2007) Impressions
India can Ill-Afford a Chill in Russia-India Strategic Partnership
Global Multipolanty in India’s Strategic Interests
India’s Pay-Back Time to Russia: The Imperatives of Strategic Balance
Indian Prime Minister’s Official Visit to Moscow (November 2007) Impressions

The Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow this November was once again marked by the absence of any official or media hype or an air of optimistic expectations.

The statements of the Indian Prime Minister on the eve of his visit to Moscow and while in Moscow emphasizing the Russia-Indian Strategic Partnership as a time-tested one and the convergences between the two countries seemed to be rhetorical and the statements as labored one.

Only three agreements were signed during this visit on space cooperation and joint development of a transport aircraft etc. There was total silence on geo-political issues and so also on the lease of Russian nuclear submarines to India which was being avidly looked forward to.

Media reports quoting Russian officials indicate that Russia had an agreement ready for signature on Russian construction of four additional nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, but India backed out at the last moment. This has been read as an Indian Government effort not to displease the United States. In Russian perceptions this logically should amount to India giving precedence to United States political sensitivities and taking the relationship with Russia as a granted one.

In fact nothing strategically dramatic emerged from the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow which has been commented on as the shortest visit abroad by Dr. Manmohan Singh.

Noticeable in the respect has also been the fact that neither the Indian Prime Minister nor any senior Indian Cabinet Minister has ever attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit Meetings which have been attended by the Russian President.

The chill in the Russia-India Strategic Partnership is becoming noticeable by the day, which leads to the important question whether India can strategically afford this.

India Can Ill-Afford a Chill in Russia-India Strategic Partnership

India can ill-afford strategically a chill in Russia-India Strategic Partnership for the following reasons:

In strategic terms, the Russia-India Strategic Partnership is a “time-tested” on as the Prime Minister has himself averred during his current visit. It is a value-added strategic partnership as opposed to the US-India Strategic Partnership which is an “evolving one”.
Therefore in terms of “strategic credibility a “time-tested” strategic partnership scores heavily over an “evolving one” where even the starting steps have not augured well.
Russia is in a strategic resurgence mode with a declaratory policy that is intent on re-emerging as an “independent global power center”. It is not strategically bogged down like the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. So Russia’s resurgence carries along with it a certain “strategic vitality” which other global power centers can ill ignore.
India would therefore need Russia’s strategic support to emerge as a global power just as it needs United States strategic support. India can therefore not afford any “strategic tilts”.
Russia has an added distinction that unlike the United States it has not indulged in South Asia in creation of “regional spoiler states” like Pakistan.
India’s overwhelming military dependency on advanced Russian military hardware cannot be easily shrugged off.
On Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russia and India enjoy strategic convergences without any pressure by Russia.
Russia, if properly handled strategically can emerge as a secure source of energy security for India.
In real strategic terms, therefore, India can ill-afford a chilly phase in Russia-India Strategic Partnership when the global strategic situation is itself in a fluid and unpredictable phase and in such a global situation Russia is in a resurgent mode.

Global Multi-polarity in India’s Strategic Interests

India as a rising global power can ill-afford a uni-polar global configuration, as in such a strategic situation newly emerging global powers are viewed as “revisionist powers” needing checkmating.

This Author has earlier emphasized that historically, no global power has assisted another nation to emerge as a global power. Economic superpowers may have been assisted in their emergence but not as global powers.

If that be so, India’s emergence as a global power can only come around in the existence of a multi-polar global system in which India can trade-off its power potential for India’s strategic gains.

Russia, China and the European Union contribute to the existence of a multi-polar global system.

India’s Pay-Back Time to Russia: The Imperative of Strategic Balance

Russia for nearly fifty years has stood by India during the various strategic crises that it was subjected to during the Cold War and thereafter. It made sure during these long years that India was not subjected to political, economic or military coercion by external powers.

More notably Russia respected India’s strategic sensitivities in South Asia and its power predominance. Russia unlike the United States and China was never an intrusive power in South Asia working at cross purposes against India’s strategic interests.

India’s pay-back time to Russia has come and it should honor the services rendered to India. India during its ascendant trajectory in relation to Russia must ensure the following:

Politically, India must advance the strategic convergences that it enjoys with Russia on Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia; India must not be politically apologetic about it.
Strategically, India must recognize that it must maintain the correct balance between Russian strategic initiatives and United States strategic initiatives. India has been strategically coy and shied away from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization but did not hesitate to jump into the US sponsored “strategic geometries” in East Asia.
In the defense acquisition relationship which is the core of the Russia-India Strategic Partnership, India must be sensitive to the historical record of Russia in terms of providing crucial military hardware in the past without any Governmental/bureaucratic delays and the reliability and assurance that defense supplies to India would not be used as a political leverage by Russia.
All things being equal, Russia should receive preferential consideration in India’s buying of military hardware even as it diversifies its sources of supply. Russian military hardware stands combat tested and found fit in Indian military conditions. India must proceed carefully while attempting diversification in respect of the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy.
Economically, India should make a determined bid to expand trade as it has done with China.
As a rising global power, India cannot afford strategic tilts to either side. Under the present Indian Prime Minister the strategic tilt towards Washington is showing. It is imperative for India that it maintains “strategic balance” and “strategic poise” in the management of its strategic partnerships with global powers.

Concluding Observations

India is at historical strategic cross-roads as it moves towards emergence as a global power. In such a trajectory it can hardly afford strategic tilts in its ascendancy. Time- tested strategic partnerships like that with Russia need equal if not more nurturing than the evolving ones which have yet to stand the test of time.

India therefore, should avoid at all costs giving an impression to Russia that in its new found strategic infatuation with the United States it can let slip the Russian Strategic Partnership into a chilly phase as no strategic partnership can be taken for granted even if it is a ‘time-tested’ one.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)