© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 1, January - March 2007
Vladimir Ovchinsky, Doctor of Science (Law), Major-General of the Police (Ret), is an advisor to the Chairman of Russia’s Constitutional Court, and a member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs.
China, which is rapidly becoming a leader in global development, is now the talk of the world. However, the positive manifestations of this diverse phenomenon are closely linked with negative ones. For example, as China continues to consolidate its leading positions in the global economy, Chinese organized crime is expected to broaden its presence in global criminal links. This is of tremendous concern for Russia and the world.
THE “TRIADS” AND REFORMS
Many observers believe that information concerning the negative processes in contemporary China is classified, but this view is largely exaggerated. Chinese criminologists (including Liao Ping, He Bisong, Xin Yan, and others) have conducted in-depth studies into organized crime in their country, and the results of these studies have been translated into other languages, including Russian. Furthermore, Chinese officials from the Communist Party and law-enforcement bodies eagerly share their information about the criminal situation.
Analysis of these studies suggests that any shift from a command economy to a market economy brings about, as a negative side effect, an upsurge (or rather an outburst) of organized crime and corruption. China launched market reforms earlier than the Soviet Union, followed by Russia, and therefore was in the position to recognize the problem at an earlier time. While the Soviet Union first confronted the problem of organized crime and corruption in the mid-1980s, beginning with the famous “Uzbek affair,” China already experienced this phenomenon in the late 1970s, with the revival of the notorious “triads” (which, incidentally, played a significant role in the Celestial Empire back in the 17th century).
The study of contemporary organized crime in China, carried out by Chinese scholar Xin Yan, shows that mafia-type organizations seriously destabilize public order. Their leaders actively infiltrate economic structures as corruption ties grow stronger and economic crimes become more refined. Meanwhile, low-level government bodies (in villages and small towns) and law-enforcement agencies become increasingly infiltrated by criminal elements.
Eventually, the leaders of criminal organizations succeed in rising to high positions in the social hierarchy. For example, they become deputies of the National People’s Congress or members of political consultative councils in the provinces. Criminal organizations are more frequently interfering with the reshuffling of high-ranking officials. Moreover, there were even cases when the authorities of some Chinese regions asked the mafia to take over low-level administrative power (for example, in villages), while many local administrators asked the mafia for financial aid. Thus, criminal organizations in those regions evolved from a “criminal force” into a “criminal power.”
Xin Yan has studied many criminal cases and concluded that organized crime groups are often organized and run by former party and administrative functionaries and high-ranking officials of prosecutor’s offices. There were even reports alleging that these criminal leaders were active deputies of the National People’s Congress, secretaries of Communist Party cells, and chief executives of local Public Security Bureaus.
An increasing number of triad societies now operate under the umbrella of legitimate companies and enterprises and infiltrate governmental economic entities. Triads, which generate massive profits, have built a system for laundering illegal revenues. According to Chinese experts, about 200 billion yuans (U.S. $24.7 billion) is laundered in China each year; huge sums of money circulate through illegal money-changing shops.
Triads are more active in the coastal provinces, especially in Hong Kong. They control heroin and opium supplies, the hard currency black market, and the trafficking of Russian and Ukrainian prostitutes for brothels in Hong Kong and Macao. Finally, they control arms trafficking and provide “protection” for local businessmen. In Hong Kong, for example, there are 15 to 20 triad groups that actively engage in criminal activities, each having at least 30,000 members.
The official China News Weekly Review published an article in 2005, revealing that, apart from Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese mafia has spread its operations to large industrial centers in mainland China, such as Guangzhou, Tianjin and Shanghai.
Mafia organizations are taking advantage of both the negative and positive aspects of China’s economic reforms. Of course, they could not ignore the country’s fast-developing Internet market (as of early 2006, China placed second in the world with over 110 million users, behind only the U.S.) and organized on-line sales of pirated audio and video materials. Now, items offered for sale by triads also include drugs, prostitutes, stolen cars, weapons, false documents, and even human organs for transplantation.
The Beijing authorities work hard to control the Net by means of over 30,000 Internet police officers. Since the beginning of the 21st century, more than 2,000 web sites have been closed down for offering sexual services and gambling entertainment. Yet every day new sites appear that replace the closed web sites.
The rapid growth in fuel prices tempted the mafia to steal crude oil from pipelines, many of which were seriously damaged. The police estimated the amount of oil stolen in 2005 at over U.S. $120 million.
CHOPPING OFF THE DRAGON HEADS
The architect of the Chinese reforms, Deng Xiaoping, laid the ideological and organizational basis for the struggle against mafia structures and corruption in the People’s Republic of China. In the early 1980s, he pointed to a steadily worsening criminogenic situation in the country and emphasized the need for a long-term struggle against this social evil. In particular, he ordered full-scale operations against organized crime.
Deng also initiated the establishment of powerful analytical subdivisions within the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security. These subdivisions prepare long-term forecasts for the development of the geostrategic and regional criminogenic situation and devise plans for full-scale operations. There are also several central analytical organizations (for example, the Research Office under the State Council).
From 1983 to 2005, at least ten full-scale operations of this kind were carried out, in which more than one million criminal groups were liquidated. Many of their leaders, together with the most odious members, were executed.
Importantly, these types of operations against organized crime, together with the ongoing struggle against the mafia and corruption, are conducted in China in strict compliance with the law. China’s criminal law, together with those laws that pertain to criminal procedure, is constantly modified to respond to changes in the situation. Chinese laws, unlike Russia’s, contain clear definitions of mafia organizations, while the Supreme People’s Court regularly gives detailed explanations of judicial practices pertaining to cases on organized crime and corruption.
To counter the increased scope of money laundering by the mafia, the Chinese government in 2004 set up the Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center. Additionally, the Ministry of Public Security has an anti-money laundering department, which develops specific measures, interacts with foreign counterparts, and coordinates the activities of the ministry’s local divisions. There is even a special computer network that controls money flows 24 hours a day.
All these organizations participate in the full-scale operations, after which criminal activities subside for some time. Yet, after a while, criminal groups become active again, because these operations fail to eliminate the main reasons for crime. Thus, in place of the chopped off head of the dragon, many more deadlier heads grow in its place.
Unless unemployment, China’s main social problem, is solved, the self-reproduction of liquidated criminal organizations will continue. The number of the unemployed in the country is estimated at 182 million to 199 million, or 26 to 28 percent of the number of the employed. This figure equals 10 Chinese armies, and the mafia uses a large part of these redundant people.
A source of special concern is that the army of the unemployed is largely recruited from young people below the age of 35. According to a study conducted by China’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the unemployment rate among young people in 62 cities across China has exceeded 60 percent. Even graduates from institutions of higher learning have difficulties finding a job.
The “going outward” and “welcome to come” strategies, conducted by China in the last few years, are intended to increase the country’s foreign trade and foreign direct investment and, simultaneously, to solve the unemployment problem through intensive labor migration to other countries.
THE EXPANSION PROJECT GAINING STRENGTH
The above strategies helped China to increase its foreign trade almost threefold between 2001 and 2005. According to expert estimates, by 2020-2030, China will pass the United States in terms of GDP, thus becoming the world’s economic leader. The same conclusion is drawn by the well-known 2020 Project [Mapping the Global Future, prepared by the National Intelligence Council, a CIA advisory group, and issued on January 15, 2006 – Ed.].
As regards the “welcome to come” strategy, according to some Western analytical centers cited by Maxim Chereda, the leaders of the largest and most influential triads established contacts with representatives of the Chinese leadership at all levels, which ensured the safe infiltration of their cash into Mainland China, mainly in its southern provinces. The triads’ money was used for establishing profitable joint ventures, such as nightclubs and casinos. The co-founders of these ventures included regional representatives of China’s security organizations, in particular the Ministry of Public Security and the People’s Liberation Army.
However, any sort of “peaceful coexistence” between the Chinese mafia and the country’s leadership could not last for long. “Triads were alright for Beijing for as long as their capital was needed for economic reforms in the country,” Chereda wrote. “Now the reform process no longer needs support from ‘not quite legitimate organizations,’ to put it mildly.” As a result, the Chinese leadership has launched an offensive against triads.
At the same time, as prominent sinologist Vilya Gelbras writes, China has attracted U.S. $600 billion in foreign direct investment in the course of its “going outward” policy. According to some estimates, China has invested U.S. $700 billion in American securities, thus protecting the dollar and securing its presence on the U.S. market. From 2002 to 2005, foreign direct investment by Chinese enterprises alone (without taking into account financial organizations) amounted to $17.9 billion (with an average increase of 36 percent a year!), while more than 10,000 various enterprises have been set up outside the country. Considering the toughening of the government’s anti-mafia and anti-corruption policies inside the country, and the continuing “going outward” strategy, triad leaders objectively benefit more from directing their expansion out of the country.
This global criminal project is already being implemented – and very effectively. Chinese mafia organizations have established control over migration processes and have taken leading positions in organizing human trafficking and illegal migration. As follows from the U.S. Department of State’s report of 2005, China now ranks amongst the countries that require special attention due to the vast number of people who are made victims of human trafficking. A June 2006 report by Europol described Chinese mafia groups as leaders in human trafficking throughout the European Union.
Chinese triads have even made Japan’s mafia, yakuza, make room in its own country: the Chinese account for about half of all crimes committed by foreigners in Japan (double the figure from a decade ago), while their mafia organizations control two-thirds of heroin trade in that country. According to U.S. expert estimates, these organizations have also infiltrated the U.S. legal and black-market economies, surpassing even the Colombian cartels. In Italy, in early 2006, law enforcement bodies launched a major investigation into links between Chinese gangsters and the Italian mafia. An investigation is being held in Milan’s Chinatown with regard to suspicious investments in real estate and trade. In Rome, investigators have revealed dummy firms and banks engaged in money laundering. The first large-scale investigation concerning the financial resources of the Chinese mafia in Italy involved 22,000 Chinese. In total, the Italian police have launched 250 criminal cases against the leaders of Chinese mafia organizations and their assistants.
A 2005 report by Italy’s chief prosecutor said that the local Chinese triad was becoming more and more aggressive and united. The last few years have seen a rise in illegal activity, such as robberies and acts of extortion with regard to Italian citizens, and the emergence of mixed Chinese-Italian criminal groups.
Chinese organized crime can provoke global economic crises and influence market prices. In particular, in 2005 the world copper market was on the brink of collapse after a disastrous gamble on the London Metal Exchange. Chinese copper trader Liu Qibing, well known among business circles, sold 200,000 tons of copper on the exchange on behalf of the Chinese State Reserve Bureau, after which he disappeared, while world copper prices reached a record high.
Given the vast expansion of Chinese organized crime, it was impossible that the phenomenon would bypass Russia, but the intensity and forms of this expansion differ in many respects from the situation in other countries. There are objective reasons for this.
INFILTRATION OF RUSSIA
Sociological studies conducted by Russian scholars on Chinese communities in Moscow, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, in addition to the results of polls taken in Blagoveshchensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Barnaul and Belokurikha (the Altai Region), have shown that Russia, like the rest of the world, is experiencing a decisive moment: the development of new conditions for the global expansion of Chinese migration, and the rise of Chinese communities in foreign countries. This largely spontaneous growth has given way to the organized expansion of Chinese immigrants abroad and the broadening of their business activities.
The estimated number of Chinese migrants in Russia varies from 400,000 to 3 million. The main problem posed by this relatively new phenomenon is the damage these groups inflict on the Russian economy: the Chinese communities, according to police information, are covertly controlled by Chinese mafia organizations. Meanwhile, relations within these communities are patterned after those in the triads (strict obedience to the leaders, a vow of silence, severe punishment of recalcitrant members, etc.).
The majority of Chinese migrants, organized by mafia, go to Russia’s Far East. There are objective historical, demographic and, particularly, economic reasons for this choice. Sinologist Andrei Ostrovsky writes that Russia’s market reforms, marked by the loss of state regulation in the economy, have not made the region attractive to investors. Actually, in the competition for attracting capital to the Far East, Russia lost out to China.
The governor of the Khabarovsk Territory in the Russian Far East, Victor Ishayev, told the Izvestia newspaper in April 2006: “The Far East has been isolated from the Russian economy. In the Soviet times, 75 percent of all our products were supplied to Russia’s domestic market, whereas today we supply only 4 percent. Full-scale ties with the rest of Russia are impossible due to unequal conditions, in particular high tariffs on heat energy, electricity and transport, and the absence of industrial restructuring… Today we are legislatively determined to be a raw-material appendage of the advanced, fast-developing countries (Japan, China, Korea).”
Chinese mafia organizations exploit Russia’s Far East and Siberia precisely as a raw-material appendage. Yuri Yegorov and Alexander Samsonov, who studied organized crime in Russia’s East Siberia and Far East on the basis of police information available for the period 1999-2003, cite the following figures.
Of all criminal cases launched by the Russian police against ethnic organized crime groups in 2002, Chinese criminal groups accounted for 38 percent of the criminal cases in East Siberia, and for 40.9 percent of all cases in the Far East.
Poaching and smuggling of the forests and seas in the Russian Far East is also carried out on an organized basis. Hundreds of Chinese citizens are repeatedly detained in the Ussuri taiga with ginseng roots and other plants included in the Red Book of Russia. During the season for pine nut picking, Russian police recovered many tons of pine nuts from Chinese illegals. In China, pine nuts are processed for oil, which is later used as a component in pharmaceuticals and perfumes. Products that are valuable on the Chinese market, including trepang, ginseng, tiger skins and even bear bile, are smuggled out of the Maritime Territory. There is also an underground market for various kinds of frogs and turtle. In 2003, Chinese citizens began to actively smuggle various species of sturgeons into China from Russia.
Chinese poachers have destroyed the commercial stock of autumn salmon in the Ussuri River and have taken almost complete control over the migration routes of valuable fish species, including Siberian salmon and Siberian sturgeon, as well as popular sturgeon spawning areas.
Initially, the Chinese caught the fish themselves; now they actually hire the local Russian population for this task. The Chinese organized crime groups also hire Russians for cultivating plots of land leased by these groups. In other words, instead of serving as additional manpower resources, these Chinese “migrants” mercilessly exploit the Russian population: the mafia never becomes a manpower resource!
Professor Vitaly Nomokonov of the Far Eastern State University warns that Chinese mafia organizations in the Far East are intensively integrating with the Russian mafia. In Ussuriisk, for example, triads have established business relations with local criminal leaders: Russian organized crime groups help triads to buy metals in the region and to ship them abroad. Also, Russians set up passenger transportation firms, which are used by the Chinese, and provide warehouses for storing goods, including contraband. The last few years have seen the rise of yet another phenomenon: more and more Chinese are joining Russian organized crime groups, tipping them off about the movements of Chinese traders. At least one Chinese trader is robbed every month.
Professor Valery Sobolnikov of the Siberian Academy of Civil Service points out that in 2002-2005 Chinese organized crime groups registered businesses with dummy Russian owners, which allowed the actual heads of these firms or commercial structures to evade taxes. In many cases, the Chinese mafia establishes firms for single transactions. In the Chita Region, for example, about a thousand such “companies” have been revealed. In the Novosibirsk Region, numerous facts have been disclosed about foreign-trade operations carried out by front businesses. Incidentally, a majority of such commercial structures export strategic raw materials out of Russia.
Professor Anna Repetskaya of the Baikal State University of Economics and Law points to a similar tendency in the Irkutsk Region. She cites reports collected by the local bodies of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which thwarted the thefts of strategic raw and radioactive materials that were intended for export to China. Many Russian and Chinese organized crime groups divided functions: Russians stole the products from local enterprises, while the Chinese smuggled them to China.
FOREST MANDARINS
Researchers are warning that the greatest threat to Russia’s national security (especially in the economic realm) comes from criminal operations in the timber sector. Anatoly Lebedev of the Bureau of Regional Public Companies in Vladivostok has analyzed this problem in detail in the course of a journalistic investigation. Below are its main findings.
The lack of funding of the State Timber Service and Inspectorate in past years, compounded by official permission to seize confiscated illegal timber, resulted in unprecedented rates of corruption in the timber sector. Later, in 2002, a new government decree outlawed the practice by foresters and law enforcement bodies to profit by means of confiscated timber. Since then, all confiscated timber must be sold in favor of the Ministry of Property, while the foresters no longer receive a cent from these revenues.
Yet the corruption continues. The system of illegal logging and timber resales has become too widespread and involves too many local high-ranking officials to be easily liquidated. Chinese businessmen play a major role in this system. This is why attempts to adopt a new Forest Code that provides for the abolition of forestry enterprises, together with the delegation of their functions to leaseholders, have caused a panic in the region. For the Far East, this would mean that the vast forests could simply fall under the direct control of Chinese businesses.
Many retired Chinese generals and agents of special services actively participate in legal and illegal commercial operations in the Far East, buying property, hiring workers and controlling the most profitable kinds of businesses. The Chinese have quickly learned to copy Russian methods of evading taxes, with a slight difference: they are more effective at it. Thus, the large-scale smuggling of timber continues to the mutual delight of Russian and Chinese businessmen – and to the detriment of the Ussuri taiga.
Many Chinese, who operate under alias Russian names, control areas for wholesale timber sales in several cities of the Maritime Territory – Luchegorsk, Dalnerechensk, Lesozavodsk, Ussuriisk, Nakhodka and Dalnegorsk, in the Khabarovsk Territory, the Jewish Autonomous Region, and in the Amur and Chita Regions. According to the Anti-Organized Crime Department of the Maritime Interior Affairs Agency, there is enough proof that Chinese timber businesses in the Maritime Territory are under the strict control of triads.
DARING THE DRAGON
Why is it important to focus attention on these natural and raw-material resources? The matter is that over the years of reforms the Russian and foreign (including Chinese) mafias have got possession of what must never fall into their hands: Russia’s natural wealth, raw-material resources, metals (including rare-earth varieties and gold), timber and coal.
This situation is tantamount to a loss by the state of the levers of governance in the law enforcement sphere. If the government does not realize where it must focus its efforts, the law enforcement resource will continue to be dissipated without yielding the required results. Since it is impossible to address all the problems at once, the government must first set national priorities. Then it will be clear what methods will be the most effective against the Chinese mafia: cleaning up Chinese markets, dislodging triads from the taiga and timber-felling sites or launching military operations against those who destroy Russian bio-resources and ship trainloads of nonferrous metals and timber to China. On this last option, it would be extremely useful for Russia to borrow from China’s experience in conducting full-scale operations against the mafia. Certainly, the success of any law-enforcement operation depends on whether the government makes a turn for the better in its social and economic policy in the Far East and East Siberia, which, in turn, depends on its policy nationwide. Why not follow the example of the Chinese leadership, which has admitted making serious mistakes pertaining to the “going outward” and “welcome to come” strategies?
The 5th Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee of the 16th convocation (held in October 2005) discussed the five-year plan for 2006-2010 and set the task of “revising the view on the development” and “creating a new development model.” In its desire to “reform the reforms,” the Chinese authorities are focusing their ideological efforts on two major areas – propaganda of a new economic policy, with an emphasis on social justice and maximum expansion of the domestic market, together with a struggle against the liberal ideology, viewed as a challenge to China’s political stability. At the same time, the authorities have shifted the focus of the polemic away from Chinese problems to Latin America, Russia and other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, asserting that those regions have turned into disaster areas due to America’s policy of imposing its liberal model on them.
Beijing has already announced that the economic model that has been used to rapidly enrich the most active part of Chinese society has exhausted itself. Now, the time has come to pay attention to the quality of growth, smooth over social conflicts, remove inequality, and provide equal opportunities for hundreds of millions of Chinese.
April 14, 2007
Iran's big bluff
Iran's claims this week to have reached an industrial level of uranium enrichment have largely been met with scorn. ISN Security Watch investigates the current status of the Iranian nuclear program.
By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch (13/4/07)
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced during a visit to the Natanz enrichment facility on Monday that the Islamic Republic was now capable of uranium enrichment on an "industrial scale," in direct contravention of UN resolutions.
However, serious doubts have arisen concerning the enrichment claim, and Iran's ability to pay for atomic facilities currently under construction, shedding a new light on the capacity and future potential of the Iranian nuclear program.
Referring to a recently extended UN sanctions package, Institute for National Security Studies disarmament expert Dr Emily Landau told ISN Security Watch: "What we need to take from this announcement is [that it is] just a further indication after the second round of sanctions that the whole issue of continuing the program as it is - enriching uranium - is still very much on the agenda. Iran has no intention of complying with the latest UN resolution.
Regarding the announcement itself, she said, "I don't think that it is really [indicative] of Iran being at that point of no return or a technical threshold where it can go it alone and start industrial-scale production."
Asked if the Iranian announcement signaled a major developmental step, International Institute for Strategic Studies non-proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick told ISN Security Watch: "No, It was a political announcement, devoid of any supporting evidence. Iran is not at the industrial-scale of enrichment, and will not be for some time."
Asked to explain the diplomatic implications of Monday's announcement, he said, "It showed that Iran has no intention of honoring the UN mandate that it suspend all enrichment-related activity."
Limiting cooperation
Both Iran and the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have made moves to limit their mutual cooperation under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Islamic Republic's ancillary NPT safeguards agreement.
The moves come amid accusations that Iran has not fully disclosed its nuclear work - including 18 years of uranium enrichment activities.
Two IAEA inspectors arrived in Iran on Tuesday. During their week-long stay the pair will investigate ongoing uranium reprocessing work at the Natanz enrichment facility. Their conclusions will heavily influence the next IAEA report to the UN Security Council on Iranian NPT compliance, to be delivered following the nuclear watchdog's board meeting in late May.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) reports that IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming told German radio station Deutschlandfunk on Wednesday that Iran would have the capacity to create a nuclear weapon in four to six years and had received related materials illegally in the past while engaging in illicit nuclear experiments.
Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani on Monday warned that Iran would be forced to review its NPT membership if it faced further international pressure over its nuclear program.
Asked if Iran would leave the NPT, Fitzpatrick said, "No. Threatening to do so is a bluff. Withdrawing from the NPT would be equivalent to saying that their intentions are not peaceful, and that the nuclear program is for weapons purposes."
ISN Security Watch spoke to an official source with an intimate knowledge of the IAEA-Iran relationshipon the condition of anonymity.
Asked if the IAEA's problems with Iran stemmed largely from the failure to provide historical data on the development of its nuclear program, the source said: "It would not be incorrect when you say that the majority of issues are actually historical."
The IAEA does "not have a full picture of the past and therefore building up future work on a past which is not that clear is not comfortable for a number of [IAEA] member states."
"There were outstanding issues," he noted, "plutonium experiments they have done in the past, sources of the P-1 centrifuges, P-2 centrifuges, [used in enrichment] etc. These have not really come to the limelight yet and this is probably one of the problems."
Sanctions bite
"I have a sense that the sanctions route is a little more effective than the diplomacy that was carried out by the EU-3 [Britain, Germany and France] from 2003 to 2005," Landau said. "Iran still is not at the place where the international community wants it to be but there are signs of pressure."
The UN Security Council voted on 26 March to expand sanctions on Iran imposed over 14 alleged breaches of its NPT commitments, including an embargo on arms exports and the freezing of financial assets of a further group of prominent Iranian figures - including Revolutionary Guards commanders.
"After the first round of sanctions there were all these voices of criticism [in Iran] that came out aimed at Ahmadinejad, and even criticism from Khamenei, the supreme leader […] calling for a more moderate team to deal with the nuclear issue," Landau said.
"I think that the significance of the criticism is not that there is a desire to take necessarily a different route in the nuclear realm," she said. "They still want to go forward with the program, but it does mean that they are not happy with so many states in the international community being in agreement on taking this kind of resolution."
Landau believes that the Iranian economy "may be starting to feel the pressure" of US threats to cut banks off from the US financial system for doing business with companies that are found to have involvement with weapons of mass destruction programs or militant groups.
"Even the hint that banks might be subject to these kinds of penalties are enough for them to cut off ties with Iranian companies. So I think that these are steps that are starting to have an effect on Iran. But again, they are obviously not at a point that they will stop uranium enrichment."
Strained ties
Arguably, the most important diplomatic shift in recent months has been Russia's seeming decision to support a gradual move towards full UN sanctions.
"Having joined three Security Council resolutions mandating a suspension in Iran's enrichment program, Russia is committed to this goal and frustrated at Iran's continued defiance," Fitzpatrick said.
Russia and China had been seen as a bulwark in the UN Security Council against the US sanctions drive, but have eased their opposition to limited sanctions in the absence of Iranian diplomatic engagement.
Problems have also arisen over the completion and supply of the Russian-built Bushehr reactor, which was expected to be fully operational last September but has been dogged by delays, Iranian intimations of poor workmanship, and a growing crisis over payment scheduling.
According to the website of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Rosatom, the country's general contractor working on the Bushehr plant, Atomstroyexport, has not been paid for over two months. Iran vehemently denies this.
Ongoing talks in Moscow and Tehran have failed to solve the crisis, and Russia will now withhold project work and nuclear fuel deliveries, the agency says.
Importantly, the first vice chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, Mikhail Grishankov, specifically linked the withholding of initial fuel shipments to Russian fears that the fuel could be used for unsanctioned purposes, describing the payments crisis as a challenge to all bilateral agreements and partner relations between the states.
"It is very hard to know with this whole issue with Bushehr […] whether the explanation really is that they haven't transferred the funds; or whether it is [related to] the demand that Iran stop uranium enrichment and only then they [Russia] will continue with the preparations," Landau said. "I tend to think that the second explanation is perhaps the more plausible."
Fading diplomacy
Crucially, the Russian suspension of nuclear fuel supplies will further undermine diplomatic efforts to convince Iran to agree to the suspension of autonomous uranium reprocessing in return for an international aid package proffered last June by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
This included an offer of light water reactors, atomic and other technological aid, in return for a guaranteed Russian nuclear fuel supply and the re-export of spent fuel.
"If the Iranian government were inclined to try to find a diplomatic solution, it would be able to use the Monday announcement as a face-saving way of saying, "We achieved our goal of industrial-scale enrichment, so now, we can afford to take a technical pause and negotiate on the basis of the proposal put forward by Mr Solana last June,"" Fitzpatrick said, adding that he did not believe Iran was ready end enrichment.
Spinning the centrifuges
Chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani confirmed on Monday that work had begun on injecting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into an undisclosed number of the 3,000 centrifuges he says are to be installed at Natanz.
"On 21 February, when the IAEA last reported on the status of the underground enrichment production facility at Natanz, the IAEA said Iran had installed two 164-centrifuge cascades and was nearing completion on two more. That was a total of 656. Going from that number to 3,000 in six weeks is impossible for a country that is just a beginner in the field of uranium enrichment," he said.
Ahmadinejad had been expected to announce that the 3,000 centrifuges were operational in January but failed to do so, in an indication that Iran may be struggling in centrifuge fabrication or in ensuring a sufficient supply of uranium hexafluoride UF6 for their operation.
According to reports, an estimated 50,000-60,000 centrifuges would be needed for the indigenous supply of one nuclear reactor, while the continuous operation of a full series of 3,000 centrifuges would allow Iran to attain the nuclear material required for a nuclear weapon within a year.
The IAEA inspectors' report will provide the first confirmation of any major expansion in Iran's enrichment capacity.
Prospects
Monday's enrichment announcement confirms that Iran is determined to maintain its right to autonomous fuel production and to push on with nuclear development.
This further raises the prospects for wider regional nuclear proliferation and the attendant risk of a future nuclear arms race.
"There is the whole issue of additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, which has been a concern all along," Landau said. "The Gulf countries as a group made an announcement and now Jordan has made several announcements, all planning to make a nuclear program."
"The only short cut that I can think of is for a state like Saudi Arabia, which can perhaps buy a nuclear bomb and that could get them there quicker. But any kind of indigenous nuclear program is not going to become a reality anytime soon."
"There is a need to look at this as an opportunity to get some kind of security dialogue going […] to somehow find a way to address their [regional states'] concerns in a common framework, and not to address their concerns by becoming proliferators themselves," Landau said.
Fitzpatrick believes, "Iran should make a rational calculation about whether its national interests are best served by pursuing uranium enrichment despite the costs of sanctions and diplomatic isolation; or by stopping the program and reaping the benefits offered in the June 2006 [Solana] proposal."
Dr Dominic Moran is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East.
2008 OLYMPICS IN CHINA: SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT
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By B.Raman
The Falun Gong, Tibetan youth, Uighur separatists and disgruntled sections of the local population due to perceived issues of economic injustice would constitute the four internal sources of concern to the Chinese authorities responsible for the security arrangements before and during the Olympic Games of 2008, which are to be held in China.
2. These elements are unlikely to indulge in acts of violence directed against the foreign participants in the Olympics. Their likely targets would be more Chinese authorities and leadership. Their aim would be not to cause death, but disruption in the arrangements for the Games and political embarrassment for the hosts. The disruptions could be in the form of acts of sabotage directed at the Games infrastructure such as the Games villages, hotels, airports, railway stations etc undertaken much before the inauguration of the Games. Apart from causing disruption, successful acts of sabotage could create feelings of insecurity in the minds of participating national teams and make them have second thoughts about their participation.The Falun Gong has many cyber disruption experts and one should be prepared for attempts by it to disrupt the information infrastructure set up for the Games. Other likely threats from these elements would include shouting slogans, demonstrations and acts of self-immolation.
3.There is an ambivalence in the attitude of Al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front (IIF) towards China. Generally, the Muslims of the world look upon China as their well-wisher because of its assistance to Pakistan in developing a military nuclear capability----the Islamic bomb--- its assistance to Pakistan, Iran and Libya in developing a missile capability, its opposition to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq and its support for Iran on the nuclear issue. At the same time, they look upon the Xinjiang province of China as rightfully belonging to the Islamic Ummah and support the struggle of the Uighurs for their separation from China. They also support the struggle of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) for an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia consisting of the Central Asian Republics and the Xinjiang Region of China.
4. While they would have no motivation for targeting Chinese nationals, interests and prestige before and during the Games, they would be strongly tempted not to miss this spectacular occasion for mounting an act of terrorism directed at the participants from the US, the UK, Australia and other countries forming part of the occupying forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tight security arrangements being made by the Chinese authorities would make it difficult for them to infiltrate into China before and during the Games. A danger is of their infiltrating as members or office-bearers of the national teams from Iraq and Afghanistan participating in the Games. The explosion in the cafeteria of the Iraqi Parliament, which is located inside the highly protected Green Zone of Baghdad, on April 12,2007, showed how the resistance-fighters managed to get into the Zone under the garb of the security guard of one of the Members of Parliament. There has been large-scale infiltration of Iraqi security forces, Government departments and other institutions by the resistance fighters and Al Qaeda. It should be easy for them to infiltrate the national contingent from Iraq for the Games. So too in the case of Afghanistan.
5. The Chinese authorities have to address two questions: First, should they allow each national team to bring its own security team? Second, if so, should they insist that the security teams accompanying the national contingents should be from State security agencies and not from private companies? Verification of the antecedents of private companies and their personnel and a strict security control over them could be very difficult.
6. During the current World Cup Cricket tournament in the West Indies, those desirous of bringing their own security teams were allowed to do so. The Indian team was accompanied by a team of the National Security Guards. Despite the tight security arrangements made by the West Indies authorities, an unidentified killer managed to reach the hotel room of the coach of the Pakistani team and allegedly kill him. The local police investigating the case are still groping in the dark. This shows how easily a determined and well-motivated person could infiltrate even seemingly strong security arrangements and commit an act of violence. The Chinese authorities should study the security arrangements made in the West Indies in order to understand how this could have happened.
7. There is seething anger against the Chinese in many African countries due to reasons such as their support to dictatorial, anti-people regimes as in Sudan and Zimbabwe, the import of a very large number of Chinese workers to work in the local Chinese-aided projects and the resulting perceptions of deprivation of jobs for the sons of the soil. This sons of the soil anger against the Chinese could be exploited by mischievous elements to infiltrate the teams from these countries and create incidents during the Olympics.
8.For a spectacular occasion such as the Olympics, collection of precise preventive intelligence regarding security threats would be very difficult. The flow of preventive intelligence would be largely a matter of luck. The only way of ensuring the security of the Games would, therefore, be through very tight physical security. An exercise should be undertaken to visualise various likely scenarios and prepare a phsyical security plan to foil those scenarios and a crisis management plan to deal with the situation if any of those scenarios becomes a reality despite tight physical security. Strict verification of the antecedents of all participants---sportsmen or officials-- is a must.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com )
How it will take US to understand the Mushraf game
M.Mumtaz Khan
How long it will take US to understand the Mushraf, who portrays himself as front ally against terrorism but his close aids from arm and ISI continue to shelter and protect them in Pakistan . First he got his religious political parties elected in two strategically important Provinces which have been sanctuary for extremists and terrorists. By getting MMA elected Mushraf has killed two birds with one stone; first he exonerated himself from being blamed for supporting terrorism since where Taliban and Al-Qaeda are believed to be based or hiding, are under MMA governments. In the center Mushraf by giving MMA reasonable seats, sidelined the genuine political opposition and brought his indirect ally MMA into the opposition for smooth sailing. The victory of MMA in last elections is attributed to the surging anti-US sentiments in those two provinces as arguments are largely advanced by Pakistan officials and US officials but hardly anyone takes serious notice of those factors and forces that facilitated the victory of MMA in Provinces and center; in order to have justification to maintain the support to Taliban and extremist organizations under MMA cover. While, externally he has been successful to translate, all his covert support he rendered to MMA, as perceived serious extremist threat to blackmail US and west, and to show that only Pakistan military is capable of dealing with or neutralizing that threat. US have not been only generous to pour billions of dollars to strengthen Mushraf position and to extract maximum his cooperation against the terrorists. Mushraf has succeeded to convince the Bush administration that if Mushraf loses power, threat of taking over Pakistan ’s nuclear weapons by extremists is very imminent. Under this self serving argument Mushraf has been successful to trigger the fear among US circles of serious extremist threat of taking over Pakistan nuclear weapons. Under the false hope of winning against terrorism with the Mushraf’s help they turned blind eyes to every other social and political aspects, and forces that could have been useful in sidelining extremists politically and socially in Pakistan . Mushraf, government is collection of such people those are widely hated and disliked elements of society including the growing hate against the overwhelming presence of military generals in every walk of life has further undermined the direct appeal to the people against extremists by Mushraf government. While any popular leadership could have been politically very effective to neutralize extremists politically if ISI had stopped backing them and had allowed popular leaderships to participate in the elections. Keeping them out of country and forcing their workers and leaders in pre-and post poll days to change their loyalties were meant to benefit pro-Mushraf forces that directly supported MMA. But If US has had serious interest pushing Pakistan on right direction would have forced Mushraf to bring someone who had public acceptance and had lent him political credibility.
Mushraf, who after 9/11 had no option except to stand with US but never gave up option of supporting Taliban and extremists in Pakistan . Pakistan military and ISI have not only hid them and sheltered them but continued to infiltrate them in Afghanistan and Indian administered Kashmir , though at very small scale in the former in first few years. India criticized US double standard of turning blind eyes toward the infiltration and terrorism, to which India is victim of, while US is busy in praising Mushraf who has not been serious and sincere in rooting out his home grown terrorists and extremists.
US, forced by its own compulsions in Afghanistan pressurized Mushraf to take at least some cosmetic steps to please India . As a result of that Musharf’s announced banning of some extremist groups, promising not allowing his territory to let terrorists use against India , and US finally succeeded to get them agreed on ceasefire. Mushraf, arrested some extremists organizations leaders especially LeT, JeM, the most notoriously terrorists organizations operating from Afghanistan to Kashmir, as cosmetic steps but they remained effective and active in carrying out their activities and operations within Pakistan and across the border freely and openly, only they have to rename themselves.
US primary object was to lessen Indian military pressure from eastern borders on Pakistan that would allow Mushraf to shift his forces to western border to guard the infiltration into Afghanistan from the porous border.
In spite of easing tension between India and Pakistan encouraging further CBMs that eased Pakistan to divert its forces to North West frontiers to help allies in Afghanistan but infiltration didn’t stop. But US despite its intelligence personnel presence in Pakistan, capturing many of important Al-Qaeda leaders and staging some skirmishes in Wazirastan against the Al-Qaeda terrorists, but never renounced his support and sheltering key vital Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan. US underestimated Pakistan ISI’s skill to manage both sides while further equipped them with new technology and skill that ISI was lacking in intercepting internet based information and many other that further helped them to train their extremist elements active in Indian administered Kashmir and Taliban presently demonstrating that skill in Afghanistan. Pakistan, military leaders once called Taliban and extremists organizations as their strategic assets, have not completely abandoned them, and now Taliban and extremists are strategic assets for military to hold on to the power using their threat to keep continue to reap rewards and concessions from US.
The agreement in Wazirastan with Taliban, purportedly claimed to contain their activities across the border but benefited terrorists largely by providing them sanctuary, releasing their arrested carders, paying them bounty and assure them non-interference have increased their influence among the local population which was not inclined to subserve their interests before. But in the wake of agreement, power and authority of Taliban was endorsed by the Pakistan government that shunned every possibility of resistance against them. No matter what Pakistan government have advanced the arguments in its favor to convince the US but this agreement have benefited Taliban and Al-Qaeda by and large; as following increasing attacks in Afghanistan are fully reflective of this fact that how they have spread their political influence beyond the WANA and Wazirastan, as in Bannu, Kohat and other Areas; are continued facing the wrath of their political Islam, threatening video stores, forcing to closure of co-education schools, warning barbers not to shave and closing of English medium schools; recruiting school boys and killing principle, police and civilians those were not cooperating is not happening itself unless state support is rendered.
Now militant Islam is on the street of Islamabad, as largely believed that forces behind recent incident of Jamia hafsa and announcing to implement the shria Law by Imam of Lal Musjid is the handiwork of Pakistan ISI to divert the attention of people’s from serious judicial crisis that has threatened Mushraf’s very basis of the power and upcoming issue of his uniform and presidential elections. Interestingly enough that Imam of Lal Mujid is employee of Pakistan government who draws salary from government ex-chequer and in grade 19 but military ruler is still issuing warning and mediation now is being conducted by Mushraf’s close ally Chaudhry Shujat the government employee, who attacked few women, kidnapped and dragged them in day light to Lal Musjid, kidnapped their police officials, announced sharia Law in Islamabad surprisingly military took no time killing Nawb Akbar Bugti, who was former Chief Minister, Governor, minister and strong political leader, because he was real challenge. The US illusion will soon over to lure Mushraf or Pakistan ISI when in coming days allies will face further serious threat from Taliban. Although presently under the growing US pressure and visit of Cheney they handed over one Taliban leader, which is another indicative of that Pakistan military, has complete access to these wanted elements. As in the past whenever Mushraf traveled to Washington Pakistan handed over the Al-Qaeda leader to Bush administration to provide justification to fill their pockets and continue political support to military rule in Pakistan . Now, military ruler sensed the US priority of defeating Taliban than Al-Qaeda, and handed over Taliban leader to show their utility and indicate that they are still in control of their strategic assets and can use them or abuse them whenever they want to.
Time is crucial for US to make tough decisions about Pakistan if serious to eliminate the threat of terrorism. As 90% terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan whether it is regional or global but Pakistan ’s direct or indirect involvement is somehow was always found in most of the cases. The recent Mushraf action against the Chief Justice and people’s reaction should serve as warning that military is losing its image among the people and coming elections in Pakistan will be benchmark for both US policy toward it and containing the threat of terrorism, and also people will assess US commitment toward democracy and democratic values it always claims to uphold and promote in the Muslim world. These elections will also determine the public perception about the US whether US sincerely interested in seeing democratic and stable Pakistan or wants to use it through military dictators. The idea of winning public support by offering aid in social sector will not make any difference unless US makes clear political choices between supporting democracy in Pakistan or military, no matter how any military dictators poses but he is perceived to be usurper of rights and US support is viewed only to strengthen that dictatorship not to the people. This impression that military is capable of delivering since it wields tremendous political influence in policy making during the civil government too, which is true, but that happens because of US continued support to them. The fight against terrorism has entered into serious phase and future of Afghanistan will determine the future of this region and political influence of US. If US fails in Afghanistan and Taliban or extremists take over then US power and authority will seriously suffer its global image. The aid to military is neither strengthening Pakistan nor liberal forces in Pakistan, and ultimately helps military to hold on to the power. Extremist and religious forces are natural ally of Pakistan military and they will never seriously try to undermine or eradicate their influence.
It is the time that US support the genuine liberal parties, and force Mushraf to let them to return to Pakistan and participate in the coming elections, and meantime it should force him to take action against the homegrown extremists parties. While its continued support to the extremists in the name of Indian administered Kashmir is an excuse to protect these extremists. By showing serious interests in democracy will enhance US image among the people of not only in Pakistan but most of the Islamic countries where US support to dictators is interpreted that US is not serious in democracy in Muslim countries.
Executive Director
International center for peace and democracy-ICFPD
Vice Chairman
International Kashmir Alliance-IKA
55 Nugget Ave suite 230 Toronto
M1P 3L1 Canada
Mumtazkhan88@yahoo.com
“The Shock of the Powers” Conference by Economic School of War
To celebrate its 10 years, the Economic School of War (EGE) organized its first international conference on “the Shock of the Powers” on April 13 .
“Shock of Civilizations” with “Shock of the Powers”
Challenges and strategies of the nations
The incipient century is marked by the assertion of the strategies of power. To date universalization generates more threats that concrete promises. This is why the States develop policies of power to maintain a dominant position or to remain competitive on the international scene.
The fourth conference of the Economic School of War underlines contemporary antagonisms geostrategic. It has an objective, to define contours of the new paradigm of the international relations: the shock of the powers.
For further information and to register you: www.lechocdespuissances.com/fr.
“Stakes and evolution of the power”
08h15 - 08h45
Reception of the participants
09h00 - 09h15
Short speech of opening
• Pierre Conesa
09h15 - 09h45
Power the History proof: theories and figures
• Christian Harbulot
09h45 - 10h15
Conditions of the development of the power
• Christophe Réveillard
10h15 - 10h45
National interests and role of Europe
• Wolfgang Reineke
10h45 - 11h15
Pauses
11h15 - 11h45
“Shock of Civilizations” to the “Shock of the Powers”
• Ali Rastbeen
11h45 - 12h15
Stakes and challenges of economic safety
• Thomas Menk
12h45 - 14h00
Lunch pauses (free)
“Which strategies of power?”
14h00 - 14h30
Militarization: Chinese method
• Anh Tiecieng
• Jacques Baudouin
14h30 - 15h00
Power by the influence: the Russian thought
• Victor Perevalov
15h00 - 15h30
Total governorship: American vision
• Charles Cogan
15h30 - 16h00
Operations of information and strategies of power
• Cameron Kerry
16h00 - 16h30
Pauses
16h30 - 17h30
Round table: Panel of strategies in Europe
• António Bessa Marks
• General Carlo Jean
17h30 - 18h00
Virtues of the way of the power
• Michel Guénaire
18h00 - 18h30
Short speech of fence
• Steve Gentili
“Shock of Civilizations” with “Shock of the Powers”
Challenges and strategies of the nations
The incipient century is marked by the assertion of the strategies of power. To date universalization generates more threats that concrete promises. This is why the States develop policies of power to maintain a dominant position or to remain competitive on the international scene.
The fourth conference of the Economic School of War underlines contemporary antagonisms geostrategic. It has an objective, to define contours of the new paradigm of the international relations: the shock of the powers.
For further information and to register you: www.lechocdespuissances.com/fr.
“Stakes and evolution of the power”
08h15 - 08h45
Reception of the participants
09h00 - 09h15
Short speech of opening
• Pierre Conesa
09h15 - 09h45
Power the History proof: theories and figures
• Christian Harbulot
09h45 - 10h15
Conditions of the development of the power
• Christophe Réveillard
10h15 - 10h45
National interests and role of Europe
• Wolfgang Reineke
10h45 - 11h15
Pauses
11h15 - 11h45
“Shock of Civilizations” to the “Shock of the Powers”
• Ali Rastbeen
11h45 - 12h15
Stakes and challenges of economic safety
• Thomas Menk
12h45 - 14h00
Lunch pauses (free)
“Which strategies of power?”
14h00 - 14h30
Militarization: Chinese method
• Anh Tiecieng
• Jacques Baudouin
14h30 - 15h00
Power by the influence: the Russian thought
• Victor Perevalov
15h00 - 15h30
Total governorship: American vision
• Charles Cogan
15h30 - 16h00
Operations of information and strategies of power
• Cameron Kerry
16h00 - 16h30
Pauses
16h30 - 17h30
Round table: Panel of strategies in Europe
• António Bessa Marks
• General Carlo Jean
17h30 - 18h00
Virtues of the way of the power
• Michel Guénaire
18h00 - 18h30
Short speech of fence
• Steve Gentili
India has China in its range
written by: Siddharth Srivastava, 13-Apr-07
NEW DELHI - Even as India celebrates the successful test-firing on Thursday of its home-grown Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missile - capable of delivering a 1.5-tonne nuclear or conventional payload over much of Asia - officials admit that the test had the tacit approval of the United States.
The US is striving to build India as a strategic counterweight to China, along with Japan and Australia.
Last May, during a period of frenzied negotiations on a civilian nuclear deal with Washington, New Delhi postponed testing of the Agni-III so as not to invite the ire of nuclear hawks in the US Congress, which was deliberating the nuclear pact that now stands approved.
According to reports last year, Washington put pressure on New Delhi to agree to a future moratorium on testing of dual-use missile technology that could be used to deliver a nuclear payload and testing another atomic bomb as a quid pro quo for the civilian nuclear deal.
India, however, rejected such a commitment as a back-door entry to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India has not signed the CTBT as it feels that the treaty came into existence after those who possessed nuclear weapons had developed the know-how.
Strategic equations have obviously changed now, with a combination of business interests, India's record as a responsible democratic nation, and the China factor coming into play.
Agni-III, given its range of 3,000 kilometers, has been specifically designed to build a minimum nuclear deterrence against China, with cities such as Beijing and Shanghai very much in the radar. Agni-III is said to possess a high degree of accuracy with a medium-to-large nuclear payload.
Beijing reacted immediately to the Indian firing, saying it hoped that India, "as a country with an important influence in this region, can work to maintain and promote peace and stability in the region". Indian officials have said Agni-III is not China-centric, but an effort to build overall security.
India, of course, has traditional rival Pakistan already covered via its Agni-I (700-800km range) and Agni-II (2,000km-plus range) missiles that are now being inducted into the armed forces. As per the agreed norms, New Delhi informed Islamabad about Agni-III prior to the test.
Not to be undone, Pakistan, with help from China and North Korea, is in the process of inducting the nuclear-capable Shaheen-II missile, tested for the first time in March 2004, which can strike Indian targets over a range of 2,000km.
Apart from gaining more security muscle in the region, the success of Agni-III is significant on other counts. The maiden test of Agni-III failed last July 9, so Indian scientists had to work on the technical glitches.
The Agni is one of five missiles that have been developed by India. The others are the short-range surface-to-surface Prithvi, the surface-to-air Trishul (Trident), the multi-purpose Akash (Sky) and the anti-tank Nag (Cobra) missile.
Other benefits
It would seem that India is also now reasonably sure of its acceptance as a nuclear exception among the global community that will allow it to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the international market. Indian efforts have now moved to turning around nations that form part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), with success on this count. India needs approval from the NSG so that it can implement its nuclear agreement with the US.
Heavyweights France, the United Kingdom and Canada have already backed the deal. The business potential and diplomatic efforts have had important countries such as China and Australia rethink their approach. Those two countries have hinted that they will not be averse to doing nuclear business with India. Russia has already chalked out its nuclear-power engagement with India.
South Africa and Brazil have been co-opted by promises of New Delhi's support in securing business deals and expertise in software and information technology.
Japan has been difficult, but Indian officials are sure that given the massive business opportunities, especially in software to upgrade Japanese companies, and extensive diplomatic efforts, Japan will come around and has already considerably softened its stand. Tokyo is pretty much clued into a US-India-Japan "axis of democracy" to counter the might of China.
Thus the timing of the Agni-III test seems to be right. Politically, the Congress-led New Delhi government has been criticized for being feeble to India's internal and external security threats, because of repeated terrorist attacks and the need to tread carefully in dealing with Beijing.
Given the ongoing detailed negotiations on the nitty-gritty of the nuclear pact with the US as well the benefits of nuclear power that will flow in times to come, it was only prudent for New Delhi to gain a few political points given the immediacy of electoral politics.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the success of the Agni-III missile is an "impressive illustration" of India mastering the strategic high technologies to uphold national security.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist.
Published in: Asia Times
NEW DELHI - Even as India celebrates the successful test-firing on Thursday of its home-grown Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missile - capable of delivering a 1.5-tonne nuclear or conventional payload over much of Asia - officials admit that the test had the tacit approval of the United States.
The US is striving to build India as a strategic counterweight to China, along with Japan and Australia.
Last May, during a period of frenzied negotiations on a civilian nuclear deal with Washington, New Delhi postponed testing of the Agni-III so as not to invite the ire of nuclear hawks in the US Congress, which was deliberating the nuclear pact that now stands approved.
According to reports last year, Washington put pressure on New Delhi to agree to a future moratorium on testing of dual-use missile technology that could be used to deliver a nuclear payload and testing another atomic bomb as a quid pro quo for the civilian nuclear deal.
India, however, rejected such a commitment as a back-door entry to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India has not signed the CTBT as it feels that the treaty came into existence after those who possessed nuclear weapons had developed the know-how.
Strategic equations have obviously changed now, with a combination of business interests, India's record as a responsible democratic nation, and the China factor coming into play.
Agni-III, given its range of 3,000 kilometers, has been specifically designed to build a minimum nuclear deterrence against China, with cities such as Beijing and Shanghai very much in the radar. Agni-III is said to possess a high degree of accuracy with a medium-to-large nuclear payload.
Beijing reacted immediately to the Indian firing, saying it hoped that India, "as a country with an important influence in this region, can work to maintain and promote peace and stability in the region". Indian officials have said Agni-III is not China-centric, but an effort to build overall security.
India, of course, has traditional rival Pakistan already covered via its Agni-I (700-800km range) and Agni-II (2,000km-plus range) missiles that are now being inducted into the armed forces. As per the agreed norms, New Delhi informed Islamabad about Agni-III prior to the test.
Not to be undone, Pakistan, with help from China and North Korea, is in the process of inducting the nuclear-capable Shaheen-II missile, tested for the first time in March 2004, which can strike Indian targets over a range of 2,000km.
Apart from gaining more security muscle in the region, the success of Agni-III is significant on other counts. The maiden test of Agni-III failed last July 9, so Indian scientists had to work on the technical glitches.
The Agni is one of five missiles that have been developed by India. The others are the short-range surface-to-surface Prithvi, the surface-to-air Trishul (Trident), the multi-purpose Akash (Sky) and the anti-tank Nag (Cobra) missile.
Other benefits
It would seem that India is also now reasonably sure of its acceptance as a nuclear exception among the global community that will allow it to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the international market. Indian efforts have now moved to turning around nations that form part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), with success on this count. India needs approval from the NSG so that it can implement its nuclear agreement with the US.
Heavyweights France, the United Kingdom and Canada have already backed the deal. The business potential and diplomatic efforts have had important countries such as China and Australia rethink their approach. Those two countries have hinted that they will not be averse to doing nuclear business with India. Russia has already chalked out its nuclear-power engagement with India.
South Africa and Brazil have been co-opted by promises of New Delhi's support in securing business deals and expertise in software and information technology.
Japan has been difficult, but Indian officials are sure that given the massive business opportunities, especially in software to upgrade Japanese companies, and extensive diplomatic efforts, Japan will come around and has already considerably softened its stand. Tokyo is pretty much clued into a US-India-Japan "axis of democracy" to counter the might of China.
Thus the timing of the Agni-III test seems to be right. Politically, the Congress-led New Delhi government has been criticized for being feeble to India's internal and external security threats, because of repeated terrorist attacks and the need to tread carefully in dealing with Beijing.
Given the ongoing detailed negotiations on the nitty-gritty of the nuclear pact with the US as well the benefits of nuclear power that will flow in times to come, it was only prudent for New Delhi to gain a few political points given the immediacy of electoral politics.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the success of the Agni-III missile is an "impressive illustration" of India mastering the strategic high technologies to uphold national security.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist.
Published in: Asia Times
Quote of the day : Brig (r) Saad Muhammad
“The only Central Asian nation that can be worked out for Pakistan’s benefit and still out of Indian influence is Kazakhstan, and Pakistan should launch serious and concerted efforts to establish its economic ties with that nation,”
Brig (r) Saad Muhammad (Lecture on Afghanistan at the Peshawar University’s Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia , Daily Times, April 14, 2007)
Brig (r) Saad Muhammad (Lecture on Afghanistan at the Peshawar University’s Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia , Daily Times, April 14, 2007)
Analysis on Afghanistan by Brigadier (r) Saad Muhammad
‘Taliban pose no threat to US, NATO presence in Afghanistan’
Staff Report: Daily Times, April 14, 2007
PESHAWAR: Former Pakistani Defence Attaché to Kabul Brigadier (r) Saad Muhammad said on Friday that there was no immediate strategic threat to the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan because of taliban movement in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.
He was delivering a lecture on Afghanistan at the Peshawar University’s Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia. Former Peshawar University vice chancellor and ex-director of the ASC Professor Dr Muhammad Anwar Khan, Dr Sarfaraz Khan, Dr Zahid Anwar, Dr Shabbir Ahmad Khan and some students participated in the discussion.
Saad Muhammad concentrated on the period from 2003-06, the time when he served as a defence attaché in Kabul, and on several issues with particular reference to Afghanistan, US, NATO, taliban and Pakistan. It was his personal and shared opinion of participants that a peaceful Afghanistan was beneficial for Pakistan and that Pakistan should do away with the policy of appeasing either the Pushtoon or any other specific ethnic groups in Afghanistan for its better future in the region.
He said that if US-NATO forces left Afghanistan today, the Pushtoon taliban would occupy Kabul within a fortnight and could deal with the non-Pushtoon population so brutally that “Changez Khan’s reputation in history will be dwarfed”.
He also discussed the hatred between the Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon segments of Afghan society. He said the non-Pushtoon population was supportive of the foreign troops because of the fear of once again being under Pushtoon domination. He defined the non-Pushtoon support to the US-NATO forces as strategic public support which had confined Taliban movement to hardly eight Afghan provinces - overwhelmingly Pushtoon and bordering with Pakistan.
Saad Muhammad said the rich oil, gas and mineral deposits in the region and the need to contain China and Russia in the region were probably the two most significant reasons for the presence of US-NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In the same context, he said the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation had adopted a “wait and see policy” vis-Ã -vis the US-NATO presence in Afghanistan because the US-NATO military operations against the Al-Qaeda and taliban went in favour of both the countries to a certain extent. He added that both countries feared Islamic extremism because of the Islamic Movement in Xingjian, China and the Chechen movement in Russia.
Turning towards Central Asian countries and Pakistan’s role there, he said Indians beyond estimations had penetrated Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. “The only Central Asian nation that can be worked out for Pakistan’s benefit and still out of Indian influence is Kazakhstan, and Pakistan should launch serious and concerted efforts to establish its economic ties with that nation,” he added.
Brig Saad was of the view that it was not possible for US-NATO forces to control Afghanistan’s militarily or fight for an indefinite period in future. The only solution, he said, was to enter into a dialogue process with various segments of Afghan society for stabilising Afghanistan.
Staff Report: Daily Times, April 14, 2007
PESHAWAR: Former Pakistani Defence Attaché to Kabul Brigadier (r) Saad Muhammad said on Friday that there was no immediate strategic threat to the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan because of taliban movement in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.
He was delivering a lecture on Afghanistan at the Peshawar University’s Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia. Former Peshawar University vice chancellor and ex-director of the ASC Professor Dr Muhammad Anwar Khan, Dr Sarfaraz Khan, Dr Zahid Anwar, Dr Shabbir Ahmad Khan and some students participated in the discussion.
Saad Muhammad concentrated on the period from 2003-06, the time when he served as a defence attaché in Kabul, and on several issues with particular reference to Afghanistan, US, NATO, taliban and Pakistan. It was his personal and shared opinion of participants that a peaceful Afghanistan was beneficial for Pakistan and that Pakistan should do away with the policy of appeasing either the Pushtoon or any other specific ethnic groups in Afghanistan for its better future in the region.
He said that if US-NATO forces left Afghanistan today, the Pushtoon taliban would occupy Kabul within a fortnight and could deal with the non-Pushtoon population so brutally that “Changez Khan’s reputation in history will be dwarfed”.
He also discussed the hatred between the Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon segments of Afghan society. He said the non-Pushtoon population was supportive of the foreign troops because of the fear of once again being under Pushtoon domination. He defined the non-Pushtoon support to the US-NATO forces as strategic public support which had confined Taliban movement to hardly eight Afghan provinces - overwhelmingly Pushtoon and bordering with Pakistan.
Saad Muhammad said the rich oil, gas and mineral deposits in the region and the need to contain China and Russia in the region were probably the two most significant reasons for the presence of US-NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In the same context, he said the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation had adopted a “wait and see policy” vis-Ã -vis the US-NATO presence in Afghanistan because the US-NATO military operations against the Al-Qaeda and taliban went in favour of both the countries to a certain extent. He added that both countries feared Islamic extremism because of the Islamic Movement in Xingjian, China and the Chechen movement in Russia.
Turning towards Central Asian countries and Pakistan’s role there, he said Indians beyond estimations had penetrated Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. “The only Central Asian nation that can be worked out for Pakistan’s benefit and still out of Indian influence is Kazakhstan, and Pakistan should launch serious and concerted efforts to establish its economic ties with that nation,” he added.
Brig Saad was of the view that it was not possible for US-NATO forces to control Afghanistan’s militarily or fight for an indefinite period in future. The only solution, he said, was to enter into a dialogue process with various segments of Afghan society for stabilising Afghanistan.
A Leadership 'Beyond Repair': Asma Jahangir
The Last Word: Asma Jahangir
A Leadership 'Beyond Repair'
By Asma Jahangir
Newsweek International
April 2, 2007 issue - These are tough times for Pervez Musharraf. Under increasing criticism for his inability to control Islamic militants in the country's tribal areas, the Pakistani president now faces a revolt within his own judicial establishment. For the past two weeks, hundreds of lawyers have staged protests and gone on strike over the president's decision to suspend Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry for alleged misuse of his powers. (The charges include nepotism and an excessive fondness for luxury cars and aircraft.) In addition to the demonstrations, eight judges and the deputy attorney general have resigned, raising questions over the future of Pakistan's judiciary—and its leader's grip. NEWSWEEK's Ron Moreau spoke to Asma Jahangir, one of Pakistan's foremost Supreme Court lawyers and chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Excerpts:
MOREAU: What is Musharraf's motive for suspending Chaudhry?
Jahangir: Insecure dictators see ghosts everywhere. This is not the first time it has happened. He forced the Supreme Court justices to swear a loyalty oath to him when he came in [via a bloodless coup in 1999.] He's insecure. Not only does he want a pliant judiciary, he wants a totally subservient one. But it's very difficult in 2007 to have that with today's free media and the independent bar.
Musharraf claims that he is only following procedure—that Chaudhry's suspension is standard reaction to the charges against the chief justice.
The president has tried once again to lie and to mislead everybody. His move is not as casual and simple as he puts it. It was obviously preplanned. He claims that placing Chaudhry under house arrest was a tactical error. Yet for two days this "tactical error" continued.
Chaudhry ordered the government to begin looking into the hundreds of so-called Islamic extremists who had been detained and disappeared. Is this a factor in Musharraf's decision?
Musharraf is a very skillful liar, but now he is losing his touch. He says: "I've been very worried about the missing people, too, but what can I do? They are jihadis." He wants the world to feel that these disappeared people are Islamic militants, which is not true. I would say 60 percent to 70 percent on the list of the 141 disappeared people that we have given to the Supreme Court are Sindhi and Baluch nationalists who are secular. And some of these nationalists are well known in the country. They are poets and writers, and their work is secular. They have no connection to jihad, or Al Qaeda or Taliban. Either he's living in denial or is misled. But I think he is just lying.
But Chaudhry ruled that the government should produce the missing people, didn't he?
As far as the missing people are concerned, Chaudhry has not given a single judgment on it. He kept the Human Rights Commission's petition pending for one and a half months. But since we are lawyers of renown, it is very difficult for any judge to kick us around—he had to hear it. But he went at it very slowly. He did give a notice to the government [to act], but he really didn't give a judgment. There was not a single time when he said that those who kept these people should be brought to justice. All he was doing was saying to the government, "Let's find some people." How can any court close its eye to hundreds of people who have disappeared?
Was Musharraf worried that Chaudhry would rule against his retaining a dual role as president and chief of Army staff later this year?
Whether the president can continue to wear his uniform or not was not an issue. We do not think that any judge has that kind of courage, including Chaudhry. We don't think that these judges have gumption or courage.
The police roughed up Chaudhry as he went to his hearing last week.
You even see the chief justice on television being dragged by the hair. It was all over the newspapers and television. It's a violation of human rights. What frightens people the most is that if they can treat a chief justice so shabbily and humiliate him so shamelessly, then nobody is safe. We all feel that we are next in line.
What will happen if the Supreme Judicial Council exonerates and reinstalls the chief justice?
If the SJC restores [Chaudhry] to the bench I don't know if he can perform independently because lawyers are championing his cause. Would a chief justice who comes back riding on the shoulders of lawyers be able to sit on the bench and not be able to think about the fact that he owes his reinstatement to lawyers?
How do you see this ending?
They [the government] probably feel the longer they prolong the proceedings the greater the chance that the movement will eventually fizzle out. My own assessment is that the situation will become defused because lawyers can't stay on strike and keep protesting for months on end. But this government will make another mistake. This government is beyond repair.
© 2007 Newsweek, Inc.
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17770835/site/newsweek/
Demographic snapshot of US Airforce Personnel
4/10/2007 - RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE, Texas (AFNEWS) -- The Air Force Personnel Center here recently published its demographics report offering a snapshot of the service's active-duty and civilian force, as of March 31.
Statistics are rounded to the nearest tenth.
Active-duty demographics
-- 337,780 individuals are on active duty composed of 68,675 officers and 269,105 enlisted Airmen.
-- The Air Force has 13,545 pilots, 4,371 navigators, 1,363 air battle managers and 33,188 non-rated line officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below.
Age
-- The average age of the officer force is 35; for enlisted Airmen it's 29.
-- 38.7 percent are below the age of 26, which is 45.3 percent of enlisted Airmen and 12.9 percent of officers.
Sex
-- There are 66,410 women in the Air Force, which is 19.7 percent of the force; 18.2 percent of officers and 20 percent of enlisted Airmen.
-- 59 percent of the female officers are line officers; 41 percent are non-line; 85.4 percent of the male officers are line officers and 14.6 percent are non-line.
-- Women first began entering pilot training in 1976, navigator training in 1977 and fighter pilot training in July 1993. Currently there are 593 (4.1 percent) female pilots, 226 (4.8 percent) female navigators and 164 air battle managers (11.7 percent)
Race
The following percentages covers self-reported racial information:
-- 0.6 percent are American Indian or native Alaskan.
-- 2.3 percent are Asian.
-- 14.8 percent are black or African American.
-- 0.8 percent are native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.
-- 74.3 percent are white.
-- 1.6 percent are of more than one of the categories.
-- 5.6 percent declined to report their race.
Ethnicity
"Hispanic or Latino" is now considered an ethnic, not a racial, category that is registered separately and in addition to the above racial categories.
-- 9.1 percent are "Hispanic/Latino."
-- 87.8 percent "not Hispanic/Latino."
-- 3.1 percent declined to respond.
Marital status
-- 60.8 percent of the current force is married, which is 72.6 percent of officers and 57.8 percent of enlisted Airmen. There are 19,597 couples in the Air Force with both spouses in the military; 1,358 of these are married to members of other military services.
Family members
-- Active duty members supported 516,685 family members; 413,159 family members reside in an Airman's household.
Overseas
-- 21.3 percent of Airmen are assigned overseas (including Alaska and Hawaii), which is composed of 10,466 officers and 61,567 enlisted Airmen.
Total active federal military service
-- The average total active federal military service is 11 years for officers and nine years for enlisted Airmen.
Academic education
-- 50.4 percent of officers have advanced or professional degrees; 40.1 percent have master's degrees, 8.9 percent have professional degrees and 1.3 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 24 percent of company grade officers have advanced degrees; 17.3 percent have master's degrees, 6.5 percent have professional degrees and 0.3 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 84.8 percent of field grade officers have advanced degrees; 70.1 percent have master's degrees, 12.2 percent have professional degrees and 2.6 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 99.95 percent of the enlisted force have at least a high school education; 73.5 percent have some semester hours toward a college degree; 16.4 percent have an associate's degree or equivalent semester hours; 4.8 percent have a bachelor's degree; 0.8 percent have a master's degree and .01 percent have a professional or doctorate degree.
Component
-- 99.4 percent of the officers have a regular commission; 99.6 percent of the line officers have a regular commission.
Developmental education
-- 60.1 percent of the officers have completed one or more professional military education or developmental education course either in residence or by correspondence; 8,939 have completed at least one senior service school or senior developmental education course, 13,633 have completed an intermediate level course while 18,675 have completed Squadron Officer School.
Source of commission
-- 19.4 percent of the officers were commissioned through the U.S. Air Force Academy, 43.1 percent through ROTC and 20.8 percent through Officer Training School. The remaining 16.7 percent were commissioned from other sources (direct appointment, etc.).
Civilian employee demographics
Total civilian strength
-- There are 142,447 civilian employees; 76 percent are "white collar" and 24 percent are "blue collar."
Citizenship
-- 133,276 are U.S. citizens including U.S. nationals (9,796 are Air Force Reserve technicians); 9,168 are foreign national employees; and three are other non-U.S. employees in the U.S. or a U.S. territory.
Age
-- The average age is 46.6 years.
Length of service
-- The average length of service is 15.6 years.
Retirement eligibility
-- 24 percent become eligible in more than 20 years.
-- 30.2 percent become eligible in 11 to 20 years.
-- 17.8 percent become eligible in six to 10 years.
-- 18 percent become eligible in one to five years.
-- 8.4 percent became eligible in one to five years ago.
-- 1.7 percent became eligible more than five years ago.
Gender
-- 33.4 percent are female and 66.6 percent are male.
Race
The following percentages cover self-reported Air Force civilian members' racial information.
-- 1.1 percent are American Indian or native Alaskan.
-- 4.8 percent are Asian.
-- 11.7 percent are black or African American.
-- 0.2 percent are native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.
-- 70.5 percent are white.
-- 0.2 percent are more than one of the categories.
-- 11.4 percent declined to respond.
Ethnicity
"Hispanic or Latino" is now considered an ethnic, not a racial, category that is registered separately and in addition to the above racial categories.
-- 7.1 percent are "Hispanic/Latino."
-- 92.9 percent are "not Hispanic/Latino."
Overseas
-- 10.8 percent of the total civilian work force are assigned overseas; 40.5 percent are U.S. citizens including U.S. nationals; 59.4 percent are local nationals.
Military service
-- 2.6 percent of civilians are retired officers.
-- 15.4 percent of civilians are retired enlisted.
-- 30.2 percent of civilians have some military service.
-- 51.7 percent have no military service.
Education
White collar
-- 25.4 percent of civilians have a bachelor's degree; 16.9 percent have a master's and 2 percent have a doctorate or professional degree; 24.2 percent have an associate's degree or have accumulated hours toward a bachelor's degree; 28.6 percent have at least a high school education; and 1.2 percent have less than a high school diploma.
Blue collar
-- 4.4 percent have a bachelor's degree; 0.4 percent have a master's degree; 27.3 percent have an associate's degree or have accumulated hours toward a bachelor's degree; 65.7 percent have at least a high school education or equivalent; and 1.8 percent have less than a high school diploma.
Developmental education
-- 5,936 civilian employees have completed one or more military schools; 3,364 have completed Squadron Officer School; 3,292 have completed intermediate developmental education; and 1,545 have completed senior developmental education.
Executive-level training
-- 330 employees have completed executive-level training; 19 Congressional fellowship programs; 276 executive and senior leadership; 27 public administration graduate school; and 12 management graduate school.
Statistics are rounded to the nearest tenth.
Active-duty demographics
-- 337,780 individuals are on active duty composed of 68,675 officers and 269,105 enlisted Airmen.
-- The Air Force has 13,545 pilots, 4,371 navigators, 1,363 air battle managers and 33,188 non-rated line officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below.
Age
-- The average age of the officer force is 35; for enlisted Airmen it's 29.
-- 38.7 percent are below the age of 26, which is 45.3 percent of enlisted Airmen and 12.9 percent of officers.
Sex
-- There are 66,410 women in the Air Force, which is 19.7 percent of the force; 18.2 percent of officers and 20 percent of enlisted Airmen.
-- 59 percent of the female officers are line officers; 41 percent are non-line; 85.4 percent of the male officers are line officers and 14.6 percent are non-line.
-- Women first began entering pilot training in 1976, navigator training in 1977 and fighter pilot training in July 1993. Currently there are 593 (4.1 percent) female pilots, 226 (4.8 percent) female navigators and 164 air battle managers (11.7 percent)
Race
The following percentages covers self-reported racial information:
-- 0.6 percent are American Indian or native Alaskan.
-- 2.3 percent are Asian.
-- 14.8 percent are black or African American.
-- 0.8 percent are native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.
-- 74.3 percent are white.
-- 1.6 percent are of more than one of the categories.
-- 5.6 percent declined to report their race.
Ethnicity
"Hispanic or Latino" is now considered an ethnic, not a racial, category that is registered separately and in addition to the above racial categories.
-- 9.1 percent are "Hispanic/Latino."
-- 87.8 percent "not Hispanic/Latino."
-- 3.1 percent declined to respond.
Marital status
-- 60.8 percent of the current force is married, which is 72.6 percent of officers and 57.8 percent of enlisted Airmen. There are 19,597 couples in the Air Force with both spouses in the military; 1,358 of these are married to members of other military services.
Family members
-- Active duty members supported 516,685 family members; 413,159 family members reside in an Airman's household.
Overseas
-- 21.3 percent of Airmen are assigned overseas (including Alaska and Hawaii), which is composed of 10,466 officers and 61,567 enlisted Airmen.
Total active federal military service
-- The average total active federal military service is 11 years for officers and nine years for enlisted Airmen.
Academic education
-- 50.4 percent of officers have advanced or professional degrees; 40.1 percent have master's degrees, 8.9 percent have professional degrees and 1.3 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 24 percent of company grade officers have advanced degrees; 17.3 percent have master's degrees, 6.5 percent have professional degrees and 0.3 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 84.8 percent of field grade officers have advanced degrees; 70.1 percent have master's degrees, 12.2 percent have professional degrees and 2.6 percent have doctorate degrees.
-- 99.95 percent of the enlisted force have at least a high school education; 73.5 percent have some semester hours toward a college degree; 16.4 percent have an associate's degree or equivalent semester hours; 4.8 percent have a bachelor's degree; 0.8 percent have a master's degree and .01 percent have a professional or doctorate degree.
Component
-- 99.4 percent of the officers have a regular commission; 99.6 percent of the line officers have a regular commission.
Developmental education
-- 60.1 percent of the officers have completed one or more professional military education or developmental education course either in residence or by correspondence; 8,939 have completed at least one senior service school or senior developmental education course, 13,633 have completed an intermediate level course while 18,675 have completed Squadron Officer School.
Source of commission
-- 19.4 percent of the officers were commissioned through the U.S. Air Force Academy, 43.1 percent through ROTC and 20.8 percent through Officer Training School. The remaining 16.7 percent were commissioned from other sources (direct appointment, etc.).
Civilian employee demographics
Total civilian strength
-- There are 142,447 civilian employees; 76 percent are "white collar" and 24 percent are "blue collar."
Citizenship
-- 133,276 are U.S. citizens including U.S. nationals (9,796 are Air Force Reserve technicians); 9,168 are foreign national employees; and three are other non-U.S. employees in the U.S. or a U.S. territory.
Age
-- The average age is 46.6 years.
Length of service
-- The average length of service is 15.6 years.
Retirement eligibility
-- 24 percent become eligible in more than 20 years.
-- 30.2 percent become eligible in 11 to 20 years.
-- 17.8 percent become eligible in six to 10 years.
-- 18 percent become eligible in one to five years.
-- 8.4 percent became eligible in one to five years ago.
-- 1.7 percent became eligible more than five years ago.
Gender
-- 33.4 percent are female and 66.6 percent are male.
Race
The following percentages cover self-reported Air Force civilian members' racial information.
-- 1.1 percent are American Indian or native Alaskan.
-- 4.8 percent are Asian.
-- 11.7 percent are black or African American.
-- 0.2 percent are native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.
-- 70.5 percent are white.
-- 0.2 percent are more than one of the categories.
-- 11.4 percent declined to respond.
Ethnicity
"Hispanic or Latino" is now considered an ethnic, not a racial, category that is registered separately and in addition to the above racial categories.
-- 7.1 percent are "Hispanic/Latino."
-- 92.9 percent are "not Hispanic/Latino."
Overseas
-- 10.8 percent of the total civilian work force are assigned overseas; 40.5 percent are U.S. citizens including U.S. nationals; 59.4 percent are local nationals.
Military service
-- 2.6 percent of civilians are retired officers.
-- 15.4 percent of civilians are retired enlisted.
-- 30.2 percent of civilians have some military service.
-- 51.7 percent have no military service.
Education
White collar
-- 25.4 percent of civilians have a bachelor's degree; 16.9 percent have a master's and 2 percent have a doctorate or professional degree; 24.2 percent have an associate's degree or have accumulated hours toward a bachelor's degree; 28.6 percent have at least a high school education; and 1.2 percent have less than a high school diploma.
Blue collar
-- 4.4 percent have a bachelor's degree; 0.4 percent have a master's degree; 27.3 percent have an associate's degree or have accumulated hours toward a bachelor's degree; 65.7 percent have at least a high school education or equivalent; and 1.8 percent have less than a high school diploma.
Developmental education
-- 5,936 civilian employees have completed one or more military schools; 3,364 have completed Squadron Officer School; 3,292 have completed intermediate developmental education; and 1,545 have completed senior developmental education.
Executive-level training
-- 330 employees have completed executive-level training; 19 Congressional fellowship programs; 276 executive and senior leadership; 27 public administration graduate school; and 12 management graduate school.
New policy protects US Air Force computer networks
by Josh Aycock
Air Combat Command Public Affairs
4/13/2007 - LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (AFNEWS) -- A new Air Force policy on encrypting and digitally signing e-mails is now in effect to ensure security and reliability of information as the battle for cyberspace dominance continues.
Officially called the Air Force Public Key Infrastructure Policy on Encrypting and Digitally Signing E-mails, it is designed to combat adversaries' growing attempts at network infiltration and sending barrages of malicious e-mails.
PKI is not simply a program. It is a combination of hardware, software, policies and procedures that allows users to securely send and receive e-mails. Every user has a personal identity on the Air Force network and now has the ability to protect their identity.
Defense Department networks sustain up to six million attacks per day, said Lt. Gen. Charles E. Croom Jr., director of the Defense Information Systems Agency and commander of the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, in a speech given at the 2007 Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association SpaceComm conference.
A digital signature is the same as a signature on a piece of paper, they both are legally binding. Digital signatures also assure the recipient of the sender's identity and reaffirm that an e-mail remains unaltered through transmission.
Message encryption assures the sender that only the intended recipient will have the ability to receive and read the message.
"Increased threats and changes in mission needs resulted in our senior leaders recently modifying the Air Force mission to include cyberspace as a viable domain in which to fight and win," said Col. Daniel Blaettler, the Cryptologic Systems Group commander at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. "PKI is integral to defending our networks against those threats."
Both digital signature and e-mail encryption are readily available tools and mandatory for network users when conducting official Air Force business through electronic means. The policy defines the criteria when these tools should be used.
Examples of when to use a digital signature include formal direction to a government employee or contractor, messages that stipulate an Air Force official position on any matter and messages that commit to, authorize or deny the use of funds in some manner, according to the policy.
In addition to being digitally signed, e-mail messages that contain sensitive, but unclassified information or mission critical information should also be encrypted with the PKI certificates to ensure confidentiality, according to the policy. Examples include e-mails containing for official use only information, Privacy Act Information or personally identifiable information, according to the policy.
"These are powerful, readily available tools everyone can use to ensure vital Air Force information infrastructure and operations are secure," Colonel Blaettler said.
Operational security can now be practiced by every user with a click of the mouse. After composing a sensitive e-mail users can click on either or both the digitally sign or encrypt e-mail icons located on the e-mail message toolbar in Microsoft Outlook.
"Digital signature and encryption is not just a change in technology, it is a change in culture," said James Pinder, Air Combat Command's core services manager.
For more information on how and when to use PKI visit the PKI Web site at: https://afpki.lackland.af.mil/html/awareness.asp.
Air Combat Command Public Affairs
4/13/2007 - LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (AFNEWS) -- A new Air Force policy on encrypting and digitally signing e-mails is now in effect to ensure security and reliability of information as the battle for cyberspace dominance continues.
Officially called the Air Force Public Key Infrastructure Policy on Encrypting and Digitally Signing E-mails, it is designed to combat adversaries' growing attempts at network infiltration and sending barrages of malicious e-mails.
PKI is not simply a program. It is a combination of hardware, software, policies and procedures that allows users to securely send and receive e-mails. Every user has a personal identity on the Air Force network and now has the ability to protect their identity.
Defense Department networks sustain up to six million attacks per day, said Lt. Gen. Charles E. Croom Jr., director of the Defense Information Systems Agency and commander of the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, in a speech given at the 2007 Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association SpaceComm conference.
A digital signature is the same as a signature on a piece of paper, they both are legally binding. Digital signatures also assure the recipient of the sender's identity and reaffirm that an e-mail remains unaltered through transmission.
Message encryption assures the sender that only the intended recipient will have the ability to receive and read the message.
"Increased threats and changes in mission needs resulted in our senior leaders recently modifying the Air Force mission to include cyberspace as a viable domain in which to fight and win," said Col. Daniel Blaettler, the Cryptologic Systems Group commander at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. "PKI is integral to defending our networks against those threats."
Both digital signature and e-mail encryption are readily available tools and mandatory for network users when conducting official Air Force business through electronic means. The policy defines the criteria when these tools should be used.
Examples of when to use a digital signature include formal direction to a government employee or contractor, messages that stipulate an Air Force official position on any matter and messages that commit to, authorize or deny the use of funds in some manner, according to the policy.
In addition to being digitally signed, e-mail messages that contain sensitive, but unclassified information or mission critical information should also be encrypted with the PKI certificates to ensure confidentiality, according to the policy. Examples include e-mails containing for official use only information, Privacy Act Information or personally identifiable information, according to the policy.
"These are powerful, readily available tools everyone can use to ensure vital Air Force information infrastructure and operations are secure," Colonel Blaettler said.
Operational security can now be practiced by every user with a click of the mouse. After composing a sensitive e-mail users can click on either or both the digitally sign or encrypt e-mail icons located on the e-mail message toolbar in Microsoft Outlook.
"Digital signature and encryption is not just a change in technology, it is a change in culture," said James Pinder, Air Combat Command's core services manager.
For more information on how and when to use PKI visit the PKI Web site at: https://afpki.lackland.af.mil/html/awareness.asp.
Economic Intelligence and Economic Patriotism :Defined
Economic intelligence
“The economic intelligence is an action and way of thinking which consists, for the companies and the territories, to organize the systematic monitoring of their environment, to protect strategic information, to capitalize and develop their knowledge (knowledge and know-how) and to be able to deploy actions of influence. The economic intelligence is made legal and ethical practices. Working on “opened” information known as, it cannot be confused with espionage. It implies a real setting in network of all the actors bus if competence is individual, the intelligence is collective. ”
Nicolas MOINET
Lecturer
Researcher with the CEREGE - Economic Intelligence Team
Director of economic Master intelligence and strategic communication
(economic ex DESS Intelligence and development of the companies)
ICOMTEC - University of Poitiers - Technopolis of Futuroscope
“The economic intelligence gathers the whole of the tools and methodologies which take part legally in the collection, the treatment and the diffusion in an optimal way of decisional information within an organized structure (Undertaken, area, state). It integrates the concepts of minimization of the risks and protection of the inheritance. It takes part in the active positioning of this structure from actions of lobbying and, in fact, is located between the strategic day before of which it takes again the synthetic analyses and intelligence counters it from which it excludes the aspect misinformation. ”
Jean-Pierre BERNAT
Responsible for mission in strategic day before CIRAD
Expert in Information, documentation and strategic day before
Economic Patriotism
“The appearance of economic patriotism in the vocabulary of the French government made flash back with force certain blockings cultural, in particular when it is a question of defining strategic autonomy that a country has the right to assert to ensure its future. It remains much of way to traverse bus with the concept of interest general is added from now on that of the collective interest. By collective interest, we understand the objectives geoeconomic that the political power must define in order to preserve the chances of development of the country. This collective interest which does not have anything a concept Marxist, gives all its direction to economic patriotism. Patriotism is the basic reference mark to approach the complexity of the reports/ratios of cold force of the post-war period. Let us point out the definition of the word fatherland: a community political individuals living on the same ground and bound by a feeling of membership to the same community, in particular cultural and linguistic. Economic patriotism thus defines the framework of development of a country confronted with the appropriatenesses and the threats of the dynamic news of power exits of the universalization of the exchanges. ”
Christian HARBULOT
Principal of War Economic (EGE)
Web site - http://www.ege.fr/
“The economic intelligence is an action and way of thinking which consists, for the companies and the territories, to organize the systematic monitoring of their environment, to protect strategic information, to capitalize and develop their knowledge (knowledge and know-how) and to be able to deploy actions of influence. The economic intelligence is made legal and ethical practices. Working on “opened” information known as, it cannot be confused with espionage. It implies a real setting in network of all the actors bus if competence is individual, the intelligence is collective. ”
Nicolas MOINET
Lecturer
Researcher with the CEREGE - Economic Intelligence Team
Director of economic Master intelligence and strategic communication
(economic ex DESS Intelligence and development of the companies)
ICOMTEC - University of Poitiers - Technopolis of Futuroscope
“The economic intelligence gathers the whole of the tools and methodologies which take part legally in the collection, the treatment and the diffusion in an optimal way of decisional information within an organized structure (Undertaken, area, state). It integrates the concepts of minimization of the risks and protection of the inheritance. It takes part in the active positioning of this structure from actions of lobbying and, in fact, is located between the strategic day before of which it takes again the synthetic analyses and intelligence counters it from which it excludes the aspect misinformation. ”
Jean-Pierre BERNAT
Responsible for mission in strategic day before CIRAD
Expert in Information, documentation and strategic day before
Economic Patriotism
“The appearance of economic patriotism in the vocabulary of the French government made flash back with force certain blockings cultural, in particular when it is a question of defining strategic autonomy that a country has the right to assert to ensure its future. It remains much of way to traverse bus with the concept of interest general is added from now on that of the collective interest. By collective interest, we understand the objectives geoeconomic that the political power must define in order to preserve the chances of development of the country. This collective interest which does not have anything a concept Marxist, gives all its direction to economic patriotism. Patriotism is the basic reference mark to approach the complexity of the reports/ratios of cold force of the post-war period. Let us point out the definition of the word fatherland: a community political individuals living on the same ground and bound by a feeling of membership to the same community, in particular cultural and linguistic. Economic patriotism thus defines the framework of development of a country confronted with the appropriatenesses and the threats of the dynamic news of power exits of the universalization of the exchanges. ”
Christian HARBULOT
Principal of War Economic (EGE)
Web site - http://www.ege.fr/
Iran emboldened : Seeks to dominate Middle East politics
Source: Armed Forces Journal
Tehran seeks to dominate Middle East politics
By Peter Brookes
With the creeping possibility of a nuclear breakout, its vigorous sponsorship of international terrorism and its escalating intervention next door in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a triple threat — at least — to international security and America's Middle Eastern interests. Indeed, perhaps no country fits the definition of rogue state as well as Iran does. Making matters worse, Iran's confidence and clout in the region — and beyond — are indubitably on the rise.
But that is only the beginning. Shiite Persian Iran is not content with being just an inconsequential pariah. Iran has grand ambitions. Tehran wants to be the predominant state in the Middle East, replacing the U.S. as the region's power broker and lording over its Sunni Arab neighbors. With the fall of its most fearsome competitors for regional pre-eminence — Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Afghanistan's Taliban — Iran is unabashedly reasserting itself on the international stage.
Buoyed by high energy prices, emboldened by continuing American challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, encouraged by consistent, unimpeded progress in its nuclear program and the increased influence of its extremist allies — Hamas and Hezbollah — Iran has its eye on becoming the regional hegemony. If unchecked, Tehran may pull it off.
NUKES 'R' US
While Tehran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian power generation, analysts are deeply skeptical. All indicators — from the lack of the program's transparency to its ties to the prodigious Pakistani proliferator, A.Q. Khan, to its burgeoning ballistic missile program — point in the direction of nuclear weapons, not nuclear power.
Moreover, Iran's continued defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on it to cease the enrichment of uranium — key to both producing nuclear reactor fuel and fissile material for nuclear weapons — has not inspired confidence in Iran's so-called "peaceful intentions."
The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says Iran could be involved in industrial-scale uranium enrichment in as little as six months. Tehran, naturally, insists it needs access to the full nuclear fuel cycle, and will only enrich uranium to 4 percent — the level needed for nuclear reactor fuel. (Fissile material used for weapons — highly enriched uranium — is enriched to 90 percent.)
According to the latest intelligence estimates, if unfettered, Iran could be a nuclear weapons state by 2015. A reasonable estimate? Perhaps. But with limited visibility into Iran's nuclear program, it is at best a "guesstimate." Further, it probably also does not take into account the possibility of external assistance from the former Soviet Union or now-nuclear North Korea, with whom Iran has budding ballistic missile ties.
Similarly troubling is the question of whether Iran, as a nuclear weapons state, will involve itself in the dreaded "secondary proliferation," passing its nuclear know-how on to others. Could Tehran's de facto ally, Syria, be the recipient of Iran's nuclear largesse? Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed at the U.N. to share Iran's nuclear technology with other Muslim states. Another question: Would Iran put other states under its nuclear umbrella?
These scenarios do not even take into account the regional implications of an Iranian nuclear breakout. In recent months, at least six Middle Eastern Arab states have declared their intention to the IAEA to pursue "peaceful" nuclear energy programs. Suspiciously, one of the six, Saudi Arabia, sits atop 25 percent of the world's known oil reserves. With only 20 million people, Riyadh hardly needs nuclear power. Moreover, the advent of an Iranian bomb would also shoot another hole in the already-leaky Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, undermining international efforts to limit access to the once exclusive nuclear weapons club.
To get conventional — or nuclear — weapons on target, Iran is developing a prodigious ballistic-missile arsenal, now the Middle East's biggest. Based on the North Korean No-Dong ballistic missile, its Shahab-3 missile can already reach all of the Middle East and Turkey. Tehran is working on another version, the Shahab-4, that can strike into Europe. A longer-range program is also on the drawing board, making Iran's recent claims of a space program set off alarm bells about an intercontinental ballistic missile, which could reach the U.S.
ties to TERRORism
According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons.
Hezbollah — a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group — is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict.
In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC.
Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats — potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region.
Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe — including in the U.S. — as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq.
Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.
IRAN IN IRAQ
Despite its insistence that it seeks stability in Iraq, Tehran is providing funding, weapons and safe passage into Iraq for Shiite militias and other militants. Hezbollah is helping with training. The IRGC, MOIS and the shadowy Quds Force are supplying explosively formed penetrators, rocket-propelled grenades, .50-caliber sniper rifles and other weapons to Shiite militias, resulting in nearly 200 U.S. deaths and 700 wounded over the last six months, according to the U.S. military.
Iran is also using "soft power" such as radio, television and the print media to shape Iraqi public opinion, including funding friendly Shiite political parties and promoting pro-Iranian officials in the Iraq government. As with Beirut and Damascus, Tehran would love to bring Baghdad under its political sway, allowing Iran to dominate the heart of the Middle East.
To implement its hegemonic designs, Iran must become the dominant military force in the Persian Gulf. Nuclear weapons only go so far. Iran's conventional forces are large in contrast with other regional militaries, but have limited capability, especially compared with U.S. forces. Most of its equipment is worn, even obsolete, but Tehran has used windfall profits from oil and natural gas exports to modernize its conventional armed forces through equipment upgrades, procurement and a robust military-exercise program. For instance, spending nearly $1 billion, Iran is purchasing the highly capable Russian short-range air defense system, the SA-15 (Tor-M1). But even with ongoing modernization efforts, limitations in command and control, intelligence, electronic warfare, logistics and joint operations will undermine Tehran's dreams of hegemony — at least for the short term.
Iran has also flexed its muscles through military exercises, especially over the last year. It is clear Iran has no intention of taking the U.S. head-on in a military dust-up. Tehran will use an asymmetric strategy, including land- and sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, missile-equipped patrol boats and mines. Irregular warfare, including suicide attacks, is a certainty. In fact, Iranian exercises have been so aggressive that American commanders are worried an incident could spark an engagement in the Persian Gulf as Tehran edges its war games into busy gulf sea lanes.
Iran has talked about wielding the oil weapon, too, closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's oil flows. But, in practice, the threat rings a bit hollow. Sure, Iran could slow maritime traffic by mining the six-mile-wide sea lanes of the strait or by attacking international shipping with, for instance, its Kilo-class diesel submarines or Seersucker anti-ship missiles. Expending a large number of assets, it could possibly close the strait to navigation for a few days, a week tops. But there are trade-offs. Iran would certainly unsettle global oil markets and intimidate its oil-producing neighbors. But if it closes the strait, it would have a difficult time getting its own oil and gas to market, hamstringing its fragile economy.
Diplomatic efforts over the past couple of years have yielded little to nothing in terms of moderating Iranian behavior, especially its nuclear program. While punitive economic sanctions would pummel the Iranian economy, already beset by high unemployment and inflation, permanent U.N. Security Council members China and Russia are reluctant to get tough. Russia is building Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr for $1 billion; China is investing $100 billion in Iranian oil and gas over the next 25 years.
NUCLEAR CAT-AND-MOUSE
So what is the prognosis for the near future? Iran is very likely to continue to play a cat-and-mouse game on its nuclear program despite international obligations and pressure. Tehran will continue to flout U.N. resolutions while offering up the possibility of negotiations to end the crisis, which some, especially the Europeans, find attractive. Iran will also continue its involvement in Iraq, being careful to keep its fingerprints off events while working to bring Iraq into its sphere of influence and hastening along an ignominious U.S. defeat and withdrawal.
But don't forget Israel. Even with the current government's weakened state, Israel could decide to take things into its own hands. A strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would be more difficult than the one against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. But an attack against key Iranian nuclear facilities could set the program back years. Iran's Arab neighbors would vociferously protest Israeli aggression for public consumption, but privately breathe a large sigh of relief. Unfortunately, a strike might not end Iran's nuclear ambitions, and there remains the possibility of a wider Israeli-Iranian war, involving Iranian missile and terrorist attacks on Israel.
So is war with Iran inevitable? War is never inevitable. But while conflict with Iran is not a certainty, misperception and miscalculation that lead to war are always a possibility. Dealing with Tehran is nettlesome. This means that while running out other diplomatic and economic sanction options, Washington would be wise to build a regional coalition to contain and deter Iran, and look for opportunities to roll back Iranian influence wherever possible — while keeping the military option squarely on the table.
Tehran seeks to dominate Middle East politics
By Peter Brookes
With the creeping possibility of a nuclear breakout, its vigorous sponsorship of international terrorism and its escalating intervention next door in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a triple threat — at least — to international security and America's Middle Eastern interests. Indeed, perhaps no country fits the definition of rogue state as well as Iran does. Making matters worse, Iran's confidence and clout in the region — and beyond — are indubitably on the rise.
But that is only the beginning. Shiite Persian Iran is not content with being just an inconsequential pariah. Iran has grand ambitions. Tehran wants to be the predominant state in the Middle East, replacing the U.S. as the region's power broker and lording over its Sunni Arab neighbors. With the fall of its most fearsome competitors for regional pre-eminence — Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Afghanistan's Taliban — Iran is unabashedly reasserting itself on the international stage.
Buoyed by high energy prices, emboldened by continuing American challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, encouraged by consistent, unimpeded progress in its nuclear program and the increased influence of its extremist allies — Hamas and Hezbollah — Iran has its eye on becoming the regional hegemony. If unchecked, Tehran may pull it off.
NUKES 'R' US
While Tehran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian power generation, analysts are deeply skeptical. All indicators — from the lack of the program's transparency to its ties to the prodigious Pakistani proliferator, A.Q. Khan, to its burgeoning ballistic missile program — point in the direction of nuclear weapons, not nuclear power.
Moreover, Iran's continued defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on it to cease the enrichment of uranium — key to both producing nuclear reactor fuel and fissile material for nuclear weapons — has not inspired confidence in Iran's so-called "peaceful intentions."
The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says Iran could be involved in industrial-scale uranium enrichment in as little as six months. Tehran, naturally, insists it needs access to the full nuclear fuel cycle, and will only enrich uranium to 4 percent — the level needed for nuclear reactor fuel. (Fissile material used for weapons — highly enriched uranium — is enriched to 90 percent.)
According to the latest intelligence estimates, if unfettered, Iran could be a nuclear weapons state by 2015. A reasonable estimate? Perhaps. But with limited visibility into Iran's nuclear program, it is at best a "guesstimate." Further, it probably also does not take into account the possibility of external assistance from the former Soviet Union or now-nuclear North Korea, with whom Iran has budding ballistic missile ties.
Similarly troubling is the question of whether Iran, as a nuclear weapons state, will involve itself in the dreaded "secondary proliferation," passing its nuclear know-how on to others. Could Tehran's de facto ally, Syria, be the recipient of Iran's nuclear largesse? Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed at the U.N. to share Iran's nuclear technology with other Muslim states. Another question: Would Iran put other states under its nuclear umbrella?
These scenarios do not even take into account the regional implications of an Iranian nuclear breakout. In recent months, at least six Middle Eastern Arab states have declared their intention to the IAEA to pursue "peaceful" nuclear energy programs. Suspiciously, one of the six, Saudi Arabia, sits atop 25 percent of the world's known oil reserves. With only 20 million people, Riyadh hardly needs nuclear power. Moreover, the advent of an Iranian bomb would also shoot another hole in the already-leaky Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, undermining international efforts to limit access to the once exclusive nuclear weapons club.
To get conventional — or nuclear — weapons on target, Iran is developing a prodigious ballistic-missile arsenal, now the Middle East's biggest. Based on the North Korean No-Dong ballistic missile, its Shahab-3 missile can already reach all of the Middle East and Turkey. Tehran is working on another version, the Shahab-4, that can strike into Europe. A longer-range program is also on the drawing board, making Iran's recent claims of a space program set off alarm bells about an intercontinental ballistic missile, which could reach the U.S.
ties to TERRORism
According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons.
Hezbollah — a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group — is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict.
In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC.
Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats — potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region.
Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe — including in the U.S. — as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq.
Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.
IRAN IN IRAQ
Despite its insistence that it seeks stability in Iraq, Tehran is providing funding, weapons and safe passage into Iraq for Shiite militias and other militants. Hezbollah is helping with training. The IRGC, MOIS and the shadowy Quds Force are supplying explosively formed penetrators, rocket-propelled grenades, .50-caliber sniper rifles and other weapons to Shiite militias, resulting in nearly 200 U.S. deaths and 700 wounded over the last six months, according to the U.S. military.
Iran is also using "soft power" such as radio, television and the print media to shape Iraqi public opinion, including funding friendly Shiite political parties and promoting pro-Iranian officials in the Iraq government. As with Beirut and Damascus, Tehran would love to bring Baghdad under its political sway, allowing Iran to dominate the heart of the Middle East.
To implement its hegemonic designs, Iran must become the dominant military force in the Persian Gulf. Nuclear weapons only go so far. Iran's conventional forces are large in contrast with other regional militaries, but have limited capability, especially compared with U.S. forces. Most of its equipment is worn, even obsolete, but Tehran has used windfall profits from oil and natural gas exports to modernize its conventional armed forces through equipment upgrades, procurement and a robust military-exercise program. For instance, spending nearly $1 billion, Iran is purchasing the highly capable Russian short-range air defense system, the SA-15 (Tor-M1). But even with ongoing modernization efforts, limitations in command and control, intelligence, electronic warfare, logistics and joint operations will undermine Tehran's dreams of hegemony — at least for the short term.
Iran has also flexed its muscles through military exercises, especially over the last year. It is clear Iran has no intention of taking the U.S. head-on in a military dust-up. Tehran will use an asymmetric strategy, including land- and sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, missile-equipped patrol boats and mines. Irregular warfare, including suicide attacks, is a certainty. In fact, Iranian exercises have been so aggressive that American commanders are worried an incident could spark an engagement in the Persian Gulf as Tehran edges its war games into busy gulf sea lanes.
Iran has talked about wielding the oil weapon, too, closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's oil flows. But, in practice, the threat rings a bit hollow. Sure, Iran could slow maritime traffic by mining the six-mile-wide sea lanes of the strait or by attacking international shipping with, for instance, its Kilo-class diesel submarines or Seersucker anti-ship missiles. Expending a large number of assets, it could possibly close the strait to navigation for a few days, a week tops. But there are trade-offs. Iran would certainly unsettle global oil markets and intimidate its oil-producing neighbors. But if it closes the strait, it would have a difficult time getting its own oil and gas to market, hamstringing its fragile economy.
Diplomatic efforts over the past couple of years have yielded little to nothing in terms of moderating Iranian behavior, especially its nuclear program. While punitive economic sanctions would pummel the Iranian economy, already beset by high unemployment and inflation, permanent U.N. Security Council members China and Russia are reluctant to get tough. Russia is building Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr for $1 billion; China is investing $100 billion in Iranian oil and gas over the next 25 years.
NUCLEAR CAT-AND-MOUSE
So what is the prognosis for the near future? Iran is very likely to continue to play a cat-and-mouse game on its nuclear program despite international obligations and pressure. Tehran will continue to flout U.N. resolutions while offering up the possibility of negotiations to end the crisis, which some, especially the Europeans, find attractive. Iran will also continue its involvement in Iraq, being careful to keep its fingerprints off events while working to bring Iraq into its sphere of influence and hastening along an ignominious U.S. defeat and withdrawal.
But don't forget Israel. Even with the current government's weakened state, Israel could decide to take things into its own hands. A strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would be more difficult than the one against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. But an attack against key Iranian nuclear facilities could set the program back years. Iran's Arab neighbors would vociferously protest Israeli aggression for public consumption, but privately breathe a large sigh of relief. Unfortunately, a strike might not end Iran's nuclear ambitions, and there remains the possibility of a wider Israeli-Iranian war, involving Iranian missile and terrorist attacks on Israel.
So is war with Iran inevitable? War is never inevitable. But while conflict with Iran is not a certainty, misperception and miscalculation that lead to war are always a possibility. Dealing with Tehran is nettlesome. This means that while running out other diplomatic and economic sanction options, Washington would be wise to build a regional coalition to contain and deter Iran, and look for opportunities to roll back Iranian influence wherever possible — while keeping the military option squarely on the table.
Wanted: occupation doctrine
Source: Armed Forces Journal
The Army has to write it now — for next time
BY RALPH PETERS
Together, the Army and Marines shoulder the combat duties in Iraq, supported by the other services. But the primary burden of occupation has been borne by the Army — as it always will be. Given the difficulty of overcoming the breathtaking range of errors committed by political ideologues during this occupation's early phases — when it wasn't even permissible to term it an "occupation" — and the uphill struggle to salvage the situation now, one of the last things the Army wants to contemplate is another occupation in the future.
But that future occupation is going to come. Followed by others. If the Army does not demonstrate the foresight and character to write and print honest, comprehensive and adaptable occupation doctrine now, it will have itself to blame when next it's tasked to repair a broken country with inadequate support and confused lines of authority — while a politically charged environment bedevils the home front.
Army leaders have yet to grasp two vital points: First, the refusal to prepare for a given mission is not an effective means of avoiding the mission. Second, doctrine isn't just for the military's internal use — manuals can function as both a contract with and warning to inexperienced civilian leaders whose geopolitical ambitions are not always tethered to reality.
In this ruptured world, with artificial borders collapsing, debased religions raging, ethnic identities resurgent and entire civilizations in crisis, the pretense that, since we don't want to conduct occupations, we shall therefore be able to avoid them, is absurd. If, miraculously, we do not need to occupy any other state, large or small, in our lifetimes, so much the better. But we had better have sound, no-nonsense doctrine in case miracles prove to be in short supply.
The immediate need for doctrine that addresses the various forms and durations of occupations under differing mandates and in different cultural environments is, obviously, to allow our military to plan wisely, act effectively and leave the occupied territory under conditions favorable to our own security requirements. But that second aspect of doctrine — the cautionary education of policymakers — may prove even more important to mission success.
Imagine how different the situation in Iraq might be today had the Army possessed an up-to-date manual, "Occupation," that laid out the complexity and challenges involved prior to our move against Saddam Hussein's regime. Oral arguments and position papers are weak tools compared to an approved doctrinal manual, in black and white, that our uniformed leaders could lay in front of the president, his advisers and Congress to detail the probable cost to achieve our goals.
The absence of such doctrine grants madcap civilian theorists a license to fantasize about bloodless war followed by easy, self-financing occupations (or worse, the assumption that occupation won't be necessary). If the Army doesn't draw its lessons learned from Iraq (and previous occupations it conducted successfully) and forge those lessons into useful doctrine, the institution will have only itself to blame the next time we blunder headlong into a reality that doesn't match the merry expectations of policymakers for whom our military is merely a global janitorial service.
Army leaders have to be hardheaded about this: Formulate realistic doctrine — neither blithely optimistic nor so pessimistic it obviously was framed to discourage occupations. While our doctrine can help politicians make wise decisions by instructing them what their visions truly involve, it's also essential that the Army doesn't fall into the "can't do" trap in which it caught itself in the mid-1990s. This isn't a matter of the Army getting to choose its missions, but of giving decision-makers a sense of reality when unavoidable missions arise.
Occupation doctrine must be forged with absolute integrity. Taken along with further evolutions of our counterinsurgency doctrine (the title of the next version of the manual should be plural: "Counterinsurgencies"), it must provide our forces with a dependable framework for occupation efforts, while imparting a sense of sobriety to elected and appointed officials. The formulation of such doctrine, as onerous as the Army may find it, isn't an optional activity. It's a duty.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE MYTHS (IEMs)
The first step in formulating usable doctrine is to sweep aside the politically correct myths that have appeared about occupations. Occupations are military activities. Period. An Army general must be in charge, at least until the security environment can be declared benign with full confidence. Historically, the occupations that worked — often brilliantly, as in the Philippines, Germany and Japan — were run by generals, not diplomats. This is another mission the Army doesn't want, but no other organization has the wherewithal to do it.
As Iraq illustrated so painfully, security must come first. That requires military decisiveness, not diplomatic quibbling. All else is secondary to the provision of security to the occupied population, and all longer-term goals depend upon quiet in the streets and peace in the countryside. A governor-general means a general as governor — we can choose more palatable terminology, but civilians cannot be put in charge in a theater of war before the shooting stops. The place for civilian decision-makers is in Washington, not in a future travesty imitating Ambassador Paul Bremer's personal Disneyland in the Baghdad Green Zone.
Consider just a few essential rules for successful occupations — all of which we violated in Iraq:
• Plan for the worst case. Pleasant surprises are better than ugly ones.
• All else flows from security. Martial law, even if imposed under a less-provocative name, must be declared immediately — it's far easier to loosen restrictions later on than to tighten them in the wake of anarchy. This is one aspect of a general principle: Take the pain up front.
• Unity of command is essential.
• The occupier's troop strength should be perceived as overwhelming and his forces ever-present.
• Key military leaders, staff officers, intelligence personnel and vital civilian advisers must be committed to initial tours of duty of not less than two years for the sake of continuity.
• Control external borders immediately.
• Don't isolate troops and their leaders from the local population.
• Whenever possible, existing host-country institutions should be retained and co-opted. After formal warfare ends, don't disband organizations you can use to your advantage.
• Give local opinion-makers a stake in your success, avoid penalizing midlevel and low-level officials (except war criminals), and get young men off the streets and into jobs.
• Don't make development promises you can't keep, and war-game reconstruction efforts to test their necessity, viability and indirect costs (an occupation must not turn into a looting orgy for U.S. or allied contractors).
• Devolve responsibility onto local leaders as quickly as possible — while retaining ultimate authority.
• Do not empower returned expatriates until you are certain they have robust local support.
• The purpose of cultural understanding is to facilitate the mission, not to paralyze our operations. Establish immediately that violent actors and seditious demagogues will not be permitted to hide behind cultural or religious symbols.
• Establish flexible guidelines for the expenditure of funds by tactical commanders and for issuing local reconstruction contracts. Peacetime accountability requirements do not work under occupation conditions and attempts to satisfy them only play into the hands of the domestic political opposition in the U.S. while crippling our efforts in the zone of occupation.
• Rigorously control private security forces, domestic or foreign. In lieu of a functioning state, we must have a monopoly on violence.
Such a list captures only a fraction of the complexity of an occupation. But these elementary truths must be driven home to counteract the myths that have appeared about how occupations — and our government — should function. Consider the prevailing claim that an occupation is a team effort involving all relevant branches of government: The problem is that the rest of the team doesn't show up. The State Department, as ambitious for power as it is incompetent to wield it, insists that it should have the lead in any occupation, yet has neither the leadership and management expertise, the institutional resources nor the personnel required (among the many State-induced debacles in Iraq, look at its appetite for developing Iraqi police forces and its total failure to deliver).
The military is the default occupier, since its personnel can be ordered into hostile environments for unlimited periods; State and other agencies rely on volunteers and, in Iraq, the volunteers have not been forthcoming — even when the tours for junior diplomats were limited to a useless 90 days and dire warnings were issued about the importance of Iraq duty to careers.
Under prevailing political circumstances, it will probably be necessary to offer a dual-model approach to occupations in the manual — one for situations in which the lead time allows the government to build interagency organizations staffed full time, resourced and trained in advance, and another, military only, for circumstances when immediate action is required or when the other government agencies cannot or will not make firm, long-term personnel commitments. Even now, the situation in Iraq remains disgraceful — with unfulfilled promises by other government departments and agencies leaving the occupation's burdens on the military's shoulders. To prevent another such shambles, the Army must assume that it will have to conduct every on-the-ground aspect of the mission by itself from the occupation's zero hour. If the rest of the government comes through, great. But the Army must be prepared to execute the occupation mission with only the support of the other uniformed services.
Although military personnel are ever in short supply, it would be worth the overhead for the Army and the other uniformed services to establish a permanent occupation-planning headquarters staffed by experienced officers (and offering joint-duty credit). It would not need to be heavily manned and, yes, there would be a danger of such an organization turning into Sleepy Hollow — but the likelihood that we will face future occupation requirements makes it worth the investment to gather, preserve and further develop how-to expertise for occupations. We should never again face a debacle such as the chaos that prevailed in the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom and immediately after the fall of Baghdad — situations exacerbated by the moral cowardice of senior military officers unwilling to take a stand on much of anything.
EDUCATING THE GENIUSES
In Washington, everybody who works across the river from the Pentagon "knows" that he has a better grasp of military strategy than the generals. Whether new congressmen or novice foreign service officers, their lack of military service (or even of interest in things military) doesn't stop D.C.'s best and brightest from scheming how to employ our armed forces.
This situation isn't going to change. The draft has receded so far into the past that we can be certain that each successful round of elections will further diminish the firsthand knowledge of military affairs on Capitol Hill. Those in uniform who imagine that the manner in which civilian ideologues steamrollered the Army in the buildup to our invasion of Iraq was an exceptional case that will not be repeated are indulging in fantasies as dangerous as those that got us where we are today. Ignorance doesn't simply disappear; arrogance is and always will be endemic to Washington, and ideological extremism of the sort that short-circuited the planning process for OIF and its aftermath is a bipartisan plague.
If military leaders do not lay out a realistic scenario for future interventions and occupations, decisions of life, death and national security will once again be made on the basis of political dogma.
The fundamental reason why the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz-Feith-Cambone cabal forbade the military from planning for a full-scale occupation was straightforward: They feared that any such plan would project high troop numbers, serious financial costs and a lengthy presence — and that the plan would inevitably leak to an already-jumpy Congress. Their attitude was, "Just get the war and everything else will sort itself out."
They got their war. But everything hasn't sorted itself out.
In the absence of current printed doctrine, even former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's judgment that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of troops could be dismissed as simply one opinion among many. Now consider how differently such a scenario might play out if a future chief of staff — or chairman of the Joint Chiefs — testifying before Congress could slap down a manual in front of the C-Span cameras and state, "Senator, this doctrine lays out the requirements for an occupation. It's the U.S. Army's institutional position, based upon the professional judgment of veteran officers. Its tenets have been tested against a full range of historical examples."
Or, as Martin Luther put it, "Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise."
Even if the ideologues of the future, on the political right or the left, again moved to prevent the Pentagon from occupation planning, the manual would still exist, impossible to censor and available to Congress and the media. Civilian "experts" anxious to insist that everything could be done on the cheap would be thrust onto the defensive — simply by existing the doctrine would seize the high ground for the military. And a printed manual blessed by the Army's leadership (or joint doctrine, for that matter) is a far more powerful tool of persuasion than a frantically compiled position paper or a verbal answer to a senator's query during a hearing.
Of course, the point of producing a manual for occupations isn't to avoid legitimate responsibilities by raising the bar impossibly high. Such doctrine must be developed with absolute integrity — describing fairly what can be done and what it takes to do it. The internal purpose is to guide our military efforts wisely. The external purpose is to force civilian decision-makers to face the probable costs and consequences of their actions up front, but not to frighten them into paralysis. Such doctrine would not be intended to deter the National Command Authority from doing what must be done — only to ensure that deployed military forces are given both the authority and the full array of resources to accomplish their assigned mission.
Every occupation will have its unique qualities and special requirements. Even the best doctrine will only provide us with an initial framework, not a complete set of infallible answers. While recognizing that all occupations share some common and irreducible requirements (such as those highlighted above), we must avoid down-in-the-weeds prescriptions that may be case-specific: The goal of doctrine is to provide a strong skeleton; specific circumstances flesh it out. There will always be surprises, in war and in the occupations that follow. But this much is certain: It would be nothing short of dereliction of duty for the Army leadership to ever allow our military and our country to be blindsided on this issue again by unelected charlatans who felt entitled to use the military to advance their ideological theories.
If the Army has not formulated a frank, practical doctrine for military occupations before the next such requirement draws in our soldiers, the generals will have only themselves to blame when our troops are misused and our national purposes frustrated.
The Army doesn't want to face another occupation, so it doesn't want to write occupation doctrine. But the Army has to shoulder this burden for the nation. No one else will.
The Army has to write it now — for next time
BY RALPH PETERS
Together, the Army and Marines shoulder the combat duties in Iraq, supported by the other services. But the primary burden of occupation has been borne by the Army — as it always will be. Given the difficulty of overcoming the breathtaking range of errors committed by political ideologues during this occupation's early phases — when it wasn't even permissible to term it an "occupation" — and the uphill struggle to salvage the situation now, one of the last things the Army wants to contemplate is another occupation in the future.
But that future occupation is going to come. Followed by others. If the Army does not demonstrate the foresight and character to write and print honest, comprehensive and adaptable occupation doctrine now, it will have itself to blame when next it's tasked to repair a broken country with inadequate support and confused lines of authority — while a politically charged environment bedevils the home front.
Army leaders have yet to grasp two vital points: First, the refusal to prepare for a given mission is not an effective means of avoiding the mission. Second, doctrine isn't just for the military's internal use — manuals can function as both a contract with and warning to inexperienced civilian leaders whose geopolitical ambitions are not always tethered to reality.
In this ruptured world, with artificial borders collapsing, debased religions raging, ethnic identities resurgent and entire civilizations in crisis, the pretense that, since we don't want to conduct occupations, we shall therefore be able to avoid them, is absurd. If, miraculously, we do not need to occupy any other state, large or small, in our lifetimes, so much the better. But we had better have sound, no-nonsense doctrine in case miracles prove to be in short supply.
The immediate need for doctrine that addresses the various forms and durations of occupations under differing mandates and in different cultural environments is, obviously, to allow our military to plan wisely, act effectively and leave the occupied territory under conditions favorable to our own security requirements. But that second aspect of doctrine — the cautionary education of policymakers — may prove even more important to mission success.
Imagine how different the situation in Iraq might be today had the Army possessed an up-to-date manual, "Occupation," that laid out the complexity and challenges involved prior to our move against Saddam Hussein's regime. Oral arguments and position papers are weak tools compared to an approved doctrinal manual, in black and white, that our uniformed leaders could lay in front of the president, his advisers and Congress to detail the probable cost to achieve our goals.
The absence of such doctrine grants madcap civilian theorists a license to fantasize about bloodless war followed by easy, self-financing occupations (or worse, the assumption that occupation won't be necessary). If the Army doesn't draw its lessons learned from Iraq (and previous occupations it conducted successfully) and forge those lessons into useful doctrine, the institution will have only itself to blame the next time we blunder headlong into a reality that doesn't match the merry expectations of policymakers for whom our military is merely a global janitorial service.
Army leaders have to be hardheaded about this: Formulate realistic doctrine — neither blithely optimistic nor so pessimistic it obviously was framed to discourage occupations. While our doctrine can help politicians make wise decisions by instructing them what their visions truly involve, it's also essential that the Army doesn't fall into the "can't do" trap in which it caught itself in the mid-1990s. This isn't a matter of the Army getting to choose its missions, but of giving decision-makers a sense of reality when unavoidable missions arise.
Occupation doctrine must be forged with absolute integrity. Taken along with further evolutions of our counterinsurgency doctrine (the title of the next version of the manual should be plural: "Counterinsurgencies"), it must provide our forces with a dependable framework for occupation efforts, while imparting a sense of sobriety to elected and appointed officials. The formulation of such doctrine, as onerous as the Army may find it, isn't an optional activity. It's a duty.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE MYTHS (IEMs)
The first step in formulating usable doctrine is to sweep aside the politically correct myths that have appeared about occupations. Occupations are military activities. Period. An Army general must be in charge, at least until the security environment can be declared benign with full confidence. Historically, the occupations that worked — often brilliantly, as in the Philippines, Germany and Japan — were run by generals, not diplomats. This is another mission the Army doesn't want, but no other organization has the wherewithal to do it.
As Iraq illustrated so painfully, security must come first. That requires military decisiveness, not diplomatic quibbling. All else is secondary to the provision of security to the occupied population, and all longer-term goals depend upon quiet in the streets and peace in the countryside. A governor-general means a general as governor — we can choose more palatable terminology, but civilians cannot be put in charge in a theater of war before the shooting stops. The place for civilian decision-makers is in Washington, not in a future travesty imitating Ambassador Paul Bremer's personal Disneyland in the Baghdad Green Zone.
Consider just a few essential rules for successful occupations — all of which we violated in Iraq:
• Plan for the worst case. Pleasant surprises are better than ugly ones.
• All else flows from security. Martial law, even if imposed under a less-provocative name, must be declared immediately — it's far easier to loosen restrictions later on than to tighten them in the wake of anarchy. This is one aspect of a general principle: Take the pain up front.
• Unity of command is essential.
• The occupier's troop strength should be perceived as overwhelming and his forces ever-present.
• Key military leaders, staff officers, intelligence personnel and vital civilian advisers must be committed to initial tours of duty of not less than two years for the sake of continuity.
• Control external borders immediately.
• Don't isolate troops and their leaders from the local population.
• Whenever possible, existing host-country institutions should be retained and co-opted. After formal warfare ends, don't disband organizations you can use to your advantage.
• Give local opinion-makers a stake in your success, avoid penalizing midlevel and low-level officials (except war criminals), and get young men off the streets and into jobs.
• Don't make development promises you can't keep, and war-game reconstruction efforts to test their necessity, viability and indirect costs (an occupation must not turn into a looting orgy for U.S. or allied contractors).
• Devolve responsibility onto local leaders as quickly as possible — while retaining ultimate authority.
• Do not empower returned expatriates until you are certain they have robust local support.
• The purpose of cultural understanding is to facilitate the mission, not to paralyze our operations. Establish immediately that violent actors and seditious demagogues will not be permitted to hide behind cultural or religious symbols.
• Establish flexible guidelines for the expenditure of funds by tactical commanders and for issuing local reconstruction contracts. Peacetime accountability requirements do not work under occupation conditions and attempts to satisfy them only play into the hands of the domestic political opposition in the U.S. while crippling our efforts in the zone of occupation.
• Rigorously control private security forces, domestic or foreign. In lieu of a functioning state, we must have a monopoly on violence.
Such a list captures only a fraction of the complexity of an occupation. But these elementary truths must be driven home to counteract the myths that have appeared about how occupations — and our government — should function. Consider the prevailing claim that an occupation is a team effort involving all relevant branches of government: The problem is that the rest of the team doesn't show up. The State Department, as ambitious for power as it is incompetent to wield it, insists that it should have the lead in any occupation, yet has neither the leadership and management expertise, the institutional resources nor the personnel required (among the many State-induced debacles in Iraq, look at its appetite for developing Iraqi police forces and its total failure to deliver).
The military is the default occupier, since its personnel can be ordered into hostile environments for unlimited periods; State and other agencies rely on volunteers and, in Iraq, the volunteers have not been forthcoming — even when the tours for junior diplomats were limited to a useless 90 days and dire warnings were issued about the importance of Iraq duty to careers.
Under prevailing political circumstances, it will probably be necessary to offer a dual-model approach to occupations in the manual — one for situations in which the lead time allows the government to build interagency organizations staffed full time, resourced and trained in advance, and another, military only, for circumstances when immediate action is required or when the other government agencies cannot or will not make firm, long-term personnel commitments. Even now, the situation in Iraq remains disgraceful — with unfulfilled promises by other government departments and agencies leaving the occupation's burdens on the military's shoulders. To prevent another such shambles, the Army must assume that it will have to conduct every on-the-ground aspect of the mission by itself from the occupation's zero hour. If the rest of the government comes through, great. But the Army must be prepared to execute the occupation mission with only the support of the other uniformed services.
Although military personnel are ever in short supply, it would be worth the overhead for the Army and the other uniformed services to establish a permanent occupation-planning headquarters staffed by experienced officers (and offering joint-duty credit). It would not need to be heavily manned and, yes, there would be a danger of such an organization turning into Sleepy Hollow — but the likelihood that we will face future occupation requirements makes it worth the investment to gather, preserve and further develop how-to expertise for occupations. We should never again face a debacle such as the chaos that prevailed in the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom and immediately after the fall of Baghdad — situations exacerbated by the moral cowardice of senior military officers unwilling to take a stand on much of anything.
EDUCATING THE GENIUSES
In Washington, everybody who works across the river from the Pentagon "knows" that he has a better grasp of military strategy than the generals. Whether new congressmen or novice foreign service officers, their lack of military service (or even of interest in things military) doesn't stop D.C.'s best and brightest from scheming how to employ our armed forces.
This situation isn't going to change. The draft has receded so far into the past that we can be certain that each successful round of elections will further diminish the firsthand knowledge of military affairs on Capitol Hill. Those in uniform who imagine that the manner in which civilian ideologues steamrollered the Army in the buildup to our invasion of Iraq was an exceptional case that will not be repeated are indulging in fantasies as dangerous as those that got us where we are today. Ignorance doesn't simply disappear; arrogance is and always will be endemic to Washington, and ideological extremism of the sort that short-circuited the planning process for OIF and its aftermath is a bipartisan plague.
If military leaders do not lay out a realistic scenario for future interventions and occupations, decisions of life, death and national security will once again be made on the basis of political dogma.
The fundamental reason why the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz-Feith-Cambone cabal forbade the military from planning for a full-scale occupation was straightforward: They feared that any such plan would project high troop numbers, serious financial costs and a lengthy presence — and that the plan would inevitably leak to an already-jumpy Congress. Their attitude was, "Just get the war and everything else will sort itself out."
They got their war. But everything hasn't sorted itself out.
In the absence of current printed doctrine, even former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's judgment that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of troops could be dismissed as simply one opinion among many. Now consider how differently such a scenario might play out if a future chief of staff — or chairman of the Joint Chiefs — testifying before Congress could slap down a manual in front of the C-Span cameras and state, "Senator, this doctrine lays out the requirements for an occupation. It's the U.S. Army's institutional position, based upon the professional judgment of veteran officers. Its tenets have been tested against a full range of historical examples."
Or, as Martin Luther put it, "Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise."
Even if the ideologues of the future, on the political right or the left, again moved to prevent the Pentagon from occupation planning, the manual would still exist, impossible to censor and available to Congress and the media. Civilian "experts" anxious to insist that everything could be done on the cheap would be thrust onto the defensive — simply by existing the doctrine would seize the high ground for the military. And a printed manual blessed by the Army's leadership (or joint doctrine, for that matter) is a far more powerful tool of persuasion than a frantically compiled position paper or a verbal answer to a senator's query during a hearing.
Of course, the point of producing a manual for occupations isn't to avoid legitimate responsibilities by raising the bar impossibly high. Such doctrine must be developed with absolute integrity — describing fairly what can be done and what it takes to do it. The internal purpose is to guide our military efforts wisely. The external purpose is to force civilian decision-makers to face the probable costs and consequences of their actions up front, but not to frighten them into paralysis. Such doctrine would not be intended to deter the National Command Authority from doing what must be done — only to ensure that deployed military forces are given both the authority and the full array of resources to accomplish their assigned mission.
Every occupation will have its unique qualities and special requirements. Even the best doctrine will only provide us with an initial framework, not a complete set of infallible answers. While recognizing that all occupations share some common and irreducible requirements (such as those highlighted above), we must avoid down-in-the-weeds prescriptions that may be case-specific: The goal of doctrine is to provide a strong skeleton; specific circumstances flesh it out. There will always be surprises, in war and in the occupations that follow. But this much is certain: It would be nothing short of dereliction of duty for the Army leadership to ever allow our military and our country to be blindsided on this issue again by unelected charlatans who felt entitled to use the military to advance their ideological theories.
If the Army has not formulated a frank, practical doctrine for military occupations before the next such requirement draws in our soldiers, the generals will have only themselves to blame when our troops are misused and our national purposes frustrated.
The Army doesn't want to face another occupation, so it doesn't want to write occupation doctrine. But the Army has to shoulder this burden for the nation. No one else will.
Economic Intelligence: French Students question presidential candidates
Nagesh Bhushan
In France as presidential campaign is in full swing , students from Economic Master Intelligence and Strategic Communication of University of Poitiers have approached all presidential candidates with some unique questions . The questions are not related to politics , but rather candidates views on Economic Intelligence . Their questions are primary on the candidates understanding of Economic Intelligence and the future direction they wish to give to this budding field .
A french Blog lesecho.fr which covers developments in Economic Intelligence in france summarised the response as below .
1 The first lesson is a happy surprise . The blog says " Contrary to 2002, the candidates and their teams are not unaware of what is the economic intelligence. The reports/ratios of then Deputy Bernard Carayon and the work of current the Economic Intelligence chief , Alain Juillet, incontestably bore fruits in left and right parties."
2. Second lesson is none the camps/Candidates are aware of the double dimension of economic intelligence , offensive and defensive . They choice of the words and laid stress on one of dimensions . While left stressed on development and the idea of division, others on protection and the conquest .
Philippe De Villiers points “the absence of total strategy of the State” and Nicolas Sarkozy, as a good expert of the subject, been a Minister of Interior Department and of the Economy, says developing a broad vision for IE is “essential, because it makes it possible to support research and to conquer new markets, to protect the strategic parameter from the national economy and to develop our influence on an international scale”.
In France as presidential campaign is in full swing , students from Economic Master Intelligence and Strategic Communication of University of Poitiers have approached all presidential candidates with some unique questions . The questions are not related to politics , but rather candidates views on Economic Intelligence . Their questions are primary on the candidates understanding of Economic Intelligence and the future direction they wish to give to this budding field .
A french Blog lesecho.fr which covers developments in Economic Intelligence in france summarised the response as below .
1 The first lesson is a happy surprise . The blog says " Contrary to 2002, the candidates and their teams are not unaware of what is the economic intelligence. The reports/ratios of then Deputy Bernard Carayon and the work of current the Economic Intelligence chief , Alain Juillet, incontestably bore fruits in left and right parties."
2. Second lesson is none the camps/Candidates are aware of the double dimension of economic intelligence , offensive and defensive . They choice of the words and laid stress on one of dimensions . While left stressed on development and the idea of division, others on protection and the conquest .
Philippe De Villiers points “the absence of total strategy of the State” and Nicolas Sarkozy, as a good expert of the subject, been a Minister of Interior Department and of the Economy, says developing a broad vision for IE is “essential, because it makes it possible to support research and to conquer new markets, to protect the strategic parameter from the national economy and to develop our influence on an international scale”.
April 12, 2007
Create "poles of competitiveness" : Alain Juillet to Indonesia
French Governments's competitive Intelligence czar Mr.Alain Juillet called for Indonesia to take cognizance of how the global market is diverging into a number of regional markets, and set up "industrial clusters" to supply appropriate products to each market .
Speaking at a seminar organized by "Indonesian Institute for Competitive Intelligence" , he said "Mastering information on one's capabilities and on the market is the strategic issue now. Not just acquiring it, but, more importantly, how to create value from the information. The open global world is full of opportunities, as well as threats, in the process of producing goods and services. Every country, therefore, has to analyze its strengths and weaknesses" .
Juillet is also a senior advisor to the French government on "competitive intelligence". He said Indonesia , like every other country, should get involved in "competitive intelligence" in the interests of the national economy, starting out by identifying those industries in which it is strong, and promoting their development . It would then need to create "poles of competitiveness", or industrial clusters, like Silicon Valley in the U.S., where businesses share information and cooperate in creating a business network, with the academic community supporting research and development.
The term "competitive intelligence" refers to the gathering and analysis of public information on products, customers and competitors to be used in planning and decision-making by a company or sovereign nation.
Compiled from Jakarta Post
Jewish Genius
Charles Murray
April 2007
Since its first issue in 1945, COMMENTARY has published hundreds of articles about Jews and Judaism. As one would expect, they cover just about every important aspect of the topic. But there is a lacuna, and not one involving some obscure bit of Judaica. COMMENTARY has never published a systematic discussion of one of the most obvious topics of all: the extravagant overrepresentation of Jews, relative to their numbers, in the top ranks of the arts, sciences, law, medicine, finance, entrepreneurship, and the media.
I have personal experience with the reluctance of Jews to talk about Jewish accomplishment—my co-author, the late Richard Herrnstein, gently resisted the paragraphs on Jewish IQ that I insisted on putting in The Bell Curve (1994). Both history and the contemporary revival of anti-Semitism in Europe make it easy to understand the reasons for that reluctance. But Jewish accomplishment constitutes a fascinating and important story. Recent scholarship is expanding our understanding of its origins.
And so this Scots-Irish Gentile from Iowa hereby undertakes to tell the story. I cover three topics: the timing and nature of Jewish accomplishment, focusing on the arts and sciences; elevated Jewish IQ as an explanation for that accomplishment; and current theories about how the Jews acquired their elevated IQ.
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From 800 B.C.E. through the first millennium of the Common Era, we have just two examples of great Jewish accomplishment, and neither falls strictly within the realms of the arts or sciences. But what a pair they are. The first is the fully realized conceptualization of monotheism, expressed through one of the literary treasures of the world, the Hebrew Bible. It not only laid the foundation for three great religions but, as Thomas Cahill describes in The Gifts of the Jews (1998), introduced a way of looking at the meaning of human life and the nature of history that defines core elements of the modern sensibility. The second achievement is not often treated as a Jewish one but clearly is: Christian theology expressed through the New Testament, an accomplishment that has spilled into every aspect of Western civilization.
But religious literature is the exception. The Jews do not appear in the annals of philosophy, drama, visual art, mathematics, or the natural sciences during the eighteen centuries from the time of Homer through the first millennium C.E., when so much was happening in Greece, China, and South Asia. It is unclear to what extent this reflects a lack of activity or the lack of a readily available record. For example, only a handful of the scientists of the Middle Ages are mentioned in most histories of science, and none was a Jew. But when George Sarton put a high-powered lens to the Middle Ages in his monumental Introduction to the History of Science (1927-48), he found that 95 of the 626 known scientists working everywhere in the world from 1150 to 1300 were Jews—15 percent of the total, far out of proportion to the Jewish population.
As it happens, that same period overlaps with the life of the most famous Jewish philosopher of medieval times, Maimonides (1135–1204), and of others less well known, not to mention the Jewish poets, grammarians, religious thinkers, scholars, physicians, and courtiers of Spain in the “Golden Age,” or the brilliant exegetes and rabbinical legislators of northern France and Germany. But this only exemplifies the difficulty of assessing Jewish intellectual activity in that period. Aside from Maimonides and a few others, these thinkers and artists did not perceptibly influence history or culture outside the confines of the Jewish world.
Generally speaking, this remained the case well into the Renaissance and beyond. When writing a book called Human Accomplishment (2003), I compiled inventories of “significant figures” in the arts and sciences, defined as people who are mentioned in at least half of the major histories of their respective fields. From 1200 to 1800, only seven Jews are among those significant figures, and only two were important enough to have names that are still widely recognized: Spinoza and Montaigne (whose mother was Jewish).
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The sparse representation of Jews during the flowering of the European arts and sciences is not hard to explain. They were systematically excluded, both by legal restrictions on the occupations they could enter and by savage social discrimination. Then came legal emancipation, beginning in the late 1700’s in a few countries and completed in Western Europe by the 1870’s, and with it one of the most extraordinary stories of any ethnic group at any point in human history.
As soon as Jewish children born under legal emancipation had time to grow to adulthood, they started appearing in the first ranks of the arts and sciences. During the four decades from 1830 to 1870, when the first Jews to live under emancipation reached their forties, 16 significant Jewish figures appear. In the next four decades, from 1870 to 1910, the number jumps to 40. During the next four decades, 1910–1950, despite the contemporaneous devastation of European Jewry, the number of significant figures almost triples, to 114.
To get a sense of the density of accomplishment these numbers represent, I will focus on 1870 onward, after legal emancipation had been achieved throughout Central and Western Europe. How does the actual number of significant figures compare to what would be expected given the Jewish proportion of the European and North American population? From 1870 to 1950, Jewish representation in literature was four times the number one would expect. In music, five times. In the visual arts, five times. In biology, eight times. In chemistry, six times. In physics, nine times. In mathematics, twelve times. In philosophy, fourteen times.
Disproportionate Jewish accomplishment in the arts and sciences continues to this day. My inventories end with 1950, but many other measures are available, of which the best known is the Nobel Prize. In the first half of the 20th century, despite pervasive and continuing social discrimination against Jews throughout the Western world, despite the retraction of legal rights, and despite the Holocaust, Jews won 14 percent of Nobel Prizes in literature, chemistry, physics, and medicine/physiology. In the second half of the 20th century, when Nobel Prizes began to be awarded to people from all over the world, that figure rose to 29 percent. So far, in the 21st century, it has been 32 percent. Jews constitute about two-tenths of one percent of the world’s population. You do the math.
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What accounts for this remarkable record? A full answer must call on many characteristics of Jewish culture, but intelligence has to be at the center of the answer. Jews have been found to have an unusually high mean intelligence as measured by IQ tests since the first Jewish samples were tested. (The widely repeated story that Jewish immigrants to this country in the early 20th century tested low on IQ is a canard.) Exactly how high has been difficult to pin down, because Jewish sub-samples in the available surveys are seldom perfectly representative. But it is currently accepted that the mean is somewhere in the range of 107 to 115, with 110 being a plausible compromise.
The IQ mean for the American population is “normed” to be 100, with a standard deviation of 15. If the Jewish mean is 110, then the mathematics of the normal distribution says that the average Jew is at the 75th percentile. Underlying that mean in overall IQ is a consistent pattern on IQ subtests: Jews are only about average on the subtests measuring visuo-spatial skills, but extremely high on subtests that measure verbal and reasoning skills.
A group’s mean intelligence is important in explaining outcomes such as mean educational attainment or mean income. The key indicator for predicting exceptional accomplishment (like winning a Nobel Prize) is the incidence of exceptional intelligence. Consider an IQ score of 140 or higher, denoting the level of intelligence that can permit people to excel in fields like theoretical physics and pure mathematics. If the mean Jewish IQ is 110 and the standard deviation is 15, then the proportion of Jews with IQ’s of 140 or higher is somewhere around six times the proportion of everyone else.
The imbalance continues to increase for still higher IQ’s. New York City’s public-school system used to administer a pencil-and-paper IQ test to its entire school population. In 1954, a psychologist used those test results to identify all 28 children in the New York public-school system with measured IQ’s of 170 or higher. Of those 28, 24 were Jews.
Exceptional intelligence is not enough to explain exceptional accomplishment. Qualities such as imagination, ambition, perseverance, and curiosity are decisive in separating the merely smart from the highly productive. The role of intelligence is nicely expressed in an analogy suggested to me years ago by the sociologist Steven Goldberg: intelligence plays the same role in an intellectually demanding task that weight plays in the performance of NFL offensive tackles. The heaviest offensive tackle is not necessarily the best. Indeed, the correlation between weight and performance among NFL offensive tackles is probably quite low. But they all weigh more than 300 pounds.
So with intelligence. The other things count, but you must be very smart to have even a chance of achieving great work. A randomly selected Jew has a higher probability of possessing that level of intelligence than a randomly selected member of any other ethnic or national group, by far.
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Nothing that I have presented up to this point is scientifically controversial. The profile of disproportionately high Jewish accomplishment in the arts and sciences since the 18th century, the reality of elevated Jewish IQ, and the connection between the two are not to be denied by means of data. And so we come to the great question: how and when did this elevated Jewish IQ come about? Here, the discussion must become speculative. Geneticists and historians are still assembling the pieces of the explanation, and there is much room for disagreement.
I begin with the assumption that elevated Jewish intelligence is grounded in genetics. It is no longer seriously disputed that intelligence in Homo sapiens is substantially heritable. In the last two decades, it has also been established that obvious environmental factors such as high income, books in the house, and parental reading to children are not as potent as one might expect. A “good enough” environment is important for the nurture of intellectual potential, but the requirements for “good enough” are not high. Even the very best home environments add only a few points, if that, to a merely okay environment. It is also known that children adopted at birth do not achieve the IQ’s predicted by their parents’ IQ.
To put it another way, we have good reason to think that Gentile children raised in Jewish families do not acquire Jewish intelligence. Hence my view that something in the genes explains elevated Jewish IQ. That conclusion is not logically necessary but, given what we know about heritability and environmental effects on intelligence in humans as a species, it is extremely plausible.
Two potential explanations for a Jewish gene pool favoring high intelligence are so obvious that many people assume they must be true: winnowing by persecution (only the smartest Jews either survived or remained Jews) and marrying for brains (scholars and children of scholars were socially desirable spouses). I too think that both of these must have played some role, but how much of a role is open to question.
In the case of winnowing through persecution, the logic cuts both ways. Yes, those who remained faithful during the many persecutions of the Jews were self-selected for commitment to Judaism, and the role of scholarship in that commitment probably means that intelligence was one of the factors in self-selection. The foresight that goes with intelligence might also have had some survival value (as in anticipating pogroms), though it is not obvious that its effect would be large enough to explain much.
But once the Cossacks are sweeping through town, the kind of intelligence that leads to business success or rabbinical acumen is no help at all. On the contrary, the most successful people could easily have become the most likely to be killed, by virtue of being more visible and the targets of greater envy. Furthermore, other groups, such as the Gypsies, have been persecuted for centuries without developing elevated intelligence. Considered closely, the winnowing-by-persecution logic is not as compelling as it may first appear.
What of the marrying-for-brains theory? “A man should sell all he possesses in order to marry the daughter of a scholar, as well as to marry his daughter to a scholar,” advises the Talmud (Pesahim 49a), and scholarship did in fact have social cachet within many Jewish communities before (and after) emancipation. The combination could have been potent: by marrying the children of scholars to the children of successful merchants, Jews were in effect joining those selected for abstract reasoning ability with those selected for practical intelligence.
Once again, however, it is difficult to be more specific about how much effect this might have had. Arguments have been advanced that rich merchants were in fact often reluctant to entrust their daughters to penniless and unworldly scholars. Nor is it clear that the fertility rate of scholars, or their numbers, were high enough to account for a major effect on intelligence. The attractiveness of brains in prospective marriage partners surely played some role but, once again, the data for assessing how much have not been assembled.
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Against this backdrop of uncertainty, a data-driven theory for explaining elevated Jewish IQ appeared in 2006 in the Journal of Biosocial Science. In an article entitled “Natural History of Ashkenazi Intelligence,” Gregory Cochran (a physicist) and Jason Hardy and Henry Harpending (anthropologists) contend that elevated Jewish IQ is confined to the Ashkenazi Jews of northern and central Europe, and developed from the Middle Ages onward, primarily from 800 to 1600 C.E.
In the analysis of these authors, the key factor explaining elevated Jewish intelligence is occupational selection. From the time Jews became established north of the Pyrenees-Balkans line, around 800 C.E., they were in most places and at most times restricted to occupations involving sales, finance, and trade. Economic success in all of these occupations is far more highly selected for intelligence than success in the chief occupation of non-Jews: namely, farming. Economic success is in turn related to reproductive success, because higher income means lower infant mortality, better nutrition, and, more generally, reproductive “fitness.” Over time, increased fitness among the successful leads to strong selection for the cognitive and psychological traits that produce that fitness, intensified when there is a low inward gene flow from other populations—as was the case with Ashkenazim.
Sephardi and Oriental Jews—i.e., those from the Iberian peninsula, the Mediterranean littoral, and the Islamic East—were also engaged in urban occupations during the same centuries. But the authors cite evidence that, as a rule, they were less concentrated in occupations that selected for IQ and instead more commonly worked in craft trades. Thus, elevated intelligence did not develop among Sephardi and Oriental Jews—as manifested by contemporary test results in Israel that show the IQ’s of non-European Jews to be roughly similar to the IQ’s of Gentiles.
The three authors conclude this part of their argument with an elegant corollary that matches the known test profiles of today’s Ashkenazim with the historical experience of their ancestors:
The suggested selective process explains the pattern of mental abilities in Ashkenazi Jews: high verbal and mathematical ability but relatively low spatio-visual ability. Verbal and mathematical talent helped medieval businessmen succeed, while spatio-visual abilities were irrelevant.
The rest of their presentation is a lengthy and technical discussion of the genetics of selection for IQ, indirect evidence linking elevated Jewish IQ with a variety of genetically based diseases found among Ashkenazim, and evidence that most of these selection effects have occurred within the last 1,200 years.
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No one has yet presented an alternative to the Cochran-Hardy-Harpending theory that can match it for documentation. But, as someone who suspects that elevated Jewish intelligence was (a) not confined to Ashkenazim and (b) antedates the Middle Ages, I will outline the strands of an alternative explanation that should be explored.
It begins with evidence that Jews who remained in the Islamic world exhibited unusually high levels of accomplishment as of the beginning of the second millennium. The hardest evidence is Sarton’s enumeration of scientists mentioned earlier, of whom 15 percent were Jews. These were not Ashkenazim in northern Europe, where Jews were still largely excluded from the world of scientific scholarship, but Sephardim in the Iberian peninsula, in Baghdad, and in other Islamic centers of learning. I have also mentioned the more diffuse cultural evidence from Spain, where, under both Muslim and Christian rule, Jews attained eminent positions in the professions, commerce, and government as well as in elite literary and intellectual circles.
After being expelled from Spain at the end of the 15th century, Sephardi Jews rose to distinction in many of the countries where they settled. Some economic historians have traced the decline of Spain after 1500, and the subsequent rise of the Netherlands, in part to the Sephardi commercial talent that was transferred from the one to the other. Centuries later, in England, one could point to such Sephardi eminences as Benjamin Disraeli and the economist David Ricardo.
In sum, I propose that a strong case could be assembled that Jews everywhere had unusually high intellectual resources that manifested themselves outside of Ashkenaz and well before the period when non-rabbinic Ashkenazi accomplishment manifested itself.
How is this case to be sustained in the face of contemporary test data indicating that non-Ashkenazi Jews do not have the elevated mean of today’s Ashkenazim? The logical inconsistency disappears if one posits that Jews circa 1000 C.E. had elevated intelligence everywhere, but that it subsequently was augmented still further among Ashkenazim and declined for Jews living in the Islamic world—perhaps because of the dynamics described by Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending (that is, Oriental Jews were concentrated in trades for which high intelligence did not yield wealth).
Recent advances in the use of genetic markers to characterize populations enable us to pursue such possibilities systematically. I offer this testable hypothesis as just one of many possibilities: if genetic markers are used to discriminate among non- Ashkenazi Jews, it will be found that those who are closest genetically to the Sephardim of Golden Age Spain have an elevated mean IQ, though perhaps not so high as the contemporary Ashkenazi IQ.
_____________
The next strand of an alternative to the Cochran-Hardy-Harpending theory involves reasons for thinking that some of the elevation of Jewish intelligence occurred even before Jews moved into occupations selected for intelligence, because of the shift in ancient Judaism from a rite-based to a learning-based religion.
All scholars who have examined the topic agree that about 80–90 percent of all Jews were farmers at the beginning of the Common Era, and that only about 10–20 percent of Jews were farmers by the end of the first millennium. No other ethnic group underwent this same kind of occupational shift. For the story of why this happened, I turn to a discussion by Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein entitled “Jewish Occupational Selection: Education, Restrictions, or Minorities?” which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 2005.
Rejecting the explanation that Jews became merchants because they were restricted from farming, Botticini and Eckstein point to cases in which Jews who were free to own land and engage in agriculture made the same shift to urban, skilled occupations that Jews exhibited where restrictions were in force. Instead, they focus on an event that occurred in 64 C.E., when the Palestinian sage Joshua ben Gamla issued an ordinance mandating universal schooling for all males starting at about age six. The ordinance was not only issued; it was implemented. Within about a century, the Jews, uniquely among the peoples of the world, had effectively established universal male literacy and numeracy.
The authors’ explanation for the subsequent shift from farming to urban occupations reduces to this: if you were educated, you possessed an asset that had economic value in occupations that required literacy and numeracy, such as those involving sales and transactions. If you remained a farmer, your education had little or no value. Over the centuries, this basic economic reality led Jews to leave farming and engage in urban occupations.
So far, Botticini and Eckstein have provided an explanatory backdrop to the shift in occupations that in turn produced the selection pressures for intelligence described by Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending. But selection pressure in this classic form was probably not the only force at work. Between the 1st and 6th centuries C.E., the number of Jews in the world plummeted from about 4.5 million to 1.5 million or fewer. About 1 million Jews were killed in the revolts against the Romans in Judea and Egypt. There were scattered forced conversions from Judaism to another religion. Some of the reduction may be associated with a general drop in population that accompanied the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. But that still leaves a huge number of Jews who just disappeared.
What happened to them? Botticini and Eckstein argue that an economic force was at work: for Jews who remained farmers, universal education involved a cost that had little economic benefit. As time went on, they drifted away from Judaism. I am sure this explanation has some merit. But a more direct explanation could involve the increased intellectual demands of Judaism.
Joshua ben Gamla’s ordinance mandating literacy occurred at about the same time as the destruction of the Second Temple—64 C.E. and 70 C.E., respectively. Both mark the moment when Judaism began actively to transform itself from a religion centered on rites and sacrifices at the Temple in Jerusalem to a religion centered on prayer and the study of the Torah at decentralized synagogues and study houses. Rabbis and scholars took on a much larger role as leaders of local communities. Since worship of God involved not only prayer but study, all Jewish males had to read if they were to practice their faith—and not only read in private but be able to read aloud in the presence of others.
In this context, consider the intellectual requirements of literacy. People with modest intelligence can become functionally literate, but they are able to read only simple texts. The Torah and the Hebrew prayer book are not simple texts; even to be able to read them mechanically requires fairly advanced literacy. To study the Talmud and its commentaries with any understanding requires considerable intellectual capacity. In short, during the centuries after Rome’s destruction of the Temple, Judaism evolved in such a way that to be a good Jew meant that a man had to be smart.
What happened to the millions of Jews who disappeared? It is not necessary to maintain that Jews of low intelligence were run out of town because they could not read the Torah and commentaries fluently. Rather, few people enjoy being in a position where their inadequacies are constantly highlighted. It is human nature to withdraw from such situations. I suggest that the Jews who fell away from Judaism from the 1st to 6th centuries C.E. were heavily concentrated among those who could not learn to read well enough to be good Jews—meaning those from the lower half of the intelligence distribution. Even before the selection pressures arising from urban occupations began to have an effect, I am arguing, the remaining self-identified Jews circa 800 C.E. already had elevated intelligence.
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A loose end remains. Is it the case that, before the 1st century C.E., Jews were intellectually ordinary? Are we to believe that the Bible, a work compiled over centuries and incorporating everything from brilliant poetry to profound ethics, with stories that speak so eloquently to the human condition that they have inspired great art, music, and literature for millennia, was produced by an intellectually run-of-the-mill Levantine tribe?
In The Evolution of Man and Society (1969), the geneticist Cyril Darlington presented the thesis that Jews and Judaism were decisively shaped much earlier than the 1st century C.E., namely, by the Babylonian captivity that began with the fall of Jerusalem to the forces of Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.E.
Darlington’s analysis touches on many issues, but I will focus on just the intelligence question. The biblical account clearly states that only a select group of Jews were taken to Babylon. We read that Nebuchadnezzar “carried into exile all Jerusalem: all the officers and fighting men, and all the craftsmen and artisans. . . . Only the poorest people of the land were left” (2 Kings 24:10).
In effect, the Babylonians took away the Jewish elites, selected in part for high intelligence, and left behind the poor and unskilled, selected in part for low intelligence. By the time the exiles returned, more than a century later, many of those remaining behind in Judah had been absorbed into other religions. Following Ezra’s command to “separate yourselves from the peoples around you and from your foreign wives” (Ezra 10:9), only those who renounced their foreign wives and children were permitted to stay within the group. The returned exiles, who formed the bulk of the reconstituted Jewish community, comprised mainly the descendants of the Jewish elites—plausibly a far more able population, on average, than the pre-captivity population.
I offer the Babylonian captivity as a concrete mechanism whereby Jewish intelligence may have been elevated very early, but I am not wedded to it. Even without that mechanism, there is reason to think that selection for intelligence antedates the 1st century C.E.
From its very outset, apparently going back to the time of Moses, Judaism was intertwined with intellectual complexity. Jews were commanded by God to heed the law, which meant they had to learn the law. The law was so extensive and complicated that this process of learning and reviewing was never complete. Moreover, Jewish males were not free to pretend that they had learned the law, for fathers were commanded to teach the law to their children. It became obvious to all when fathers failed in their duty. No other religion made so many intellectual demands upon the whole body of its believers. Long before Joshua ben Gamla and the destruction of the Second Temple, the requirements for being a good Jew had provided incentives for the less intelligent to fall away.
Assessing the events of the 1st century C.E. thus poses a chicken-and-egg problem. By way of an analogy, consider written Chinese with its thousands of unique characters. On cognitive tests, today’s Chinese do especially well on visuo-spatial skills. It is possible, I suppose, that their high visuo-spatial skills have been fostered by having to learn written Chinese; but I find it much more plausible that only people who already possessed high visuo-spatial skills would ever devise such a ferociously difficult written language. Similarly, I suppose it is possible that the Jews’ high verbal skills were fostered, through secondary and tertiary effects, by the requirement that they be able to read and understand complicated texts after the 1st century C.E.; but I find it much more plausible that only people who already possessed high verbal skills would dream of installing such a demanding requirement.
This reasoning pushes me even farther into the realm of speculation. Insofar as I am suggesting that the Jews may have had some degree of unusual verbal skills going back to the time of Moses, I am naked before the evolutionary psychologists’ ultimate challenge. Why should one particular tribe at the time of Moses, living in the same environment as other nomadic and agricultural peoples of the Middle East, have already evolved elevated intelligence when the others did not?
At this point, I take sanctuary in my remaining hypothesis, uniquely parsimonious and happily irrefutable. The Jews are God’s chosen people.
About the Author
Charles Murray is the W.H. Brady scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author most recently of In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the Welfare State (2006). This article has been adapted from a presentation at the annual Herzliya Conference in Israel in January.
April 2007
Since its first issue in 1945, COMMENTARY has published hundreds of articles about Jews and Judaism. As one would expect, they cover just about every important aspect of the topic. But there is a lacuna, and not one involving some obscure bit of Judaica. COMMENTARY has never published a systematic discussion of one of the most obvious topics of all: the extravagant overrepresentation of Jews, relative to their numbers, in the top ranks of the arts, sciences, law, medicine, finance, entrepreneurship, and the media.
I have personal experience with the reluctance of Jews to talk about Jewish accomplishment—my co-author, the late Richard Herrnstein, gently resisted the paragraphs on Jewish IQ that I insisted on putting in The Bell Curve (1994). Both history and the contemporary revival of anti-Semitism in Europe make it easy to understand the reasons for that reluctance. But Jewish accomplishment constitutes a fascinating and important story. Recent scholarship is expanding our understanding of its origins.
And so this Scots-Irish Gentile from Iowa hereby undertakes to tell the story. I cover three topics: the timing and nature of Jewish accomplishment, focusing on the arts and sciences; elevated Jewish IQ as an explanation for that accomplishment; and current theories about how the Jews acquired their elevated IQ.
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From 800 B.C.E. through the first millennium of the Common Era, we have just two examples of great Jewish accomplishment, and neither falls strictly within the realms of the arts or sciences. But what a pair they are. The first is the fully realized conceptualization of monotheism, expressed through one of the literary treasures of the world, the Hebrew Bible. It not only laid the foundation for three great religions but, as Thomas Cahill describes in The Gifts of the Jews (1998), introduced a way of looking at the meaning of human life and the nature of history that defines core elements of the modern sensibility. The second achievement is not often treated as a Jewish one but clearly is: Christian theology expressed through the New Testament, an accomplishment that has spilled into every aspect of Western civilization.
But religious literature is the exception. The Jews do not appear in the annals of philosophy, drama, visual art, mathematics, or the natural sciences during the eighteen centuries from the time of Homer through the first millennium C.E., when so much was happening in Greece, China, and South Asia. It is unclear to what extent this reflects a lack of activity or the lack of a readily available record. For example, only a handful of the scientists of the Middle Ages are mentioned in most histories of science, and none was a Jew. But when George Sarton put a high-powered lens to the Middle Ages in his monumental Introduction to the History of Science (1927-48), he found that 95 of the 626 known scientists working everywhere in the world from 1150 to 1300 were Jews—15 percent of the total, far out of proportion to the Jewish population.
As it happens, that same period overlaps with the life of the most famous Jewish philosopher of medieval times, Maimonides (1135–1204), and of others less well known, not to mention the Jewish poets, grammarians, religious thinkers, scholars, physicians, and courtiers of Spain in the “Golden Age,” or the brilliant exegetes and rabbinical legislators of northern France and Germany. But this only exemplifies the difficulty of assessing Jewish intellectual activity in that period. Aside from Maimonides and a few others, these thinkers and artists did not perceptibly influence history or culture outside the confines of the Jewish world.
Generally speaking, this remained the case well into the Renaissance and beyond. When writing a book called Human Accomplishment (2003), I compiled inventories of “significant figures” in the arts and sciences, defined as people who are mentioned in at least half of the major histories of their respective fields. From 1200 to 1800, only seven Jews are among those significant figures, and only two were important enough to have names that are still widely recognized: Spinoza and Montaigne (whose mother was Jewish).
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The sparse representation of Jews during the flowering of the European arts and sciences is not hard to explain. They were systematically excluded, both by legal restrictions on the occupations they could enter and by savage social discrimination. Then came legal emancipation, beginning in the late 1700’s in a few countries and completed in Western Europe by the 1870’s, and with it one of the most extraordinary stories of any ethnic group at any point in human history.
As soon as Jewish children born under legal emancipation had time to grow to adulthood, they started appearing in the first ranks of the arts and sciences. During the four decades from 1830 to 1870, when the first Jews to live under emancipation reached their forties, 16 significant Jewish figures appear. In the next four decades, from 1870 to 1910, the number jumps to 40. During the next four decades, 1910–1950, despite the contemporaneous devastation of European Jewry, the number of significant figures almost triples, to 114.
To get a sense of the density of accomplishment these numbers represent, I will focus on 1870 onward, after legal emancipation had been achieved throughout Central and Western Europe. How does the actual number of significant figures compare to what would be expected given the Jewish proportion of the European and North American population? From 1870 to 1950, Jewish representation in literature was four times the number one would expect. In music, five times. In the visual arts, five times. In biology, eight times. In chemistry, six times. In physics, nine times. In mathematics, twelve times. In philosophy, fourteen times.
Disproportionate Jewish accomplishment in the arts and sciences continues to this day. My inventories end with 1950, but many other measures are available, of which the best known is the Nobel Prize. In the first half of the 20th century, despite pervasive and continuing social discrimination against Jews throughout the Western world, despite the retraction of legal rights, and despite the Holocaust, Jews won 14 percent of Nobel Prizes in literature, chemistry, physics, and medicine/physiology. In the second half of the 20th century, when Nobel Prizes began to be awarded to people from all over the world, that figure rose to 29 percent. So far, in the 21st century, it has been 32 percent. Jews constitute about two-tenths of one percent of the world’s population. You do the math.
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What accounts for this remarkable record? A full answer must call on many characteristics of Jewish culture, but intelligence has to be at the center of the answer. Jews have been found to have an unusually high mean intelligence as measured by IQ tests since the first Jewish samples were tested. (The widely repeated story that Jewish immigrants to this country in the early 20th century tested low on IQ is a canard.) Exactly how high has been difficult to pin down, because Jewish sub-samples in the available surveys are seldom perfectly representative. But it is currently accepted that the mean is somewhere in the range of 107 to 115, with 110 being a plausible compromise.
The IQ mean for the American population is “normed” to be 100, with a standard deviation of 15. If the Jewish mean is 110, then the mathematics of the normal distribution says that the average Jew is at the 75th percentile. Underlying that mean in overall IQ is a consistent pattern on IQ subtests: Jews are only about average on the subtests measuring visuo-spatial skills, but extremely high on subtests that measure verbal and reasoning skills.
A group’s mean intelligence is important in explaining outcomes such as mean educational attainment or mean income. The key indicator for predicting exceptional accomplishment (like winning a Nobel Prize) is the incidence of exceptional intelligence. Consider an IQ score of 140 or higher, denoting the level of intelligence that can permit people to excel in fields like theoretical physics and pure mathematics. If the mean Jewish IQ is 110 and the standard deviation is 15, then the proportion of Jews with IQ’s of 140 or higher is somewhere around six times the proportion of everyone else.
The imbalance continues to increase for still higher IQ’s. New York City’s public-school system used to administer a pencil-and-paper IQ test to its entire school population. In 1954, a psychologist used those test results to identify all 28 children in the New York public-school system with measured IQ’s of 170 or higher. Of those 28, 24 were Jews.
Exceptional intelligence is not enough to explain exceptional accomplishment. Qualities such as imagination, ambition, perseverance, and curiosity are decisive in separating the merely smart from the highly productive. The role of intelligence is nicely expressed in an analogy suggested to me years ago by the sociologist Steven Goldberg: intelligence plays the same role in an intellectually demanding task that weight plays in the performance of NFL offensive tackles. The heaviest offensive tackle is not necessarily the best. Indeed, the correlation between weight and performance among NFL offensive tackles is probably quite low. But they all weigh more than 300 pounds.
So with intelligence. The other things count, but you must be very smart to have even a chance of achieving great work. A randomly selected Jew has a higher probability of possessing that level of intelligence than a randomly selected member of any other ethnic or national group, by far.
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Nothing that I have presented up to this point is scientifically controversial. The profile of disproportionately high Jewish accomplishment in the arts and sciences since the 18th century, the reality of elevated Jewish IQ, and the connection between the two are not to be denied by means of data. And so we come to the great question: how and when did this elevated Jewish IQ come about? Here, the discussion must become speculative. Geneticists and historians are still assembling the pieces of the explanation, and there is much room for disagreement.
I begin with the assumption that elevated Jewish intelligence is grounded in genetics. It is no longer seriously disputed that intelligence in Homo sapiens is substantially heritable. In the last two decades, it has also been established that obvious environmental factors such as high income, books in the house, and parental reading to children are not as potent as one might expect. A “good enough” environment is important for the nurture of intellectual potential, but the requirements for “good enough” are not high. Even the very best home environments add only a few points, if that, to a merely okay environment. It is also known that children adopted at birth do not achieve the IQ’s predicted by their parents’ IQ.
To put it another way, we have good reason to think that Gentile children raised in Jewish families do not acquire Jewish intelligence. Hence my view that something in the genes explains elevated Jewish IQ. That conclusion is not logically necessary but, given what we know about heritability and environmental effects on intelligence in humans as a species, it is extremely plausible.
Two potential explanations for a Jewish gene pool favoring high intelligence are so obvious that many people assume they must be true: winnowing by persecution (only the smartest Jews either survived or remained Jews) and marrying for brains (scholars and children of scholars were socially desirable spouses). I too think that both of these must have played some role, but how much of a role is open to question.
In the case of winnowing through persecution, the logic cuts both ways. Yes, those who remained faithful during the many persecutions of the Jews were self-selected for commitment to Judaism, and the role of scholarship in that commitment probably means that intelligence was one of the factors in self-selection. The foresight that goes with intelligence might also have had some survival value (as in anticipating pogroms), though it is not obvious that its effect would be large enough to explain much.
But once the Cossacks are sweeping through town, the kind of intelligence that leads to business success or rabbinical acumen is no help at all. On the contrary, the most successful people could easily have become the most likely to be killed, by virtue of being more visible and the targets of greater envy. Furthermore, other groups, such as the Gypsies, have been persecuted for centuries without developing elevated intelligence. Considered closely, the winnowing-by-persecution logic is not as compelling as it may first appear.
What of the marrying-for-brains theory? “A man should sell all he possesses in order to marry the daughter of a scholar, as well as to marry his daughter to a scholar,” advises the Talmud (Pesahim 49a), and scholarship did in fact have social cachet within many Jewish communities before (and after) emancipation. The combination could have been potent: by marrying the children of scholars to the children of successful merchants, Jews were in effect joining those selected for abstract reasoning ability with those selected for practical intelligence.
Once again, however, it is difficult to be more specific about how much effect this might have had. Arguments have been advanced that rich merchants were in fact often reluctant to entrust their daughters to penniless and unworldly scholars. Nor is it clear that the fertility rate of scholars, or their numbers, were high enough to account for a major effect on intelligence. The attractiveness of brains in prospective marriage partners surely played some role but, once again, the data for assessing how much have not been assembled.
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Against this backdrop of uncertainty, a data-driven theory for explaining elevated Jewish IQ appeared in 2006 in the Journal of Biosocial Science. In an article entitled “Natural History of Ashkenazi Intelligence,” Gregory Cochran (a physicist) and Jason Hardy and Henry Harpending (anthropologists) contend that elevated Jewish IQ is confined to the Ashkenazi Jews of northern and central Europe, and developed from the Middle Ages onward, primarily from 800 to 1600 C.E.
In the analysis of these authors, the key factor explaining elevated Jewish intelligence is occupational selection. From the time Jews became established north of the Pyrenees-Balkans line, around 800 C.E., they were in most places and at most times restricted to occupations involving sales, finance, and trade. Economic success in all of these occupations is far more highly selected for intelligence than success in the chief occupation of non-Jews: namely, farming. Economic success is in turn related to reproductive success, because higher income means lower infant mortality, better nutrition, and, more generally, reproductive “fitness.” Over time, increased fitness among the successful leads to strong selection for the cognitive and psychological traits that produce that fitness, intensified when there is a low inward gene flow from other populations—as was the case with Ashkenazim.
Sephardi and Oriental Jews—i.e., those from the Iberian peninsula, the Mediterranean littoral, and the Islamic East—were also engaged in urban occupations during the same centuries. But the authors cite evidence that, as a rule, they were less concentrated in occupations that selected for IQ and instead more commonly worked in craft trades. Thus, elevated intelligence did not develop among Sephardi and Oriental Jews—as manifested by contemporary test results in Israel that show the IQ’s of non-European Jews to be roughly similar to the IQ’s of Gentiles.
The three authors conclude this part of their argument with an elegant corollary that matches the known test profiles of today’s Ashkenazim with the historical experience of their ancestors:
The suggested selective process explains the pattern of mental abilities in Ashkenazi Jews: high verbal and mathematical ability but relatively low spatio-visual ability. Verbal and mathematical talent helped medieval businessmen succeed, while spatio-visual abilities were irrelevant.
The rest of their presentation is a lengthy and technical discussion of the genetics of selection for IQ, indirect evidence linking elevated Jewish IQ with a variety of genetically based diseases found among Ashkenazim, and evidence that most of these selection effects have occurred within the last 1,200 years.
_____________
No one has yet presented an alternative to the Cochran-Hardy-Harpending theory that can match it for documentation. But, as someone who suspects that elevated Jewish intelligence was (a) not confined to Ashkenazim and (b) antedates the Middle Ages, I will outline the strands of an alternative explanation that should be explored.
It begins with evidence that Jews who remained in the Islamic world exhibited unusually high levels of accomplishment as of the beginning of the second millennium. The hardest evidence is Sarton’s enumeration of scientists mentioned earlier, of whom 15 percent were Jews. These were not Ashkenazim in northern Europe, where Jews were still largely excluded from the world of scientific scholarship, but Sephardim in the Iberian peninsula, in Baghdad, and in other Islamic centers of learning. I have also mentioned the more diffuse cultural evidence from Spain, where, under both Muslim and Christian rule, Jews attained eminent positions in the professions, commerce, and government as well as in elite literary and intellectual circles.
After being expelled from Spain at the end of the 15th century, Sephardi Jews rose to distinction in many of the countries where they settled. Some economic historians have traced the decline of Spain after 1500, and the subsequent rise of the Netherlands, in part to the Sephardi commercial talent that was transferred from the one to the other. Centuries later, in England, one could point to such Sephardi eminences as Benjamin Disraeli and the economist David Ricardo.
In sum, I propose that a strong case could be assembled that Jews everywhere had unusually high intellectual resources that manifested themselves outside of Ashkenaz and well before the period when non-rabbinic Ashkenazi accomplishment manifested itself.
How is this case to be sustained in the face of contemporary test data indicating that non-Ashkenazi Jews do not have the elevated mean of today’s Ashkenazim? The logical inconsistency disappears if one posits that Jews circa 1000 C.E. had elevated intelligence everywhere, but that it subsequently was augmented still further among Ashkenazim and declined for Jews living in the Islamic world—perhaps because of the dynamics described by Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending (that is, Oriental Jews were concentrated in trades for which high intelligence did not yield wealth).
Recent advances in the use of genetic markers to characterize populations enable us to pursue such possibilities systematically. I offer this testable hypothesis as just one of many possibilities: if genetic markers are used to discriminate among non- Ashkenazi Jews, it will be found that those who are closest genetically to the Sephardim of Golden Age Spain have an elevated mean IQ, though perhaps not so high as the contemporary Ashkenazi IQ.
_____________
The next strand of an alternative to the Cochran-Hardy-Harpending theory involves reasons for thinking that some of the elevation of Jewish intelligence occurred even before Jews moved into occupations selected for intelligence, because of the shift in ancient Judaism from a rite-based to a learning-based religion.
All scholars who have examined the topic agree that about 80–90 percent of all Jews were farmers at the beginning of the Common Era, and that only about 10–20 percent of Jews were farmers by the end of the first millennium. No other ethnic group underwent this same kind of occupational shift. For the story of why this happened, I turn to a discussion by Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein entitled “Jewish Occupational Selection: Education, Restrictions, or Minorities?” which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 2005.
Rejecting the explanation that Jews became merchants because they were restricted from farming, Botticini and Eckstein point to cases in which Jews who were free to own land and engage in agriculture made the same shift to urban, skilled occupations that Jews exhibited where restrictions were in force. Instead, they focus on an event that occurred in 64 C.E., when the Palestinian sage Joshua ben Gamla issued an ordinance mandating universal schooling for all males starting at about age six. The ordinance was not only issued; it was implemented. Within about a century, the Jews, uniquely among the peoples of the world, had effectively established universal male literacy and numeracy.
The authors’ explanation for the subsequent shift from farming to urban occupations reduces to this: if you were educated, you possessed an asset that had economic value in occupations that required literacy and numeracy, such as those involving sales and transactions. If you remained a farmer, your education had little or no value. Over the centuries, this basic economic reality led Jews to leave farming and engage in urban occupations.
So far, Botticini and Eckstein have provided an explanatory backdrop to the shift in occupations that in turn produced the selection pressures for intelligence described by Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending. But selection pressure in this classic form was probably not the only force at work. Between the 1st and 6th centuries C.E., the number of Jews in the world plummeted from about 4.5 million to 1.5 million or fewer. About 1 million Jews were killed in the revolts against the Romans in Judea and Egypt. There were scattered forced conversions from Judaism to another religion. Some of the reduction may be associated with a general drop in population that accompanied the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. But that still leaves a huge number of Jews who just disappeared.
What happened to them? Botticini and Eckstein argue that an economic force was at work: for Jews who remained farmers, universal education involved a cost that had little economic benefit. As time went on, they drifted away from Judaism. I am sure this explanation has some merit. But a more direct explanation could involve the increased intellectual demands of Judaism.
Joshua ben Gamla’s ordinance mandating literacy occurred at about the same time as the destruction of the Second Temple—64 C.E. and 70 C.E., respectively. Both mark the moment when Judaism began actively to transform itself from a religion centered on rites and sacrifices at the Temple in Jerusalem to a religion centered on prayer and the study of the Torah at decentralized synagogues and study houses. Rabbis and scholars took on a much larger role as leaders of local communities. Since worship of God involved not only prayer but study, all Jewish males had to read if they were to practice their faith—and not only read in private but be able to read aloud in the presence of others.
In this context, consider the intellectual requirements of literacy. People with modest intelligence can become functionally literate, but they are able to read only simple texts. The Torah and the Hebrew prayer book are not simple texts; even to be able to read them mechanically requires fairly advanced literacy. To study the Talmud and its commentaries with any understanding requires considerable intellectual capacity. In short, during the centuries after Rome’s destruction of the Temple, Judaism evolved in such a way that to be a good Jew meant that a man had to be smart.
What happened to the millions of Jews who disappeared? It is not necessary to maintain that Jews of low intelligence were run out of town because they could not read the Torah and commentaries fluently. Rather, few people enjoy being in a position where their inadequacies are constantly highlighted. It is human nature to withdraw from such situations. I suggest that the Jews who fell away from Judaism from the 1st to 6th centuries C.E. were heavily concentrated among those who could not learn to read well enough to be good Jews—meaning those from the lower half of the intelligence distribution. Even before the selection pressures arising from urban occupations began to have an effect, I am arguing, the remaining self-identified Jews circa 800 C.E. already had elevated intelligence.
_____________
A loose end remains. Is it the case that, before the 1st century C.E., Jews were intellectually ordinary? Are we to believe that the Bible, a work compiled over centuries and incorporating everything from brilliant poetry to profound ethics, with stories that speak so eloquently to the human condition that they have inspired great art, music, and literature for millennia, was produced by an intellectually run-of-the-mill Levantine tribe?
In The Evolution of Man and Society (1969), the geneticist Cyril Darlington presented the thesis that Jews and Judaism were decisively shaped much earlier than the 1st century C.E., namely, by the Babylonian captivity that began with the fall of Jerusalem to the forces of Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.E.
Darlington’s analysis touches on many issues, but I will focus on just the intelligence question. The biblical account clearly states that only a select group of Jews were taken to Babylon. We read that Nebuchadnezzar “carried into exile all Jerusalem: all the officers and fighting men, and all the craftsmen and artisans. . . . Only the poorest people of the land were left” (2 Kings 24:10).
In effect, the Babylonians took away the Jewish elites, selected in part for high intelligence, and left behind the poor and unskilled, selected in part for low intelligence. By the time the exiles returned, more than a century later, many of those remaining behind in Judah had been absorbed into other religions. Following Ezra’s command to “separate yourselves from the peoples around you and from your foreign wives” (Ezra 10:9), only those who renounced their foreign wives and children were permitted to stay within the group. The returned exiles, who formed the bulk of the reconstituted Jewish community, comprised mainly the descendants of the Jewish elites—plausibly a far more able population, on average, than the pre-captivity population.
I offer the Babylonian captivity as a concrete mechanism whereby Jewish intelligence may have been elevated very early, but I am not wedded to it. Even without that mechanism, there is reason to think that selection for intelligence antedates the 1st century C.E.
From its very outset, apparently going back to the time of Moses, Judaism was intertwined with intellectual complexity. Jews were commanded by God to heed the law, which meant they had to learn the law. The law was so extensive and complicated that this process of learning and reviewing was never complete. Moreover, Jewish males were not free to pretend that they had learned the law, for fathers were commanded to teach the law to their children. It became obvious to all when fathers failed in their duty. No other religion made so many intellectual demands upon the whole body of its believers. Long before Joshua ben Gamla and the destruction of the Second Temple, the requirements for being a good Jew had provided incentives for the less intelligent to fall away.
Assessing the events of the 1st century C.E. thus poses a chicken-and-egg problem. By way of an analogy, consider written Chinese with its thousands of unique characters. On cognitive tests, today’s Chinese do especially well on visuo-spatial skills. It is possible, I suppose, that their high visuo-spatial skills have been fostered by having to learn written Chinese; but I find it much more plausible that only people who already possessed high visuo-spatial skills would ever devise such a ferociously difficult written language. Similarly, I suppose it is possible that the Jews’ high verbal skills were fostered, through secondary and tertiary effects, by the requirement that they be able to read and understand complicated texts after the 1st century C.E.; but I find it much more plausible that only people who already possessed high verbal skills would dream of installing such a demanding requirement.
This reasoning pushes me even farther into the realm of speculation. Insofar as I am suggesting that the Jews may have had some degree of unusual verbal skills going back to the time of Moses, I am naked before the evolutionary psychologists’ ultimate challenge. Why should one particular tribe at the time of Moses, living in the same environment as other nomadic and agricultural peoples of the Middle East, have already evolved elevated intelligence when the others did not?
At this point, I take sanctuary in my remaining hypothesis, uniquely parsimonious and happily irrefutable. The Jews are God’s chosen people.
About the Author
Charles Murray is the W.H. Brady scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author most recently of In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the Welfare State (2006). This article has been adapted from a presentation at the annual Herzliya Conference in Israel in January.
Turkey's Coming Offensive Against the Iraqi-based PKK
Source: Jamestown Foundation
By Andrew McGregor
The creation of a largely autonomous and peaceful "Kurdistan" in northern Iraq is often trumpeted as a major success in post-Baathist Iraq. Any progress made, however, toward an independent nation for the stateless Kurds creates great uneasiness in Turkey, Syria and Iran, all of which host significant and sometimes militant Kurdish minorities. Turkey's struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey has cost 35,000 lives since 1984.
The Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is determined to preempt a spring offensive by the PKK. If the Iraqi government and U.S.-led forces are unwilling to cooperate with each other to counter the PKK, a designated terrorist organization, Turkey has signaled that it is willing to operate unilaterally. Last August, following a number of clashes with PKK guerrillas, Turkey massed tanks, artillery and troops along the Iraqi border. The PKK consistently denies that operations are launched from the Mount Qandil area in northern Iraq, claiming that it maintains only a "political presence" there. Last weekend, however, the Turkish army took its first steps in mounting a full-scale offensive against the Iraqi bases of the PKK. Mine-clearing operations are underway along the border, while Turkish special forces have reportedly penetrated 20 to 40 kilometers inside northern Iraq to prepare the advance and seal off PKK escape routes. As many as 200,000 Turkish soldiers are being brought up to the border this week.
With Turkish presidential and general elections approaching, Turkish security forces have carried out mass arrests of alleged PKK terrorists in Istanbul and have detained 19 members of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party in Izmir and Manisa (The New Anatolian, March 21). Turkey has been busy resupplying army divisions along the Iraq border and has cancelled all leave for these formations for the next three months (Zaman, March 20).
The PKK's Iraqi Harbor
The PKK arrived in northern Iraq after Syria ended its sponsorship of the movement in 1998. The movement's longtime leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested in Kenya shortly afterward and brought to trial in Turkey. The PKK still contains a large number of Syrian Kurds, some of whom are now agitating for attacks on Syria (Terrorism Monitor, February 15). In Iraq, the PKK established bases around Mount Qandil, close to the Iranian border but about 100 kilometers from the border with Turkey. The PKK has bases on the west side of the mountain while its Iranian equivalent, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), has a base on the southern slopes close to the Iranian border (Terrorism Monitor, September 8, 2006). While the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Massoud Barzani has provided some support to the PKK, both Barzani and Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) have little use for the imprisoned PKK leader. During past Turkish incursions against PKK elements in Iraq, fighters from both the Barzani and al-Talabani factions have been known to operate in support of Turkish troops.
Turkish intelligence estimates that there are 3,800 Kurdish fighters in the Qandil region ready to carry out attacks on Turkish military and civilian targets. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is believed to still be trying to run the movement through messages passed through his lawyers from his cell on the prison island of Imrali. Recent medical tests failed to find any trace of toxins after rumors spread that Ocalan was being poisoned in captivity (Anatolia News Agency, March 12). Ocalan's attempts to control the movement from a distance have stifled the emergence of a new political leadership. Without strong central leadership, the PKK is subject to fragmentation due to the disparate origins and motivations of its fighters.
Despite their apparent weakness, the PKK has threatened to expand the conflict to neighboring countries if they continue to interfere with the movement's struggle against Turkey. KRG leader Massoud Barzani has also threatened to deploy Kurdish troops against Turkish forces should they cross into Iraq. Kurdish intentions to absorb the Iraqi city of Kirkuk with its immense oil reserves and large Turkmen population into a northern Iraqi "Kurdistan" is another growing irritant in Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Kurds. There are fears that Kirkuk's petroleum industry could provide the economic heart of a viable and independent Kurdistan that would inspire Kurdish separatism in neighboring states.
NATO Allies at Odds
Turkish dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to root out the PKK comes at a difficult time. The current U.S. Congress debate on the WWI-era "genocide" of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire is quickly poisoning U.S.-Turkish relations, particularly in the politically powerful Turkish armed forces. To mollify Turkish opinion, the United States has appointed a special envoy to deal with the PKK issue, retired Air Force General Joseph Ralston. General Ralston has stated that "the PKK is a terrorist organization and needs to be put out of business" (Zaman, March 16). Besides Turkey's status as a vital cornerstone of the NATO alliance, southern Turkey's Incirlik Air Base is also a crucial staging ground for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States is unwilling to open a new front in northern Iraq, nor can it afford to lose its support from Iraq's Kurdish population. Kurds provide the most reliable units in the reformed Iraqi national army and have taken part in recent counter-terrorism operations in Baghdad and other parts of the country dominated by Sunni or Shiite political factions.
Turkish Cooperation with Iran?
In late February, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards pursued PJAK elements through the Iranian province of West Azerbaijan to the Turkish border, killing 17 guerrillas (IRNA, February 24). It was only the latest in a series of intense clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and PJAK in the northwestern region of Iran. Iranian artillery frequently fires on the PJAK base at Mount Qandil. PJAK is generally regarded as the Iranian wing of the PKK, with which it cooperates (Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006). There are seven million Kurds in Iran, who are actively seeking greater economic and commercial ties with Turkey.
Turkey and Iran have quietly worked out a reciprocal security arrangement, whereby Iran's military will engage Kurdish separatists whenever encountered, in exchange for Turkey's cooperation against the Iranian Mujahideen-e-Khalq movement (MEK), a well-armed and cult-like opposition group that previously found refuge in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Both Iranian officials and Turkey's prime minister have alluded to "mechanisms" (likely to involve intelligence-sharing) already in place to deal with security issues of mutual interest. Neither Turkey nor Iran has any desire to see an independent Kurdish state established in northern Iraq. For the moment, Turkey's cooperation with Iran is achieving better results than its frustrating inability to persuade the United States to help eliminate a designated terrorist group in northern Iraq. The Erdogan government continues to forge a distinctly Turkish foreign policy, conducted in alliance with, but not in submission to, the United States. In a recent interview, Erdogan vowed that Turkey would not allow attacks on its neighbors from its territory, adding, in an obvious allusion to Iran, that all countries had a right to pursue the development of a peaceful nuclear energy program (Milliyet, March 12).
Iran complains that the British and U.S. intelligence agencies are now supporting and inciting "anti-revolutionary" militant groups, some of which are ethnic-based movements active in sensitive border regions. Nearly all of these groups use terrorist methods, such as car bombs, one of which recently killed 17 Revolutionary Guards members traveling in a bus near the Iranian border with Pakistan's turbulent Balochistan province.
In January, Turkish diplomats played down reports that Israel and the U.S. Department of Defense were providing clandestine support to Kurdish PJAK "terrorists," operating in the northwestern Iranian border region, questioning the usefulness of such a policy in countering Iran's nuclear ambitions or destabilizing the country in advance of a military strike (Journal of Turkish Weekly, January 4). The reports, originating in a Seymour Hersh article in the January 4 New Yorker, were vigorously denied by White House and Israeli spokespersons. Since then, there have been further allegations that the CIA is using its classified budget to support terrorist operations by disaffected members of Iran's ethnic minorities, including Azeris, Baloch, Kurds and Arabs (Sunday Telegraph, February 25).
Potential Outcomes
Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Iraq, but is unwilling to sacrifice its own perceived security interests (especially as regards separatist groups or other threats to national unity). In this, the government has the support of Turkey's generals and most of the opposition parties. The Turkish military is well aware that the elimination of cross-border refugees and support systems is an essential factor in any counter-insurgency strategy. Whether this will be accomplished peacefully or by force will depend largely on the success of the upcoming meeting of U.S. and regional foreign ministers in Istanbul. Among those elements necessary to a political settlement are Turkey's readiness to make at least limited concessions to its own Kurdish community, a demonstration from the United States that it is not prepared to risk its alliance with a major NATO partner during the growing confrontation with Iran and a willingness by Iraqi Kurds to sacrifice the PKK and dreams of an independent "Greater Kurdistan" in return for regional autonomy in northern Iraq.
Iran may be expected to continue aggressive military operations against Kurdish militants to keep its border region secure in a politically volatile period, while continuing to demonstrate to Turkey its usefulness as a security partner in contrast to U.S. reluctance to undertake anti-Kurdish military activities. U.S. intervention in northern Iraq's Kurdistan region could create a new wave of destabilization in Iraq, as well as diverting U.S. resources from a confrontation with Iran (a result no doubt desired by Tehran).
A Turkish incursion will likely have limited scope and objectives, although it will likely include at least two divisions (20,000 men each) with support units. The last major cross-border operation 10 years ago involved 40,000 Turkish troops. With the greater distance to PKK bases at Mount Qandil from the Turkish border, a first wave of helicopter-borne assault troops might follow strikes by the Turkish Air Force. An assault on Mount Qandil will prove difficult even without opposition from Iraqi Kurdish forces. More ambitious plans are likely to have been drawn up by Turkish staff planners for a major multi-division offensive as far south as Kirkuk if such an operation is deemed necessary. A Turkish newspaper has reported that General Ralston has already negotiated a deal with the KRG to permit a Turkish attack on Mount Qandil in April (Zaman, March 25).
Conclusion
While tensions peak on the border, the time has in many ways never been better for a resolution to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. From captivity, Abdullah Ocalan appears ready to concede Turkey's territorial unity in exchange for stronger local governments. He recently stated, "The problems of Turkey's Kurds can only be solved under a unitary structure. This is why Turkey's Kurds should look to Ankara and nowhere else for a solution" (Zaman, March 26). Turkish investment in northern Iraq is far preferable to having Turkish tanks and artillery massed menacingly along the border. If the KRG was intending to keep the PKK as a card to use in coercing Turkish support for Kurdish autonomy, it may be time to play it. PKK morale is low and prolonged inactivity under the aging leadership will ultimately send many fighters back to their villages. The movement is hardly in a position to mount an effective offensive, however. Without state sponsorship, the PKK is poorly armed and supplied. The KRG's limited hospitality is hardly a replacement for Syrian patronage. Massoud Barzani has urged face-to-face talks on the PKK problem with Turkish leaders, who have also recently indicated openness to discussion (NTV, February 26). Turkey's continuing conflict with the Kurds jeopardizes its candidacy for European Union membership. With the possibility of full-scale Turkish military operations beginning in northern Iraq in the coming weeks, both U.S. and Turkish strategists must realize that any clash between the Turkish military and U.S.-supported Iraqi Kurds backing their PKK brethren is a political disaster in waiting.
By Andrew McGregor
The creation of a largely autonomous and peaceful "Kurdistan" in northern Iraq is often trumpeted as a major success in post-Baathist Iraq. Any progress made, however, toward an independent nation for the stateless Kurds creates great uneasiness in Turkey, Syria and Iran, all of which host significant and sometimes militant Kurdish minorities. Turkey's struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey has cost 35,000 lives since 1984.
The Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is determined to preempt a spring offensive by the PKK. If the Iraqi government and U.S.-led forces are unwilling to cooperate with each other to counter the PKK, a designated terrorist organization, Turkey has signaled that it is willing to operate unilaterally. Last August, following a number of clashes with PKK guerrillas, Turkey massed tanks, artillery and troops along the Iraqi border. The PKK consistently denies that operations are launched from the Mount Qandil area in northern Iraq, claiming that it maintains only a "political presence" there. Last weekend, however, the Turkish army took its first steps in mounting a full-scale offensive against the Iraqi bases of the PKK. Mine-clearing operations are underway along the border, while Turkish special forces have reportedly penetrated 20 to 40 kilometers inside northern Iraq to prepare the advance and seal off PKK escape routes. As many as 200,000 Turkish soldiers are being brought up to the border this week.
With Turkish presidential and general elections approaching, Turkish security forces have carried out mass arrests of alleged PKK terrorists in Istanbul and have detained 19 members of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party in Izmir and Manisa (The New Anatolian, March 21). Turkey has been busy resupplying army divisions along the Iraq border and has cancelled all leave for these formations for the next three months (Zaman, March 20).
The PKK's Iraqi Harbor
The PKK arrived in northern Iraq after Syria ended its sponsorship of the movement in 1998. The movement's longtime leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested in Kenya shortly afterward and brought to trial in Turkey. The PKK still contains a large number of Syrian Kurds, some of whom are now agitating for attacks on Syria (Terrorism Monitor, February 15). In Iraq, the PKK established bases around Mount Qandil, close to the Iranian border but about 100 kilometers from the border with Turkey. The PKK has bases on the west side of the mountain while its Iranian equivalent, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), has a base on the southern slopes close to the Iranian border (Terrorism Monitor, September 8, 2006). While the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Massoud Barzani has provided some support to the PKK, both Barzani and Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) have little use for the imprisoned PKK leader. During past Turkish incursions against PKK elements in Iraq, fighters from both the Barzani and al-Talabani factions have been known to operate in support of Turkish troops.
Turkish intelligence estimates that there are 3,800 Kurdish fighters in the Qandil region ready to carry out attacks on Turkish military and civilian targets. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is believed to still be trying to run the movement through messages passed through his lawyers from his cell on the prison island of Imrali. Recent medical tests failed to find any trace of toxins after rumors spread that Ocalan was being poisoned in captivity (Anatolia News Agency, March 12). Ocalan's attempts to control the movement from a distance have stifled the emergence of a new political leadership. Without strong central leadership, the PKK is subject to fragmentation due to the disparate origins and motivations of its fighters.
Despite their apparent weakness, the PKK has threatened to expand the conflict to neighboring countries if they continue to interfere with the movement's struggle against Turkey. KRG leader Massoud Barzani has also threatened to deploy Kurdish troops against Turkish forces should they cross into Iraq. Kurdish intentions to absorb the Iraqi city of Kirkuk with its immense oil reserves and large Turkmen population into a northern Iraqi "Kurdistan" is another growing irritant in Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Kurds. There are fears that Kirkuk's petroleum industry could provide the economic heart of a viable and independent Kurdistan that would inspire Kurdish separatism in neighboring states.
NATO Allies at Odds
Turkish dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to root out the PKK comes at a difficult time. The current U.S. Congress debate on the WWI-era "genocide" of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire is quickly poisoning U.S.-Turkish relations, particularly in the politically powerful Turkish armed forces. To mollify Turkish opinion, the United States has appointed a special envoy to deal with the PKK issue, retired Air Force General Joseph Ralston. General Ralston has stated that "the PKK is a terrorist organization and needs to be put out of business" (Zaman, March 16). Besides Turkey's status as a vital cornerstone of the NATO alliance, southern Turkey's Incirlik Air Base is also a crucial staging ground for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States is unwilling to open a new front in northern Iraq, nor can it afford to lose its support from Iraq's Kurdish population. Kurds provide the most reliable units in the reformed Iraqi national army and have taken part in recent counter-terrorism operations in Baghdad and other parts of the country dominated by Sunni or Shiite political factions.
Turkish Cooperation with Iran?
In late February, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards pursued PJAK elements through the Iranian province of West Azerbaijan to the Turkish border, killing 17 guerrillas (IRNA, February 24). It was only the latest in a series of intense clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and PJAK in the northwestern region of Iran. Iranian artillery frequently fires on the PJAK base at Mount Qandil. PJAK is generally regarded as the Iranian wing of the PKK, with which it cooperates (Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006). There are seven million Kurds in Iran, who are actively seeking greater economic and commercial ties with Turkey.
Turkey and Iran have quietly worked out a reciprocal security arrangement, whereby Iran's military will engage Kurdish separatists whenever encountered, in exchange for Turkey's cooperation against the Iranian Mujahideen-e-Khalq movement (MEK), a well-armed and cult-like opposition group that previously found refuge in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Both Iranian officials and Turkey's prime minister have alluded to "mechanisms" (likely to involve intelligence-sharing) already in place to deal with security issues of mutual interest. Neither Turkey nor Iran has any desire to see an independent Kurdish state established in northern Iraq. For the moment, Turkey's cooperation with Iran is achieving better results than its frustrating inability to persuade the United States to help eliminate a designated terrorist group in northern Iraq. The Erdogan government continues to forge a distinctly Turkish foreign policy, conducted in alliance with, but not in submission to, the United States. In a recent interview, Erdogan vowed that Turkey would not allow attacks on its neighbors from its territory, adding, in an obvious allusion to Iran, that all countries had a right to pursue the development of a peaceful nuclear energy program (Milliyet, March 12).
Iran complains that the British and U.S. intelligence agencies are now supporting and inciting "anti-revolutionary" militant groups, some of which are ethnic-based movements active in sensitive border regions. Nearly all of these groups use terrorist methods, such as car bombs, one of which recently killed 17 Revolutionary Guards members traveling in a bus near the Iranian border with Pakistan's turbulent Balochistan province.
In January, Turkish diplomats played down reports that Israel and the U.S. Department of Defense were providing clandestine support to Kurdish PJAK "terrorists," operating in the northwestern Iranian border region, questioning the usefulness of such a policy in countering Iran's nuclear ambitions or destabilizing the country in advance of a military strike (Journal of Turkish Weekly, January 4). The reports, originating in a Seymour Hersh article in the January 4 New Yorker, were vigorously denied by White House and Israeli spokespersons. Since then, there have been further allegations that the CIA is using its classified budget to support terrorist operations by disaffected members of Iran's ethnic minorities, including Azeris, Baloch, Kurds and Arabs (Sunday Telegraph, February 25).
Potential Outcomes
Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Iraq, but is unwilling to sacrifice its own perceived security interests (especially as regards separatist groups or other threats to national unity). In this, the government has the support of Turkey's generals and most of the opposition parties. The Turkish military is well aware that the elimination of cross-border refugees and support systems is an essential factor in any counter-insurgency strategy. Whether this will be accomplished peacefully or by force will depend largely on the success of the upcoming meeting of U.S. and regional foreign ministers in Istanbul. Among those elements necessary to a political settlement are Turkey's readiness to make at least limited concessions to its own Kurdish community, a demonstration from the United States that it is not prepared to risk its alliance with a major NATO partner during the growing confrontation with Iran and a willingness by Iraqi Kurds to sacrifice the PKK and dreams of an independent "Greater Kurdistan" in return for regional autonomy in northern Iraq.
Iran may be expected to continue aggressive military operations against Kurdish militants to keep its border region secure in a politically volatile period, while continuing to demonstrate to Turkey its usefulness as a security partner in contrast to U.S. reluctance to undertake anti-Kurdish military activities. U.S. intervention in northern Iraq's Kurdistan region could create a new wave of destabilization in Iraq, as well as diverting U.S. resources from a confrontation with Iran (a result no doubt desired by Tehran).
A Turkish incursion will likely have limited scope and objectives, although it will likely include at least two divisions (20,000 men each) with support units. The last major cross-border operation 10 years ago involved 40,000 Turkish troops. With the greater distance to PKK bases at Mount Qandil from the Turkish border, a first wave of helicopter-borne assault troops might follow strikes by the Turkish Air Force. An assault on Mount Qandil will prove difficult even without opposition from Iraqi Kurdish forces. More ambitious plans are likely to have been drawn up by Turkish staff planners for a major multi-division offensive as far south as Kirkuk if such an operation is deemed necessary. A Turkish newspaper has reported that General Ralston has already negotiated a deal with the KRG to permit a Turkish attack on Mount Qandil in April (Zaman, March 25).
Conclusion
While tensions peak on the border, the time has in many ways never been better for a resolution to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. From captivity, Abdullah Ocalan appears ready to concede Turkey's territorial unity in exchange for stronger local governments. He recently stated, "The problems of Turkey's Kurds can only be solved under a unitary structure. This is why Turkey's Kurds should look to Ankara and nowhere else for a solution" (Zaman, March 26). Turkish investment in northern Iraq is far preferable to having Turkish tanks and artillery massed menacingly along the border. If the KRG was intending to keep the PKK as a card to use in coercing Turkish support for Kurdish autonomy, it may be time to play it. PKK morale is low and prolonged inactivity under the aging leadership will ultimately send many fighters back to their villages. The movement is hardly in a position to mount an effective offensive, however. Without state sponsorship, the PKK is poorly armed and supplied. The KRG's limited hospitality is hardly a replacement for Syrian patronage. Massoud Barzani has urged face-to-face talks on the PKK problem with Turkish leaders, who have also recently indicated openness to discussion (NTV, February 26). Turkey's continuing conflict with the Kurds jeopardizes its candidacy for European Union membership. With the possibility of full-scale Turkish military operations beginning in northern Iraq in the coming weeks, both U.S. and Turkish strategists must realize that any clash between the Turkish military and U.S.-supported Iraqi Kurds backing their PKK brethren is a political disaster in waiting.
Balochistan : Government bans Urdu magazine Samalan
QUETTA: The Balochistan Home and Tribal Affairs Department on Wednesday banned a magazine and ordered confiscation of all of its copies. An official handout released here in connection with the ban on the Urdu language magazine, Samalan, which was being published from Bolan district, said, “Samalan, which published contents that undermined national integrity and ideology and promoted hatred, has been banned.” Samalan Baloch, the editor of the magazine, said that he was “surprised” at the decision and added that he would take up the issue with the authorities concerned. “We will move the court against the decision,” he said. This is the first time that the government has banned a publication in Balochistan in recent years. malik siraj akbar
Iran: Jundallah Suspects Arrested
April 12, 2007 15 23 GMT
Iran has arrested 90 members of the Balochi militant group Jundallah and seized a large quantity of weapons and explosives, Intelligence Minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie said, Kayhan newspaper reported April 12. Jundallah has been carrying out operations in Iran's restive Sistan-Balochistan province, which borders Pakistan and Afghanistan. The group claimed responsibility for a Feb. 11 attack that killed 11 members of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. ( Stratfor)
Iran arrests 90 militants from shadowy Sunni group
AFP
April 12, 2007
TEHRAN -- Iran has arrested 90 members of a shadowy Sunni militant group known as Jundallah accused of attacks in a volatile area on the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, a press report said Thursday.
"We have arrested 90 members of this group and a large quantity of weapons and explosives were also confiscated," intelligence minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie was quoted as saying in Kayhan newspaper.
He said that four militants who were "preparing for armed action" were also arrested.
However, he did not say whether they were among the 90 or reveal when the arrests took place.
Jundallah has been blamed for a string of attacks in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, which borders Pakistan and Afghanistan and has a substantial Baluch community, a minority Sunni Muslim group.
In February, 11 members of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards were killed and 31 wounded when a car bomb ripped through a bus carrying them to a base in an attack claimed by Jundallah.
Mohseni Ejeie said that his ministry's agents were also closely monitoring the activities of militant groups in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, which borders Iraq and is home to a substantial Arab minority.
"Ten days ago, we arrested a group of seven people who wanted to carry out several bomb attacks [in Khuzestan]," he added.
In the past two years, Khuzestan has been rocked by a string of blasts blamed on Arab separatist groups that Iran charges are backed by Britain.
Iran: Jundallah Suspects Arrested
April 12, 2007 15 23 GMT
Iran has arrested 90 members of the Balochi militant group Jundallah and seized a large quantity of weapons and explosives, Intelligence Minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie said, Kayhan newspaper reported April 12. Jundallah has been carrying out operations in Iran's restive Sistan-Balochistan province, which borders Pakistan and Afghanistan. The group claimed responsibility for a Feb. 11 attack that killed 11 members of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. ( Stratfor)
Iran arrests 90 militants from shadowy Sunni group
AFP
April 12, 2007
TEHRAN -- Iran has arrested 90 members of a shadowy Sunni militant group known as Jundallah accused of attacks in a volatile area on the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, a press report said Thursday.
"We have arrested 90 members of this group and a large quantity of weapons and explosives were also confiscated," intelligence minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie was quoted as saying in Kayhan newspaper.
He said that four militants who were "preparing for armed action" were also arrested.
However, he did not say whether they were among the 90 or reveal when the arrests took place.
Jundallah has been blamed for a string of attacks in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, which borders Pakistan and Afghanistan and has a substantial Baluch community, a minority Sunni Muslim group.
In February, 11 members of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards were killed and 31 wounded when a car bomb ripped through a bus carrying them to a base in an attack claimed by Jundallah.
Mohseni Ejeie said that his ministry's agents were also closely monitoring the activities of militant groups in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, which borders Iraq and is home to a substantial Arab minority.
"Ten days ago, we arrested a group of seven people who wanted to carry out several bomb attacks [in Khuzestan]," he added.
In the past two years, Khuzestan has been rocked by a string of blasts blamed on Arab separatist groups that Iran charges are backed by Britain.
Pakistan: Trouble in the mosque
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Pakistan's military and political movers and shakers have traditionally frequented the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad's city center. Now, a standoff over the mosque, which has become a potent symbol of the power of Pakistan's radical Islamists, threatens the very core of the country's ruling establishment.
The mosque and its affiliated madrassa (seminary) Jamia Hafsa are pitted against the government. The crisis began when the mosque and the madrassa challenged the writ of the government by calling for the declaration of Islamic (sharia) law in the country, leading to the occupation of a nearby library and kidnappings.
Last Friday, the chief cleric of Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Aziz, announced the setting up of a Taliban-style vigilante Islamic court and vowed suicide-bomb attacks if the authorities tried to crack down on the mosque and its followers.
Also on Friday, Aziz's brother, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, gave the government a month either to follow sharia law or see it enforced through the mosque's parallel system.
Already, girls from the Jamia Hafsa, backed by their male counterparts from Jamia Fareedia, another religious institution administered by the Lal Masjid, have been roving through Islamabad, asking music- and video-shop owners to close down their businesses. "Vice and virtue" squads urge women to adopt the Islamic dress code.
The mosque compound has taken on the form of a rebel camp, with young men armed with sticks posted at the gates and at lookout points along banner-strewn walls. More than 10,000 students are affiliated with the mosque's two madrassas.
President General Pervez Musharraf has so far resisted the temptation to use force, and was due on Wednesday to receive advice from his cabinet on ways to defuse the situation. The only action taken so far is by the privately run Federal Madaris Board, which has canceled the registration of the seminaries.
Waiting and watching developments are remnants of the military elite of the 1990s who planned an Islamic coup before Musharraf seized power in 1999, the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan (JI) Islamist political party, underground militant organizations and a segment of the establishment - all of them dedicated to bringing Musharraf down.
They see the crisis as an opportunity to take khurooj (mass mobilization to change the regime) to the next level, and even to revive the idea of Pakistan becoming a caliphate.
The brothers of Lal Masjid
Maulana Abdullah was assassinated in the Lal Masjid in the late 1990s, and since then the complex has been run by his sons, Aziz and Ghazi, both in their 40s. The brothers were active in the mujahideen struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The brothers come from Balochistan province's Mari tribe, which is the most active component of the ongoing Baloch insurgency. Maulana Abdullah was known for his critical speeches in Friday prayers, even against the late president Zia ul-Haq, who provided Maulana Abdullah with the land in the most expensive sector of Islamabad to construct Jamia Fareedia. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was widely blamed for Maulana Abdullah's killing.
Maulana Abdullah was a highly respected figure, known for his piety, knowledge and struggle for an Islamic way of life. Many top generals and bureaucrats attended his Friday prayers. These included disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who frequently contributed to the needs of seminary by donating books, food and construction material.
Maulana Abdullah's legacy was transferred to his sons, who also supported the cause of jihad and earned respect from such people as Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the chief of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yaldeshiv.
This correspondent has seen a letter of appreciation written by Yaldeshiv, shown by Rasheed, when the Lal Masjid issued a religious edict in 2004 that any Pakistani soldier killed in the South Waziristan tribal area did not deserve Muslim funeral prayers or burial in a Muslim graveyard. The letter was later endorsed by more than 500 scholars and became one of the main reasons for defiance in the Pakistan Army during military operations in South Waziristan.
Lal Masjid was also the main site for Pakistani militants to visit, which landed the brothers in serious trouble in 2004 when the government accused them of being partners in a conspiracy to carry out major terror operations in Islamabad. The connection was Rasheed's car, which was apparently used by one Usman, who had been arrested in connection with sabotage activities in the capital.
The government wanted the brothers arrested, but then-federal minister for religious affairs and son of former president Zia Ejaz ul-Haq, who was very close to the brothers, intervened. He became guarantor on behalf of the state that if Rasheed surrendered for interrogations to an intelligence agency of the armed forces and if no evidence came out, he would be cleared of all charges.
"Before going into custody I made it clear to Ejaz ul-Haq that I had met everybody, including Osama, [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar [and] Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and that many wanted figures did come to Lal Masjid because it is a mosque and anybody can come to this place. So any evidence of terror should be other than that. Ejaz ul-Haq agreed, and then I was handed over to intelligence," Rasheed told Asia Times Online in a recent interview.
Rasheed spent several weeks in custody before being released in the clear.
These developments convinced Musharraf that the two seminaries run by the brothers should be moved out of Islamabad. At the same time, Rasheed, who had previously been at loggerheads with the military establishment, established a rapport with it.
Leader of a khurooj?
The brothers are respected for their services for jihad in Afghanistan and their connection with the esteemed former justice of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, Taqi Usmani. Taqi Usmani is a big name in Islamic economics and helped establish and run a leading Islamic bank in Pakistan.
Taqi Usmani is Aziz's religious and spiritual guide, and after the latest campaign by students to enforce Islam in Islamabad, Taqi Usmani visited Aziz to hear his side of the argument. The two disagreed, and Taqi Usmani severed his relationship with Aziz. This could only have been a painful experience, for Aziz to be rejected by his mentor - as well as by the board, which canceled the mosque's registration.
Others, though, see an important role for the brothers in creating the right circumstances for an Islamic revolution.
"They are capable of swaying all Islamic elements under a single banner and they are qualified for leadership because they are pious and assertive," former ISI official and retired squadron leader Khalid Khawaja, who is now in jail, once told this correspondent.
However, it could be that the brothers will only be useful in the initial stages, as they are likely to be silenced one way or the other by the military or go underground in the Waziristan tribal areas.
To date, the only religious force that is publicly standing behind the brothers is the JI, the forerunner of the idea of khurooj in the last century. It was also the only political party that was hand-in-glove with the plan of the military elite in the 1990s to stage an Islamic coup in the country.
It is possible that retired officers from this era, the JI, headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, and the Lal Masjid are talking to a section of the establishment over the downfall of Musharraf.
Organizations such as al-Qaeda and militant groups, meanwhile, are waiting to exploit any chaos to declare a caliphate.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Printing...
KARACHI - Pakistan's military and political movers and shakers have traditionally frequented the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad's city center. Now, a standoff over the mosque, which has become a potent symbol of the power of Pakistan's radical Islamists, threatens the very core of the country's ruling establishment.
The mosque and its affiliated madrassa (seminary) Jamia Hafsa are pitted against the government. The crisis began when the mosque and the madrassa challenged the writ of the government by calling for the declaration of Islamic (sharia) law in the country, leading to the occupation of a nearby library and kidnappings.
Last Friday, the chief cleric of Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Aziz, announced the setting up of a Taliban-style vigilante Islamic court and vowed suicide-bomb attacks if the authorities tried to crack down on the mosque and its followers.
Also on Friday, Aziz's brother, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, gave the government a month either to follow sharia law or see it enforced through the mosque's parallel system.
Already, girls from the Jamia Hafsa, backed by their male counterparts from Jamia Fareedia, another religious institution administered by the Lal Masjid, have been roving through Islamabad, asking music- and video-shop owners to close down their businesses. "Vice and virtue" squads urge women to adopt the Islamic dress code.
The mosque compound has taken on the form of a rebel camp, with young men armed with sticks posted at the gates and at lookout points along banner-strewn walls. More than 10,000 students are affiliated with the mosque's two madrassas.
President General Pervez Musharraf has so far resisted the temptation to use force, and was due on Wednesday to receive advice from his cabinet on ways to defuse the situation. The only action taken so far is by the privately run Federal Madaris Board, which has canceled the registration of the seminaries.
Waiting and watching developments are remnants of the military elite of the 1990s who planned an Islamic coup before Musharraf seized power in 1999, the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan (JI) Islamist political party, underground militant organizations and a segment of the establishment - all of them dedicated to bringing Musharraf down.
They see the crisis as an opportunity to take khurooj (mass mobilization to change the regime) to the next level, and even to revive the idea of Pakistan becoming a caliphate.
The brothers of Lal Masjid
Maulana Abdullah was assassinated in the Lal Masjid in the late 1990s, and since then the complex has been run by his sons, Aziz and Ghazi, both in their 40s. The brothers were active in the mujahideen struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The brothers come from Balochistan province's Mari tribe, which is the most active component of the ongoing Baloch insurgency. Maulana Abdullah was known for his critical speeches in Friday prayers, even against the late president Zia ul-Haq, who provided Maulana Abdullah with the land in the most expensive sector of Islamabad to construct Jamia Fareedia. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was widely blamed for Maulana Abdullah's killing.
Maulana Abdullah was a highly respected figure, known for his piety, knowledge and struggle for an Islamic way of life. Many top generals and bureaucrats attended his Friday prayers. These included disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who frequently contributed to the needs of seminary by donating books, food and construction material.
Maulana Abdullah's legacy was transferred to his sons, who also supported the cause of jihad and earned respect from such people as Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the chief of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yaldeshiv.
This correspondent has seen a letter of appreciation written by Yaldeshiv, shown by Rasheed, when the Lal Masjid issued a religious edict in 2004 that any Pakistani soldier killed in the South Waziristan tribal area did not deserve Muslim funeral prayers or burial in a Muslim graveyard. The letter was later endorsed by more than 500 scholars and became one of the main reasons for defiance in the Pakistan Army during military operations in South Waziristan.
Lal Masjid was also the main site for Pakistani militants to visit, which landed the brothers in serious trouble in 2004 when the government accused them of being partners in a conspiracy to carry out major terror operations in Islamabad. The connection was Rasheed's car, which was apparently used by one Usman, who had been arrested in connection with sabotage activities in the capital.
The government wanted the brothers arrested, but then-federal minister for religious affairs and son of former president Zia Ejaz ul-Haq, who was very close to the brothers, intervened. He became guarantor on behalf of the state that if Rasheed surrendered for interrogations to an intelligence agency of the armed forces and if no evidence came out, he would be cleared of all charges.
"Before going into custody I made it clear to Ejaz ul-Haq that I had met everybody, including Osama, [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar [and] Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and that many wanted figures did come to Lal Masjid because it is a mosque and anybody can come to this place. So any evidence of terror should be other than that. Ejaz ul-Haq agreed, and then I was handed over to intelligence," Rasheed told Asia Times Online in a recent interview.
Rasheed spent several weeks in custody before being released in the clear.
These developments convinced Musharraf that the two seminaries run by the brothers should be moved out of Islamabad. At the same time, Rasheed, who had previously been at loggerheads with the military establishment, established a rapport with it.
Leader of a khurooj?
The brothers are respected for their services for jihad in Afghanistan and their connection with the esteemed former justice of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, Taqi Usmani. Taqi Usmani is a big name in Islamic economics and helped establish and run a leading Islamic bank in Pakistan.
Taqi Usmani is Aziz's religious and spiritual guide, and after the latest campaign by students to enforce Islam in Islamabad, Taqi Usmani visited Aziz to hear his side of the argument. The two disagreed, and Taqi Usmani severed his relationship with Aziz. This could only have been a painful experience, for Aziz to be rejected by his mentor - as well as by the board, which canceled the mosque's registration.
Others, though, see an important role for the brothers in creating the right circumstances for an Islamic revolution.
"They are capable of swaying all Islamic elements under a single banner and they are qualified for leadership because they are pious and assertive," former ISI official and retired squadron leader Khalid Khawaja, who is now in jail, once told this correspondent.
However, it could be that the brothers will only be useful in the initial stages, as they are likely to be silenced one way or the other by the military or go underground in the Waziristan tribal areas.
To date, the only religious force that is publicly standing behind the brothers is the JI, the forerunner of the idea of khurooj in the last century. It was also the only political party that was hand-in-glove with the plan of the military elite in the 1990s to stage an Islamic coup in the country.
It is possible that retired officers from this era, the JI, headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, and the Lal Masjid are talking to a section of the establishment over the downfall of Musharraf.
Organizations such as al-Qaeda and militant groups, meanwhile, are waiting to exploit any chaos to declare a caliphate.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Printing...
Indian discussing with Areva for 10,000 MWe nuclear plant
Indian generators think ahead
11 April 2007
Indian power companies are drawing provisional plans for a huge expansion in nuclear capacity after the expected lifting of trade restrictions.
Reports in the Indian newspaper Financial Express indicate that Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) is discussing the construction of a 10,000 MWe nuclear plant composed of six of Areva's EPR pressurized water reactor units in the state of Maharashtra. Most other NPCIL units are indigenously developed pressurised heavy water reactors.
Officials would hope to begin work on the first of the EPRs as early as 2008. Chairman of the company, S K Jain said such a project would cost just $11.4 billion in India.
Separately, India's largest electric utility, NTPC, has made moves towards exploiting nuclear power for the first time. On 5 March the company's board of directors approved a proposal to amend its association documents to allow the use of nuclear power. NTPC decribed this as a strategic initiative.
Consultants including former staff of NPCIL and the Atomic Energy Commission were hired to define a roadmap for NTPC, resulting in the goal of 6000 MWe of nuclear capacity. According to NTPC chair and managing director, T Sankaralingam: "We will have 2000 MWe of nuclear power generation by the middle of the 12th plan (2012-2017). Simultaneously, we will work on two power plants of 2000 MWe each."
NTPC are reportedly in discussion with General Electric and Thorium Power. The company is considering sites in Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra.
Officials from both companies recognise that trade restrictions must be lifted before Western hardware can be employed. Negotiations are currently underway between India and the USA toward a '123' Agreement necessary for US-India trade, already sanctioned by President George Bush. Following agreement, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group will likely draft new guidelines for its members, allowing widespread nuclear trade with India.
11 April 2007
Indian power companies are drawing provisional plans for a huge expansion in nuclear capacity after the expected lifting of trade restrictions.
Reports in the Indian newspaper Financial Express indicate that Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) is discussing the construction of a 10,000 MWe nuclear plant composed of six of Areva's EPR pressurized water reactor units in the state of Maharashtra. Most other NPCIL units are indigenously developed pressurised heavy water reactors.
Officials would hope to begin work on the first of the EPRs as early as 2008. Chairman of the company, S K Jain said such a project would cost just $11.4 billion in India.
Separately, India's largest electric utility, NTPC, has made moves towards exploiting nuclear power for the first time. On 5 March the company's board of directors approved a proposal to amend its association documents to allow the use of nuclear power. NTPC decribed this as a strategic initiative.
Consultants including former staff of NPCIL and the Atomic Energy Commission were hired to define a roadmap for NTPC, resulting in the goal of 6000 MWe of nuclear capacity. According to NTPC chair and managing director, T Sankaralingam: "We will have 2000 MWe of nuclear power generation by the middle of the 12th plan (2012-2017). Simultaneously, we will work on two power plants of 2000 MWe each."
NTPC are reportedly in discussion with General Electric and Thorium Power. The company is considering sites in Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra.
Officials from both companies recognise that trade restrictions must be lifted before Western hardware can be employed. Negotiations are currently underway between India and the USA toward a '123' Agreement necessary for US-India trade, already sanctioned by President George Bush. Following agreement, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group will likely draft new guidelines for its members, allowing widespread nuclear trade with India.
India, Pakistan: Quest to control the skies
India, Pakistan: Quest to control the skies
As India and Pakistan continue with their quests to become the regional air power, some say an arms race has begun in earnest, and others say there is no cause for alarm, just yet.
By Animesh Roul in New Delhi for ISN Security Watch (12/04/07)
India's quest to become a regional air power by acquiring over 100 new age fighter planes has annoyed authorities across the border in Pakistan, though similar efforts are underway there to dominate the subcontinent's skyline.
The aggressive acquisition plans for arming Indian and Pakistani arsenals under the pretext of force modernization have triggered a dangerous arms race trend in the subcontinent, with major defense contractors hustling to further the already volatile situation.
Presently, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin's F-16 (both from the US) are among the top contenders for the future Indian Air Force's (IAF) order for 127 medium-range multi-role combat aircrafts (MRCA). The other players in the fray are the Russian MiG-35, the Swedish JAS-39 Grippen, the French Mirage and Rafale and the four-nation Eurofighter Typhoon.
While the US administration is pressing for the IAF tender, Russia made it clear in January that it also would compete for the tender by offering next-generation MiG-35 jets.
On the other side of the Radcliff Line, Pakistan is involved in similar efforts to build up its arsenal with 36 brand new F-16 jets and 60 F-16 A/B mid-life update modification kits from the US, as well as Chinese collaborated JF-17 Thunder jet fighters.
Military (im)balance
The apparent rush for air superiority began after the US closed a multi-billion dollar arms package with Pakistan last year, agreeing to provide Islamabad with 36 new F-16 jets and 60 F-16 A/B mid-life update modification kits for the Pakistani Air Force's (PAF) existing falcons.
Also causing much apprehension in New Delhi was Pakistan's plans to begin the serial production of JF-17 Thunder jet fighters with China's active collaboration to raise 10-12 squadrons by 2015.
The two developments caused India to express fears that it could lose its conventional air superiority to its main nuclear rival, Pakistan.
India's air force boast a 3:1 numerical superiority over its Pakistan counterpart, with nearly 7:1 superiority in terms of modern hi-tech weapons. But with the recent phasing out of its older MiG jets and with Pakistani's addition of new F-16s and other refurbishments and munitions, the IAF is apprehensive about its combat strength, which is already down to 28 fighter squadrons.
According to Nathan Hughes, a military analyst for Austin (USA) based Stratfor, "Pakistan will remain at a disadvantage position to India as far as military strength is concern."
"Lots of countries may find it in their interest to keep Pakistan powerful enough to keep India looking over its shoulder," he told ISN Security Watch.
"I do not think that numerical or otherwise dimensions of comparative power will affect military balance or imbalance in the region," argues Deba R Mohanty, senior fellow in security studies at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation. In an interview with ISN Security Watch, Mohanty said that "India's power projection transcends beyond the immediate region, while Pakistan's ambitions have been considered limited in comparison to that of India."
However, the Indian Defense Ministry's long standing request for proposal (RPF) - the initiating document for procurement - for the IAF's 126 MRCA was expected to be released by 31 March but was delayed. Observers speculate that further delay will spur powerful lobbying by major arms contractors with their national governments taking sides with certain players.
Lobbying, US style
So far, only the US has begun lobbying for these lucrative Indian tenders. The US deputy under-secretary of the Air Force, Bruce Lemkin, made a strong recommendation in mid-February on behalf of Lockheed Martin's F-16 fighter for the IAF, arguing that they were best suited for inter-operability between Indo-US air forces in the ongoing global war on terror. One of Lemkin's colleagues also cautioned New Delhi not to mix its MRCA requirements like Malaysia, which opted for a mix of F-16s and MiG-29s with a "disastrous" effect.
Reacting guardedly to Lemkin's proposition, Anil Shrikhande, Boeing India vice president and country leader of its Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), said "his [Lemkin's] advocacy reflected the view of the US Air Force, which vouched for the Lockheed Martin's aging combat fighter, scheduled to cease production in next two years."
Speaking to ISN Security Watch, Shrikhande argued for Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet (US Navy), pushing forward the fact that India is a "priority market" for his company and "Boeing IDS has a large portfolio of defense products that match up very well to India's defense modernization needs."
"The US Navy has plans to continue funding upgrades and new technology insertions into the F/A-18, which is an advanced combat-ready fighter aircraft to 2030 and beyond, whereas the F-16 will not enjoy the US Air Force's funded technology upgrades after 2009," he added.
Real toys, unreal ground
This lobbying notwithstanding, ironically enough, the war on terror argument for having multi-role fighter jets was given by the Washington administration when it inked an arms package contract worth billions with Pakistan in late September 2006.
Experts aired reservations then, saying F-16s were better suited to fighting neighboring India than to combat terrorists in the region.
"You do not need F-16 Falcons for fighting low-intensity conflicts between state and non-state actors," Mohanty opined.
"Falcons are certainly bigger toys for the said purpose and Pakistan's acquisition and build-up is India centric."
"These MRCAs [Falcons, Super Hornets or Mig-35s] are fourth generation medium-range fighter aircraft, which can be nuke-capable and meant for regular conventional warfare," he added.
Straftor's Nathan Hughes for the most part agreed. "Pakistan may use those [F-16s] against domestic/terrorist targets, but they're certainly thinking of them in terms of India's air force."
Race or rush?
Shahid Malik, Pakistan's high commissioner to India, expressed concern in early February over India's plan to purchase new fighter jets. Talking to media in New Delhi, Malik said: "[We] only hope that this would not lead to any such massive scale of armaments buying that would lead to an arms race in the region." However, Malik overlooked Pakistan's similar effort.
The vital question now is whether the MRCA rush will indeed lead to an arms race in the region involving China. Undoubtedly, Beijing's support to Pakistan in building JF-17 Thunders is a major concern for India, as China is certainly a key aerospace player in the region.
Ajey Lele, a defense analyst presently with the government-funded Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, downplayed such fears. "One can term this as great rush but certainly not the race, as India is getting ready for its own security concerns and not engaging in any arms race with Pakistan or China in the region."
"New Delhi's MRCA projections are long term and it is not asking all 126 aircrafts in one go" Lele added.
Mohanty too rejected the idea of an all-out arms race between India and Pakistan. "China is already there as a global power, India aspires to become one and Pakistan is nowhere in the picture."
"One may argue that an arms race may still exist in some form or the other between India and China, but the same in the case of India and Pakistan makes no sense at all."
However, Mohanty acknowledged that "some elements of action-reaction as part of a greater arms race were evident between India and Pakistan and India and China during the heights of the Cold War" but has lost its relevance "when comprehensive military modernization programs were initiated by countries in this part of the world."
Arms race or rush, India and Pakistan look set to continue engaging in plans to upgrade their respective air power inventory with large scale MRCA acquisitions, regardless of the future implications and resultant regional anxiety.
Animesh Roul is a New Delhi-based correspondent and analyst for ISN Security Watch.
ISN Security Watch - India, Pakistan: Quest to control the skies
As India and Pakistan continue with their quests to become the regional air power, some say an arms race has begun in earnest, and others say there is no cause for alarm, just yet.
By Animesh Roul in New Delhi for ISN Security Watch (12/04/07)
India's quest to become a regional air power by acquiring over 100 new age fighter planes has annoyed authorities across the border in Pakistan, though similar efforts are underway there to dominate the subcontinent's skyline.
The aggressive acquisition plans for arming Indian and Pakistani arsenals under the pretext of force modernization have triggered a dangerous arms race trend in the subcontinent, with major defense contractors hustling to further the already volatile situation.
Presently, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin's F-16 (both from the US) are among the top contenders for the future Indian Air Force's (IAF) order for 127 medium-range multi-role combat aircrafts (MRCA). The other players in the fray are the Russian MiG-35, the Swedish JAS-39 Grippen, the French Mirage and Rafale and the four-nation Eurofighter Typhoon.
While the US administration is pressing for the IAF tender, Russia made it clear in January that it also would compete for the tender by offering next-generation MiG-35 jets.
On the other side of the Radcliff Line, Pakistan is involved in similar efforts to build up its arsenal with 36 brand new F-16 jets and 60 F-16 A/B mid-life update modification kits from the US, as well as Chinese collaborated JF-17 Thunder jet fighters.
Military (im)balance
The apparent rush for air superiority began after the US closed a multi-billion dollar arms package with Pakistan last year, agreeing to provide Islamabad with 36 new F-16 jets and 60 F-16 A/B mid-life update modification kits for the Pakistani Air Force's (PAF) existing falcons.
Also causing much apprehension in New Delhi was Pakistan's plans to begin the serial production of JF-17 Thunder jet fighters with China's active collaboration to raise 10-12 squadrons by 2015.
The two developments caused India to express fears that it could lose its conventional air superiority to its main nuclear rival, Pakistan.
India's air force boast a 3:1 numerical superiority over its Pakistan counterpart, with nearly 7:1 superiority in terms of modern hi-tech weapons. But with the recent phasing out of its older MiG jets and with Pakistani's addition of new F-16s and other refurbishments and munitions, the IAF is apprehensive about its combat strength, which is already down to 28 fighter squadrons.
According to Nathan Hughes, a military analyst for Austin (USA) based Stratfor, "Pakistan will remain at a disadvantage position to India as far as military strength is concern."
"Lots of countries may find it in their interest to keep Pakistan powerful enough to keep India looking over its shoulder," he told ISN Security Watch.
"I do not think that numerical or otherwise dimensions of comparative power will affect military balance or imbalance in the region," argues Deba R Mohanty, senior fellow in security studies at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation. In an interview with ISN Security Watch, Mohanty said that "India's power projection transcends beyond the immediate region, while Pakistan's ambitions have been considered limited in comparison to that of India."
However, the Indian Defense Ministry's long standing request for proposal (RPF) - the initiating document for procurement - for the IAF's 126 MRCA was expected to be released by 31 March but was delayed. Observers speculate that further delay will spur powerful lobbying by major arms contractors with their national governments taking sides with certain players.
Lobbying, US style
So far, only the US has begun lobbying for these lucrative Indian tenders. The US deputy under-secretary of the Air Force, Bruce Lemkin, made a strong recommendation in mid-February on behalf of Lockheed Martin's F-16 fighter for the IAF, arguing that they were best suited for inter-operability between Indo-US air forces in the ongoing global war on terror. One of Lemkin's colleagues also cautioned New Delhi not to mix its MRCA requirements like Malaysia, which opted for a mix of F-16s and MiG-29s with a "disastrous" effect.
Reacting guardedly to Lemkin's proposition, Anil Shrikhande, Boeing India vice president and country leader of its Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), said "his [Lemkin's] advocacy reflected the view of the US Air Force, which vouched for the Lockheed Martin's aging combat fighter, scheduled to cease production in next two years."
Speaking to ISN Security Watch, Shrikhande argued for Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet (US Navy), pushing forward the fact that India is a "priority market" for his company and "Boeing IDS has a large portfolio of defense products that match up very well to India's defense modernization needs."
"The US Navy has plans to continue funding upgrades and new technology insertions into the F/A-18, which is an advanced combat-ready fighter aircraft to 2030 and beyond, whereas the F-16 will not enjoy the US Air Force's funded technology upgrades after 2009," he added.
Real toys, unreal ground
This lobbying notwithstanding, ironically enough, the war on terror argument for having multi-role fighter jets was given by the Washington administration when it inked an arms package contract worth billions with Pakistan in late September 2006.
Experts aired reservations then, saying F-16s were better suited to fighting neighboring India than to combat terrorists in the region.
"You do not need F-16 Falcons for fighting low-intensity conflicts between state and non-state actors," Mohanty opined.
"Falcons are certainly bigger toys for the said purpose and Pakistan's acquisition and build-up is India centric."
"These MRCAs [Falcons, Super Hornets or Mig-35s] are fourth generation medium-range fighter aircraft, which can be nuke-capable and meant for regular conventional warfare," he added.
Straftor's Nathan Hughes for the most part agreed. "Pakistan may use those [F-16s] against domestic/terrorist targets, but they're certainly thinking of them in terms of India's air force."
Race or rush?
Shahid Malik, Pakistan's high commissioner to India, expressed concern in early February over India's plan to purchase new fighter jets. Talking to media in New Delhi, Malik said: "[We] only hope that this would not lead to any such massive scale of armaments buying that would lead to an arms race in the region." However, Malik overlooked Pakistan's similar effort.
The vital question now is whether the MRCA rush will indeed lead to an arms race in the region involving China. Undoubtedly, Beijing's support to Pakistan in building JF-17 Thunders is a major concern for India, as China is certainly a key aerospace player in the region.
Ajey Lele, a defense analyst presently with the government-funded Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, downplayed such fears. "One can term this as great rush but certainly not the race, as India is getting ready for its own security concerns and not engaging in any arms race with Pakistan or China in the region."
"New Delhi's MRCA projections are long term and it is not asking all 126 aircrafts in one go" Lele added.
Mohanty too rejected the idea of an all-out arms race between India and Pakistan. "China is already there as a global power, India aspires to become one and Pakistan is nowhere in the picture."
"One may argue that an arms race may still exist in some form or the other between India and China, but the same in the case of India and Pakistan makes no sense at all."
However, Mohanty acknowledged that "some elements of action-reaction as part of a greater arms race were evident between India and Pakistan and India and China during the heights of the Cold War" but has lost its relevance "when comprehensive military modernization programs were initiated by countries in this part of the world."
Arms race or rush, India and Pakistan look set to continue engaging in plans to upgrade their respective air power inventory with large scale MRCA acquisitions, regardless of the future implications and resultant regional anxiety.
Animesh Roul is a New Delhi-based correspondent and analyst for ISN Security Watch.
ISN Security Watch - India, Pakistan: Quest to control the skies
April 11, 2007
The Imminent Spread of EFPs
April 11, 2007 19 00 GMT
Source: Stratfor
By Fred Burton
Iraqi and coalition troops involved in Operation Black Eagle, the ongoing effort to secure the city of Ad Diwaniyah, discovered several factories producing explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), U.S. Central Command said April 8. The troops also reported having uncovered caches of completed EFPs and IEDs along with explosives and other bombmaking material at various other locations across the city.
Since the invasion of Iraq, IEDs have taken a tremendous toll on coalition and Iraqi forces. The insurgents have used a number of different IED designs, including suicide vests, vehicle-borne bombs -- some of them large truck bombs packed with chlorine -- and roadside bombs. Of the roadside IEDs, perhaps the most effective are those that incorporate EFPs.
EFPs have been part of the military inventory of many countries for years. The U.S. Army, for example, added the M-2 Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition (aptly named the SLAM) to its inventory in 1990. EFP technology also is used in anti-tank guided missiles such as the TOW 2B. The EFP concept is not new on the militant front either. In 1989, the Red Army Faction used a "platter charge" (similar to an EFP) to penetrate the armored Mercedes carrying German banker Alfred Herrhausen, killing him. Militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas also have used EFP devices (like the Hamas Shawaz) against Israeli armored vehicles for several years now. In fact, the heavy use of such devices by Hezbollah in Lebanon is one of the reasons why Iran is being blamed for the appearance of EFP devices in Iraq.
EFPs, however, have never before been deployed on the scale seen in Iraq. Clearly, they are being heavily deployed now because they are effective, economical and easy to make (many are of an improvised nature and fabricated in makeshift factories such as those discovered in Ad Diwaniyah). These three factors, along with the international aspect of the insurgency in Iraq, ensure that militants elsewhere will adopt the improvised EFP technology. In fact, considering the ease with which EFPs are constructed, Iranian involvement in regards to the Iraqi EFPs would not be required. The proliferation of this technology, though, has some serious security implications. Though this certainly will affect military forces, the most significant implications could be in the civilian security realm.
What is an EFP?
An explosively formed projectile, sometimes referred to as an explosively formed penetrator, is a simple device composed of a case, a liner and an explosive filler -- though employing such a device in the field also requires a detonator and a firing chain to initiate that detonator. The firing chain can vary widely, from a hardwired command-detonated system to a system that involves modifying the infrared safety beam from a garage door opener.
The case of an improvised EFP is often constructed from a short section of well-casing pipe with a plate welded to one end. A small hole is drilled in the pipe to allow a blasting cap to be inserted. The pipe is then filled with high explosive and a metal liner, most often made of copper, is affixed over the open end of the pipe.
EFPs utilize the same general principle as a shaped charge that focuses the power of an explosive device. In a traditional shaped-charge munition, like the warhead on an anti-tank rocket, a thin metal cone is used to achieve this focusing effect. When crushed, the convex metal cone in the warhead becomes a high-velocity projectile that, with a jet of super-heated gas from the explosive, penetrates the armor. In order for a shaped charge to work most effectively, however, it must have a relatively short standoff distance.
The EFP munition is somewhat like a traditional shaped charge, but it incorporates a metal liner with less of an angle. So, instead of a cone, the liner is more of a concave lens or dish shape. The EFP also uses a heavier liner, which, when the device is detonated, is formed into a slug or "penetrator." The penetrator, then, is propelled at the target at an extremely high velocity. This difference in the shape and weight of the liner allows the EFP to be deployed from a greater distance than a traditional shaped charge.
Because of its ability to focus the force of an explosive charge, a small EFP containing just a few pounds of high explosive can cause far more damage to an armored vehicle than can a traditional IED -- even a large vehicle-borne one -- made with far more high-explosive material.
Cheap, Easy and Effective
Because the components required to construct EFPs are simple, such devices can be fabricated inexpensively and out of readily available materials. The well-casing pipe and steel plate, for example, are widely available in almost any region of the world. Moreover, making the EFP casing from these elements requires little skill and only simple machinery, such as a welder, a grinder and a drill.
The copper liner is the sophisticated part of the device, requiring a bit more precision in its fabrication. However, once the proper shape for the liner is determined, either by copying the shape of the liner in a professionally fabricated EFP device or by plain old guesswork, the discs can be fabricated in much the same way that artisans have been making copper bowls for centuries -- by hammering them into shape. They also can be made using more modern methods, such as spinning them into a form on a lathe or stamping them with a metal press.
In Iraq, blasting caps and the high-explosive filler required to make such devices are readily available. The Iraqi military cached tons of plastic explosives -- the preferred filler -- for use in the resistance. In a pinch, however, filler material can be obtained by melting the high explosives out of Iraq's ubiquitous artillery and mortar rounds. Because of the efficiency of EFPs, they only require a few pounds of high-explosive filler to do their deadly work. That means an insurgent bombmaker can make hundreds of EFP devices from the explosive filler required to make one large truck bomb. Being small, EFPs also are easily concealed and harder to detect than larger devices.
The effectiveness and standoff range of an improvised EFP can vary widely, depending on the precision and specifications of the liner and the explosive filler used. Some of the improvised devices clearly are better fabricated than others. Of course, the skill of the operative planting the device also can have a large impact on its effectiveness.
Despite the differences in quality between the various bombmakers producing improvised EFPs, such devices used in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have proven to be highly effective against armored vehicles -- even main battle tanks -- and they are downright deadly against lighter vehicles such as armored personnel carriers, transport trucks, jeeps and Humvees -- even up-armored Humvees.
Implications
Given that EFPs are effective, inexpensive and easy to make, it is clearly only a matter of time before they are deployed in other places. This is especially true considering the international nature of the insurgency in Iraq, which Stratfor has long held to be a militant training ground and laboratory for developing new IED technologies and the tactics to employ them. Afghanistan likely will be one of the first places the EFPs will appear, followed closely by Algeria -- though eventually we will see them widely used by jihadists and other militants in many different parts of the world.
There are, of course, military implications to this spread of EFP weapons. They provide lightly armed insurgents the ability to engage armored vehicles from a distance -- and thus to avoid exposing themselves to the counterfire that often follows the use of rocket-propelled grenades or anti-tank guided missiles. Furthermore, these devices can be daisy-chained for use in a potent ambush against an entire convoy of vehicles.
The use of roadside IEDs already has caused the U.S. military to engage in an IED/counter-IED arms race with the insurgents in Iraq since shortly after the U.S. invasion -- and the coming use of EFPs in other regions and conflicts will help further spread this IED arms race to those areas.
Perhaps the most ominous implications of the spread of EFP technology will be in the nonmilitary realm. As demonstrated in the attack against Herrhausen, such devices can easily defeat the armored vehicles used to protect government officials and corporate executives. This will force the protection teams assigned to such potential targets to rely even more heavily on protective intelligence, route analysis, countersurveillance and deception.
It should also be remembered that EFPs have many uses beyond the destruction of vehicles. EFPs fielded by the U.S. military, like those included in the M303 Special Operation Forces Demolition Kit, also can be used in a variety of sabotage applications, such as punching holes in fuel and chemical storage tanks, puncturing pipelines, breaching reinforced concrete walls and destroying other strategic material. Like in the anti-vehicular role, EFPs used for sabotage also can be fired from a standoff distance. The penetrating power and standoff ability of such devices will pose a tremendous challenge for those charged with protecting sensitive civilian infrastructure targets.
The EFP genie is out of the bottle. These devices not only are widely known in the military and militant realms, they even are showing up on television, in shows such as the Discovery Channel's "Future Weapons" program. Those responsible for protecting potential targets -- not only in conflict zones -- had best take notice because EFPs are coming soon and will be around for a long time to come.
Stratfor
Source: Stratfor
By Fred Burton
Iraqi and coalition troops involved in Operation Black Eagle, the ongoing effort to secure the city of Ad Diwaniyah, discovered several factories producing explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), U.S. Central Command said April 8. The troops also reported having uncovered caches of completed EFPs and IEDs along with explosives and other bombmaking material at various other locations across the city.
Since the invasion of Iraq, IEDs have taken a tremendous toll on coalition and Iraqi forces. The insurgents have used a number of different IED designs, including suicide vests, vehicle-borne bombs -- some of them large truck bombs packed with chlorine -- and roadside bombs. Of the roadside IEDs, perhaps the most effective are those that incorporate EFPs.
EFPs have been part of the military inventory of many countries for years. The U.S. Army, for example, added the M-2 Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition (aptly named the SLAM) to its inventory in 1990. EFP technology also is used in anti-tank guided missiles such as the TOW 2B. The EFP concept is not new on the militant front either. In 1989, the Red Army Faction used a "platter charge" (similar to an EFP) to penetrate the armored Mercedes carrying German banker Alfred Herrhausen, killing him. Militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas also have used EFP devices (like the Hamas Shawaz) against Israeli armored vehicles for several years now. In fact, the heavy use of such devices by Hezbollah in Lebanon is one of the reasons why Iran is being blamed for the appearance of EFP devices in Iraq.
EFPs, however, have never before been deployed on the scale seen in Iraq. Clearly, they are being heavily deployed now because they are effective, economical and easy to make (many are of an improvised nature and fabricated in makeshift factories such as those discovered in Ad Diwaniyah). These three factors, along with the international aspect of the insurgency in Iraq, ensure that militants elsewhere will adopt the improvised EFP technology. In fact, considering the ease with which EFPs are constructed, Iranian involvement in regards to the Iraqi EFPs would not be required. The proliferation of this technology, though, has some serious security implications. Though this certainly will affect military forces, the most significant implications could be in the civilian security realm.
What is an EFP?
An explosively formed projectile, sometimes referred to as an explosively formed penetrator, is a simple device composed of a case, a liner and an explosive filler -- though employing such a device in the field also requires a detonator and a firing chain to initiate that detonator. The firing chain can vary widely, from a hardwired command-detonated system to a system that involves modifying the infrared safety beam from a garage door opener.
The case of an improvised EFP is often constructed from a short section of well-casing pipe with a plate welded to one end. A small hole is drilled in the pipe to allow a blasting cap to be inserted. The pipe is then filled with high explosive and a metal liner, most often made of copper, is affixed over the open end of the pipe.
EFPs utilize the same general principle as a shaped charge that focuses the power of an explosive device. In a traditional shaped-charge munition, like the warhead on an anti-tank rocket, a thin metal cone is used to achieve this focusing effect. When crushed, the convex metal cone in the warhead becomes a high-velocity projectile that, with a jet of super-heated gas from the explosive, penetrates the armor. In order for a shaped charge to work most effectively, however, it must have a relatively short standoff distance.
The EFP munition is somewhat like a traditional shaped charge, but it incorporates a metal liner with less of an angle. So, instead of a cone, the liner is more of a concave lens or dish shape. The EFP also uses a heavier liner, which, when the device is detonated, is formed into a slug or "penetrator." The penetrator, then, is propelled at the target at an extremely high velocity. This difference in the shape and weight of the liner allows the EFP to be deployed from a greater distance than a traditional shaped charge.
Because of its ability to focus the force of an explosive charge, a small EFP containing just a few pounds of high explosive can cause far more damage to an armored vehicle than can a traditional IED -- even a large vehicle-borne one -- made with far more high-explosive material.
Cheap, Easy and Effective
Because the components required to construct EFPs are simple, such devices can be fabricated inexpensively and out of readily available materials. The well-casing pipe and steel plate, for example, are widely available in almost any region of the world. Moreover, making the EFP casing from these elements requires little skill and only simple machinery, such as a welder, a grinder and a drill.
The copper liner is the sophisticated part of the device, requiring a bit more precision in its fabrication. However, once the proper shape for the liner is determined, either by copying the shape of the liner in a professionally fabricated EFP device or by plain old guesswork, the discs can be fabricated in much the same way that artisans have been making copper bowls for centuries -- by hammering them into shape. They also can be made using more modern methods, such as spinning them into a form on a lathe or stamping them with a metal press.
In Iraq, blasting caps and the high-explosive filler required to make such devices are readily available. The Iraqi military cached tons of plastic explosives -- the preferred filler -- for use in the resistance. In a pinch, however, filler material can be obtained by melting the high explosives out of Iraq's ubiquitous artillery and mortar rounds. Because of the efficiency of EFPs, they only require a few pounds of high-explosive filler to do their deadly work. That means an insurgent bombmaker can make hundreds of EFP devices from the explosive filler required to make one large truck bomb. Being small, EFPs also are easily concealed and harder to detect than larger devices.
The effectiveness and standoff range of an improvised EFP can vary widely, depending on the precision and specifications of the liner and the explosive filler used. Some of the improvised devices clearly are better fabricated than others. Of course, the skill of the operative planting the device also can have a large impact on its effectiveness.
Despite the differences in quality between the various bombmakers producing improvised EFPs, such devices used in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have proven to be highly effective against armored vehicles -- even main battle tanks -- and they are downright deadly against lighter vehicles such as armored personnel carriers, transport trucks, jeeps and Humvees -- even up-armored Humvees.
Implications
Given that EFPs are effective, inexpensive and easy to make, it is clearly only a matter of time before they are deployed in other places. This is especially true considering the international nature of the insurgency in Iraq, which Stratfor has long held to be a militant training ground and laboratory for developing new IED technologies and the tactics to employ them. Afghanistan likely will be one of the first places the EFPs will appear, followed closely by Algeria -- though eventually we will see them widely used by jihadists and other militants in many different parts of the world.
There are, of course, military implications to this spread of EFP weapons. They provide lightly armed insurgents the ability to engage armored vehicles from a distance -- and thus to avoid exposing themselves to the counterfire that often follows the use of rocket-propelled grenades or anti-tank guided missiles. Furthermore, these devices can be daisy-chained for use in a potent ambush against an entire convoy of vehicles.
The use of roadside IEDs already has caused the U.S. military to engage in an IED/counter-IED arms race with the insurgents in Iraq since shortly after the U.S. invasion -- and the coming use of EFPs in other regions and conflicts will help further spread this IED arms race to those areas.
Perhaps the most ominous implications of the spread of EFP technology will be in the nonmilitary realm. As demonstrated in the attack against Herrhausen, such devices can easily defeat the armored vehicles used to protect government officials and corporate executives. This will force the protection teams assigned to such potential targets to rely even more heavily on protective intelligence, route analysis, countersurveillance and deception.
It should also be remembered that EFPs have many uses beyond the destruction of vehicles. EFPs fielded by the U.S. military, like those included in the M303 Special Operation Forces Demolition Kit, also can be used in a variety of sabotage applications, such as punching holes in fuel and chemical storage tanks, puncturing pipelines, breaching reinforced concrete walls and destroying other strategic material. Like in the anti-vehicular role, EFPs used for sabotage also can be fired from a standoff distance. The penetrating power and standoff ability of such devices will pose a tremendous challenge for those charged with protecting sensitive civilian infrastructure targets.
The EFP genie is out of the bottle. These devices not only are widely known in the military and militant realms, they even are showing up on television, in shows such as the Discovery Channel's "Future Weapons" program. Those responsible for protecting potential targets -- not only in conflict zones -- had best take notice because EFPs are coming soon and will be around for a long time to come.
Stratfor
Pakistan :Some unanswered questions about the judicial crisis
Some unanswered questions about the judicial crisis — Ijaz Hussain
We may not have an answer to the genesis of the judicial crisis but we certainly have an answer to its impact. It is true that the crisis did not unleash a people’s movement against the regime, but it certainly showed that Musharraf had lost the moral claim to power
The Musharraf regime is in a real soup as a result of the judicial crisis. For the first time in seven years it is engaged in an existential struggle. When Musharraf, the commando, reportedly met Kamran Khan for the Geo interview following the manhandling of the chief justice (CJ) and the attack on the Geo office in Islamabad, he for once really looked worried and defensive. He kept pleading his innocence by completely disassociating himself from these reprehensible acts.
The present crisis, which apparently started out of the blue on 9th March, remains a mystery till today. It raises a number of questions that need to be addressed if we want to fully comprehend its genesis and dynamics.
To begin with, who was at the origin of the reference? We know that Punjab’s Chief Minister did not like the CJ because he killed his New Murree project in which he had big financial stakes. Similarly, the prime minister was miffed at the way he was treated in the Pakistan Steel Mills case, if we disregard the rumour that he would have been one of the beneficiaries of the failed deal. Again, the ISI got offended by the way the CJ handled the missing persons case. The fact that Nawab Akbar Bugti at one time appointed him as advocate general must have made him look more villainous. Finally, his ambiguous stand on Musharraf’s re-election as President-in-uniform by the existing assemblies must have been the last straw on the camel’s back. It would be interesting to know who played what role in egging the president to take on the CJ.
It appears as if the whole issue was not properly analysed before moving the reference. The Musharraf regime’s hands are not clean, as it finds itself in the company of some of the most corrupt politicians in the country, not to speak of its promoting lotas. According to Transparency International Pakistan was never as corrupt as it is today. Notwithstanding this damning verdict, Musharraf moved the reference in which he charged the CJ, among others, with using his clout to further the career of his son and seeking a protocol to which he was not entitled, while at the same time tolerating the presence of corrupt politicians in his own government.
Musharraf’s advisers evidently are not very clever. They apparently never thought that the CJ could have been handled in a more subtle way to make him do the needful regarding the re-election of the president. For example, the government could have let the Damocles’ sword of charges listed in the reference hang over his head without making them public to make him bend to its will.
If he has been catapulted into the present dizzying heights of popularity it is in large measure due to the bunglings of the government. And if he had defied the government he could have been neutralised by winning over other members of the bench who, Musharraf knows from experience, would have been highly amenable to manipulation. After all, the CJ does not have more than one vote in a case.
Secondly, who advised the government to make the CJ “non-functional”, get Justice Javed Iqbal to hurriedly take oath as acting CJ while Musharraf kept the CJ engaged, and subsequently send the latter on “forced leave”? Again who advised him to do all this when Justice Baghwandas, who was next in line but whose loyalties were suspect, was on leave in India?
It is obvious that whosoever advised the government was either incompetent or not a friend of the government. It would have been much more appropriate to send the reference to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) headed by the CJ as he could not have presided in his own case and the next senior-most judge would have taken his place. Had he done otherwise, hell would have broken loose against the CJ.
Thirdly, why was no frontline lawyer prepared to defend the government before the SJC? Justice (r) Fakhruddin G Ibrahim refused to take up the government’s brief in the early days of the crisis. The other legal stalwarts like S M Zafar, Sharifuddin Pirzada and Wasim Sajjad also did not come forward to defend the government. Is the explanation for the reluctance of the legal luminaries to defend the government to be found in their realisation that it would be morally reprehensible to support it? Or were they scared of being excommunicated by the Pakistan Bar Council, that has over the last few years developed a somewhat effective watchdog role over the affairs of the bar and the bench? Or did they think that they should not support a tottering regime?
Fourthly, why were the government ministers like Sher Afghan Niazi, Aftab Khan Sherpao and other leaders like Senator Wasim Sajjad reluctant to take up cudgels on behalf of the government? Was it so because they deemed the government’s position untenable or did they think that its days were numbered or simply because the instinct for political survival dictated it? It is noteworthy that the PML (Q) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, speaking from his medical retreat in the US, disassociated himself from the reference by declaring that it was a fight between the army and the judiciary. The ministers started speaking in favour of the government’s decision to move the reference only after Musharraf pushed them into it. He also reportedly had one-to-one meetings with some members of the ruling coalition in which he reprimanded them for their acts of omission in the matter.
Fifthly, who was responsible for manhandling the CJ and the attack on the Geo office in Islamabad? The graphic images of the CJ being pulled by the hair to the waiting government vehicle and the smashing of the Geo office were simply appalling to say the least. They came on the heel of an earlier act of assault and battery perpetrated on the protesting lawyers that injured many of them, including the PPP senator Latif Khosa. The foregoing series of events were a turning point in the present crisis as the big claims made by the government towards respect for independent judiciary, media freedom and the right of free assembly were utterly exposed. Musharraf’s subsequent attempt to explain these sordid acts in terms of a conspiracy against him failed to carry conviction.
We may not have an answer to the genesis of the judicial crisis but we certainly have an answer to its impact. It is true that the crisis did not unleash a people’s movement against the regime, but it certainly showed that Musharraf had lost the moral claim to power. The man whom the middle class backed for his liberal views and for putting the country on the road to development was fully exposed by this crisis. His latest attempt to make a Machiavellian deal with corruption-tainted Benazir-Zardari duo reinforces this impression.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com
We may not have an answer to the genesis of the judicial crisis but we certainly have an answer to its impact. It is true that the crisis did not unleash a people’s movement against the regime, but it certainly showed that Musharraf had lost the moral claim to power
The Musharraf regime is in a real soup as a result of the judicial crisis. For the first time in seven years it is engaged in an existential struggle. When Musharraf, the commando, reportedly met Kamran Khan for the Geo interview following the manhandling of the chief justice (CJ) and the attack on the Geo office in Islamabad, he for once really looked worried and defensive. He kept pleading his innocence by completely disassociating himself from these reprehensible acts.
The present crisis, which apparently started out of the blue on 9th March, remains a mystery till today. It raises a number of questions that need to be addressed if we want to fully comprehend its genesis and dynamics.
To begin with, who was at the origin of the reference? We know that Punjab’s Chief Minister did not like the CJ because he killed his New Murree project in which he had big financial stakes. Similarly, the prime minister was miffed at the way he was treated in the Pakistan Steel Mills case, if we disregard the rumour that he would have been one of the beneficiaries of the failed deal. Again, the ISI got offended by the way the CJ handled the missing persons case. The fact that Nawab Akbar Bugti at one time appointed him as advocate general must have made him look more villainous. Finally, his ambiguous stand on Musharraf’s re-election as President-in-uniform by the existing assemblies must have been the last straw on the camel’s back. It would be interesting to know who played what role in egging the president to take on the CJ.
It appears as if the whole issue was not properly analysed before moving the reference. The Musharraf regime’s hands are not clean, as it finds itself in the company of some of the most corrupt politicians in the country, not to speak of its promoting lotas. According to Transparency International Pakistan was never as corrupt as it is today. Notwithstanding this damning verdict, Musharraf moved the reference in which he charged the CJ, among others, with using his clout to further the career of his son and seeking a protocol to which he was not entitled, while at the same time tolerating the presence of corrupt politicians in his own government.
Musharraf’s advisers evidently are not very clever. They apparently never thought that the CJ could have been handled in a more subtle way to make him do the needful regarding the re-election of the president. For example, the government could have let the Damocles’ sword of charges listed in the reference hang over his head without making them public to make him bend to its will.
If he has been catapulted into the present dizzying heights of popularity it is in large measure due to the bunglings of the government. And if he had defied the government he could have been neutralised by winning over other members of the bench who, Musharraf knows from experience, would have been highly amenable to manipulation. After all, the CJ does not have more than one vote in a case.
Secondly, who advised the government to make the CJ “non-functional”, get Justice Javed Iqbal to hurriedly take oath as acting CJ while Musharraf kept the CJ engaged, and subsequently send the latter on “forced leave”? Again who advised him to do all this when Justice Baghwandas, who was next in line but whose loyalties were suspect, was on leave in India?
It is obvious that whosoever advised the government was either incompetent or not a friend of the government. It would have been much more appropriate to send the reference to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) headed by the CJ as he could not have presided in his own case and the next senior-most judge would have taken his place. Had he done otherwise, hell would have broken loose against the CJ.
Thirdly, why was no frontline lawyer prepared to defend the government before the SJC? Justice (r) Fakhruddin G Ibrahim refused to take up the government’s brief in the early days of the crisis. The other legal stalwarts like S M Zafar, Sharifuddin Pirzada and Wasim Sajjad also did not come forward to defend the government. Is the explanation for the reluctance of the legal luminaries to defend the government to be found in their realisation that it would be morally reprehensible to support it? Or were they scared of being excommunicated by the Pakistan Bar Council, that has over the last few years developed a somewhat effective watchdog role over the affairs of the bar and the bench? Or did they think that they should not support a tottering regime?
Fourthly, why were the government ministers like Sher Afghan Niazi, Aftab Khan Sherpao and other leaders like Senator Wasim Sajjad reluctant to take up cudgels on behalf of the government? Was it so because they deemed the government’s position untenable or did they think that its days were numbered or simply because the instinct for political survival dictated it? It is noteworthy that the PML (Q) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, speaking from his medical retreat in the US, disassociated himself from the reference by declaring that it was a fight between the army and the judiciary. The ministers started speaking in favour of the government’s decision to move the reference only after Musharraf pushed them into it. He also reportedly had one-to-one meetings with some members of the ruling coalition in which he reprimanded them for their acts of omission in the matter.
Fifthly, who was responsible for manhandling the CJ and the attack on the Geo office in Islamabad? The graphic images of the CJ being pulled by the hair to the waiting government vehicle and the smashing of the Geo office were simply appalling to say the least. They came on the heel of an earlier act of assault and battery perpetrated on the protesting lawyers that injured many of them, including the PPP senator Latif Khosa. The foregoing series of events were a turning point in the present crisis as the big claims made by the government towards respect for independent judiciary, media freedom and the right of free assembly were utterly exposed. Musharraf’s subsequent attempt to explain these sordid acts in terms of a conspiracy against him failed to carry conviction.
We may not have an answer to the genesis of the judicial crisis but we certainly have an answer to its impact. It is true that the crisis did not unleash a people’s movement against the regime, but it certainly showed that Musharraf had lost the moral claim to power. The man whom the middle class backed for his liberal views and for putting the country on the road to development was fully exposed by this crisis. His latest attempt to make a Machiavellian deal with corruption-tainted Benazir-Zardari duo reinforces this impression.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com
How serious is Baluch insurgency..? | Asian Tribune
How serious is Baluch insurgency..?
Thu, 2007-04-12 01:12
By GS Bhargava - Syndicate Features
American scholars critical, rightly, of General Pervez Musharraf’s half-hearted efforts to put down the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Waziristan area of north-west Pakistan, attribute the unabated tribal insurgency in Baluchistan for it. According to U.S. Intelligence sources as many as six Pakistan army brigades or a quarter million regular troops plus paramilitary forces are deployed in Baluchistan. The ‘Baluch Liberation Army’ waging guerrilla warfare in the Kohlu Mountains and the surrounding areas is said to be giving the Pakistan army a good run for its money.
The Pakistan Human Rights Commission, bearing the stamp of its doughty leader, Asma Jehangir, has alleged that Islamabad has been using US supplied Cobra helicopter gunships as well as US F-16 fighter planes against Baluchi civilians in its indiscriminate attacks on the guerrillas. It also put fatal casualties at over 200 non-combatants in recent weeks.
If the human rights activists expected the U.S. Government to be outraged by the ‘excesses’ of the Pakistan army against Baluch insurgents they should have been disappointed, expectedly. Their appeals to the US President had drawn a blank. Under-Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, on a visit to Islamabad has washed Washington’s hands of it, saying that it was Pakistan’s ‘internal matter.’
One is reminded of the caustic comment of another Pakistan military leader, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in the 1960s that the US- gifted military hardware was not meant to be ‘kept in cotton wool’ when Pakistan’s security was at stake. Ayub was reacting to Indian objections to Pakistan’s use of Patton tanks and Sabre jets in the 1965 border conflict with India.
American and other supporters of Baluch struggle for autonomy argue that the US has a “major strategic stake in a peaceful accommodation between Islamabad and Baluch leaders.” But it does not seem that Washington is inclined to heed such advice. Even when cross-border terrorism fuelled from Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was raging in India the U.S. administration stood by General Musharraf as a crucial ally in the war against the Taliban.
Both the earlier Democratic and the present Republican administrations in Washington have been so taken in by General Musharraf’s volte face after 9/11 that they would not doubt the genuineness of the General’s ‘change of heart.’
US might be thinking that it was tactically more useful to keep General Musharraf in the American camp rather than provoke him to return to his earlier Taliban company. Not that he would do it, especially after the blunt American warning that whoever was not with the US in the fight against terrorism would be taken to be on the other side.
Meanwhile, the Baluch leaders seem to have read the writing on the wall, that in a situation of virtual isolation they should opt for autonomy within a multi-ethnic Pakistan rather than harp on secession which had always been a pipe dream even when the Bugti tribesmen battling the Ayub regime harboured the idea.
It no doubt provided India with a brownie point in the war of words against Pakistan! The Baluch area is rich in oil and other mineral resources, including natural gas, uranium and copper .So the Pakistan Government is rather cagey about allowing greater autonomy to the State
In the last forty odd years, the strategic importance of Baluchistan has grown perceptibly. China has built a state- of- the- art port at Gwadar, close to the Strait of Hormuz, with a projected 27 berths. At the same time, ethnic Baluch sentiment has been on the rise with Baluchis living in eastern Iran making common cause with their fellow tribesmen across the Pakistan-Iran border.
There is also a nascent Baluch rebellion of sorts against the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regime in Teheran. Observers in Pakistan expect the US to involve itself in the Baluch imbroglio in the larger interests of safeguarding American interests in the region, especially Iran.
For the record India has been ambivalent towards the Baluch aspirations for greater autonomy within Pakistan. The days of vocal support to Baluch tribal revolt of the 1960’s are over. Still, Islamabad lodged a formal protest to New Delhi recently alleging “moral and material” support to Baluch insurgents. India, for its part, denied the charge.
Interestingly, General Musharraf had readily allowed a jatha lead by former external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh (of the BJP) to undertake a tour of Sindhi and Rajasthani pilgrim places deep inside Baluchistan in the last week of January. Jaswant Singh and his companions visited the temple of their family deity of Hinglaj Devi at Hinglaj in southern Baluchistan. In the course of their pilgrimage, conducted without slogans and flags, they passed through Khokrapar, Chor, Mirpur Khas, Hyderabad (Sindh), etc. The famous Kalander Dargah, which figures in the popular Sindhi prayer song, was also in their itinerary
The ‘national’ newspapers in our country being so inward looking that they did not devote enough attention to the visit of Jaswant Singh to a south Baluch shrine and the interest it evoked in Sindh and Baluchistan, not to mention the border areas of Rajasthan.
The media is so obsessed with BJP baiting, while eulogising Sonia Gandhi’s ‘sacrifice, ‘that they have no eyes for a grass-root level non-political event which stirred the peoples of our two countries deeply. To many of them it was more interesting that Jaswant Singh did not pay obeisance at the Jinnah mausoleum in Karachi like his senior colleague L.K. Advani a few months earlier. Even the Government’s willingness to extend up to Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti’s Dargah in Ajmer the revived Khokrapar-Munabao (Sindh- Rajasthan) rail link did not sink in their minds.
- Syndicate Features -
How serious is Baluch insurgency..? | Asian Tribune
Thu, 2007-04-12 01:12
By GS Bhargava - Syndicate Features
American scholars critical, rightly, of General Pervez Musharraf’s half-hearted efforts to put down the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Waziristan area of north-west Pakistan, attribute the unabated tribal insurgency in Baluchistan for it. According to U.S. Intelligence sources as many as six Pakistan army brigades or a quarter million regular troops plus paramilitary forces are deployed in Baluchistan. The ‘Baluch Liberation Army’ waging guerrilla warfare in the Kohlu Mountains and the surrounding areas is said to be giving the Pakistan army a good run for its money.
The Pakistan Human Rights Commission, bearing the stamp of its doughty leader, Asma Jehangir, has alleged that Islamabad has been using US supplied Cobra helicopter gunships as well as US F-16 fighter planes against Baluchi civilians in its indiscriminate attacks on the guerrillas. It also put fatal casualties at over 200 non-combatants in recent weeks.
If the human rights activists expected the U.S. Government to be outraged by the ‘excesses’ of the Pakistan army against Baluch insurgents they should have been disappointed, expectedly. Their appeals to the US President had drawn a blank. Under-Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, on a visit to Islamabad has washed Washington’s hands of it, saying that it was Pakistan’s ‘internal matter.’
One is reminded of the caustic comment of another Pakistan military leader, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in the 1960s that the US- gifted military hardware was not meant to be ‘kept in cotton wool’ when Pakistan’s security was at stake. Ayub was reacting to Indian objections to Pakistan’s use of Patton tanks and Sabre jets in the 1965 border conflict with India.
American and other supporters of Baluch struggle for autonomy argue that the US has a “major strategic stake in a peaceful accommodation between Islamabad and Baluch leaders.” But it does not seem that Washington is inclined to heed such advice. Even when cross-border terrorism fuelled from Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was raging in India the U.S. administration stood by General Musharraf as a crucial ally in the war against the Taliban.
Both the earlier Democratic and the present Republican administrations in Washington have been so taken in by General Musharraf’s volte face after 9/11 that they would not doubt the genuineness of the General’s ‘change of heart.’
US might be thinking that it was tactically more useful to keep General Musharraf in the American camp rather than provoke him to return to his earlier Taliban company. Not that he would do it, especially after the blunt American warning that whoever was not with the US in the fight against terrorism would be taken to be on the other side.
Meanwhile, the Baluch leaders seem to have read the writing on the wall, that in a situation of virtual isolation they should opt for autonomy within a multi-ethnic Pakistan rather than harp on secession which had always been a pipe dream even when the Bugti tribesmen battling the Ayub regime harboured the idea.
It no doubt provided India with a brownie point in the war of words against Pakistan! The Baluch area is rich in oil and other mineral resources, including natural gas, uranium and copper .So the Pakistan Government is rather cagey about allowing greater autonomy to the State
In the last forty odd years, the strategic importance of Baluchistan has grown perceptibly. China has built a state- of- the- art port at Gwadar, close to the Strait of Hormuz, with a projected 27 berths. At the same time, ethnic Baluch sentiment has been on the rise with Baluchis living in eastern Iran making common cause with their fellow tribesmen across the Pakistan-Iran border.
There is also a nascent Baluch rebellion of sorts against the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regime in Teheran. Observers in Pakistan expect the US to involve itself in the Baluch imbroglio in the larger interests of safeguarding American interests in the region, especially Iran.
For the record India has been ambivalent towards the Baluch aspirations for greater autonomy within Pakistan. The days of vocal support to Baluch tribal revolt of the 1960’s are over. Still, Islamabad lodged a formal protest to New Delhi recently alleging “moral and material” support to Baluch insurgents. India, for its part, denied the charge.
Interestingly, General Musharraf had readily allowed a jatha lead by former external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh (of the BJP) to undertake a tour of Sindhi and Rajasthani pilgrim places deep inside Baluchistan in the last week of January. Jaswant Singh and his companions visited the temple of their family deity of Hinglaj Devi at Hinglaj in southern Baluchistan. In the course of their pilgrimage, conducted without slogans and flags, they passed through Khokrapar, Chor, Mirpur Khas, Hyderabad (Sindh), etc. The famous Kalander Dargah, which figures in the popular Sindhi prayer song, was also in their itinerary
The ‘national’ newspapers in our country being so inward looking that they did not devote enough attention to the visit of Jaswant Singh to a south Baluch shrine and the interest it evoked in Sindh and Baluchistan, not to mention the border areas of Rajasthan.
The media is so obsessed with BJP baiting, while eulogising Sonia Gandhi’s ‘sacrifice, ‘that they have no eyes for a grass-root level non-political event which stirred the peoples of our two countries deeply. To many of them it was more interesting that Jaswant Singh did not pay obeisance at the Jinnah mausoleum in Karachi like his senior colleague L.K. Advani a few months earlier. Even the Government’s willingness to extend up to Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti’s Dargah in Ajmer the revived Khokrapar-Munabao (Sindh- Rajasthan) rail link did not sink in their minds.
- Syndicate Features -
How serious is Baluch insurgency..? | Asian Tribune
EU wants bigger slice of Australian yellowcake
European Union wants bigger slice of yellowcake
Nigel Wilson, Energy writer
April 12, 2007
THE European Union wants a share of Australia's future uranium sales, rather than be closed out of the billion dollar market by China and India.
It is arguing that Europe, as a strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is a reliable consumer of uranium compared with other countries.
Last year Prime Minister John Howard and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an agreement under which Australia will sell uranium to China for power generation, while India has been pressing Australia to lift its ban on uranium sales to countries that are not signatories to the treaty.
EU ambassador Bruno Julien told West Australian Premier Alan Carpenter yesterday that while the state's ban on uranium mining was an internal political matter, Europe had to rely on nuclear power for matters of energy security and climate change.
Mr Carpenter reiterated at the meeting there would be no uranium mining in the state while he was Premier.
Mr Julien said the EU needed energy security because energy was a very important source of competitiveness for its 27 member countries, with their 480 million consumers.
Fifteen of the 27 EU member states are already using nuclear energy and it is moving towards an integrated energy policy, though nuclear energy is a matter for individual members to decide.
Mr Julien said Australia, with about 30 per cent of the world's low-cost uranium reserves, was important as a supplier.
"We need energy supply from reliable providers and you know that some of the providers of energy right now are unstable countries," he said.
"So we need to have diversity of countries supplying energy and also of sources of energy.
"In addition to that, one of our major problems we are trying to fight against is climate change."
Europe sources about 30 per cent of its energy from nuclear power.
Mr Julien said the European Council decided earlier this year to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent, which could increase the requirement for nuclear energy.
"We have to consider that having diverse sources of supply and diverse sources of energy should certainly include uranium," he said.
"What I want to secure is a source of supply, and that all of your uranium is not going to India or China and we can have our share of the cake."
Mr Julien said the EU was willing to adhere to full application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
"We are a signatory and we think it is very important that we are a very reliable user of resources."
European Union wants bigger slice of yellowcake | Mining & Energy | The Australian
Nigel Wilson, Energy writer
April 12, 2007
THE European Union wants a share of Australia's future uranium sales, rather than be closed out of the billion dollar market by China and India.
It is arguing that Europe, as a strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is a reliable consumer of uranium compared with other countries.
Last year Prime Minister John Howard and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an agreement under which Australia will sell uranium to China for power generation, while India has been pressing Australia to lift its ban on uranium sales to countries that are not signatories to the treaty.
EU ambassador Bruno Julien told West Australian Premier Alan Carpenter yesterday that while the state's ban on uranium mining was an internal political matter, Europe had to rely on nuclear power for matters of energy security and climate change.
Mr Carpenter reiterated at the meeting there would be no uranium mining in the state while he was Premier.
Mr Julien said the EU needed energy security because energy was a very important source of competitiveness for its 27 member countries, with their 480 million consumers.
Fifteen of the 27 EU member states are already using nuclear energy and it is moving towards an integrated energy policy, though nuclear energy is a matter for individual members to decide.
Mr Julien said Australia, with about 30 per cent of the world's low-cost uranium reserves, was important as a supplier.
"We need energy supply from reliable providers and you know that some of the providers of energy right now are unstable countries," he said.
"So we need to have diversity of countries supplying energy and also of sources of energy.
"In addition to that, one of our major problems we are trying to fight against is climate change."
Europe sources about 30 per cent of its energy from nuclear power.
Mr Julien said the European Council decided earlier this year to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent, which could increase the requirement for nuclear energy.
"We have to consider that having diverse sources of supply and diverse sources of energy should certainly include uranium," he said.
"What I want to secure is a source of supply, and that all of your uranium is not going to India or China and we can have our share of the cake."
Mr Julien said the EU was willing to adhere to full application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
"We are a signatory and we think it is very important that we are a very reliable user of resources."
European Union wants bigger slice of yellowcake | Mining & Energy | The Australian
Indo-US military links spook Beijing
Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent
April 12, 2007
HIGH-level military talks between New Delhi and Washington have ruffled feathers in Beijing, with China suspicious about the emergence of an "axis of democracy" in the Asia-Pacific involving India, the US, Japan and Australia upgrading their defence ties.
The joint Indo-US working group on defence was reported yesterday to be focused on China's rapidly growing military might, its spreading arc of influence in the region and uncertainty about its longer-term aims.
The meeting was held on the eve of naval exercises that will take place next week off Yokosuka, near Tokyo Bay, for the first time bringing together forces from India, the US and Japan in military manoeuvres.
As a further pointer to the strategic alignments emerging in the region as China continues the massive modernisation of its military capability, the meeting of the defence working group coincided with a visit to New Delhi by the chief of the Indonesian navy, Admiral Slamet Soebijanto.
The Indonesian parliament recently ratified a defence agreement with India, and the two countries are planning to hold joint naval exercises next year.
But New Delhi was reported yesterday to be insisting it wants to be viewed as a neutral player in the region, rather than "projected as a counterweight to China or being part of any grand strategy to contain China".
Indian officials said that following the naval manoeuvres with the US and Japan, the country would take part in exercises with China and Russia.
But New Delhi's ties with the US have been vastly enhanced by the recently concluded nuclear agreement with Washington.
Reports in The Times of India yesterday said India continued to be apprehensive about China's strategic ties with Pakistan, the rapid modernisation of China's 2.5-million strong People's Liberation Army and the military infrastructure build-up in Tibet.
Sources told the paper that during the meeting, Indian officials gave their US counterparts New Delhi's assessment of China's maritime strategy and growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. China is increasing its maritime and military links with Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar.
Analysts said the newspaper's assessment of Indian "apprehension" about what China was up to probably understated the reality, suggesting that while New Delhi wants to be regarded as neutral, Indian officials have deep and growing concerns about Beijing's intentions.
It was disclosed this week that Burma's military junta had pledged to sell the entire output from major new undersea gas reserves to China rather than India, even though it would have made more economic sense to sell to New Delhi.
And there is concern about Beijing using the new power being wielded by the Maoists in government in neighbouring Nepal to increase its influence over Kathmandu.
The hardline Maoist leader Prachanda in Nepal has close Communist Party ties to Beijing. There is talk of the Chinese extending their Tibetan railway to Nepal, which would enhance Beijing's influence in the Himalayan country and undermine India's long-standing power over its politics and its economy.
India is trying to counter these moves, despite having good relations with Beijing, especially following President Hu Jintao's visit to the country earlier this year.
According to reports yesterday, the US delegation at the joint defence working group talks briefed India about China's Asat weapons test in space in January and its serious implications for the region.
The US is reported to have argued that the test poses a danger to the assets of all nations involved in space exploration, including India.
Indo-US military links spook Beijing | The World | The Australian
April 12, 2007
HIGH-level military talks between New Delhi and Washington have ruffled feathers in Beijing, with China suspicious about the emergence of an "axis of democracy" in the Asia-Pacific involving India, the US, Japan and Australia upgrading their defence ties.
The joint Indo-US working group on defence was reported yesterday to be focused on China's rapidly growing military might, its spreading arc of influence in the region and uncertainty about its longer-term aims.
The meeting was held on the eve of naval exercises that will take place next week off Yokosuka, near Tokyo Bay, for the first time bringing together forces from India, the US and Japan in military manoeuvres.
As a further pointer to the strategic alignments emerging in the region as China continues the massive modernisation of its military capability, the meeting of the defence working group coincided with a visit to New Delhi by the chief of the Indonesian navy, Admiral Slamet Soebijanto.
The Indonesian parliament recently ratified a defence agreement with India, and the two countries are planning to hold joint naval exercises next year.
But New Delhi was reported yesterday to be insisting it wants to be viewed as a neutral player in the region, rather than "projected as a counterweight to China or being part of any grand strategy to contain China".
Indian officials said that following the naval manoeuvres with the US and Japan, the country would take part in exercises with China and Russia.
But New Delhi's ties with the US have been vastly enhanced by the recently concluded nuclear agreement with Washington.
Reports in The Times of India yesterday said India continued to be apprehensive about China's strategic ties with Pakistan, the rapid modernisation of China's 2.5-million strong People's Liberation Army and the military infrastructure build-up in Tibet.
Sources told the paper that during the meeting, Indian officials gave their US counterparts New Delhi's assessment of China's maritime strategy and growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. China is increasing its maritime and military links with Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar.
Analysts said the newspaper's assessment of Indian "apprehension" about what China was up to probably understated the reality, suggesting that while New Delhi wants to be regarded as neutral, Indian officials have deep and growing concerns about Beijing's intentions.
It was disclosed this week that Burma's military junta had pledged to sell the entire output from major new undersea gas reserves to China rather than India, even though it would have made more economic sense to sell to New Delhi.
And there is concern about Beijing using the new power being wielded by the Maoists in government in neighbouring Nepal to increase its influence over Kathmandu.
The hardline Maoist leader Prachanda in Nepal has close Communist Party ties to Beijing. There is talk of the Chinese extending their Tibetan railway to Nepal, which would enhance Beijing's influence in the Himalayan country and undermine India's long-standing power over its politics and its economy.
India is trying to counter these moves, despite having good relations with Beijing, especially following President Hu Jintao's visit to the country earlier this year.
According to reports yesterday, the US delegation at the joint defence working group talks briefed India about China's Asat weapons test in space in January and its serious implications for the region.
The US is reported to have argued that the test poses a danger to the assets of all nations involved in space exploration, including India.
Indo-US military links spook Beijing | The World | The Australian
April 10, 2007
Is Iran hinting at a deal?
By Patrick J. Buchanan
Creators Syndicate
Published: April 10, 2007
The Easter pardon by Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the 15 British sailors and Marines, seized by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in waters off the Iraqi coast two weeks ago, ends the crisis.
And as the beaming smile of President Ahmadinejad while he graciously accepted apologies from the sailors and Marines testifies, there is no doubt as to who won the showdown. Among Iranians, for whom love of the Brits is an acquired taste, Ahmadinejad is the victor. His position inside Iran, a subject of speculation, is surely stronger today.
But his victory and that of the Revolutionary Guards comes at a cost to Iran, which showed itself to be a state willing to engage in hostage-taking and show trials as a negotiating tactic.
As for the British military, it has sustained a humiliation.
What kind of rules of engagement were these Marines operating under to permit themselves to be surrounded, captured and disarmed without firing a shot? What kind of training did they have? How was it that, in days, if not hours, some were parroting the storyline fed them by their captors - that they regretted having violated Iranian territory and wished to express remorse. As yet, there is no evidence any were abused or tortured.
What could today's Britain have done? Unlike the Falklands War of 25 years ago, the Royal Navy is not what it was, and Tony Blair is not Margaret Thatcher. The Brits might have the nuclear weapons to destroy Iran. In conventional power, they are like the rest of the European Union - bantamweights, at best.
Knowledge of this must have been what the Iranians were banking on. For, no matter the outcome, Tehran took a risk.
Among the risks Iran took was that the British Marines would fight, not surrender. Blood could have been shed, casualties taken, and Britain might have retaliated, forcing Iran to fight. That almost surely would bring U.S. intervention on behalf of its ally.
Why, then, did the Iranians seize the Brits, then suddenly let them go?
One explanation is that they are sending a message.
While they do not want war with us, they do not fear it to such an extent that they will permit themselves to be pushed around. You hit us, we hit back. But if you engage us diplomatically, rather than disrespect and threaten us, progress is possible in getting what you want.
For Iran was provocative at first, conciliatory at the end. And if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard truly wanted to put the Brits on trial, somebody overruled them.
The United States should test again, via back channels, whether Iran is willing to suspend enrichment of uranium in return for a U.S. suspension of sanctions. For time is not on our side. Iran's ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, however limited today, improves every month.
And while war would be a calamity for both countries, incidents are increasing that could bring us to war, the latest being the seizure of the Brits.
In recent months, U.S. forces have, on two occasions, seized Iranians inside Iraq. Iraqis close to the U.S. military bagged another. He was released the day before the Brits were let go. Now, the U.S. military has permitted Red Cross visits to five Iranians seized in Irbil.
There have been reports of insurgent attacks on Iranians inside Iran, in the Kurdish region in the northwest, the Arab region of the southwest and in Baluchistan, near the Afghan-Pakistan border. These attacks have resulted in Iranian dead. There have been reports of U.S. special forces inside Iran, getting intelligence for attacks on their nuclear sites.
America has charged elements of the Iranian military with providing extra-lethal IEDs, the roadside bombs that have killed and wounded so many of our troops.
So far, neither the Iranians nor Americans have crossed a red line that would make inevitable the war some in both countries might want, but the great majority in both countries do not want.
To find out more about Patrick Buchanan, visit the Creators Syndicate Web page at www.creators.com.
Creators Syndicate
Published: April 10, 2007
The Easter pardon by Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the 15 British sailors and Marines, seized by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in waters off the Iraqi coast two weeks ago, ends the crisis.
And as the beaming smile of President Ahmadinejad while he graciously accepted apologies from the sailors and Marines testifies, there is no doubt as to who won the showdown. Among Iranians, for whom love of the Brits is an acquired taste, Ahmadinejad is the victor. His position inside Iran, a subject of speculation, is surely stronger today.
But his victory and that of the Revolutionary Guards comes at a cost to Iran, which showed itself to be a state willing to engage in hostage-taking and show trials as a negotiating tactic.
As for the British military, it has sustained a humiliation.
What kind of rules of engagement were these Marines operating under to permit themselves to be surrounded, captured and disarmed without firing a shot? What kind of training did they have? How was it that, in days, if not hours, some were parroting the storyline fed them by their captors - that they regretted having violated Iranian territory and wished to express remorse. As yet, there is no evidence any were abused or tortured.
What could today's Britain have done? Unlike the Falklands War of 25 years ago, the Royal Navy is not what it was, and Tony Blair is not Margaret Thatcher. The Brits might have the nuclear weapons to destroy Iran. In conventional power, they are like the rest of the European Union - bantamweights, at best.
Knowledge of this must have been what the Iranians were banking on. For, no matter the outcome, Tehran took a risk.
Among the risks Iran took was that the British Marines would fight, not surrender. Blood could have been shed, casualties taken, and Britain might have retaliated, forcing Iran to fight. That almost surely would bring U.S. intervention on behalf of its ally.
Why, then, did the Iranians seize the Brits, then suddenly let them go?
One explanation is that they are sending a message.
While they do not want war with us, they do not fear it to such an extent that they will permit themselves to be pushed around. You hit us, we hit back. But if you engage us diplomatically, rather than disrespect and threaten us, progress is possible in getting what you want.
For Iran was provocative at first, conciliatory at the end. And if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard truly wanted to put the Brits on trial, somebody overruled them.
The United States should test again, via back channels, whether Iran is willing to suspend enrichment of uranium in return for a U.S. suspension of sanctions. For time is not on our side. Iran's ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, however limited today, improves every month.
And while war would be a calamity for both countries, incidents are increasing that could bring us to war, the latest being the seizure of the Brits.
In recent months, U.S. forces have, on two occasions, seized Iranians inside Iraq. Iraqis close to the U.S. military bagged another. He was released the day before the Brits were let go. Now, the U.S. military has permitted Red Cross visits to five Iranians seized in Irbil.
There have been reports of insurgent attacks on Iranians inside Iran, in the Kurdish region in the northwest, the Arab region of the southwest and in Baluchistan, near the Afghan-Pakistan border. These attacks have resulted in Iranian dead. There have been reports of U.S. special forces inside Iran, getting intelligence for attacks on their nuclear sites.
America has charged elements of the Iranian military with providing extra-lethal IEDs, the roadside bombs that have killed and wounded so many of our troops.
So far, neither the Iranians nor Americans have crossed a red line that would make inevitable the war some in both countries might want, but the great majority in both countries do not want.
To find out more about Patrick Buchanan, visit the Creators Syndicate Web page at www.creators.com.
SHIA-SUNNI JIHAD IN KURRAM: IRAN BLAMED
By B. Raman
The Kurram Agency in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has been the scene of a no-holds barred jihad being waged by the local Shias and Sunnis against each other since April 6, 2007. The local adherents of the two sects of Islam have been using not only small arms and ammunition, but also mortars and rocket-launchers against each other, resulting in heavy casualties. The clashes initially started in Parachinar, the capital of the Agency. It has since spread to the interior areas. The imposition of a curfew by the Pakistani authorities has not yet brought the violence down.
2. There are conflicting figures of the fatalities inflicted by the two sects against each other and by the security forces on the warring sects. In an attempt to bring the situation under control, the Pakistan Army has been using helicopter gunships. While the Pakistani authorities have estimated the total number of fatalities as between 15 and 40, non-Governmental sources have alleged that at least 80 persons have been killed so far.
3. On April 1, 2007, the Sunnis of Parachinar had taken out a religious procession to mark the Holy Prophet's birthday. Anti-Shia slogans were shouted. To protest against this, the local Shias took out a procession on April 6, 2007. Some Sunni residents of the town opened fire on this procession, killing four Shias. This led to widespread clashes between the two sects all over the town. The security forces brought the situation under control by imposing a curfew, but the clashes then spread to the interior areas of the Agency.
4. Till 1977, the Shias were in a preponderant majority in the Kurram Agency and in the Northern Areas ( Gilgit and Baltistan) of Jammu and Kashmir, which is presently under Pakistani occupation. After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February, 1979, there was a radicalisation of the Shias of these areas. They started demanding the creation of a separate Shia majority province to be called the Karakoram Province, consisting of the Kurram Agency, the Northern Areas and other contiguous Shia majority areas.
5. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq put down this movement ruthlessly. He also started a policy of re-settling the Sunnis in these areas in order to control the Shias and dilute their preponderant majority. While Sunni ex-servicemen from other parts of Pakistan were re-settled in the Northern Areas, Afghan Sunni refugees from the refugee camps were re-settled in the Kurram Agency. This led to widespread resentment among the Shias against the Government as well as the Sunni settlers. There were serious riots in Gilgit in 1988 which were ruthlessly put down by Zia with the help of a combined force of Sunni tribals and Arabs led by Osama bin Laden. Hundreds of Shias were killed. It is generally believed that the anger caused by this massacre contributed to the death of Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash in August 1988. Enquiries into the crash reportedly brought out that the crash took place when a Shia airman belonging to Gilgit released tear-smoke or some other gas in the cockpit, thereby disorienting the crew.
6. The Kurram Agency has also been the scene of frequent Shia-Sunni clashes, with most of the attacks by the Shias directed against the Afghan and Pakistani Sunni settlers brought in by Zia. There were three major Shia-Sunni clashes in the Agency in 1983, 1988 and 1996, which resulted in the deaths of a total of 1,200 persons belonging to both the sects.
7. In the current violence, the local leaders of the two sects have accused the Pakistani Army of siding with the other sect. Some Sunni leaders have also accused Iran of fomenting the Shia attacks against the Sunnis in order to teach Pakistan a lesson for allegedly allowing the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to use the Pakistani territory for destabilisation operations against Iran.
8. Addressing the media at the Peshawar Press Club on April 9, 2007, Mast Gul, a Sunni jihadi leader, alleged that since April 6, Shias had killed hundreds of innocent Sunnis. According to him, just on one day about 28 Sunni women and children were slaughtered in the Kurram Agency.He accused Iran of providing financial resources and weapons to the Shias in the Agency. He also alleged that Iran has given shelter to Baloch nationalist leaders and has been helping them. He warned the Pakistan Army that if it did not take effective action against the Shias, he would appeal to the Sunnis in the other parts of Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir to come to Kurram and help the local Sunnis.
9. Mast Gul used to belong to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) formed in 1998. He used to operate in J&K till 1995. He and his followers were responsible for the burning down of the Islamic holy shrine at Charar-e-Sharief in 1995. It is not known to which organisation he belongs now. Some reports say he is now a member of the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ).
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:itschen36@gmail.com)
The Kurram Agency in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has been the scene of a no-holds barred jihad being waged by the local Shias and Sunnis against each other since April 6, 2007. The local adherents of the two sects of Islam have been using not only small arms and ammunition, but also mortars and rocket-launchers against each other, resulting in heavy casualties. The clashes initially started in Parachinar, the capital of the Agency. It has since spread to the interior areas. The imposition of a curfew by the Pakistani authorities has not yet brought the violence down.
2. There are conflicting figures of the fatalities inflicted by the two sects against each other and by the security forces on the warring sects. In an attempt to bring the situation under control, the Pakistan Army has been using helicopter gunships. While the Pakistani authorities have estimated the total number of fatalities as between 15 and 40, non-Governmental sources have alleged that at least 80 persons have been killed so far.
3. On April 1, 2007, the Sunnis of Parachinar had taken out a religious procession to mark the Holy Prophet's birthday. Anti-Shia slogans were shouted. To protest against this, the local Shias took out a procession on April 6, 2007. Some Sunni residents of the town opened fire on this procession, killing four Shias. This led to widespread clashes between the two sects all over the town. The security forces brought the situation under control by imposing a curfew, but the clashes then spread to the interior areas of the Agency.
4. Till 1977, the Shias were in a preponderant majority in the Kurram Agency and in the Northern Areas ( Gilgit and Baltistan) of Jammu and Kashmir, which is presently under Pakistani occupation. After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February, 1979, there was a radicalisation of the Shias of these areas. They started demanding the creation of a separate Shia majority province to be called the Karakoram Province, consisting of the Kurram Agency, the Northern Areas and other contiguous Shia majority areas.
5. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq put down this movement ruthlessly. He also started a policy of re-settling the Sunnis in these areas in order to control the Shias and dilute their preponderant majority. While Sunni ex-servicemen from other parts of Pakistan were re-settled in the Northern Areas, Afghan Sunni refugees from the refugee camps were re-settled in the Kurram Agency. This led to widespread resentment among the Shias against the Government as well as the Sunni settlers. There were serious riots in Gilgit in 1988 which were ruthlessly put down by Zia with the help of a combined force of Sunni tribals and Arabs led by Osama bin Laden. Hundreds of Shias were killed. It is generally believed that the anger caused by this massacre contributed to the death of Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash in August 1988. Enquiries into the crash reportedly brought out that the crash took place when a Shia airman belonging to Gilgit released tear-smoke or some other gas in the cockpit, thereby disorienting the crew.
6. The Kurram Agency has also been the scene of frequent Shia-Sunni clashes, with most of the attacks by the Shias directed against the Afghan and Pakistani Sunni settlers brought in by Zia. There were three major Shia-Sunni clashes in the Agency in 1983, 1988 and 1996, which resulted in the deaths of a total of 1,200 persons belonging to both the sects.
7. In the current violence, the local leaders of the two sects have accused the Pakistani Army of siding with the other sect. Some Sunni leaders have also accused Iran of fomenting the Shia attacks against the Sunnis in order to teach Pakistan a lesson for allegedly allowing the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to use the Pakistani territory for destabilisation operations against Iran.
8. Addressing the media at the Peshawar Press Club on April 9, 2007, Mast Gul, a Sunni jihadi leader, alleged that since April 6, Shias had killed hundreds of innocent Sunnis. According to him, just on one day about 28 Sunni women and children were slaughtered in the Kurram Agency.He accused Iran of providing financial resources and weapons to the Shias in the Agency. He also alleged that Iran has given shelter to Baloch nationalist leaders and has been helping them. He warned the Pakistan Army that if it did not take effective action against the Shias, he would appeal to the Sunnis in the other parts of Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir to come to Kurram and help the local Sunnis.
9. Mast Gul used to belong to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) formed in 1998. He used to operate in J&K till 1995. He and his followers were responsible for the burning down of the Islamic holy shrine at Charar-e-Sharief in 1995. It is not known to which organisation he belongs now. Some reports say he is now a member of the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ).
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:itschen36@gmail.com)
April 09, 2007
New stakes of the economic intelligence : Alain Juillet
Which are the levers of action of the patriotic State when a French group is coveted by a foreign group? How to help the companies to remain with the point of the world innovation? Does the economic intelligence, how it go? Alain Juillet was named at the end of 2003 High person in charge in charge of the economic intelligence to the Secretariat general for national Defense.
The script complete of our “cat” of Tuesday February 20 on the echos.fr with Alain Juillet, High responsible in charge of the economic intelligence to the Secretariat general for national Defense.
Caroline: Can you define what is the economic intelligence and give of the concrete examples of this concept? Isn't it purely theoretical?
Alain Juillet: It is the control and the protection of useful strategic information for for all the decision makers. It is not at all theoretical, it is very practical and effective.
JeanChristophe: Hello Mr. ALAIN JULY, During a discussion with a framework working with the direction of human resources of a great French group side on the Parisian market, I intended to say: “the economic intelligence I did not connait, they are not our concerns”. How think that thus people leaving a training in intelligence economic and wanting to work in great French groups in order to safeguard an economic inheritance rather fragile and coveted by foreign groups, are motivated to work in this branch whereas other branches recruit?
Alain Alain Juillet: More and more of person in charge for human resources know the economic intelligence but there is still work of sensitizing to make. It is not yet the concern of some groups but it is already that of all the American law firms of businesses. Fortunately full with other French groups are interested.
bob: With did your opinion, something change significantly as regards IE into France since 2004? Do you estimate to have the means of your action? Can you give a concrete example of success obtained recently thanks to the step of IE in France?
Alain Juillet: Yes, the fact of implementing a public policy of economic intelligence made discover this activity with many of our fellow-citizens and allowed the development of the use of the techniques by considerable companies. The French better and better know what that relates to. The administrations are mobilized to put in place in-house concept and external. Satisfaction comes when small companies say to us thank you to have helped them to leave itself there. Examples of success, there is much of it, of the lace of Calais to the decree on the foreign investments which gives us the means of negotiating.
Bram Bargh: Which is the manpower of the Secretariat general of the national Defense which works in the field of the IE? Which are the profiles of these people?
Alain Juillet: We have a small team of 12 people but we work in direct connection with all the ministries concerned which place at our disposal the means necessary to fill each mission. My team is made up civils servant placed at the disposal by their administration (Interior, Défense, Finances, Affaires foreign, and SGDN). Each one has a speciality while working on the whole of the subjects according to the needs.
Pierre-Olivier Dybman: I am currently student at the Central School of Electronics and I would like to direct me towards the IE, but several things make a little obstacle. Firstly, the effect of mode: the IE has the wind in poop, but it is already difficult to be placed without being in the medium (of the consent of a teacher of IE). What will it be tomorrow? Secondly, which formation to follow? Between the economic School of war, facs, or to remain with a diploma for the occupation of engineer and to make slip his career towards the IE… What would you make if you were in my place?
Alain Juillet: the IE is a new activity in France. It is not a phenomenon of mode because that goes very well elsewhere. The problem, it is that we are in phase of development of the concept. The companies really do not use it separately the large companies. The market of the experts is thus still reduced even if it increases each year. On the other hand there is a true request for students trained with other specialities which they supplement by a formation in IE. It as should be known as there is more than 12 trades identified in the IE. The schools in general add to a general training a specific complement to be different. It is thus necessary to select its school according to the speciality.
Bram Bargh: Which is the budget allocated with the operations concerned with “the economic intelligence”? Exist there, as it is the case in the United States (In-Q-Such, CCAT…), funds of investment which supports economic initiatives, patents particularly innovating of SME or which places resource (technical and/or human means)?
Alain Juillet: The budget is distributed between the various ministries. Yes, we launched strategic funds of investment to help powerful SME in key technologies in connection with the Case of the Deposits and the private investors, in the compliance with the European rules.
fredk: The French groups often complain about the weakness of average French compared with the means used by the United States, for example, to support their industry. One about political pressures, industrial espionage, etc is France intends to speak if late on the matter? How the State can support its great groups in this field?
Alain Juillet: France has a voluntarist policy of assistance to its companies. It is necessary to pay attention in the comparisons because the aids and subsidies are not the same ones on the two sides of the Atlantic. All the countries try to help and support their companies vis-a-vis the international conccurence. Actually, the principal problem for the State is to take care that the competing combat occurs to equal weapons. I do not believe that one can say that France is late but the State cannot subtituer with the companies to negotiate or build their competitiveness.
20syl: Does the economic intelligence have to be carried out by former soldiers or police officers? Isn't this to solidify in a posture of defense?
Alain Juillet: The police officers or the soldiers do not have particular legitimacy in this trade. It is necessary to have a specific training in IE which is acquired in the universities, the schools or on the ground. The IE is at the same time offensive and defensive since best defense, it is the attack.
ENNO: Which role hold the General Information in the official device of economic intelligence? Are they officially invested missions of IE, y a-til a section of the RG especially dedicated to these questions, on the matter exists it a French or European equivalent at the American agencies?
Alain Juillet: All the services of information and the gendarmerie have a role to play in the IE because it is them which ensure the contact with the companies on their territory of work and it is them which can alert us in the event of problem. Within this framework the RG by their national organization are indeed concerned. There is more than one ten American agencies in contact with the companies. We are thus in a system rather close to the others.
Richard: Which is the place of the information of source open in your work? Thank you
Alain Juillet: We work practically only with sources open on the Internet or within the framework of official or private networks of information.
simroc: You evoked there is a few moments the interest of the American law firms of businesses for the economic intelligence. Could you specify how in a concrete way the latter use it to date?
Alain Juillet: The investment banks and law firms use the IE to have a good knowledge of the markets and environment of their files. The knowledge and the comprehension of the other are essential in the current competing combat that some compare besides to the economic war.
joetoile: In IE, one is always on the wire between the information which to become more extremely collectively and that that should be shared should be protected to remain better all alone. Which is the logic of the poles of competitiveness which accomodate with open arms of the company like IBM, Glaxo, etc? Is this to make benefit from their power the pole and France or to open a breach towards “hostile” multinationals?
Alain Juillet: The development of knowledge passes by the division of information and work in network. It is on this report which Porter launched the concept of the “clusters” that one calls here poles of competitiveness. Theoretically, on a side one shares certain resources and means to share of it the result and on another side one keeps a part for oneself in order to have a competitive advantage. It is the role of the IE and the secrecy of a pole which goes. Imbalance between the partners of the pole must be controlled because it can lead to conflicts or technology transfers not envisaged and thus dangerous.
Beatrice Rivalier: In the schedule of conditions of the poles of competitiveness the obligation was registered to make IE. However, very few poles actually initiated this mission. The poles did not seek to work by the day before their positioning and their strategy of excellence. After the phase of installation of their governorship, they rocked all in the management of the calls to projects undoubtedly launched too quickly by the State. Their objectives were to make finance all rapidemment their projects by using the financial basket represented. The shared feeling was the urgency. From this point of view the search for a positioning of excellence could be against-productive! What can you make to catch up with the blow and to thus give again body with the concept of pole of competitiveness? I specify that I am consulting in IES and that I control mission IE of pole IPMF (maritime pine). In addition, I am the deputy regional one of Fépie in Aquitaine.
Alain Juillet: You are right completely. One privileged the calls to projects which brought financing to the detriment of the organization of the day before between all the actors of the pole. Safety was also neglected. It remains much to make but I note that the things evolve/move positively even if they do not go as quickly as one would like. It is necessary that we arrive so that the poles adapt really the step of IE as it is already the case for some.
Anne: Hello, Which solutions do you recommend for the companies interested by the IE to set up a step of day before in cost zero?
Alain Juillet: To use the free search engines and the gates and systems set up by the Chamber of Commerce. A good watcher manages to recover much information without buying them.
Micael: How the current government can claim to make economic intelligence one of its priorities and, in same time, to let pass TDF under the control of funds TPG, not to express any reaction to the reorganizations of Alcatel (which are connected with delocalizations in China whereas the State is shareholder) and privatiser part of the motorways at broken prices?
Alain Juillet: The IE is a technique and a concept which makes it possible to identify the threats and opportunities. We are thus there to alert and to inform but is then with the companies to act. The policy of the State aims at making it possible the companies to be able to anticipate and react when they undergo attacks or try to gain contracts. It is with them to do it in the respect of the French and European laws.
curious: What a patriotic State? Would there be nonpatriotic States and could one have some examples of their “intelligence”?
Alain Juillet: Any State defends its interest and its nationals in world competition. This has nothing to do with protectionism because it is rather good direction. This being certain States are more offensive than others in particular in the economic field. Let us not forget that the finality of the competing confrontations from the point of view of the State, it is employment.
Vallier: The preceding government entrusted the mission to you of structuring the IE for the interest general of the Nation. How the candidates with the presidential election did position with respect to your work? Do some consider reinforced means, others show a lack of interest?
Alain Juillet: All the candidates expressed interest for the IE and the will to continue this action of public policy. The future of the IE is thus assured and it is a beautiful reward for those which have fought for it for several years.
Alain Juillet: Thank you with all. Your questions will enable us to improve our action as well on the level of its comprehension as of the encouragements as they represent for all my team.
'Pak govt hand-in-glove with jihadis'
REDIFF
April 09, 2007 23:31 IST
The top rights panel in Pakistan has accused the government for being hand in glove with the radical Islamists and encouraging the Talibanisation of the country while attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus in Sindh, continue unabated.
"The lack of action after the excesses committed by the female students of the Jamia Hafsa in Islamabad exposes the deep-rooted links between the military and religious jihadi groups in the country," the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has said.
The HRCP said the dire warnings of forced Islamisation, suicide attacks and the setting up of a Qazi court by the clerics running the controversial Lal Masjid are even grimmer.
It was not convinced by President Pervez Musharraf's assertion that the rampaging women armed with sticks are being tolerated for the time being to avoid large-scale violence in the event of a crackdown on the Islamists.
"This is ironic since over the past months, dozens of female political workers, labour leaders, NGO activists and others have been beaten by police with batons, dragged on the ground and their clothes ripped," the rights panel, headed by noted lawyer and activist Asma Jahangir, said.
The panel report has also highlighted the attacks on non-Muslim citizens across the country. "False cases have been registered against Hindus in Sindh, where they have been especially targeted as a means of political victimisation," the statement by the HRCP said. It has also mentioned "attacks on temples, churches and other places of worship."
"The trend of forced conversions, especially of young women, is continuing most notably in Sindh," the HRCP said.
Alleging that the intelligence agencies in the country was directly linked to the cases of missing persons, the HRCP has "demanded the setting up of a judicial commission to probe the cases."
"The official contention that these people had themselves left their homes, possibly to take part in 'jihad' is simply incredulous," the statement by the HRCP said.
The rights panel has also condemned the detention of political dissidents without the due process of law. "The treatment meted out to Akhtar Mengal of the BNP, who was held in a 'cage' while appearing before an anti-terrorism court in Karachi, is just one example of victimisation of Baloch nationalist leaders," it said.
Flaying the "blatant intervention in the judicial process by the military regime", it has praised the democratic aspiration of the citizens, especially the "struggle" waged by the lawyers against the removal of the chief justice of Pakistan to safeguard the judicial independence.
Highlighting the threat to the freedom of the media in the country, the HRCP said "journalists have been abducted, threatened and beaten as part of a campaign to suppress dissent."
It has mentioned the "picking-up" by agencies of the BBC's Dilawar Wazir in November last year and the abduction of Peshawar-based journalist Sohail Qalandar early this year.
"The mayhem inflicted by police within the offices of the Geo private channel in Islamabad is one of the worst incidents" while "other channels too have been warned to tone down criticism of the government," the panel said in a statement
April 09, 2007 23:31 IST
The top rights panel in Pakistan has accused the government for being hand in glove with the radical Islamists and encouraging the Talibanisation of the country while attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus in Sindh, continue unabated.
"The lack of action after the excesses committed by the female students of the Jamia Hafsa in Islamabad exposes the deep-rooted links between the military and religious jihadi groups in the country," the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has said.
The HRCP said the dire warnings of forced Islamisation, suicide attacks and the setting up of a Qazi court by the clerics running the controversial Lal Masjid are even grimmer.
It was not convinced by President Pervez Musharraf's assertion that the rampaging women armed with sticks are being tolerated for the time being to avoid large-scale violence in the event of a crackdown on the Islamists.
"This is ironic since over the past months, dozens of female political workers, labour leaders, NGO activists and others have been beaten by police with batons, dragged on the ground and their clothes ripped," the rights panel, headed by noted lawyer and activist Asma Jahangir, said.
The panel report has also highlighted the attacks on non-Muslim citizens across the country. "False cases have been registered against Hindus in Sindh, where they have been especially targeted as a means of political victimisation," the statement by the HRCP said. It has also mentioned "attacks on temples, churches and other places of worship."
"The trend of forced conversions, especially of young women, is continuing most notably in Sindh," the HRCP said.
Alleging that the intelligence agencies in the country was directly linked to the cases of missing persons, the HRCP has "demanded the setting up of a judicial commission to probe the cases."
"The official contention that these people had themselves left their homes, possibly to take part in 'jihad' is simply incredulous," the statement by the HRCP said.
The rights panel has also condemned the detention of political dissidents without the due process of law. "The treatment meted out to Akhtar Mengal of the BNP, who was held in a 'cage' while appearing before an anti-terrorism court in Karachi, is just one example of victimisation of Baloch nationalist leaders," it said.
Flaying the "blatant intervention in the judicial process by the military regime", it has praised the democratic aspiration of the citizens, especially the "struggle" waged by the lawyers against the removal of the chief justice of Pakistan to safeguard the judicial independence.
Highlighting the threat to the freedom of the media in the country, the HRCP said "journalists have been abducted, threatened and beaten as part of a campaign to suppress dissent."
It has mentioned the "picking-up" by agencies of the BBC's Dilawar Wazir in November last year and the abduction of Peshawar-based journalist Sohail Qalandar early this year.
"The mayhem inflicted by police within the offices of the Geo private channel in Islamabad is one of the worst incidents" while "other channels too have been warned to tone down criticism of the government," the panel said in a statement
Indian Air Force To Gain Global Combat Ability: Fali Major
Dated 9/4/2007
Indicating that an Aerospace Command will take shape soon to give India means to exploit its space assets for military purposes, new Air Force chief Fali Homi Major on Monday said IAF has chalked out a plan to give it a truly global combat reach.
In his maiden interaction with the media after taking over as the Air Chief on March 31, he said a time-bound plan was already underway to induct top-of-the-shelf fighters, force multipliers and other strategic assets to help the force on its way to have worldwide reach.
Denying that delay in floating international tenders for purchase of 126 Medium Range Combat Aircraft could hit the country's defence preparedness, Fali Major said that all threat perceptions in the present geo-political scenario around the country has been 'catered to.'
Saying that the RFP for the fighters will be out soon, the Air Chief said the tenders involved certain complex issue like life cycle costs, transfer of technology and framing of integrity pact, which was being worked out.
"It is for the first time that IAF as well as Ministry of Defence has come up with concepts like life cycle costs. So it is taking a little longer," he said. But, he asserted that IAF was going in for upgradation of its top-of-the-shelf fighters like Mig-29 and Mirage 2000 to ensure the country's air power retained the cutting edge in the region in the meantime.
Along with purchase of fighters, Major said IAF was in various stages of acquiring more radar, surveillance platforms and other strategic assets. On Aerospace command, like his two predecessors, the new Air Chief pointed to it as an 'urgent requirement' and said he would pursue the concept with the government.
"It will be a Tri-service command, with the Air Force having the lead role as it is the force, which would operate space-based assets being planned and being inducted," he said. "As the geo-political environment changes and as we induct newer systems, it is our endeavour to re-orient our minds and adapt our doctrines to keep pace," he said.
On the proposed collaboration with Russia for the 5th generation fighters, Major said the concepts were still on drawing board stage and would take about ten years more. IAF, he said, along with boosting up its fighter squadron strength was also going in for upgrading the numbers of medium lift helicopters as well as transport aircraft.
"A RFP on government to government basis is almost finalised for setting up the first ever squadron of C-130J Hercules transport aircraft for the special forces," he said. Admitting that their were gaps in the country's radar coverage specially in the peninsular regions in the South, he said major plans were underway to acquire different kinds of radar to set up a comprehensive radar coverage of the entire peninsular India.
Asked if the IAF will acquire high altitude gunships against insurgents, Major said IAF had the power and means to carry out such mission, but it was for the government to determine whether or not to use air power against terrorists.
While admitting that IAF assets like helicopters and transport aircraft were being used to ferry paramilitary forces for anti-insurgent and anti-Naxalite operations, the new Air Chief termed these as 'security missions' for which IAF is tasked for. Turning to flight safety, the new Air Chief said in 2006-07, IAF had achieved the lowest accident rate of 0.36 per cent since its inception.
Patting the Directorate of Flight Safety for this, Major attributed the fall in accident rate to modifications in flying technique, framing better work ethos, carrying out better analysis of snags and framing better training pattern for pilots. Flying safely is our utmost concern, Major said, adding, "At every step, we must strive to fly hard, fly well and fly safe."
Photograph Courtesy Press Information Bureau, Indian Government
Indicating that an Aerospace Command will take shape soon to give India means to exploit its space assets for military purposes, new Air Force chief Fali Homi Major on Monday said IAF has chalked out a plan to give it a truly global combat reach.
In his maiden interaction with the media after taking over as the Air Chief on March 31, he said a time-bound plan was already underway to induct top-of-the-shelf fighters, force multipliers and other strategic assets to help the force on its way to have worldwide reach.
Denying that delay in floating international tenders for purchase of 126 Medium Range Combat Aircraft could hit the country's defence preparedness, Fali Major said that all threat perceptions in the present geo-political scenario around the country has been 'catered to.'
Saying that the RFP for the fighters will be out soon, the Air Chief said the tenders involved certain complex issue like life cycle costs, transfer of technology and framing of integrity pact, which was being worked out.
"It is for the first time that IAF as well as Ministry of Defence has come up with concepts like life cycle costs. So it is taking a little longer," he said. But, he asserted that IAF was going in for upgradation of its top-of-the-shelf fighters like Mig-29 and Mirage 2000 to ensure the country's air power retained the cutting edge in the region in the meantime.
Along with purchase of fighters, Major said IAF was in various stages of acquiring more radar, surveillance platforms and other strategic assets. On Aerospace command, like his two predecessors, the new Air Chief pointed to it as an 'urgent requirement' and said he would pursue the concept with the government.
"It will be a Tri-service command, with the Air Force having the lead role as it is the force, which would operate space-based assets being planned and being inducted," he said. "As the geo-political environment changes and as we induct newer systems, it is our endeavour to re-orient our minds and adapt our doctrines to keep pace," he said.
On the proposed collaboration with Russia for the 5th generation fighters, Major said the concepts were still on drawing board stage and would take about ten years more. IAF, he said, along with boosting up its fighter squadron strength was also going in for upgrading the numbers of medium lift helicopters as well as transport aircraft.
"A RFP on government to government basis is almost finalised for setting up the first ever squadron of C-130J Hercules transport aircraft for the special forces," he said. Admitting that their were gaps in the country's radar coverage specially in the peninsular regions in the South, he said major plans were underway to acquire different kinds of radar to set up a comprehensive radar coverage of the entire peninsular India.
Asked if the IAF will acquire high altitude gunships against insurgents, Major said IAF had the power and means to carry out such mission, but it was for the government to determine whether or not to use air power against terrorists.
While admitting that IAF assets like helicopters and transport aircraft were being used to ferry paramilitary forces for anti-insurgent and anti-Naxalite operations, the new Air Chief termed these as 'security missions' for which IAF is tasked for. Turning to flight safety, the new Air Chief said in 2006-07, IAF had achieved the lowest accident rate of 0.36 per cent since its inception.
Patting the Directorate of Flight Safety for this, Major attributed the fall in accident rate to modifications in flying technique, framing better work ethos, carrying out better analysis of snags and framing better training pattern for pilots. Flying safely is our utmost concern, Major said, adding, "At every step, we must strive to fly hard, fly well and fly safe."
Photograph Courtesy Press Information Bureau, Indian Government
April 08, 2007
YS Rajasekhar Reddy US visit : Hindu groups organising protest
Telugu groups in US are planning a protest march against Y S Rajashaker Reddy for his alleged policies against Hindu Temple . These groups say he is misusing Hindu temple Endowment Act and Looting, Selling, Encroachment of temple property . Below material is been circulated on net .
Please circulate this among your friends and relatives in USA, so that they can perform their Dharmic duty of participating in the Chicago protest against the anti-Hindu CM of Andhra Pradesh, Y.Samuel Rajasekhar Reddy, on Sunday, 6th May,2007.
Dr.Vijayalakshmi
http://savetemples.org/
Awareness Campaign to Save Temples
Please Join the Protest during AP CM Samuel Reddy visit at TANA/ATA reception
Sun. May 6, 2007 at 4:30 PM
Donald Stephens Convention Center
5555 N. River Rd. Rosemont, IL,
847-692-2220
Out of state people can join and come in a car pool. For more details please visit and register at http://savetemples.org or send email to bharatmat@gmail.com
Details:
Hindu Temples, Institutions & Hinduism itself are unfairly targeted by Governments in India. Using Hindu Temple Endowment Act Looting, Selling, Encroachments are occurring all over India. Particularly alarming is the situation in Andhra Pradesh (AP).
Under AP CM Y. Samuel Rajasekhar Reddy (YSR) About 34,000 Temples are under Govt. control & only 18% is said to be given back for temples maintenance. Looting, Massive sale of temple lands, Demolition, Encroachments, aggressive religious conversions in temples vicinity occurring all over AP. Govt. which is supposed to be a protector has become perpetrator that threatens the very existence of Hindu Institutions. Even world famous Tirupathi temple is not spared.
* Tirupathi : Govt. attempted to take over 5 out of 7 Tirumala Hills for Church and Tourism Purposes. Samuel Reddy is alleged to use TTD money for Hockey tournament in his parents name. Govt. eyed only Hindu (TTD) funds for Jala Yagnam to tune of 500 crores. (The Hindu: 7/17/06, Deccan Chronicle:3/8/07, justandhra.com,3/22/06).
Demolition: Recently 15 temples were demolished for Golf Course. Samuel Reddy's son blew up a temple in Anantpur (Hindu 8/27/2004 Deccan Chronicle:3/8/2007, Jyoti).
* Illegal occupation and Land scams: Valuable temple properties, estimated at hundreds of crores, is under encroachment. More than 50 per cent of the `land-grabbers' seem to have strong political connections, while others include those `patronized' by the Endowments Department. Samuel Reddy's brother Vivekananda Reddy build personal property on Gurkul Trust Lands worth many crores (The Hindu, 3/9/07).
* Mass Land Sales: Tens of thousands of acres of endowment lands, meant for sustenance in perpetuity are being sold without approval of the Hindu community and without any justification. Eg., 3000 acres temple land in East Godavari was sold. Sold 9201 acres of rural temple land and decided to sell 7000 acres of urban lands worth 20,000 crores (Deccan Chronicle, 4/31/06, Eenadu, 3/30/06, Deccan Chronicle 4/8/06).
* Take Over: On 3/12/2007 State Govt. announced plans to takeover cash rich 181 mutts and all religious trusts in the state with many crores of assets, the first step in looting them (Deccan Chronicle, 3/12/07).
* AP Govt. allocates 1.1 crores for Mosques, 6.5 crores for Churches. Pays Haj trips (12,000 Rs per pilgrim) with pending proposal to Bethlehem. Compare this with 50% bus fare surcharge on Maha Sivarathri day taxing poor Hindus similar to Auranazeb's Jizya tax (Deccan Chronicle: 8/23/06, 12/18/06, Eeenadu, 2/16/07). Hindu Festivals Holi, Krishna Janmashtami and Rama Navami (in AP) are no more Govt. Holidays .(Jyoti, 4/5/07)
More Data on Assault on Hindu Institutions
The actions of Samuel Reddy Govt. suggests a well designed plan to decimate Hinduism in Andhra Pradesh through destruction of Hindu Institutions and abetting massive illegal conversions. The entire state infrastructure is made available for these activities.
Areas surrounding every major Hindu Temple has become center of intense conversion activity. Endowment Dept. permits enormous Christian prayer meeting on temple lands with advertisements in temples. All these activities are to encourage Hindus to convert.
The Major chunk of temple money is transferred for various political schemes while more than 40,000 Priests are given salary below Rs.500 /- Month and over 3,000 Priest are paid only Rs. 400 /- for the whole year. While Muslim and Christian institution funds are left untouched, Govt. relentlessly targets Hindu (e.g., TTD) money for various projects.
Per YSR son-in-law Mr. Anil Kumar, YSR believes he attained position of power only due to his faith and not the Pada Yatra that mobilised people who voted him to power, largest percentage of which are Hindus.
Sample of atrocities on Specific Hindu Temples.
TIRUPATHI
The state Govt. in association with Missionaries has particularly targeted the World famous Tirupathi temple. The subversive activities of Missionaries were zeroed at Tirumala temple itself. Attempted to tie up SVIMS Sri Venkateswara Institute for Medical Sciences with Christian Cherian Heart Foundation using 100 crores of TTD money. Padmavathi University Vice Chancellor Veena Noble Das appointed by Govt. is engaging in conversion activities on campus and is reported to be responsible for suicide of a student who was forced to convert (Andhra Jyothi, 3/30/3007). In July 2006, TV Journalist Om Prakash who attempted to record the Christian Evangelical activity was beaten up and his equipment was confiscated.
SIMACHALAM
Simachalam is the Ancient Temple of Narasimha Swamy. Very Recently the Temple has come under siege by Missionaries, who have conducting aggressive conversions. In a span of 20 Months, four churches and 3 convent schools have come up in the vicinity at the foothills. Just one village Arilova has 35 churches. Out of 11,000 acres owned originally by temple, endowment department has record of only 8000 acres and it is believed that more than 3000 acres of land was encroached.
BHADRACHALAM
BHADRACHALAM is a famous temple dedicated to Lord Sri Ramachandra and situated on the banks of the sacred river Godavari. Govt. is currently planning to buy 900 acres of temple land at rate determined by Govt. for donation to victims of Polavaram project (Eenadu, 4/3/2007). On Hanuman Jayanthi day missionaries placed posters in the temple encouraging conversion (Eenadu, 5/24/06).
CHILAKURI BALAJI TEMPLE
This is famous Chilakuri Balaji Temple at Hyderabad Outskirts. It is a very well run organization by Private trustees. However it is target of Government takeover for its revenue generating potential. (The Hindu, 8/24/06)
SRISAILAM
SRISAILAM is situated in the thick and inaccessible forests of the Nallamalai hills, in the northeastern portion of the Nandikotkur Taluk of Kurnool District. The Endowment department has allowed encroachment of many Acres of Temple Land surrounding the temple and like all other temples, aggressive conversions is occurring relentlessly in surrounding areas.
Please circulate this among your friends and relatives in USA, so that they can perform their Dharmic duty of participating in the Chicago protest against the anti-Hindu CM of Andhra Pradesh, Y.Samuel Rajasekhar Reddy, on Sunday, 6th May,2007.
Dr.Vijayalakshmi
http://savetemples.org/
Awareness Campaign to Save Temples
Please Join the Protest during AP CM Samuel Reddy visit at TANA/ATA reception
Sun. May 6, 2007 at 4:30 PM
Donald Stephens Convention Center
5555 N. River Rd. Rosemont, IL,
847-692-2220
Out of state people can join and come in a car pool. For more details please visit and register at http://savetemples.org or send email to bharatmat@gmail.com
Details:
Hindu Temples, Institutions & Hinduism itself are unfairly targeted by Governments in India. Using Hindu Temple Endowment Act Looting, Selling, Encroachments are occurring all over India. Particularly alarming is the situation in Andhra Pradesh (AP).
Under AP CM Y. Samuel Rajasekhar Reddy (YSR) About 34,000 Temples are under Govt. control & only 18% is said to be given back for temples maintenance. Looting, Massive sale of temple lands, Demolition, Encroachments, aggressive religious conversions in temples vicinity occurring all over AP. Govt. which is supposed to be a protector has become perpetrator that threatens the very existence of Hindu Institutions. Even world famous Tirupathi temple is not spared.
* Tirupathi : Govt. attempted to take over 5 out of 7 Tirumala Hills for Church and Tourism Purposes. Samuel Reddy is alleged to use TTD money for Hockey tournament in his parents name. Govt. eyed only Hindu (TTD) funds for Jala Yagnam to tune of 500 crores. (The Hindu: 7/17/06, Deccan Chronicle:3/8/07, justandhra.com,3/22/06).
Demolition: Recently 15 temples were demolished for Golf Course. Samuel Reddy's son blew up a temple in Anantpur (Hindu 8/27/2004 Deccan Chronicle:3/8/2007, Jyoti).
* Illegal occupation and Land scams: Valuable temple properties, estimated at hundreds of crores, is under encroachment. More than 50 per cent of the `land-grabbers' seem to have strong political connections, while others include those `patronized' by the Endowments Department. Samuel Reddy's brother Vivekananda Reddy build personal property on Gurkul Trust Lands worth many crores (The Hindu, 3/9/07).
* Mass Land Sales: Tens of thousands of acres of endowment lands, meant for sustenance in perpetuity are being sold without approval of the Hindu community and without any justification. Eg., 3000 acres temple land in East Godavari was sold. Sold 9201 acres of rural temple land and decided to sell 7000 acres of urban lands worth 20,000 crores (Deccan Chronicle, 4/31/06, Eenadu, 3/30/06, Deccan Chronicle 4/8/06).
* Take Over: On 3/12/2007 State Govt. announced plans to takeover cash rich 181 mutts and all religious trusts in the state with many crores of assets, the first step in looting them (Deccan Chronicle, 3/12/07).
* AP Govt. allocates 1.1 crores for Mosques, 6.5 crores for Churches. Pays Haj trips (12,000 Rs per pilgrim) with pending proposal to Bethlehem. Compare this with 50% bus fare surcharge on Maha Sivarathri day taxing poor Hindus similar to Auranazeb's Jizya tax (Deccan Chronicle: 8/23/06, 12/18/06, Eeenadu, 2/16/07). Hindu Festivals Holi, Krishna Janmashtami and Rama Navami (in AP) are no more Govt. Holidays .(Jyoti, 4/5/07)
More Data on Assault on Hindu Institutions
The actions of Samuel Reddy Govt. suggests a well designed plan to decimate Hinduism in Andhra Pradesh through destruction of Hindu Institutions and abetting massive illegal conversions. The entire state infrastructure is made available for these activities.
Areas surrounding every major Hindu Temple has become center of intense conversion activity. Endowment Dept. permits enormous Christian prayer meeting on temple lands with advertisements in temples. All these activities are to encourage Hindus to convert.
The Major chunk of temple money is transferred for various political schemes while more than 40,000 Priests are given salary below Rs.500 /- Month and over 3,000 Priest are paid only Rs. 400 /- for the whole year. While Muslim and Christian institution funds are left untouched, Govt. relentlessly targets Hindu (e.g., TTD) money for various projects.
Per YSR son-in-law Mr. Anil Kumar, YSR believes he attained position of power only due to his faith and not the Pada Yatra that mobilised people who voted him to power, largest percentage of which are Hindus.
Sample of atrocities on Specific Hindu Temples.
TIRUPATHI
The state Govt. in association with Missionaries has particularly targeted the World famous Tirupathi temple. The subversive activities of Missionaries were zeroed at Tirumala temple itself. Attempted to tie up SVIMS Sri Venkateswara Institute for Medical Sciences with Christian Cherian Heart Foundation using 100 crores of TTD money. Padmavathi University Vice Chancellor Veena Noble Das appointed by Govt. is engaging in conversion activities on campus and is reported to be responsible for suicide of a student who was forced to convert (Andhra Jyothi, 3/30/3007). In July 2006, TV Journalist Om Prakash who attempted to record the Christian Evangelical activity was beaten up and his equipment was confiscated.
SIMACHALAM
Simachalam is the Ancient Temple of Narasimha Swamy. Very Recently the Temple has come under siege by Missionaries, who have conducting aggressive conversions. In a span of 20 Months, four churches and 3 convent schools have come up in the vicinity at the foothills. Just one village Arilova has 35 churches. Out of 11,000 acres owned originally by temple, endowment department has record of only 8000 acres and it is believed that more than 3000 acres of land was encroached.
BHADRACHALAM
BHADRACHALAM is a famous temple dedicated to Lord Sri Ramachandra and situated on the banks of the sacred river Godavari. Govt. is currently planning to buy 900 acres of temple land at rate determined by Govt. for donation to victims of Polavaram project (Eenadu, 4/3/2007). On Hanuman Jayanthi day missionaries placed posters in the temple encouraging conversion (Eenadu, 5/24/06).
CHILAKURI BALAJI TEMPLE
This is famous Chilakuri Balaji Temple at Hyderabad Outskirts. It is a very well run organization by Private trustees. However it is target of Government takeover for its revenue generating potential. (The Hindu, 8/24/06)
SRISAILAM
SRISAILAM is situated in the thick and inaccessible forests of the Nallamalai hills, in the northeastern portion of the Nandikotkur Taluk of Kurnool District. The Endowment department has allowed encroachment of many Acres of Temple Land surrounding the temple and like all other temples, aggressive conversions is occurring relentlessly in surrounding areas.
Public Diplomacy in Sino-Egyptian Relations
By Chris Zambelis
China’s pursuit of stable sources of energy and access to burgeoning consumer markets largely dictates its diplomacy in resource-rich Africa and the Middle East. An oft overlooked objective of this strategy, however, is Beijing’s aim of enhancing its position as a rising global power, which would require the ability to project influence outside of its immediate regional periphery. To this end, China is busy cultivating multifaceted relationships with regional powers throughout Africa and the Middle East—beyond the energy and business sectors—to include cooperation in the political and security spheres, as well as science and cultural exchanges. Shoring up regional support for the “One China” principle also tops Beijing’s agenda.
Beijing is also fashioning itself as an alternative source of economic development aid, a role traditionally dominated by the United States, Europe and Western-led institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Western-dictated aid structures have led to deep-seated resentment among regional governments and populations. In contrast, as a developing country untainted by the colonial legacy of its Western counterparts in the region, Beijing is able to portray itself as a champion of the developing world. To date, this approach has reaped great dividends for China on many fronts.
In this context, Egypt figures prominently into China’s strategic calculus. Egypt is an influential Arab, Muslim and Middle Eastern power that in many respects represents the political and cultural center of gravity of the Arab world. Likewise, it is an African power that is keen on reestablishing the regional influence it once enjoyed on the continent, most notably when President Gamal Abdel Nasser was on the forefront of supporting the national liberation movements that resisted colonialism in Africa in the 1950s and 60s. Egypt is also determined to emerge as the leader of Arabs, Muslims and Africans in the international arena. For example, Cairo’s pursuit of a permanent seat on a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) alongside the five permanent members—a goal supported by Beijing—is often framed as an effort to marshal Arab, Muslim and African interests.
Despite growing tensions and popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the region, Egypt remains a staunch ally of the United States and is firmly entrenched in the U.S.-led regional security architecture. At the same time, Cairo resents what it sees as U.S. interference in its internal affairs regarding issues such as the slow pace of political reform and its human rights record. Egypt is also frustrated by what it considers to be the unwillingness of the United States to engage in a genuine Middle East peace process, a key source of resentment among Egyptians and the rest of the region amidst the ongoing violence and instability in Iraq. In contrast, China is widely regarded as an advocate for the Palestinian national cause. In this regard, Egypt sees China as a potential partner that can help enhance its leverage vis-Ã -vis the United States. Cairo believes that Beijing could someday play a constructive role in Middle East diplomacy, a calculation based largely on its potential to act as a check on U.S. power in the region. Egypt is also counting on Chinese support for reviving its peaceful nuclear program that was suspended in 1986 (Al-Ahram Weekly, November 9-15, 2006).
Sino-Egyptian relations are firmly rooted in the confluence of tangible mutual interests that encompass economics, geopolitics and security. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the nature of the rhetoric both sides use to characterize their rapidly expanding ties and better understand the trajectory of the Sino-Egyptian relationship. Doing so would provide insight into the power of effective public diplomacy. After all, like all forms of public diplomacy, Sino-Egyptian discourse is calculated to achieve specific objectives and to present a carefully calibrated image for international and domestic consumption.
Among other things, China and Egypt see themselves as the proud heirs of great civilizations. As a result, they believe that they occupy a privileged place in the world based on their respective ancient heritages. Sino-Egyptian public diplomacy is imbued with this kind of reinforcing rhetoric, in addition to populist themes that emphasize “South-South” cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, discourse highlighting themes such as mutual respect, equality and a shared sense of pride resonates strongly in Africa and the Middle East, especially in societies that continue to be shaped by patron-client relationships with former colonial and Western powers. In contrast, despite its aspirations of global power, China is keen on portraying its inevitable rise as a benign phenomenon and one that is symbolic of the potential harbored by developing countries. This presents China as a positive example worth following for countries like Egypt.
Brotherly Ties That Bind
The rhetoric used to mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Egyptian relations in May 2006 is typical of Chinese public diplomacy in Egypt. During a June 2006 press conference in Cairo, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: “China and Egypt both have great civilizations…and are both creators of human glory and progress and defender [sic] of mankind’s cultural heritage, and we both pursue lofty values and ideals,” (People’s Daily, June 19, 2006). He added that China “feels indebted” to the Egyptians, the first nation in Africa to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1956. He quoted a Chinese proverb in a sign of heartfelt appreciation: “We should never forget the benefits we are offered or forget the favor received.” Premier Jiabao went on to remind his Egyptian audience that “the hat of neo-colonialism simply doesn’t fit China,” a response meant to refute reports of Chinese human rights abuses in the African business sector (Xinhua, October 5, 2006).
There are signs that Beijing’s calculated rhetoric towards Egypt resonates beyond the official state level and is reaching ordinary Chinese. Zhang Boyin, a retired professor at Beijing University described his first trip to Egypt in 2006 as a “dream come true.” He went on to proudly repeat Mao Zedong’s adage regarding the significance of Africa to China: “it is our African brothers who carried us into the United Nations,” (Xinhua, October 5, 2006). China is tapping this momentum by expanding Sino-Egyptian contacts on the popular level. For example, Beijing is encouraging outbound Chinese tourism to Egypt, as well as to Africa more generally. China is also rapidly expanding cultural contacts to include educational exchanges in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa to include the promotion of the Chinese language and culture through the establishment of local “Confucius Institutes” (Xinhua, October 5, 2006).
Egyptian public diplomacy in China mirrors its counterpart’s emphasis on the “special” nature of Sino-Egyptian ties. In a statement just prior to his November 2006 visit to Beijing to attend the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated: “For me, visiting China is like going home. Egypt sees China more as a brother than as an ordinary friendly nation.” In a show of appreciation for Beijing’s growing engagement in Africa in recent years, Mubarak added: “The development of Africa-China friendship should be credited to the fact that Africa-China relations are based on equality, mutual respect and reciprocity,” (Xinhua, October 31, 2006). In this regard, both China and Egypt are quick to highlight what they label as the revival of “South-South” cooperation, a subtle message meant for U.S. and Western audiences (Al-Ahram Weekly, November 9-15, 2006).
Ordinary Egyptians generally harbor positive opinions towards the Chinese. For the most part, Egyptians see China as a potential check on U.S. power in the region, a sentiment stemming from deep-seated opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. However, there is evidence that China is attracting popular support and admiration among Egyptians for other reasons. For example, the recent inaugurations of the region’s first Confucius Institute, in partnership with Cairo University, and a joint Egyptian-Chinese University are drawing interest among a wide cross-section of Egyptians. Speaking about the Confucius Institute, American University of Cairo Economics Professor Adel Bashai remarked: “we have a lot to learn from the Chinese…the biggest benefit is to know the culture and religion…to know how they got to where they got.” The number of Egyptians studying the Chinese language is also growing rapidly. Chinese is now taught at a number of major universities across Egypt, including al-Azhar, one of the world’s leading centers of Islamic scholarship” (Daily Star [Egypt], December 28, 2006).
Conclusion
Sino-Egyptian relations are poised to develop further in the coming years and effective public diplomacy will play a critical role in sustaining these ties. Beijing will continue to see Cairo as a strategic gateway toward expanded ties with the Arab world and Africa. Likewise, Egypt will look to China as a means of gaining leverage in its increasingly precarious position vis-Ã -vis its primary ally, the United States. Egypt will also try to harness China’s momentum in assuming a greater leadership role in an attempt to represent Arabs, Muslims and Africans on the global stage. However, despite their mutual emphasis on furthering “South-South” cooperation and enhancing “brotherly ties,” there are limits to this relationship. Beijing and Cairo are not prepared or willing to jeopardize friendly and constructive relations with the United States in the foreseeable future in the hopes of cementing closer relations that threaten to directly undermine Washington’s stake in the region. Indeed, despite the rhetoric, the expansion of Sino-Egyptian ties is driven as much by the intent of ensuring friendly relations with the United States as it is bolstering the existing Sino-Egyptian bond.
China’s pursuit of stable sources of energy and access to burgeoning consumer markets largely dictates its diplomacy in resource-rich Africa and the Middle East. An oft overlooked objective of this strategy, however, is Beijing’s aim of enhancing its position as a rising global power, which would require the ability to project influence outside of its immediate regional periphery. To this end, China is busy cultivating multifaceted relationships with regional powers throughout Africa and the Middle East—beyond the energy and business sectors—to include cooperation in the political and security spheres, as well as science and cultural exchanges. Shoring up regional support for the “One China” principle also tops Beijing’s agenda.
Beijing is also fashioning itself as an alternative source of economic development aid, a role traditionally dominated by the United States, Europe and Western-led institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Western-dictated aid structures have led to deep-seated resentment among regional governments and populations. In contrast, as a developing country untainted by the colonial legacy of its Western counterparts in the region, Beijing is able to portray itself as a champion of the developing world. To date, this approach has reaped great dividends for China on many fronts.
In this context, Egypt figures prominently into China’s strategic calculus. Egypt is an influential Arab, Muslim and Middle Eastern power that in many respects represents the political and cultural center of gravity of the Arab world. Likewise, it is an African power that is keen on reestablishing the regional influence it once enjoyed on the continent, most notably when President Gamal Abdel Nasser was on the forefront of supporting the national liberation movements that resisted colonialism in Africa in the 1950s and 60s. Egypt is also determined to emerge as the leader of Arabs, Muslims and Africans in the international arena. For example, Cairo’s pursuit of a permanent seat on a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) alongside the five permanent members—a goal supported by Beijing—is often framed as an effort to marshal Arab, Muslim and African interests.
Despite growing tensions and popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the region, Egypt remains a staunch ally of the United States and is firmly entrenched in the U.S.-led regional security architecture. At the same time, Cairo resents what it sees as U.S. interference in its internal affairs regarding issues such as the slow pace of political reform and its human rights record. Egypt is also frustrated by what it considers to be the unwillingness of the United States to engage in a genuine Middle East peace process, a key source of resentment among Egyptians and the rest of the region amidst the ongoing violence and instability in Iraq. In contrast, China is widely regarded as an advocate for the Palestinian national cause. In this regard, Egypt sees China as a potential partner that can help enhance its leverage vis-Ã -vis the United States. Cairo believes that Beijing could someday play a constructive role in Middle East diplomacy, a calculation based largely on its potential to act as a check on U.S. power in the region. Egypt is also counting on Chinese support for reviving its peaceful nuclear program that was suspended in 1986 (Al-Ahram Weekly, November 9-15, 2006).
Sino-Egyptian relations are firmly rooted in the confluence of tangible mutual interests that encompass economics, geopolitics and security. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the nature of the rhetoric both sides use to characterize their rapidly expanding ties and better understand the trajectory of the Sino-Egyptian relationship. Doing so would provide insight into the power of effective public diplomacy. After all, like all forms of public diplomacy, Sino-Egyptian discourse is calculated to achieve specific objectives and to present a carefully calibrated image for international and domestic consumption.
Among other things, China and Egypt see themselves as the proud heirs of great civilizations. As a result, they believe that they occupy a privileged place in the world based on their respective ancient heritages. Sino-Egyptian public diplomacy is imbued with this kind of reinforcing rhetoric, in addition to populist themes that emphasize “South-South” cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, discourse highlighting themes such as mutual respect, equality and a shared sense of pride resonates strongly in Africa and the Middle East, especially in societies that continue to be shaped by patron-client relationships with former colonial and Western powers. In contrast, despite its aspirations of global power, China is keen on portraying its inevitable rise as a benign phenomenon and one that is symbolic of the potential harbored by developing countries. This presents China as a positive example worth following for countries like Egypt.
Brotherly Ties That Bind
The rhetoric used to mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Egyptian relations in May 2006 is typical of Chinese public diplomacy in Egypt. During a June 2006 press conference in Cairo, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: “China and Egypt both have great civilizations…and are both creators of human glory and progress and defender [sic] of mankind’s cultural heritage, and we both pursue lofty values and ideals,” (People’s Daily, June 19, 2006). He added that China “feels indebted” to the Egyptians, the first nation in Africa to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1956. He quoted a Chinese proverb in a sign of heartfelt appreciation: “We should never forget the benefits we are offered or forget the favor received.” Premier Jiabao went on to remind his Egyptian audience that “the hat of neo-colonialism simply doesn’t fit China,” a response meant to refute reports of Chinese human rights abuses in the African business sector (Xinhua, October 5, 2006).
There are signs that Beijing’s calculated rhetoric towards Egypt resonates beyond the official state level and is reaching ordinary Chinese. Zhang Boyin, a retired professor at Beijing University described his first trip to Egypt in 2006 as a “dream come true.” He went on to proudly repeat Mao Zedong’s adage regarding the significance of Africa to China: “it is our African brothers who carried us into the United Nations,” (Xinhua, October 5, 2006). China is tapping this momentum by expanding Sino-Egyptian contacts on the popular level. For example, Beijing is encouraging outbound Chinese tourism to Egypt, as well as to Africa more generally. China is also rapidly expanding cultural contacts to include educational exchanges in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa to include the promotion of the Chinese language and culture through the establishment of local “Confucius Institutes” (Xinhua, October 5, 2006).
Egyptian public diplomacy in China mirrors its counterpart’s emphasis on the “special” nature of Sino-Egyptian ties. In a statement just prior to his November 2006 visit to Beijing to attend the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated: “For me, visiting China is like going home. Egypt sees China more as a brother than as an ordinary friendly nation.” In a show of appreciation for Beijing’s growing engagement in Africa in recent years, Mubarak added: “The development of Africa-China friendship should be credited to the fact that Africa-China relations are based on equality, mutual respect and reciprocity,” (Xinhua, October 31, 2006). In this regard, both China and Egypt are quick to highlight what they label as the revival of “South-South” cooperation, a subtle message meant for U.S. and Western audiences (Al-Ahram Weekly, November 9-15, 2006).
Ordinary Egyptians generally harbor positive opinions towards the Chinese. For the most part, Egyptians see China as a potential check on U.S. power in the region, a sentiment stemming from deep-seated opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. However, there is evidence that China is attracting popular support and admiration among Egyptians for other reasons. For example, the recent inaugurations of the region’s first Confucius Institute, in partnership with Cairo University, and a joint Egyptian-Chinese University are drawing interest among a wide cross-section of Egyptians. Speaking about the Confucius Institute, American University of Cairo Economics Professor Adel Bashai remarked: “we have a lot to learn from the Chinese…the biggest benefit is to know the culture and religion…to know how they got to where they got.” The number of Egyptians studying the Chinese language is also growing rapidly. Chinese is now taught at a number of major universities across Egypt, including al-Azhar, one of the world’s leading centers of Islamic scholarship” (Daily Star [Egypt], December 28, 2006).
Conclusion
Sino-Egyptian relations are poised to develop further in the coming years and effective public diplomacy will play a critical role in sustaining these ties. Beijing will continue to see Cairo as a strategic gateway toward expanded ties with the Arab world and Africa. Likewise, Egypt will look to China as a means of gaining leverage in its increasingly precarious position vis-Ã -vis its primary ally, the United States. Egypt will also try to harness China’s momentum in assuming a greater leadership role in an attempt to represent Arabs, Muslims and Africans on the global stage. However, despite their mutual emphasis on furthering “South-South” cooperation and enhancing “brotherly ties,” there are limits to this relationship. Beijing and Cairo are not prepared or willing to jeopardize friendly and constructive relations with the United States in the foreseeable future in the hopes of cementing closer relations that threaten to directly undermine Washington’s stake in the region. Indeed, despite the rhetoric, the expansion of Sino-Egyptian ties is driven as much by the intent of ensuring friendly relations with the United States as it is bolstering the existing Sino-Egyptian bond.
China and Africa: A New Scramble?
By Mauro De Lorenzo
While the question of China’s growing role in Africa has attracted wide attention over the past year, the intensity of the debate has not always been proportional to the actual extent of China’s role on the continent. China’s footprint in Africa is indeed expanding, as is that of the United States, Europe, India and many other countries that are looking to Africa as a trade and investment partner. Since 2001, every industrialized country has markedly increased its trade with Africa, principally with oil and gas purchases. As more and more African conflicts find resolution and as African governments continue to improve their regulatory environment, this growth of foreign—including Chinese— activities is a predictable consequence.
What distinguishes China’s involvement in Africa from that of other nations is that it is accompanied by a clear government policy in support of African commercial ventures, abundant financing and tax benefits for Chinese firms operating abroad and robust diplomacy toward the region [1]. State-owned Chinese companies can depend on the Ministry of Commerce, which manages most Chinese aid programs, to add sweeteners to bids for African government contracts or assets. A $5 billion oil-backed concessional loan was a prominent feature of the massive energy deals struck in Angola in 2005-2006, for example. With the announcement of a $5 billion investment fund for Africa at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, we can expect more deals that combine aid and investment.
Meanwhile, thanks to the pageantry associated with the Beijing Summit in November 2006 and the numerous extended visits paid to Africa by President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, the high visibility of China’s new profile in Africa has served as a target for Western concerns about the consequences of China’s economic and military rise, and of its true intentions in regions where it previously had few interests and little influence. And while China proclaims benign intentions—“mutual benefit” and “win-win cooperation” are the catchphrases—it may not fully appreciate the possible consequences of its methods of delivering aid upon African politics.
Trade, Investment and Aid
There are three main components to China’s economic engagement in Africa that are not always distinguished: trade, investment and aid. First, Chinese trade with Africa increased from $11 billion to $40 billion between 2000 and 2005, becoming Africa’s third largest trading partner [2]. Most of the increase comes from oil imports from Sudan, where China’s companies have been active since 1995, and Angola, where they made major energy investments in 2003-4. It is, however, important to consider these figures together with Africa’s increased trade with Europe and North America. It has also grown, though less slowly, and continues to constitute the destination for the majority of Africa’s exports. An important difference, however, is that the increase in Chinese trade with Africa is driven by “complementarities” between the two economies, whereas increased trade with North America and Europe has resulted from preferential trade arrangements, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Second, Chinese investment in Africa is increasing, but still represents a small fraction of China’s total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock. The stock of Chinese FDI in Africa in 2005 was $1.6 billion, which represented only 3 percent of China’s total FDI. Most Chinese investment was directed to Asia (53 percent) and Latin America (37 percent). The period 2003-2005 saw massive increases of Chinese FDI outflows to all parts of the world, not just to Africa [3].
Third, Chinese aid is now set to increase dramatically as well, and it is here that we can expect to see the most profound challenges to Africa’s relationships with the rest of the world. China has had aid programs in Africa since the 1960s, but with the exception of the rail line between Tanzania and Zambia and a number of stadiums around the continent, the impact left by Chinese aid was not great. World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz has called China to account for lending to countries that have recently benefited from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) loan forgiveness program. The value of Chinese aid in Africa is set to overtake World Bank assistance in 2007 with $8.1 billion on offer compared with only $2.3 billion from the Bank (Bloomberg.com, November 3, 2006).
The Chinese “aid” now on offer is intimately tied to its commercial expansion and often comes in the form of credits from the Chinese Export-Import Bank. The Beijing Summit also announced a token expansion of more purely humanitarian aid programs, such as the dispatching of 300 “young volunteers” to Africa and the pledge of establishing 100 rural schools in the continent before 2009. Beijing sees aid-giving as a way of generating positive sentiment toward China, and seems unaware of the consequences it can have on governance and economic performance, particularly when channeled through weak and undemocratic national governments. To the extent that Western donors have begun to learn some of the lessons from the poor performance of their previous aid programs, increased Chinese aid-giving could be a setback for sound economic policy-making and democratic accountability in Africa.
A View from the Great Lakes of Africa
With no energy resources, Rwanda and Burundi are not high priorities for China, but they are strategically situated next to the resource-rich Democratic Republic of Congo, where China has growing interests. Discussions are underway to start a Confucius Institute at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology in 2007, and Rwanda would like to entice Chinese companies doing business in the sub-region to locate their headquarters in Kigali [4]. However, though China’s engagement in both countries is on the increase, it has hardly reached the tsunami-like proportions that breathless media reports about China re-colonizing Africa would suggest.
In Rwanda, there has actually been little new Chinese investment since 2004. The Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) has issued no incentive-qualification certificates to Chinese companies over the past year. Most of the Chinese companies active in Rwanda are in the construction sector and have been working there since the 1970s or 1980s, such as the China National Road and Bridge Company, which has won significant contracts from the Rwandan government. New entrants include telecommunications companies Zhongxing and Huawei, with which the U.S.-Rwandan telephone company, Terracom, recently signed a deal to upgrade its network technology. The number of Chinese restaurants has expanded by 50 percent, from two to three.
Many of the Chinese actors on the ground are small-scale, private entrepreneurs or traders [5]. The owner of the new Chinese restaurant in Kigali first came to the country in 1996—to open a medical clinic; Chinese medicine has been extremely popular in East Africa since at least the 1980s. This tallies with UNCTAD’s finding that most Chinese investments in Africa are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—and thus only indirectly motivated by the high-level Chinese “go abroad” policy and its attendant incentives. Chinese firms are present in the Rwandan market, but they are not particularly central and hardly dominant. There are also none of the complaints about Chinese traders that are commonly heard in Zambia or South Africa. Chinese diplomats lament how “conservative” and “short-sighted” their compatriots are: very few end up investing despite promises of embassy support in bidding for contracts.
Rwanda was the first African country to open a permanent trade office in China. It is based in Shenzhen, and staffed by two Rwandans, one of whom has lived in China for 12 years and speaks Mandarin fluently. It assists Rwandan importers who visit Hong Kong and the factories of Guangdong in search of electronics and textiles that sell well in Rwanda and the sub-region. The office has had less success in enticing Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Rwanda, though a mobile-phone assembly facility for the local market is being planned in Rwanda by a Chinese-Rwandan joint venture. The office found that its most urgent task in China was much more basic: reassuring Chinese businesspeople that Rwandans did not live in trees, that Chinese visitors would not be hacked to death in a flare-up of the genocide, and that there is food to eat. A poster showing a bare-chested Rwandan traditional dancer was removed from the office because it was giving visitors the wrong impression about how most Rwandans dress.
The views of senior Rwandan officials toward China are positive and welcoming, but do not rise to adulation. They had a good experience at the Beijing Summit, but are waiting to see how China’s promises of increased cooperation will be translated into action. While they are concerned that Rwandans might be taken advantage of by Chinese firms and prefer Chinese investment over aid, Rwanda is allowing China to build the new headquarters for its foreign ministry. The rest of China’s aid program in Rwanda—some small health and agriculture programs and the management of a government-owned cement plant—is not significant enough that it would give the government significant “leverage” with the World Bank or bilateral donors. Even with the increased commitments announced in Beijing, there is little chance that China will soon rival the hundreds of millions of dollars a year that Rwanda receives from U.S. and European sources. A Chinese diplomat stated privately that there were no plans to respond to one of the Rwandan government’s top infrastructure priorities—a railway to Tanzania and the coast—because it would be “uneconomical.” China is financing the equally uneconomical Benguela railway rehabilitation in Angola, a major oil supplier.
In neighboring Burundi, where a gleaming new Chinese embassy was recently completed by a company brought in from China, an embassy official expressed his disappointment that the company had decided to return to China rather than establish a permanent presence in the region; the company saw high risks and few returns. Tianshi Health Products, however, proudly flies the Chinese flag over their new office in Bujumbura. In line with paragraph 4.4 of China’s January 2006 Africa Policy which declared that “it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange,” some members of the Burundian intelligence service have undergone training in China, according to a foreign human rights researcher who saw photographs of the training in the offices of the Burundian security service. At the official opening of parliament in February 2007, Burundi’s only admiral proudly wore a pin he had received during an exchange visit to China. Whether such military and intelligence cooperation is as practical as it is ceremonial is difficult to ascertain.
Though not representative of the continent as a whole, China’s engagement in Rwanda and Burundi has not dramatically increased over the past three years. Yet, neither is the engagement of China in oil-producing states like Angola and Sudan representative of the rest of the continent. The China-Africa question is not spontaneously discussed, and is not often in the media. With the exception of some importers, the countries’ political and economic elites continue to be oriented primarily to the United States, Europe and South Africa [6]
A View from Beijing
Foreign delegations visiting Beijing to discuss China-Africa relations tend to interact primarily with a community of Africanists and aid specialists based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and other government-affiliated think tanks [6]. They tend to portray China as a selfless friend of African countries and make frequent reference to China’s Cold War aid programs and support for African liberation movements. These scholars tend to believe that aid really can buy friendship and goodwill abroad, and also that China needs to systematize its aid apparatus if it is to be able to deliver upon the large commitments made at the Beijing Summit. There is little awareness that aid can have negative economic and political effects in the countries that receive it. There do not seem to be any mechanisms in place to monitor the effectiveness of Chinese aid, even at the most basic level of ensuring that the money is not stolen.
In discussions with U.S. delegations, the focus is often a competition to show which side is more genuinely concerned with Africa’s well-being. To the frustration of African interlocutors, the discussion is rarely focused on what Africa should do to take advantage of the new opportunities that China’s expanded commitment to Africa offers. To China’s experts, criticism of the country’s intentions and investments in Africa seems like part of a strategy by Western countries to “thwart China’s development,” as one scholar put it. One rumor in circulation in PLA circles suggests that U.S. intelligence agencies are planning to foment local unrest toward Chinese ventures in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.
In off-the-record discussions, two senior Chinese scholars conceded that China should indeed “do something” when faced with genocide in Africa—though they seemed to be referring to private exchanges with African leaders rather than public denunciation or military action. China’s intransigent position on Sudan seems to derive not only from China’s traditional adherence to a doctrine of “non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states,” but also from a desire to thwart U.S. foreign policy, and less from any specific concern about the security of Chinese energy investments in Sudan: Sudan needs China more than China needs it. One of China’s undisclosed requirements for agreeing to pressure the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping force may be that Hu Jintao, rather than George W. Bush, takes the credit. As one Chinese blogger exulted during President Hu’s trip to Africa in February 2007: “Our brother Hu thawed the Darfur crisis with his cordial smile! The United Nations peacekeeping force is going to station in Darfur with his cordial smile! Bush failed, brother Hu succeeded with a smile! Sino-Africa friendship is true friendship!”[7].
Notes
1. See the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)”, the key document emanating from the Beijing Summit in November 2006. It recapitulates and expands the Chinese government white paper on policy towards Africa issued in January 2006.
2. UNCTAD/UNDP, Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Nations, New York, March 2007, p. 56.
3.UNCTAD/UNDP, Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Countries, New York, March 2007.
4. See .
5. Based upon this author’s observations during his several visits to the Great Lakes region.
6. For a good indication of Rwanda’s priorities, see this article about President Kagame’s address to the Starbucks board of directors in March 2007 and his expanding relations with American CEOs: pluggedin_Gunther_Rwanda.fortune/?postversion=2007032910.
7. Referenced at the blog of China-Africa watcher Jennifer Brea:
While the question of China’s growing role in Africa has attracted wide attention over the past year, the intensity of the debate has not always been proportional to the actual extent of China’s role on the continent. China’s footprint in Africa is indeed expanding, as is that of the United States, Europe, India and many other countries that are looking to Africa as a trade and investment partner. Since 2001, every industrialized country has markedly increased its trade with Africa, principally with oil and gas purchases. As more and more African conflicts find resolution and as African governments continue to improve their regulatory environment, this growth of foreign—including Chinese— activities is a predictable consequence.
What distinguishes China’s involvement in Africa from that of other nations is that it is accompanied by a clear government policy in support of African commercial ventures, abundant financing and tax benefits for Chinese firms operating abroad and robust diplomacy toward the region [1]. State-owned Chinese companies can depend on the Ministry of Commerce, which manages most Chinese aid programs, to add sweeteners to bids for African government contracts or assets. A $5 billion oil-backed concessional loan was a prominent feature of the massive energy deals struck in Angola in 2005-2006, for example. With the announcement of a $5 billion investment fund for Africa at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, we can expect more deals that combine aid and investment.
Meanwhile, thanks to the pageantry associated with the Beijing Summit in November 2006 and the numerous extended visits paid to Africa by President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, the high visibility of China’s new profile in Africa has served as a target for Western concerns about the consequences of China’s economic and military rise, and of its true intentions in regions where it previously had few interests and little influence. And while China proclaims benign intentions—“mutual benefit” and “win-win cooperation” are the catchphrases—it may not fully appreciate the possible consequences of its methods of delivering aid upon African politics.
Trade, Investment and Aid
There are three main components to China’s economic engagement in Africa that are not always distinguished: trade, investment and aid. First, Chinese trade with Africa increased from $11 billion to $40 billion between 2000 and 2005, becoming Africa’s third largest trading partner [2]. Most of the increase comes from oil imports from Sudan, where China’s companies have been active since 1995, and Angola, where they made major energy investments in 2003-4. It is, however, important to consider these figures together with Africa’s increased trade with Europe and North America. It has also grown, though less slowly, and continues to constitute the destination for the majority of Africa’s exports. An important difference, however, is that the increase in Chinese trade with Africa is driven by “complementarities” between the two economies, whereas increased trade with North America and Europe has resulted from preferential trade arrangements, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Second, Chinese investment in Africa is increasing, but still represents a small fraction of China’s total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock. The stock of Chinese FDI in Africa in 2005 was $1.6 billion, which represented only 3 percent of China’s total FDI. Most Chinese investment was directed to Asia (53 percent) and Latin America (37 percent). The period 2003-2005 saw massive increases of Chinese FDI outflows to all parts of the world, not just to Africa [3].
Third, Chinese aid is now set to increase dramatically as well, and it is here that we can expect to see the most profound challenges to Africa’s relationships with the rest of the world. China has had aid programs in Africa since the 1960s, but with the exception of the rail line between Tanzania and Zambia and a number of stadiums around the continent, the impact left by Chinese aid was not great. World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz has called China to account for lending to countries that have recently benefited from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) loan forgiveness program. The value of Chinese aid in Africa is set to overtake World Bank assistance in 2007 with $8.1 billion on offer compared with only $2.3 billion from the Bank (Bloomberg.com, November 3, 2006).
The Chinese “aid” now on offer is intimately tied to its commercial expansion and often comes in the form of credits from the Chinese Export-Import Bank. The Beijing Summit also announced a token expansion of more purely humanitarian aid programs, such as the dispatching of 300 “young volunteers” to Africa and the pledge of establishing 100 rural schools in the continent before 2009. Beijing sees aid-giving as a way of generating positive sentiment toward China, and seems unaware of the consequences it can have on governance and economic performance, particularly when channeled through weak and undemocratic national governments. To the extent that Western donors have begun to learn some of the lessons from the poor performance of their previous aid programs, increased Chinese aid-giving could be a setback for sound economic policy-making and democratic accountability in Africa.
A View from the Great Lakes of Africa
With no energy resources, Rwanda and Burundi are not high priorities for China, but they are strategically situated next to the resource-rich Democratic Republic of Congo, where China has growing interests. Discussions are underway to start a Confucius Institute at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology in 2007, and Rwanda would like to entice Chinese companies doing business in the sub-region to locate their headquarters in Kigali [4]. However, though China’s engagement in both countries is on the increase, it has hardly reached the tsunami-like proportions that breathless media reports about China re-colonizing Africa would suggest.
In Rwanda, there has actually been little new Chinese investment since 2004. The Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) has issued no incentive-qualification certificates to Chinese companies over the past year. Most of the Chinese companies active in Rwanda are in the construction sector and have been working there since the 1970s or 1980s, such as the China National Road and Bridge Company, which has won significant contracts from the Rwandan government. New entrants include telecommunications companies Zhongxing and Huawei, with which the U.S.-Rwandan telephone company, Terracom, recently signed a deal to upgrade its network technology. The number of Chinese restaurants has expanded by 50 percent, from two to three.
Many of the Chinese actors on the ground are small-scale, private entrepreneurs or traders [5]. The owner of the new Chinese restaurant in Kigali first came to the country in 1996—to open a medical clinic; Chinese medicine has been extremely popular in East Africa since at least the 1980s. This tallies with UNCTAD’s finding that most Chinese investments in Africa are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—and thus only indirectly motivated by the high-level Chinese “go abroad” policy and its attendant incentives. Chinese firms are present in the Rwandan market, but they are not particularly central and hardly dominant. There are also none of the complaints about Chinese traders that are commonly heard in Zambia or South Africa. Chinese diplomats lament how “conservative” and “short-sighted” their compatriots are: very few end up investing despite promises of embassy support in bidding for contracts.
Rwanda was the first African country to open a permanent trade office in China. It is based in Shenzhen, and staffed by two Rwandans, one of whom has lived in China for 12 years and speaks Mandarin fluently. It assists Rwandan importers who visit Hong Kong and the factories of Guangdong in search of electronics and textiles that sell well in Rwanda and the sub-region. The office has had less success in enticing Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Rwanda, though a mobile-phone assembly facility for the local market is being planned in Rwanda by a Chinese-Rwandan joint venture. The office found that its most urgent task in China was much more basic: reassuring Chinese businesspeople that Rwandans did not live in trees, that Chinese visitors would not be hacked to death in a flare-up of the genocide, and that there is food to eat. A poster showing a bare-chested Rwandan traditional dancer was removed from the office because it was giving visitors the wrong impression about how most Rwandans dress.
The views of senior Rwandan officials toward China are positive and welcoming, but do not rise to adulation. They had a good experience at the Beijing Summit, but are waiting to see how China’s promises of increased cooperation will be translated into action. While they are concerned that Rwandans might be taken advantage of by Chinese firms and prefer Chinese investment over aid, Rwanda is allowing China to build the new headquarters for its foreign ministry. The rest of China’s aid program in Rwanda—some small health and agriculture programs and the management of a government-owned cement plant—is not significant enough that it would give the government significant “leverage” with the World Bank or bilateral donors. Even with the increased commitments announced in Beijing, there is little chance that China will soon rival the hundreds of millions of dollars a year that Rwanda receives from U.S. and European sources. A Chinese diplomat stated privately that there were no plans to respond to one of the Rwandan government’s top infrastructure priorities—a railway to Tanzania and the coast—because it would be “uneconomical.” China is financing the equally uneconomical Benguela railway rehabilitation in Angola, a major oil supplier.
In neighboring Burundi, where a gleaming new Chinese embassy was recently completed by a company brought in from China, an embassy official expressed his disappointment that the company had decided to return to China rather than establish a permanent presence in the region; the company saw high risks and few returns. Tianshi Health Products, however, proudly flies the Chinese flag over their new office in Bujumbura. In line with paragraph 4.4 of China’s January 2006 Africa Policy which declared that “it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange,” some members of the Burundian intelligence service have undergone training in China, according to a foreign human rights researcher who saw photographs of the training in the offices of the Burundian security service. At the official opening of parliament in February 2007, Burundi’s only admiral proudly wore a pin he had received during an exchange visit to China. Whether such military and intelligence cooperation is as practical as it is ceremonial is difficult to ascertain.
Though not representative of the continent as a whole, China’s engagement in Rwanda and Burundi has not dramatically increased over the past three years. Yet, neither is the engagement of China in oil-producing states like Angola and Sudan representative of the rest of the continent. The China-Africa question is not spontaneously discussed, and is not often in the media. With the exception of some importers, the countries’ political and economic elites continue to be oriented primarily to the United States, Europe and South Africa [6]
A View from Beijing
Foreign delegations visiting Beijing to discuss China-Africa relations tend to interact primarily with a community of Africanists and aid specialists based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and other government-affiliated think tanks [6]. They tend to portray China as a selfless friend of African countries and make frequent reference to China’s Cold War aid programs and support for African liberation movements. These scholars tend to believe that aid really can buy friendship and goodwill abroad, and also that China needs to systematize its aid apparatus if it is to be able to deliver upon the large commitments made at the Beijing Summit. There is little awareness that aid can have negative economic and political effects in the countries that receive it. There do not seem to be any mechanisms in place to monitor the effectiveness of Chinese aid, even at the most basic level of ensuring that the money is not stolen.
In discussions with U.S. delegations, the focus is often a competition to show which side is more genuinely concerned with Africa’s well-being. To the frustration of African interlocutors, the discussion is rarely focused on what Africa should do to take advantage of the new opportunities that China’s expanded commitment to Africa offers. To China’s experts, criticism of the country’s intentions and investments in Africa seems like part of a strategy by Western countries to “thwart China’s development,” as one scholar put it. One rumor in circulation in PLA circles suggests that U.S. intelligence agencies are planning to foment local unrest toward Chinese ventures in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.
In off-the-record discussions, two senior Chinese scholars conceded that China should indeed “do something” when faced with genocide in Africa—though they seemed to be referring to private exchanges with African leaders rather than public denunciation or military action. China’s intransigent position on Sudan seems to derive not only from China’s traditional adherence to a doctrine of “non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states,” but also from a desire to thwart U.S. foreign policy, and less from any specific concern about the security of Chinese energy investments in Sudan: Sudan needs China more than China needs it. One of China’s undisclosed requirements for agreeing to pressure the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping force may be that Hu Jintao, rather than George W. Bush, takes the credit. As one Chinese blogger exulted during President Hu’s trip to Africa in February 2007: “Our brother Hu thawed the Darfur crisis with his cordial smile! The United Nations peacekeeping force is going to station in Darfur with his cordial smile! Bush failed, brother Hu succeeded with a smile! Sino-Africa friendship is true friendship!”[7].
Notes
1. See the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)”, the key document emanating from the Beijing Summit in November 2006. It recapitulates and expands the Chinese government white paper on policy towards Africa issued in January 2006.
2. UNCTAD/UNDP, Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Nations, New York, March 2007, p. 56.
3.UNCTAD/UNDP, Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Countries, New York, March 2007.
4. See .
5. Based upon this author’s observations during his several visits to the Great Lakes region.
6. For a good indication of Rwanda’s priorities, see this article about President Kagame’s address to the Starbucks board of directors in March 2007 and his expanding relations with American CEOs: pluggedin_Gunther_Rwanda.fortune/?postversion=2007032910.
7. Referenced at the blog of China-Africa watcher Jennifer Brea:
MARXIST CONSPIRACY AGAINST HINDUS
Dr. Babu Suseelan
Recently I was having a conversation with a Marxist academician from India who was on a speaking tour in the U.S. He was invited by a college under the management of a Christian fundamentalist group. During our conversation, he accused "Hindutva Vadis" of being "mean-spirited, hateful and, judgmental."
The conversation was instructive that led me to ponder the question why atheist Marxists have an affinity for Islamic and Christian fundamentalists. Why they hate peace loving, tolerant and passive Hindus who believe in coexistence and universalism? Why have they established an unholy alliance with Islamic fascists and Christian fundamentalists in India?
Marxist hatred of religion is inherent in the philosophy of Marx. For Marx, "religion does not reflect the productive process, and it diverts people's attention from their miseries, which are consequences of exploitation. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is the opium of the people."
The passage clearly states Marx's view that religion is the resulting conditions of the historical systems of exploitation. Marx's theory of religion was an aspect of his general theory of society that prevailed in Europe in his era. For Marx, Christianity was the cause of human suffering in Europe. For him, Christianity appeared as an unmitigated evil, a superstition. He saw Christianity as the greatest obstacle to human progress. For the European communists, the Church had "extinguished the torch of progress in the blood of Christ."
For European communists, hatred of religion proceeds from their belief that fundamentalist religions like Christianity has been a hindrance to progress and has resulted in much evil. In fact, Marx was even skeptical of Christianity's ability to serve the interests of the working class. The reason for Marx's hatred towards Christianity was the historical evidence that Church has always supported the maintenance of the legitimacy of the exploiter. Thus, to create a classless society, religion as a tie to the past must be eliminated. Marx suggested that Christianity, with its concepts of salvation, reflects the outlook of utterly despairing people, of slaves, who lost their battles with their masters.
Marx's opposition to religion may reflect the social conditions prevailed in Europe. Marx was trying to solve the problem of duality of egoistic individualism and the religious society that exploited the poor masses. He advocated the need to emancipate the Christian world which opposed the proletariat.
In spite of number of problems with his ideology, Marx's theory of society and of religion while in many ways controversial has nonetheless provided great insight into the oppressive nature of Christianity.
Indian Marxists have departed from Marx and made a grotesque alliance with Islamic fascists and Christian fundamentalists. Their goal is to comfort the comfortable Imams, Jihadi terrorists, Bishops and the Church and wage a relentless war against Hindutva that comfort the afflicted Indian masses. Indian Marxists make Hindus the eternal scapegoat. At the same time, they are pleased to tolerate Islamic poison and Christian hatred.
Marxist intellectuals are not interested in studying the all inclusive, universal philosophy of Hindutva. Rather than understanding Hindutva, the social fabric that keeps India together, they prefer to study social history of Europe and ignore the cruelties and immoralities of Christianity and forget butcheries committed by Islamic Jihadis. Dogmatic Islam and Christianity and their regressive, rigid and irrational belief system are dear to Indian Marxists. In India, Marxists have made an unholy coalition with Islamic fascists, Christian fundamentalists and anarchists against Hindutva. Indian Marxists never view Islam and Christianity as the creation of bourgeoisie and they are unaware that they serve the interests of bourgeoisie and are against the interests of the proletariat. They seldom study their historical exploitation, divisive nature and brutality.
Age old Hindu customs, temple practices, spiritual traditions, personal freedom have been revalued under Marxist perversion. They can't seem to fathom freedom, spirituality and culture in the same sense as Hindus. The frame of-mind of Marx was more in tune with the realities of the Christian fundamentalists. Indian Marxists stand in stark contrast and make partnership with Islamic Mullahs and the Church. When Indian Marxists speak of freedom today, they are acknowledging the defeat of freedom for Hindus and license for Jihadi terrorists. Hindus are defeated in almost every corner in the Marxist ruled West Bengal and Kerala. Under Marxist rule, Jihadis and evangelists obtain more liberty, and their anti-Hindu activities are protected.
Marxist party mobilizes poor people against their own interests and uproot them from their cultural tradition-in the service of Marxists against Hindus. The anti-national Marxists, in recent years have hijacked malcontent people, Jihadi terrorists, Christian grievance collectors, social agitators and anarchists into contrived groups as having special needs as opposed to poor Hindus. Rich and powerful Marxist leaders, Mullahs and Bishops live in luxury houses, drive deluxe limousines, send their children at expensive boarding schools and lead an elite life. The Marxist political leaders are at a huge, incalculable distance from the average citizen. The five star Marxists encourage the rich grievance groups to fight against Hindus. They are anchored in their twisted anti-national ideology and work hard against the interests of the nation. Marxist media elite are bold in smoldering hatred of Jihadis into burst of flames. They manufacture Hindu hate messages and it is often accompanied by social, political and economic discrimination.
The Marxists make common cause with Jihadis and it is one of the bizarre facts of modern Indian politics. The only thing they have in common today is their hatred of Hindutva. That is the foundation on which Marxist-Islamic scheme is formed and the motivation behind any actions they carry out. It is rooted in their self hatred. Marxists seem to identify closely with the very Jihadis who will destroy them and us. Marx said "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness." In the Communist Manifesto, Marx suggests that religion, like morality and philosophy might be eliminated if we are to achieve a new political and economic existence. Communism abolishes all religion, and all morality instead of constituting them on new basis. Indian Marxists tend to ignore that Islamic institutions and the Church everywhere control personal and social behavior and carry out a process of unity as part of building resistance to Marxist consciousness.
Hindu hatred of the Marxists reached its final point when the Marxist government in Kerala introduced Hindu Devasom Law to take over Hindu temples. It is the Marxist attempt to loot Hindu temple wealth. Marxists know that Hindutva survives through temples and they have to take over temples and make a long march through temple culture before they can destroy Hindutva. The impulse motivating Marxists, bogus liberals and Islamic fascists has nothing to do with any desire for a moral or cultural renewal. Spiritual reflection and continuity of Dharma have disappeared from the Marxist/Jihadi domain long ago. Contemporary Marxism is an anti-Hindu movement with explicitly aggressive political objectives. Marxists aligned with phony secularists ensures that Islamic and Christian institutions are protected and their special privileges are preserved. Marxists have no qualm that Islamic fanatics are the largest recipient of Indian tax payer's largesse.
The reason for the Marxist conspiracy against Hindus and their unholy alliance with Islamic/Christian fundamentalists is simple. They are all rigid, totalitarian, dualistic, closed, fundamentalist dogmas. Their goal is to undercut the spiritual/cultural/intellectual foundation of India and exacerbate the social disintegration of India. In short, Marxists have accelerated a human disaster of almost unprecedented proportions in India. These combined forces working together against Hindutva are aggravating an already fundamental disaster in India that has been created by the disastrous policies of the pseudo secular politicians.
Tragically, counterfeit secular leaders play down the seriousness of the Marxist/Jihadi alliance, violence, coercive religious conversion, separatist movements, Islamic infiltration from Pakistan and Bangladesh and subversive activities. The liberal intellectuals deliberately underestimate the risks of Jihadi terrorism, Marxist menace, religious conversion, internal sabotage and pooh-pooh fears of impending calamity.
The destruction of Hindu temples, forceful deconstruction of Hindu culture and spiritual foundation by the unholy alliance is one of the monumental social crimes perpetuated by these anti national conspirators. The pseudo secular intellectuals, which facilitate catastrophe, have a moral duty to speak. The daily degradation of Hindus by the sinister coalition is the degradation of all humanity. The Marxist policies serve the aims of Jihadis and evangelists to win brownie points from the fundamentalists. The Marxist party actively defends terrorist groups, missionaries, anarchists, subversive agents and mischief mongers as part of its program for expansion. Only false patriots and those without conscience, without honor, without respect can be silent about the destruction of the eternal Hindu Dharma. The heinous communist crimes against Hindus have been numerous and they left a wreckage of broken lives and families worse than the aftermath of colonialism.
Hindus must do all that they can to survive. India needs Hindus. The world needs universal Hindu value system. Hinduism has existed long before Marxism, Islam, Christianity, Capitalism and post modernism. Hinduism is not the product of class struggle, dialectical materialism, revelation of a messiah, or concocted by a self proclaimed prophet. Hinduism is eternal, time tested, all inclusive and systemic. It is the natural consequence on the reflection of man's consciousness.
Hindus need to recognize the threat, reclaim liberties, and prepare an effective defense against these organized invaders. These organized barbarian groups are not ad-hoc believers of religious freedom, pluralism, tolerance, spirituality or varieties of beliefs. Hindus have tremendous amounts of work to do, once again, to win Hindus to understand and to act on their real interests and to achieve a major re-polarization, a realignment of political forces and the political terrain
Recently I was having a conversation with a Marxist academician from India who was on a speaking tour in the U.S. He was invited by a college under the management of a Christian fundamentalist group. During our conversation, he accused "Hindutva Vadis" of being "mean-spirited, hateful and, judgmental."
The conversation was instructive that led me to ponder the question why atheist Marxists have an affinity for Islamic and Christian fundamentalists. Why they hate peace loving, tolerant and passive Hindus who believe in coexistence and universalism? Why have they established an unholy alliance with Islamic fascists and Christian fundamentalists in India?
Marxist hatred of religion is inherent in the philosophy of Marx. For Marx, "religion does not reflect the productive process, and it diverts people's attention from their miseries, which are consequences of exploitation. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is the opium of the people."
The passage clearly states Marx's view that religion is the resulting conditions of the historical systems of exploitation. Marx's theory of religion was an aspect of his general theory of society that prevailed in Europe in his era. For Marx, Christianity was the cause of human suffering in Europe. For him, Christianity appeared as an unmitigated evil, a superstition. He saw Christianity as the greatest obstacle to human progress. For the European communists, the Church had "extinguished the torch of progress in the blood of Christ."
For European communists, hatred of religion proceeds from their belief that fundamentalist religions like Christianity has been a hindrance to progress and has resulted in much evil. In fact, Marx was even skeptical of Christianity's ability to serve the interests of the working class. The reason for Marx's hatred towards Christianity was the historical evidence that Church has always supported the maintenance of the legitimacy of the exploiter. Thus, to create a classless society, religion as a tie to the past must be eliminated. Marx suggested that Christianity, with its concepts of salvation, reflects the outlook of utterly despairing people, of slaves, who lost their battles with their masters.
Marx's opposition to religion may reflect the social conditions prevailed in Europe. Marx was trying to solve the problem of duality of egoistic individualism and the religious society that exploited the poor masses. He advocated the need to emancipate the Christian world which opposed the proletariat.
In spite of number of problems with his ideology, Marx's theory of society and of religion while in many ways controversial has nonetheless provided great insight into the oppressive nature of Christianity.
Indian Marxists have departed from Marx and made a grotesque alliance with Islamic fascists and Christian fundamentalists. Their goal is to comfort the comfortable Imams, Jihadi terrorists, Bishops and the Church and wage a relentless war against Hindutva that comfort the afflicted Indian masses. Indian Marxists make Hindus the eternal scapegoat. At the same time, they are pleased to tolerate Islamic poison and Christian hatred.
Marxist intellectuals are not interested in studying the all inclusive, universal philosophy of Hindutva. Rather than understanding Hindutva, the social fabric that keeps India together, they prefer to study social history of Europe and ignore the cruelties and immoralities of Christianity and forget butcheries committed by Islamic Jihadis. Dogmatic Islam and Christianity and their regressive, rigid and irrational belief system are dear to Indian Marxists. In India, Marxists have made an unholy coalition with Islamic fascists, Christian fundamentalists and anarchists against Hindutva. Indian Marxists never view Islam and Christianity as the creation of bourgeoisie and they are unaware that they serve the interests of bourgeoisie and are against the interests of the proletariat. They seldom study their historical exploitation, divisive nature and brutality.
Age old Hindu customs, temple practices, spiritual traditions, personal freedom have been revalued under Marxist perversion. They can't seem to fathom freedom, spirituality and culture in the same sense as Hindus. The frame of-mind of Marx was more in tune with the realities of the Christian fundamentalists. Indian Marxists stand in stark contrast and make partnership with Islamic Mullahs and the Church. When Indian Marxists speak of freedom today, they are acknowledging the defeat of freedom for Hindus and license for Jihadi terrorists. Hindus are defeated in almost every corner in the Marxist ruled West Bengal and Kerala. Under Marxist rule, Jihadis and evangelists obtain more liberty, and their anti-Hindu activities are protected.
Marxist party mobilizes poor people against their own interests and uproot them from their cultural tradition-in the service of Marxists against Hindus. The anti-national Marxists, in recent years have hijacked malcontent people, Jihadi terrorists, Christian grievance collectors, social agitators and anarchists into contrived groups as having special needs as opposed to poor Hindus. Rich and powerful Marxist leaders, Mullahs and Bishops live in luxury houses, drive deluxe limousines, send their children at expensive boarding schools and lead an elite life. The Marxist political leaders are at a huge, incalculable distance from the average citizen. The five star Marxists encourage the rich grievance groups to fight against Hindus. They are anchored in their twisted anti-national ideology and work hard against the interests of the nation. Marxist media elite are bold in smoldering hatred of Jihadis into burst of flames. They manufacture Hindu hate messages and it is often accompanied by social, political and economic discrimination.
The Marxists make common cause with Jihadis and it is one of the bizarre facts of modern Indian politics. The only thing they have in common today is their hatred of Hindutva. That is the foundation on which Marxist-Islamic scheme is formed and the motivation behind any actions they carry out. It is rooted in their self hatred. Marxists seem to identify closely with the very Jihadis who will destroy them and us. Marx said "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness." In the Communist Manifesto, Marx suggests that religion, like morality and philosophy might be eliminated if we are to achieve a new political and economic existence. Communism abolishes all religion, and all morality instead of constituting them on new basis. Indian Marxists tend to ignore that Islamic institutions and the Church everywhere control personal and social behavior and carry out a process of unity as part of building resistance to Marxist consciousness.
Hindu hatred of the Marxists reached its final point when the Marxist government in Kerala introduced Hindu Devasom Law to take over Hindu temples. It is the Marxist attempt to loot Hindu temple wealth. Marxists know that Hindutva survives through temples and they have to take over temples and make a long march through temple culture before they can destroy Hindutva. The impulse motivating Marxists, bogus liberals and Islamic fascists has nothing to do with any desire for a moral or cultural renewal. Spiritual reflection and continuity of Dharma have disappeared from the Marxist/Jihadi domain long ago. Contemporary Marxism is an anti-Hindu movement with explicitly aggressive political objectives. Marxists aligned with phony secularists ensures that Islamic and Christian institutions are protected and their special privileges are preserved. Marxists have no qualm that Islamic fanatics are the largest recipient of Indian tax payer's largesse.
The reason for the Marxist conspiracy against Hindus and their unholy alliance with Islamic/Christian fundamentalists is simple. They are all rigid, totalitarian, dualistic, closed, fundamentalist dogmas. Their goal is to undercut the spiritual/cultural/intellectual foundation of India and exacerbate the social disintegration of India. In short, Marxists have accelerated a human disaster of almost unprecedented proportions in India. These combined forces working together against Hindutva are aggravating an already fundamental disaster in India that has been created by the disastrous policies of the pseudo secular politicians.
Tragically, counterfeit secular leaders play down the seriousness of the Marxist/Jihadi alliance, violence, coercive religious conversion, separatist movements, Islamic infiltration from Pakistan and Bangladesh and subversive activities. The liberal intellectuals deliberately underestimate the risks of Jihadi terrorism, Marxist menace, religious conversion, internal sabotage and pooh-pooh fears of impending calamity.
The destruction of Hindu temples, forceful deconstruction of Hindu culture and spiritual foundation by the unholy alliance is one of the monumental social crimes perpetuated by these anti national conspirators. The pseudo secular intellectuals, which facilitate catastrophe, have a moral duty to speak. The daily degradation of Hindus by the sinister coalition is the degradation of all humanity. The Marxist policies serve the aims of Jihadis and evangelists to win brownie points from the fundamentalists. The Marxist party actively defends terrorist groups, missionaries, anarchists, subversive agents and mischief mongers as part of its program for expansion. Only false patriots and those without conscience, without honor, without respect can be silent about the destruction of the eternal Hindu Dharma. The heinous communist crimes against Hindus have been numerous and they left a wreckage of broken lives and families worse than the aftermath of colonialism.
Hindus must do all that they can to survive. India needs Hindus. The world needs universal Hindu value system. Hinduism has existed long before Marxism, Islam, Christianity, Capitalism and post modernism. Hinduism is not the product of class struggle, dialectical materialism, revelation of a messiah, or concocted by a self proclaimed prophet. Hinduism is eternal, time tested, all inclusive and systemic. It is the natural consequence on the reflection of man's consciousness.
Hindus need to recognize the threat, reclaim liberties, and prepare an effective defense against these organized invaders. These organized barbarian groups are not ad-hoc believers of religious freedom, pluralism, tolerance, spirituality or varieties of beliefs. Hindus have tremendous amounts of work to do, once again, to win Hindus to understand and to act on their real interests and to achieve a major re-polarization, a realignment of political forces and the political terrain
MUSHARRAF'S BHINDRANWALE : Maulana Mohammad Abdul Aziz
By B.Raman
Bhindranwale was a Sikh cleric, who became notorious in the 1980s.Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, and Zail Singh, her Home Minister, allegedly tried to use him to create a split in the terrorist movement, which started a fight against the Government of India in 1981 for the creation of an independent State for the Sikhs to be called Khalistan.
2. After some months of seeming co-operation with the Government of India, he went out of control, joined the terrorists and took over the leadership of their so-called Khalistan movement. He and his terrorist followers took shelter inside the Golden Temple in Amritsar in Punjab and, from there, spread havoc across Punjab and Delhi. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) tried to take advantage of the movement in order to destabilise Punjab.
3. After showing patience for some months, Indira Gandhi was forced to send the Indian Army inside the Golden Temple in June,1984, in an operation code-named Blue Star to neutralise Bhindranwale and his supporters. They put up a fierce fight and many of them, including Bhindranwale himself, were killed duringn the operation. A part of the Golden Temple was damaged.
4. This caused widespread anger in the Sikh community, culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh body-guards on October,31,1984.
5.Maulana Mohammad Abdul Aziz is a Deobandi cleric, who was not very well-known in Pakistan. Nobody had heard of him outside Pakistan. He is the head of the Lal Mosque in Islamabad, where many of the civilian bureaucrats and military officers of the Pakistani capital used to go for the prayers.
6. Since seizing power in October,1999, Musharraf and the ISI were using him to discredit Ms.Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Ministers, and other political opponents. Since last year, he has gone out of control. He has assumed the leadership of the pro-Taliban elements in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan and has started a jihad against Musharraf for his co-operation with the US.
7. The Lal Masjid has two madrasas (religious schools) attached to it---one for boys and the other for girls. The madrasa for girls is called Jamia Hafsa. Many of the madrasa students are the children of the pro-Taliban tribals of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They project themselves as the future wives and mothers of suicide bombers. The daughters of many persons of Pakistani origin from the UK and the US are also studying there.
7.Since January this year, the madrasa students----boys and girls, the girls of Jamia Hafsa more ferociously than the boys--- have been on the warpath against Musharraf. The trouble started initially when the ISI ordered the Islamabad municipal authorities to demolish some mosques, which were located on routes generally used by Musharraf while moving between Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Government claimed that these mosques were demolished because they were unauthorised constructions. The real reason was that the ISI feared that the terrorists targeting Musharraf could use these mosques as a hide-out.
8. In protest against the demolition, the girls occupied a nearby library for children. The boys joined the protest. Rattled by this, the Government accepted their demand to have the demolished mosques re-constructed at its expense. The girls have refused to vacate the library till the re-construction is complete.
9.Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi, another cleric, have taken over the leadership of the anti-Musharraf agitation of the madrasa students. From inside the sanctuary of the Lal Masjid, they have been issuing statements praising Osama bin Laden and Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and calling for a ban on TV, for the destruction of all video shops and arrest of prostitutes. They attacked police vehicles deployed outside the mosque and took away their communication sets. They are now using these sets to communicate with the pro-Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements in the FATA. They managed to get hold of FM radio equipment from the FATA and started using them to make anti-Musharraf, pro-bin Laden and pro-Omar broadcasts to the residents of the capital. They have started their own web site for disseminating their propaganda.
10. There is a torrent of fatwas (edicts) coming out of the mosque every day. One fatwa calls for Islamic rule in Pakistan in accordance with the Sharia. Another calls for the release of all those arrested by the Government in connection with the current agitation. A third calls for the release of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other jihadis detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba. A fourth calls upon all tribal madrasas to declare a vacation for their students so that they could march to Islamabad and join the ant-Musharraf agitation and overthrow him just as the madrasa students from Pakistan marched to Kabul in April,1992, and helped the Afghan Mujahideen in the overthrow of Najibullah, the then Afghan President.Addressing the Friday congregation on April 6,2007, Maulana Aziz announced that he was setting up a religious court in Islamabad , and threatened suicide attacks if the Government did not enact the Islamic law and close down brothels and video stores within a month.
11. Musharraf is hesitant to act against the pro-Taliban and pro-bin Laden agitators in the capital, who have been flouting his authority for nearly three months. There is estimated to be a total of 6000 agitators inside the mosque and its madrasas.Many of the students of these madrasas are the children of the non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces. Many of the NCOs frequent the Lal Masjid for prayers and are devoted to Maulana Aziz and his brother.Musharraf is, therefore, not certain whether the lower and middle level members of his security forces would carry out his orders if he asked them to raid the moque and the madrasas, put an end to the agitation and arrest the two clerics. More worrying is what would be the impact on the armed forces personnel if some of these children get killed in any military raid.
12.Musharraf, the commando, who always brags that he believes in leading from the front, is reluctant to do so in this case. He has let his subordinates handle the agitation as best as they can.Finding his writ increasingly challenged by the jihadi terrorists in the FATA, the NWFP and the Islamabad capital region and by the Baloch nationalists in Balochistan, he has started doing what President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has been doing since 2002----gallivanting all over the world and projecting himself as an important leader of the Islamic world, whose advice is being increasingly sought by the international community. He has started spending more time seemingly attending to the problems of other Muslim countries than to the life-threatening problems of his own country.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com
Bhindranwale was a Sikh cleric, who became notorious in the 1980s.Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, and Zail Singh, her Home Minister, allegedly tried to use him to create a split in the terrorist movement, which started a fight against the Government of India in 1981 for the creation of an independent State for the Sikhs to be called Khalistan.
2. After some months of seeming co-operation with the Government of India, he went out of control, joined the terrorists and took over the leadership of their so-called Khalistan movement. He and his terrorist followers took shelter inside the Golden Temple in Amritsar in Punjab and, from there, spread havoc across Punjab and Delhi. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) tried to take advantage of the movement in order to destabilise Punjab.
3. After showing patience for some months, Indira Gandhi was forced to send the Indian Army inside the Golden Temple in June,1984, in an operation code-named Blue Star to neutralise Bhindranwale and his supporters. They put up a fierce fight and many of them, including Bhindranwale himself, were killed duringn the operation. A part of the Golden Temple was damaged.
4. This caused widespread anger in the Sikh community, culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh body-guards on October,31,1984.
5.Maulana Mohammad Abdul Aziz is a Deobandi cleric, who was not very well-known in Pakistan. Nobody had heard of him outside Pakistan. He is the head of the Lal Mosque in Islamabad, where many of the civilian bureaucrats and military officers of the Pakistani capital used to go for the prayers.
6. Since seizing power in October,1999, Musharraf and the ISI were using him to discredit Ms.Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Ministers, and other political opponents. Since last year, he has gone out of control. He has assumed the leadership of the pro-Taliban elements in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan and has started a jihad against Musharraf for his co-operation with the US.
7. The Lal Masjid has two madrasas (religious schools) attached to it---one for boys and the other for girls. The madrasa for girls is called Jamia Hafsa. Many of the madrasa students are the children of the pro-Taliban tribals of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They project themselves as the future wives and mothers of suicide bombers. The daughters of many persons of Pakistani origin from the UK and the US are also studying there.
7.Since January this year, the madrasa students----boys and girls, the girls of Jamia Hafsa more ferociously than the boys--- have been on the warpath against Musharraf. The trouble started initially when the ISI ordered the Islamabad municipal authorities to demolish some mosques, which were located on routes generally used by Musharraf while moving between Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Government claimed that these mosques were demolished because they were unauthorised constructions. The real reason was that the ISI feared that the terrorists targeting Musharraf could use these mosques as a hide-out.
8. In protest against the demolition, the girls occupied a nearby library for children. The boys joined the protest. Rattled by this, the Government accepted their demand to have the demolished mosques re-constructed at its expense. The girls have refused to vacate the library till the re-construction is complete.
9.Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi, another cleric, have taken over the leadership of the anti-Musharraf agitation of the madrasa students. From inside the sanctuary of the Lal Masjid, they have been issuing statements praising Osama bin Laden and Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and calling for a ban on TV, for the destruction of all video shops and arrest of prostitutes. They attacked police vehicles deployed outside the mosque and took away their communication sets. They are now using these sets to communicate with the pro-Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements in the FATA. They managed to get hold of FM radio equipment from the FATA and started using them to make anti-Musharraf, pro-bin Laden and pro-Omar broadcasts to the residents of the capital. They have started their own web site for disseminating their propaganda.
10. There is a torrent of fatwas (edicts) coming out of the mosque every day. One fatwa calls for Islamic rule in Pakistan in accordance with the Sharia. Another calls for the release of all those arrested by the Government in connection with the current agitation. A third calls for the release of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other jihadis detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba. A fourth calls upon all tribal madrasas to declare a vacation for their students so that they could march to Islamabad and join the ant-Musharraf agitation and overthrow him just as the madrasa students from Pakistan marched to Kabul in April,1992, and helped the Afghan Mujahideen in the overthrow of Najibullah, the then Afghan President.Addressing the Friday congregation on April 6,2007, Maulana Aziz announced that he was setting up a religious court in Islamabad , and threatened suicide attacks if the Government did not enact the Islamic law and close down brothels and video stores within a month.
11. Musharraf is hesitant to act against the pro-Taliban and pro-bin Laden agitators in the capital, who have been flouting his authority for nearly three months. There is estimated to be a total of 6000 agitators inside the mosque and its madrasas.Many of the students of these madrasas are the children of the non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces. Many of the NCOs frequent the Lal Masjid for prayers and are devoted to Maulana Aziz and his brother.Musharraf is, therefore, not certain whether the lower and middle level members of his security forces would carry out his orders if he asked them to raid the moque and the madrasas, put an end to the agitation and arrest the two clerics. More worrying is what would be the impact on the armed forces personnel if some of these children get killed in any military raid.
12.Musharraf, the commando, who always brags that he believes in leading from the front, is reluctant to do so in this case. He has let his subordinates handle the agitation as best as they can.Finding his writ increasingly challenged by the jihadi terrorists in the FATA, the NWFP and the Islamabad capital region and by the Baloch nationalists in Balochistan, he has started doing what President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has been doing since 2002----gallivanting all over the world and projecting himself as an important leader of the Islamic world, whose advice is being increasingly sought by the international community. He has started spending more time seemingly attending to the problems of other Muslim countries than to the life-threatening problems of his own country.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com
Muslims spend more than Hindu peers-
-The Economic Times
- SHAILESH DOBHAL & BHANU PANDE
NEW DELHI: Forget all half-baked opinions you may have heard on the economic state of religious communities in India. Truth be told, at the national level, Hindus and Muslims are closer than you thought as far as average household income, expenditure, savings and even ownership of select consumer goods go.
In fact, in rural India, the gap between the two communities' narrows appreciably and even reverses in some cases in favour of Muslims. Not surprisingly, the Sikhs are the most prosperous lot in India, with highest household income, expenditure and ownership of cars, two-wheelers, TV sets and refrigerators. Christians and other smaller communities don't lag too far behind either.
Hindu 61,423
Muslim 58,420
Christian 70,644
Sikh 91,153
Others 101,105
Average annual household income (Rs At 2004-05 prices)
In the first ever exercise mapping the economic contours of different religious communities in India, ET presents an exclusive peek into the National Council of Applied Economic Research's (NCAER) data analysis from its National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (2004-05), which was led by senior fellow Rajesh Shukla.
Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others
Car 5.1 4.3 10.9 17.3 13.1
Two Wheelers 35.3 31.3 41.7 54.7 57.0
TVs 62.8 54.0 77.6 86.6 85.2
Radio 49.5 51.3 56.0 36.3 47.2
Fridge 17.9 15.9 28.0 45.7 37.0
Ownership of selected consumer goods (% of households owning)
The survey collected primary data from a sample of approximately 63,000 households out of preliminary listed sample of 4,40,000 households spread over 1,976 villages (250 districts) and 2,255 urban wards (342 towns) covering 64 National Sample Survey (NSS) regions in 24 states/UTs.
If you thought Muslims alone were steeped in poverty, read on. Hindus and Muslims, at a national level, run neck-and-neck on average annual household income (AHI) of Rs 61, 423 and Rs 58,420, respectively.
Or, to put it differently, an average Hindu household has an income of Rs 168 per day, while an average Muslim household earns Rs 160 a day. In rural India, an average Hindu AHI is Rs 49,077 with Muslim close behind with AHI of Rs 47,805. On income parameters, at least, Hindus and Muslims are, indeed, bhai-bhai.
Marketers planning an ethnographic pitch to grab mindshare or policy makers preparing ground for affirmative action may do good to remember that an average Muslim household, at the national level, spends more than a Hindu one, with annual household routine expenditure (AHRE) at Rs 40,327 compared to Rs 40,009 for the latter.
Sikh household AHRE is highest at Rs 60,475 with Christians at Rs 45,291. In rural India, Muslim AHRE (Rs 33,711) is higher than Hindu (Rs 32,555) and compares well with Christian (Rs 38,068).
Interestingly, Muslims who are the bottom as far as income is concerned—top the list when AHRE is measured as a percentage of AHI. They spend over 69% of their income on routine household expenditure followed by Sikhs (66%) and Hindus (64%).
While the average national AHI for all religious groups at 2004-05 prices, stood at Rs 62,066, the patterns across specific groups reflect stark differential. The smaller religious communities (excluding Christians and Sikhs) taken as the whole are an affluent lot with AHI of over Rs 1 lakh. Sikhs and Christians leave larger communities way behind with AHI of Rs 91,153 and Rs 70,644 respectively.
And this has a clear impact on their expenditure and ownership patterns for a select consumer goods. Ownership patterns may tell their own story if the industry chooses to dig further. Penetration of cars is highest among Sikhs (17.3% households), followed by Christians (10.95%).
At the national level, Hindu and Muslim households virtually mirror each other on ownership of a host of products—cars ( 5.1% and 4.3%), two-wheeler (35.3% and 31.3%), refrigerator (17.9% and 15.9%) and radio (49.5% and 51.3%). Turn to rural India and Muslim households have an edge on not just AHRE, but even car ownership (2.6% versus 2.4% of Hindu households).
The only oddity in ownership between Hindus and Muslims is on television, with national penetration at 62.8 % and 54%, respectively. Even rural Muslim household lag here with penetration of just 39.1% compared to 52% for the majority community.
- SHAILESH DOBHAL & BHANU PANDE
NEW DELHI: Forget all half-baked opinions you may have heard on the economic state of religious communities in India. Truth be told, at the national level, Hindus and Muslims are closer than you thought as far as average household income, expenditure, savings and even ownership of select consumer goods go.
In fact, in rural India, the gap between the two communities' narrows appreciably and even reverses in some cases in favour of Muslims. Not surprisingly, the Sikhs are the most prosperous lot in India, with highest household income, expenditure and ownership of cars, two-wheelers, TV sets and refrigerators. Christians and other smaller communities don't lag too far behind either.
Hindu 61,423
Muslim 58,420
Christian 70,644
Sikh 91,153
Others 101,105
Average annual household income (Rs At 2004-05 prices)
In the first ever exercise mapping the economic contours of different religious communities in India, ET presents an exclusive peek into the National Council of Applied Economic Research's (NCAER) data analysis from its National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (2004-05), which was led by senior fellow Rajesh Shukla.
Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others
Car 5.1 4.3 10.9 17.3 13.1
Two Wheelers 35.3 31.3 41.7 54.7 57.0
TVs 62.8 54.0 77.6 86.6 85.2
Radio 49.5 51.3 56.0 36.3 47.2
Fridge 17.9 15.9 28.0 45.7 37.0
Ownership of selected consumer goods (% of households owning)
The survey collected primary data from a sample of approximately 63,000 households out of preliminary listed sample of 4,40,000 households spread over 1,976 villages (250 districts) and 2,255 urban wards (342 towns) covering 64 National Sample Survey (NSS) regions in 24 states/UTs.
If you thought Muslims alone were steeped in poverty, read on. Hindus and Muslims, at a national level, run neck-and-neck on average annual household income (AHI) of Rs 61, 423 and Rs 58,420, respectively.
Or, to put it differently, an average Hindu household has an income of Rs 168 per day, while an average Muslim household earns Rs 160 a day. In rural India, an average Hindu AHI is Rs 49,077 with Muslim close behind with AHI of Rs 47,805. On income parameters, at least, Hindus and Muslims are, indeed, bhai-bhai.
Marketers planning an ethnographic pitch to grab mindshare or policy makers preparing ground for affirmative action may do good to remember that an average Muslim household, at the national level, spends more than a Hindu one, with annual household routine expenditure (AHRE) at Rs 40,327 compared to Rs 40,009 for the latter.
Sikh household AHRE is highest at Rs 60,475 with Christians at Rs 45,291. In rural India, Muslim AHRE (Rs 33,711) is higher than Hindu (Rs 32,555) and compares well with Christian (Rs 38,068).
Interestingly, Muslims who are the bottom as far as income is concerned—top the list when AHRE is measured as a percentage of AHI. They spend over 69% of their income on routine household expenditure followed by Sikhs (66%) and Hindus (64%).
While the average national AHI for all religious groups at 2004-05 prices, stood at Rs 62,066, the patterns across specific groups reflect stark differential. The smaller religious communities (excluding Christians and Sikhs) taken as the whole are an affluent lot with AHI of over Rs 1 lakh. Sikhs and Christians leave larger communities way behind with AHI of Rs 91,153 and Rs 70,644 respectively.
And this has a clear impact on their expenditure and ownership patterns for a select consumer goods. Ownership patterns may tell their own story if the industry chooses to dig further. Penetration of cars is highest among Sikhs (17.3% households), followed by Christians (10.95%).
At the national level, Hindu and Muslim households virtually mirror each other on ownership of a host of products—cars ( 5.1% and 4.3%), two-wheeler (35.3% and 31.3%), refrigerator (17.9% and 15.9%) and radio (49.5% and 51.3%). Turn to rural India and Muslim households have an edge on not just AHRE, but even car ownership (2.6% versus 2.4% of Hindu households).
The only oddity in ownership between Hindus and Muslims is on television, with national penetration at 62.8 % and 54%, respectively. Even rural Muslim household lag here with penetration of just 39.1% compared to 52% for the majority community.
Deal seen boosting kidnapping as tactic
Source: newsday.com
JAMES RUPERT
james.rupert@newsday.com
April 8, 2007
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan officials and Taliban spokesmen confirmed yesterday the kidnapping by Taliban of two French and three Afghan child-welfare workers - a new sign that last month's deal to free an Italian journalist has helped strengthen hostage-taking as a Taliban weapon.
Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan's far south say they are holding nearly a dozen hostages overall and are demanding the release of more of their own people from government prisons. In particular, they are threatening to kill the Italian journalist's Afghan interpreter, who was left behind in the deal for the Italian's freedom.
In recent months, several journalists - including two Pakistanis, a Briton and their Afghan colleagues - have been detained by Taliban guerrillas but then released once guerrilla commanders found they were truly reporters rather than spies.
But the kidnapping last month of reporter Daniele Mastrogiacomo took a more malevolent turn. His captor, a prominent commander named Mullah Dadullah, known for his violence, demanded the freedom of Taliban prisoners held by the government. And he put pressure on the Afghan and Italian authorities by having Mastrogiacomo's Afghan driver beheaded.
Analysts say the change in tactics may have come in part because Italy's government has been known to negotiate for the release of its citizens taken hostage - and because Prime Minister Romano Prodi has been under severe political pressure at home against the continued deployment of 1,800 Italian troops as part of the NATO force in Afghanistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he had several phone calls from Prodi asking him to win the freedom of Mastrogiacomo, a reporter for the daily La Repubblica. Karzai handed over five prominent Taliban prisoners, including Dadullah's brother. But when the Italian was freed, his interpreter, Ajmal Naqshbandi, was held back.
The exchange was "extraordinary ... and won't be repeated," Karzai said Friday. "It was a very difficult situation. The Italian government could have collapsed any time," he told a news conference. "Despite knowing what would be the consequences of this, we handed over some Taliban prisoners and [they] freed the Italian journalist."
Karzai has been criticized both for caving in to the hostage-takers and for failing to save an Afghan as he did a foreigner. The surrender of Taliban prisoners for Mastrogiacomo "could very well result in the abduction of other reporters and foreigners in Afghanistan," wrote the U.S. security analysis firm Stratfor. "In effect, it has become a neon sign declaring open season on foreigners."
In fact, the odds for foreigners kidnapped in Afghanistan already had been declining. Between 2003 and 2005, eight of 11 foreigners seized by the Taliban in Afghanistan were freed. But in the past year, five out of seven have been killed.
Amid Afghanistan's general insecurity and feuding, many Afghans have been kidnapped, either for political motives or for monetary ransom. But Naqshbandi's case has become a political cause here, and a crisis for Karzai. The painfully contrasting images of Mastrogiacomo, 52, pumping his fists skyward at his return to an Italian airport, and Naqshbandi, 23, staring uncertainly into his captors' video camera, appear nightly on Afghan television.
A Rome-based news agency, AKI, quoted Naqshbandi's brother, Munir, as saying he got a phone call from a Dadullah aide Thursday setting a Monday deadline for a deal to prevent Naqshbandi's execution.
And officials in southwestern Afghanistan told the French news agency, AFP, yesterday that a French man and woman working with Terre d'Enfance, a child-welfare agency, had been taken with their three Afghan colleagues to Helmand province, the main stronghold in Afghanistan of the Taliban.
A Taliban spokesman confirmed the kidnapping. No ransom demands have been issued.
JAMES RUPERT
james.rupert@newsday.com
April 8, 2007
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan officials and Taliban spokesmen confirmed yesterday the kidnapping by Taliban of two French and three Afghan child-welfare workers - a new sign that last month's deal to free an Italian journalist has helped strengthen hostage-taking as a Taliban weapon.
Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan's far south say they are holding nearly a dozen hostages overall and are demanding the release of more of their own people from government prisons. In particular, they are threatening to kill the Italian journalist's Afghan interpreter, who was left behind in the deal for the Italian's freedom.
In recent months, several journalists - including two Pakistanis, a Briton and their Afghan colleagues - have been detained by Taliban guerrillas but then released once guerrilla commanders found they were truly reporters rather than spies.
But the kidnapping last month of reporter Daniele Mastrogiacomo took a more malevolent turn. His captor, a prominent commander named Mullah Dadullah, known for his violence, demanded the freedom of Taliban prisoners held by the government. And he put pressure on the Afghan and Italian authorities by having Mastrogiacomo's Afghan driver beheaded.
Analysts say the change in tactics may have come in part because Italy's government has been known to negotiate for the release of its citizens taken hostage - and because Prime Minister Romano Prodi has been under severe political pressure at home against the continued deployment of 1,800 Italian troops as part of the NATO force in Afghanistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he had several phone calls from Prodi asking him to win the freedom of Mastrogiacomo, a reporter for the daily La Repubblica. Karzai handed over five prominent Taliban prisoners, including Dadullah's brother. But when the Italian was freed, his interpreter, Ajmal Naqshbandi, was held back.
The exchange was "extraordinary ... and won't be repeated," Karzai said Friday. "It was a very difficult situation. The Italian government could have collapsed any time," he told a news conference. "Despite knowing what would be the consequences of this, we handed over some Taliban prisoners and [they] freed the Italian journalist."
Karzai has been criticized both for caving in to the hostage-takers and for failing to save an Afghan as he did a foreigner. The surrender of Taliban prisoners for Mastrogiacomo "could very well result in the abduction of other reporters and foreigners in Afghanistan," wrote the U.S. security analysis firm Stratfor. "In effect, it has become a neon sign declaring open season on foreigners."
In fact, the odds for foreigners kidnapped in Afghanistan already had been declining. Between 2003 and 2005, eight of 11 foreigners seized by the Taliban in Afghanistan were freed. But in the past year, five out of seven have been killed.
Amid Afghanistan's general insecurity and feuding, many Afghans have been kidnapped, either for political motives or for monetary ransom. But Naqshbandi's case has become a political cause here, and a crisis for Karzai. The painfully contrasting images of Mastrogiacomo, 52, pumping his fists skyward at his return to an Italian airport, and Naqshbandi, 23, staring uncertainly into his captors' video camera, appear nightly on Afghan television.
A Rome-based news agency, AKI, quoted Naqshbandi's brother, Munir, as saying he got a phone call from a Dadullah aide Thursday setting a Monday deadline for a deal to prevent Naqshbandi's execution.
And officials in southwestern Afghanistan told the French news agency, AFP, yesterday that a French man and woman working with Terre d'Enfance, a child-welfare agency, had been taken with their three Afghan colleagues to Helmand province, the main stronghold in Afghanistan of the Taliban.
A Taliban spokesman confirmed the kidnapping. No ransom demands have been issued.
Baloch people must be consulted before launching mega projects in the province
From our ANI Correspondent
Quetta, Apr 8: Deputy Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly Muhammad Aslam Bhootani has demanded that the federal government take elected representatives and population of the region into confidence before launching any mega project in the province.
He said the people of Balochistan were not against any developmental process in the province but wanted the government to take the local people into confidence before starting any new project in the area.
"The people of the area must know how the proposed project would benefit them, and they should have a guarantee that they won't face any discrimination in jobs and other matters," the Dawn quoted Bhootani as saying.
He cited the example of the Gwadar Port project, adding that the federal government was yet to remove the reservations and apprehensions of the people regarding the project.
He said the apprehensions had proved true as people of other areas were being recruited at the port after its completion.
The nazims and other elected representatives of Gwadar district had registered their protest by observing strikes and staging demonstrations against these steps of the federal government, but they didn't yield any results, he said.
The federal government had learnt no lesson from the Gwadar situation and it was now taking important decisions about the Sonmiani port project without taking the area representatives and people into confidence, he added.
"The outcome of the Sonmiani mega project will be no different from Gwadar," Bhootani said, adding that the government had to ensure protection of rights of the people of Hub, Dureji, costal highway and Gadani in terms of jobs and lands.
"They should be given a guarantee that no injustice and discrimination would be done with them. Thousands of acres of private land have already been declared the government land in many villages situated along the coastal highway," Bhootani said.
"Sonmiani was just 80 kilometres from Karachi and influx of outsiders was causing a demographic imbalance and this trend must be checked," he said, adding that the federal government must come up with a satisfactory response and suggestion for the development of the area and remove apprehensions of the local people so that they could play their role in the development of their area.
Copyright Dailyindia.com/ANI
Quetta, Apr 8: Deputy Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly Muhammad Aslam Bhootani has demanded that the federal government take elected representatives and population of the region into confidence before launching any mega project in the province.
He said the people of Balochistan were not against any developmental process in the province but wanted the government to take the local people into confidence before starting any new project in the area.
"The people of the area must know how the proposed project would benefit them, and they should have a guarantee that they won't face any discrimination in jobs and other matters," the Dawn quoted Bhootani as saying.
He cited the example of the Gwadar Port project, adding that the federal government was yet to remove the reservations and apprehensions of the people regarding the project.
He said the apprehensions had proved true as people of other areas were being recruited at the port after its completion.
The nazims and other elected representatives of Gwadar district had registered their protest by observing strikes and staging demonstrations against these steps of the federal government, but they didn't yield any results, he said.
The federal government had learnt no lesson from the Gwadar situation and it was now taking important decisions about the Sonmiani port project without taking the area representatives and people into confidence, he added.
"The outcome of the Sonmiani mega project will be no different from Gwadar," Bhootani said, adding that the government had to ensure protection of rights of the people of Hub, Dureji, costal highway and Gadani in terms of jobs and lands.
"They should be given a guarantee that no injustice and discrimination would be done with them. Thousands of acres of private land have already been declared the government land in many villages situated along the coastal highway," Bhootani said.
"Sonmiani was just 80 kilometres from Karachi and influx of outsiders was causing a demographic imbalance and this trend must be checked," he said, adding that the federal government must come up with a satisfactory response and suggestion for the development of the area and remove apprehensions of the local people so that they could play their role in the development of their area.
Copyright Dailyindia.com/ANI
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