Abkhazia Is Not Kosovo

Transitions Online

by David L. Phillips
7 February 2008

Moscow’s shrill denunciations of the West’s stance on Kosovo hold no water, as the Russians know better than anyone.

Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaci recently made his case for recognition of Kosovo to the UN Security Council knowing that one of its permanent members was not prepared to hear him out.

Russia is not only prepared to veto the council’s resolution authorizing independence for Kosovo; President Vladimir Putin also has intimated that Moscow may recognize Abkhazia, a separatist enclave in the Republic of Georgia, if the United States establishes diplomatic relations with Kosovo. Such brinksmanship would destabilize the Caucasus and exacerbate problems between the United States and Russia at a time when world events require cooperation between the two powers.

Simply put, Abkhazia is not Kosovo. There are fundamental legal and political differences between the two territories.

Kosovo’s claim to independence is based on international law while Abkhazia’s is not. After NATO intervened in 1999 to stop the expulsions of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 explicitly requiring a plebiscite to determine the province’s future political status in accordance with the will of its people. Since then, Kosovo has satisfied international criteria for recognition. Abkhazia’s claim, however, falls far short of international standards.

Kosovo’s legal claim to independence was also affirmed by the 1974 constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which established Kosovo as an autonomous province with the same rights as Yugoslavia’s republics. Although Slobodan Milosevic tried to curtail the province’s constitutional rights by declaring a state of emergency and imposing martial law, his efforts were overtaken by events as Yugoslavia slid into civil war during the 1990s. It is true that Resolution 1244 affirmed “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” – which by that time had been reduced to a rump state consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. However, that republic’s legal identity changed with Montenegrins voted to secede, leaving only Serbia as the successor state. And even before these events Kosovo had exercised its constitutional right in conducting a referendum that overwhelmingly endorsed independence. With ethnic Albanians comprising more than 90 percent of the population, the result was a foregone conclusion.

In contrast, Georgia was recognized by the international community within its current borders that included Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. When the Georgia-Abkhazia civil war broke out in 1992, the United Nations developed a process to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity – not establish a protectorate stewarding Abkhazia’s independence.

Political leaders from Kosovo and Abkhazia have dramatically different visions of the future that help measure their readiness for self-rule. Kosovo’s leadership has endorsed an extensive package of minority rights for ethnic Serbs and promised autonomy for communities where Kosovo Serbs predominate. (Despite the majority’s rhetorical commitment, many non-Albanians, chiefly Roma, fear a new round of violence and have elected to remain outside the province.) Georgia’s political factions have also spoken of their good intentions toward minorities, promising to encourage minority rights and local self-government so that conditions are created for, in particular, Abkhazia’s reintegration into the political and social fabric of Georgia.

Abkhaz leaders have taken a different and more insidious tack. They actively block the UN’s efforts to create security and economic conditions enabling the return of internally displaced persons because they know full well that a majority of Abkhazia’s original population support reunification with Georgia.

The scope and scale of human rights abuses further distinguish Kosovo from Abkhazia. Kosovar Albanians were victims of atrocities on a massive scale. After a decade of gross human rights abuses, Serbia’s leaders launched an ethnic cleansing campaign in 1998 that resulted in the deaths of more than 10,000 and the displacement of a million. The international Yugoslav war crimes tribunal has indicted Serbs responsible for these events and charged them with genocide or crimes against humanity. In my many visits to Kosovo, I have not met a single ethnic Albanian who supports Serbia’s rule.

Abkhaz separatists, in contrast, perpetrated violence directly aimed at the expulsion of ethnic Georgians. When the Soviet Union fragmented, Georgia emerged as a weak state victimized by infighting and incompetence. Ethnic Abkhaz made up less than one-fifth of Abkhazia’s total population and only became the largest language community by expelling 200,000 ethnic Georgians.

RUSSIAN INTRANSIGENCE

Russia has not been helpful in either conflict. Through its position on the Security Council, Russia provided diplomatic support to Belgrade during the Yugoslav wars. It also instigated the Georgia-Abkhaz civil war by financing and arming Abkhaz separatists.


Peacekeepers or occupiers?

In its relentless effort to undermine Georgia’s statehood, Russia has imposed a trade embargo, cut off energy supplies, and a Russian aircraft dropped a missile on Georgian territory. It antagonizes Georgia by issuing Russian passports to ethnic Abkhaz and granting them Russian citizenship. Russia even set up polling stations in Abkhazia so that Abkhaz could vote in last December’s parliamentary elections. As the only country contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force for Abkhazia, Russia’s deployment is nothing more than a thinly veiled occupation.

Russia’s approach to both Abkhazia and Kosovo suggests scorn for the UN Charter. Russia has pledged to veto the “supervised independence” plan devised by the UN’s special envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, against the wishes of the majority of Security Council members and the European Union. Russia’s willingness to go it alone and block authorization of Kosovo’s independence underlines its contempt for the international community.

Russia would be well advised to let events in Kosovo take their course. It should also abandon its provocative policy toward not only Georgia, but other states in its “near abroad.” Challenging the United States may bring some short-term gratification, but it also carries a cost.


David L. Phillips is a visiting scholar at Columbia University’s Center for the Study of Human Rights. He worked on the Balkans and Caucasus as a senior adviser to the U.S. State Department during the Clinton administration.