India’s Internal Security Dimensions

Source: SAAG

Guest Column by R.Swaminathan

In pre-independence India, conventional wisdom had it that external security threats stemmed from hostile countries and internal security threats were all totally indigenous. In the six decades since then, the internal security situation has undergone a sea change. Many internal security threats are externally sponsored or guided or inspired or supported or tolerated. Therefore, as change has been said to be the only constant in the order of things, we have to adapt our attitudes and policies to the new realities. We can no longer merely offer or accept the excuse of the “foreign hand”. The rapidly developing political, economic and military strength of India, if unfortunately accompanied by a fragile internal security scenario, could become a significant factor for instability in the region and in the world.

This paper is a quick walk-through of the various dimensions of India's internal security and will not touch upon military, energy or food security.

External Factors

Pakistan has been using state-sponsored and state-supported cross-border terrorism (primarily in Jammu & Kashmir) as an instrument of its state policy. China had, at one stage, provided shelter and support to ethnic-separatist militancy in the north-east. Various militant groups operating in India’s northeast have often found safe haven and operational bases in Bangladesh. The linkages between the Maoists in Nepal and those in the bordering states in India remain a cause for major concern. One, however, has to recognize, accept and cater for the fact that while external factors could provide seen-or-unseen, real-or-virtual, inspiration and support (like fertilizer and water) to various groups that pose internal security threats, only the pre-existence of the basic grievances and causes (like soil and seeds) could make them functional.

Jihadi terrorism, inspired by externally generated ideas about taking revenge for perceived wrongs committed against Islam over the centuries and the grandiose ambition of establishing an Islamic Caliphate across international borders, is posing a major threat. The increasing numbers of Indian Muslims seen to be involved in such activities calls for special attention. The so-called "global war on terror" is not likely to be of much help to India. It is not as if the jihadi terrorists have a joint “global” or "national” headquarters or if such groups hold any defined territories from which they operate. There may be similarities in methodologies and techniques; but it would be a big mistake to try and evolve a grand plan of macro solutions to this problem. In order to gain local support, every such group would have to focus on specific local-oriented politico-economic-religious issues; and these may have to be tackled through customised approaches that include the addressing of genuine grievances.

Jihadi terrorism, based only on Islamic extremism, is eventually most likely to fail in South Asia, even as Muslims themselves (as well as the Islam-based power structures within the sponsoring/supporting states) increasingly become prime targets. Their support to the ideological and/or religious presuppositions of the Islamic terrorist groups may become inadequate to shield them from harm. When such unavoidable termination would happen would depend largely on the intentions and capabilities of the two primary state sponsors/supporters of terrorist groups in India - Pakistan and Bangladesh - and on the international support and acceptance they would continue to receive.

One of the unfortunate consequences of the raise of Islamic fundamentalism is the mostly indigenous “retaliatory” raise in fundamentalist revivals amongst Hindus and other religionists. Such revivals have the dangerous potential of being accepted by the majority as totally justified.

It is essential to be aware of the potential danger from the spill-over effects of any unstable conditions in India’s neighborhood. The Maoist participation in the government in Nepal, the continuing ethnic problem in Sri Lanka with the increasing menace of smuggling and drug trafficking, events in Pakistan and Bangla Desh etc. would all have their own effect in the adjoining areas in India.

Ethnic Militancy

There has been some success over the years in handling ethno-centric militancy in the northeast. Successive governments in India have been following the dual path of negotiation on grievances and firm handling of violence. The near and long term prospects of this approach would very much depend on the fine tuning of the balance between the two paths and the drying up of external support or safe havens. The future would also depend on the relative strengths (real and perceived) of the government and the militant groups. If the latter are able to consolidate their positions and secure an advantage over the state - as had been happening in Sri Lanka - they may be tempted to escalate their demands to the point of a breakdown and reversion to violence. On the other hand, if the state negotiates from a position of demonstrated strength, these groups could weaken with the passage of time and may be inclined to accept the maximum benefits and honourable solutions offered; and rejoin the mainstream.

A potentially dangerous development is the “opportunistic” and “unprincipled” (but limited) international support to the declaration of independence by Kosovo. Ethnic separatists like ULFA, NSCN and those in Manipur could try speciously to apply the Kosovo precedent to their areas. The Government of India should therefore take note of this potential land-mine and be very careful in framing its reaction and response to the developments in Kosovo.

Maoist Insurgency

Maoist (Naxalite) movements have gripped a significantly large portion of India and presently pose one of the most serious threats to our internal security. Though the “ideology” and the “methodology” may be imported, the basic causes are indigenous. There is a wide-spread perception that “land reforms” and efforts at redressal of genuine grievances have only been superficial and that the “exploiters” continue to “exploit” the poor and the landless agriculturists. It cannot be a coincidence that the Maoists are most effective in areas of past maximum exploitation. If, however, this perception is wrong, it is for the state agencies to inform the public of the correct position. On the other hand, if there is any element of truth in this perception, urgent steps are required to remedy the situation on the ground.

A majority of India’s small farmers have been facing severe economic problems due to various factors, including globalization, credit crunch (compounded by usurious money-lenders), non-inclusive economic progress etc. It would not be difficult for the Maoists to project themselves as the sole protectors of the poor farmer’s interests and the militant way as the only viable redressal procedure available to them. Some recently announced relief measures, including the “revolutionary” farm loan waiver scheme, are very welcome steps, but they should be the beginning and not the end of the many measures necessary to retrieve the poor farmers from the potential embrace of the Maoists. The perception of imbalanced subsidies, which is also a major source of alienation, needs to be overcome by introducing a more rational system.

Maritime & Cargo Security

Apart from the conventional maritime threats to India’s national security, special attention needs to be paid to the protection of Indian interests in the exclusive economic zone, to the protection of the (lives and) interests of Indian fishermen, to threats of sabotage/drug trafficking/smuggling posed by container traffic etc. An example of the kind of threat from un-inspected container traffic was graphically provided a couple of days ago, by the fire that started in the privatized luggage (parcel) enclosure in the Chennai-Madurai Pandian Express.

The potential of the presence of the Sea Tigers in the Palk Strait (and of the clashes between the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers in that area) becoming a serious threat to India’s national security cannot be forgotten or ignored.

Cyber Space

India is becoming notorious as a major originator of spam and “phishing” on the internet. Cyber-based economic offences like illegal money transfers to anti-social entities, laundering of black money, share market manipulation, bank frauds etc. are on the increase, though specific and reliable data is not available.

Changes that Need to be Considered

The above listing (albeit incomplete) of the dimensions of the internal security threats faced by India may seem extremely frightening and may lead to theories of “conspiracies” against India’s inevitable march towards becoming a major actor in the international arena. India has the human and material resources for overcoming the problems and for ensuring her internal security; but some significant changes in our mind-set and in our policy-making are necessary. One thing that is certain is that we cannot afford to continue doing business as usual.

First and foremost is the need to recognize that our internal security can be ensured only if there is a consensus on national security policies. Political entities need to agree to eschew the temptation of exploiting (for narrow party interests or for creating/maintaining vote-banks) divisive issues which have the potential of posing threats to national security and cohesion. Such issues should be discussed between all the concerned political entities and the concerned people, so that agreed policy approaches could be worked out. The relatively easy procedure of inciting emotions and passions on potentially divisive issues needs to be given up, though at some cost to the popular “image”.

Similarly, parochialism (whether in Assam or Tamil Nadu or Karnataka or Mumbai or anywhere else) should not be allowed to over-ride overall national interests, particularly relating to national security and national integration. Local and minor issues should not emotionally be blown up to become a major national issue. Local and regional concerns no doubt require attention, but they could be pursued with a proper sense of proportion; and discussion and negotiation should become the first choice – instead of agitation, merely to attract the attention of the media and the public. All sections of the media need to resolve that they would demand and encourage such a change in the priorities for the procedures to be adopted for the resolution of potential (and existing) conflicts of interest.

On the part of the government, it has to recognize the public perception that while considerable progress has been made in the area of collection of intelligence, through technical means, about the activities of terrorist and militant groups, such progress does not seem to have been matched in the areas of penetration of those groups and collection of intelligence through human agents. If this perception is correct, necessary measures to rectify the imbalance need to be initiated urgently.

Further, though the required mechanisms are stated to have been created for effective co-ordination between state and central agencies, as also amongst central agencies themselves, the results do not reflect the effectiveness of these mechanisms. What the public see and hear, soon after any “incident” or “failure of security”, is a prompt litany of complaints from state and central security agencies, , though mostly indigenous against each other. This effort to shift “blame” often takes precedence over speedy investigation and relief measures.

The variety of internal security threats makes it essential that coping with those threats cannot be left to be the sole responsibility of the state security agencies. There is an inescapable need effectively to involve all other state agencies, all political and religious entities, private security agencies, educationists, social workers and the civil society as a whole to protect our nation. Prevention should be the primary objective, with effective detection and deterrent punishment (when prevention fails) as the backup. It is in the area of prevention that the total involvement of the nation could be made most effective.

Conclusion

Security is not a luxury and is not merely a function of the state; it is a way of life. India has to and can overcome the general inability of democracies to put together the political will, the resources and the strategies that are necessary to prevail over all internal security threats. Real reforms that would remove or minimize economic and religion/caste-based inequalities, good and honest governance and effective policing are pre-requisites for the marshalling the total resources of the nation in these efforts. The Govt of India should also be prepared to lower the threshold of tolerance in relation to cross-border terrorism and to serve credible notice that India has the capabilities and the determination to inflict prohibitively high and unacceptable cost on the state sponsors of terrorist acts against Indian interests.

(This presentation was prepared for delivery on 15 March 2008 at the One-Day National Seminar on “Internal Security Dimensions of India”, jointly organized in Chennai by the Dept of Defence & Strategic Studies (University of Madras) and Observer research Foundation (Chennai Chapter). The author can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com)