Time to Deliver for Pak’s New Leaders

Source: SAAG.ORG

Bhaskar Roy

Pakistan’s new Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani displayed some quiet, but firm maturity. His first move was to order the release of the judges put under house arrest by President Pervez Musharraf. It was the judges of Pakistan’s superior courts, supported fully by the lawyer’s community that helped triggered the wave of opposition to Musharraf’s lordship over the country. As Mao Zedong said, one spark can set a thousand prairies on fire.

Gilani’s next step was to order the army back to the barracks. Senior and middle level military officers are expected to revert to their respective services in two weeks. The rest, the JCOs and NCOs would take some more time to move.

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Asfaq Kyani had already initiated the move following the elections which saw the PPP and PML (N) coalition root out Musharraf’s Party, the PML(Q). Next, Kyani reshuffled the top army brass, especially the Corps Commanders, except the Director General of the ISI. He again shifted out the powerful Military Intelligence (MI) Chief, Maj. Gen. Md. Asif, a Musharraf confidante, and replaced him with his own man, Maj. Gen. Nadim Ejaz. These were clever moves by Kyani. He knew these officers were handpicked by Musharraf and loyal to him.

In the armed forces, loyalists do not shift like politicians. There are exceptions like Musharraf himself, but training and discipline inculcates this character of loyalty. Among Pakistani politicians, Mushahid Hossain is a star example. He shifted his camp from former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s to that of Musharraf after the latter locked him up for a year in jail.

One does not know Gen. Kyani’s mind in any depth or detail. He is reported to be a better listener than talker. He reads the moods of the people, and that of the Islamic terrorists very well. Another military coup, Martial Law or Emergency Rule would not be acceptable to the people. The Americans may have supported such a development with Musharraf as the head in their misunderstanding and strategy in the war against terror.

The top most priority for the army is to win the trust and support of the Pakistani people. Informed media reports from Pakistan have said Gen. Kyani is Washington’s man. But when such a man reaches the top leadership position of an establishment as important as the army in Pakistan, he has to look at the domestic situation for his stable conduct of affairs. Wishes of foreign mentors even for a pressing international cause come afterwards.

It may be noted that Gen. Kyani has not moved the ISI Chief appointed under Musharraf’s signature. The Army Chief would have had a significant say in this appointment and should be a man of his trust. He succeeded Kyani in the post.

The Pakistan armed forces have become too dependent upon the ISI, especially in their political role. The political role of the ISI included a dominant role in Afghanistan, and India-Pak relations. It was through the ISI that weapons were supplied to the Taliban, relations maintained with Al-Qaeda, and terrorist organizations like the Lashker-e-Toiba (LeT), HUJI and Jaish-e-Mohammad were created for promoting terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India.

Since the ISI is a secret organization its budget is not known. But reports say, with some supporting evidence, that the organization supplements its government budget through Afghan drug deals and gun running. The unofficial revenue earned by the ISI keeps alive its nefarious operations.

Over the years, the ISI has evolved into a deep organization with onion-like layers of levels which generally have their own agenda. Can Gen. Kyani rein in the ISI? Perhaps, yes. Much of this will depend upon the policies the new government pursues.

Prime Minister Gilani has initiated a major step to abolish the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, enacted by the British. The frontier area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan has been a special issue for a long time. The fiercely independent tribals of the region known now as the Federally Administered Tibal Area (FATA) could not be tamed by the British or, following them, the Pakistanis. In a frustrated move the Empire’s minions tried to criminalize the people of this region. Pakistan followed the same recipe, but with obvious failure. FATA is hardly administered by the government in Islamabad. As Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Michael Hayden recently disclosed, the Al-Qaeda has established a highly secure safe haven along the Pak-Afghanistan border in the tribal area which they never enjoyed before. Osama bin Laden is hiding there, Hayden added.

Gilani has taken this first step. But a lot of work remains to be done to bring the people of this frontier area within the mainstream of Pakistan in the sense of development.

FATA is a no man’s land. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders like Mollah Omar and Osama bin Laden are afforded shelter here. Parts of this region host international terrorists. If the tribal Chiefs can be convinced that Islamic terrorism is wrong, it will be a major blow to terrorism.

It is easier said than done, however. The new policy to address the issue of terrorism through dialogue and not military might may be a good experiment. It is, however, a very delicate and sensitive demand to address. The tribals are wary and suspicious. They may see their citadels under attack. They have also been conditioned by ISI crafted propaganda mainly through Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda and Mollah Omar’s Taliban to destroy the infidels. The Mullahs of ISI have played no mean role in this effort.

Afghanistan as Pakistan’s strategic depth is unlikely to change in the near future. Therefore, this central policy may contradict its efforts to tame FATA because the anti-India framework in Afghanistan is a strategic priority. It is difficult to see if the new dispensation in Pakistan can discard this policy fixation. There are built-in contradictions in this issue.

Prime Minister Gilani appears to have left a very important aspect of democracy up in the air. Left the fourth estate, the media. He has only shifted the draconian Press and Electronic Media Regulations Act (PENRA) to the Ministry of Information. Musharraf had generally left the media quite free except towards the end of his unquestioned power run. The media, on its part, did more than its fair bit to bring back democracy in Pakistan.

In fact, Mia Nawaz Sharif, as Prime Minister, was much more harsh on journalists who criticized his policies. The Friday Times editor Najam Sethi would vouch for that. If the PPP and the PML (N) really want a vibrant democracy to take roots in Pakistan, the first thing they should do is to abolish PEMRA.

Pakistan’s mainstream media matured quickly under Gen.Musharraf’s draconian measures, since his 1999 coup. In the very initial stages there was support to Musharraf precisely because of the bad name that Prime Minister Sharif, his family and his close allies had earned, because of unbridled corruption. But the media also learnt subsequently that imperfect freedom is better than to be in chains.

The new coalition government went a large step forward allowing unions in Colleges and Universities. It was the military rulers and politicians who killed political learning among the country’s youth, for decades. The political parties will face challenges from this section which will demand mature handling. All said, this is a healthy development.

In his first speech laying down the priorities of his government for the first hundred days, Prime Minister Gilani gave a ball-park picture of his foreign policy perspective. He set his top priorities to counter terrorism, and cordial relations with neighbouring countries. He did not specifically name neighbours, but added that the demands of the Kashmiri people would be taken into consideration in resolving the Kashmir issue with India.

PPP Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari had initially indicated that the Kashmir issue would not be allowed to stonewall improvement of relations with India. An out cry from Kashmiri Jehadis like the Hijbul Mujahidin and their mentors in Pakistan warned that Zardari may have jumped the political gun.

The Kashmir issue, as interpreted by the Pakistani military and political leader for more than half a century is embedded in the minds of both the common people and intellectuals. It is so strong that no person, institution or government could exist in the country with a contrary view. Asif Ali Zardari has to correct his view. Zardari, Gilani and others must keep in consideration that the Pakistani army calls the shots on this issue. And the ISI is not going to let go easily their proprietary role in Kashmir insurgency, and expanded terrorism in the rest of India.

Gilani’s observation on the Kashmir issue cannot be faulted, given the situation. It will take time for the new government in Pakistan to revert to a purely political and bilateral exchange with India on the Kashmir issue.

New Delhi would be well advised not to push the Kashmir aspect in a hurry. Instead, there is an urgent need from both sides to address terrorism including those sponsored by the ISI. The new Pakistan must learn from Musharraf’s multi-angled approach to terrorism. He tried to use them in his own interests but finally brought this curse on Pakistan.

Pakistan’s immediate foreign thrust should be on Afghanistan, USA, China and India, with Saudi Arabia as the rather silent but strong plinth of the country as always. Briefly, each of these countries could play positive roles in their own way extending out to other countries and regions. A spider-web network in a manner of saying for Islamabad’s new external relations strategy.

Afghanistan is, perhaps, the biggest and most complicated challenge for Prime Minister Gilani. It is intimately and intricately connected with Pakistan’s internal stability and security. Pak governments, dictated by the army and intelligence agencies, sought “strategic depth” in Afghanistan for a war against India. With the Americans turning their back on both Afghanistan and Pakistan, following the Soviet withdrawal after the first Afghan war, Islamabad’s policies there had a field day. What happened there after is well known. For the new Pakistani government, and the Pak army led by its Chief Gen. Kyani, the urgent task would be how to disentangle from this mess.

The Taliban is an indigenous force which was propped up by both the US and the western alliance along with Pakistan, to drive out Moscow’s occupation of Afghanistan. It took strong roots even after the war was over, and with Islamabad’s open assistance, tried to force down the throat of the country obscurantist Wahabi Islam. Saudi Arabia was equally complicit with financial and ideological support.

Worst was Taliban Chief, Mullah Omar giving Al-Qaeda base, sanctuary and protection and freedom to act. Osama bin Laden brought in foreign terrorists, some of them highly educated but equally committed to Wahabism. At the same time, the low level foreign terrorists and fighters brought in mainly by the Al-Qaeda may not be totally acceptable to the locals.

Use of military power to fight terrorism cannot be done away with totally. But this has to be used with greater statesmanship. Use of paramilitary power by the US with some help from Pervez Musharraf did damage, but it also had repercussion, with the US losing people’s support. Musharraf played games all around, running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. He looked clever and won many admirers as a master strategist. But such games do not last, and did not.

Pakistan has already made a new, good beginning. The policy to negotiate with their own tribal fighter and the Pakistani Taliban, backed by force if need be, demands appreciation and support from all concerned.

The next step should be to grab the opportunities revealed by Pakistan’s March elections, in which religious fundamentalists were electorally “wiped out”, proving that the Mullahs and their terrorist arms have no support among the people.

The liberal forces in Afghanistan are gaining support. Otherwise, the Taliban would have allowed a show like the “Afghan Idol” to be held, and that too in Kandahar. It shows the people are becoming bolder and gaining confidence to challenge the armed radicals. The Taliban is beginning to realize this. But the hardliners are a determined lot. They have forced the Afghan Information Ministry to stop telecast of Indian serials as un-Islamic. It must, however, be admitted that President Karzai’s Ministers may not hold the same view with him as religion issues.

In both the countries, the terror inflicting religions fanatics do not enjoy popular support. It was not so subtle support from the Pakistan officialdom, basically the Pakistan armed forces and intelligence that gave the fundamentalists their power and success.

It is not only the responsibility of the Gilani government, but an imperative duty, to extend support to President Hamid Karzai, to work together, using a carrot and stick policy to take on the situation. People’s power can be a Tsunami like wave. But they require support from the powers that be.

There is, of course, the age old tribal culture and tradition issue in both the countries. This has to be dealt with delicately and with high sensitivity. These tribals do not like foreigners or external elements among them. They share the same religion but their way of life is different and their traditions and customs are most precious to them. An anti-terrorism plan which respects their way of life is sure to succeed. The Al-Qaeda will have difficulty in operating from the Pak-Afghan border.

People and people’s power are critical, and are waiting to play their role. It may also be unwise to assume that the tribals are unwilling to modernize and develop. The world is no longer in the 18th and 19th centuries. The computer and internet have been instrumental to a great extent for tempting changes, and the tribals are not totally immune to the “world wide web”.

Finally, Pakistan must rethink its policy of using Afghanistan as its “strategic depth”, and stop trying to enforce suzverainity over it. Otherwise, peace and stability will be a difficult objective to achieve.

The United States has been pushing strategic interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Washington must realize that with interest comes responsibility, an issue in which the American have not acquitted themselves with glory in most parts of the world.

Going after the terrorists in this region is not exactly like killing the (Red) Indian Chiefs like Sitting Bull or Spotted Wolf. Washington had tried to coax and bribe Mullah Omar to surrender Osama bin Laden in exchange for diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as the legitimate government. Human Rights was not an issue at all in the US offer. Mullah Omar refused.

Washington also tried to work with the Taliban to allow UNOCAL, the oil and gas giant, to build an energy pipeline from Central Asia through Afghanistan that could bring the hydrocarbon out through Pakistan. UNOCAL is reported to have bribed the Taliban for the project. This also did not work. The Taliban would not work with the USA mainly because of the kind of political and cultural influence that could follow.

The White House, Pentagon and all betted on President Musharraf. A dictator, especially one which works to Washington’s dictates, is far more acceptable than a democracy with different voices and influence on the government. The option of Musharraf is fast receding for the US, and they have to work with the new political force in the country.

The US does not have considerably support among the people of Pakistan, especially from March, 2007. Washington continued to support Musharraf when the latter began sabotaging the judiciary. The report is well known history, fresh in the minds of the people.

The foregoing does not mean the USA should withdraw from Pakistan. Far from it, the USA is required for regional balance and also to boost Pakistan’s economy. But it will have to reassess its anti-terror policy.

Pakistan’s relations with China have been long, strong and enduring. Unlike the USA, Beijing has never turned its back on Pakistan. The country’s armed forces are basically armed with weapons made in China; including its nuclear weapons arsenal (hoodwinking all international non-proliferation regimes). Economically also, China has been steadfast in its support. Given all these, China’s political influence in Pakistan needs no elaboration.

From China’s point of view, Pakistan is a strategic jewel. Islamabad has been its bridge head to the Middle East, instrumental in its break through with the US, an anchor in China’s encirclement of India policy, and a solid supporter for China entering the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). China enjoys much more goodwill among the people of Pakistan than the US does.

China has two important problems with Pakistan about which it may not be openly very vocal, but is acutely sensitive. These are terrorism, and the US dropping anchor in Pakistan.

Uighur Muslim separatists started receiving Islamic indoctrination and arms training in camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan from the late 1980s. These camps were run by the Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and with some ISI role thrown in. Chinese Premier Li Peng had taken up this issue with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as far back as 1992, when she visited China.

With the rising protest and demonstration by Uighurs in China, a senior Chinese leader openly stated that the Uighur body, the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM), a designated terrorist organization of Xinjiang – Uighur Autonomous Region, were being directed by their leaders currently in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This observation by Xinjiang Communist Party Chief Wang Lequan in Late March is very serious which the Pakistani leader will have to address sooner than later. China has lost a number of its citizens in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in recent years.

The increasing American presence in Pakistan is a bigger security challenge as perceived by China. From China’s strategic perspective, India traditionally followed an independent foreign policy (that has changed in Beijing recent assessments), but Pakistani leaders are periodically inclined to close relations with the USA without taking Beijing into full confidence.

During the latter half of the cold war, a US-Pakistan-China axis thrived against a perceived Indo-Soviet axis in the region. Chinese were involved quietly on the US-Pak side against a Soviet thrust in Afghanistan. It was relieved when the US withdrew after the Soviet withdrawal.

This time, however, the US has acquired far more and long term interests in Pakistan. These interests include terrorism, the developments in the Gulf region, Central Asian energy resources and, of course, Washington’s 21st century Asia policy. In addition, Beijing is concerned over the growing Indo-US Co-operation in the area of defence.

On top of all these is the US military presence on Pakistan’s soil with the US-Pak agreement to place their aircraft for counter-terrorism. The US intelligence presence in Pakistan is also a worry for the security of China’s restive Xinjiang region.

President Pervez Musharraf is to visit China soon after a long hiatus. Though Musharraf, the Chief architect of the Pak-US relations may not be able to enthuse confidence among the Chinese leaders, they would listen to him.

The Pakistani leader would have to assure the Chinese they would positively address their concerns. They would have to prove this with some action on the ground. China, however, is unlikely to give up on Pakistan. Their foreign policy does not work in that way.

While prosecuting its relations with the players discussed in this article, Pakistan may find India coming up a large number of issues. These are important bilateral, regional and international issues the Pakistani and Indian governments will have to iron out.

Much will depend upon how the new Pakistani government embarks upon this road. Reports in the Pakistani media say Yusaf Gilani is not a puppet and can be his own man. This is good news. Having said that, the reality is somewhat different. First, no one is sure how long he will be there as Prime Minister, or is he keeping PM’s Chair warm for PPP Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari, the de facto head of the party. Next, he is a coalition’s consensus choice for the post.

The coalition government comprises two parties who ran government in the past and rivaled each other. They have their own policies. They co-operated to oust Musharraf. They have promised to bury the past. But this is easier said than done. PML(N) Chairman Mia Nawaz Sharif would like to return as Prime Minister for a third time. Zardari’s and late Benazir’s son Bilawal all of 19 years, is a future Prime Minister in the making.

There is also the case of the armed forces, its intelligence arms like the ISI and Military Intelligence (MI), and the traditional anti-India forces who appear in all sections of people and institutions in some number or the other. The army, till now, held the policy edge on Afghanistan, the Kashmir issue and India. And then Army’s approach in all these cases have been aggressive and pro-active. Let us not forget army/ISI backed terrorism, and Kargil.

History, however, is a witness to many changes. Adversaries have become close friends in the interest of peace and development. Look at Europe. Yet, human and emotional issues, basic questions of land and water, have kept people divided and warring. Look at the Israel-Palestine issue. Between the Palestinians and the Israelis, religion is only a subsidiary matter. Sheer existence is the issue there.

The issues between India and Pakistan do not hold the balance of the existence of either country or their people. In fact, it is quite the opposite. If the two countries co-operate in all aspects, the SAARC will develop into a vibrant and dynamic, economic and social entity and a force in the world to contend with. This region has the manpower in an ideal age bracket, intellect and expertise, and the resources as well.

Pakistanis, especially the army, holds India responsible for the break up of Pakistan in 1971. This is not the full truth. Seeds of separation between the two wings of Pakistan was sown in 1948 in the eastern wing, now Bangladesh. Neither geographically nor politically and even less culturally the wings enjoyed any proximity. Islamabad’s policies in East Pakistan was not only insensitive, but lacked any understanding of the region. Pakistanis who hold 1971 against India as an incident to be avenged, need to introspect honestly to see the truth.

Kashmir is a more difficult problem to resolve quickly. The two sides must keep talking, but as Asif Zardari said, not make it the condition for improvement in bilateral relations. Keep it on the candle-warmer, end terrorism which will in turn see an end to Indian security forces in Indian Kashmir. At the same time, Pakistan must give the Kashmiri’s in POK the right enjoyed by the Kashmiris in India. The process will be slow, b ut well worth the time for all concerned especially the Kashmiris.

The distrust between the two sides on Afghanistan must end. Afghanistan is a sovereign country and enjoys age old close relations with India. Pakistan sees it as its backyard, its strategic depth and it extended sovereignty. This policy is unlikely to work.

Pakistan must understand that while it has its legitimate rights and concerns with the development in a close bordering country like Afghanistan, it does not hold proprietary rights over it. It is not only India, but other countries like China, Russia, the USA and others who are interested in the stability and modernization of this country. Pakistan’s policy of playing footsies with the Taliban has only backfired on itself.

Prime Minister Gilani has sought a 100-day time table for setting the course right for Pakistan. But, there are many things beyond the Prime Minister’s control. The real decisions lie with Asif Ali zardari, Mia Nawaz Sharif, and Gen. Asfaq Kyani. In turn, each of these power centers have their own constituencies to contend with.

Kyani may have neutralized top Musharraf allies in the army, and started withdrawing army personnel from civilian duties. This is an internal matter, however, India is another matter.

The other issue is how to deal with Musharraf. Differences within the alliance have already begun to be aired in the PPP. If Musharraf is retained in his position as President to encash his assets, his policies cannot be thrown overboard in entirety. This is the Gordian Knot.

(The author is an eminent analyst with many years of experience. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)