B.RAMAN
The pressure on Pakistan from the US and other Western countries to act firmly against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and its political wing called the Jammat-ud-Dawa (JUD) is quite strong not only because of their anxiety to prevent an Indian military retaliation for the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26,2008, but also because of the anger in Israel and the Jewish diaspora in the West over the brutal massacre of eight Israeli nationals ---two them with dual US nationality--- and a Jewish person from Mexico by the LET terrorists in the Narriman House of Mumbai..
2. Concerns of Western businessmen, with business interests in India, over the security of their life and property have also contributed to the Western pressure on Pakistan, which is more intense this time than it was after the joint attack on the Indian Parliament launched by the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) on December 13,2001.
3. Under this pressure, Pakistan has ostensibly acted against the JUD, through measures such as placing its Amir Pro-Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed under house arrest, arresting some cadres at senior, middle and junior levels , freezing the bank accounts of the organization etc.
4.Interestingly, it has attributed its actions to the decision of the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council to designate the JUD as a terrorist organization and blacklist four of its top leaders including Prof.Sayeed. It has sought to avoid adding to the anti-Government anger in the pro-jihadi sections of its population by creating an impression that its actions were dictated by the decision of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Committee, which the Government was bound to obey, and not by US pressure. Despite this, its actions are seen by these sections as due to Indian and US pressure and not just due to the UN designation.
5. This has added to the anti-Indian and anti-US anger in these sections, comparable to the anti-Chinese and anti-US anger after the commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad from July 10 to 13,2007, which was seen by the pro-Al Qaeda jihadis as dictated by Chinese and American pressure on Pervez Mushharraf, the then President and Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
6. One should, therefore, be prepared for a further surge in jihadi terrorist attacks on Indian nationals and interests as well as on Western and Israeli nationals and interests. The attacks on Indian and Western nationals and interests could be in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Indian territory. The attacks on Israeli nationals and interests could be in Indian territory.
7. The attacks on Indian nationals and interests could be not only from the remnants of the LET and the JEM, which have evaded arrest in Pakistan, but also from their supporters and sympathizers in the Indian Muslim community and in Bangladesh. The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), which was not banned by Musharraf in January,2002, and its branch in Bangladesh known as HUJI (B), have also a presence in a number of States in India having illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
8. It is likely that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, (TTP), which has not so far joined the anti-Indian jihad and has focused its operations against the US and Pakistani forces, may do so now in solidarity with the JUD and the LET. Another danger would be from Jundullahs (Soldiers of Allah), who are lone-wolf jihadis without any organizational affiliation. Many of them have taken to suicide or suicidal terrorism in Pakistan after the commando action in the Lal Masjid and have shown a capability for attacking high-value and hard targets, including in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
9. The danger of a further surge in jihadi terrorism against Indian nationals and interests in the coming months, if not weeks, would call for immediate measures for strengthening the physical security in all metro cities, namely, Delhi, Mumbai,Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad as well as in Goa, which has been a favourite destination for Israeli tourists.
10. The Government should immediately lay down tailor-made terrorism prevention and incident management drill for each metro city, clearly identifying who will be responsible for leadership and co-ordination. A similar drill should be prepared for the Government of India. The drill should cover aspects such as incident management, media management, relatives management, public management, co-ordination between the State affected and the Centre etc.
11. The measures, which the Government of India proposes to take such as the creation of a national agency for the investigation of terrorism-related cases with a pan-Indian dimension, additional powers for the Police, creating a rapid response capability in the Police in important States, the creation of a coastal command etc are strategic measures which would take at least one to two years to mature. Till then, enforcement of immediate preventive measures of a tactical nature would be necessary in consultation with the States of Delhi, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Goa.
12. The Government of India should immediately undertake a vulnerability assessment to identify areas and establishments, which would require immediate attention and initiate the necessary additional security measures with the presently available human and technical resources. Among immediate measures required would be intensification and strengthening of Police patrolling, intensification of enquiries about visitors of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in hotels, inns, guest houses and other places, watch on areas of concentration of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh etc .
13. India has been attacked by the jihadi terrorists---home-grown as well as of Pakistani origin---for many years. Despite this, the international business community with interests in India had confidence in the capability of the Indian counter-terrorism machinery to prevail over them and in their ability to protect the lives and property of foreign business executives working and living in India. In justification of their continuing confidence in the Indian counter-terrorism machinery, they remembered the successful record of India in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East, the Khalistani terrorism in Punjab, the Al Ummah terrorism in Tamil Nadu and even in controlling the jihadi terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
14. That confidence has been shaken after the Mumbai strike of November 26. This can be seen in the advisories being issued by private risk assessment consultancy groups to their business clients. The image of an India that can in the fight against terrorism is slowly giving way to an image of an India that probably can’t. This negative image of India, which has started emerging, can be reversed by determined tactical action to prevent any more acts of catastrophic terrorism and strategic measures to bring India in step with the Western countries in strengthening its counter-terrorism machinery. Mumbai—November 26 caused only 185 fatalities. Despite this, it was catastrophic in terms of the damage it has caused to the external image of India’s political leadership and professional national security managers. One more November 26 in any city with a large population of foreign businessmen---the present nervousness can turn into panic.
15. The Government of India has been in a denial and cover-up modes since it came to office in 2004. As a result of November 26, it is slowly coming out of its denial mode, but it continues to be in a cover-up mode as could be seen from its reluctance to order a detailed enquiry by a commission, enjoying the confidence of the Parliament and the public, into the sins of commission and omission, which facilitated the operation of November 26 by the LET and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Without such an enquiry with the findings of the enquiry available to the public, including the business community, we will find it difficult to regain the confidence of the public and the business community.
16. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the main opposition party, which hopes to come to power after the forthcoming parliamentary elections, has also been in a denial mode of its own. It is refusing to acknowledge that there are pockets of anger among Indian Muslim youth due to perceptions of the unfairness of the Indian system towards them. This anger has been inducing some of them to assist organizations such as the LET and the JEM in their terrorist attacks in Indian territory and some others to wage their own jihad in Indian colours in the name of the so-called Indian Mujahideen.
17. Dealing with the internal dimensions of the jihad is as important as dealing with the external dimensions. While the external dimensions have started receiving attention, the internal dimensions are sought to be pushed under the carpet. Anyone, who persists in drawing attention to the internal dimensions is sought to be ridiculed or vilified or projected as an apologist for the jihadis. Such an approach would be counter-productive and will ultimately weaken our fight against the external dimensions.
18. For four years, we dithered over the proposal to set up a national agency to investigate terrorism cases with a pan-Indian dimension. In our post-Mumbai haste to set it up, we should not repeat the mistakes we committed while creating the National Security Guards (NSGs) by making it over-centralised with no regional presence. The proposed national agency to investigate pan-Indian terrorism cases should not similarly become an over-centralised agency.
19. When terrorists strike, the first to reach the scene and start the investigation is the staff of the police station in whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. This should remain so. The police station should register the offence, start the investigation and keep it going till the national agency decides to take it over. This “first to start the investigation” role of the local police should not be diluted or supplanted by the proposed national agency. (14-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
December 13, 2008
QUOTE OF THE DAY : Vikram Sood
Why IB and RAW should not be merged
"This is unworkable and ridiculous for several reasons. The two require totally different disciplines. Intelligence is a function of area, language and regional expertise and of operational skills honed over years of practical experience. It is not a function that can be professionally performed by birds of passage. External intelligence requires different skills in language, regions and issues. Its method of collection is different as it has to work in hostile surroundings, against the laws of the country to which its officers are assigned. Internal intelligence operates on home ground in accordance with local laws and has the backing of the state. The two functions are not interchangeable. Besides, no democratic country has one intelligence service. "
December 12, 2008
Bringing Mumbai perpetrators to book top priority: Negroponte
New Delhi (IANS): Asking Pakistan to "act forcefully" against terrorist outfits, the US on Friday said it was cooperating with India in probing the Mumbai terror strikes and underlined the “responsibility” of the international community in bringing the perpetrators of the attack to book.
“We think it is imperative that these attacks be thoroughly investigated and we think it is also imperative that those responsible for perpetrating these attacks be brought to account,” visiting US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte told reporters here.
“So the effort at the moment is concentrated on investigating these attacks and bringing those responsible to account,” said Negroponte, who arrived here Friday on a day-long visit, after visiting Islamabad.
“We're cooperating in this effort, obviously the government of India is in the lead, but all of our diplomatic partners have a responsibility to contribute to this effort,” Negroponte said.
His remarks reflected a growing perception that the international community needs to proactively deal with the ramifications of the Mumbai attacks which have been seen as not just an attack on India but as part of the global scourge in which 26 foreigners were among 179 killed.
“We deplore them, we think that these were dastardly acts, and of course in addition to the fact that India has been seriously aggrieved, there were United States casualties as well. So we are also victims of these attacks,” he said.
Negroponte met External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and discussed the leads gathered by US security agencies that appeared to confirm India's accusation that elements from Pakistan were directly involved in Mumbai's bloody terror assaults, reliable sources said.
Negroponte briefed Mukherjee on his interaction with Pakistani leaders during his visit to Islamabad Thursday and his message to them to widen the crackdown on anti-terror outfits in that country, sources said.
Negroponte came here a day after Pakistan clamped down on Jamat-ud-Dawah (JuD), a front organisation for the Laskhar-e-Taiba suspected of masterminding the Mumbai attacks.
While underlining the need for concrete and urgent action by Pakistan against terrorist apparatus in that country, he also advised India to be restrained and pursue diplomatic options in dealing with Pakistan, the sources added.
Conveying the sense of deep anger and outrage in India, Mukherjee told his US interlocutor about growing perception in New Delhi that Islamabad needs to move beyond tokenism and focus on dismantling the entire terrorist infrastructure in that country, the sources said.
Negroponte also met National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and discussed the US experience in dealing with trans-national terror threats after the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington.
Negroponte's India trip comes 10 days after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi and asked Islamabad to take action against “non-state actors”, saying Pakistan must cooperate “urgently and transparently” with India in the probe into the Mumbai terror attacks.
In Washington, Rice sent a clear message to Islamabad to act forcefully against terror outfits that India suspcts of plotting and executing the Mumbai carnage. "Frankly, the US has better relations with India and Pakistan than in 2001-02. But it is obviously a dangerous situation, and Pakistan needs to act and act forcefully," she stressed.
"And I think the Indians rightly were concerned to make sure that the perpetrators are brought to justice and that follow-on attacks are prevented," she said.
According to The Dawn, a Pakistani daily, Negroponte had shared a list with his Pakistani interlocutors that contains names of lesser-known groups like the Pasban Ahle-e-Hadith against whom Washington wants Islamabad to take action.
The US diplomat has asked Islamabad to continue action against the LeT and to expand the scope of the operations to other "groups that may be linked with subversive activities in India", the daily said.
“We think it is imperative that these attacks be thoroughly investigated and we think it is also imperative that those responsible for perpetrating these attacks be brought to account,” visiting US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte told reporters here.
“So the effort at the moment is concentrated on investigating these attacks and bringing those responsible to account,” said Negroponte, who arrived here Friday on a day-long visit, after visiting Islamabad.
“We're cooperating in this effort, obviously the government of India is in the lead, but all of our diplomatic partners have a responsibility to contribute to this effort,” Negroponte said.
His remarks reflected a growing perception that the international community needs to proactively deal with the ramifications of the Mumbai attacks which have been seen as not just an attack on India but as part of the global scourge in which 26 foreigners were among 179 killed.
“We deplore them, we think that these were dastardly acts, and of course in addition to the fact that India has been seriously aggrieved, there were United States casualties as well. So we are also victims of these attacks,” he said.
Negroponte met External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and discussed the leads gathered by US security agencies that appeared to confirm India's accusation that elements from Pakistan were directly involved in Mumbai's bloody terror assaults, reliable sources said.
Negroponte briefed Mukherjee on his interaction with Pakistani leaders during his visit to Islamabad Thursday and his message to them to widen the crackdown on anti-terror outfits in that country, sources said.
Negroponte came here a day after Pakistan clamped down on Jamat-ud-Dawah (JuD), a front organisation for the Laskhar-e-Taiba suspected of masterminding the Mumbai attacks.
While underlining the need for concrete and urgent action by Pakistan against terrorist apparatus in that country, he also advised India to be restrained and pursue diplomatic options in dealing with Pakistan, the sources added.
Conveying the sense of deep anger and outrage in India, Mukherjee told his US interlocutor about growing perception in New Delhi that Islamabad needs to move beyond tokenism and focus on dismantling the entire terrorist infrastructure in that country, the sources said.
Negroponte also met National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and discussed the US experience in dealing with trans-national terror threats after the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington.
Negroponte's India trip comes 10 days after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi and asked Islamabad to take action against “non-state actors”, saying Pakistan must cooperate “urgently and transparently” with India in the probe into the Mumbai terror attacks.
In Washington, Rice sent a clear message to Islamabad to act forcefully against terror outfits that India suspcts of plotting and executing the Mumbai carnage. "Frankly, the US has better relations with India and Pakistan than in 2001-02. But it is obviously a dangerous situation, and Pakistan needs to act and act forcefully," she stressed.
"And I think the Indians rightly were concerned to make sure that the perpetrators are brought to justice and that follow-on attacks are prevented," she said.
According to The Dawn, a Pakistani daily, Negroponte had shared a list with his Pakistani interlocutors that contains names of lesser-known groups like the Pasban Ahle-e-Hadith against whom Washington wants Islamabad to take action.
The US diplomat has asked Islamabad to continue action against the LeT and to expand the scope of the operations to other "groups that may be linked with subversive activities in India", the daily said.
Banning Jamaat-ud-Dawa not sufficient: Germany
New Delhi (PTI): Germany on Friday said that banning of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, believed to be behind the Mumbai attacks, is "not sufficient" and Pakistan must act to prevent further terror strikes.
German Home Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who held talks with Home Minister P Chidambaram and National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, said there was evidence to show that the Islamic terror network behind the Mumbai attacks had origin in Pakistan.
Schaeuble, who arrived here on Friday morning for discussing cooperation with India in dealing with terrorism, said the Pakistan was being encouraged by the international community to "cope" and "fight" terrorism as it is a threat to it too.
When asked whether banning of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is a frontal organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, by Pakistan was enough, Schaeuble said "it is a right thing but may be not sufficient."
Noting that "forbidding an organisation is one thing and to avoid crimes is another", he suggested that Pakistan should try those proscribed to "ensure that nobody will commit terrorist attacks or other crimes".
On whether the government of Pakistan was really capable of cracking down on the terror elements, the German minister said hope and optimism cannot be given up.
He said it was a "difficult" situation for the Pakistan government "but don't know if there is any alternative". He hoped that Pakistan government will continue to move on the path of cracking down on terror elements.
German Home Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who held talks with Home Minister P Chidambaram and National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, said there was evidence to show that the Islamic terror network behind the Mumbai attacks had origin in Pakistan.
Schaeuble, who arrived here on Friday morning for discussing cooperation with India in dealing with terrorism, said the Pakistan was being encouraged by the international community to "cope" and "fight" terrorism as it is a threat to it too.
When asked whether banning of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is a frontal organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, by Pakistan was enough, Schaeuble said "it is a right thing but may be not sufficient."
Noting that "forbidding an organisation is one thing and to avoid crimes is another", he suggested that Pakistan should try those proscribed to "ensure that nobody will commit terrorist attacks or other crimes".
On whether the government of Pakistan was really capable of cracking down on the terror elements, the German minister said hope and optimism cannot be given up.
He said it was a "difficult" situation for the Pakistan government "but don't know if there is any alternative". He hoped that Pakistan government will continue to move on the path of cracking down on terror elements.
British and Saudi Intelligence Recruit Terrorists In British Mosques
Increase DecreaseDecember 10, 2008 (LPAC)--The British think-tank Policy Exchange produced an exhaustive and fair-minded report, "The Hijacking of British Islam; How Extremist Literature Is Subverting Mosques in the UK," in 2007. An initial review shows how the whole framework of facts-on-the-ground in Britain, proves in the starkest terms that the British Muslim terrorists found in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are no coincidence, but the result of the fact that British and Saudi intelligence are up to their elbows in cooperation in recruiting and deploying them in Britain.
First of all, the great majority of British Muslims, over two thirds of an estimated 1.8 million (half born in Britain), are of South Asian origin, mostly Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indian. But the outside financing and control of mosques, is much more Saudi than it is South Asian. Indeed, under Saudi financing and control, the complexion of religious belief of Britons of Pakistani origin has been shifting rapidly since 1970 and later, with the rapid growth the Saudi-allied Deobandi movement, which was previously a minority of perhaps 20%. In September 2007, the London Times claimed that "almost half of Britain's mosques" were by then under Deobandi control.
Most of the South Asian Islamic terrorist movements are Deobandi-linked; the others are linked to various other Saudi-financed sects.
For this study, teams of Muslim researchers visited almost 100 representative British mosques, to see whether "extremist" literature, preaching hate or violent jihad, was available there. It was available in 26 mosques, or almost one-quarter. But what is more interesting is that a large part this hate literature had actually been shipped over from Saudi Arabia. If you include pamphlets produced with Saudi subsidies, it would be a clear majority.
Hate literature of this sort is an integral part of the recruiting of terrorists, as case studies have repeatedly shown.
The report's authors, who are scholars of Islam, place primary responsibility on Saudi Arabia for the growth of Islamic extremism and therefore terrorism in Britain, but omit to mention that all this is taking place under the nose, and therefore with the complicity, of British secret domestic intelligence MI-5, and by extension British secret foreign intelligence MI-6.
Forty-eight percent of the hate pamphlets were in English, 45% in Arabic, and 7% in Urdu, a Pakistani language. But one single institution of many such in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic University of Medina, publishes texts in no fewer than 47 languages. "This is an institution within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," the authors report, "dedicated to Islamic propagation (da'wah). It was founded in 1961 when members of the [London-hatched] Muslim Brotherhood who had been exiled from Egypt, persuaded the Saudi king to found a Wahhabite institution that might become a rival to Cairo's famous al-Azhar Mosque and University."
Most revealing is that it is precisely those Islamic institutions which are most extremism-ridden, which official British government bodies have chosen to "partner" with, and thus to support and sponsor. These include the Islamic Foundation and its associated Markfield Institute of Higher Education. The Muslim Safety Forum, which described itself as the "key advisory body ... on issues concerning British Muslims," with which the Metropolitan Police Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers were working unreservedly, had as affiliates three of the worst offending mosques and institutions.
In their conclusions, the authors demand that the Saudis come clean on what they're doing with their money and their extremist literature, and even ask them whether all Saudi clergy sent to Britain are given diplomatic status, in view of the fact that those recently approached by British police on any matter turn out to have diplomatic status, and therefore immunity.
First of all, the great majority of British Muslims, over two thirds of an estimated 1.8 million (half born in Britain), are of South Asian origin, mostly Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indian. But the outside financing and control of mosques, is much more Saudi than it is South Asian. Indeed, under Saudi financing and control, the complexion of religious belief of Britons of Pakistani origin has been shifting rapidly since 1970 and later, with the rapid growth the Saudi-allied Deobandi movement, which was previously a minority of perhaps 20%. In September 2007, the London Times claimed that "almost half of Britain's mosques" were by then under Deobandi control.
Most of the South Asian Islamic terrorist movements are Deobandi-linked; the others are linked to various other Saudi-financed sects.
For this study, teams of Muslim researchers visited almost 100 representative British mosques, to see whether "extremist" literature, preaching hate or violent jihad, was available there. It was available in 26 mosques, or almost one-quarter. But what is more interesting is that a large part this hate literature had actually been shipped over from Saudi Arabia. If you include pamphlets produced with Saudi subsidies, it would be a clear majority.
Hate literature of this sort is an integral part of the recruiting of terrorists, as case studies have repeatedly shown.
The report's authors, who are scholars of Islam, place primary responsibility on Saudi Arabia for the growth of Islamic extremism and therefore terrorism in Britain, but omit to mention that all this is taking place under the nose, and therefore with the complicity, of British secret domestic intelligence MI-5, and by extension British secret foreign intelligence MI-6.
Forty-eight percent of the hate pamphlets were in English, 45% in Arabic, and 7% in Urdu, a Pakistani language. But one single institution of many such in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic University of Medina, publishes texts in no fewer than 47 languages. "This is an institution within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," the authors report, "dedicated to Islamic propagation (da'wah). It was founded in 1961 when members of the [London-hatched] Muslim Brotherhood who had been exiled from Egypt, persuaded the Saudi king to found a Wahhabite institution that might become a rival to Cairo's famous al-Azhar Mosque and University."
Most revealing is that it is precisely those Islamic institutions which are most extremism-ridden, which official British government bodies have chosen to "partner" with, and thus to support and sponsor. These include the Islamic Foundation and its associated Markfield Institute of Higher Education. The Muslim Safety Forum, which described itself as the "key advisory body ... on issues concerning British Muslims," with which the Metropolitan Police Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers were working unreservedly, had as affiliates three of the worst offending mosques and institutions.
In their conclusions, the authors demand that the Saudis come clean on what they're doing with their money and their extremist literature, and even ask them whether all Saudi clergy sent to Britain are given diplomatic status, in view of the fact that those recently approached by British police on any matter turn out to have diplomatic status, and therefore immunity.
Fight For India
09.12.2008
Andrei VOLODIN
Following the coordinated terror attacks in India’s financial center of Mumbai, which were called “carnage” in the local media, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev paid an official visit to Delhi on 4-5 December. India`s meticulous journalists praised Mr. Medvedev`s calmness and his decision to stay at “Sheraton Maurya” hotel, while the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had visited Delhi ahead of the Russian-Indian summit, preferred the residency of the US Ambassador to India David Mulford.
What`s the outcome of the Russia-India talks in Delhi?
1. The sides signed a joint Declaration, in which among other things they emphasized “an importance to implement an integral reform of the international financial and economic system in order to adjust it to new realia of global economy”. Russia and India announced their preparedness to “aim at the establishment of a fairer economic world order, based on the principles of multipolarity, supremacy of law, equality, mutual respect and common responsibility”. India announced its support to Russia as a mediator in the Caucasus: “In view of the recent war conflict in South Ossetia, Russia and India welcome the Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan and hope the measure be enough to establish peace and stability in the region”.
2. Moscow and Delhi signed a long-awaited atomic energy cooperation deal. In accordance with the agreement, Russia will build four more nuclear reactors at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant (state of Tamil Nadu) in addition to the existing power generating units, with the first to be commissioned in April 2009. Few more nuclear power plants are due to be constructed in India with Russia planning to supply nuclear fuel to its Indian partners. As the local media report, the move will increase the national available capacities in non-classical energy up to 90% (currently the reactors` maximum capacities are 30-40%).
3. The sides focused on military-technical cooperation (MTC), the issue which had been for some time a bone of contention in their bilateral relations. Yet no decision has been made on the cost of re-equipment of the ‘Admiral Gorshkov’ aircraft carrier (probably, the issue will be settled by the new Indian government in spring 2009). The vessel`s re-equipment demands huge investments. However, India’s Finance Ministry thinks there may be a precedent other participants of the MTC could use for their needs. Russia expects to win the tender for buying 126 multifunctional fighter jets but India again postponed the campaign. The sides yet have not agreed on T-90 tanks and nuclear submarines. (The recent tragedy in the Sea of Japan with Russia`s “Nerpa” submarine received an extensive and sometimes biased coverage in the Indian media). However, the participants of the talks had a kind of a backup, and India`s Defence Ministry signed a $1 billion deal with Russian “Rosoboronexport” to receive 80 multi-role Mi-17V-5 helicopters.
4. Dmitry Medvedev and his Indian counterpart signed a Memorandum on mutual understanding between the Federal Financial Markets Service and India`s Council on Securities and Stocks. Amid the global economic crisis, financial issues are expected to remain on the Russian-Indian agenda for quite a long time. I believe BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) ought to establish an inter-regional economic zone, which would be relatively autonomous from traditional centers of world economy (US, Western Europe and Japan). The move could prevent global crisis deepening.
5. Some changes have been seen in the scheme of Russia-India trade turnover. Currently the deliveries of Russian machinery equipment make 40% of Russian exports. Experts indicate that the Russian business has begun its integration into India`s market: Joint Stock Financial Corporation “System” launched an all-India mobile operator project. However, Russian direct investments to India ($145 million) fall behind the influx of capital coming from Delhi: India has already invested about $800 million in Russian economy. The two countries seem to have boosted their cooperation in science. Still, Russia-India mutual trade turnover does not exceed $7 billion. Analysts name $16-18 billion as real achievement since then non-state participants of economic process usually disclose their interests and join in.
6. Although Mr. Medvedev`s visit to India cannot be called a “breakthrough”, the talks were successful. The sides discussed their perspectives on bilateral cooperation and made another step toward stability in Asia.
Andrei VOLODIN
Following the coordinated terror attacks in India’s financial center of Mumbai, which were called “carnage” in the local media, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev paid an official visit to Delhi on 4-5 December. India`s meticulous journalists praised Mr. Medvedev`s calmness and his decision to stay at “Sheraton Maurya” hotel, while the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had visited Delhi ahead of the Russian-Indian summit, preferred the residency of the US Ambassador to India David Mulford.
What`s the outcome of the Russia-India talks in Delhi?
1. The sides signed a joint Declaration, in which among other things they emphasized “an importance to implement an integral reform of the international financial and economic system in order to adjust it to new realia of global economy”. Russia and India announced their preparedness to “aim at the establishment of a fairer economic world order, based on the principles of multipolarity, supremacy of law, equality, mutual respect and common responsibility”. India announced its support to Russia as a mediator in the Caucasus: “In view of the recent war conflict in South Ossetia, Russia and India welcome the Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan and hope the measure be enough to establish peace and stability in the region”.
2. Moscow and Delhi signed a long-awaited atomic energy cooperation deal. In accordance with the agreement, Russia will build four more nuclear reactors at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant (state of Tamil Nadu) in addition to the existing power generating units, with the first to be commissioned in April 2009. Few more nuclear power plants are due to be constructed in India with Russia planning to supply nuclear fuel to its Indian partners. As the local media report, the move will increase the national available capacities in non-classical energy up to 90% (currently the reactors` maximum capacities are 30-40%).
3. The sides focused on military-technical cooperation (MTC), the issue which had been for some time a bone of contention in their bilateral relations. Yet no decision has been made on the cost of re-equipment of the ‘Admiral Gorshkov’ aircraft carrier (probably, the issue will be settled by the new Indian government in spring 2009). The vessel`s re-equipment demands huge investments. However, India’s Finance Ministry thinks there may be a precedent other participants of the MTC could use for their needs. Russia expects to win the tender for buying 126 multifunctional fighter jets but India again postponed the campaign. The sides yet have not agreed on T-90 tanks and nuclear submarines. (The recent tragedy in the Sea of Japan with Russia`s “Nerpa” submarine received an extensive and sometimes biased coverage in the Indian media). However, the participants of the talks had a kind of a backup, and India`s Defence Ministry signed a $1 billion deal with Russian “Rosoboronexport” to receive 80 multi-role Mi-17V-5 helicopters.
4. Dmitry Medvedev and his Indian counterpart signed a Memorandum on mutual understanding between the Federal Financial Markets Service and India`s Council on Securities and Stocks. Amid the global economic crisis, financial issues are expected to remain on the Russian-Indian agenda for quite a long time. I believe BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) ought to establish an inter-regional economic zone, which would be relatively autonomous from traditional centers of world economy (US, Western Europe and Japan). The move could prevent global crisis deepening.
5. Some changes have been seen in the scheme of Russia-India trade turnover. Currently the deliveries of Russian machinery equipment make 40% of Russian exports. Experts indicate that the Russian business has begun its integration into India`s market: Joint Stock Financial Corporation “System” launched an all-India mobile operator project. However, Russian direct investments to India ($145 million) fall behind the influx of capital coming from Delhi: India has already invested about $800 million in Russian economy. The two countries seem to have boosted their cooperation in science. Still, Russia-India mutual trade turnover does not exceed $7 billion. Analysts name $16-18 billion as real achievement since then non-state participants of economic process usually disclose their interests and join in.
6. Although Mr. Medvedev`s visit to India cannot be called a “breakthrough”, the talks were successful. The sides discussed their perspectives on bilateral cooperation and made another step toward stability in Asia.
Nuclear parity threatened
11:30 | 12/ 12/ 2008
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military correspondent Ilya Kramnik) - The 1991 Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) expires December 5 next year.
This brings to the fore the problem of reducing nuclear arsenals and the monitoring of the process because the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which is valid through 2012, does not provide for irreversible reductions and does not establish a permanent mutual verification mechanism.
The 1991 treaty, which entered into force in late 1994, limits the sides' strategic offensive potential to 1,600 carriers and 6,000 warheads. START II, the successor of START I, banned the use of MIRVs on ICBMs but it was never validated. In 2004, Russia officially withdrew from START II in response to the U.S. pullout from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002.
The latest nuclear disarmament agreement, SORT, limits the sides' nuclear arsenal to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. It does not specify how many warheads one carrier may have. Each side can independently determine the components and structure of its nuclear force. The treaty does not establish a mechanism to verify compliance. Instead, the sides merely refer to the currently valid START I treaty and agree to convene a monitoring commission twice a year.
However, as mentioned above, the START I treaty expires next year, which means that its verification provisions will become invalid. As for the SORT treaty, it does not restrict decommissioned warheads or carriers. They may be stored at munitions depots and quickly put back into service.
Russia is against this approach. Economically, we are unable to quickly build up our strategic nuclear potential, considering that in the next decade we will have to replace almost 300 ground-based missiles and close to a hundred sea-based missiles. It is necessary to conclude a new comprehensive agreement on cuts in strategic offensive arms, which would not only establish quantitative restrictions, but also create a dependable verification mechanism.
Lack of such agreement and deployment of a U.S. missile defense system may undermine strategic parity between the Russian Federation and the U.S. The potential enemy's considerable superiority in the number of warheads is greatly increasing the risk of a disarming first strike, and the surviving missiles may not be enough to penetrate missile defenses and inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.
Ideally, a new treaty should not only limit strategic offensive arms but also regulate the sides' missile defense relations. The outgoing Republican administration did not wish to negotiate these problems. Hopefully, the new guard will change this policy, and enable Russia and the United States to preserve parity, and continue the gradual reduction of nuclear threat, launched in the 1980s.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military correspondent Ilya Kramnik) - The 1991 Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) expires December 5 next year.
This brings to the fore the problem of reducing nuclear arsenals and the monitoring of the process because the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which is valid through 2012, does not provide for irreversible reductions and does not establish a permanent mutual verification mechanism.
The 1991 treaty, which entered into force in late 1994, limits the sides' strategic offensive potential to 1,600 carriers and 6,000 warheads. START II, the successor of START I, banned the use of MIRVs on ICBMs but it was never validated. In 2004, Russia officially withdrew from START II in response to the U.S. pullout from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002.
The latest nuclear disarmament agreement, SORT, limits the sides' nuclear arsenal to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. It does not specify how many warheads one carrier may have. Each side can independently determine the components and structure of its nuclear force. The treaty does not establish a mechanism to verify compliance. Instead, the sides merely refer to the currently valid START I treaty and agree to convene a monitoring commission twice a year.
However, as mentioned above, the START I treaty expires next year, which means that its verification provisions will become invalid. As for the SORT treaty, it does not restrict decommissioned warheads or carriers. They may be stored at munitions depots and quickly put back into service.
Russia is against this approach. Economically, we are unable to quickly build up our strategic nuclear potential, considering that in the next decade we will have to replace almost 300 ground-based missiles and close to a hundred sea-based missiles. It is necessary to conclude a new comprehensive agreement on cuts in strategic offensive arms, which would not only establish quantitative restrictions, but also create a dependable verification mechanism.
Lack of such agreement and deployment of a U.S. missile defense system may undermine strategic parity between the Russian Federation and the U.S. The potential enemy's considerable superiority in the number of warheads is greatly increasing the risk of a disarming first strike, and the surviving missiles may not be enough to penetrate missile defenses and inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.
Ideally, a new treaty should not only limit strategic offensive arms but also regulate the sides' missile defense relations. The outgoing Republican administration did not wish to negotiate these problems. Hopefully, the new guard will change this policy, and enable Russia and the United States to preserve parity, and continue the gradual reduction of nuclear threat, launched in the 1980s.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Top 5 Intelligence Analysis Methods: Social Network Analysis (#3)
Thursday, December 11, 2008
SourcesAndMethods
Part 1 -- IntroductionPart 2 -- What Makes A Good Method?
SourcesAndMethods
Part 1 -- IntroductionPart 2 -- What Makes A Good Method?
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is fundamentally about entities and the relationships between them. As a result, this method has a number of variations within the intelligence community ranging from techniques such as association matrices through link analysis charts right up to the validated mathematical models. It is most commonly used as a way to picture a network, however, and is rarely used in the more formal way envisioned by the sociologists who created the method. In other words, while SNA is a very powerful method, intelligence professionals rarely take advantage of its full potential.Because it is primarily a visual method, most analysts (and the decisionmakers they support) immediately grasp the value of the method. Likewise, some variation of SNA will likely work with any data set where the entities and the relationships among those entities are important (in other words, almost every problem). Parsing all the relevant attributes can be difficult, however, and there are few automated solutions that work well with unstructured data sets. Likewise, at the higher levels of analysis, where the analyst is trying to do more than merely visualize a network, a good bit of special knowledge is required to understand the results.Talking about SNA doesn't make a lot of sense though. It is much easier to grasp its value as an intel method by looking at some examples. I2's Analyst Notebook is widely available and examining their case studies is helpful in seeing what that tool can do. Another widely used tool, particularly for more formal analyses, is UCINET. For example, some of our students used this tool last year to examine the "social network" of government and non-governmental organizations engaged in security sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa (the image above comes from their study). Recently, my students and I have been playing around with a new tool from Carnegie Mellon University called ORA. It is very easy to use and very powerful.Of the 5 methods I intend to discuss, SNA is the one with the widest visibility in all three major intelligence communities (national security, business and law enforcement). As such, there is already a good bit of research activity into how to better use this method in the intelligence analysis process. The big challenge, as I see it, is to design educational programs and tools that help analysts move away from the "pretty picture" possibilities presented by this method and toward the more rigorous results generated by the more formal application of the method.Tomorrow: #2...
The neo-Taliban: A year on
The success of a reinvigorated Afghan insurgency – albeit qualified by overstretch and internal tensions – guarantees that 2009 will be another tough year of combat, writes Antonio Giustozzi for openDemocracy.
By Antonio Giustozzi
2008 has seen a marked worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan, both in terms of the number of incidents and in terms of the geographical spread of the insurgency. The number of violent incidents has increased by about 50 percent on previous years (although statistics vary depending on the source); while the government has de facto lost control over two provinces close to the capital Kabul (Wardak and Logar).
In some northern provinces - most notably Kunduz - the insurgency is beginning to represent a serious threat. Indeed, clear signs of insurgent infiltration exist in almost all the northern provinces: Only Samangan and Panjshir provinces appear to remain completely free of violent activities.
In central Afghanistan, Bamiyan is only marginally affected, with just one district showing sign of the presence of the Taliban. The situation in the other 31 provinces of Afghanistan is far more serious; all have insurgents active within their territory. What I described a year ago as the "war difficult to win" has become even more so, and the "unlikely peace" even less imaginable (see "The resurgence of the neo-Taliban," 14 December 2007).
The fuse's spark
It is also clear as 2008 nears its end (though again, estimates vary) that the number of rebels is growing steadily and must now range in the tens of thousands. In part this expansion is due to the growth of the Taliban, but it is also the case that other groups are increasingly mobilizing against the Kabul government and the foreign troops. The most influential of these groups is the Hizb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a key player in the jihad against the leftist regime in Kabul and its Soviet army backers in the 1980s.
Perhaps more worryingly, the insurgents show signs of improving their tactical skills. Some of their ambushes and attacks on fixed positions in 2008 have been executed more effectively than ever before, and they have become more operationally flexible (reducing the focus on direct attacks and using more asymmetrical tactics, for example). The casualties they have been inflicting on foreign troops are up 20 percent this year, while less complete statistics seem to show higher casualties for the Afghan security forces too.
The Taliban in particular are also having some success in infiltrating the Afghan security forces, in particular the police, which is now in deep crisis in several Afghan provinces in the south and west of the country. The Taliban's tactical improvement owes something to successful efforts to integrate Afghan and foreign fighters.
In the past, predominantly or exclusively foreign jihadist groups have not operated very successful in Afghanistan, in part because cooperation with Afghan Taliban has proved troublesome. Now at least some foreign jihadists - acting as specialists and supplying skills that are rare among the mostly illiterate Afghan rank-and-file - accept the authority of Afghan commanders. It is likely that a few non-Afghan jihadists are also involved in training the Afghan Taliban, for example in bomb-making skills.
The shoe's grit
The Taliban's campaign is, however, not quite trouble-free. Afghanistan's difficult economic situation - and the large pool of unemployed and disaffected young people that is one of its by-products - favors the Taliban less than might be expected (even though there are allegations of a large mercenary presence in the movement's ranks). Although high unemployment may push some people towards joining the insurgency, the same could be said of the police or the national army.
Moreover, the Taliban might now be experiencing a crisis of growth. Their expansion has made internal communication, and central command-and-control, increasingly difficult. Moreover, the movement's leadership is trying to turn it into a more structured and disciplined entity. This involves a range of measures: insisting that its commanders behave more moderately towards the civilian population, marginalizing its more extremist component, establishing a civilian administration, and expanding its judiciary into more and more areas.
In implementing these objectives, the Taliban leadership is facing multiple difficulties; indeed it is by no means assured that it will succeed in achieving them. Not all commanders in the field are keen to follow the leadership's directives; some are not well equipped intellectually and emotionally to correctly interpret them; others still might operate in conditions where implementing them is difficult. In the absence of any effective system of supervision from the centre to the field level, making any administrative structure work well is a daunting task.
Indeed, there are indications that the Taliban's governors in most cases have little power over the commanders and that their effectiveness or lack thereof depends on their personal relations with the various networks of Taliban commanders. Similarly, the Taliban's desire to offer an alternative to the very corrupt state judiciary has outstripped its ability to expand its own sharia-based judiciary, which is still limited to perhaps two dozen districts (out of about 400). Elsewhere, the Taliban are sending people to any Islamic judge willing to hand down sentences; the fact that the group has little control over the outcome dilutes the "quality" of the judicial services it offers.
The purse's hole
Nonetheless, the Taliban strategy remains on the whole quite sound - not least because the other side in the conflict is still unable to piece together a strategy both appropriate and workable. The counter-insurgency debate among western military strategists in Afghanistan is just emerging from a phase of political maneuvering and has barely entered one of experimenting with any of the new ideas canvassed (a troop surge, the creation of pro-government tribal militias, increased funding, the massive expansion of the size of the national army, a reform of the police).
The latter two components of the counter-insurgency strategy appear the most promising - but even were they to be effectively implemented, they would be certain also to take longer than any other initiatives. The much-debated foreign-troop surge, which should translate to 20,000 additional troops in Afghanistan, would in reality do little more than maintain the trend of previous years into 2009 (for the international contingents have been growing steadily since 2004). But more soldiers are not a panacea; and greater funds might well disappear amid government corruption and incompetence (and "government" here does not mean only Afghan).
The real novelty of the debate among counter-insurgents in the last few months has in a sense been the creation of militias on a large scale. It is also the most controversial element of the future anti-Taliban strategy, on two grounds.
First, it is not clear how much enthusiasm exists in the villages for participating in the creation of tribal militias; if anything the elders seem to have been drifting away from the Kabul government.
Second, there is some conflict over the control of such militias. The Americans, among the chief proponents and surely the main donor-to-be in the initiative, would like to exercise strict supervision over how the money assigned to them is going to be spent. President Hamid Karzai and the cabinet would instead like to retain control over the process, which promises to be a major source of patronage. This will be another source of tension among allies in what promises to be another difficult year in Afghanistan's long war.
Antonio Giustozzi is a researcher at the Crisis Research Centre at the LSE, and author of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Resurgence of the Neo-Taliban in Afghanistan (C Hurst, 2007).
Editor's note:
To view the original article, please click here.
Kuwait's political morass
12 Dec 2008
With the emirate embroiled in its latest political fiasco, Kuwait's regionally important reform process is under severe strain, Dominic Moran writes for ISN Security Watch.
By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch
Kuwait has again plunged into political crisis with efforts underway to reconstitute the government, after the cabinet tendered its resignation over parliamentary efforts to hold the prime minister to account for alleged misdeeds.
Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, who retains full executive authority in the reformed Kuwaiti governance structure, demurred before deciding to accept the cabinet's resignation.
His call for the reappointment of outgoing prime minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah almost certainly presages further conflict between the parliamentary opposition and government.
While the political crisis peaked with parliamentary efforts to question the prime minister on his alleged mismanagement, and for allowing a banned Iranian Shia cleric to enter the country, more fundamental issues are at stake.
"I think that this is more of a symptom of a larger issue of the legislature trying to gain more power in the Kuwaiti political system," Professor F Gregory Gause III from the University of Vermont told ISN Security Watch.
Chatham House's Professor Gerd Nonneman agreed, "It is a combination, on one hand, of grandstanding on the part of various MPs who want to make their name and, on the other hand, a genuine conviction that some of the things that the government gets up to are not properly accounted for or aren't appropriate in Islamic terms - when you are talking about some of the Islamist MPs," he told ISN Security Watch.
Stalemate
Kuwait's political system is caught betwixt and between the traditional authoritarianism of Gulf monarchic and emirate rule and full representational government under a constitutional monarchy. It is the tensions created by the failure to find a stable middle path that has led to ongoing political stalemate and repeated governance breakdowns.
The 50-seat unicameral National Assembly – which expands to up to 66 members through the presence of unelected cabinet members – is empowered to oversee the budget and pass legislation.
Through a formal parliamentary questioning process, known as interpellation, the Assembly is also able to encourage the ouster of ministers, via subsequent no-confidence measures.
The premier, who is a direct appointee of the emir, is not subject to no-confidence motions. However, it is clear from the recent crisis over Sheikh Nasser's planned interpellation and a similar questioning attempt in 2006 that led directly to elections, that the ruling family is currently unwilling to allow the Assembly to win an important symbolic victory through formally chastising a standing prime minister.
"Because of the nature of the political system that exists now, it means that any parliamentary scrutiny that leads to scrutinizing the government is effectively opposition and the government […] or the royal family is on the other side," Nonneman noted in explaining the ongoing legislature-government standoff.
While theoretically inferior to some regional legislatures, the Kuwaiti parliament enjoys greater effective clout. Other powers include signing off on prime ministerial cabinet selections and involvement in determining the identity of the crown prince – a power that grants the Assembly a key role in choosing the future emir.
Neither the ruling family nor parliament appear to favor fresh polls at this time, which would not ease tensions and would be costly to the political blocs and individuals forced to seek a new popular mandate so soon after legislative elections in May. The polls came after the emir dissolved parliament in March due to ongoing government-parliament tensions.
The tumult surrounding parliamentary prerogatives and the seeming institutionalization of the standoff between government and parliament bodes ill for both domestic and regional reform efforts.
Palace factionalism?
Opposing factions and figures within the ruling al-Sabah family have allegedly pressed opposition MPs to question ministers in an effort to bolster their own prospects of replacing the incumbents, according to media reports.
The importance of factional political power plays within the family was demonstrated in January 2006 when Sheikh Sabah replaced the late Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, who had ruled as emir for just over a week, without being officially confirmed.
The ouster upset the regular transition of power between the two main branches of the royal family, but any resultant tensions appear to have had little political salience.
Asked if factionalism within the ruling family contributes to political instability in Kuwait, Nonneman said, "I don't think it does particularly.
"Of course there are different views within the royal family about where this democratic experiment should go; whether it should be rolled back or not. And of course there is also competition between various people for future top jobs. But that is not really the cause of the current problems," he said.
Key portfolios in the Kuwaiti cabinet are reserved for prominent members of the ruling family. Thus, the competition for factional influence within the al-Sabah dynasty is the true contest for power in the absence of more determined political reform processes. The balancing of intra-family tensions is a key task for the emir.
"Now that is the kind of thing that you are never going to get conclusive evidence on because family matters tend to very much be kept close to the vest," Gause said, adding, "even if it is exaggerated it has become a factor in people's political calculations."
Failed reform
Electoral district reform in 2006 brought the number of constituencies down from 25 to five, fulfilling a long-sought demand of the political opposition, backed by a strong popular campaign dubbed the Orange Movement.
The sharp diminution of electorates was sought to undermine a purported process whereby parliamentary deputies were often elected by slim majorities and a narrow core of support, leading to complaints of both undue influence and vote-buying from within limited constituency pools.
"It was a stirring, bottom-up political reform that as far as I can tell has had absolutely no effect on the way politics is conducted or even the people who are in the legislature," Gause said.
Some analysts believe that the reformed constituencies over-represent affluent elements of the population who are unlikely to favor the extension of legislature prerogatives, while having minimal impact on the alleged bias and improprieties the measure was designed to address.
It is now clear that fiddling with the process whereby members are elected to parliament will not, of itself, bring the necessary changes required to ease the Kuwaiti political stalemate, which ultimately is an issue of power being withheld from the legislature itself.
Asked what impact the electorate rezoning had on easing the political paralysis Nonneman said, "None at all. The only impact was, ultimately, that the elections were seen to be more legitimate.
"I guess some of the parliamentarians concluded from that that they had greater power or legitimacy. So maybe that gave them [more] determination to push their case," he said.
Multiple tendencies
The constitutional ban on political parties has cast a pall over efforts to develop a truly representative governance structure, with the balance between small, loosely affiliated tribal, sectarian Islamist and liberal opposition blocs shifting on an issue-specific basis.
The resultant fragmentation while promoting damaging dissensus, has failed to stop opposition legislators from the various tendencies – some organized in de-facto parties - from banding together in a manner that has effectively paralyzed the government.
Gause identifies five organized tendencies within the Kuwaiti legislature, "Salafi Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood Sunni Islamists, Shia Islamists and, for want of a better term, liberals." He also included pro-government MPs, many of whom share the socially conservative stances of the Islamic blocs.
Alongside these small established blocs "there are all sorts of independents who, I think the voters know kind of where they side but they don't affiliate with any of the organized groups," Gause said.
He also stated that due to politics happening behind parliament's closed doors and not in public, as with a real parliamentary democracy, it is hard to determine the political winners and losers in elections.
Salafism on the rise
Salafi and tribal representatives were the big winners in the May poll, with the former seeming to draw support from Kuwait's wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Hadas).
HADAS has been thoroughly integrated into the Kuwaiti political mainstream a fact that appears to have allowed it to be outflanked by the more hard-line Salafi elements.
Indeed, the relatively poor performance of Hadas in the May election, when taken alongside similar reverses for the Brotherhood's Moroccan and Jordanian wings, has been seen by some analysts, who talked to ISN Security Watch, as signaling that the Brotherhood regionally may be on the verge of decline.
This is perhaps too broad a reading and is one that ignores vast differences in national wealth and resultant social conditions across the region. The Kuwaiti shift away from the Brotherhood has not been as substantial or irreversible as often presented – though it does bring up the salient issue of the impact of institutionalization on popular support for Islamic movements.
Referring to the mainstream status of Hadas, Nonneman added, "Unless the government shuts the political experiment down altogether, I think many of the Salafis will evolve in a similar kind of direction. Kuwait is not the kind of environment where extreme radicals will get much of a chance."
Islamic parties' efforts to promote a conservative religious, educational and social reform agenda have created significant ruptures with the small liberal bloc in parliament on issues such as women's rights – creating rifts often exploited by recurrent governments.
Where emirs have been unable to play on the latent tensions between the somewhat amorphous competing opposition blocs they have, over the decades, chosen the path of firing ministers, reforming governments and, in fewer cases, the dissolution or suspension of the legislature as a whole.
"In each case the emir says, "Right, let's suspend parliament" or "We move this minister." And the upshot of this is that no serious decision-making is done over the long-term," Nonneman said.
Worryingly, this tendency toward governance failure and pattern of collapse and reconstitution has picked up pace in recent years, a fact that speaks to the ultimately untenable nature of the current balance of competing political forces in the absence of more substantial reform, or autocratic regression.
Reform prospects
It is difficult to foresee a viable future for the political reform process in Kuwait in which the ruling family fails to divest itself of power more determinedly through allowing legislators to play an increasing role in government.
"I think that there would have to be a really big change in Kuwait for that to happen – constitutional changes – and I don't really see them on the horizon," Gause said.
"There'll be a bargain I think in the end," he said, "Maybe it will be more elected legislators getting cabinet positions."
The ongoing stalemate with parliament is already undermining the emirate's efforts to promote economic reforms and address the impact of falling oil prices and the global economic downturn on the local economy. The local bourse has plummeted 30 percent in the last year, according to Reuters, amid concerns regarding the government's failure to appoint a market regulator.
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti reform experiment is worth encouraging and extending. Important markers have been achieved in recent years including women's emancipation and partial press liberalization, while the parliament's ability to criticize and hold to account government members is unprecedented in the Gulf states.
The overall success of the reformed Kuwaiti political structure is of pivotal importance in determining both the future trajectory and stability of the state and prospects for the future extension of civil and democratic reforms in fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
Given that this would directly impact on both the executive authority of the emir and prospects for advancement of competing al-Sabah factions and individuals, the chances for significant further reform advances do not appear good at present.
Dr Dominic Moran, based in Tel Aviv, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East and the Director of Operations of ISA Consulting.
With the emirate embroiled in its latest political fiasco, Kuwait's regionally important reform process is under severe strain, Dominic Moran writes for ISN Security Watch.
By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch
Kuwait has again plunged into political crisis with efforts underway to reconstitute the government, after the cabinet tendered its resignation over parliamentary efforts to hold the prime minister to account for alleged misdeeds.
Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, who retains full executive authority in the reformed Kuwaiti governance structure, demurred before deciding to accept the cabinet's resignation.
His call for the reappointment of outgoing prime minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah almost certainly presages further conflict between the parliamentary opposition and government.
While the political crisis peaked with parliamentary efforts to question the prime minister on his alleged mismanagement, and for allowing a banned Iranian Shia cleric to enter the country, more fundamental issues are at stake.
"I think that this is more of a symptom of a larger issue of the legislature trying to gain more power in the Kuwaiti political system," Professor F Gregory Gause III from the University of Vermont told ISN Security Watch.
Chatham House's Professor Gerd Nonneman agreed, "It is a combination, on one hand, of grandstanding on the part of various MPs who want to make their name and, on the other hand, a genuine conviction that some of the things that the government gets up to are not properly accounted for or aren't appropriate in Islamic terms - when you are talking about some of the Islamist MPs," he told ISN Security Watch.
Stalemate
Kuwait's political system is caught betwixt and between the traditional authoritarianism of Gulf monarchic and emirate rule and full representational government under a constitutional monarchy. It is the tensions created by the failure to find a stable middle path that has led to ongoing political stalemate and repeated governance breakdowns.
The 50-seat unicameral National Assembly – which expands to up to 66 members through the presence of unelected cabinet members – is empowered to oversee the budget and pass legislation.
Through a formal parliamentary questioning process, known as interpellation, the Assembly is also able to encourage the ouster of ministers, via subsequent no-confidence measures.
The premier, who is a direct appointee of the emir, is not subject to no-confidence motions. However, it is clear from the recent crisis over Sheikh Nasser's planned interpellation and a similar questioning attempt in 2006 that led directly to elections, that the ruling family is currently unwilling to allow the Assembly to win an important symbolic victory through formally chastising a standing prime minister.
"Because of the nature of the political system that exists now, it means that any parliamentary scrutiny that leads to scrutinizing the government is effectively opposition and the government […] or the royal family is on the other side," Nonneman noted in explaining the ongoing legislature-government standoff.
While theoretically inferior to some regional legislatures, the Kuwaiti parliament enjoys greater effective clout. Other powers include signing off on prime ministerial cabinet selections and involvement in determining the identity of the crown prince – a power that grants the Assembly a key role in choosing the future emir.
Neither the ruling family nor parliament appear to favor fresh polls at this time, which would not ease tensions and would be costly to the political blocs and individuals forced to seek a new popular mandate so soon after legislative elections in May. The polls came after the emir dissolved parliament in March due to ongoing government-parliament tensions.
The tumult surrounding parliamentary prerogatives and the seeming institutionalization of the standoff between government and parliament bodes ill for both domestic and regional reform efforts.
Palace factionalism?
Opposing factions and figures within the ruling al-Sabah family have allegedly pressed opposition MPs to question ministers in an effort to bolster their own prospects of replacing the incumbents, according to media reports.
The importance of factional political power plays within the family was demonstrated in January 2006 when Sheikh Sabah replaced the late Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, who had ruled as emir for just over a week, without being officially confirmed.
The ouster upset the regular transition of power between the two main branches of the royal family, but any resultant tensions appear to have had little political salience.
Asked if factionalism within the ruling family contributes to political instability in Kuwait, Nonneman said, "I don't think it does particularly.
"Of course there are different views within the royal family about where this democratic experiment should go; whether it should be rolled back or not. And of course there is also competition between various people for future top jobs. But that is not really the cause of the current problems," he said.
Key portfolios in the Kuwaiti cabinet are reserved for prominent members of the ruling family. Thus, the competition for factional influence within the al-Sabah dynasty is the true contest for power in the absence of more determined political reform processes. The balancing of intra-family tensions is a key task for the emir.
"Now that is the kind of thing that you are never going to get conclusive evidence on because family matters tend to very much be kept close to the vest," Gause said, adding, "even if it is exaggerated it has become a factor in people's political calculations."
Failed reform
Electoral district reform in 2006 brought the number of constituencies down from 25 to five, fulfilling a long-sought demand of the political opposition, backed by a strong popular campaign dubbed the Orange Movement.
The sharp diminution of electorates was sought to undermine a purported process whereby parliamentary deputies were often elected by slim majorities and a narrow core of support, leading to complaints of both undue influence and vote-buying from within limited constituency pools.
"It was a stirring, bottom-up political reform that as far as I can tell has had absolutely no effect on the way politics is conducted or even the people who are in the legislature," Gause said.
Some analysts believe that the reformed constituencies over-represent affluent elements of the population who are unlikely to favor the extension of legislature prerogatives, while having minimal impact on the alleged bias and improprieties the measure was designed to address.
It is now clear that fiddling with the process whereby members are elected to parliament will not, of itself, bring the necessary changes required to ease the Kuwaiti political stalemate, which ultimately is an issue of power being withheld from the legislature itself.
Asked what impact the electorate rezoning had on easing the political paralysis Nonneman said, "None at all. The only impact was, ultimately, that the elections were seen to be more legitimate.
"I guess some of the parliamentarians concluded from that that they had greater power or legitimacy. So maybe that gave them [more] determination to push their case," he said.
Multiple tendencies
The constitutional ban on political parties has cast a pall over efforts to develop a truly representative governance structure, with the balance between small, loosely affiliated tribal, sectarian Islamist and liberal opposition blocs shifting on an issue-specific basis.
The resultant fragmentation while promoting damaging dissensus, has failed to stop opposition legislators from the various tendencies – some organized in de-facto parties - from banding together in a manner that has effectively paralyzed the government.
Gause identifies five organized tendencies within the Kuwaiti legislature, "Salafi Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood Sunni Islamists, Shia Islamists and, for want of a better term, liberals." He also included pro-government MPs, many of whom share the socially conservative stances of the Islamic blocs.
Alongside these small established blocs "there are all sorts of independents who, I think the voters know kind of where they side but they don't affiliate with any of the organized groups," Gause said.
He also stated that due to politics happening behind parliament's closed doors and not in public, as with a real parliamentary democracy, it is hard to determine the political winners and losers in elections.
Salafism on the rise
Salafi and tribal representatives were the big winners in the May poll, with the former seeming to draw support from Kuwait's wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Hadas).
HADAS has been thoroughly integrated into the Kuwaiti political mainstream a fact that appears to have allowed it to be outflanked by the more hard-line Salafi elements.
Indeed, the relatively poor performance of Hadas in the May election, when taken alongside similar reverses for the Brotherhood's Moroccan and Jordanian wings, has been seen by some analysts, who talked to ISN Security Watch, as signaling that the Brotherhood regionally may be on the verge of decline.
This is perhaps too broad a reading and is one that ignores vast differences in national wealth and resultant social conditions across the region. The Kuwaiti shift away from the Brotherhood has not been as substantial or irreversible as often presented – though it does bring up the salient issue of the impact of institutionalization on popular support for Islamic movements.
Referring to the mainstream status of Hadas, Nonneman added, "Unless the government shuts the political experiment down altogether, I think many of the Salafis will evolve in a similar kind of direction. Kuwait is not the kind of environment where extreme radicals will get much of a chance."
Islamic parties' efforts to promote a conservative religious, educational and social reform agenda have created significant ruptures with the small liberal bloc in parliament on issues such as women's rights – creating rifts often exploited by recurrent governments.
Where emirs have been unable to play on the latent tensions between the somewhat amorphous competing opposition blocs they have, over the decades, chosen the path of firing ministers, reforming governments and, in fewer cases, the dissolution or suspension of the legislature as a whole.
"In each case the emir says, "Right, let's suspend parliament" or "We move this minister." And the upshot of this is that no serious decision-making is done over the long-term," Nonneman said.
Worryingly, this tendency toward governance failure and pattern of collapse and reconstitution has picked up pace in recent years, a fact that speaks to the ultimately untenable nature of the current balance of competing political forces in the absence of more substantial reform, or autocratic regression.
Reform prospects
It is difficult to foresee a viable future for the political reform process in Kuwait in which the ruling family fails to divest itself of power more determinedly through allowing legislators to play an increasing role in government.
"I think that there would have to be a really big change in Kuwait for that to happen – constitutional changes – and I don't really see them on the horizon," Gause said.
"There'll be a bargain I think in the end," he said, "Maybe it will be more elected legislators getting cabinet positions."
The ongoing stalemate with parliament is already undermining the emirate's efforts to promote economic reforms and address the impact of falling oil prices and the global economic downturn on the local economy. The local bourse has plummeted 30 percent in the last year, according to Reuters, amid concerns regarding the government's failure to appoint a market regulator.
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti reform experiment is worth encouraging and extending. Important markers have been achieved in recent years including women's emancipation and partial press liberalization, while the parliament's ability to criticize and hold to account government members is unprecedented in the Gulf states.
The overall success of the reformed Kuwaiti political structure is of pivotal importance in determining both the future trajectory and stability of the state and prospects for the future extension of civil and democratic reforms in fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
Given that this would directly impact on both the executive authority of the emir and prospects for advancement of competing al-Sabah factions and individuals, the chances for significant further reform advances do not appear good at present.
Dr Dominic Moran, based in Tel Aviv, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East and the Director of Operations of ISA Consulting.
Terrorism & The Business World
by B. Raman
Terrorists target human beings---combatants and non-combatants (civilians) --- as well as capabilities---economic and strategic.
2. Till the 1980s, they focused more on targeting human beings. Targeting of capabilities----which may or may not cause human fatalities---- came into vogue in the 1980s, when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried out explosions in London's financial district.
3. Targeting of capabilities does not create the same kind of public revulsion against the terrorists as the targeting of human beings does. Whereas the after-effects of the targeting of human beings remain localised in the area where they were targeted, the impact of the targeting of capabilities has a ripple effect far beyond the area where the act of terrorism was carried out.
4. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland had a ripple effect right across the world because of the increase in insurance premia for various business transactions and dislocation of international flights. The successful terrorist strikes in Bali had an impact on the tourist economy of not only Indonesia, but also of neighbouring countries. The effect of a successful terrorist strike on the oil installations of Saudi Arabia or on commercial shipping in the Malacca Strait would be felt right across the world with varying degrees of intensity. The impact of a successful terrorist strike on the information technology (IT) industries of Bangalore would be felt not only in Bangalore, but also in the stock markets of different cities, where the shares of the IT companies are traded. Because of networking, the repercussions of a successful terrorist operation against the critical information infrastructure in one city can spread the resulting damage right across the world.
5. Globalisation and decentralisation are the defining characteristics of the business world of today. Very often many of the core tasks of multinational companies are performed not by their headquarters in their country of origin, but by their field offices spread across the world. Western multinationals delegate many of their core tasks to their offices in India because of the availability in India of highly-qualified managerial experts, who are prepared to work for emoluments, which are high by Indian standards, but not so high by the standards of the country of origin of the multinational. If an act of terrorism disrupts the workling of their Indian offices it would affect not only their business operations in India, but also their operations right across the world.
6. Many studies of terrorist operations across the world since 9/11 have brought out how the international terrorist organisations of various hues have successfully adapted for their operations the same concepts and techniques of globalisation and decentralisation, which they have borrowed from the business world. They are globalised in their thinking and outlook and decentralised and autonomous in their operations in the field.
7. The terrorist strike in Mumbai from the night of November 26, 2008 to the morning of November 29, 2008, has sent a shiver right across the world not just because it was spectacular, but because there was a fearsome brain, which had conceptualised the entire operation, planned it to the minutest details and had it carried out through remote control from Pakistan with the help of not more than 10 terrorists. There might have been----I apprehend there would have been--- many, many more terrorists involved in various peripheral roles such as intelligence collection, reconnoitring, logistics etc, but the core group, which carried out the strike was not more than 10 in number, but it managed to have an important corner of Mumbai, India's financial capital, under its control for more than 48 hours. A force of nearly 600 men of the Mumbai Police and the National Security Guards was required to eliminate this small group of 10. This was asymmetric urban warfare of a kind not seen in the world ever since terrorism assumed its major dimensions in the post-1967 world after the Arab-Israeli war of that year.
8. We saw in Mumbai a mix of attacks on human beings and capabilities, a mix of attacks on Indians and foreigners and a mix of various strategies. A strategy to disrupt the peace process between India and Pakistan was mixed with a strategy for reprisal against the expanding strategic co-operation of India with Israel and the Western world. A strategy for discrediting India's political leadership and professional national security managers in the eyes of the Indian public was combined with a strategy for discrediting them in the eyes of the international community and the international business world. These strategies focussed on a mix of targets----the man in the street and the elite. The man in the street was attacked in places like a railway station, a hospital and other public places. The elite was attacked in the Taj Mahal Hotel and the Oberoi-Trident Hotels.
9. These hotels are not just the favourite spots of tourists who travel on shoe-string budgets. These are the favourite spots of the cream of the international business world, who come to Mumbai not for pleasure, but for their business. Imagine what impressions the business managers of the world, who escaped being killed by the terrorists, would have carried back to their corporate headquarters--- about the security of life and property in India, about the efficiency of India's national security managers, about the quality of our political and professional leadership.
10. In an article on the terrorist strike in Mumbai, the "Guardian" of the UK wrote: "Analysts are worried that the constant reminder of the attacks will heighten investors' concerns at a time when the Indian economy is slowing and foreign capital is being repatriated. 'This is the last thing India needs,' said businessman Sir Gulam Noon. The British-based multimillionaire, who made his fortune in ready meals, escaped unhurt from the Taj Mahal after spending a frightening night holed up in his suite on the third floor. 'The attacks will temporarily have an impact. It's clearly not good for the economy at a time when the world is in a financial crisis.' That the Taj Mahal and Oberoi play host to the cream of the international business elite is clear given the high-profile executives caught up in the tragedy. Along with Noon, Unilever chief executive Patrick Cescau and his successor, Paul Polman, escaped the Taj Mahal. 'The security landscape has changed overnight,' said Jake Stratton of investment risk consultancy Control Risks. 'This will have a serious effect on how foreign companies perceive India as a business destination.'
11. The success of the terrorists in Mumbai was due to various factors---- inaction or inadequate action on available intelligence about the plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to target Mumbai with a sea-borne operation, the rusting of our rapid response capability, our failure to draw the right lessons about crisis management from the unsatisfactory manner in which the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar in 1999 was handled, and the lack of a joint action capability in our counter-terrorism community consisting of the intelligence agencies, the police, the armed forces, the NSG, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee.
12. The intelligence about the plans for a sea-borne strike in Mumbai had reportedly started flowing in from September when the attention of our policy-makers and senior national security managers was turned towards Vienna where the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was meeting to consider the question of a waiver for India. In their preoccupation with the Vienna meeting of the NSG, the task of co-ordinating the follow-up action on the flow of intelligence appears to have been relegated to junior officials. whose decisions and directions did not have the same impact on the various dramatis personae involved in joint action. Moreover, during the months preceding the attack the Joint Intelligence Committee, whose task it would have been to analyse and assess the intelligence and decide on follow-up action, was without a head just as it was during the months when the Pakistan Army was getting ready to launch its intrusions into the Kargil area in 1998-99. One of the important lessons of the Kargil conflict was the danger of leaving important posts in our national security apparatus remain unfilled, but we seem to have repeated that mistake once again.
13. Terrorist attacks directed against economic and business targets have a tactical as well as a strategic impact, an economic as well as a psychological impact. The tactical impact is in respect of replaceable damages. The strategic impact has a long-term effect on the profitability of their business operations due to factors such as an increase in insurance premia for business transactions, an increase in their expenditure on physical security, and an increase in their tax liability due to a surge in Govt. spending on counter-terrorism for which the money has to come from the tax-payers. It has been estimated that the 9/11 terrorist strikes have resulted in a one-third increase in the expenditure on counter-terrorism in the US Defence Department alone. This does not include the expenditure of the Department of Homeland Security. The total US expenditure on counter-terrorism now amounts to US $ 500 billion per annum, which is 20 per cent of the total federal budget. This money has to come from the tax-payers.
14. The psychological impact arises from the nervousness of the business community. A businessman, who ventures abroad, looks for two things----profitability and security of life and property. If we are not able to assure the security of life and property, no amount of profitability will induce him to take the risk of operating from India.
15. It is important to hold a thorough, time-bound enquiry into what went wrong in Mumbai and to share its findings with the Parliament and the public. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US led to an enquiry by a National Commission constituted jointly by the President and the two Houses of the Congress. Its report was released to the public and discussed in the Congress. A bipartisan resolution to implement its recommendations was passed in 2004. The London blasts of July 2005, were followed by a detailed enquiry by the joint Intelligence and Security Committee. Its report was discussed in the Parliament and its recommendations implemented. So too in Spain after the Madrid blasts of March, 2004. In Singapore, there was a detailed enquiry into the escape from jail of a member of the pro-Al Qaeda Jemmah Islamiyah some months ago. Its report was placed before the Parliament and discussed. Since 9/11, there have been many acts of mass casualty terrorism in India---- seven since November, 2007, alone. We have not had a thorough enquiry into any of them. How can we identify the weaknesses in our counter-terrorism machinery unless we enquire into the terrorist strikes?
16. The National Commission in the US, which went into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, pointed out that there was no culture of joint action in the US counter-terrorism community. We have no culture of joint action either. The basic principle underlying the concept of joint action is that every organisation in the counter-terrorism community is individually and jointly responsible for preventing an act of terrorism. Had we developed this culture of joint action, we would not be seeing the unedifying spectacle of the intelligence agencies, the Navy and the Mumbai Police blaming each other for not preventing the Mumbai strike.
17. Terrorists calculate that repeated and sustained successful terrorist strikes against capabilities would make the States more amenable to pressure and intimidation from them than successful terrorist strikes against human beings. Their calculations are not far wrong. In the case of terrorism against capabilities, even fears or rumours of a possible terrorist strike against them can have a negative effect on the economy.
18. Protection of capabilities against terrorist strikes has, therefore, become an important component of counter-terrorism. Protection of the capabilities of the State is the exclusive responsibility of the State for which it has a preventive intelligence capability and specially trained physical security agencies or forces.
19. Protection of the capabilities in the private sector is basically the responsibility of the physical security set-ups of the companies concerned, but the State too has an important responsibility for guiding them and helping them to improve their physical security set-ups through appropriate advice. There may be sensitive industries in the private sector, where the State's role extends beyond guidance and advice to actually buttressing the physical security set-up of the company through its (the Government's) own trained and armed personnel.
20. Effective physical security rests on a strong information base. The security set-ups of private companies and other establishments suffer from a major handicap in this regard. Their ability to collect intelligence is confined to the interior of the company or establishment. They will have no means of collecting intelligence about threats, which could arise from outside the company or establishment.
21. For this awareness of likely external threats they are dependent on the media, the police and the governmental intelligence agencies. The media reporting often tends to be sensational and over-dramatised. The reliability of their reports is often questionable. While open source information from the media is important for increasing awareness of likely threats, the ability to have it verified, analysed and assessed is equally important. Otherwise, physical security set-ups will be groping in the dark.
22. Such verification, analysis and assessment have to come from the Police and the intelligence agencies and the results of this process have to be shared promptly with the companies or establishments, which are likely to face a threat, with appropriate suggestions for follow-up action. It should not be left to the security set-ups of private companies to take the initiative to contact the police and other counter-terrorism agencies to find out if there are any external threats to them---particularly after reading media reports in this regard.
23. The police and other counter-terrorism agencies should play a proactive role in creating and strengthening credible information awareness among the heads of the security set-ups of vulnerable private companies and their CEOs. This has to be constantly achieved through periodic interactions organised by the police in the form of brain-storming sessions, round-table discussions etc. Such interactions at the initiative of the governmental agencies seem to be more sporadic than regular----often triggered only by an actual crisis than by the anticipation of a possible crisis.
24. Heads of the security set-ups of private companies should have easy access, when warranted, to senior officers of the police and other counter-terrorism agencies. One gets an impression that such access is often restricted to officers at the middle or lower levels, who do not have the required degree of professionalism and self-confidence to be able to interact meaningfully and satisfactorily with senior officers of the private sector.
25. The effective physical security of any establishment---sensitive or non-sensitive, private or public--- depends on effective access control. Access control is ensured through means such as renewable identity cards for the permanent members of the staff; temporary identity cards to outsiders coming on legitimate work; numbered invitation cards to those invited to conferences, meetings etc; restrictions on the entry of vehicles of outsiders into the campus; restricting the number of entry points and exits to the minimum unavoidable; identity checking at doors; checking for weapons and explosives through door-frame detectors; checking of vehicles for explosives; installation of closed circuit TV at the points of entry and exit and at sensitive points in the establishment; a central control room to monitor all happenings at the entry points and exits and inside the premises through the CCTV etc. Better access control by the security staff is facilitated through the advance sharing of information with them about the outsiders, who are expected to visit the premises for meetings, conferences, seminars etc.
26. These are the minimum measures considered necessary for any company or establishment, which is considered vulnerable to terrorist strikes. It is important for the Police to prepare and revise periodically lists of vulnerable companies/establishments in their jurisdiction and share their conclusions with the security set-ups concerned.
27. Similarly, it is important for each vulnerable company or establishment to prepare and revise periodically a list of vulnerable points/occasions, which would need the special attention of the security staff and brief the security staff on the follow-up action to be taken. It would also be necessary to discuss this list with the Police and seek their advice on the adequacy of the security measures, which the security set-up of the company or establishment proposes to take. The Police should not consider such consultations as unnecessary intrusions on their time. They should welcome such consultations or interactions as a necessary component of their counter-terrorism strategy.
28. IT companies and other establishments in South India often face work interruptions due to hoax telephone calls and E-mail and Fax messages regarding possible terrorist strikes. A basic principle in physical security is, "treat every information, hoax call etc as possibly correct unless and until it is proved to be false and take the necessary follow-up action. Never start on the presumption that the information is probably false or the message a hoax. This would be extremely inadvisable and even dangerous.
29. Even the best of intelligence cannot prevent a terrorist strike, if the physical security set-up is weak or inefficient. A competent physical security set-up can prevent a terrorist strike even in the absence of preventive intelligence.
30. Sometimes, despite the best of physical security, terrorists might succeed in staging an incident. That is where the role of the crisis management drill comes in to limit the damage. A well-prepared and frequently rehearsed crisis management drill is a very important part of the counter-terrorism strategy in any establishment---private or public.
31. Effective physical security is the outcome of constant enhancements in the security personnel of professionalism, self-confidence, information awareness, threat and vulnerability perceptions and protective capability. Achieving these enhancements is primarily the responsibility of the security set-up of the establishment, but the Police has an important role in facilitating this. This is a responsibility, which they should not evade. Well-structured police---security set-up interactions to enhance security in the private sector is the need of the hour.
32. Business resilience and business continuity management in terrorism-affected situations are two concepts increasingly figuring in discourses in the Western countries. They have also formed the subject of many studies by the business community and the counter-terrorism community----separately of each other as well as jointly. It is said that the best contribution that the business community can make to counter-terrorism is by staying in business despite terrorist strikes. They may not be able to do it alone. The Government has to help them by playing a proactive role.
33. New ideas and new institutions have come up in the West to promote partnership between the Government and the business community for ensuring their security and for keeping their resilence undamaged. One example is the Overseas Security Assistance Council established in 1985 by the U.S. State Department to facilitate the exchange of security related information between the U.S. Government and the American private sector operating abroad. Another example is the creation of posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers in important police stations in the UK after the London blasts of July, 2005. One of their tasks is to keep in touch with the business establishments in their jurisdiction and advise them on security-related matters. 243 posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers have been created since July 2005 and it has been reported that each important Police Station in London has at least two advisers attached to it. The London Police have established a programme called "London First" in which the Police and the private sector co-operate closely to ensure better security in London. The principle underlying it is that it is the joint responsibility of everyone in London to ensure its security from terrorist attacks. Let us have our own Delhi First, Mumbai First, Chennai First, Kolkata First, Bangalore First and Hyderabad First partnerships to ensure that November 26 will not be repeated again.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Terrorists target human beings---combatants and non-combatants (civilians) --- as well as capabilities---economic and strategic.
2. Till the 1980s, they focused more on targeting human beings. Targeting of capabilities----which may or may not cause human fatalities---- came into vogue in the 1980s, when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried out explosions in London's financial district.
3. Targeting of capabilities does not create the same kind of public revulsion against the terrorists as the targeting of human beings does. Whereas the after-effects of the targeting of human beings remain localised in the area where they were targeted, the impact of the targeting of capabilities has a ripple effect far beyond the area where the act of terrorism was carried out.
4. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland had a ripple effect right across the world because of the increase in insurance premia for various business transactions and dislocation of international flights. The successful terrorist strikes in Bali had an impact on the tourist economy of not only Indonesia, but also of neighbouring countries. The effect of a successful terrorist strike on the oil installations of Saudi Arabia or on commercial shipping in the Malacca Strait would be felt right across the world with varying degrees of intensity. The impact of a successful terrorist strike on the information technology (IT) industries of Bangalore would be felt not only in Bangalore, but also in the stock markets of different cities, where the shares of the IT companies are traded. Because of networking, the repercussions of a successful terrorist operation against the critical information infrastructure in one city can spread the resulting damage right across the world.
5. Globalisation and decentralisation are the defining characteristics of the business world of today. Very often many of the core tasks of multinational companies are performed not by their headquarters in their country of origin, but by their field offices spread across the world. Western multinationals delegate many of their core tasks to their offices in India because of the availability in India of highly-qualified managerial experts, who are prepared to work for emoluments, which are high by Indian standards, but not so high by the standards of the country of origin of the multinational. If an act of terrorism disrupts the workling of their Indian offices it would affect not only their business operations in India, but also their operations right across the world.
6. Many studies of terrorist operations across the world since 9/11 have brought out how the international terrorist organisations of various hues have successfully adapted for their operations the same concepts and techniques of globalisation and decentralisation, which they have borrowed from the business world. They are globalised in their thinking and outlook and decentralised and autonomous in their operations in the field.
7. The terrorist strike in Mumbai from the night of November 26, 2008 to the morning of November 29, 2008, has sent a shiver right across the world not just because it was spectacular, but because there was a fearsome brain, which had conceptualised the entire operation, planned it to the minutest details and had it carried out through remote control from Pakistan with the help of not more than 10 terrorists. There might have been----I apprehend there would have been--- many, many more terrorists involved in various peripheral roles such as intelligence collection, reconnoitring, logistics etc, but the core group, which carried out the strike was not more than 10 in number, but it managed to have an important corner of Mumbai, India's financial capital, under its control for more than 48 hours. A force of nearly 600 men of the Mumbai Police and the National Security Guards was required to eliminate this small group of 10. This was asymmetric urban warfare of a kind not seen in the world ever since terrorism assumed its major dimensions in the post-1967 world after the Arab-Israeli war of that year.
8. We saw in Mumbai a mix of attacks on human beings and capabilities, a mix of attacks on Indians and foreigners and a mix of various strategies. A strategy to disrupt the peace process between India and Pakistan was mixed with a strategy for reprisal against the expanding strategic co-operation of India with Israel and the Western world. A strategy for discrediting India's political leadership and professional national security managers in the eyes of the Indian public was combined with a strategy for discrediting them in the eyes of the international community and the international business world. These strategies focussed on a mix of targets----the man in the street and the elite. The man in the street was attacked in places like a railway station, a hospital and other public places. The elite was attacked in the Taj Mahal Hotel and the Oberoi-Trident Hotels.
9. These hotels are not just the favourite spots of tourists who travel on shoe-string budgets. These are the favourite spots of the cream of the international business world, who come to Mumbai not for pleasure, but for their business. Imagine what impressions the business managers of the world, who escaped being killed by the terrorists, would have carried back to their corporate headquarters--- about the security of life and property in India, about the efficiency of India's national security managers, about the quality of our political and professional leadership.
10. In an article on the terrorist strike in Mumbai, the "Guardian" of the UK wrote: "Analysts are worried that the constant reminder of the attacks will heighten investors' concerns at a time when the Indian economy is slowing and foreign capital is being repatriated. 'This is the last thing India needs,' said businessman Sir Gulam Noon. The British-based multimillionaire, who made his fortune in ready meals, escaped unhurt from the Taj Mahal after spending a frightening night holed up in his suite on the third floor. 'The attacks will temporarily have an impact. It's clearly not good for the economy at a time when the world is in a financial crisis.' That the Taj Mahal and Oberoi play host to the cream of the international business elite is clear given the high-profile executives caught up in the tragedy. Along with Noon, Unilever chief executive Patrick Cescau and his successor, Paul Polman, escaped the Taj Mahal. 'The security landscape has changed overnight,' said Jake Stratton of investment risk consultancy Control Risks. 'This will have a serious effect on how foreign companies perceive India as a business destination.'
11. The success of the terrorists in Mumbai was due to various factors---- inaction or inadequate action on available intelligence about the plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to target Mumbai with a sea-borne operation, the rusting of our rapid response capability, our failure to draw the right lessons about crisis management from the unsatisfactory manner in which the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar in 1999 was handled, and the lack of a joint action capability in our counter-terrorism community consisting of the intelligence agencies, the police, the armed forces, the NSG, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee.
12. The intelligence about the plans for a sea-borne strike in Mumbai had reportedly started flowing in from September when the attention of our policy-makers and senior national security managers was turned towards Vienna where the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was meeting to consider the question of a waiver for India. In their preoccupation with the Vienna meeting of the NSG, the task of co-ordinating the follow-up action on the flow of intelligence appears to have been relegated to junior officials. whose decisions and directions did not have the same impact on the various dramatis personae involved in joint action. Moreover, during the months preceding the attack the Joint Intelligence Committee, whose task it would have been to analyse and assess the intelligence and decide on follow-up action, was without a head just as it was during the months when the Pakistan Army was getting ready to launch its intrusions into the Kargil area in 1998-99. One of the important lessons of the Kargil conflict was the danger of leaving important posts in our national security apparatus remain unfilled, but we seem to have repeated that mistake once again.
13. Terrorist attacks directed against economic and business targets have a tactical as well as a strategic impact, an economic as well as a psychological impact. The tactical impact is in respect of replaceable damages. The strategic impact has a long-term effect on the profitability of their business operations due to factors such as an increase in insurance premia for business transactions, an increase in their expenditure on physical security, and an increase in their tax liability due to a surge in Govt. spending on counter-terrorism for which the money has to come from the tax-payers. It has been estimated that the 9/11 terrorist strikes have resulted in a one-third increase in the expenditure on counter-terrorism in the US Defence Department alone. This does not include the expenditure of the Department of Homeland Security. The total US expenditure on counter-terrorism now amounts to US $ 500 billion per annum, which is 20 per cent of the total federal budget. This money has to come from the tax-payers.
14. The psychological impact arises from the nervousness of the business community. A businessman, who ventures abroad, looks for two things----profitability and security of life and property. If we are not able to assure the security of life and property, no amount of profitability will induce him to take the risk of operating from India.
15. It is important to hold a thorough, time-bound enquiry into what went wrong in Mumbai and to share its findings with the Parliament and the public. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US led to an enquiry by a National Commission constituted jointly by the President and the two Houses of the Congress. Its report was released to the public and discussed in the Congress. A bipartisan resolution to implement its recommendations was passed in 2004. The London blasts of July 2005, were followed by a detailed enquiry by the joint Intelligence and Security Committee. Its report was discussed in the Parliament and its recommendations implemented. So too in Spain after the Madrid blasts of March, 2004. In Singapore, there was a detailed enquiry into the escape from jail of a member of the pro-Al Qaeda Jemmah Islamiyah some months ago. Its report was placed before the Parliament and discussed. Since 9/11, there have been many acts of mass casualty terrorism in India---- seven since November, 2007, alone. We have not had a thorough enquiry into any of them. How can we identify the weaknesses in our counter-terrorism machinery unless we enquire into the terrorist strikes?
16. The National Commission in the US, which went into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, pointed out that there was no culture of joint action in the US counter-terrorism community. We have no culture of joint action either. The basic principle underlying the concept of joint action is that every organisation in the counter-terrorism community is individually and jointly responsible for preventing an act of terrorism. Had we developed this culture of joint action, we would not be seeing the unedifying spectacle of the intelligence agencies, the Navy and the Mumbai Police blaming each other for not preventing the Mumbai strike.
17. Terrorists calculate that repeated and sustained successful terrorist strikes against capabilities would make the States more amenable to pressure and intimidation from them than successful terrorist strikes against human beings. Their calculations are not far wrong. In the case of terrorism against capabilities, even fears or rumours of a possible terrorist strike against them can have a negative effect on the economy.
18. Protection of capabilities against terrorist strikes has, therefore, become an important component of counter-terrorism. Protection of the capabilities of the State is the exclusive responsibility of the State for which it has a preventive intelligence capability and specially trained physical security agencies or forces.
19. Protection of the capabilities in the private sector is basically the responsibility of the physical security set-ups of the companies concerned, but the State too has an important responsibility for guiding them and helping them to improve their physical security set-ups through appropriate advice. There may be sensitive industries in the private sector, where the State's role extends beyond guidance and advice to actually buttressing the physical security set-up of the company through its (the Government's) own trained and armed personnel.
20. Effective physical security rests on a strong information base. The security set-ups of private companies and other establishments suffer from a major handicap in this regard. Their ability to collect intelligence is confined to the interior of the company or establishment. They will have no means of collecting intelligence about threats, which could arise from outside the company or establishment.
21. For this awareness of likely external threats they are dependent on the media, the police and the governmental intelligence agencies. The media reporting often tends to be sensational and over-dramatised. The reliability of their reports is often questionable. While open source information from the media is important for increasing awareness of likely threats, the ability to have it verified, analysed and assessed is equally important. Otherwise, physical security set-ups will be groping in the dark.
22. Such verification, analysis and assessment have to come from the Police and the intelligence agencies and the results of this process have to be shared promptly with the companies or establishments, which are likely to face a threat, with appropriate suggestions for follow-up action. It should not be left to the security set-ups of private companies to take the initiative to contact the police and other counter-terrorism agencies to find out if there are any external threats to them---particularly after reading media reports in this regard.
23. The police and other counter-terrorism agencies should play a proactive role in creating and strengthening credible information awareness among the heads of the security set-ups of vulnerable private companies and their CEOs. This has to be constantly achieved through periodic interactions organised by the police in the form of brain-storming sessions, round-table discussions etc. Such interactions at the initiative of the governmental agencies seem to be more sporadic than regular----often triggered only by an actual crisis than by the anticipation of a possible crisis.
24. Heads of the security set-ups of private companies should have easy access, when warranted, to senior officers of the police and other counter-terrorism agencies. One gets an impression that such access is often restricted to officers at the middle or lower levels, who do not have the required degree of professionalism and self-confidence to be able to interact meaningfully and satisfactorily with senior officers of the private sector.
25. The effective physical security of any establishment---sensitive or non-sensitive, private or public--- depends on effective access control. Access control is ensured through means such as renewable identity cards for the permanent members of the staff; temporary identity cards to outsiders coming on legitimate work; numbered invitation cards to those invited to conferences, meetings etc; restrictions on the entry of vehicles of outsiders into the campus; restricting the number of entry points and exits to the minimum unavoidable; identity checking at doors; checking for weapons and explosives through door-frame detectors; checking of vehicles for explosives; installation of closed circuit TV at the points of entry and exit and at sensitive points in the establishment; a central control room to monitor all happenings at the entry points and exits and inside the premises through the CCTV etc. Better access control by the security staff is facilitated through the advance sharing of information with them about the outsiders, who are expected to visit the premises for meetings, conferences, seminars etc.
26. These are the minimum measures considered necessary for any company or establishment, which is considered vulnerable to terrorist strikes. It is important for the Police to prepare and revise periodically lists of vulnerable companies/establishments in their jurisdiction and share their conclusions with the security set-ups concerned.
27. Similarly, it is important for each vulnerable company or establishment to prepare and revise periodically a list of vulnerable points/occasions, which would need the special attention of the security staff and brief the security staff on the follow-up action to be taken. It would also be necessary to discuss this list with the Police and seek their advice on the adequacy of the security measures, which the security set-up of the company or establishment proposes to take. The Police should not consider such consultations as unnecessary intrusions on their time. They should welcome such consultations or interactions as a necessary component of their counter-terrorism strategy.
28. IT companies and other establishments in South India often face work interruptions due to hoax telephone calls and E-mail and Fax messages regarding possible terrorist strikes. A basic principle in physical security is, "treat every information, hoax call etc as possibly correct unless and until it is proved to be false and take the necessary follow-up action. Never start on the presumption that the information is probably false or the message a hoax. This would be extremely inadvisable and even dangerous.
29. Even the best of intelligence cannot prevent a terrorist strike, if the physical security set-up is weak or inefficient. A competent physical security set-up can prevent a terrorist strike even in the absence of preventive intelligence.
30. Sometimes, despite the best of physical security, terrorists might succeed in staging an incident. That is where the role of the crisis management drill comes in to limit the damage. A well-prepared and frequently rehearsed crisis management drill is a very important part of the counter-terrorism strategy in any establishment---private or public.
31. Effective physical security is the outcome of constant enhancements in the security personnel of professionalism, self-confidence, information awareness, threat and vulnerability perceptions and protective capability. Achieving these enhancements is primarily the responsibility of the security set-up of the establishment, but the Police has an important role in facilitating this. This is a responsibility, which they should not evade. Well-structured police---security set-up interactions to enhance security in the private sector is the need of the hour.
32. Business resilience and business continuity management in terrorism-affected situations are two concepts increasingly figuring in discourses in the Western countries. They have also formed the subject of many studies by the business community and the counter-terrorism community----separately of each other as well as jointly. It is said that the best contribution that the business community can make to counter-terrorism is by staying in business despite terrorist strikes. They may not be able to do it alone. The Government has to help them by playing a proactive role.
33. New ideas and new institutions have come up in the West to promote partnership between the Government and the business community for ensuring their security and for keeping their resilence undamaged. One example is the Overseas Security Assistance Council established in 1985 by the U.S. State Department to facilitate the exchange of security related information between the U.S. Government and the American private sector operating abroad. Another example is the creation of posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers in important police stations in the UK after the London blasts of July, 2005. One of their tasks is to keep in touch with the business establishments in their jurisdiction and advise them on security-related matters. 243 posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers have been created since July 2005 and it has been reported that each important Police Station in London has at least two advisers attached to it. The London Police have established a programme called "London First" in which the Police and the private sector co-operate closely to ensure better security in London. The principle underlying it is that it is the joint responsibility of everyone in London to ensure its security from terrorist attacks. Let us have our own Delhi First, Mumbai First, Chennai First, Kolkata First, Bangalore First and Hyderabad First partnerships to ensure that November 26 will not be repeated again.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
December 10, 2008
AL QAEDA AS A TOURNAMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Raul Caruso
Istituto di Politica Economica
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano
raul.caruso@unicatt.it
Abstract: This short paper aims to find an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a
contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – namely, official membership and economic
rewards – to candidate extremists groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each
other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of
winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally
destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims
must depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the
hypothesis. At the same time, results show that al Qaeda-style terrorist activity depends also
upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.
The Growing Importance of Civilians in Armed Conflict
This policy brief argues that civilians play an increasingly important and complex role in armed conflicts. At the same time, the author states, the lines between 'civilians' and 'combatants' are becoming blurred. The brief postulates that how states and multilateral institutions respond to these challenges is of great importance for the legitimacy and efficiency of their stabilization efforts in crisis areas.
© 2008 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
Download: English (PDF · 3 pages · 293 KB)
Author: Andreas Wenger
Series: CSS Analyses in Security Policy
Volume: 3
Issue: 45
Publisher: Center for Security Studies (CSS), Zurich, Switzerland
December 09, 2008
Mumbai attackers used sophisticated technology
International herald Tribune
By Jeremy Kahn Published: December 9, 2008
MUMBAI: The terrorists who struck this city in November stunned the authorities not only with their use of sophisticated weaponry but also with their comfort with modern technology.
The terrorists navigated across the Arabian Sea to Mumbai from Karachi, Pakistan, with the help of a global positioning system handset. While under way, they communicated using a satellite phone with those in Pakistan believed to have coordinated the attacks. They recognized their targets and knew the most direct routes to reach them in part because they had studied satellite photos from Google Earth.
And, perhaps most significantly, throughout the three-day siege at two luxury hotels and a Jewish center, the Pakistani-based handlers communicated with the attackers using Internet phones that complicate efforts to trace and intercept calls.
Those handlers, who were apparently watching the attacks unfold live on television, were able to inform the attackers of the movement of security forces from news accounts and provide the gunmen with instructions and encouragement, the authorities said.
Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai's police commissioner, said Monday that as once-complicated technologies - including global positioning systems and satellite phones - have become simpler to operate, terrorists, like everyone else, have become adept at using them. "Well, whether terrorists or common criminals, they do try to be a step ahead in terms of technology," he said.
These sailors embrace risk for rewardCooperation with China critical for ObamaChinese petition for more rightsIndian security forces surrounding the buildings were able to monitor the terrorists' outgoing calls by intercepting their cellphone signals. But Indian police officials said those directing the attacks, who are believed to be from Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant group based in Pakistan, were using a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service, which has complicated efforts to determine their whereabouts and identities.
VoIP services, in which conversations are carried over the Internet instead of conventional phone lines or cellphone towers, are popular with people looking to save money on long-distance and international calls. Many such services, like Skype and Vonage, allow a user to call another VoIP-enabled device anywhere in the world free of charge, or to call a standard telephone or cellphone at a deeply discounted rate.
But the same services are also increasingly popular with criminals and terrorists, a trend that worries some law enforcement and intelligence agencies. "It's a concern," said one Indian security official, who spoke anonymously because the investigation was continuing. "It's not something we have seen before."
In mid-October, a draft U.S. Army intelligence report highlighted the growing interest of Islamic militants in using VoIP, noting recent news reports of Taliban insurgents using Skype to communicate. The unclassified report, which examined discussions of emerging technologies on jihadist Web sites, was obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit group based in Washington that monitors the effect of science on national security.
VoIP calls pose an array of difficulties for intelligence and law enforcement services, according to communications experts. "It means the phone-tapping techniques that work for old traditional interception don't work," said Matt Blaze, a professor and computer security expert at the University of Pennsylvania.
An agency using conventional tracing techniques to track a call from a land line or cellphone to a VoIP subscriber would be able to get only as far as the switching station that converts the voice call into Internet data, communications experts said. The switch, usually owned and operated by the company providing the VoIP service, could be located thousands of miles from the subscriber.
The subscriber's phone number would also probably reveal no information about his location. For instance, someone in New York could dial a local phone number but actually be connected via the Internet to a person in Thailand.
In Mumbai, the authorities have declined to disclose the names of the VoIP companies whose services the Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers used, but reports in the Indian news media have said the calls have been traced to companies in New Jersey and Austria. Yet investigators have said they are convinced that the handlers who directed the attacks were actually sitting somewhere in Pakistan during the calls.
One senior Lashkar-e-Taiba leader who U.S. officials believe may have played a key role in planning the Mumbai attacks is Zarrar Shah.
Shah, known to be a specialist in communications technology, may have been aware of the difficulties in tracing VoIP.
To determine the location of a VoIP caller, an investigating agency has to access a database kept by the service provider. The database logs the unique numerical identifier, known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address, of whatever device the subscriber was using to connect to the Internet. This could be a computer equipped with a microphone, a special VoIP phone, or even a cellphone with software that routes calls over the Internet using wireless connections as opposed to cellular signals.
It would then take additional electronic sleuthing to determine where the device was located. The customer's identity could be obtained from the service provider as well, but it might prove fraudulent, experts said.
Getting the IP address and then determining its location can take days longer than a standard phone trace, particularly if service providers involved are in a foreign country.
"Ultimately, we can trace them," said Gafoor, referring to VoIP calls. "It takes a little longer, but we will trace them."
Washington is assisting the Indian authorities in obtaining this information, according to another Indian police official who also spoke anonymously because of the continuing investigation.
Further complicating this task is the fact that IP addresses change frequently and are less tied to a specific location than phone numbers.
Computer experts said that while these challenges were formidable, none were insurmountable. And they cautioned that security services and police forces might be disingenuous when they complain about terrorists' use of new technologies, including VoIP.
The experts said that VoIP calls left a far richer data trail for investigators to mine than someone calling from an old-fashioned pay phone.
Blaze, the computer security expert at the University of Pennsylvania, also noted that 15 years ago the Mumbai attackers would probably not have had the capacity to make calls to their handlers during the course of their attacks, depriving investigators of vital clues to their identities.
"As one door closes - traditional wire line tapping - all these other doors have opened," Blaze said
By Jeremy Kahn Published: December 9, 2008
MUMBAI: The terrorists who struck this city in November stunned the authorities not only with their use of sophisticated weaponry but also with their comfort with modern technology.
The terrorists navigated across the Arabian Sea to Mumbai from Karachi, Pakistan, with the help of a global positioning system handset. While under way, they communicated using a satellite phone with those in Pakistan believed to have coordinated the attacks. They recognized their targets and knew the most direct routes to reach them in part because they had studied satellite photos from Google Earth.
And, perhaps most significantly, throughout the three-day siege at two luxury hotels and a Jewish center, the Pakistani-based handlers communicated with the attackers using Internet phones that complicate efforts to trace and intercept calls.
Those handlers, who were apparently watching the attacks unfold live on television, were able to inform the attackers of the movement of security forces from news accounts and provide the gunmen with instructions and encouragement, the authorities said.
Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai's police commissioner, said Monday that as once-complicated technologies - including global positioning systems and satellite phones - have become simpler to operate, terrorists, like everyone else, have become adept at using them. "Well, whether terrorists or common criminals, they do try to be a step ahead in terms of technology," he said.
These sailors embrace risk for rewardCooperation with China critical for ObamaChinese petition for more rightsIndian security forces surrounding the buildings were able to monitor the terrorists' outgoing calls by intercepting their cellphone signals. But Indian police officials said those directing the attacks, who are believed to be from Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant group based in Pakistan, were using a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service, which has complicated efforts to determine their whereabouts and identities.
VoIP services, in which conversations are carried over the Internet instead of conventional phone lines or cellphone towers, are popular with people looking to save money on long-distance and international calls. Many such services, like Skype and Vonage, allow a user to call another VoIP-enabled device anywhere in the world free of charge, or to call a standard telephone or cellphone at a deeply discounted rate.
But the same services are also increasingly popular with criminals and terrorists, a trend that worries some law enforcement and intelligence agencies. "It's a concern," said one Indian security official, who spoke anonymously because the investigation was continuing. "It's not something we have seen before."
In mid-October, a draft U.S. Army intelligence report highlighted the growing interest of Islamic militants in using VoIP, noting recent news reports of Taliban insurgents using Skype to communicate. The unclassified report, which examined discussions of emerging technologies on jihadist Web sites, was obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit group based in Washington that monitors the effect of science on national security.
VoIP calls pose an array of difficulties for intelligence and law enforcement services, according to communications experts. "It means the phone-tapping techniques that work for old traditional interception don't work," said Matt Blaze, a professor and computer security expert at the University of Pennsylvania.
An agency using conventional tracing techniques to track a call from a land line or cellphone to a VoIP subscriber would be able to get only as far as the switching station that converts the voice call into Internet data, communications experts said. The switch, usually owned and operated by the company providing the VoIP service, could be located thousands of miles from the subscriber.
The subscriber's phone number would also probably reveal no information about his location. For instance, someone in New York could dial a local phone number but actually be connected via the Internet to a person in Thailand.
In Mumbai, the authorities have declined to disclose the names of the VoIP companies whose services the Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers used, but reports in the Indian news media have said the calls have been traced to companies in New Jersey and Austria. Yet investigators have said they are convinced that the handlers who directed the attacks were actually sitting somewhere in Pakistan during the calls.
One senior Lashkar-e-Taiba leader who U.S. officials believe may have played a key role in planning the Mumbai attacks is Zarrar Shah.
Shah, known to be a specialist in communications technology, may have been aware of the difficulties in tracing VoIP.
To determine the location of a VoIP caller, an investigating agency has to access a database kept by the service provider. The database logs the unique numerical identifier, known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address, of whatever device the subscriber was using to connect to the Internet. This could be a computer equipped with a microphone, a special VoIP phone, or even a cellphone with software that routes calls over the Internet using wireless connections as opposed to cellular signals.
It would then take additional electronic sleuthing to determine where the device was located. The customer's identity could be obtained from the service provider as well, but it might prove fraudulent, experts said.
Getting the IP address and then determining its location can take days longer than a standard phone trace, particularly if service providers involved are in a foreign country.
"Ultimately, we can trace them," said Gafoor, referring to VoIP calls. "It takes a little longer, but we will trace them."
Washington is assisting the Indian authorities in obtaining this information, according to another Indian police official who also spoke anonymously because of the continuing investigation.
Further complicating this task is the fact that IP addresses change frequently and are less tied to a specific location than phone numbers.
Computer experts said that while these challenges were formidable, none were insurmountable. And they cautioned that security services and police forces might be disingenuous when they complain about terrorists' use of new technologies, including VoIP.
The experts said that VoIP calls left a far richer data trail for investigators to mine than someone calling from an old-fashioned pay phone.
Blaze, the computer security expert at the University of Pennsylvania, also noted that 15 years ago the Mumbai attackers would probably not have had the capacity to make calls to their handlers during the course of their attacks, depriving investigators of vital clues to their identities.
"As one door closes - traditional wire line tapping - all these other doors have opened," Blaze said
World blind to nurseries of terror
Barry Rubin
The shame is not India’s but the world’s that a democratic, law-abiding country can be attacked by a neighbour with terrorism and receive no strong international support
India’s Government faces difficult choices and no one should interfere in that hard process. Still, it is worth describing the alternatives New Delhi must ponder and what it might ask the rest of the world to do.
First, of course, no one should criticise India or draw conclusions too quickly. The Indian Government will investigate and confer with friendly states. An official conclusion will be reached. Rumours and newspaper articles are not sufficient: The security and intelligence forces must examine the evidence; Government must speak.
What is most interesting is the conclusion that elements in Pakistan were involved. This does not necessarily mean that the Pakistani Government officially ordered the attack or knew about it. The Indian Government, however, has made the following points:
# Pakistan hosts terrorist groups that carried out the attack.
# Pakistani intelligence knew the attack was being planned.
# Some Pakistani agencies or officials helped the terrorists obtain weapons, training, equipment, and to travel freely in and out of the country.
So, what can India do? It has asked Pakistan to cooperate fully in the investigation, to respond to specific questions, to expel Indian nationals involved and to punish any Pakistanis involved. The Pakistani response has been lukewarm. In such circumstances, India has several normal options given world history, political reality, and diplomatic practice:
# Make threats and carry out sanctions. This is relatively easy but India does not have much leverage over Pakistan. These may be necessary but will change nothing.
# India goes to the international community and asks for help. This should be the solution. The Indian Government presents evidence, the international community is appalled, and Pakistan is not only denounced but faces sanctions and pressures.
The problem here is that the international community is not exactly courageous. There are those who sympathise with the terrorists, those who apologise for the terrorists, and those who are afraid of the terrorists.
What is truly frightening is how much the world is afraid of the terrorists. An example: In 2006 the Israel-Hizbullah war ended with a UN ceasefire resolution. The UN, meaning more than 180 countries, pledged to patrol southern Lebanon and keep Hizbullah forces from returning there. It also promised to help stop arms smuggling from Iran and Syria to Hizbullah. In fact, after two years the UN armed soldiers in Lebanon have done nothing. Hizbullah has returned and rearmed. What happened? Hizbullah, and Syria, hinted that if the UN forces did their job they would be attacked. The entire world surrendered to Hizbullah.
But India does have some interesting options here:
# It can present evidence to the new US Administration and ask Pakistan be added to the State Department list of terrorism-supporting states, which automatically incurs certain sanctions.
# It can do the same with the EU and ask that the groups attacking India, now and in the past, be found to be terrorist organisations, which means their assets can be confiscated and their members refused entry or deported.
In each case, India could lobby with the US Congress and EU Parliament to press for action.
Obviously, India would prefer strong sanctions and diplomatic pressures. In Israel’s case, however, the United States has pushed Syria to close terrorism offices there for more than 20 years with no success. America keeps getting either sidetracked or fooled by the Syrians. Now, it is Syria’s pretended moderation that will perhaps make Washington forget about the fact that Damascus is daily sponsoring terrorism!
The shame is not India’s but the world’s that a democratic, law-abiding country can be attacked by a neighbour with terrorism and receive no strong material international support, as opposed to condolences. What signal does this send to radical regimes and to terrorist groups? That they can attack and get away with it! And so they will attack, again and again.
Should we be surprised, then, that there is so much international terrorism.
# The third option is military and yet that is difficult enough even without the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. And note that Pakistan is setting a precedent for what Iran can do when it has nuclear weapons: Anything it wants without paying a price in retaliation or real international pressure.
This is truly tragic. For if Pakistan can blatantly allow or encourage a terrorist attack on India, then ignore complaints and threats; if Syria and Iran can sponsor terrorism on Israel; if Russia can invade Georgia and face no international response, what kind of a world is the 21st century giving us?
-- The writer is director of GLORIA Center, Jerusalem, and the acclaimed author of The Truth About Syria and A Chronological History of Terrorism.
http://dailypioneer.com/142245/World-blind-to-nurseries-of-terror.html
The shame is not India’s but the world’s that a democratic, law-abiding country can be attacked by a neighbour with terrorism and receive no strong international support
India’s Government faces difficult choices and no one should interfere in that hard process. Still, it is worth describing the alternatives New Delhi must ponder and what it might ask the rest of the world to do.
First, of course, no one should criticise India or draw conclusions too quickly. The Indian Government will investigate and confer with friendly states. An official conclusion will be reached. Rumours and newspaper articles are not sufficient: The security and intelligence forces must examine the evidence; Government must speak.
What is most interesting is the conclusion that elements in Pakistan were involved. This does not necessarily mean that the Pakistani Government officially ordered the attack or knew about it. The Indian Government, however, has made the following points:
# Pakistan hosts terrorist groups that carried out the attack.
# Pakistani intelligence knew the attack was being planned.
# Some Pakistani agencies or officials helped the terrorists obtain weapons, training, equipment, and to travel freely in and out of the country.
So, what can India do? It has asked Pakistan to cooperate fully in the investigation, to respond to specific questions, to expel Indian nationals involved and to punish any Pakistanis involved. The Pakistani response has been lukewarm. In such circumstances, India has several normal options given world history, political reality, and diplomatic practice:
# Make threats and carry out sanctions. This is relatively easy but India does not have much leverage over Pakistan. These may be necessary but will change nothing.
# India goes to the international community and asks for help. This should be the solution. The Indian Government presents evidence, the international community is appalled, and Pakistan is not only denounced but faces sanctions and pressures.
The problem here is that the international community is not exactly courageous. There are those who sympathise with the terrorists, those who apologise for the terrorists, and those who are afraid of the terrorists.
What is truly frightening is how much the world is afraid of the terrorists. An example: In 2006 the Israel-Hizbullah war ended with a UN ceasefire resolution. The UN, meaning more than 180 countries, pledged to patrol southern Lebanon and keep Hizbullah forces from returning there. It also promised to help stop arms smuggling from Iran and Syria to Hizbullah. In fact, after two years the UN armed soldiers in Lebanon have done nothing. Hizbullah has returned and rearmed. What happened? Hizbullah, and Syria, hinted that if the UN forces did their job they would be attacked. The entire world surrendered to Hizbullah.
But India does have some interesting options here:
# It can present evidence to the new US Administration and ask Pakistan be added to the State Department list of terrorism-supporting states, which automatically incurs certain sanctions.
# It can do the same with the EU and ask that the groups attacking India, now and in the past, be found to be terrorist organisations, which means their assets can be confiscated and their members refused entry or deported.
In each case, India could lobby with the US Congress and EU Parliament to press for action.
Obviously, India would prefer strong sanctions and diplomatic pressures. In Israel’s case, however, the United States has pushed Syria to close terrorism offices there for more than 20 years with no success. America keeps getting either sidetracked or fooled by the Syrians. Now, it is Syria’s pretended moderation that will perhaps make Washington forget about the fact that Damascus is daily sponsoring terrorism!
The shame is not India’s but the world’s that a democratic, law-abiding country can be attacked by a neighbour with terrorism and receive no strong material international support, as opposed to condolences. What signal does this send to radical regimes and to terrorist groups? That they can attack and get away with it! And so they will attack, again and again.
Should we be surprised, then, that there is so much international terrorism.
# The third option is military and yet that is difficult enough even without the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. And note that Pakistan is setting a precedent for what Iran can do when it has nuclear weapons: Anything it wants without paying a price in retaliation or real international pressure.
This is truly tragic. For if Pakistan can blatantly allow or encourage a terrorist attack on India, then ignore complaints and threats; if Syria and Iran can sponsor terrorism on Israel; if Russia can invade Georgia and face no international response, what kind of a world is the 21st century giving us?
-- The writer is director of GLORIA Center, Jerusalem, and the acclaimed author of The Truth About Syria and A Chronological History of Terrorism.
http://dailypioneer.com/142245/World-blind-to-nurseries-of-terror.html
China And The Mumbai Bloodshed
By Bhaskar Roy
In unison with the leaders of the international community, the Chinese leaders – President, Premier and Foreign Minister condoled the awful hurt suffered by the people of Mumbai in a 60 hour ordeal starting November 26 night. The line was clear. Each of the leaders from President Hu Jintao down words reiterated that China condemned all forms of terrorism. Some indications are, however, now coming out of China that the Beijing leaders are also trying to play the Mumbai massacre to political, diplomatic and strategic advantage against India.
In the last several years China formed the doctrine opposing the “Three Evils”, that is, “terrorism, extremism, separatism”. Of course, the Chinese leaders have their problems in these areas. Muslim Uighur separatists in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XAR) have never accepted Chinese sovereignty. They have retaliated with militant attacks against Chinese forces.
The Tibetans are not demanding independence or a separate state. They are asking for greater autonomy under China’s constitution and Chinese sovereignty to protect their religion, culture, language and history. But Beijing is still apprehensive that the Dalai Lama’s autonomy proposal is actually “independence” cloaked in other words.
“Separatism” is a much wider concept for China. Apart from Xinjiang and Tibet, the concerns focus on Taiwan which is a de facto independent country. It still remains under China’s claims because of international politics, but functions independently in all matters from Beijing. Only, it has lost its membership of the United Nations. China’s fear is if Taiwan becomes an UN recognized independent country the break up of China’s territory will start.
China has, therefore, amalgamated the issue of terrorism in a much larger, domestic political issue. Certainly, domestic issues including domestic terrorism, is of primary importance to any country. At the same time playing dangerously with international terrorism simultaneously is far more dangerous. The international demon can also turn back on China.
It is time, therefore, that China’s contribution to contain international terrorism as a specific issue be examined.
Following the Mumbai bloodshed in which not only Indians but many foreigners died and were injured, it appears the powerful Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reviewed the incident and procured sanction from the party’s Political Bureau to unleash an anti-India campaign.
For example, the Beijing-controlled Hong Kong daily Wen Wai Po (December 02) wrote the following: “The Indian government’s eagerness to declare the Mumbai terror attacks were carried out by foreign forces was an attempt to cover up internal contradictions”.
The China Radio International (CRI), an official radio station under the Ministry of Radio and Television and also the Party Propaganda Department, blamed the attack on India’s failure to resolve social problems left over by the British. The CRI’s charter resembles USA’s cold war propaganda apparatus like the Radio Free Europe, and the ongoing Voice of Tibet. The CCP mouth piece, the People’s Daily, the most authentic newspaper which projects the position of the CCP and the Chinese government, highlighted (December 02) that the attack was a “major blow to India’s big power ambition”.
Statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and other editorial articles in the People’s Daily, also conveyed serious concerns about the possibility of an India-Pakistan military conflict. There were strong suggestions that the US restrain India, and jointly focus with Pakistan in their counter-terrorism efforts in Pakistan’s northern areas bordering Afghanistan.
The Chinese thrust has been multi-pronged and at different levels. The most important was the allusion that unable to put its own house in order, giving a raw deal to its Muslims, India was falsely trying to implicate Pakistan for a major internal terrorist implosion. This is a very devious strategy, suggesting India has willingly kept its Muslim citizens disenfranchised both socially and economically. The message absolves Pakistan-based terrorist organizations like the LET, its mother body the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), and even the Al Qaeda ensconced in Pakistan’s FATA area. It is also an effort to placate these organizations that China has nothing against them. A look at the media organs used for this propaganda by the Chinese government, also tells both the Chinese people and smaller countries that India has become a fractious and weak country.
A thread of very high concern for India that runs through the Chinese media manipulations is that Muslims in India remain sanctioned by the Indian government. The aim is that this view be surreptitiously carried through Muslim countries by discussions and gossip. Gossip of this kind, as is known, is highly infections in developing countries. Most people in Arab streets still think that “9/11” was an internal conspiracy by the CIA!
The Chinese leadership does not want an open war between Pakistan and India. That would challenge their position on a number of issues including on terrorism and their strategy in South Asia. If China does not deploy in favour of Pakistan and against India, their South Asian dominos may lose faith in the Chinese power vis-Ã -vis India. A war of attrition against India from Pakistan through terrorism suits China’s policy admirably.
An India-Pakistan conflict would draw the US more into the Indian subcontinent, a development contrary to China’s security perspective, and an impediment to Pakistan-based terrorist penetration in India. What suits China is that the USA and its partners fight the terrorist strongholds in Pakistan which have links with the Uighur separatist militants. Two objectives are taken care of without involvement.
China’s cooperation with international terrorism has still been in doubt. Their focus remains on countering the Muslim Uighurs. To do this, they have interlocuted with the Pakistani authorities over more than a decade to stop training of Uighur militants in camps run in Pakistan, not close down these camps. Earlier this year, in the run up to the Beijing Olympics, high level Chinese officials disclosed that Uighur terrorists were being trained in camps in Pakistan. The Chinese dialogue with Pakistan had started at least as early as 1992 between Chinese Premier Li Peng and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Yet, when the USA launched attacks against the Al Qaeda and Taliban in October 2001 in Afghanistan following “9/11”, the Chinese leaders from the highest level openly expressed doubts over US evidence of terrorism against these two organizations. At that time, Chinese government entities were involved with the Taliban through the good offices of Pakistan in strategic projects in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Highly significant is the fact that when the discussions came up in the UN Security Council in 2006 to designate the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the mother organization of the LET, as a terrorist organization China opposed it. It supported Pakistan’s plea that the Jammat-ud-Dawa was an Islamic social organization and worked in rescue and rehabilitation efforts after the 2005 earthquake. It would be childish to accept the Chinese explanation that the JUD was a social non-government organization (NGO). But the Chinese can create a farce and expect the world to believe it. It is no secret the world over that Prof. Hafeez Mohammad Saeed is the head of both the LET and the JUD, and is patronized by Pakistan’s ISI to counter India.
China has obviously put terrorism into two compartments. One is internal, in which the totality of Chinese territorial perspective is involved. The other is international, which is, if terrorism can debilitate its perceived adversaries then it should be quietly abetted.
Taking into account the Chinese propaganda manipulations adopted on the Mumbai terrorist mayhem, and its track record as briefly recounted, it would not be unwise to conclude that the Chinese leadership has some interest, whether by omission or commission, in the terrorist attacks in India.
(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
In unison with the leaders of the international community, the Chinese leaders – President, Premier and Foreign Minister condoled the awful hurt suffered by the people of Mumbai in a 60 hour ordeal starting November 26 night. The line was clear. Each of the leaders from President Hu Jintao down words reiterated that China condemned all forms of terrorism. Some indications are, however, now coming out of China that the Beijing leaders are also trying to play the Mumbai massacre to political, diplomatic and strategic advantage against India.
In the last several years China formed the doctrine opposing the “Three Evils”, that is, “terrorism, extremism, separatism”. Of course, the Chinese leaders have their problems in these areas. Muslim Uighur separatists in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XAR) have never accepted Chinese sovereignty. They have retaliated with militant attacks against Chinese forces.
The Tibetans are not demanding independence or a separate state. They are asking for greater autonomy under China’s constitution and Chinese sovereignty to protect their religion, culture, language and history. But Beijing is still apprehensive that the Dalai Lama’s autonomy proposal is actually “independence” cloaked in other words.
“Separatism” is a much wider concept for China. Apart from Xinjiang and Tibet, the concerns focus on Taiwan which is a de facto independent country. It still remains under China’s claims because of international politics, but functions independently in all matters from Beijing. Only, it has lost its membership of the United Nations. China’s fear is if Taiwan becomes an UN recognized independent country the break up of China’s territory will start.
China has, therefore, amalgamated the issue of terrorism in a much larger, domestic political issue. Certainly, domestic issues including domestic terrorism, is of primary importance to any country. At the same time playing dangerously with international terrorism simultaneously is far more dangerous. The international demon can also turn back on China.
It is time, therefore, that China’s contribution to contain international terrorism as a specific issue be examined.
Following the Mumbai bloodshed in which not only Indians but many foreigners died and were injured, it appears the powerful Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reviewed the incident and procured sanction from the party’s Political Bureau to unleash an anti-India campaign.
For example, the Beijing-controlled Hong Kong daily Wen Wai Po (December 02) wrote the following: “The Indian government’s eagerness to declare the Mumbai terror attacks were carried out by foreign forces was an attempt to cover up internal contradictions”.
The China Radio International (CRI), an official radio station under the Ministry of Radio and Television and also the Party Propaganda Department, blamed the attack on India’s failure to resolve social problems left over by the British. The CRI’s charter resembles USA’s cold war propaganda apparatus like the Radio Free Europe, and the ongoing Voice of Tibet. The CCP mouth piece, the People’s Daily, the most authentic newspaper which projects the position of the CCP and the Chinese government, highlighted (December 02) that the attack was a “major blow to India’s big power ambition”.
Statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and other editorial articles in the People’s Daily, also conveyed serious concerns about the possibility of an India-Pakistan military conflict. There were strong suggestions that the US restrain India, and jointly focus with Pakistan in their counter-terrorism efforts in Pakistan’s northern areas bordering Afghanistan.
The Chinese thrust has been multi-pronged and at different levels. The most important was the allusion that unable to put its own house in order, giving a raw deal to its Muslims, India was falsely trying to implicate Pakistan for a major internal terrorist implosion. This is a very devious strategy, suggesting India has willingly kept its Muslim citizens disenfranchised both socially and economically. The message absolves Pakistan-based terrorist organizations like the LET, its mother body the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), and even the Al Qaeda ensconced in Pakistan’s FATA area. It is also an effort to placate these organizations that China has nothing against them. A look at the media organs used for this propaganda by the Chinese government, also tells both the Chinese people and smaller countries that India has become a fractious and weak country.
A thread of very high concern for India that runs through the Chinese media manipulations is that Muslims in India remain sanctioned by the Indian government. The aim is that this view be surreptitiously carried through Muslim countries by discussions and gossip. Gossip of this kind, as is known, is highly infections in developing countries. Most people in Arab streets still think that “9/11” was an internal conspiracy by the CIA!
The Chinese leadership does not want an open war between Pakistan and India. That would challenge their position on a number of issues including on terrorism and their strategy in South Asia. If China does not deploy in favour of Pakistan and against India, their South Asian dominos may lose faith in the Chinese power vis-Ã -vis India. A war of attrition against India from Pakistan through terrorism suits China’s policy admirably.
An India-Pakistan conflict would draw the US more into the Indian subcontinent, a development contrary to China’s security perspective, and an impediment to Pakistan-based terrorist penetration in India. What suits China is that the USA and its partners fight the terrorist strongholds in Pakistan which have links with the Uighur separatist militants. Two objectives are taken care of without involvement.
China’s cooperation with international terrorism has still been in doubt. Their focus remains on countering the Muslim Uighurs. To do this, they have interlocuted with the Pakistani authorities over more than a decade to stop training of Uighur militants in camps run in Pakistan, not close down these camps. Earlier this year, in the run up to the Beijing Olympics, high level Chinese officials disclosed that Uighur terrorists were being trained in camps in Pakistan. The Chinese dialogue with Pakistan had started at least as early as 1992 between Chinese Premier Li Peng and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Yet, when the USA launched attacks against the Al Qaeda and Taliban in October 2001 in Afghanistan following “9/11”, the Chinese leaders from the highest level openly expressed doubts over US evidence of terrorism against these two organizations. At that time, Chinese government entities were involved with the Taliban through the good offices of Pakistan in strategic projects in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Highly significant is the fact that when the discussions came up in the UN Security Council in 2006 to designate the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the mother organization of the LET, as a terrorist organization China opposed it. It supported Pakistan’s plea that the Jammat-ud-Dawa was an Islamic social organization and worked in rescue and rehabilitation efforts after the 2005 earthquake. It would be childish to accept the Chinese explanation that the JUD was a social non-government organization (NGO). But the Chinese can create a farce and expect the world to believe it. It is no secret the world over that Prof. Hafeez Mohammad Saeed is the head of both the LET and the JUD, and is patronized by Pakistan’s ISI to counter India.
China has obviously put terrorism into two compartments. One is internal, in which the totality of Chinese territorial perspective is involved. The other is international, which is, if terrorism can debilitate its perceived adversaries then it should be quietly abetted.
Taking into account the Chinese propaganda manipulations adopted on the Mumbai terrorist mayhem, and its track record as briefly recounted, it would not be unwise to conclude that the Chinese leadership has some interest, whether by omission or commission, in the terrorist attacks in India.
(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
Beyond Borders: The Global Innovation 1000
STRATEGY+BUSINESS
by Barry Jaruzelski and Kevin Dehoff
This year’s annual Booz & Company study of corporate R&D spending reveals, for the first time, where in the world the money is being spent — and why.
As business becomes increasingly global, corporate innovation strategies are becoming more global as well: Multinational companies are spending a significant — and growing — share of their research and development money outside the countries in which they are headquartered. Booz & Company’s annual Global Innovation 1000 study found that in 2007, the top 80 U.S. corporate R&D spenders deployed an estimated US$80.1 billion of their $146 billion R&D funds overseas. The top 50 European companies spent $51.4 billion of their $117 billion total outside the continent. In Japan, the top 43 Japanese firms exported $40.4 billion of their total $71.6 billion to other countries.
READ MORE
by Barry Jaruzelski and Kevin Dehoff
This year’s annual Booz & Company study of corporate R&D spending reveals, for the first time, where in the world the money is being spent — and why.
As business becomes increasingly global, corporate innovation strategies are becoming more global as well: Multinational companies are spending a significant — and growing — share of their research and development money outside the countries in which they are headquartered. Booz & Company’s annual Global Innovation 1000 study found that in 2007, the top 80 U.S. corporate R&D spenders deployed an estimated US$80.1 billion of their $146 billion R&D funds overseas. The top 50 European companies spent $51.4 billion of their $117 billion total outside the continent. In Japan, the top 43 Japanese firms exported $40.4 billion of their total $71.6 billion to other countries.
READ MORE
Pakistan’s mixed feelings on terror groups perilous
http://www.ajc.com/opinion/content/opinion/stories/2008/12/10/kellyed_1210.html
By JOHN H. KELLY
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
With Mumbai attacks in mind, a nephew wrote to ask, “Why can’t Pakistan wipe out the Taliban and al-Qaida and other terror groups?” He thought that if it was Russia or India the army would be able to shut down terrorists operating inside the country.
I answered that Pakistan — and more so Afghanistan — has some of the toughest geography in the world. The Taliban and al-Qaida and other terror gangs operate in this tough geography in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province, both nominally part of Pakistan.
But these areas have never been ruled or conquered, at least since Alexander the Great tried to in the third century B.C. The peoples are tribal and the tribes fight regularly. In the border area people are mostly Pushtuns, fundamentalist Muslims, most of whom are living in something like Europe in the Middle Ages, except with more modern weapons.
When I first visited that area in 1989 I was stunned. I thought I had seen tough conditions during the war in Lebanon. I was in Pakistan as part of my job to negotiate a Soviet Army withdrawal from Afghanistan and to persuade the Afghan groups to form a successor government.
Peshawar, the biggest Pakistani city in the northwest, was awash in weapons and narcotics, openly sold in shop fronts with opium by the kilo stacked in windows and machine guns and every weapon imaginable readily available. I went up to the Khyber Pass to the Afghan border, with a platoon of the Khyber rifles to protect me on the 60- mile drive on hairpin curves. Every house or village was a fort with high mud or stone walls, lookout towers, firing slits.
And who was running Pakistan then? Benazir Bhutto, a graduate of Harvard and Oxford. The Pakistan army and intelligence service leaders, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst graduates with clipped mustaches and well-pressed uniforms, blinked at all this and made quiet cause with the Islamic militants against the Soviets in Afghanistan, as did we under Presidents Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The Soviets were finally beaten and the Taliban won the struggle in Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis found the Islamic militants useful in their covert war against India in Kashmir, as the Indians found Hindu militants useful in their covert war against Pakistan. The Pakistanis have been of two minds about the Islamic militants and terrorists. Prime Minister Bhutto in 1990 made a fiery speech calling on Islamic fighters to seize Kashmir from India. When I next met with her over tea in her modest Islamabad office, I chided her about her appeal to militant Islam, which she regularly deplored in private conversations. She said that her speech was “just words” to a specific audience, not intended for the West. I responded that words had implications that cannot be avoided.
But why can’t these militants be stopped, now that we all realize how terrible they are?
Russia, with vast military superiority and brutality, has been unsuccessful in controlling the Chechens. India has been unable to put down the Kashmir, Naxalite or Northeastern [Assam] insurgencies for 40 years. Spain has been fighting the Basque ETA for a lifetime. The Thai have been unable to handle their Muslim insurgency since the 1960s. It is very hard to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns or win guerilla wars — see Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon or the Mau Mau in Kenya. Israel cannot contain Palestinian terrorists, despite overwhelming superiority. The British took 40 years to reduce violence in Northern Ireland and it was a negotiation that did that.
Pakistan was born out of the partition from India in 1947, which probably killed a million people on both sides and created 14 million refugees. It sowed the seeds for last week’s terror in Mumbai.
Pakistan is a continuing tragedy of poverty and violence among the Punjabis (Lahore) and Sindis (Karachi) and Baluchis and Pushtuns and Muhajirs (exiles from India), none of whom trust each other. It is a feudal society.
Bhutto’s father was prime minister: overthrown, imprisoned and executed. She followed an almost similar pattern. Now her husband is prime minister and will probably meet the same end. Bhutto’s mother believed that Benazir killed her two brothers to prevent them from ruling. This sounds like the Borgias or the Romans, and this is our ally.
• John Kelly, a former assistant secretary of state, is ambassador-in-residence at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech.
By JOHN H. KELLY
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
With Mumbai attacks in mind, a nephew wrote to ask, “Why can’t Pakistan wipe out the Taliban and al-Qaida and other terror groups?” He thought that if it was Russia or India the army would be able to shut down terrorists operating inside the country.
I answered that Pakistan — and more so Afghanistan — has some of the toughest geography in the world. The Taliban and al-Qaida and other terror gangs operate in this tough geography in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province, both nominally part of Pakistan.
But these areas have never been ruled or conquered, at least since Alexander the Great tried to in the third century B.C. The peoples are tribal and the tribes fight regularly. In the border area people are mostly Pushtuns, fundamentalist Muslims, most of whom are living in something like Europe in the Middle Ages, except with more modern weapons.
When I first visited that area in 1989 I was stunned. I thought I had seen tough conditions during the war in Lebanon. I was in Pakistan as part of my job to negotiate a Soviet Army withdrawal from Afghanistan and to persuade the Afghan groups to form a successor government.
Peshawar, the biggest Pakistani city in the northwest, was awash in weapons and narcotics, openly sold in shop fronts with opium by the kilo stacked in windows and machine guns and every weapon imaginable readily available. I went up to the Khyber Pass to the Afghan border, with a platoon of the Khyber rifles to protect me on the 60- mile drive on hairpin curves. Every house or village was a fort with high mud or stone walls, lookout towers, firing slits.
And who was running Pakistan then? Benazir Bhutto, a graduate of Harvard and Oxford. The Pakistan army and intelligence service leaders, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst graduates with clipped mustaches and well-pressed uniforms, blinked at all this and made quiet cause with the Islamic militants against the Soviets in Afghanistan, as did we under Presidents Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The Soviets were finally beaten and the Taliban won the struggle in Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis found the Islamic militants useful in their covert war against India in Kashmir, as the Indians found Hindu militants useful in their covert war against Pakistan. The Pakistanis have been of two minds about the Islamic militants and terrorists. Prime Minister Bhutto in 1990 made a fiery speech calling on Islamic fighters to seize Kashmir from India. When I next met with her over tea in her modest Islamabad office, I chided her about her appeal to militant Islam, which she regularly deplored in private conversations. She said that her speech was “just words” to a specific audience, not intended for the West. I responded that words had implications that cannot be avoided.
But why can’t these militants be stopped, now that we all realize how terrible they are?
Russia, with vast military superiority and brutality, has been unsuccessful in controlling the Chechens. India has been unable to put down the Kashmir, Naxalite or Northeastern [Assam] insurgencies for 40 years. Spain has been fighting the Basque ETA for a lifetime. The Thai have been unable to handle their Muslim insurgency since the 1960s. It is very hard to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns or win guerilla wars — see Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon or the Mau Mau in Kenya. Israel cannot contain Palestinian terrorists, despite overwhelming superiority. The British took 40 years to reduce violence in Northern Ireland and it was a negotiation that did that.
Pakistan was born out of the partition from India in 1947, which probably killed a million people on both sides and created 14 million refugees. It sowed the seeds for last week’s terror in Mumbai.
Pakistan is a continuing tragedy of poverty and violence among the Punjabis (Lahore) and Sindis (Karachi) and Baluchis and Pushtuns and Muhajirs (exiles from India), none of whom trust each other. It is a feudal society.
Bhutto’s father was prime minister: overthrown, imprisoned and executed. She followed an almost similar pattern. Now her husband is prime minister and will probably meet the same end. Bhutto’s mother believed that Benazir killed her two brothers to prevent them from ruling. This sounds like the Borgias or the Romans, and this is our ally.
• John Kelly, a former assistant secretary of state, is ambassador-in-residence at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech.
Delhi Results - Offstumped Analysis
Taking a closer look at the Delhi results in the 42 seats the Congress won, Offstumped has compared the vote shares with those projected by this earlier survey shared by Offstumped based on the turnout from MCD Polls as well as analysis of new voter registration data.
From this it is clear that 3 trends helped the Congress:
- Higher turnout benefited it while BJP remained stagnant in a lot of seats.
- The above effect was most pronounced in seats which had a significant Muslim voter base as well as saw a very high registration of first time Muslim voters
- While the BSP factor hurt the BJP, the bigger message is the number of seats where the BJP and Congress reversed vote shares implying the choice of candidates did not help the BJP.
So the real lesson for the BJP is that the demographics in the National Capital Territory have changed significantly. It can no longer rely on its traditional base to win especially if an election spurs a higher turnout of uncommitted and first time voters. It must expand its appeal demographically to the cosmpolitan nature of this region from Muslim migrants from Bihar and UP to the yuppies from the South.
Detailed seat by seat analysis
Nerela - Tossup with <1%, BSP factor
Timarpur - Tossup with 2% margin, huge swing in favor of Cong from MCD elections
Adarsh nagar - decisive, could be Muslim vote consolidation
Badli - Muslim vote consolidation against BJP and BSP factor contribute to Congress gain
Bawana - decisive, Muslim vote consolidation against BJP
Sultanpur - Decisive, interesting trend that high turnout benefited cong while bjp vote share remained stagnant
Nangloi Jat - decisive, interesting trend that high turnout benefited cong while bjp vote share remained stagnant
Mangal Puri - decisive, turnout benefited cong, bjp stagnant
Trinagar - tossup <2% high turnout benefitted both
Wazirpur - decisive, high turnout had a massive boost to Cong when compared to BJP which marginally lost its vote share
Model Town - same story high turnout boosted congress vote share while BJP more or less maintained its share
Sadar Bazaar - high turnout boosts both but Cong greater beneficiary, high Muslim first time voter seat
Chandni Chowk - interesting that Cong vote share stagnant, BJP vote share dented by BSP, high Muslim first time voter seat
Balli Maran - interesting that Cong vote share marginally higher but BJP vote share dented by BSP, it is also high Muslim first time voter seat
Patel Nagar - high turnout boosts Cong, bjp and bsp vote share nearly stagnant
Madi Pur - all 3 gain from high voter turnout, Cong maintains traditional advantage
Rajouri Garden - cliffhanger <1% margin, punjabi battleground
Vikaspuri - another cliffhanger <1% margin
Uttam Nagar - high voter turnout boosts Cong, BJP vote share stagnant
Dwarka - high voter turnout boosts cong while all both gain vote share
Matiala - Clear loss to Congress vote shares reversed
New Delhi - Sheila Dixit had to win
Jangpura - massive win, again high turnout marginally benefits BJP, huge boost for the Congress evidently as it is also a high first time Muslim voter seat
Kasturba Nagar - high turnout benefits all 3, BSP gives Cong the edge
Malviya Nagar - clear loss to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed, also a high Muslim first time voter seat
RK Puram - high voter turnout massive boost to Cong, marginal boost to BJP,
Mehrauli - cliffhanger <2%, independent played spoil sport
Chattarpur - cong bjp vote share reversed, BSP major gainer
Deoli - decisive gain for Cong and BSP, note its a high first time Muslim voter seat
Ambedkar Nagar - Cong benefits from higher voter turnout bjp, bsp stagnant
Kalkaji - vote shares reversed, BJP loss to Cong
Okhla - this is one seat that sums up the impact of First Time Muslim Voters. It was battleground between Cong, RJD, BSP for that vote, BJP was a 4th
Kondli - high turnout boosts Cong, bjp, bsp stagnant
Lakshminagar - high turnout massive boost to the Cong BJP marginally loses vote share
Vishwas Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed
Gandhi Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed, also a high muslim first time voter seat
Shahdara - cliffhanger <1% margin
Seemapuri - massive boost to Cong from turnout, also a high first time Muslim voter seat
Rohtas Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares more than reversed
Seelampur - Massive boost to the Cong and BSP from turnout, also high first time muslim voter seat
Mustafabad - cliffhanger <1%
From this it is clear that 3 trends helped the Congress:
- Higher turnout benefited it while BJP remained stagnant in a lot of seats.
- The above effect was most pronounced in seats which had a significant Muslim voter base as well as saw a very high registration of first time Muslim voters
- While the BSP factor hurt the BJP, the bigger message is the number of seats where the BJP and Congress reversed vote shares implying the choice of candidates did not help the BJP.
So the real lesson for the BJP is that the demographics in the National Capital Territory have changed significantly. It can no longer rely on its traditional base to win especially if an election spurs a higher turnout of uncommitted and first time voters. It must expand its appeal demographically to the cosmpolitan nature of this region from Muslim migrants from Bihar and UP to the yuppies from the South.
Detailed seat by seat analysis
Nerela - Tossup with <1%, BSP factor
Timarpur - Tossup with 2% margin, huge swing in favor of Cong from MCD elections
Adarsh nagar - decisive, could be Muslim vote consolidation
Badli - Muslim vote consolidation against BJP and BSP factor contribute to Congress gain
Bawana - decisive, Muslim vote consolidation against BJP
Sultanpur - Decisive, interesting trend that high turnout benefited cong while bjp vote share remained stagnant
Nangloi Jat - decisive, interesting trend that high turnout benefited cong while bjp vote share remained stagnant
Mangal Puri - decisive, turnout benefited cong, bjp stagnant
Trinagar - tossup <2% high turnout benefitted both
Wazirpur - decisive, high turnout had a massive boost to Cong when compared to BJP which marginally lost its vote share
Model Town - same story high turnout boosted congress vote share while BJP more or less maintained its share
Sadar Bazaar - high turnout boosts both but Cong greater beneficiary, high Muslim first time voter seat
Chandni Chowk - interesting that Cong vote share stagnant, BJP vote share dented by BSP, high Muslim first time voter seat
Balli Maran - interesting that Cong vote share marginally higher but BJP vote share dented by BSP, it is also high Muslim first time voter seat
Patel Nagar - high turnout boosts Cong, bjp and bsp vote share nearly stagnant
Madi Pur - all 3 gain from high voter turnout, Cong maintains traditional advantage
Rajouri Garden - cliffhanger <1% margin, punjabi battleground
Vikaspuri - another cliffhanger <1% margin
Uttam Nagar - high voter turnout boosts Cong, BJP vote share stagnant
Dwarka - high voter turnout boosts cong while all both gain vote share
Matiala - Clear loss to Congress vote shares reversed
New Delhi - Sheila Dixit had to win
Jangpura - massive win, again high turnout marginally benefits BJP, huge boost for the Congress evidently as it is also a high first time Muslim voter seat
Kasturba Nagar - high turnout benefits all 3, BSP gives Cong the edge
Malviya Nagar - clear loss to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed, also a high Muslim first time voter seat
RK Puram - high voter turnout massive boost to Cong, marginal boost to BJP,
Mehrauli - cliffhanger <2%, independent played spoil sport
Chattarpur - cong bjp vote share reversed, BSP major gainer
Deoli - decisive gain for Cong and BSP, note its a high first time Muslim voter seat
Ambedkar Nagar - Cong benefits from higher voter turnout bjp, bsp stagnant
Kalkaji - vote shares reversed, BJP loss to Cong
Okhla - this is one seat that sums up the impact of First Time Muslim Voters. It was battleground between Cong, RJD, BSP for that vote, BJP was a 4th
Kondli - high turnout boosts Cong, bjp, bsp stagnant
Lakshminagar - high turnout massive boost to the Cong BJP marginally loses vote share
Vishwas Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed
Gandhi Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares nearly reversed, also a high muslim first time voter seat
Shahdara - cliffhanger <1% margin
Seemapuri - massive boost to Cong from turnout, also a high first time Muslim voter seat
Rohtas Nagar - clear loss from BJP to Cong, vote shares more than reversed
Seelampur - Massive boost to the Cong and BSP from turnout, also high first time muslim voter seat
Mustafabad - cliffhanger <1%
December 08, 2008
The Thought Leader Interview: Allan Meltzer
by Rob Norton
The world is not facing another Great Depression, says the noted economic historian, but the Federal Reserve is eroding its credibility.
STRATEGY+BUSINESS
When the United States Federal Reserve System becomes a fixture on page A1 of the Wall Street Journal, it means that either the U.S. economy is in trouble or the global financial system is under stress. As everyone reading this magazine knows, for the year and a half since the summer of 2007, it has meant both.
It is no wonder that fears about the future of the economy, the financial system, and the Fed’s ability to perform its tasks have been widespread, and recent assessments from market commentators range from the gloomy to the very dark. Some have warned that the global economy is at the brink of the next Great Depression, with the U.S. leading the way; that only massive reregulation can save the banking industry; and that the Fed is no longer in control.
Much of this commentary, however, lacks perspective, and perhaps no one has a more complete perspective on the interrelationships between the economy, the financial system, and the Fed than Allan Meltzer, who holds an eponymous endowed chair as the Allan H. Meltzer University Professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business. Meltzer, born in 1928, has been studying monetary economics since the late 1950s, and is completing his definitive History of the Federal Reserve. (The first volume, covering the years 1913 to 1951, was published by the University of Chicago Press in 2003 and ran 800 pages; the second installment, which will bring the history forward to 1986, is due to be published in two volumes running 1,400 pages in October 2009.)
In both of its major roles, the Fed has been (and is being) tested by the economic crisis of late 2008. The first test has to do with its role as the manager of U.S. monetary policy, setting short-term interest rates for interbank borrowing in the United States. The Fed is charged with striking the right balance between economic growth and inflation, and, given the size of the U.S. economy and the importance of the dollar in world trade, its decisions ripple out and affect financial institutions throughout the world. The second test has been connected to its role as lender of last resort, when the imminent failure of a financial institution creates a potentially systemic risk in the markets. Even before the U.S. Congress began debating its Wall Street bailout plan in September, the Fed had made unusually aggressive forays into the credit markets to forestall the collapse of the mortgage finance industry, extending emergency loans through its “discount window” to investment banking companies, including Bear Stearns, which was shut down and sold to J.P. Morgan Chase & Company in March 2008, and to AIG, the troubled insurance company. No matter what the aftermath is on Wall Street, the U.S. economy is likely to face both recession and rising inflation, the latter for the first time in a generation. To someone currently seeking stability and reassurance, none of this is good news.
However, Allan Meltzer is impatient with comparisons of the current situation to the Great Depression. The economy circa 2008, in his view, is in a slowdown that appears to be modest, and from which it should recover in routine fashion. And although the financial system is under great stress, Meltzer does not think that anything we have seen so far suggests great danger. The Federal Reserve, he believes, has made only two major errors in its 94-year history. One was permitting the monetary deflation that worsened the Great Depression; the other was unleashing what economists call the Great Inflation, which saw the U.S. inflation rate rise from about 1 percent in early 1965 to nearly 14 percent in 1980. But in addition to these mortal sins of policymaking, the Fed, in Meltzer’s view, has been guilty of many more venial ones.
He says the Fed has recently made several mistakes that fall into the latter category, including the way in which it conducted some of the recent bailouts and the way that it is allowing inflation to take root again. Both are evidence of a more endemic problem: The Federal Reserve, in Meltzer’s opinion, is allowing itself to be driven by events and pushed around by Congress, squandering the hard-won reputation for institutional independence that it gained in the 1980s and 1990s. It is thus devaluing the only truly worthwhile currency that a central bank has: its credibility as a bulwark against inflation. The Fed’s emergence as the über-regulator of the U.S. financial system — with regulatory powers extending to Wall Street firms — is ill advised, according to Meltzer, because this will further politicize the Fed and divert its attention from its most critical role.
Meltzer sees some new regulation as inevitable, but he favors simple fixes. Imposing strict capital adequacy requirements on all financial institutions and establishing clear penalties for those that get into trouble would go a long way, he believes, toward limiting the damage from future financial-sector problems. The other reform he favors, however, can come only from the financial industry itself. That reform is an overall rethinking of the incentive and compensation structures that set the stage for the recent disasters.
Meltzer’s own intellectual progression follows the aphorism (attributed to the early-20th-century French Prime Minister Aristide Briand) that a man who is not a socialist at 20 has no heart, and a man who is still a socialist at 40 has no head. In the 1948 presidential election, Meltzer was a 20- year-old campaign volunteer for the Progressive Party, whose platform included full voting rights for African-Americans and universal health insurance (the party’s candidate, Henry Wallace, received 2.4 percent of the popular vote). Meltzer had graduated from Duke University that year with a bachelor’s degree in economics. He shed his left-wing leanings during his graduate studies with economists such as Armen Alchian and Karl Brunner, earning his master’s degree in 1955 and his doctorate in 1958 at the University of California at Los Angeles. Brunner, a Swiss émigré with an interest in monetary economics, became his mentor, and later his colleague and coauthor. Together they wrote dozens of articles and several books.
Meltzer and Brunner were influential figures in the economic school of monetarism, a disruptive innovation in the history of economic thought. Monetarism emphasized the importance of controlling the growth of the money supply to restrain inflation and promote stable growth, and is associated with the late Nobel laureate Milton Friedman. This idea was considered heretical by many economists in the 1960s and 1970s, and one of its central suggestions — that the discretionary policies of central banks be replaced by a simple rule for monetary growth — never gained traction, although former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker described his own approach to ending inflation in the early 1980s as “practical monetarism.” Eventually monetarism withered as a distinct school of economic thought, but its central ideas about the importance of controlling the growth of the money supply have been absorbed into both the mainstream of economic thought and the practices of the Fed and other central banks.
In late July 2008, Meltzer spoke with strategy+business in his Pittsburgh office as he was preparing to attend the meeting of Federal Reserve officials and monetary economists held every August in Jackson Hole, Wyo. We spoke with him again in late September following the subsequent market collapse of Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, and others. He updated a few of his answers, but his overall opinions were unchanged.
S+B: The financial system is in a very disturbed state, and the economy has not been doing well. How bad do you consider the situation, and how does it compare to earlier episodes?
MELTZER: The biggest banking problem in modern history, of course, was during the Great Depression, when we had waves of bank failures. So far, we have had a few failures, including some very large ones, but we haven’t seen anything that could be called a wave of bank failures. The defaults we’re seeing in the mortgage finance market are the biggest problem today, and the write-offs that we’re seeing today are very large in dollar terms, but the financial system is much larger than it was in the 1930s. Today, the defaults on mortgages are 6 percent and rising; during the Great Depression, they were 50 percent.
One somewhat similar crisis was in 1920 and 1921, when there was a wave of failures of agricultural banks. At the time, farmers represented a bigger part of the economy than they do now, and it was a serious problem. Farmers had bought land during World War I, and mortgaged it at high interest rates. Then came a big deflation of about 20 percent. As a result, Congress created the Federal Land Banks, which bought up the troubled loans and extended credit. Another somewhat similar case was the failures in the savings and loan industry in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which dragged down a lot of the banking system. That wound up costing taxpayers an estimated $150 billion. The current mortgage and credit crisis will probably cost taxpayers a lot more.
S+B: But you don’t see this as a major threat to the economy?
MELTZER: I’ve always been skeptical that the housing crisis was going to cause a deep recession in the United States. The reason is that it’s localized, for the most part, in six communities: Southern California, Southern Nevada, Arizona, Southern Florida, and, for very different reasons, Cleveland and Detroit. This is a big economy, and six local problems can cause a wider problem. A downturn? Yes. A slowing in housing construction? Absolutely. But a major depression for the United States? Not at all. It’s not likely.
S+B: Do you see further weakness in the credit markets beyond the mortgage market?
MELTZER: We will probably see difficulties in consumer credit and consumer loans somewhere along the line, but I don’t think it will be a result of the housing situation. The current problems that consumers face are high energy and food prices, and the spreading of energy price increases to everything the consumer buys that moves by truck or airplane. Those prices are going up. Plus, consumers are going to suffer in the wintertime with rising heating and electricity prices. I think that is going to keep consumption growth slow.
There’s no question that we’re coming out of a period of very lax credit standards, and they are being tightened. The bankers are probably overreacting, as they often do, going from one extreme to the other. This is hurting people with student loans, housing loans, and consumer loans — although credit, for the most part, is still expanding. Good prospects can get financed. Risky things are more difficult.
The biggest problem in the credit markets can’t be solved, and won’t be solved, until there is a pretty good idea as to where housing prices are going to settle. You can’t value mortgages until you know what houses are worth. And no one really knows yet. Recently, bankers have marked down their portfolios of mortgage securities aggressively. I think that’s a step toward a solution, so I don’t regard that as terrible. The sooner those prices fall, the quicker this thing is going to be over.
Once people in the financial markets have an idea of where prices will settle — prices don’t have to necessarily get there, but people have to have an idea of where they’re going to go — the markets will be able to price the mortgages. So today a banker will lend to other bankers for one day or maybe one week, but he won’t lend for one month because there’s just too much uncertainty about the value of the assets on a bank’s portfolio. And until that problem is resolved, this so-called crisis is going to continue.
Lenders of Last Resort
S+B: When you say “so-called crisis,” do you doubt that it’s a crisis at this point, or again, is that just a question of terminology?
MELTZER: It’s a crisis for the housing sector, but that sector is used to crises — it’s a very up-and-down business. And it is a crisis for banks and the big Wall Street firms, particularly those banks that are heavily invested in mortgage securities, which turns out to be a large number of them.
S+B: One of the aspects of this crisis that seems distinctive is the way it has shaken the investment banking business and the insurance business, rather than just commercial banks or mortgage finance companies, beginning with the bailout of Bear Stearns. There has been much discussion about whether the Fed’s role in that failure — as well as in some other recent instances — was appropriate, especially in acting as “lender of last resort” for an investment bank, with a 28-day emergency loan of and an agreement to guarantee $30 billion in assets. [The deal included Bear Stearns’s ultimate sale to J.P. Morgan Chase at $10 per share.] How big a change does that episode represent?
MELTZER: Historically, there have been few failures of Wall Street firms, partly because they mark their portfolios to market every night. They have to borrow enough to balance their assets. If they cannot borrow enough, the problems come to light pretty quickly. But most investment banks have not gotten into trouble in the past, and not all of them got into trouble this time. Some have taken losses — some of them very large losses — but that’s the nature of their business.
The fact that the Fed acted as lender of last resort in the Bear Stearns case was not, by itself, inappropriate. They have done that in the past. The Fed should be lender of last resort to the whole financial system. In the past, if an investment bank became insolvent, if it posed a systemic risk to the markets, the Fed would provide liquidity to the market to avoid a contagion effect, and they would let the investment bank go out of business. In the Bear Stearns case, that’s what they did. They stepped in, made credit available through the discount window, and then allowed Bear Stearns to fail, wiped out the equity, and replaced the management.
But they made a mistake in guaranteeing $30 billion of Bear Stearns’s portfolio. That transferred potential losses from the market to the taxpayer. As I said, the Fed should be the lender of last resort to the financial system. It in fact took them a long time to learn that, and they didn’t really learn it until the [Penn Central] commercial paper crisis of 1970. But the Fed should not be the permanent financier of any individual — especially not people who are selling them risky, illiquid paper, as was the case with Bear Stearns and AIG. If the Fed had said to these institutions, “Sure, we’ll lend to you through the discount window if you have Treasury bills or the equivalent,” that’s one thing. But to say, “Come and sell us,” or, “We’ll lend to you against assets that no one else will buy,” that’s a mistake. This is not what a central bank is supposed to do.
S+B: What are the risks of the Fed holding a large amount of these types of questionable assets on its balance sheet?
MELTZER: It limits their flexibility; it means there’s less they can do. They can’t sell those assets, so in effect they’ve cut their balance sheet in half, although they still have a big enough portfolio that they can engage in the operations that they want to. Also, it shifts the risk to the taxpayers because not all those assets may be paid when they are due, or even at all. The bigger problem, in my opinion, is the perception — now held by the market and Congress — that the Fed can be pushed around, which is not what a central bank in a well-run country wants to have. It affects its independence, and ultimately its credibility in conducting monetary policy.
The Limits of Regulation
S+B: Before we discuss monetary policy, what’s your view on the Federal Reserve’s emerging role as supervisor of the big Wall Street firms — in addition to the commercial banks that they oversee? MELTZER: I am very concerned with the Fed’s role in regulating these institutions. The Fed is not equipped to do it; it won’t do it well because it doesn’t have a history of being a good regulator. It has a hard time understanding the complicated securities that are involved there.
The Fed did a terrible job, for example, of resolving the Latin American debt problem in the 1980s. The Latin American countries had large bank loans and were paying interest to the banks when the crisis started. When they couldn’t pay, the Fed arranged with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] that the IMF would lend the countries the money, and the money would be paid to the banks to keep the interest payments up to date. As a result, the debt kept getting bigger, the solution receded further into the future, and neither the Fed nor the IMF had any idea about how they were going to end the problem. Finally, in 1987, John Reed, the CEO at Citicorp — the predecessor of Citigroup — decided to write off his institution’s Latin American loans and get back to doing business. And that was the beginning of the end of the problem.
One of the things that gets too little attention is the fact that after 1974, when we had several commercial bank failures here and in Germany, the international regulators got together, and they established the Basel standards for bank capital. The Basel standards, like so much regulation, were written by bureaucrats and lawyers with little thought about the incentives they were creating. It was a familiar circumstance: The lawyers make the rules, and the markets determine how to circumvent them. In this case the rule said that if a bank took on more risk, it had to put up more reserves. To circumvent that rule, the banks didn’t put the risk on their balance sheets. One way they avoided this was by packaging the loans they made into new types of securities that they could sell to other financial institutions.
We went from a system that was not well regulated, but at least was observed, to a system in which no one knew where the risks were. We still don’t know where all of the risks are. Tomorrow we may learn that somebody somewhere has a portfolio of securities that’s now deeply underwater. It’s not a very good system. It doesn’t speak well for the way in which the regulation was conducted.
That’s why I worry that Congress will overrespond to this crisis and put more regulation on the financial markets than is good for us, so that the markets will move, probably to London. The trading, in particular, will move to London. I think the Sarbanes-Oxley Act certainly was a step in that direction, and that’s a real risk here.
My concern is that instead of the Fed making its role the protection of the public, it will make its role the protection of the bankers. That is hardly what you think of as the public interest. The agreement to open the discount window to nonbank financial institutions and the expansion of the Fed’s regulatory role both stem from pressure from Congress and Wall Street. It’s hard to see how the Fed can routinely respond to that pressure and still be credible. People on Wall Street and in Congress like it, but the public, ultimately, won’t like it. And it’s not a sustainable system. There can’t be a system where the bankers make the profits and the public takes the losses. Sooner or later that system has to change.
Anticipating Big Changes
S+B: You were quoted in an interview several years ago saying that “big changes usually come after there is a crisis or a perceived failure of the old policy that can no longer be denied.”
MELTZER: Isn’t it the truth.
S+B: Are we at that point now?
MELTZER: Absolutely. The question that needs to be asked is, How do we avoid problems like these in the future? I’ve indicated what I think should not happen — expanding the Fed’s regulatory role. Instead, I think there are three steps that would go a long way toward correcting the problems.
The first would be to make sure that all financial institutions are subject to minimum capital requirements and to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act [FDICIA], in the same way that commercial banks have been. This has already happened for the big New York investment banks that have changed recently into bank holding companies. Congress enacted FDICIA in 1991 to force the regulators to shut down failing banks before they lose all their capital. These kinds of rules have not been considered necessary for investment banks in the past — partly because, as I said, there haven’t been many failures. There probably won’t be that many failures going forward either, but capital requirements and the FDICIA procedures will reduce the prospect that there will be. That way, if the capital of one of the remaining investment banks gets to a low enough point relative to assets, we can stop it from paying dividends, get rid of the management, and push the losses on to the shareholders.
The second step is for the Fed to make a clear statement of its policy for dealing with failures. Throughout its history, it has never done that. Sometimes the Fed decides that it has to bail out the bank. Sometimes it decides it can let the bank fail. Sometimes it takes some intermediate step. You could avoid the uncertainty by having a clear and definite rule that is applied to everybody. When Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street — his great book on central banking and the lender of last resort function in the 19th century — he didn’t criticize the Bank of England for not doing the right thing. He criticized the Bank of England for not announcing in advance what it was going to do. And that’s where the Fed has failed. It has never said what it wanted to do.
Both of those changes could be made by legislation, and it would be a big change in the regulation of financial markets.
The third thing we need to do is to change the incentives in the markets, and I think that would be best done by the markets and the companies themselves. These institutions need to change their compensation systems so that individual traders are more at risk, and salaries and bonuses are based on performance over a longer period of time than is the case now — something like basing bonuses on five-year average earnings.
S+B: How important is that final change?
MELTZER: I think it is essential. You have to ask yourself — as I have asked myself: Here are my students, and students from other quality institutions five or 10 years into their careers, and they are selling pieces of paper that they have to know aren’t worth much. Why are they doing that? The answer is that they make a lot of money doing it, and if they don’t make the money, they get fired. It’s a rare firm — though there are a few — that resists the temptation to control the risky behavior that leads to eventual losses.
We have to remember in thinking about all of these things that the financial markets, for the most part, lend long and borrow short. So there are always going to be periods, unavoidably, in which expectations change for one of a million different reasons and you find people in a position where it’s hard to renew short-term loans to finance long-term debt. But we can reduce those problems by improving the incentives of the people who work in those markets.
Hindsight and Resilience
S+B: Turning to the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy, some critics trace the problems we are experiencing back to the 1990s, blaming the Fed for allowing the dot-com bubble to form by keeping monetary policy easy and interest rates too low for too long, and in turn creating the conditions for the housing bubble.
MELTZER: I don’t like the idea of bubbles, especially applied to the dot-com episode. I know it’s a very common view of the episode, but here are two reasons I disagree: First, it didn’t affect all stocks. It affected stocks of new companies that were using the new technology. Second, for every buyer there was a seller. So if a buyer was enthused by the prospects of the future, there was a different attitude on the part of the sellers, right? I think a better explanation of what happened in the dot-com period was that people saw a new technology, and at least some people decided that new technology was going to be highly profitable. It turned out it wasn’t. Entry was too easy, and the dot-coms were squeezing each other out. It took years for Amazon, which is one of the most successful dot-coms, to ever make a profit. That awareness eventually dawned on people in the market.
What could the Fed have done? Can you raise the interest rate enough to stop this, or do you just kill the economy in the process? And I guess the Fed’s answer, or at least Alan Greenspan’s answer, was, “Well, we’re not going to kill the economy. We’re going to let these people make these mistakes.” And as he said at the Jackson Hole conference at one point, “Then we’ll mop up the problem that remains.”
There are many who criticize Alan Greenspan for not taking more action. I’m a bit less sure that there was much the Fed could have done. People said, “Well, you could have put on margin requirements” to limit borrowing used to buy stocks. First of all, the stock purchases weren’t heavily margined. And this is not 1929. There are so many ways that people can borrow to finance stock purchases today. Margin requirements have no chance of stopping that kind of activity.
The Fed has only a very blunt tool for dealing with problems like that. And as far as I’m concerned, there’s nothing terrible about letting the people who make mistakes pay for them.
S+B: In effect, that’s what happened when the dot-coms crashed. Many of the people who invested in the dot-coms lost a lot of money, but it didn’t cause a serious economic downturn.
MELTZER: There was a short period in 2001 and 2002 when the economy was slow because people were uncertain about what was going to happen, but that’s in the nature of the market economy.
S+B: What about the theory that the Fed kept interest rates too low after the dot-com crash, leaving too much money floating around, which migrated naturally into the mortgage market and created the conditions for the mortgage crisis. Is that too simple?
MELTZER: I don’t know. I really don’t know. At the time, you’ll remember that the Fed was very concerned about the prospect of deflation. I think they overestimated the risk. I discuss deflation at length in the first volume of my history of the Fed. The U.S. had about six periods of deflation and recession before 1950, and if you look at the data, for five of them the recovery from those recessions is indistinguishable from any other recession. The only bad one was 1929 to 1933. That was a case in which the Fed’s policy was deflationary. It was a very particular case. So the Fed’s concern about deflation after the dot-com bubble burst was just a policy mistake — one of many.
S+B: And the result of that mistake was an overly easy monetary policy that created the conditions for the housing bubble that followed?
MELTZER: The Fed kept money growth too high, too long, and interest rates too low, too long. Having said that, it’s important to add, as far as I’m concerned, that no one forced the bankers to make bad loans. That was their decision. So while the Fed was certainly a facilitator, the bankers were the ones who made the mistakes.
Returning to Growth
S+B: What is your view of the Fed’s monetary policy stance today?
MELTZER: I am not comfortable with the Fed’s current stance. The economy doesn’t seem to be in a recession, and if one does develop, it is not going to be a serious one. I think they were putting too much weight on the possibility of recession and too little weight on the prospect for inflation. I believe that the Fed panicked in January and February of this year, and overestimated the seriousness of what was happening. They talk about inflation, but talk is cheap. Back in the 1970s, Arthur Burns, then the Fed chairman, used to talk a strong anti-inflation game, but helped cause the largest peacetime inflationary episode in U.S. history. I think there’s a danger that we’re repeating those same mistakes.
In the 1980s and 1990s, under Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, the Fed managed to build its credibility and independence. Over the last few years, I fear that [current chairman] Ben Bernanke has thrown it away, and we are back where we were in the 1970s.
I think the current Fed will make some effort to deal with inflation, but not until after the presidential election. The Fed doesn’t like to act before the election, and has done it on only a very few occasions. The crisis atmosphere today makes it even less likely anytime soon.
The question is whether Congress will go along with an increase in interest rates of the magnitude that will be needed to bring inflation down. The inflation rate is currently around 4 or 5 percent, and that means you have to raise short-term interest rates up to 4 or 5 percent from 2 percent, where they are now, to have much of an effect. That’s a big move, and it’s hard to see it happening.
S+B: How much are increases in energy and food prices affecting inflation today?
MELTZER: Many economists and popular writers use the term “inflation” to refer to any increase in the price level. Like Milton Friedman, I define inflation as a sustained rate of change in a broad-based index. Food and energy prices, for me, are relative price changes. The only products of the Federal Reserve are money and credit. It cannot replace or supply oil or food. All it should do is make its best effort to prevent the oil- and food-price changes from becoming a reason for a sustained increase in the rate of price change. Alas, it has not done that.
S+B: You’ve said that the Fed’s greatest mistakes were the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Do you think what’s happening now could be the third?
MELTZER: It’s possible that they are creating another period of sustained inflation, but I don’t think it is a high probability. There is enough concern among some of the Fed’s policymakers that I think there will be limits to how expansive the Fed will be.
S+B: Given that outlook for monetary policy, and the problems in the housing and financial markets, what do you see happening in the economy over the intermediate term?
MELTZER: I think we will see slow growth through next year. The worst of the housing problem will begin to end when we see housing prices settle, or get an idea of where they’re expected to settle. Then the economy will begin to recover. We will come out of this, although we will bear the loss of wealth. The great thing about the U.S. economy that you can’t escape is its ability to reinvent itself. The mortgage finance situation will be remembered as a serious problem, but not the most serious problem. And sometime in 2009 or 2010, we will see a return to growth.
Reprint No. 08409
Author Profile:
Rob Norton is the executive editor of strategy+business. He is the editor of CFO Thought Leaders: Advancing the Frontiers of Finance (strategy+business Books, 2005) and coauthor of Content Critical: Gaining Competitive Advantage through High-quality Web Content (Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2001).
The world is not facing another Great Depression, says the noted economic historian, but the Federal Reserve is eroding its credibility.
STRATEGY+BUSINESS
When the United States Federal Reserve System becomes a fixture on page A1 of the Wall Street Journal, it means that either the U.S. economy is in trouble or the global financial system is under stress. As everyone reading this magazine knows, for the year and a half since the summer of 2007, it has meant both.
It is no wonder that fears about the future of the economy, the financial system, and the Fed’s ability to perform its tasks have been widespread, and recent assessments from market commentators range from the gloomy to the very dark. Some have warned that the global economy is at the brink of the next Great Depression, with the U.S. leading the way; that only massive reregulation can save the banking industry; and that the Fed is no longer in control.
Much of this commentary, however, lacks perspective, and perhaps no one has a more complete perspective on the interrelationships between the economy, the financial system, and the Fed than Allan Meltzer, who holds an eponymous endowed chair as the Allan H. Meltzer University Professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business. Meltzer, born in 1928, has been studying monetary economics since the late 1950s, and is completing his definitive History of the Federal Reserve. (The first volume, covering the years 1913 to 1951, was published by the University of Chicago Press in 2003 and ran 800 pages; the second installment, which will bring the history forward to 1986, is due to be published in two volumes running 1,400 pages in October 2009.)
In both of its major roles, the Fed has been (and is being) tested by the economic crisis of late 2008. The first test has to do with its role as the manager of U.S. monetary policy, setting short-term interest rates for interbank borrowing in the United States. The Fed is charged with striking the right balance between economic growth and inflation, and, given the size of the U.S. economy and the importance of the dollar in world trade, its decisions ripple out and affect financial institutions throughout the world. The second test has been connected to its role as lender of last resort, when the imminent failure of a financial institution creates a potentially systemic risk in the markets. Even before the U.S. Congress began debating its Wall Street bailout plan in September, the Fed had made unusually aggressive forays into the credit markets to forestall the collapse of the mortgage finance industry, extending emergency loans through its “discount window” to investment banking companies, including Bear Stearns, which was shut down and sold to J.P. Morgan Chase & Company in March 2008, and to AIG, the troubled insurance company. No matter what the aftermath is on Wall Street, the U.S. economy is likely to face both recession and rising inflation, the latter for the first time in a generation. To someone currently seeking stability and reassurance, none of this is good news.
However, Allan Meltzer is impatient with comparisons of the current situation to the Great Depression. The economy circa 2008, in his view, is in a slowdown that appears to be modest, and from which it should recover in routine fashion. And although the financial system is under great stress, Meltzer does not think that anything we have seen so far suggests great danger. The Federal Reserve, he believes, has made only two major errors in its 94-year history. One was permitting the monetary deflation that worsened the Great Depression; the other was unleashing what economists call the Great Inflation, which saw the U.S. inflation rate rise from about 1 percent in early 1965 to nearly 14 percent in 1980. But in addition to these mortal sins of policymaking, the Fed, in Meltzer’s view, has been guilty of many more venial ones.
He says the Fed has recently made several mistakes that fall into the latter category, including the way in which it conducted some of the recent bailouts and the way that it is allowing inflation to take root again. Both are evidence of a more endemic problem: The Federal Reserve, in Meltzer’s opinion, is allowing itself to be driven by events and pushed around by Congress, squandering the hard-won reputation for institutional independence that it gained in the 1980s and 1990s. It is thus devaluing the only truly worthwhile currency that a central bank has: its credibility as a bulwark against inflation. The Fed’s emergence as the über-regulator of the U.S. financial system — with regulatory powers extending to Wall Street firms — is ill advised, according to Meltzer, because this will further politicize the Fed and divert its attention from its most critical role.
Meltzer sees some new regulation as inevitable, but he favors simple fixes. Imposing strict capital adequacy requirements on all financial institutions and establishing clear penalties for those that get into trouble would go a long way, he believes, toward limiting the damage from future financial-sector problems. The other reform he favors, however, can come only from the financial industry itself. That reform is an overall rethinking of the incentive and compensation structures that set the stage for the recent disasters.
Meltzer’s own intellectual progression follows the aphorism (attributed to the early-20th-century French Prime Minister Aristide Briand) that a man who is not a socialist at 20 has no heart, and a man who is still a socialist at 40 has no head. In the 1948 presidential election, Meltzer was a 20- year-old campaign volunteer for the Progressive Party, whose platform included full voting rights for African-Americans and universal health insurance (the party’s candidate, Henry Wallace, received 2.4 percent of the popular vote). Meltzer had graduated from Duke University that year with a bachelor’s degree in economics. He shed his left-wing leanings during his graduate studies with economists such as Armen Alchian and Karl Brunner, earning his master’s degree in 1955 and his doctorate in 1958 at the University of California at Los Angeles. Brunner, a Swiss émigré with an interest in monetary economics, became his mentor, and later his colleague and coauthor. Together they wrote dozens of articles and several books.
Meltzer and Brunner were influential figures in the economic school of monetarism, a disruptive innovation in the history of economic thought. Monetarism emphasized the importance of controlling the growth of the money supply to restrain inflation and promote stable growth, and is associated with the late Nobel laureate Milton Friedman. This idea was considered heretical by many economists in the 1960s and 1970s, and one of its central suggestions — that the discretionary policies of central banks be replaced by a simple rule for monetary growth — never gained traction, although former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker described his own approach to ending inflation in the early 1980s as “practical monetarism.” Eventually monetarism withered as a distinct school of economic thought, but its central ideas about the importance of controlling the growth of the money supply have been absorbed into both the mainstream of economic thought and the practices of the Fed and other central banks.
In late July 2008, Meltzer spoke with strategy+business in his Pittsburgh office as he was preparing to attend the meeting of Federal Reserve officials and monetary economists held every August in Jackson Hole, Wyo. We spoke with him again in late September following the subsequent market collapse of Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, and others. He updated a few of his answers, but his overall opinions were unchanged.
S+B: The financial system is in a very disturbed state, and the economy has not been doing well. How bad do you consider the situation, and how does it compare to earlier episodes?
MELTZER: The biggest banking problem in modern history, of course, was during the Great Depression, when we had waves of bank failures. So far, we have had a few failures, including some very large ones, but we haven’t seen anything that could be called a wave of bank failures. The defaults we’re seeing in the mortgage finance market are the biggest problem today, and the write-offs that we’re seeing today are very large in dollar terms, but the financial system is much larger than it was in the 1930s. Today, the defaults on mortgages are 6 percent and rising; during the Great Depression, they were 50 percent.
One somewhat similar crisis was in 1920 and 1921, when there was a wave of failures of agricultural banks. At the time, farmers represented a bigger part of the economy than they do now, and it was a serious problem. Farmers had bought land during World War I, and mortgaged it at high interest rates. Then came a big deflation of about 20 percent. As a result, Congress created the Federal Land Banks, which bought up the troubled loans and extended credit. Another somewhat similar case was the failures in the savings and loan industry in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which dragged down a lot of the banking system. That wound up costing taxpayers an estimated $150 billion. The current mortgage and credit crisis will probably cost taxpayers a lot more.
S+B: But you don’t see this as a major threat to the economy?
MELTZER: I’ve always been skeptical that the housing crisis was going to cause a deep recession in the United States. The reason is that it’s localized, for the most part, in six communities: Southern California, Southern Nevada, Arizona, Southern Florida, and, for very different reasons, Cleveland and Detroit. This is a big economy, and six local problems can cause a wider problem. A downturn? Yes. A slowing in housing construction? Absolutely. But a major depression for the United States? Not at all. It’s not likely.
S+B: Do you see further weakness in the credit markets beyond the mortgage market?
MELTZER: We will probably see difficulties in consumer credit and consumer loans somewhere along the line, but I don’t think it will be a result of the housing situation. The current problems that consumers face are high energy and food prices, and the spreading of energy price increases to everything the consumer buys that moves by truck or airplane. Those prices are going up. Plus, consumers are going to suffer in the wintertime with rising heating and electricity prices. I think that is going to keep consumption growth slow.
There’s no question that we’re coming out of a period of very lax credit standards, and they are being tightened. The bankers are probably overreacting, as they often do, going from one extreme to the other. This is hurting people with student loans, housing loans, and consumer loans — although credit, for the most part, is still expanding. Good prospects can get financed. Risky things are more difficult.
The biggest problem in the credit markets can’t be solved, and won’t be solved, until there is a pretty good idea as to where housing prices are going to settle. You can’t value mortgages until you know what houses are worth. And no one really knows yet. Recently, bankers have marked down their portfolios of mortgage securities aggressively. I think that’s a step toward a solution, so I don’t regard that as terrible. The sooner those prices fall, the quicker this thing is going to be over.
Once people in the financial markets have an idea of where prices will settle — prices don’t have to necessarily get there, but people have to have an idea of where they’re going to go — the markets will be able to price the mortgages. So today a banker will lend to other bankers for one day or maybe one week, but he won’t lend for one month because there’s just too much uncertainty about the value of the assets on a bank’s portfolio. And until that problem is resolved, this so-called crisis is going to continue.
Lenders of Last Resort
S+B: When you say “so-called crisis,” do you doubt that it’s a crisis at this point, or again, is that just a question of terminology?
MELTZER: It’s a crisis for the housing sector, but that sector is used to crises — it’s a very up-and-down business. And it is a crisis for banks and the big Wall Street firms, particularly those banks that are heavily invested in mortgage securities, which turns out to be a large number of them.
S+B: One of the aspects of this crisis that seems distinctive is the way it has shaken the investment banking business and the insurance business, rather than just commercial banks or mortgage finance companies, beginning with the bailout of Bear Stearns. There has been much discussion about whether the Fed’s role in that failure — as well as in some other recent instances — was appropriate, especially in acting as “lender of last resort” for an investment bank, with a 28-day emergency loan of and an agreement to guarantee $30 billion in assets. [The deal included Bear Stearns’s ultimate sale to J.P. Morgan Chase at $10 per share.] How big a change does that episode represent?
MELTZER: Historically, there have been few failures of Wall Street firms, partly because they mark their portfolios to market every night. They have to borrow enough to balance their assets. If they cannot borrow enough, the problems come to light pretty quickly. But most investment banks have not gotten into trouble in the past, and not all of them got into trouble this time. Some have taken losses — some of them very large losses — but that’s the nature of their business.
The fact that the Fed acted as lender of last resort in the Bear Stearns case was not, by itself, inappropriate. They have done that in the past. The Fed should be lender of last resort to the whole financial system. In the past, if an investment bank became insolvent, if it posed a systemic risk to the markets, the Fed would provide liquidity to the market to avoid a contagion effect, and they would let the investment bank go out of business. In the Bear Stearns case, that’s what they did. They stepped in, made credit available through the discount window, and then allowed Bear Stearns to fail, wiped out the equity, and replaced the management.
But they made a mistake in guaranteeing $30 billion of Bear Stearns’s portfolio. That transferred potential losses from the market to the taxpayer. As I said, the Fed should be the lender of last resort to the financial system. It in fact took them a long time to learn that, and they didn’t really learn it until the [Penn Central] commercial paper crisis of 1970. But the Fed should not be the permanent financier of any individual — especially not people who are selling them risky, illiquid paper, as was the case with Bear Stearns and AIG. If the Fed had said to these institutions, “Sure, we’ll lend to you through the discount window if you have Treasury bills or the equivalent,” that’s one thing. But to say, “Come and sell us,” or, “We’ll lend to you against assets that no one else will buy,” that’s a mistake. This is not what a central bank is supposed to do.
S+B: What are the risks of the Fed holding a large amount of these types of questionable assets on its balance sheet?
MELTZER: It limits their flexibility; it means there’s less they can do. They can’t sell those assets, so in effect they’ve cut their balance sheet in half, although they still have a big enough portfolio that they can engage in the operations that they want to. Also, it shifts the risk to the taxpayers because not all those assets may be paid when they are due, or even at all. The bigger problem, in my opinion, is the perception — now held by the market and Congress — that the Fed can be pushed around, which is not what a central bank in a well-run country wants to have. It affects its independence, and ultimately its credibility in conducting monetary policy.
The Limits of Regulation
S+B: Before we discuss monetary policy, what’s your view on the Federal Reserve’s emerging role as supervisor of the big Wall Street firms — in addition to the commercial banks that they oversee? MELTZER: I am very concerned with the Fed’s role in regulating these institutions. The Fed is not equipped to do it; it won’t do it well because it doesn’t have a history of being a good regulator. It has a hard time understanding the complicated securities that are involved there.
The Fed did a terrible job, for example, of resolving the Latin American debt problem in the 1980s. The Latin American countries had large bank loans and were paying interest to the banks when the crisis started. When they couldn’t pay, the Fed arranged with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] that the IMF would lend the countries the money, and the money would be paid to the banks to keep the interest payments up to date. As a result, the debt kept getting bigger, the solution receded further into the future, and neither the Fed nor the IMF had any idea about how they were going to end the problem. Finally, in 1987, John Reed, the CEO at Citicorp — the predecessor of Citigroup — decided to write off his institution’s Latin American loans and get back to doing business. And that was the beginning of the end of the problem.
One of the things that gets too little attention is the fact that after 1974, when we had several commercial bank failures here and in Germany, the international regulators got together, and they established the Basel standards for bank capital. The Basel standards, like so much regulation, were written by bureaucrats and lawyers with little thought about the incentives they were creating. It was a familiar circumstance: The lawyers make the rules, and the markets determine how to circumvent them. In this case the rule said that if a bank took on more risk, it had to put up more reserves. To circumvent that rule, the banks didn’t put the risk on their balance sheets. One way they avoided this was by packaging the loans they made into new types of securities that they could sell to other financial institutions.
We went from a system that was not well regulated, but at least was observed, to a system in which no one knew where the risks were. We still don’t know where all of the risks are. Tomorrow we may learn that somebody somewhere has a portfolio of securities that’s now deeply underwater. It’s not a very good system. It doesn’t speak well for the way in which the regulation was conducted.
That’s why I worry that Congress will overrespond to this crisis and put more regulation on the financial markets than is good for us, so that the markets will move, probably to London. The trading, in particular, will move to London. I think the Sarbanes-Oxley Act certainly was a step in that direction, and that’s a real risk here.
My concern is that instead of the Fed making its role the protection of the public, it will make its role the protection of the bankers. That is hardly what you think of as the public interest. The agreement to open the discount window to nonbank financial institutions and the expansion of the Fed’s regulatory role both stem from pressure from Congress and Wall Street. It’s hard to see how the Fed can routinely respond to that pressure and still be credible. People on Wall Street and in Congress like it, but the public, ultimately, won’t like it. And it’s not a sustainable system. There can’t be a system where the bankers make the profits and the public takes the losses. Sooner or later that system has to change.
Anticipating Big Changes
S+B: You were quoted in an interview several years ago saying that “big changes usually come after there is a crisis or a perceived failure of the old policy that can no longer be denied.”
MELTZER: Isn’t it the truth.
S+B: Are we at that point now?
MELTZER: Absolutely. The question that needs to be asked is, How do we avoid problems like these in the future? I’ve indicated what I think should not happen — expanding the Fed’s regulatory role. Instead, I think there are three steps that would go a long way toward correcting the problems.
The first would be to make sure that all financial institutions are subject to minimum capital requirements and to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act [FDICIA], in the same way that commercial banks have been. This has already happened for the big New York investment banks that have changed recently into bank holding companies. Congress enacted FDICIA in 1991 to force the regulators to shut down failing banks before they lose all their capital. These kinds of rules have not been considered necessary for investment banks in the past — partly because, as I said, there haven’t been many failures. There probably won’t be that many failures going forward either, but capital requirements and the FDICIA procedures will reduce the prospect that there will be. That way, if the capital of one of the remaining investment banks gets to a low enough point relative to assets, we can stop it from paying dividends, get rid of the management, and push the losses on to the shareholders.
The second step is for the Fed to make a clear statement of its policy for dealing with failures. Throughout its history, it has never done that. Sometimes the Fed decides that it has to bail out the bank. Sometimes it decides it can let the bank fail. Sometimes it takes some intermediate step. You could avoid the uncertainty by having a clear and definite rule that is applied to everybody. When Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street — his great book on central banking and the lender of last resort function in the 19th century — he didn’t criticize the Bank of England for not doing the right thing. He criticized the Bank of England for not announcing in advance what it was going to do. And that’s where the Fed has failed. It has never said what it wanted to do.
Both of those changes could be made by legislation, and it would be a big change in the regulation of financial markets.
The third thing we need to do is to change the incentives in the markets, and I think that would be best done by the markets and the companies themselves. These institutions need to change their compensation systems so that individual traders are more at risk, and salaries and bonuses are based on performance over a longer period of time than is the case now — something like basing bonuses on five-year average earnings.
S+B: How important is that final change?
MELTZER: I think it is essential. You have to ask yourself — as I have asked myself: Here are my students, and students from other quality institutions five or 10 years into their careers, and they are selling pieces of paper that they have to know aren’t worth much. Why are they doing that? The answer is that they make a lot of money doing it, and if they don’t make the money, they get fired. It’s a rare firm — though there are a few — that resists the temptation to control the risky behavior that leads to eventual losses.
We have to remember in thinking about all of these things that the financial markets, for the most part, lend long and borrow short. So there are always going to be periods, unavoidably, in which expectations change for one of a million different reasons and you find people in a position where it’s hard to renew short-term loans to finance long-term debt. But we can reduce those problems by improving the incentives of the people who work in those markets.
Hindsight and Resilience
S+B: Turning to the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy, some critics trace the problems we are experiencing back to the 1990s, blaming the Fed for allowing the dot-com bubble to form by keeping monetary policy easy and interest rates too low for too long, and in turn creating the conditions for the housing bubble.
MELTZER: I don’t like the idea of bubbles, especially applied to the dot-com episode. I know it’s a very common view of the episode, but here are two reasons I disagree: First, it didn’t affect all stocks. It affected stocks of new companies that were using the new technology. Second, for every buyer there was a seller. So if a buyer was enthused by the prospects of the future, there was a different attitude on the part of the sellers, right? I think a better explanation of what happened in the dot-com period was that people saw a new technology, and at least some people decided that new technology was going to be highly profitable. It turned out it wasn’t. Entry was too easy, and the dot-coms were squeezing each other out. It took years for Amazon, which is one of the most successful dot-coms, to ever make a profit. That awareness eventually dawned on people in the market.
What could the Fed have done? Can you raise the interest rate enough to stop this, or do you just kill the economy in the process? And I guess the Fed’s answer, or at least Alan Greenspan’s answer, was, “Well, we’re not going to kill the economy. We’re going to let these people make these mistakes.” And as he said at the Jackson Hole conference at one point, “Then we’ll mop up the problem that remains.”
There are many who criticize Alan Greenspan for not taking more action. I’m a bit less sure that there was much the Fed could have done. People said, “Well, you could have put on margin requirements” to limit borrowing used to buy stocks. First of all, the stock purchases weren’t heavily margined. And this is not 1929. There are so many ways that people can borrow to finance stock purchases today. Margin requirements have no chance of stopping that kind of activity.
The Fed has only a very blunt tool for dealing with problems like that. And as far as I’m concerned, there’s nothing terrible about letting the people who make mistakes pay for them.
S+B: In effect, that’s what happened when the dot-coms crashed. Many of the people who invested in the dot-coms lost a lot of money, but it didn’t cause a serious economic downturn.
MELTZER: There was a short period in 2001 and 2002 when the economy was slow because people were uncertain about what was going to happen, but that’s in the nature of the market economy.
S+B: What about the theory that the Fed kept interest rates too low after the dot-com crash, leaving too much money floating around, which migrated naturally into the mortgage market and created the conditions for the mortgage crisis. Is that too simple?
MELTZER: I don’t know. I really don’t know. At the time, you’ll remember that the Fed was very concerned about the prospect of deflation. I think they overestimated the risk. I discuss deflation at length in the first volume of my history of the Fed. The U.S. had about six periods of deflation and recession before 1950, and if you look at the data, for five of them the recovery from those recessions is indistinguishable from any other recession. The only bad one was 1929 to 1933. That was a case in which the Fed’s policy was deflationary. It was a very particular case. So the Fed’s concern about deflation after the dot-com bubble burst was just a policy mistake — one of many.
S+B: And the result of that mistake was an overly easy monetary policy that created the conditions for the housing bubble that followed?
MELTZER: The Fed kept money growth too high, too long, and interest rates too low, too long. Having said that, it’s important to add, as far as I’m concerned, that no one forced the bankers to make bad loans. That was their decision. So while the Fed was certainly a facilitator, the bankers were the ones who made the mistakes.
Returning to Growth
S+B: What is your view of the Fed’s monetary policy stance today?
MELTZER: I am not comfortable with the Fed’s current stance. The economy doesn’t seem to be in a recession, and if one does develop, it is not going to be a serious one. I think they were putting too much weight on the possibility of recession and too little weight on the prospect for inflation. I believe that the Fed panicked in January and February of this year, and overestimated the seriousness of what was happening. They talk about inflation, but talk is cheap. Back in the 1970s, Arthur Burns, then the Fed chairman, used to talk a strong anti-inflation game, but helped cause the largest peacetime inflationary episode in U.S. history. I think there’s a danger that we’re repeating those same mistakes.
In the 1980s and 1990s, under Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, the Fed managed to build its credibility and independence. Over the last few years, I fear that [current chairman] Ben Bernanke has thrown it away, and we are back where we were in the 1970s.
I think the current Fed will make some effort to deal with inflation, but not until after the presidential election. The Fed doesn’t like to act before the election, and has done it on only a very few occasions. The crisis atmosphere today makes it even less likely anytime soon.
The question is whether Congress will go along with an increase in interest rates of the magnitude that will be needed to bring inflation down. The inflation rate is currently around 4 or 5 percent, and that means you have to raise short-term interest rates up to 4 or 5 percent from 2 percent, where they are now, to have much of an effect. That’s a big move, and it’s hard to see it happening.
S+B: How much are increases in energy and food prices affecting inflation today?
MELTZER: Many economists and popular writers use the term “inflation” to refer to any increase in the price level. Like Milton Friedman, I define inflation as a sustained rate of change in a broad-based index. Food and energy prices, for me, are relative price changes. The only products of the Federal Reserve are money and credit. It cannot replace or supply oil or food. All it should do is make its best effort to prevent the oil- and food-price changes from becoming a reason for a sustained increase in the rate of price change. Alas, it has not done that.
S+B: You’ve said that the Fed’s greatest mistakes were the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Do you think what’s happening now could be the third?
MELTZER: It’s possible that they are creating another period of sustained inflation, but I don’t think it is a high probability. There is enough concern among some of the Fed’s policymakers that I think there will be limits to how expansive the Fed will be.
S+B: Given that outlook for monetary policy, and the problems in the housing and financial markets, what do you see happening in the economy over the intermediate term?
MELTZER: I think we will see slow growth through next year. The worst of the housing problem will begin to end when we see housing prices settle, or get an idea of where they’re expected to settle. Then the economy will begin to recover. We will come out of this, although we will bear the loss of wealth. The great thing about the U.S. economy that you can’t escape is its ability to reinvent itself. The mortgage finance situation will be remembered as a serious problem, but not the most serious problem. And sometime in 2009 or 2010, we will see a return to growth.
Reprint No. 08409
Author Profile:
Rob Norton is the executive editor of strategy+business. He is the editor of CFO Thought Leaders: Advancing the Frontiers of Finance (strategy+business Books, 2005) and coauthor of Content Critical: Gaining Competitive Advantage through High-quality Web Content (Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2001).
ULFA trying to build base in China: DGP
Assam Tribune
R Dutta ChoudhurY
GUWAHATI, Dec 6 – Feeling threatened in Bangladesh, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is exploring the possibility of establishing bases in the Yunan province of China, said the Director General of Assam Police, GM Srivastava. He also expressed the view that in order to tackle the militants, police and security forces would have to be more innovative in the days to come.
Talking to The Assam Tribune here today, Srivastava, who has recently taken over as the DGP of the State Police force, revealed that according to an input received by the police, around 70 ULFA members are now in Yunan province of China. But at the same time, he admitted that the number of militants staying in that part of China is yet to be confirmed. He said that the ULFA was always maintaining contacts in Yunan area and the Commander in Chief of the outfit, Paresh Baruah visited the area several times. In fact, according to information available, Baruah stayed in Yunan for nearly a year after the formation of the ULFA. He also revealed that in the early days of the ULFA, a group of youths were taken to that area for training and the outfit has been trying to re-establish the old connections as it is feeling threatened in Bangladesh in the face of global outcry against terrorism.
The DGP said that according to information available, the ULFA was still maintaining some training bases in the Chittagong Hill Tract area of Bangladesh, while, senior leaders of the ULFA are also staying in the neighbouring country. “The ULFA commander in chief has three bases in Dhaka, but he mostly stays in a safe place and only occasionally visits his own bases. For the moment, Paresh Baruah and the Foreign Secretary of the ULFA, Sasha Choudhury, who was one of the first persons to be trained by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, are safe in Bangladesh,” he added.
Commenting on the overall security scenario of the State, Srivastava said that though different parts of India have started facing terrorist attacks in recent times, the situation in Assam is different. He said that most other parts of India did not face secessionist movements like Assam and other parts of North East. He expressed the view that the militants have started changing their tactics and police and security forces would have to be more innovative to deal with the situation. The security personnel would have to improve their skills and the weapons need to be upgraded. Intelligence collection also need to be improved to thwart the attempts of the militants to indulge in violence, he added.
Srivastava said that though the strength of the ULFA has gone down, the militant outfit could not be written off as some hardcore militants are still at large, while, senior leaders of the outfit are abroad. He said that recently, the ULFA recruited a number of youths for training. As per information available, the new recruits are from North Lakhimpur and Upper Assam districts. However, the exact number of the new recruits is not yet known to the police and security agencies.
R Dutta ChoudhurY
GUWAHATI, Dec 6 – Feeling threatened in Bangladesh, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is exploring the possibility of establishing bases in the Yunan province of China, said the Director General of Assam Police, GM Srivastava. He also expressed the view that in order to tackle the militants, police and security forces would have to be more innovative in the days to come.
Talking to The Assam Tribune here today, Srivastava, who has recently taken over as the DGP of the State Police force, revealed that according to an input received by the police, around 70 ULFA members are now in Yunan province of China. But at the same time, he admitted that the number of militants staying in that part of China is yet to be confirmed. He said that the ULFA was always maintaining contacts in Yunan area and the Commander in Chief of the outfit, Paresh Baruah visited the area several times. In fact, according to information available, Baruah stayed in Yunan for nearly a year after the formation of the ULFA. He also revealed that in the early days of the ULFA, a group of youths were taken to that area for training and the outfit has been trying to re-establish the old connections as it is feeling threatened in Bangladesh in the face of global outcry against terrorism.
The DGP said that according to information available, the ULFA was still maintaining some training bases in the Chittagong Hill Tract area of Bangladesh, while, senior leaders of the ULFA are also staying in the neighbouring country. “The ULFA commander in chief has three bases in Dhaka, but he mostly stays in a safe place and only occasionally visits his own bases. For the moment, Paresh Baruah and the Foreign Secretary of the ULFA, Sasha Choudhury, who was one of the first persons to be trained by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, are safe in Bangladesh,” he added.
Commenting on the overall security scenario of the State, Srivastava said that though different parts of India have started facing terrorist attacks in recent times, the situation in Assam is different. He said that most other parts of India did not face secessionist movements like Assam and other parts of North East. He expressed the view that the militants have started changing their tactics and police and security forces would have to be more innovative to deal with the situation. The security personnel would have to improve their skills and the weapons need to be upgraded. Intelligence collection also need to be improved to thwart the attempts of the militants to indulge in violence, he added.
Srivastava said that though the strength of the ULFA has gone down, the militant outfit could not be written off as some hardcore militants are still at large, while, senior leaders of the outfit are abroad. He said that recently, the ULFA recruited a number of youths for training. As per information available, the new recruits are from North Lakhimpur and Upper Assam districts. However, the exact number of the new recruits is not yet known to the police and security agencies.
What is systemic failure
DECCAN CHRONICLE
By G.B. Reddy
"Enough is Enough," symbolises the mood of the nation. Its implications are far reaching: enough of politicians; Enough of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism; enough of bureaucratic incompetence and; enough of "turf wars". Conjointly, they constitute the most potent threat to the nation.
Mrs Sonia Gandhi has highlighted the root cause as "systemic failure". The Prime Minister has been reiterating the need for coordination among police forces and security forces. Even the Naval Chief has talked about "systemic failure" as the root cause for present state of national security.
What does "systemic failure" imply? It implies that the complete machinery responsible for maintenance of internal security has failed to deliver: Ministers of home at both Central and state levels; bureaucracy responsible to coordinate and monitor conduct of internal security operations, which includes both acquisition of strategic, tactical and actionable intelligence and rapid reaction operational response; agencies and security forces responsible for execution of field-level operations; the media for its over-enthusiasm to provide instantaneous live coverage to terrorists; and the people at large.
The reasons for "systemic failure" are easy to identify: Systems overload, fatigue, lackadaisical processes and leadership failure at all levels. So, all the components of the system need replacement by a more appropriate model. It implies radical departure, which as a nation we are unaccustomed to. Incompetent heads must roll if the nation is earnest to counter terrorism.
Let me briefly review the "actions taken" till date.
On the political front, political consensus on formulating a viable strategy to counter terrorism is a myth. Mr L.K. Advani declared, "At this juncture, the country needs to fight the terrorist menace resolutely and stand together. It needs an all-party consensus on counter-terrorism." But he failed to attend the Prime Minister’s all-party meeting on December 1.
Under intense public and media pressure, the Congress high command has been forced to direct the Union home minister Shivraj Patil, Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and the state home minister R.R. Patil to resign. Opposition parties are not satisfied. They want the Prime Minister also to resign and the UPA alliance to step down. What is the proposed alternative? They want the conduct of elections. The leadership knows that people may not give a verdict in favour of one political alliance thereby plunging the nation into further political chaos. Is that a consensual or unified approach to counter the present crisis?
On the diplomatic front internationally, there is coordinated pressure on Pakistan to decisively act against terrorists. The US, the UK, Israel and other affected nations have expressed their solidarity. But, they are against war or massing troops on the border and even strikes against terrorist camps. They do not want destabilisation on the Afghan border should the Pakistan Army redeploy its forces on the Eastern front.
On the leadership front, the government’s responses hardly inspire confidence. Only, the concerned bureaucrat has been shifted. Whereas action should have been taken against all concerned for dereliction of duty among the bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and security forces.
On the modernisation front, a few random sanctions for augmentation of capacities were announced — including the sanction of 6,000 additional personnel for the Intelligence Bureau (IB) — immediately after the serial blasts in Delhi on September 13. Even the intent to create a Federal Investigative Agency as the panacea of counter-terrorism may not yield the desired results what with disconnect between the two command functions: Operational and intelligence.
What is urgently needed is a de novo review of roles, structures and processes. Most vital, there is a need for redefining the role for the Indian Armed Forces.
There is also an urgent need to create a ministry of national security (MoNS) through merger/integration of home ministry and defence ministry each for ministry of external security (MoES) and ministry of internal security (MoIS) that will be directly responsible to the MoNS. What about setting up of a joint intelligence control centre not only at the Central level but also at the state levels networked with district and police station levels? What about the processes: Daily and periodic reviews as per situational requirements?
Since police/internal security forces have limited rapid response capabilities against terrorist strikes and the more heinous nuclear, biological and chemical threats, it is an imperative to redefine the Armed Forces’ role just as the US has done. It has designated 20,000 troops for Homeland Security by 2011. For addressing "systemic failure" at strategic, operational and tactical levels, the reassignment of a plethora of para-military forces by merger with either external and internal security forces is an imperative.
Even the oft-repeated assurances on maritime security is a bogey. How does one integrate the Coast Guard operating under MoD with the custom department, coastal police stations, maritime shipping and fishing trawlers to ensure close cooperation and coordination with the Navy. Currently, a suitable mechanism does not exist. Next, the prevailing laws on terrorism. A set of toothless provisions inserted in 2005 into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, does not inspire confidence. It is absurd that the arrested "terrorist" who killed many innocents at the CST should be produced in the court and remanded to custody.
Alongside the above radical modernistion proposed at the Central level, there is urgent need to make our political forces more effective on all fronts. Mere police reforms as suggested by the Police Commission cannot create an effective police mechanism. The emphasis should be on "qualitative" instead of "quantitative" approach.
One should not expect today’s cop, manned with a danda, to overnight turn into a fearless and patriotic commondo type. So, any attempt to create State Security Guards (on the lines of NSG) from the existing pool of police forces is a cosmetic measure which will not act as a deterrent for terrorists.
To create such forces at the state level requires personnel to be highly motivated to sacrifice their lives (just as the terrorists). They must have outstanding physical endurance and sharp shooting capabilities. It implies that the upper age limit for such a force should be preferably below 30 years. And, they must be equipped with most sophisticated weapons and equipment meant for "fighting in built-up areas" and provided suitable mobility means to meet various operational contingencies.
In sum, "systemic failure" requires complete "system modernisation" and not system or sub-systems overhaul. Ultimately, even the new system will only function as effectively as the leaders who manage it at all levels. People will get the chance to elect their political leaders very soon. If the people fail to elect great leaders in the forthcoming elections, then woe to be the posterity of nation.
Brigadier G.B. Reddy (Retd) is a former special mission commander of the IPKF and a national security strategy analyst
By G.B. Reddy
"Enough is Enough," symbolises the mood of the nation. Its implications are far reaching: enough of politicians; Enough of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism; enough of bureaucratic incompetence and; enough of "turf wars". Conjointly, they constitute the most potent threat to the nation.
Mrs Sonia Gandhi has highlighted the root cause as "systemic failure". The Prime Minister has been reiterating the need for coordination among police forces and security forces. Even the Naval Chief has talked about "systemic failure" as the root cause for present state of national security.
What does "systemic failure" imply? It implies that the complete machinery responsible for maintenance of internal security has failed to deliver: Ministers of home at both Central and state levels; bureaucracy responsible to coordinate and monitor conduct of internal security operations, which includes both acquisition of strategic, tactical and actionable intelligence and rapid reaction operational response; agencies and security forces responsible for execution of field-level operations; the media for its over-enthusiasm to provide instantaneous live coverage to terrorists; and the people at large.
The reasons for "systemic failure" are easy to identify: Systems overload, fatigue, lackadaisical processes and leadership failure at all levels. So, all the components of the system need replacement by a more appropriate model. It implies radical departure, which as a nation we are unaccustomed to. Incompetent heads must roll if the nation is earnest to counter terrorism.
Let me briefly review the "actions taken" till date.
On the political front, political consensus on formulating a viable strategy to counter terrorism is a myth. Mr L.K. Advani declared, "At this juncture, the country needs to fight the terrorist menace resolutely and stand together. It needs an all-party consensus on counter-terrorism." But he failed to attend the Prime Minister’s all-party meeting on December 1.
Under intense public and media pressure, the Congress high command has been forced to direct the Union home minister Shivraj Patil, Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and the state home minister R.R. Patil to resign. Opposition parties are not satisfied. They want the Prime Minister also to resign and the UPA alliance to step down. What is the proposed alternative? They want the conduct of elections. The leadership knows that people may not give a verdict in favour of one political alliance thereby plunging the nation into further political chaos. Is that a consensual or unified approach to counter the present crisis?
On the diplomatic front internationally, there is coordinated pressure on Pakistan to decisively act against terrorists. The US, the UK, Israel and other affected nations have expressed their solidarity. But, they are against war or massing troops on the border and even strikes against terrorist camps. They do not want destabilisation on the Afghan border should the Pakistan Army redeploy its forces on the Eastern front.
On the leadership front, the government’s responses hardly inspire confidence. Only, the concerned bureaucrat has been shifted. Whereas action should have been taken against all concerned for dereliction of duty among the bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and security forces.
On the modernisation front, a few random sanctions for augmentation of capacities were announced — including the sanction of 6,000 additional personnel for the Intelligence Bureau (IB) — immediately after the serial blasts in Delhi on September 13. Even the intent to create a Federal Investigative Agency as the panacea of counter-terrorism may not yield the desired results what with disconnect between the two command functions: Operational and intelligence.
What is urgently needed is a de novo review of roles, structures and processes. Most vital, there is a need for redefining the role for the Indian Armed Forces.
There is also an urgent need to create a ministry of national security (MoNS) through merger/integration of home ministry and defence ministry each for ministry of external security (MoES) and ministry of internal security (MoIS) that will be directly responsible to the MoNS. What about setting up of a joint intelligence control centre not only at the Central level but also at the state levels networked with district and police station levels? What about the processes: Daily and periodic reviews as per situational requirements?
Since police/internal security forces have limited rapid response capabilities against terrorist strikes and the more heinous nuclear, biological and chemical threats, it is an imperative to redefine the Armed Forces’ role just as the US has done. It has designated 20,000 troops for Homeland Security by 2011. For addressing "systemic failure" at strategic, operational and tactical levels, the reassignment of a plethora of para-military forces by merger with either external and internal security forces is an imperative.
Even the oft-repeated assurances on maritime security is a bogey. How does one integrate the Coast Guard operating under MoD with the custom department, coastal police stations, maritime shipping and fishing trawlers to ensure close cooperation and coordination with the Navy. Currently, a suitable mechanism does not exist. Next, the prevailing laws on terrorism. A set of toothless provisions inserted in 2005 into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, does not inspire confidence. It is absurd that the arrested "terrorist" who killed many innocents at the CST should be produced in the court and remanded to custody.
Alongside the above radical modernistion proposed at the Central level, there is urgent need to make our political forces more effective on all fronts. Mere police reforms as suggested by the Police Commission cannot create an effective police mechanism. The emphasis should be on "qualitative" instead of "quantitative" approach.
One should not expect today’s cop, manned with a danda, to overnight turn into a fearless and patriotic commondo type. So, any attempt to create State Security Guards (on the lines of NSG) from the existing pool of police forces is a cosmetic measure which will not act as a deterrent for terrorists.
To create such forces at the state level requires personnel to be highly motivated to sacrifice their lives (just as the terrorists). They must have outstanding physical endurance and sharp shooting capabilities. It implies that the upper age limit for such a force should be preferably below 30 years. And, they must be equipped with most sophisticated weapons and equipment meant for "fighting in built-up areas" and provided suitable mobility means to meet various operational contingencies.
In sum, "systemic failure" requires complete "system modernisation" and not system or sub-systems overhaul. Ultimately, even the new system will only function as effectively as the leaders who manage it at all levels. People will get the chance to elect their political leaders very soon. If the people fail to elect great leaders in the forthcoming elections, then woe to be the posterity of nation.
Brigadier G.B. Reddy (Retd) is a former special mission commander of the IPKF and a national security strategy analyst
The tough life of a commondo
8 Dec 2008, 0002 hrs IST, TNN
Bangalore : When you live, day after tough day, with the looming possibilities of death, it takes tremendous levels of motivation to keep
going. India's commandos -- serving in various defence as well as police units -- have their task cut out when it comes to balancing courage under fire, with the hard truth that's death. A macho man, armed with the latest weaponry and geared to fight and protect, is a fascinating image. But the image clouds the reality of an excruciatingly tough job.
After the terror strike in Mumbai, the country is on alert and you spot these commandos deputed to guard important locations and installations. Commandos are men with specialized training in war strategies like jungle warfare, anti-Naxal and anti-terrorism operations. It doesn't just require a fit body but an extremely robust mind to be on the run, whenever called, according to experts.
The Indian Army has around 11 lakh men, of who only a few are selected for commando training. Once an officer decides to become a commando, he has to undergo a probationary phase of 30 days, when he is tested on his mental and physical fitness. Then, through specialized training in the use of weapons and explosives, for which he is sent to National Security Guard (NSG) bases and Manesar in Haryana.
Candidates for the anti-Naxal squad are sent to Greyhounds in Hyderabad, while anti-terrorist wing commandos are trained in Hazaribagh in Bihar. The average age group of the commandos is 20-35 years. Commandos aged above 35 years are reviewed on their fitness every year. Most of the commandos are trained paratroopers, parajumpers, skydivers or deep-sea divers. Typically, a commando unit operates with four or five personnel during the assignment.
Commandos are used for different tasks, depending on their specialization. In terms of salary, they are a bit better off than general Army personnel, but at the same time, they are engaged in operations that involve higher risk, according to a retired commando attached to the Indian Army. Commandos are trained every day as long as they are in the unit.
He began his journey as a commando after the 1965 Pakistan war. "I was a paratrooper. The Army was looking for volunteers, I was interested and thought I would be suitable for the profile. I qualified in all the tests and then delivered as a commando in the 1971 war,'' he said. A commando's job is mostly on the front. He gets into enemy camps and areas to investigate what kind of weapons and explosives they have, and then strategize a commando action.
"Casualty is very high in case of commandos. You cannot say that you failed. If you fail, you are dead, because the enemy would have killed you. When you are inside enemy territory, say Pakistan, if your strategies fail, you are usually killed by the enemy. It's like a suicide mission,'' he says.
Critical players
Former armed forces personnel draw attention to the general contention that commandos enter the fray with a rider on their lives. Their lives, though, can't be taken for granted because their job is not to get killed, and they are playing a critical role in eliminating anti-social elements as well.
"Once a soldier joins the force, he and his family are prepared for the possibilities of his death, anytime. So on that count, he is on a perpetually high-risk job. Various factors, including the spirit to serve the nation, regimental comradeship and even peer pressure, can get a commando motivated through his career,'' says Maj. Gen. (retd) M C Nanjappa.
According to some former armed forces personnel, the trauma of living with constant stress could be telling on the commandos, but what's more damaging could be that feeling of doing a thankless job. Maj. Gen. (retd) Nanjappa says there's a feeling that their efforts are not adequately recognized. "A contrast with the recognition for say, a policeman who dies on duty, will tell you the story. There are hundreds of commandos fighting the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir... their life and death don't get the right attention or recognition,'' he says.
Some ex-servicemen feel the delay in the legal process acts as a dampener on the spirit of these commandos. The politicization and communalization of terrorism, invariably, lead to delayed justice on acts of terrorism. When there's no logical end to the commandos' act of courage and when there's no follow-up action on the captured terrorists, it leaves the commandos demoralized, according to former armed forces personnel who have associated with them.
Family ties
The families of commandos are also mentally prepared for separation and impending risks. Commandos get about 30 days' casual leave and an annual leave of two months, when they are able to spend time with their family. Also, if stationed in a peace zone for some time, they are allowed to live with family. Preparedness is a very important aspect of a commando's life. "Nobody knew they would be called during the Mumbai attack. They had no clue. They just announced and the commandos had to get ready with weapons and rush. That's how it is,'' says a former commando.
Beefing up
The Karnataka State Reserve Police (KSRP) has around 500 commandos. The commandos who are to be trained are selected from the State Reserve Police. There are around 12 KSRP battalions in the state, and it has been proposed to give 100 people all the requisite commando training. The commandos usually practice simulated firing on the computer everyday, along with other specialized training.
Hoskote and Channapatna have live firing ranges where commandos practice regularly. They are also trained extensively in handling all kinds of arms and ammunition.
Bangalore : When you live, day after tough day, with the looming possibilities of death, it takes tremendous levels of motivation to keep
going. India's commandos -- serving in various defence as well as police units -- have their task cut out when it comes to balancing courage under fire, with the hard truth that's death. A macho man, armed with the latest weaponry and geared to fight and protect, is a fascinating image. But the image clouds the reality of an excruciatingly tough job.
After the terror strike in Mumbai, the country is on alert and you spot these commandos deputed to guard important locations and installations. Commandos are men with specialized training in war strategies like jungle warfare, anti-Naxal and anti-terrorism operations. It doesn't just require a fit body but an extremely robust mind to be on the run, whenever called, according to experts.
The Indian Army has around 11 lakh men, of who only a few are selected for commando training. Once an officer decides to become a commando, he has to undergo a probationary phase of 30 days, when he is tested on his mental and physical fitness. Then, through specialized training in the use of weapons and explosives, for which he is sent to National Security Guard (NSG) bases and Manesar in Haryana.
Candidates for the anti-Naxal squad are sent to Greyhounds in Hyderabad, while anti-terrorist wing commandos are trained in Hazaribagh in Bihar. The average age group of the commandos is 20-35 years. Commandos aged above 35 years are reviewed on their fitness every year. Most of the commandos are trained paratroopers, parajumpers, skydivers or deep-sea divers. Typically, a commando unit operates with four or five personnel during the assignment.
Commandos are used for different tasks, depending on their specialization. In terms of salary, they are a bit better off than general Army personnel, but at the same time, they are engaged in operations that involve higher risk, according to a retired commando attached to the Indian Army. Commandos are trained every day as long as they are in the unit.
He began his journey as a commando after the 1965 Pakistan war. "I was a paratrooper. The Army was looking for volunteers, I was interested and thought I would be suitable for the profile. I qualified in all the tests and then delivered as a commando in the 1971 war,'' he said. A commando's job is mostly on the front. He gets into enemy camps and areas to investigate what kind of weapons and explosives they have, and then strategize a commando action.
"Casualty is very high in case of commandos. You cannot say that you failed. If you fail, you are dead, because the enemy would have killed you. When you are inside enemy territory, say Pakistan, if your strategies fail, you are usually killed by the enemy. It's like a suicide mission,'' he says.
Critical players
Former armed forces personnel draw attention to the general contention that commandos enter the fray with a rider on their lives. Their lives, though, can't be taken for granted because their job is not to get killed, and they are playing a critical role in eliminating anti-social elements as well.
"Once a soldier joins the force, he and his family are prepared for the possibilities of his death, anytime. So on that count, he is on a perpetually high-risk job. Various factors, including the spirit to serve the nation, regimental comradeship and even peer pressure, can get a commando motivated through his career,'' says Maj. Gen. (retd) M C Nanjappa.
According to some former armed forces personnel, the trauma of living with constant stress could be telling on the commandos, but what's more damaging could be that feeling of doing a thankless job. Maj. Gen. (retd) Nanjappa says there's a feeling that their efforts are not adequately recognized. "A contrast with the recognition for say, a policeman who dies on duty, will tell you the story. There are hundreds of commandos fighting the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir... their life and death don't get the right attention or recognition,'' he says.
Some ex-servicemen feel the delay in the legal process acts as a dampener on the spirit of these commandos. The politicization and communalization of terrorism, invariably, lead to delayed justice on acts of terrorism. When there's no logical end to the commandos' act of courage and when there's no follow-up action on the captured terrorists, it leaves the commandos demoralized, according to former armed forces personnel who have associated with them.
Family ties
The families of commandos are also mentally prepared for separation and impending risks. Commandos get about 30 days' casual leave and an annual leave of two months, when they are able to spend time with their family. Also, if stationed in a peace zone for some time, they are allowed to live with family. Preparedness is a very important aspect of a commando's life. "Nobody knew they would be called during the Mumbai attack. They had no clue. They just announced and the commandos had to get ready with weapons and rush. That's how it is,'' says a former commando.
Beefing up
The Karnataka State Reserve Police (KSRP) has around 500 commandos. The commandos who are to be trained are selected from the State Reserve Police. There are around 12 KSRP battalions in the state, and it has been proposed to give 100 people all the requisite commando training. The commandos usually practice simulated firing on the computer everyday, along with other specialized training.
Hoskote and Channapatna have live firing ranges where commandos practice regularly. They are also trained extensively in handling all kinds of arms and ammunition.
Behind 26/11: Snoop network is fine, but not data-sharing
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081208/jsp/nation/story_10221291.jsp
NISHIT DHOLABHAI
New Delhi, Dec. 7: The Mumbai terror attacks have unleashed a fresh round of sniping between our many defence and security agencies over alleged intelligence lapses — information that was either not picked up in the first place or information that was available but was not interpreted or acted upon.
Intelligence comes off a complex and elaborate network that extends down from the chiefs of various wings, mostly headquartered in New Delhi, down to faceless — and mostly plainclothed — operatives at the grassroots.
What goes under the omnibus and often loosely-used term “intelligence network” is a vast and variegated workforce that is meant to shore up information from a variety of fields ranging from drugs to markets and revenues and industry to diplomacy to defence preparedness to internal security and the activities of politicians and political parties themselves.
Very often — as the Mumbai terror attacks have brought home to us again — intelligence gathering not only needs to cut across various wings, the inputs also need to be pooled and processed in order to give the consumer — in this case the government — the ability to locate and neutralise possible threats.
The set-up
At the apex of the intelligence network is the Prime Minister himself, but in a day-to-day sense, the hands-on intelligence boss is meant to be the national security adviser (NSA), an office institutionalised during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s premiership and currently occupied by M.K. Narayanan.
The chief internal security snoop network is the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Beyond its official ranks, the IB works with what is known as “human intelligence”, an informal and paid network of informers. These informers or “assets” are cultivated by intelligence officers in the subsidiary intelligence bureaux (SIB) spread across the country.
Intelligence officers in touch with the ground give their inputs to assistant chief intelligence officers and chief intelligence officers. They, in turn, pass inputs to assistant directors and the flow terminates, at the state level, with the joint director of the SIB.
The flow goes up from various states to the IB director, whose office, in turn, is meant to redirect or distribute information wherever it is relevant — state governments, other government wings etc.
Information on the Mumbai strike, or its preparations, for instance, should ideally have reached one or more of the two dozen joint directors at the IB headquarters, before being passed on or shared.
The IB has dedicated desks to keep watch on activities related to Pakistan, Kashmir, the Northeast, Naxalites, Punjab and minority affairs.
A similar set-up exists in the country’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which is headed by a secretary-level officer assisted by four special secretaries, two additional secretaries and several joint secretaries. There is also the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) that provides air intelligence, reconnaissance and transport inputs required for internal and external purposes.
Both RAW and ARC report through the cabinet secretariat to the NSA and the Prime Minister. There is also the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) that receives inputs from the defence forces, primarily through the office of the director-general of military intelligence (DGMI).
Technically, the IB and RAW chiefs can brief the Prime Minister directly but since the NSA’s post was institutionalised, he is the key information/intelligence gateway to the Prime Minister.
Two years ago, a new body called the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up with a view to enhancing India’s technical intelligence. The NTRO has remained an unevolved entity.
We also have financial intelligence reaching the finance, home and external affairs ministries through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the ministry of economic affairs, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and the Customs. Even as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh vowed that the government would snap fund flow to terror groups, there is said to be little co-ordination or information-sharing among the financial intelligence agencies and the other ministries.
Then we have intelligence flowing in from the Narcotics Control Board (NCB) on the narcotics trade and its overlap with terror networks. Paramilitary forces like the BSF and the ITBP have their intelligence wings. There are also the state intelligence cells or special branches in each state police force.
There exist, therefore, many streams overflowing with material and information that need to be co-ordinated and processed — either to be kept at the background or to be acted upon.
Analysts & analysis
Two major bodies exist to collate and analyse this huge data bank — the NSA backed by its secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
The JIC comprises officers from various intelligence agencies and so does the secretariat, headed by the NSA who is assisted by three deputy NSAs.
There is also a third body called the Multi-Agency Centre or MAC, which has representatives from all the agencies and is headed by the NSA.
After the terror attacks in Assam recently, a joint task force has been formed in the Northeast on the lines of a state-level multi-agency centre where all states in the region can co-ordinate among themselves.
There are two main kinds of intelligence inputs too — specific and actionable. These categorisations are made depending upon interpretation of information. But action on information also depends on speedy analysis and decision-making. It is here that both informers and action-taking bodies can be held accountable for failure to protect lives across the country, including Mumbai.
Information on a Pakistani threat through the sea route was available, as sources say, through September, October and November before the attacks shook Mumbai and the nation. Intelligence experts insist that if an intelligence input is received repeatedly, it needs to be treated as knowledge. “Even if it does not describe the colour of a terrorist’s clothes and the number of guns he is carrying,” says a retired IB chief. India does not have a “yellow, amber, red” rating in intelligence like the Americans and, as an IB operative said sarcastically: “Nor do we create incidents and information like the ISI.”
Whether the knowledge of a threat reached the Indian Navy brass is still a raging debate. The armed forces have argued that if the information was so critical and urgent, why did the agencies not go to the Prime Minister’s Office and complain? That, however, is part of the debate.
The fact that information existed is certain. It is also a fact that it was not considered knowledge despite repeated receipts of similar or identical inputs.
Chinks in armour
At the lowest level, the strength of assets is considered to be the major strength of any intelligence set-up. For India, which doesn’t have the luxury of huge budgets — the US spends $40 billion a year, for instance — the task is getting tougher every passing day. Besides, there are other drawbacks.
A major one is the low representation of minorities in intelligence units, something that hampers information gathering at the grassroots level. One of the reasons the terror attack in Ahmedabad was possible was that over the years Muslims had been weeded out of police special cells. This anomaly exists in varying degrees elsewhere too.
Co-ordination block
Fast processing of information and moving on it remain a huge problem. For instance, an input on a threat to Manipur will be sent by the IB to the RAW, JIC, NSA, home ministry, DG Assam Rifles, local police and home officials, perhaps even the foreign ministry since Myanmar is in the neighbourhood.
However, failures occur when decision-makers and analysts miss the point where information has translated into knowledge. That is when action is not taken and we hear accusations of lack of “specific intelligence”. Tragedy often follows.
NISHIT DHOLABHAI
New Delhi, Dec. 7: The Mumbai terror attacks have unleashed a fresh round of sniping between our many defence and security agencies over alleged intelligence lapses — information that was either not picked up in the first place or information that was available but was not interpreted or acted upon.
Intelligence comes off a complex and elaborate network that extends down from the chiefs of various wings, mostly headquartered in New Delhi, down to faceless — and mostly plainclothed — operatives at the grassroots.
What goes under the omnibus and often loosely-used term “intelligence network” is a vast and variegated workforce that is meant to shore up information from a variety of fields ranging from drugs to markets and revenues and industry to diplomacy to defence preparedness to internal security and the activities of politicians and political parties themselves.
Very often — as the Mumbai terror attacks have brought home to us again — intelligence gathering not only needs to cut across various wings, the inputs also need to be pooled and processed in order to give the consumer — in this case the government — the ability to locate and neutralise possible threats.
The set-up
At the apex of the intelligence network is the Prime Minister himself, but in a day-to-day sense, the hands-on intelligence boss is meant to be the national security adviser (NSA), an office institutionalised during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s premiership and currently occupied by M.K. Narayanan.
The chief internal security snoop network is the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Beyond its official ranks, the IB works with what is known as “human intelligence”, an informal and paid network of informers. These informers or “assets” are cultivated by intelligence officers in the subsidiary intelligence bureaux (SIB) spread across the country.
Intelligence officers in touch with the ground give their inputs to assistant chief intelligence officers and chief intelligence officers. They, in turn, pass inputs to assistant directors and the flow terminates, at the state level, with the joint director of the SIB.
The flow goes up from various states to the IB director, whose office, in turn, is meant to redirect or distribute information wherever it is relevant — state governments, other government wings etc.
Information on the Mumbai strike, or its preparations, for instance, should ideally have reached one or more of the two dozen joint directors at the IB headquarters, before being passed on or shared.
The IB has dedicated desks to keep watch on activities related to Pakistan, Kashmir, the Northeast, Naxalites, Punjab and minority affairs.
A similar set-up exists in the country’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which is headed by a secretary-level officer assisted by four special secretaries, two additional secretaries and several joint secretaries. There is also the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) that provides air intelligence, reconnaissance and transport inputs required for internal and external purposes.
Both RAW and ARC report through the cabinet secretariat to the NSA and the Prime Minister. There is also the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) that receives inputs from the defence forces, primarily through the office of the director-general of military intelligence (DGMI).
Technically, the IB and RAW chiefs can brief the Prime Minister directly but since the NSA’s post was institutionalised, he is the key information/intelligence gateway to the Prime Minister.
Two years ago, a new body called the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up with a view to enhancing India’s technical intelligence. The NTRO has remained an unevolved entity.
We also have financial intelligence reaching the finance, home and external affairs ministries through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the ministry of economic affairs, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and the Customs. Even as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh vowed that the government would snap fund flow to terror groups, there is said to be little co-ordination or information-sharing among the financial intelligence agencies and the other ministries.
Then we have intelligence flowing in from the Narcotics Control Board (NCB) on the narcotics trade and its overlap with terror networks. Paramilitary forces like the BSF and the ITBP have their intelligence wings. There are also the state intelligence cells or special branches in each state police force.
There exist, therefore, many streams overflowing with material and information that need to be co-ordinated and processed — either to be kept at the background or to be acted upon.
Analysts & analysis
Two major bodies exist to collate and analyse this huge data bank — the NSA backed by its secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
The JIC comprises officers from various intelligence agencies and so does the secretariat, headed by the NSA who is assisted by three deputy NSAs.
There is also a third body called the Multi-Agency Centre or MAC, which has representatives from all the agencies and is headed by the NSA.
After the terror attacks in Assam recently, a joint task force has been formed in the Northeast on the lines of a state-level multi-agency centre where all states in the region can co-ordinate among themselves.
There are two main kinds of intelligence inputs too — specific and actionable. These categorisations are made depending upon interpretation of information. But action on information also depends on speedy analysis and decision-making. It is here that both informers and action-taking bodies can be held accountable for failure to protect lives across the country, including Mumbai.
Information on a Pakistani threat through the sea route was available, as sources say, through September, October and November before the attacks shook Mumbai and the nation. Intelligence experts insist that if an intelligence input is received repeatedly, it needs to be treated as knowledge. “Even if it does not describe the colour of a terrorist’s clothes and the number of guns he is carrying,” says a retired IB chief. India does not have a “yellow, amber, red” rating in intelligence like the Americans and, as an IB operative said sarcastically: “Nor do we create incidents and information like the ISI.”
Whether the knowledge of a threat reached the Indian Navy brass is still a raging debate. The armed forces have argued that if the information was so critical and urgent, why did the agencies not go to the Prime Minister’s Office and complain? That, however, is part of the debate.
The fact that information existed is certain. It is also a fact that it was not considered knowledge despite repeated receipts of similar or identical inputs.
Chinks in armour
At the lowest level, the strength of assets is considered to be the major strength of any intelligence set-up. For India, which doesn’t have the luxury of huge budgets — the US spends $40 billion a year, for instance — the task is getting tougher every passing day. Besides, there are other drawbacks.
A major one is the low representation of minorities in intelligence units, something that hampers information gathering at the grassroots level. One of the reasons the terror attack in Ahmedabad was possible was that over the years Muslims had been weeded out of police special cells. This anomaly exists in varying degrees elsewhere too.
Co-ordination block
Fast processing of information and moving on it remain a huge problem. For instance, an input on a threat to Manipur will be sent by the IB to the RAW, JIC, NSA, home ministry, DG Assam Rifles, local police and home officials, perhaps even the foreign ministry since Myanmar is in the neighbourhood.
However, failures occur when decision-makers and analysts miss the point where information has translated into knowledge. That is when action is not taken and we hear accusations of lack of “specific intelligence”. Tragedy often follows.
December 07, 2008
Will the United States prevent Iran from going nuclear?
20:55 | 05/ 12/ 2008
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - The conclusions made by Washington's leading analytical centers on Iran's nuclear program have come as a big surprise. It appears that Iran is much closer to the development of nuclear weapons than was previously believed.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may report in half a year that Iran has enough uranium for a nuclear bomb. A recent report by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei suggests that this is not unlikely.
This news has split American experts into pessimists and relative optimists. The former believe that nothing can stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The latter are hoping to prevent this with diplomatic efforts.
Former U.S. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton is a pessimist. He thinks that both George W. Bush and Barack Obama said many times that a nuclear Iran was unacceptable for the United States but that neither of them backed this position with any action. Israel, the main opponent of Iran's full nuclear cycle, is not likely to deal a strike at its nuclear facilities, even less so until January 20 when Obama assumes office.
Optimists proceed from the premise that Iran's nuclear ambitions are limited to the desire to dominate the region. For this reason, it is possible to agree with Iran on the limits of its influence in the Gulf. Talks with Iran should cover four subjects: resumption of diplomatic relations, its nuclear program, regional security, and an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Moscow urged Washington to do exactly this before Iran launched its first nuclear enrichment centrifuge. Now it has from 4,000 to 6,000 of them.
Time has been wasted. Even if Obama starts direct talks, this does not guarantee that Iran will agree to stop nuclear enrichment.
Bolton said that negotiators with Iran should have opted for tough economic sanctions, up to its economic isolation in order to make it stop uranium enrichment. He may be right. After all, nuclear non-proliferation was at stake. Now it only remains for us to wonder what other countries will declare rights to a full nuclear cycle for "peaceful purposes" and go nuclear - Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey?
The president-elect has been offered two scenarios for resolving the Iranian problem. The first one provides for talks from the position of strength, up to a military operation. The second one is limited to strictly diplomatic efforts, and includes recognition of Iran's regional leadership.
Will Obama gain the time wasted by his predecessor in following the second option? If not, will he have the resolve to choose the first one?
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - The conclusions made by Washington's leading analytical centers on Iran's nuclear program have come as a big surprise. It appears that Iran is much closer to the development of nuclear weapons than was previously believed.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may report in half a year that Iran has enough uranium for a nuclear bomb. A recent report by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei suggests that this is not unlikely.
This news has split American experts into pessimists and relative optimists. The former believe that nothing can stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The latter are hoping to prevent this with diplomatic efforts.
Former U.S. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton is a pessimist. He thinks that both George W. Bush and Barack Obama said many times that a nuclear Iran was unacceptable for the United States but that neither of them backed this position with any action. Israel, the main opponent of Iran's full nuclear cycle, is not likely to deal a strike at its nuclear facilities, even less so until January 20 when Obama assumes office.
Optimists proceed from the premise that Iran's nuclear ambitions are limited to the desire to dominate the region. For this reason, it is possible to agree with Iran on the limits of its influence in the Gulf. Talks with Iran should cover four subjects: resumption of diplomatic relations, its nuclear program, regional security, and an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Moscow urged Washington to do exactly this before Iran launched its first nuclear enrichment centrifuge. Now it has from 4,000 to 6,000 of them.
Time has been wasted. Even if Obama starts direct talks, this does not guarantee that Iran will agree to stop nuclear enrichment.
Bolton said that negotiators with Iran should have opted for tough economic sanctions, up to its economic isolation in order to make it stop uranium enrichment. He may be right. After all, nuclear non-proliferation was at stake. Now it only remains for us to wonder what other countries will declare rights to a full nuclear cycle for "peaceful purposes" and go nuclear - Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey?
The president-elect has been offered two scenarios for resolving the Iranian problem. The first one provides for talks from the position of strength, up to a military operation. The second one is limited to strictly diplomatic efforts, and includes recognition of Iran's regional leadership.
Will Obama gain the time wasted by his predecessor in following the second option? If not, will he have the resolve to choose the first one?
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Mumbai 26/11: Strategic Hostages?
By Swati Parashar*
It has been a week since the operations to flush out terrorists in Mumbai. We have precious little to show in terms of real and tangible actions on the ground.
A few pointers to the level of the preparedness:
1. On December 3, 2008, a week after the Mumbai terror attacks, two bags containing eight kilograms of explosive material were recovered from the Chhatrapati Shivaji Rail Terminus in Mumbai.
2. On December 5, 2008, in the early hours there was ‘reported’ firing at IGI Airport at New Delhi. There was no follow up investigation; only denials and cover ups.
3. On December 5, 2008, two CPI(M) MPs delayed an Air India domestic flight by almost four hours when they refused to de-board the aircraft which developed a technical problem. (This incident makes a mockery of Defence Minister A K Antony’s directive on December 3, 2008, which warned the armed forces of possible terror attacks from airborne platforms similar to the 9/11 attacks in the US. The Defence Minister asked them to be prepared to counter the threat of terrorists from the air and prevent a repeat of World Trade Centre-type of attacks carried out by the Al Qaeda.)
4. On December 6, 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits West Bengal; the state police deploy boys and men for surveillance of the area from tree tops as part of security measures! Some of these were school children who are paid Rs 120 to keep a watch from treetops and report any suspicious movements or objects.
These incidents reflect India’s preparedness to foil future terror attacks! India’s will to seek justice for the past terror attacks has been held hostage by various quarters inimical to India’s sovereignty. We, the people of India, must realise that we are held hostage to US interests in Afghanistan, ISI interests in Pakistan, nuclear deterrence, political interests of our own so-called leaders and worthless national security officialdom.
Our Prime Minister does not tire of telling us that his government is waiting for an effective ‘international response’ to the Mumbai terror attack. All the Prime Minister is interested in, is making a cheap spectacle of our tragedy. We are relying on the international community which in turn is guided by individual national interests of the constituent nation-states. The Indian Government looks for sympathy; therefore, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gatecrashes into a grieving India and lulls this country into inaction instead of joining hands in giving a fitting reply to the state that sponsors such heinous acts. The Secretary of State achieves her only objective of sabotaging India’s strong response, in order to protect US geopolitical interests in the region. There are about 34,000 US troops (around 64,000 foreign forces) in Afghanistan fighting the ‘war on terror’. Pakistani armed forces supposedly provide security to the trucks carrying food, clothes, equipments etc into Afghanistan for these foreign forces. India’s response to the Mumbai carnage is held hostage to the supplies and logistics for the foreign troops in Afghanistan. It seems that the primary objective of the Pakistani forces fighting on their western frontiers is not to fight the Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists but to ensure the logistic supply route to Afghanistan. (The Taliban leaders have expressed their willingness to fight alongside the Pakistani army should India take military action against Pakistan; so much for the ‘war on terror’!) The moot point is, will the US ever allow their ‘traffic police’ to be distracted by any thing else at this juncture?
Mumbai terror victims are, but, collateral damages in this great ‘war on terror’. Pakistan has been amply rewarded for the outsourced services; a staggering 10 billion USD since the day President Musharraf said ‘I do’ to his master in the White House. US has supplied military hardware, training and partnerships of an unprecedented scale to Pakistan, has sanctioned the worst nuclear offender Abdul Qadeer Khan to go scot free and most recently has permitted the generous IMF loan of 7.5 billion USD. In contrast the jihadi terrorists operating with impunity and state patronage in Pakistan have been India’s reward in this sham ‘war on terror’.
We, Indians, have been over-zealous to protect American interests even without being asked for it! Post 9/11 attacks on America we were too eager to allow Americans to use our territory to launch the attacks on Afghanistan, even before the Americans had put a formal request for it. In our overriding eagerness to be a part of US war efforts we did not even get our geography right (Afghanistan is not next door to us!). The duplicity in American policy is blatant; they ask us to collect all the evidence, compile them neatly, undertake national security audit and finally show restrain! What evidence and restraint did the US demonstrate when 9/11 happened? Where is our national interest? Realism in International Relations preaches that ‘national interest’ is the driving force for all state actors in every policy decision. I am yet to see any ‘national interest’ reflected in the responses of our government to the Mumbai attacks. We are worried about Pakistan, about America, about Bangladesh, about everyone but ourselves. For the audacious attack on our innocent people in Mumbai, we await the international community to tell us what to do, instead of informing the international community about our intentions and options in the pursuit of justice.
Indian response to the Mumbai attacks seems to be governed less by our ISI (Indian State Institutions) but more by Pakistani ISI. The bleeding hearts of this country and also of the world are so blinded by their love for the forever ‘nascent and fledging democracy’ of Pakistan that this ‘demon-cracy’ in India is quite acceptable to them. The body politic of Pakistan has the army as its body and the ISI as its soul while the civilian government is a convenient façade for the politically naive. The Pakistani Army Chief reprimanded the ‘Civilian President’ so severely that President Zardari lost his art of delicate diplomacy. The ‘Director General’ of ISI became the ‘Director’ of ISI. And of course the ever genteel Indian Prime Minister did not confront Zardari for his hearing problems when there is no possibility of any ‘lost in translation’! Furthermore, the Army Chief dispatched his own aircraft to abruptly fetch the Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, mid-way during his recent visit to India (coinciding with the Mumbai horror). The ever eloquent Qureshi has been fumbling for words ever since. Unfortunately, the ISI handlers did not brief some of their Hurriyat friends in Kashmir, such as Syed Ali Shah Geelani who attributed the unceremonious departure of Qureshi to India’s ‘intimidation’!
If the ex ISI Chief and presently Army Chief, Gen. Kayani, takes over power from the civilian government at least India can deal with a single agency which also happens to be the real rulers of the state as well as of the ‘non state actors’ based within Pakistan. India is neither responsible nor a sponsor of the ‘civilian’ government and democracy in Pakistan and this should never be allowed to hold India’s pursuit for justice to ransom.
There are numerous doom sayers in India who never tire of warning us about the nuclear capability of Pakistan and thereby dismissing any notion of hot pursuit of the offenders in Pakistani territory. Every time Pakistani jihadi groups have launched their atrocities in this country, the entire world goes ballistic in calling this region a ‘nuclear flashpoint’. It is time to ask fundamental questions. Has Pakistan acquired the nuclear umbrella to launch frequent terror attacks on India and then conveniently duck under the umbrella from any reprisal? Have we, in India, forfeited the right to pursue the terrorists and seek justice just because Pakistan has some nuclear arsenal of dubious nature? For how long do we tolerate the ‘Pakistani Nuclear Deterrent’ as an excuse to absolve it of the senseless murder of our citizens? There has to be a credible alternative to bring the culprits to the book other than engaging in this nuclear posturing. We can not allow our demands for justice to be held hostage to Pakistan’s military and nuclear capability.
The political class of our country seems to be working for the betterment of the global environment by recycling the waste. How else can we have Chhagan Bhujbal appointed as the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra again, after R R Patil became a casualty of his ‘conscience’? Mr. Sharad Pawar never stops springing surprises. His earlier nominee R R Patil could find his conscience only when his position became untenable and his eloquence became untreatable. Mr. Chhagan Bhujbal needs no introduction; he was forced to resign in 2003 as Deputy CM after the Telgi stamps scam was unearthed. The Telgi scam had multiple dimensions and funding of terrorist organisations was one of them! In all probabilities Mr. Chhagan Bhujbal will wrest the Home Ministry in Maharashtra. This does not seem to be a case of building confidence in the administration in fighting terror, unless rampant nepotism is the best way to fight terror. We all know Agriculture Minister, Mr. Sharad Pawar loves his cricket, his nephew Ajit Pawar, his daughter Supriya Sule and ruling his Maharashtra by proxy. For such a busy man how can farmer suicides be of any concern or for that matter fighting terror!
The fact that Mr. Vilas Rao Deshmukh ‘offered to resign’ to his party high command (like obeisance to a deity!) was a very small respite in the whole drama of the power hungry and morally bankrupt Congress Party. Narayan Rane is so furious at being denied the Chief Ministership that he is threatening to become a turncoat yet again. The point is, power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely! The Maharashtra Congress political soap opera has consumed some very important national resources at this precarious juncture. Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Defence Minister A K Antony happened to waste a lot of time in selecting some non entity as another Chief Minister in Mumbai. While we are told that our Government is engaging with the international community in exposing Pakistan’s heinous partnership with the terrorists, our Foreign and Defence Ministers have been busy hobnobbing with the MLAs over a petty provincial ‘problem’. Even at this critical hour if these two gentlemen put their political party before the country, hadn’t they better resign from the ministerships? The idea that these two vital ministries are without complete supervision is preposterous and speaks how unimportant national security is for our political ruling class.
The Prime Minister (after being properly secured by school children from the treetops!) finds the top of his voice in the serene Shantiniketan only to announce "tToday, we are witnessing an unacceptable rise in intolerance. Our society seems more divided, more angry, and, tragically, more violent". Imagine, our otherwise taciturn Prime Minister only has his own people to find fault with rather than provide them with succour and comfort at this hour. Mr. Prime Minster we are not more violent, rather, we have been subjected to more and more violence. Who were you addressing by the way: Indians or Pakistanis?
Counter terror responses of this country have been held hostage to the ambitions of these corrupt and unethical set of politicians. Incidentally, it seems most of us have forgotten this country has another constitutional head called the President. It seems that she did visit Mumbai but one has not heard her speak to the people. Who is in charge? Why does it seem like an institutional vacuum? How long can the government take public outrage for granted? We are tired of TV interviews where the likes of P. Chidambaram and Sharad Pawar read obituaries on the security and intelligence failures. We are tired of political theatrics. We are tired of our leaders assuring foreign countries of our inaction. We are tired of having our foreign policy run by foreign interests. A beleaguered nation awaits answers.
Fear has its use but cowardice has none. (Mahatma Gandhi)
Swati Parashar is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University, UK. She can be contacted at swatiparashar@hotmail.com
MUMBAI: ANSWERS TO READERS' QUESTIONS
B.RAMAN
(In this article, I will try to answer some of the questions, which I have received from readers of my articles on the Mumbai terrorist strikes)
1.How strong is the evidence of the involvement of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) ?
It is very strong.The evidence collected till now is partly direct and partly circumstantial. The direct evidence has come from the interrogation of one of the perpetrators (Mohammad Ajmal Amir, son of Mohammad Amir Imam, of village Faridkot in the Okara District of Pakistan's Punjab), who has been arrested and who is under interrogation. He has given details of the entire conspiracy and the involvement of the LET in it. The circumstantial evidence has come from the interrogation of four Indian Muslims arrested by the Uttar Pradesh Police in February,2008, during their investigation of the terrorist attack on a camp of the Central Reserve Police Force in Rampur on January 1,2008. They had reportedly spoken of the plans of the LET for future terrorist strikes, one of which was planned in Mumbai. One of them, Faheem Ahmed Ansari, was carrying a fake Pakistani passport and a list and maps of nine targets in southern Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal Hotel and other sites attacked on November 26,2008. Some other circumstantial evidence has also come from technical intelligence reportedly collected by the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) in September,2008, which spoke of the plans of the LET to launch a sea-borne terrorist strike in Mumbai.
2.Were there only 10 terrorists involved?
That is what the Mumbai Police and the Maharashtra Government have been saying, apparently on the basis of the interrogation of the arrested perpetrator. The operation involved detailed intelligence collection, reconnoitring the places to be attacked and the final planning and execution. It is difficult to accept that the same 10 persons performed all these tasks.There must have been definitely more people in the conspiracy--- at least performing peripheral roles such as intelligence collection and reconnoitring.
3.What are your comments on the modus operandi used?
Jihadi terrorists indulge in acts of collective brutality and individualised brutality. The collective brutality is in the form of planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in public places, throwing hand-grenades into crowds etc. There is no face-to-face brutalisation. Individualised brutality is face-to-face brutalisation of targeted individuals. Examples of individualised face-to-face brutality: the kidnapping and murder of Ravi Mhatre of the Indian Assistant High Commission in Birmingham by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1983, the kidnapping and murder of the Vice-Chancellor of the Srinagar University and two others by the JKLF in 1990, the kidnapping of some Western tourists by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under the name of Al Faran in Kashmir in 1995 and slitting of the throat of one of them,the slitting of the throat of a young Hindu passenger of the Indian Airlines aircraft, which was hijacked by the HUM to Kandahar in December,1999, and the kidnapping and beheading of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, in Karachi in January-February,2002, in which the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JUM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) were reported to have been involved. We had in the past seen instances of individualised brutality in J&K, but not in Indian territory outside J&K.There are many reports of individualised face-to-face brutality against Indian and Israeli nationals and other Jews. Reports of individualised brutality against Indian nationals have mainly come from the Taj Palace Hotel and against Israeli nationals and other Jews mainly from the Narriman House.While some Indian nationals in the Taj Palace Hotel were allegedly lined up and shot dead, Israelis and other Jewish persons in the Narriman House were allegedly tortured and killed in a savage manner.Of the six Americans killed, at least two seem to have been killed in a brutal manner not because they were Americans, but because they were Jewish, holding the dual nationality of the US and Israel. India's home-grown jihadis outside J&K have till now not come to notice for indulging in individualised brutality. Slitting the throat of an infidel or of a Muslim apostate is a typical MO of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani jihadi organisations. They do it not only to intimidate non-Muslims, but also as an act of religious sacrifice to Allah just as one slits the throat of a goat before Id.
4.The LET is reported to have denied its involvement?
This does not mean anything.In fact, it is not the LET which has denied involvement. It is the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), of which Prof.-Hafiz Mohd.Sayeed is the Amir, which has denied involvement. Indian and American intelligence professionals look upon the JUD as the political wing of the LET. The Americans have included the LET as well as the JUD in their list of terrorist organisations. The Musharraf Government, which banned the LET as a terrorist organisation on January 15,2002, refused to ban the JUD on the ground that it has nothing to do with the LET. In fact, it was the contention of the Musharraf Government that the LET had ceased to exist in Pakistan as a result of the actions taken by it and that what operated in India under the name of the LET was a purely Indian organisation. However, even large sections of the Pakistani media have refused to accept the Govt's contention and describe the JUD as the political wing of the LET. While the LET sometimes accepts responsibility for successful strikes in J&K, it never claims responsibility for terrorist strikes in Indian territory outside J&K, lest it embarrass the Pakistan Government.
5.An organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen (DM) is reported to have claimed responsibility in a message sent to the Indian media. Some reports say this message had originated from a computer in Pakistan?
The word Deccan refers to South India and was widely used during the Moghul and British rule. It is now rarely used in India, but in Pakistan it continues to be used widely. Many Pakistanis refer to the Indian Hyderbad as Hyderabad, Deccan, to distinguish it from Hyderabad in Sindh. After independence in 1947, the ruler of the state of Hyderabad, who was known as the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the ruler of the State of Junagadh in Gujarat, who was known as the Nawab of Junagadh, hesitated to join the Indian Federation. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, sent the Army into Hyderabad to merge it with India. Junagadh also joined India without the need for using the Army there. Many pro-Pakistan Muslims from Hyderbad fled to Karachi and settled down there. The LET has long enjoyed some support from the descendents of some Muslims who migrated to Karachi from Hyderabad and Junagadh. It describes Hyderabad and Junagadh as Pakistani territory illegally occupied by India. One of its objectives is to liberate J&K, Hyderabad and Junagadh from what it describes as Hindu rule. It is possible that some of these Muslims originating from Hyderabad have been constituted by the LET into an organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen and told to claim responsibility for the Mumbai terrorist strike. The ISI and the LET are known to adopt this MO of asking someone else to claim responsibility in order to conceal their own involvement. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Pakistani Army shot down a plane of the Indian Air Force. The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), an Indian terrorist orgnisation whose leader Syed Salahuddin is based in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the shooting down. Subsequently, the R&AW intercepted a telephone conversation between Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and Musharraf, who was then in Beijing. In that tape, which was released by the Govt. to the media, Aziz clearly said that the Army shot down the Indian aircraft and asked the HM to claim responsibility. Musharraf replied : "Very good."
6. Has there been the involvement of home-grown jihadis in the Mumbai terrorist strike?
Very likely. It is very difficult to carry out an operation of this nature by a group of Pakistanis without at least the logistic support of some indian Muslims. India's home-grown jihadis fall into two groups. The first group consists of those who have joined the LET and the HUJI and have been helping them. These are the fifth columnists in the Indian Muslim community.The second group consists of those calling themselves the Indian Mujahideen (IM), who maintain they have no links with the ISI or the Pakistani jihadi organisations. The IM was responsible for the serial explosions in many cities since November 2007. It has also claimed responsibility for the Mumbai suburban train blasts of July,2006. There is so far no evidence to show that the IM might have been involved in the Mumbai terrorist strike. The involvement of the group of fifth columnists is a strong likelihood. This possibility was also corroborated by the interrogation of Faheem Ahmed Ansari.
7 What are the links of the LET with Al Qaeda? Is there a possibility of the involvement of Al Qaeda in the Mumbai terrorist strike?
The LET is a member of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed by Osama bin Laden in 1998. Abu Zubaidah, then projected as No.3 in Al Qaeda, was arrested from the house of an LET operative in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002. In 2002, when the command and control of Al Qaeda was disrupted by the US military strikes in Afghanistan, the LET took over the responsibility for the co-ordination of the operations of the IIF.Subsequently, suspected individual members of the LET in the local Muslim communities were arrested in a number of countries and an LET cell getting itself secretly trained in the US with the help of some local Muslims for operations in India was neutralised in the US. A press note issued by the US Department of Treasury on October 16,2003, after designating Dawood Ibrahim as a global terrorist said: "Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian crime lord, has found common cause with Al Qaida, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamic extremists aimed at destabilizing the Indian government. He is wanted in India for the 1993 Bombay Exchange bombings and is known to have financed the activities of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous), a group designated by the United States in October 2001 and banned by the Pakistani Government -- who also froze their assets -- in January 2002. Ibrahim's syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the UK and Western Europe. The syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa are shared with Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network. Successful routes established over recent years by Ibrahim's syndicate have been subsequently utilised by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes. In the late 1990s, Ibrahim travelled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.Ibrahim's syndicate has consistently aimed to destabilise the Indian Government through inciting riots, acts of terrorism and civil disobedience. He is currently wanted by India for the March 12,1993, Bombay Exchange bombings, which killed hundreds of Indians and injured over a thousand more.Information from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that Ibrahim has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET). For example, this information indicates that Ibrahim has been helping finance increasing attacks in Gujarat by LET. " See my article at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers9/paper818.html . The meticulous planning and execution of the Mumbai atrike and the targeting of Israelis and other Jews and the use of shocking brutality against them indicate strongly an Al Qaeda mind. The mind that planned and orchestrated was Al Qaeda's, but the hands that killed were of the LET.
8. What about the involvement of the ISI?
The terrorist organisations operating from Pakistani territory fall into four groups: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, which is mainly active in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, which poses a threat to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, and the LET and other organisations, which are operating against India from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Pakistan has been acting only against the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and co-operating with the US against Al Qaeda. It has not taken any action against the Afghan Taliban and the anti-India organisations, which it looks upon as strategic assets to promote its national interests in Afghanistan and against India. It has not taken any action against their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. There are two old definitions of what constitutes state sponsorship of terrorism given by George Shultz, the Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, and George Bush, the father of the present President, who was Vice-President under Reagan. They gave these definitions after the terrorist strikes against the US Marines and the French commandoes in Beirut. They said that any State that provides sanctuaries or training or arms and ammunition, or funds or travel documents to terrorists is a state-sponsor of terrorism. In subsequent years, the State Department clarified that these facilities must have been provided by the guilty State repeatedly. One or two isolated instances would not bring a State under this category. The LET entered India via J&K in 1993. Before that it was active only in Afghanistan. Since 1993, it has been enjoying all these facilities in Pakistani territory with the co-operation or at least the connivance of the ISI. The accumulated evidence of nearly 15 years collected not only by the Indian intelligence, but also by the agencies of the US and many West European countries clearly shows the involvement of the ISI in propping up the LET and using it against India. There is, therefore, enough evidence to act against it.
9.How about the denials of President Asif Ali Zardari? He has even denied that the arrested LET perpetrator is a Pakistani?
This is nothing surprising. By his denials, Zardari has shown that he has the same reflexes as the previous Pakistani rulers. In 1999, regular Pakistani troops posing as militants infiltrated into indian territory. the Indian Army killed many of them. The Pakistan Army refused to accept the dead bodies of its own soldiers and contended that they were indian militants and not Pakistanis. It is immature on the part of us to expect that Zardari or any other Pakistani ruler would do a mea culpa.
10.How about suggestions for joint investigation emanating from the US and some sections of our own elite?
These, if accepted, would give an escape valve to Pakistan.After the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, the US and China, independently of each other, proposed that the chiefs of the ISI and the R&AW meet secretly to discuss the Indian allegations of ISI involvement. Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister, rejected their suggestion.He had many reasons for doing so. One of his reasons was that the ISI would find out during these meetings what evidence the Indian Police had been able to collect and try to cover up its tracks.
11. Zardari says that India has not been able to produce any evidence against persons living in Pakistan whose arrest and handing-over it has been demanding.
The people, whose arrest and handing-over India has been demanding fall into four groups. In the first group are the Khalistanis, who hijacked Indian aircraft to Lahore. Pakistan terminated the hijackings and returned the aircraft, but refused to hand over the hijackers to India for trial. The hijackings were covered by the internatinal media, including the press conferences addressed by the hijackers. Pakistan did try Gajendra Singh, the hijacker of the Dal Khalsa. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment, but he was allowed to spend the period in a gurudwara instead of in a jail. He used to meet and address the Sikh jathas visiting the Nankana Sahib in the Lahore area. When Pakistan was asked to re-arrest him and hand him over to India for trial in cases pending against him in Indian courts, it denied that he was in Pakistan.In the second group are Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon, who are wanted for trial in India in connection with the March,1993, Mumbai blasts. The evidence against Dawood Ibrahim has been produced not only by the Indian intelligence, but also by the US intelligence as could be seen from the press release dated October 16,2003 of the US Treasury Department. The third group consists of terrorists from J&K operating from Pakistani territory such as Syed Salahuddin, the Amir of the HM. The fourth group consists of Pakistani nationals such as Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), Hafiz Mohd Sayeed, the Amir of the JUD etc. Pakistan's stand has been consistent, whoever might be the ruler. In the case of the Indian nationals in the first two groups, it denies their very presence in Pakistani territory even though sections of the Pakistani media have been reporting about their presence and activities in Pakistani territory. In the case of the Kashmiris in the third group, it denies that they are Indian nationals and projects them as freedom fighters and not as terrorists. In the case of the Pakistanis in the fourth group it says that India has not been able to produce any evidence against them.
Since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, there has not been a single criminal case involving a Muslim in which it has extended mutual legal assistance to India---- whether it was a case of terrorism, robbery, cattle-lifting, narcotics smuggling, rape or even child sex. It has had no hesitation in handing over nearly 200 Muslims suspected by the US as Al Qaeda members to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the US without following the due process of law, but it has never handed over a single Muslim criminal to India for trial. Even in the case of the US, it avoids handing over persons whose interrogation might bring out their links with the ISI.A typical example is the case of the accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case. Another typical example is that of Dawood Ibrahim. The ISI is worried that his interrogation outside Pakistan might bring out his involvement in the nuclear proliferation activities of Pakistan.
12. How about the role of the Pakistan Army?
There are two defining characteristics of the mindset of the Pakistan Army. It thinks that its nuclear and missile capabilities have given it a psychological parity with India and will enable it to continue to indulge in terrorism against India without fear of a retaliation by India. It thinks that the Indian policy-makers are not prepared to take the risk of a military option for fear of provoking a nuclear confrontation. It has also convinced itself that the US will not allow India to choose a military option due to the same fear of a nuclear confrontation. It thinks that its strategic position and its role as the so-called frontline state in the US-led war against Al Qaeda will guarantee that the West will not exercise too much pressure on it to respond to Indian concerns. This mindset has to be changed through appropriate actions by India.
13. Is a military option available to India?
Yes. We should not paralyse ourselves into inaction through fears of a nuclear confrontation if we choose the military option. By doing so, we should be confirming Pakistan's thinking that its nuclear capability will protect it against any Indian retaliation. However, this is not the time for a military confrontation when nearly 50,000 NATO troops are fighting against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and when more US troops are expected to go there when Barack Obama takes over as the US President. A military confrontation between India and Pakistan could come in the way of the movement of supplies for the NATO forces from Karachi. It could hamper the war against terrorism in the Pashtun tribal belt. We might lose whatever little support we have from the US and other NATO countries. If the worst comes to the worst, we may have to use the military option if and when the time for it comes. It has not yet come.
14. You talk of the covert action option? What do you mean by it?
One of the definitions of a covert action is a deniable para-military or para-diplomatic action against an adversary---whether it is a state actor or a foreign-based non-State actor--- when traditional military or diplomatic options are considered as not feasible or not advisable. It is an unconventional option to meet an unconventional threat from terrorists and a State sponsoring terrorism.The US and Israel have reserved to themselves through public declarations the right to use unconventional covert options if left with no other alternative. Other countries believe in this option, but have not publicly admitted it.
15.Is not covert action immoral? Will we not be stooping to the same level as Pakistan?
By saying we should use the covert action option, one does not mean that we should indulge in actions against the Pakistani people which would amount to terrorism. There could be a wide choice of covert actions to convey a message to Pakistan that the use of terrorism against India will be counter-productive. The objective of the covert action should be limited to neutralising the LET and its capabilities in Pakistani territory. During the election campaign, Obama said that he would be willing to consider actions against Al Qaeda in Pakistani territory if he concluded that Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to deal with Al Qaeda. We should have a similar policy with regard to the LET. (7-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
(In this article, I will try to answer some of the questions, which I have received from readers of my articles on the Mumbai terrorist strikes)
1.How strong is the evidence of the involvement of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) ?
It is very strong.The evidence collected till now is partly direct and partly circumstantial. The direct evidence has come from the interrogation of one of the perpetrators (Mohammad Ajmal Amir, son of Mohammad Amir Imam, of village Faridkot in the Okara District of Pakistan's Punjab), who has been arrested and who is under interrogation. He has given details of the entire conspiracy and the involvement of the LET in it. The circumstantial evidence has come from the interrogation of four Indian Muslims arrested by the Uttar Pradesh Police in February,2008, during their investigation of the terrorist attack on a camp of the Central Reserve Police Force in Rampur on January 1,2008. They had reportedly spoken of the plans of the LET for future terrorist strikes, one of which was planned in Mumbai. One of them, Faheem Ahmed Ansari, was carrying a fake Pakistani passport and a list and maps of nine targets in southern Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal Hotel and other sites attacked on November 26,2008. Some other circumstantial evidence has also come from technical intelligence reportedly collected by the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) in September,2008, which spoke of the plans of the LET to launch a sea-borne terrorist strike in Mumbai.
2.Were there only 10 terrorists involved?
That is what the Mumbai Police and the Maharashtra Government have been saying, apparently on the basis of the interrogation of the arrested perpetrator. The operation involved detailed intelligence collection, reconnoitring the places to be attacked and the final planning and execution. It is difficult to accept that the same 10 persons performed all these tasks.There must have been definitely more people in the conspiracy--- at least performing peripheral roles such as intelligence collection and reconnoitring.
3.What are your comments on the modus operandi used?
Jihadi terrorists indulge in acts of collective brutality and individualised brutality. The collective brutality is in the form of planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in public places, throwing hand-grenades into crowds etc. There is no face-to-face brutalisation. Individualised brutality is face-to-face brutalisation of targeted individuals. Examples of individualised face-to-face brutality: the kidnapping and murder of Ravi Mhatre of the Indian Assistant High Commission in Birmingham by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1983, the kidnapping and murder of the Vice-Chancellor of the Srinagar University and two others by the JKLF in 1990, the kidnapping of some Western tourists by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under the name of Al Faran in Kashmir in 1995 and slitting of the throat of one of them,the slitting of the throat of a young Hindu passenger of the Indian Airlines aircraft, which was hijacked by the HUM to Kandahar in December,1999, and the kidnapping and beheading of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, in Karachi in January-February,2002, in which the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JUM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) were reported to have been involved. We had in the past seen instances of individualised brutality in J&K, but not in Indian territory outside J&K.There are many reports of individualised face-to-face brutality against Indian and Israeli nationals and other Jews. Reports of individualised brutality against Indian nationals have mainly come from the Taj Palace Hotel and against Israeli nationals and other Jews mainly from the Narriman House.While some Indian nationals in the Taj Palace Hotel were allegedly lined up and shot dead, Israelis and other Jewish persons in the Narriman House were allegedly tortured and killed in a savage manner.Of the six Americans killed, at least two seem to have been killed in a brutal manner not because they were Americans, but because they were Jewish, holding the dual nationality of the US and Israel. India's home-grown jihadis outside J&K have till now not come to notice for indulging in individualised brutality. Slitting the throat of an infidel or of a Muslim apostate is a typical MO of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani jihadi organisations. They do it not only to intimidate non-Muslims, but also as an act of religious sacrifice to Allah just as one slits the throat of a goat before Id.
4.The LET is reported to have denied its involvement?
This does not mean anything.In fact, it is not the LET which has denied involvement. It is the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), of which Prof.-Hafiz Mohd.Sayeed is the Amir, which has denied involvement. Indian and American intelligence professionals look upon the JUD as the political wing of the LET. The Americans have included the LET as well as the JUD in their list of terrorist organisations. The Musharraf Government, which banned the LET as a terrorist organisation on January 15,2002, refused to ban the JUD on the ground that it has nothing to do with the LET. In fact, it was the contention of the Musharraf Government that the LET had ceased to exist in Pakistan as a result of the actions taken by it and that what operated in India under the name of the LET was a purely Indian organisation. However, even large sections of the Pakistani media have refused to accept the Govt's contention and describe the JUD as the political wing of the LET. While the LET sometimes accepts responsibility for successful strikes in J&K, it never claims responsibility for terrorist strikes in Indian territory outside J&K, lest it embarrass the Pakistan Government.
5.An organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen (DM) is reported to have claimed responsibility in a message sent to the Indian media. Some reports say this message had originated from a computer in Pakistan?
The word Deccan refers to South India and was widely used during the Moghul and British rule. It is now rarely used in India, but in Pakistan it continues to be used widely. Many Pakistanis refer to the Indian Hyderbad as Hyderabad, Deccan, to distinguish it from Hyderabad in Sindh. After independence in 1947, the ruler of the state of Hyderabad, who was known as the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the ruler of the State of Junagadh in Gujarat, who was known as the Nawab of Junagadh, hesitated to join the Indian Federation. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, sent the Army into Hyderabad to merge it with India. Junagadh also joined India without the need for using the Army there. Many pro-Pakistan Muslims from Hyderbad fled to Karachi and settled down there. The LET has long enjoyed some support from the descendents of some Muslims who migrated to Karachi from Hyderabad and Junagadh. It describes Hyderabad and Junagadh as Pakistani territory illegally occupied by India. One of its objectives is to liberate J&K, Hyderabad and Junagadh from what it describes as Hindu rule. It is possible that some of these Muslims originating from Hyderabad have been constituted by the LET into an organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen and told to claim responsibility for the Mumbai terrorist strike. The ISI and the LET are known to adopt this MO of asking someone else to claim responsibility in order to conceal their own involvement. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Pakistani Army shot down a plane of the Indian Air Force. The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), an Indian terrorist orgnisation whose leader Syed Salahuddin is based in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the shooting down. Subsequently, the R&AW intercepted a telephone conversation between Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and Musharraf, who was then in Beijing. In that tape, which was released by the Govt. to the media, Aziz clearly said that the Army shot down the Indian aircraft and asked the HM to claim responsibility. Musharraf replied : "Very good."
6. Has there been the involvement of home-grown jihadis in the Mumbai terrorist strike?
Very likely. It is very difficult to carry out an operation of this nature by a group of Pakistanis without at least the logistic support of some indian Muslims. India's home-grown jihadis fall into two groups. The first group consists of those who have joined the LET and the HUJI and have been helping them. These are the fifth columnists in the Indian Muslim community.The second group consists of those calling themselves the Indian Mujahideen (IM), who maintain they have no links with the ISI or the Pakistani jihadi organisations. The IM was responsible for the serial explosions in many cities since November 2007. It has also claimed responsibility for the Mumbai suburban train blasts of July,2006. There is so far no evidence to show that the IM might have been involved in the Mumbai terrorist strike. The involvement of the group of fifth columnists is a strong likelihood. This possibility was also corroborated by the interrogation of Faheem Ahmed Ansari.
7 What are the links of the LET with Al Qaeda? Is there a possibility of the involvement of Al Qaeda in the Mumbai terrorist strike?
The LET is a member of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed by Osama bin Laden in 1998. Abu Zubaidah, then projected as No.3 in Al Qaeda, was arrested from the house of an LET operative in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002. In 2002, when the command and control of Al Qaeda was disrupted by the US military strikes in Afghanistan, the LET took over the responsibility for the co-ordination of the operations of the IIF.Subsequently, suspected individual members of the LET in the local Muslim communities were arrested in a number of countries and an LET cell getting itself secretly trained in the US with the help of some local Muslims for operations in India was neutralised in the US. A press note issued by the US Department of Treasury on October 16,2003, after designating Dawood Ibrahim as a global terrorist said: "Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian crime lord, has found common cause with Al Qaida, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamic extremists aimed at destabilizing the Indian government. He is wanted in India for the 1993 Bombay Exchange bombings and is known to have financed the activities of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous), a group designated by the United States in October 2001 and banned by the Pakistani Government -- who also froze their assets -- in January 2002. Ibrahim's syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the UK and Western Europe. The syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa are shared with Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network. Successful routes established over recent years by Ibrahim's syndicate have been subsequently utilised by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes. In the late 1990s, Ibrahim travelled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.Ibrahim's syndicate has consistently aimed to destabilise the Indian Government through inciting riots, acts of terrorism and civil disobedience. He is currently wanted by India for the March 12,1993, Bombay Exchange bombings, which killed hundreds of Indians and injured over a thousand more.Information from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that Ibrahim has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET). For example, this information indicates that Ibrahim has been helping finance increasing attacks in Gujarat by LET. " See my article at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers9/paper818.html . The meticulous planning and execution of the Mumbai atrike and the targeting of Israelis and other Jews and the use of shocking brutality against them indicate strongly an Al Qaeda mind. The mind that planned and orchestrated was Al Qaeda's, but the hands that killed were of the LET.
8. What about the involvement of the ISI?
The terrorist organisations operating from Pakistani territory fall into four groups: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, which is mainly active in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, which poses a threat to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, and the LET and other organisations, which are operating against India from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Pakistan has been acting only against the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and co-operating with the US against Al Qaeda. It has not taken any action against the Afghan Taliban and the anti-India organisations, which it looks upon as strategic assets to promote its national interests in Afghanistan and against India. It has not taken any action against their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. There are two old definitions of what constitutes state sponsorship of terrorism given by George Shultz, the Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, and George Bush, the father of the present President, who was Vice-President under Reagan. They gave these definitions after the terrorist strikes against the US Marines and the French commandoes in Beirut. They said that any State that provides sanctuaries or training or arms and ammunition, or funds or travel documents to terrorists is a state-sponsor of terrorism. In subsequent years, the State Department clarified that these facilities must have been provided by the guilty State repeatedly. One or two isolated instances would not bring a State under this category. The LET entered India via J&K in 1993. Before that it was active only in Afghanistan. Since 1993, it has been enjoying all these facilities in Pakistani territory with the co-operation or at least the connivance of the ISI. The accumulated evidence of nearly 15 years collected not only by the Indian intelligence, but also by the agencies of the US and many West European countries clearly shows the involvement of the ISI in propping up the LET and using it against India. There is, therefore, enough evidence to act against it.
9.How about the denials of President Asif Ali Zardari? He has even denied that the arrested LET perpetrator is a Pakistani?
This is nothing surprising. By his denials, Zardari has shown that he has the same reflexes as the previous Pakistani rulers. In 1999, regular Pakistani troops posing as militants infiltrated into indian territory. the Indian Army killed many of them. The Pakistan Army refused to accept the dead bodies of its own soldiers and contended that they were indian militants and not Pakistanis. It is immature on the part of us to expect that Zardari or any other Pakistani ruler would do a mea culpa.
10.How about suggestions for joint investigation emanating from the US and some sections of our own elite?
These, if accepted, would give an escape valve to Pakistan.After the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, the US and China, independently of each other, proposed that the chiefs of the ISI and the R&AW meet secretly to discuss the Indian allegations of ISI involvement. Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister, rejected their suggestion.He had many reasons for doing so. One of his reasons was that the ISI would find out during these meetings what evidence the Indian Police had been able to collect and try to cover up its tracks.
11. Zardari says that India has not been able to produce any evidence against persons living in Pakistan whose arrest and handing-over it has been demanding.
The people, whose arrest and handing-over India has been demanding fall into four groups. In the first group are the Khalistanis, who hijacked Indian aircraft to Lahore. Pakistan terminated the hijackings and returned the aircraft, but refused to hand over the hijackers to India for trial. The hijackings were covered by the internatinal media, including the press conferences addressed by the hijackers. Pakistan did try Gajendra Singh, the hijacker of the Dal Khalsa. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment, but he was allowed to spend the period in a gurudwara instead of in a jail. He used to meet and address the Sikh jathas visiting the Nankana Sahib in the Lahore area. When Pakistan was asked to re-arrest him and hand him over to India for trial in cases pending against him in Indian courts, it denied that he was in Pakistan.In the second group are Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon, who are wanted for trial in India in connection with the March,1993, Mumbai blasts. The evidence against Dawood Ibrahim has been produced not only by the Indian intelligence, but also by the US intelligence as could be seen from the press release dated October 16,2003 of the US Treasury Department. The third group consists of terrorists from J&K operating from Pakistani territory such as Syed Salahuddin, the Amir of the HM. The fourth group consists of Pakistani nationals such as Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), Hafiz Mohd Sayeed, the Amir of the JUD etc. Pakistan's stand has been consistent, whoever might be the ruler. In the case of the Indian nationals in the first two groups, it denies their very presence in Pakistani territory even though sections of the Pakistani media have been reporting about their presence and activities in Pakistani territory. In the case of the Kashmiris in the third group, it denies that they are Indian nationals and projects them as freedom fighters and not as terrorists. In the case of the Pakistanis in the fourth group it says that India has not been able to produce any evidence against them.
Since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, there has not been a single criminal case involving a Muslim in which it has extended mutual legal assistance to India---- whether it was a case of terrorism, robbery, cattle-lifting, narcotics smuggling, rape or even child sex. It has had no hesitation in handing over nearly 200 Muslims suspected by the US as Al Qaeda members to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the US without following the due process of law, but it has never handed over a single Muslim criminal to India for trial. Even in the case of the US, it avoids handing over persons whose interrogation might bring out their links with the ISI.A typical example is the case of the accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case. Another typical example is that of Dawood Ibrahim. The ISI is worried that his interrogation outside Pakistan might bring out his involvement in the nuclear proliferation activities of Pakistan.
12. How about the role of the Pakistan Army?
There are two defining characteristics of the mindset of the Pakistan Army. It thinks that its nuclear and missile capabilities have given it a psychological parity with India and will enable it to continue to indulge in terrorism against India without fear of a retaliation by India. It thinks that the Indian policy-makers are not prepared to take the risk of a military option for fear of provoking a nuclear confrontation. It has also convinced itself that the US will not allow India to choose a military option due to the same fear of a nuclear confrontation. It thinks that its strategic position and its role as the so-called frontline state in the US-led war against Al Qaeda will guarantee that the West will not exercise too much pressure on it to respond to Indian concerns. This mindset has to be changed through appropriate actions by India.
13. Is a military option available to India?
Yes. We should not paralyse ourselves into inaction through fears of a nuclear confrontation if we choose the military option. By doing so, we should be confirming Pakistan's thinking that its nuclear capability will protect it against any Indian retaliation. However, this is not the time for a military confrontation when nearly 50,000 NATO troops are fighting against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and when more US troops are expected to go there when Barack Obama takes over as the US President. A military confrontation between India and Pakistan could come in the way of the movement of supplies for the NATO forces from Karachi. It could hamper the war against terrorism in the Pashtun tribal belt. We might lose whatever little support we have from the US and other NATO countries. If the worst comes to the worst, we may have to use the military option if and when the time for it comes. It has not yet come.
14. You talk of the covert action option? What do you mean by it?
One of the definitions of a covert action is a deniable para-military or para-diplomatic action against an adversary---whether it is a state actor or a foreign-based non-State actor--- when traditional military or diplomatic options are considered as not feasible or not advisable. It is an unconventional option to meet an unconventional threat from terrorists and a State sponsoring terrorism.The US and Israel have reserved to themselves through public declarations the right to use unconventional covert options if left with no other alternative. Other countries believe in this option, but have not publicly admitted it.
15.Is not covert action immoral? Will we not be stooping to the same level as Pakistan?
By saying we should use the covert action option, one does not mean that we should indulge in actions against the Pakistani people which would amount to terrorism. There could be a wide choice of covert actions to convey a message to Pakistan that the use of terrorism against India will be counter-productive. The objective of the covert action should be limited to neutralising the LET and its capabilities in Pakistani territory. During the election campaign, Obama said that he would be willing to consider actions against Al Qaeda in Pakistani territory if he concluded that Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to deal with Al Qaeda. We should have a similar policy with regard to the LET. (7-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
'Hamid Gul among 4 ex-Pak army officials may be put on UN sanctions'
Islamabad (PTI): The US is believed to be planning to send the names of at least four Pakistanis, including former ISI chief Hamid Gul, and Pakistan-based groups to the UN Security Council for imposing sanctions against them for alleged links to terrorist activities.
US State Department deputy spokesman Robert Wood told a briefing in Washington on Friday that details of the list of names to be submitted to the Security Council would be revealed when the document is sent to the UN.
Sources privy to the development told PTI that the names of Lt Gen Gul, who served as chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence during 1987-89, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, who was ISI chief during 1992-93, Maj Gen Zahirul Islam Abbasi and a former army chief were believed to be on the list.
Asked to confirm if the US had already sent the names of some Pakistani individuals, including several retired ISI officials, to the Security Council for addition to the UN terrorist sanctions list, State Department spokesman Wood said: "I'm not going to comment on names that we may or may not submit to the UN. "It wouldn't be appropriate for me to do (so) at this point."
There has been no official word from the Pakistan government on this issue.
Recent media reports in Pakistan have suggested that Gul and at least three other former officials of the powerful spy agency could be put on the list of terrorist sanctions. Gul played a key role in assisting mujahideen groups that fought against Soviet forces which had occupied Afghanistan and in instigating the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. He continues to be a vocal supporter of jehadi groups.
Beyond the line of control
Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are battling extremists at different levels and all three of them are 'destined' to play a role in the 'war on terror'
By Hassan Abbas
Naomi Klein, Canadian columnist and author of The Shock Doctrine insightfully says, "Terrorism doesn't just blow up buildings; it blasts every other issue off the political map. The spectre of terrorism - real and exaggerated - has become a shield of impunity, protecting governments around the world from scrutiny for their human rights abuses." South Asia today is a victim of terror in this context. Social injustice, political instability, religious fanaticism and a rising sense of insecurity are the factors pushing South Asians to the brink of a prolonged conflict.
If this diagnosis is accurate, then logically the remedy lies in the rule of law, the empowerment of the ordinary, pluralism and the resolution of the regional conflicts. No change in the Western power corridors alone can usher in a transformation in South Asia, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, if these three states remain poorly governed, distrustful of each other and continue with the policy of marginalisation of their minority communities – ethnic as well as religious. India is better governed than Pakistan and Pakistan has a better track record than Afghanistan but at a regional level the fate of these countries is interlinked. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have similar issues but for the purpose of this article, I am only focusing on countries which are battling extremists at different levels and are 'destined' to play a role in the 'war on terror'. United States' relations with and stakes in these three states also put them into a unique category of sorts.
The fact that President-elect Barack Obama of the United States has not used the phrase 'war on terror' at least since he won the election on Nov 4 is a hopeful sign. It is encouraging because the 'war' has complicated the South Asian scene immensely in the last eight years or so and a different strategy and perspective is the need of the hour. However, any change in US policy can only have a complimentary effect – as South Asians themselves hold the real key.
Beginning with the case of India, its democratic and pluralistic credentials are well established. In a Hindu majority state, till recently a Muslim was the president of the state and currently a member of the Sikh minority community is the prime minister. However, there are also active insurgencies in its Northeastern part and, according to South Asia Intelligence Review, a mainstream Indian research centre, there are 30 armed insurgent groups operating in that region. India's controversial policies in regard to Jammu and Kashmir, are more well known to Pakistan. Despite sustained economic growth, poverty and inequality are also serious challenges facing India. Last but not the least of its troubles relate to the plight of minorities in India – primarily Christians and Muslims. Attacks on many Christian churches in recent years, orchestrated by Hindu extremist groups, are well recorded and findings of the Sacher Committee report about the social, economic and educational status of Muslims of India speaks volumes about the societal as well as institutional biases against Muslims. Massacres of Muslims in Gujarat a few years ago were reported worldwide. Despite these problems, India is internationally recognised as a rising power and its economic success is acknowledged round the globe. According to a recent US intelligence assessment (NIC's 2025), India's rise as one of the major global economic powers in coming years is a foregone conclusion. Growth rate statistics and infrastructure improvements in India substantiate this view. The fact that the Bush administration went out of its way to sign a treaty for nuclear cooperation, ignoring the concerns of many influential quarters even within the US, show the US deference for India's success.
In this context, the ghastly and deplorable terror attacks in Mumbai jolted India as well as the international community. Besides exposing the failure of its intelligence services and counter-terrorism outfits, it damaged the credibility of Indian politicians in the eyes of the people. More importantly for Pakistan, however, is the Indian consensus that Pakistan has at least something to do with all this. By and large, the international community - and especially the Western states - share Indian suspicions. Interestingly, Pakistan sees this assessment as a mere propaganda. Irrespective of whether any Pakistan based militant group will be found involved in Mumbai attacks, Pakistan must look inwards also to analyse and evaluate why Indians think on these lines.
Without a doubt, Indian media channels jumped to conclusions that were targeting Pakistan even when the details about terrorists were very sketchy and unconfirmed, but likewise mainstream Pakistani media was also unwilling initially to even hypothetically consider that militants from Pakistan can be involved. If Pakistani militants can destroy Islamabad's Marriott hotel and blow themselves up so often in almost all corners of Pakistan, what can possibly stop them from going to India and conducting similar operations. Considering all possibilities dispassionately is no sin.
Indian government had its own limitations, inhibitions and political compulsions to put all the blame on Pakistan right from the word go. Hopefully, wisdom will prevail when India comes out of the shock. Extremism, bigotry and violence know no state boundaries. The fire that is burning in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan was bound to reach India in some shape or the other. Indian regional policy has its share of failures and transgressions. In the sphere of intelligence wars too, India was not behind other states in the region. However, given that India's democratic institutions are strong, it will likely realise that unresolved conflicts, perennial distrust between neighbours and use of force against one's own people exacerbate differences and increase chances of non-violent reactions.
Pakistan is more or less in a similar bind, though the causes are perhaps more potent and symptoms of malaise are more pronounced. Authoritarianism, feudal mentality of the political elite (with few exceptions) and confusion about the role of religion in state encouraged by the 'defenders of the faith' has engendered an identity crisis in the country that has stilted Pakistan's growth and progress. Ethnic and sectarian confrontations are a by-product of this phenomenon. Rivalry with India and consequent insecurity on the other hand undermined Pakistan's potential significantly. Rather than trying to figure out how to tackle these serious challenges, historically Pakistan's leadership pushed it into regional and global battlefronts in search of security. The consequences are proving to be disastrous. We must not forget that this vicious cycle of instability begins from state's failure to govern and stabilise itself.
Afghanistan's story is not much different, though it went through a longer spell of instability, civil war and violence. Tribalism, besides failure to develop an equitable formula to share power among different ethnic groups and bridge the gap between its urban and rural areas spell the disaster for Afghanistan. Consequently, its leaders looked outwards for strength and resources turning it into a rentier state. Afghan Jihad of the 1980s saved Afghanistan from Soviets but destroyed its social fabric and the US involvement in the country since late 2001 has created more problems. Taliban resurgence is a gift of Western 'nation-building' failure. The solutions there, too, are hidden internally.
This brief analysis about political and security dynamics in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is geared to make just one basic point – internal solutions in terms of empowerment of the people, equitable rights and instituting accountable and representative governments are crucial to stability, security and development of any state. The ugly face of religious extremism and radicalisation leading to violence in South Asia can only be defeated by these three countries through reconciliation, mutual cooperation and by forgiving each others' past mistakes. United States under Obama presidency can facilitate as well as complement such a transformation by supporting those in this region whose rights have been trampled upon and to whom justice has been denied. That would be a sure way to play a constructive role in stabilising the region.
(Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror and runs a blog Watandost. He can be reached at hassan_abbas@ksg.harvard.edu)
By Hassan Abbas
Naomi Klein, Canadian columnist and author of The Shock Doctrine insightfully says, "Terrorism doesn't just blow up buildings; it blasts every other issue off the political map. The spectre of terrorism - real and exaggerated - has become a shield of impunity, protecting governments around the world from scrutiny for their human rights abuses." South Asia today is a victim of terror in this context. Social injustice, political instability, religious fanaticism and a rising sense of insecurity are the factors pushing South Asians to the brink of a prolonged conflict.
If this diagnosis is accurate, then logically the remedy lies in the rule of law, the empowerment of the ordinary, pluralism and the resolution of the regional conflicts. No change in the Western power corridors alone can usher in a transformation in South Asia, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, if these three states remain poorly governed, distrustful of each other and continue with the policy of marginalisation of their minority communities – ethnic as well as religious. India is better governed than Pakistan and Pakistan has a better track record than Afghanistan but at a regional level the fate of these countries is interlinked. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have similar issues but for the purpose of this article, I am only focusing on countries which are battling extremists at different levels and are 'destined' to play a role in the 'war on terror'. United States' relations with and stakes in these three states also put them into a unique category of sorts.
The fact that President-elect Barack Obama of the United States has not used the phrase 'war on terror' at least since he won the election on Nov 4 is a hopeful sign. It is encouraging because the 'war' has complicated the South Asian scene immensely in the last eight years or so and a different strategy and perspective is the need of the hour. However, any change in US policy can only have a complimentary effect – as South Asians themselves hold the real key.
Beginning with the case of India, its democratic and pluralistic credentials are well established. In a Hindu majority state, till recently a Muslim was the president of the state and currently a member of the Sikh minority community is the prime minister. However, there are also active insurgencies in its Northeastern part and, according to South Asia Intelligence Review, a mainstream Indian research centre, there are 30 armed insurgent groups operating in that region. India's controversial policies in regard to Jammu and Kashmir, are more well known to Pakistan. Despite sustained economic growth, poverty and inequality are also serious challenges facing India. Last but not the least of its troubles relate to the plight of minorities in India – primarily Christians and Muslims. Attacks on many Christian churches in recent years, orchestrated by Hindu extremist groups, are well recorded and findings of the Sacher Committee report about the social, economic and educational status of Muslims of India speaks volumes about the societal as well as institutional biases against Muslims. Massacres of Muslims in Gujarat a few years ago were reported worldwide. Despite these problems, India is internationally recognised as a rising power and its economic success is acknowledged round the globe. According to a recent US intelligence assessment (NIC's 2025), India's rise as one of the major global economic powers in coming years is a foregone conclusion. Growth rate statistics and infrastructure improvements in India substantiate this view. The fact that the Bush administration went out of its way to sign a treaty for nuclear cooperation, ignoring the concerns of many influential quarters even within the US, show the US deference for India's success.
In this context, the ghastly and deplorable terror attacks in Mumbai jolted India as well as the international community. Besides exposing the failure of its intelligence services and counter-terrorism outfits, it damaged the credibility of Indian politicians in the eyes of the people. More importantly for Pakistan, however, is the Indian consensus that Pakistan has at least something to do with all this. By and large, the international community - and especially the Western states - share Indian suspicions. Interestingly, Pakistan sees this assessment as a mere propaganda. Irrespective of whether any Pakistan based militant group will be found involved in Mumbai attacks, Pakistan must look inwards also to analyse and evaluate why Indians think on these lines.
Without a doubt, Indian media channels jumped to conclusions that were targeting Pakistan even when the details about terrorists were very sketchy and unconfirmed, but likewise mainstream Pakistani media was also unwilling initially to even hypothetically consider that militants from Pakistan can be involved. If Pakistani militants can destroy Islamabad's Marriott hotel and blow themselves up so often in almost all corners of Pakistan, what can possibly stop them from going to India and conducting similar operations. Considering all possibilities dispassionately is no sin.
Indian government had its own limitations, inhibitions and political compulsions to put all the blame on Pakistan right from the word go. Hopefully, wisdom will prevail when India comes out of the shock. Extremism, bigotry and violence know no state boundaries. The fire that is burning in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan was bound to reach India in some shape or the other. Indian regional policy has its share of failures and transgressions. In the sphere of intelligence wars too, India was not behind other states in the region. However, given that India's democratic institutions are strong, it will likely realise that unresolved conflicts, perennial distrust between neighbours and use of force against one's own people exacerbate differences and increase chances of non-violent reactions.
Pakistan is more or less in a similar bind, though the causes are perhaps more potent and symptoms of malaise are more pronounced. Authoritarianism, feudal mentality of the political elite (with few exceptions) and confusion about the role of religion in state encouraged by the 'defenders of the faith' has engendered an identity crisis in the country that has stilted Pakistan's growth and progress. Ethnic and sectarian confrontations are a by-product of this phenomenon. Rivalry with India and consequent insecurity on the other hand undermined Pakistan's potential significantly. Rather than trying to figure out how to tackle these serious challenges, historically Pakistan's leadership pushed it into regional and global battlefronts in search of security. The consequences are proving to be disastrous. We must not forget that this vicious cycle of instability begins from state's failure to govern and stabilise itself.
Afghanistan's story is not much different, though it went through a longer spell of instability, civil war and violence. Tribalism, besides failure to develop an equitable formula to share power among different ethnic groups and bridge the gap between its urban and rural areas spell the disaster for Afghanistan. Consequently, its leaders looked outwards for strength and resources turning it into a rentier state. Afghan Jihad of the 1980s saved Afghanistan from Soviets but destroyed its social fabric and the US involvement in the country since late 2001 has created more problems. Taliban resurgence is a gift of Western 'nation-building' failure. The solutions there, too, are hidden internally.
This brief analysis about political and security dynamics in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is geared to make just one basic point – internal solutions in terms of empowerment of the people, equitable rights and instituting accountable and representative governments are crucial to stability, security and development of any state. The ugly face of religious extremism and radicalisation leading to violence in South Asia can only be defeated by these three countries through reconciliation, mutual cooperation and by forgiving each others' past mistakes. United States under Obama presidency can facilitate as well as complement such a transformation by supporting those in this region whose rights have been trampled upon and to whom justice has been denied. That would be a sure way to play a constructive role in stabilising the region.
(Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror and runs a blog Watandost. He can be reached at hassan_abbas@ksg.harvard.edu)
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