Obama’s Af-Pak Policy: A Strategic Barter?

By Divya Kumar Soti




Obama administration’s Af-Pak Policy has incorporated some ill-framed formulae and classifications for stabilizing Af-Pak region. These include some concessions to both state as well as non-state actors active in this restive region. To start with, in practical terms this policy aims to deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan separately. In other words, it aims to de-link the two and thus, hopes to de-link the radical elements active on both sides of Durand Line although, interestingly, none of these elements recognize the Durand Line! This, in turn, forms basis of ‘Good Taliban-Bad Taliban’ classifications. Although, nobody in Washington or Kabul has attempted to define what these two terms exactly mean but implementation of this policy which is underway indicates that Good Taliban comes to mean a major portion of Afghan Taliban and Bad Taliban refers to Pak Taliban which is trying to destabilize a nuclear armed country and infecting its armed ranks- a major international security hazard.


Framers of this policy proceed upon some extremely technical presumptions. In their view Afghan Taliban qualifies as Good one because it is believed that it can be controlled through Islamabad. It is believed that Afghan Taliban is still dependant upon ISI and thus, it can be tamed through ISI if some concessions are made in Afghanistan. The ground for all this is prepared by instruments like PEACE Act of US congress which is aimed at cultivating goodwill towards US in Pak civil society.


But this way out is closed if Afghan Taliban manages to become self-reliant to even a particular extent, if not fully. Only way in which this is possible is by Pak Taliban’s increasing strength in NWFP and FATA. So, Pak Taliban is to be weakened so that things may proceed in Afghanistan. Hence, Washington is sponsoring Zardari’s offensive through PEACE Act, some multi-colored signals on Kashmir and an opportunity of increased role in Afghanistan. Islamabad over last many months did all kind of adventurous acts to secure such offers. Those range from selling of nuke nightmares by Zardari in Washington, mysterious and repeated torching of NATO supply trucks in Peshawar and allowing TNSM to spill out of Swat. Islamabad was further encouraged by statements of NATO Commanders in Afghanistan and recent address of Obama in Qairo, in which he described how futile and unprofitable it is to be in Afghanistan. Such statements further pushed many Afghan tribal leaders into a perilous situation and contributed to worsening situation in Afghan rural areas.


Pak Army found the new Afghan opportunity exciting and is trying to fulfill the pre-condition by weakening and militarily engaging Pak Taliban led by Baitullah Mehsud. It may further be expected that Afghan elections will be more peaceful than anyone thinks and good Taliban will be accommodated. It cannot be said exactly that who will be the face of Good Taliban but many names are already doing rounds. The additional 20,000 troops that US is sending are not coming with any broader brief but to face the contingency arising in case Pak Army fails to degrade Pak Taliban to required limits or in case, ISI especially the rogue faction and the Afghan Taliban refuse to behave accordingly, as nobody in Islamabad is in a position to guarantee that.


As far as, controlling Pak Taliban is concerned, militarily it is not an easy task. From Alexander to British, everybody faced heat in tribal areas and none of them was found by history to possess enough endurance to fight a long War. So, offensive in Waziristan needs to be quick and results should be out soon. Pak Army has two more limitations- One, a faction of its intelligence arm sympathizes with Taliban. By most conservative estimates at least 10-15% of Pak intelligence community does not support this offensive. Second, the challenge which Pak Army faces is further augmented by coupling of Pashtun idea of freedom with Islamic extremism. While everybody from Alexander to British was alien, Pak army is fighting its own ‘strategic assets’ and any attempt to surgically bisect them is a painful one. But Islamabad for now seems to be ready to bear the pain, in hope of attaining some sort of ‘limited strategic depth’ besides retaining covert capabilities in Afghanistan as asset species like Haqqani network are unlikely to be affected by such offensives. However, it may prove to be imprudent that Afghan Taliban will behave since it has an upper hand. To achieve success, Taliban as a phenomenon is to be weakened in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the chances of success of this plan are slim, as it is based on some highly technical presumptions which may be theoretically sound but may not hold good in rough and tumble of fields of action.