Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman
There is no consensus about the future of Pakistan among Pakistan experts (scholars and previous diplomats), Pakistani government spokesmen, or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Optimists believe that despite the encroachment of the Taliban, lopping off town after town, the Pakistani military can take those areas back. Pessimists note that while it is true that the army could smash the fanatics, they see no evidence that it will. Although the modern secular population of Pakistan is alarmed by the prospect of a Taliban Pakistan, they don’t seem to have the will to fight, but the Taliban does.
The imminent collapse of Pakistan did not drop out of the clouds; it has a long history, starting with the country’s beginnings. When the British were negotiating a peaceful turnover of colonial rule to the handful of India’s revolutionary leadership (led by Jawaharlal Nehru, a secular Indian nationalist), another member of the leadership, Mohammad Ali Jinna, a secular Indian of Muslim background, insisted on partition so that a new Muslim state could be created. His motivation for this was ostensibly fear that with the British gone, Hindus would persecute Muslims. The real reason, I suspect, was that he wanted power – and what more delicious power can there be than to be father of a new country?
The partition was a horror of violence with populations fleeing from Muslim to Hindu regions and vice versa.
It is interesting to note that India, Pakistan (divided into East and West Pakistan) and Israel were all born the same year. Of the three, Israel is the only one that succeeded in producing a modern state with a modern economy and an entirely literate population. India has had a much more difficult time, being a much larger, much more populous, and much more backward, but it now making up for lost time. Their government is still secular, and its large, clumsy democracy still functions – and is showing signs of improvement. The biggest remaining problem for them is the feudal nature of rural India – with a population desperately poor and appallingly ignorant.
But Pakistan, from its very inception, could not have worked. The fact that the population was Muslim was not enough to make a country. Its provinces are feudal, tribal, and have little in common with the relatively small secular elite governing the country. First, East Pakistan fought a war to get out from under the nasty governance of West Pakistan – and became Bangladesh. Now the western tribal areas, feudal and anarchistic, are in the process of removing themselves from Pakistan (or threatening to take over the whole country themselves). One fanatical leader warned: “today Swat, tomorrow Pakistan, and then the rest of the world.” Of course this is silly, but chilling to secular Pakistanis.
Another province is on the verge of rebellion – Baluchistan in the south, is developing an important port on the Indian Ocean (with Chinese money). The Baluchis are a tribe that spills over into Iran and Afghanistan, and were until now one of the most backward and feudal of the region’s tribes. They are about to get some wealth from that port – and they want to keep it. They hate Pakistan and will probably agitate to create their own state.
The Pakistan government has wasted a half-century in paranoid fear of India; they have spent their money on repression, no public education system at all, and a judiciary that functions like that of Charles Dickens’ Bleak House. The result is that they have little to show for their independence, except for a small, English-speaking, secular elite. Their modern army has a secular elite officer corps, but increasingly, the recruits are coming from the uneducated sector that is being radicalized by militant Islam. This happened in Iran, and the Shah’s army was not able to maintain control over its recruits.
If I were part of that secular elite, I would petition India to let me (and my nukes) back in. India should never have been partitioned in the first place.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman is an historian, lecturer, and author who also writes for the Santa Cruz Sentinel. You may contact her at Lfarhat102@aol.com or http://www.globalthink.net/.
May 06, 2009
A Baluch Dissent
DOWNLOAD COMPLETE REPORT : PAKISTAN STATE OF THE UNION
Wahid Baloch
Contrary to this report, the Baluch people are not fighting Pakistan for a greater share of resources,provincial autonomy or restoration of the 1973 Constitution. It is a great injustice, distortion of fact and misleading to say that Baluch are fighting for such things. Baluch demands are simple and clear. “End the illegal occupation of Baluchistan.”
The only solution that is acceptable to the Baluch people is the end of the Pakistani illegal occupation, the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from occupied Baluchistan, the unification of all three parts of Baluchistan (i.e., the Iranian Occupied Baluchistan, the Pakistani Occupied Baluchistan and the Afghan portion of Baluchistan) into one United Baluchistan, with the restoration of Baluch sovereignty over Baluch lands, coasts and resources. Nothing less than that will be acceptable to the Baluch people.
Baluch do not consider themselves as Pakistani. We are a secular nation. We should not be forced to live in with terrorists and extremists in Pakistan. We have nothing in common with Islamic Pakistan. Our culture, language and traditions are completely different from that of Pakistan. We are not separatists or terrorists as the Pakistan media projects us to be. We are fighting for our freedom that Pakistan has taken away from us. Baluchistan was never a part of Pakistan. Baluch people were not a part of Indian Muslim League’s movement to create Pakistan.
Baluchistan was an independent sovereign state even before Pakistan was created out of India in 1947. Baluchistan was forcefully annexed into Pakistan against the wishes of Baluch people, in March 27, 1948, at gunpoint by the Pakistani Terrorist Islamic army. Since then Baluch are fighting against the Pakistani illegal occupation of their land and exploitation of their resources. Pakistan is in violation of international law for its continuous illegal occupation of Baluchistan and exploitation of Baluch resources. Pakistani army has committed war crimes against the Baluch people in Baluchistan. These war crimes include indiscriminate bombing women and children, use of chemical weapons, rape, torture, murder, disappearances and displacement of thousands of Baluch people, testing its nuclear weapons in Baluchistan, rendering hundreds of miles of Baluch lands into waste and leading to thousands of nomadic lives to perish, causing abnormal birth defects and spread of other diseases as a result of radio active materials. These and many other crimes are well documented by independent human rights organizations. They all constitute crimes against humanity and call for international intervention and action that is long overdue.
Pakistan owes the Baluch people trillions of dollars for illegally occupying Baluch land, exploiting Baluch resources for the last 60 years and for testing its nuclear weapons on Baluch soil without the Baluch consent. Pakistani army must leave Baluchistan peacefully without further bloodshed and Pakistan must pay restitution to thousand Baluch families whose loved ones were killed, tortured, murdered, jailed or made disappeared by Pakistani army and ISI. We are not an enemy of the United States. An independent free democratic secular united Baluchistan is not against the U.S. interests. We support NATO forces and the democratic Government of President Hamid Karzai against Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists.
Dr. Wahid Baloch, President of
Baloch Society Of North America (BSO-NA),
1629 K Street NW, Suit 300
Washington D.C 20036 USA
Tel: (202) 349-1682
Fax: (202) 331-3759
E-Mail: Contact@bso-na.org
Website: http://www.bso-na.org/
A Baluch Dissent
Wahid Baloch
Contrary to this report, the Baluch people are not fighting Pakistan for a greater share of resources,
provincial autonomy or restoration of the 1973 Constitution. It is a great injustice, distortion of fact
and misleading to say that Baluch are fighting for such things.
Baluch demands are simple and clear. “End the illegal occupation of Baluchistan.”
The only solution that is acceptable to the Baluch people is the end of the Pakistani illegal
occupation, the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from occupied Baluchistan, the unification of all
three parts of Baluchistan (i.e., the Iranian Occupied Baluchistan, the Pakistani Occupied Baluchistan
and the Afghan portion of Baluchistan) into one United Baluchistan, with the restoration of Baluch
sovereignty over Baluch lands, coasts and resources. Nothing less than that will be acceptable to the
Baluch people.
Baluch do not consider themselves as Pakistani. We are a secular nation. We should not be
forced to live in with terrorists and extremists in Pakistan. We have nothing in common with Islamic
Pakistan. Our culture, language and traditions are completely different from that of Pakistan. We are
not separatists or terrorists as the Pakistan media projects us to be. We are fighting for our freedom
that Pakistan has taken away from us. Baluchistan was never a part of Pakistan. Baluch people were
not a part of Indian Muslim League’s movement to create Pakistan.
Baluchistan was an independent sovereign state even before Pakistan was created out of
India in 1947. Baluchistan was forcefully annexed into Pakistan against the wishes of Baluch people,
in March 27, 1948, at gunpoint by the Pakistani Terrorist Islamic army. Since then Baluch are fighting
against the Pakistani illegal occupation of their land and exploitation of their resources.
Pakistan is in violation of international law for its continuous illegal occupation of
Baluchistan and exploitation of Baluch resources. Pakistani army has committed war crimes against
the Baluch people in Baluchistan. These war crimes include indiscriminate bombing women and
children, use of chemical weapons, rape, torture, murder, disappearances and displacement of
thousands of Baluch people, testing its nuclear weapons in Baluchistan, rendering hundreds of miles
of Baluch lands into waste and leading to thousands of nomadic lives to perish, causing abnormal
birth defects and spread of other diseases as a result of radio active materials. These and many other
crimes are well documented by independent human rights organizations. They all constitute crimes
against humanity and call for international intervention and action that is long overdue.
Pakistan owes the Baluch people trillions of dollars for illegally occupying Baluch land,
exploiting Baluch resources for the last 60 years and for testing its nuclear weapons on Baluch soil
Pakistan The State of the Union
74
Working Papers
Pakistan The State of the Union 75
without the Baluch consent. Pakistani army must leave Baluchistan peacefully without further
bloodshed and Pakistan must pay restitution to thousand Baluch families whose loved ones
were killed, tortured, murdered, jailed or made disappeared by Pakistani army and ISI.
We are not an enemy of the United States. An independent free democratic secular
united Baluchistan is not against the U.S. interests. We support NATO forces and the democratic
Government of President Hamid Karzai against Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists.
I would like to emphasize that the Baluchistan was never a part of Pakistan but was a
sovereign state which was forcefully occupied by Pakistani army and annexed into Pakistan at gun
point on March 27, 1948 against the wishes of the Baluch people. Ever since, Baluchistan has been
under the Pakistani military’s illegal occupation and siege and its people are being subjected to the
worse Nazi-style brutalities to silence their genuine voice against the illegal, immoral and unjust
occupation of their land and exploitations of their resources. Pakistan is in violation of International
laws for its continuous illegal occupation of Baluchistan for the last 61 years.
Baluchistan, rich in oil, gas, gold, copper and other minerals with 900 miles of strategically
located coast line, extending from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi, is very important for Pakistan’s
survival. Without Baluchistan Pakistan cannot survive and will collapse within days. Baluchistan is
extremely rich but its natives are extremely poor and in the Stone Age. Baluchistan has the highest
infant mortality rate in the world.
Over the last six decades Pakistan army has carried out five military operations in
Baluchistan and the fifth one is still going on. Among the victims include the top Baluch Nationalist
leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was assassinated by Pakistani army on August 26, 2006 in a
massive military operation at his hide-out using military gun ship helicopter and napalm bombs
in Dera Bugti, Baluchistan. He was the former chief minister and governor of Baluchistan.
Since March 2005, thousands of Baluch, including women and children, have been killed by
Pakistani army’s indiscriminate bombing and more than 250,000 Baluch have been dislocated from
their homes and are living in harsh conditions. Robert van Dijk, the top UNICEF officer for Pakistan,
who visited the Baluch refugee camp, described the situation as grave and called it a “crime against
humanity.” He condemned the Pakistani military for not allowing UN Aid workers to distribute aid
packages including food, tents, and medicine to Baluch refugees who are dying of hunger and water
born diseases.
The premier Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asian Human Rights Commission
and Amnesty International have deplored Pakistan’s atrocities on the people of Baluchistan, who have
been subjected to helicopter gunship attacks and use of poison phosphorus gas in recent months.
The confirmed and published reports about Baluchistan should give you a clear picture about the
prevailing terrifying human rights situation in Baluchistan.
Soon after Nawab Bugti’s assassination, the most significant event was the Grand Baluch
Jirga, Baluchistan’s representative assembly, called upon by De Jure ruler of Baluchistan the Khan
of Kalat, Suleiman Daud Ahmedzai, which was attended by almost all Baluch tribal leaders, political
leaders, activists and students. The historic Grand Baluch Jirga denounced the Pakistani military
operation in Baluchistan and extra-judicial killing of Nawab Bugti and made a unanimous declaration
to challenge the illegal occupation of Baluchistan at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
76
Pakistan The State of the Union
Khan of Kalat is currently in London seeking political asymlum.
Pakistan’s military is committing gross atrocities and serious war crimes against the
Baluch people in Baluchistan. The fifth military operation that started in March, 2005, is still going on
in Baluchistan, which has resulted in the loss of life for thousands of the Baluch people, including
children, women and elderly, and has resulted in displacement of hundreds and thousands of civilian
Baluch population. The national leaders of Baluchistan have been in prison without trial, humiliated
and target killed by Pakistani civil and military authorities. Thousands of political activists have been
kidnapped, tortured and killed. We genuinely believe that it is the moral duty of the United States and
world community to assist the Baluch people in ending the illegal occupation of their country.
We expect and ask the Obama administration the champion of freedom and justice and the leader of
the free world, to recognize the historic fact that Baluchistan is an occupied land and that Baluchistan
was never a part of Pakistan. Trying to Pakistanize Baluchistan at the gunpoint wand through the
slogan of Allah-o-Akbar by Pakistan has not worked for the last six decades and will not work in the
future. Simply because the majority of Baluch are born Muslim, does not give the Jihadi armies of
Paksitan and Iran a license to continue to occupy our lands, conduct genocide of our people, loot and
plunder our resources and test their nuclear weapons in Baluchistan. The U.S. Government and the
world community must not close their eyes over the crimes against the secular Baluch people.
Baluch people, just like the Kurds, are secular and a great ally in the war on terror.
We support and defend the International Security Assistance Force and the democratic government
of Afghanistan’s right to pursue the Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists right into the sanctuaries
provided to them by the Pakistan army and the Inter Services Intelligence. A Baluchistan ruled by
secular forces is in the interest of the peoples of the world, including the United States
May 05, 2009
RUSSIA: Main Intelligence Directorate gets new chief
17:00 | 28/ 04/ 2009
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - On April 24, President Dmitry Medvedev dismissed Army General Valentin Korabelnikov from the position of chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Russia's military intelligence agency, and deputy chief of the General Staff and appointed Korabelnikov's deputy, Lieutenant General Alexander Shlyakhturov, in his place.
Korabelnikov's possible resignation, which was long surrounded by rumors, is now a reality. The Russian media says Korabelnikov opposed the Kremlin's sweeping reforms for the country's Armed Forces.
In the past few months, top GRU officials and the Defense Ministry were divided on the military reform, primarily its aspects concerning the military intelligence agency.
The sides disagreed on the proposed reduction of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) GRU brigades and their re-subordination to military district headquarters. This process became the focus of contradictory media reports, some of which implied that the Armed Forces would be deprived of their SWAT units.
A respected publication claimed that the GRU's technical reconnaissance systems, namely, space satellites and radio intercept units, would be re-subordinated to the Foreign Intelligence Service, an off-shoot of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB).
The very same publication discussed the possible re-subordination of all GRU divisions to the Foreign Intelligence Service. Although this rumor was not confirmed, it, along with other reports concerning a resignation allegedly handed in by Korabelnikov, caused many questions about the future of the GRU and the entire military reform.
Despite groundless rumors concerning the GRU's possible liquidation, many analysts knew that a conflict was brewing between top GRU and Defense Ministry officials, and that either the GRU chief or the Defense Minister would have to step down. General Korabelnikov had to resign because Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his concept of the military reform are supported by the Kremlin.
General Korabelnikov received an honorable discharge, plus the Order of Service to the Fatherland, 3rd class, and was reportedly allowed to choose his successor, General Shlyakhturov.
The public knows nothing about General Shlyakhturov's biography and service record. Such tight secrecy implies that he is a career intelligence operative.
It is unclear how the GRU of the General Staff will change under General Shlyakhturov. One thing is obvious: The agency will have to be overhauled together with the entire army, whose administrative and troop control divisions, which had evolved over the decades, are currently being revamped. Personnel cuts and other negative consequences seem inevitable.
However, most Russians will never be able to assess the effectiveness of the GRU reform.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - On April 24, President Dmitry Medvedev dismissed Army General Valentin Korabelnikov from the position of chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Russia's military intelligence agency, and deputy chief of the General Staff and appointed Korabelnikov's deputy, Lieutenant General Alexander Shlyakhturov, in his place.
Korabelnikov's possible resignation, which was long surrounded by rumors, is now a reality. The Russian media says Korabelnikov opposed the Kremlin's sweeping reforms for the country's Armed Forces.
In the past few months, top GRU officials and the Defense Ministry were divided on the military reform, primarily its aspects concerning the military intelligence agency.
The sides disagreed on the proposed reduction of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) GRU brigades and their re-subordination to military district headquarters. This process became the focus of contradictory media reports, some of which implied that the Armed Forces would be deprived of their SWAT units.
A respected publication claimed that the GRU's technical reconnaissance systems, namely, space satellites and radio intercept units, would be re-subordinated to the Foreign Intelligence Service, an off-shoot of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB).
The very same publication discussed the possible re-subordination of all GRU divisions to the Foreign Intelligence Service. Although this rumor was not confirmed, it, along with other reports concerning a resignation allegedly handed in by Korabelnikov, caused many questions about the future of the GRU and the entire military reform.
Despite groundless rumors concerning the GRU's possible liquidation, many analysts knew that a conflict was brewing between top GRU and Defense Ministry officials, and that either the GRU chief or the Defense Minister would have to step down. General Korabelnikov had to resign because Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his concept of the military reform are supported by the Kremlin.
General Korabelnikov received an honorable discharge, plus the Order of Service to the Fatherland, 3rd class, and was reportedly allowed to choose his successor, General Shlyakhturov.
The public knows nothing about General Shlyakhturov's biography and service record. Such tight secrecy implies that he is a career intelligence operative.
It is unclear how the GRU of the General Staff will change under General Shlyakhturov. One thing is obvious: The agency will have to be overhauled together with the entire army, whose administrative and troop control divisions, which had evolved over the decades, are currently being revamped. Personnel cuts and other negative consequences seem inevitable.
However, most Russians will never be able to assess the effectiveness of the GRU reform.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Costs of War: The Fear Virus
A swine flu 'protective' kit
A virulent disease sweeps the US, but it isn't swine flu. The fear virus, spawned by the war on terrorism, causes an over-reaction to the H1N1 flu that could be more dangerous and costly than the actual disease, Shaun Waterman writes for ISN Security Watch.
By Shaun Waterman in Washington, DC for ISN Security Watch
One of the key challenges for government in any public health emergency is the calibration of its messages to the population. Panicked residents can easily overwhelm the health services of any town or city if enough of them only think they are sick; so officials are supposed to stick carefully to the script government scientists and doctors prepare for them to ensure the delivery of a consistent and credible message to the public.
Since the 26 April declaration of a federal public health emergency in relation to the emergence of a new strain of influenza virus - Novel A H1N1, initially popularly called swine flu - US officials have been carefully following the expert playbook. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and other cabinet members have been briefing the press daily alongside top government scientists and medical officials. The administration’s advice on limiting the virus’ spread - regular hand washing and the use and disposal of tissues - has even become fodder for late-night TV comedians - a sign of cultural ubiquity, if not necessarily success.
So Vice President Joseph Biden’s comments on NBC Television last Thursday morning must have had a few people choking on their coffee.
“I would tell members of my family - and I have - I wouldn't go anywhere in confined places now. It's not that it's just going to Mexico, it's that you're in a confined aircraft,” Biden replied when asked what advice he would give to a relative who planned to fly to Mexico, where the outbreak began. “If you're out in the middle of a field when someone sneezes, that's one thing. If you're in a closed aircraft or a closed container or closed car or closed classroom, it's another thing.”
To be fair to the vice president, the interview was conducted over the subtitle “Swine flu outbreak: Is the US doing enough to stop the spread?” and he was asked why the administration had no plans to close the border.
At this point, the number of confirmed deaths from H1N1 in Mexico was about a dozen, from 100 or so confirmed infections - although “estimates” in the news media ran as high as 160 fatalities. But with dozens of confirmed cases - and only a single death - in the US, the question was already being posed: Why the different death rates? Why did the disease seem to be so much more deadly there than at home?
But the figures from Mexico were - and still are - far from comprehensive, and greatly over-state the occurrence of serious illness and death, because the initial tests were all done on hospitalized patients, “the sickest of the sick,” Acting Director of the US Centers for Disease Control Richard Besser acknowledged during the weekend.
The disease had been much more widespread than those numbers would suggest, Besser said. “Initial reports really were looking at flu that was all presenting as hospitalization, high rates of mortality,” he told NBC’s Meet the Press. “As we're looking more, we're seeing that that may have actually been the tip of the iceberg, with a large number of cases that were less severe [...] it appears that they have had widespread flu across their country.”
“As we learn more about how widespread this is,” he continued, “it may be that the rates of severe disease in Mexico will end up being not different than what we see here.”
In other words: Why was H1N1 so much more deadly in Mexico? Answer: It wasn’t.
In retrospect, Biden’s comments, unfortunate as they were, are starting to look like the rhetorical turning point of a week marked by the kind of endless hyperventilation and breathless speculation about crucial unknowns that only wall-to-wall cable news coverage can provide.
“The administration’s plan for any terrorist attack should prioritize moving [Biden] to an undisclosed location,” jokes Jim Harper, director of information policy studies at the libertarian Cato Institute. “Not for his security or for continuity of government, [but] so he won’t appear in the media!”
On Friday, President Barack Obama himself took care to stress the precautionary character of all the administration’s actions - including $2 billion in emergency spending in the war supplemental for this year; advice to close schools where the disease is detected for up to 14 days; and the release of 11 million courses of anti-viral treatment from federal drug stockpiles to state and local authorities.
In Mexico, he said, “relatively young, healthy people” had died. “So that's why we're taking it seriously. We have not yet seen those same kinds of fatalities here in the United States among young, healthy people … but we want to make sure that we're preparing appropriately.”
Calling it a “cause for concern, but not alarm,” Obama concluded, “We are essentially ensuring that in the worst-case scenario we can manage this [...].
“Obviously,” he said later in the day making a similar point, “we hope the precautions we’re taking prove unnecessary, but better safe than sorry.”
The problem with governing in accordance with the precautionary principle lies in what it might cost to be “safe,” and to deal with the inevitable, occasional miss-calibrations of the message.
“Even the precautions that you take against this kind of global flu pandemic could knock about 1.9 [or] 2 percent off global [economic production]. That’s about a trillion dollars,” according to journalist Martin Walker, who cited World Bank figures from a study last year.
The Economist reported last week that the crisis in Mexico was costing Mexico City’s service and retail industries $55m a day - not because of the handful of deaths but because of people’s reactions. And that was even before the national suspension of non-essential public activities called for this week by the authorities there, which was expected to double that cost.
In the US, the Washington Post reported Monday that businesses in the capital and its suburbs were bracing themselves for the effects of spreading school closures, which “appeared likely to create a ripple effect for employers across the region as parents drew up plans to take off work if they cannot make other arrangements.”
Following Biden’s comments, there were reports of US carriers cutting schedules to Mexico and other travel being canceled or postponed.
The Air Transport Association, which represents the big US airlines, says it won’t have figures on the industry-wide impact for three weeks or so, since the numbers are generally only available a month in arrears.
“It’s too soon to tell,” Elizabeth Merida, the association’s spokeswoman told ISN Security Watch. And she said it would be hard to isolate the impact of any particular event or remarks from the cost of the public reaction.
Perfect calibration will always be beyond the grasp of policymakers, even the best-intentioned and well-disciplined of them, because of the lopsided impact of the different kinds of messages.
“Fear is much more virulent than statistics,” Cato’s Harper told ISN Security Watch. In the early stages of the crisis that the emergence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy - better known as mad cow disease - provoked in Britain in the mid-1990s, Agriculture Secretary John Selwyn Gummer staged a photo-op where he fed his two young children beef-burgers to drive home the point that the meat was safe.
He was excoriated by the press and public opinion, but his fate illustrates the problem policymakers face. “It’s very hard to calm people with numbers,” pointed out Harper.
Shaun Waterman is a senior writer and analyst for ISN Security Watch. He is a UK journalist based in Washington, DC, covering homeland and national security.
NEPAL: WHAT NEXT?
B.RAMAN
In a televised address to the nation on the afternoon of May 4,2009, the Maoist Prime Minister of Nepal, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, dramatically announced his resignation in the wake of opposition to his decision the previous day to sack the 61-year-old Army Chief Gen Rukmangad Katawal following the General’s opposition to the demand of Prachanda for the integration of the members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) raised by the Maoists during their days in the insurgency into the Army. Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka, the No.2 in the Army, was asked by Prachanda to act as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) until further orders.
2. Before announcing his decision, Prachanda met with Katawal and Khadka separately first, then jointly, before seeking the approval of the Cabinet for sacking the COAS. His decision was opposed by the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) with 108 members in the Constituent Assembly, which decided to quit the ruling coalition Government. “We decided to withdraw our support to protest the Prime Minister’s unilateral decision,” CPN-UML General Secretary Ishwar Pokhrel said.
3.While the Nepali Congress and the Madhesi Peoples Party joined 17 other parties in opposing the sacking of the General , the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) with 51 members in the Assembly and some other smaller parties maintained an ambivalent attitude. The MPRF reportedly submitted a note of dissent disagreeing with Prachanda’s decision, but did not leave the coalition. The CPN-Maoist with 229 seats in the Constituent Assembly needed the crucial support from MPRF and other small parties to continue to enjoy a majority in the 601-member Assembly tasked to frame a new constitution for the country after it abolished its unpopular 240-year-old monarchy last year.
4. Prachanda’s action in unilaterally sacking the Army Chief despite strong opposition in the coalition Cabinet was nullified by the President Ram Baran Yadav, who faxed a special instruction to the Chief of the Army Staff "asking him to continue in his office in the capacity of CoAS as per the Interim Constitution, 2007, and the existing law".
5. The spokesman of the Maoists, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, who is the Minister for Information and Communication, told the media that the President’s order to the COAS to continue in office was tantamount to a "constitutional coup" and said that the Maoists would fight back with street protests. He said: "The President is... violating constitutional norms. The President's move has put the peace process in peril. Our party has taken the President's step as a constitutional coup and we will fight against it. The executive power to sack and appoint an acting army chief lies with the Government and not the President. We will stick to our decision. We don't have any plans to quit the Government."
6. Prachanda called the Attorney General Raghav Lal Baidya and senior Cabinet colleagues early on May 4 to discuss the constitutionality and consequences of the President's intervention. There was speculation that the Maoists might move for the impeachment of the President. After finding that they would not have the required support for such a move in the Constituent Assembly, he decided to resign.
7. It remains to be seen whether his resignation is a purely tactical move to confront the other members of the ruling coalition with the danger of serious political instability if they did not support his sacking of the Army chief or was forced by his realizing that there was no way he could have his way against the Army chief. Both the Army chief and Prajwal, the Commander of the seventh division of the PLA, were reported to have ordered the two forces under their respective command to remain in a state of alert to prevent any disturbance of law and order.
8. The peace accord reached by the various political parties before last year’s election to the Constituent Assembly had provided for the rehabilitation and integration of the members of the PLA and other Maoist cadres, including members of the people’s courts set up by the Maoists during their days in the insurgency. After Prachanda assumed office in August last year as the Prime Minister, differences surfaced over the interpretation of this principle. The Maoists treated rehabilitation and integration as synonymous and insisted that the only of rehabilitating the 19,000 members of the PLA was by integrating them into the Army, barring those physically unfit or unwilling to serve in the Army.
9. The Army and other political parties were strongly opposed to this. They held that rehabilitation and integration were two different processes. According to them, rehabilitation meant enabling the Maoist cadres to be gainfully employed, but not necessarily in the Army. While they were prepared to consider the integration of small numbers of the PLA into the Army if they were found to be professionally suitable, they were not prepared to agree to the wholesale merger of the PLA into the Army. Such an action would have resulted in about one-fourth of the Army consisting of indoctrinated Maoists, with their number steadily increasing with fresh recruitment.
10. Prachanda also wanted that the Maoists, who held officer-equivalent ranks in the PLA, should be given appropriate ranks in the Army. Thus, he reportedly wanted PLA commander Nanda Kishor
Pun “Pasang” to be made a Major General and many others to get the rank of Brigadiers. He also reportedly wanted that there should be no new recruitment to the Army for some years.
11. Neil Horning, an American expert on the Maoist movement of Nepal, who is himself believed to be sympathetic to the Maoists, wrote as follows is his blogspot on the controversy between rehabilitation and integration: “The mainstream parties, as well as the elite in the army, view army integration in an apocalyptic light. While integrating the PLA into the NA was agreed upon time and again in the course of peace negotiations, the Non-Maoist parties made their
agreements under the assumption that the Maoists could not possibly win electoral victory, and would not be in charge of implementing the integration. They counted on returning to the long standing Nepali political habit of agreeing to a demand in negotiation and then reneging
on it later when the opponent is not in a position to make a challenge. They are trying to do the same now by continually insisting that Maoists combatants be “rehabilitated” rather than integrated, but it is they who have lost their bargaining position. Yet, why can’t they let it
happen in the first place? The Maoists don’t have more than 20,000 troops to integrate into the more than 90,000 currently in the Army. This would hardly make the army into a force at the Maoists’ beck and call. It’s not that the army would become the private force of the Maoists, but that it would cease to be a check on them. With at least 25 per cent of troops and officers being former Maoist partisans, the possibility of a reactionary coup becomes impossible. The troops needed to suppress the public would simply turn their weapons on the command. Therefore, the army would cease to be a check and social change would continue unabated.”
12. According to Kanak Mani Dixit, the Nepali political analyst, “at their large National Council conclave in the Kharipati outskirts of Kathmandu in late November 2008, the Maoists came to the conclusion that they were in government but did not control the state, for which the Nepal Army and the independent judiciary were found to be prime obstacles. It decided that the (Maoist) cantonments should not be disbanded until the new constitution is written.”
13. When the Maoists found that whenever they had a dispute with the Army over issues such as the ban on new recruitment which was disregarded by the COAS the judiciary was taking up a position, which was unfavourable to the Maoists, they also started talking of integrating the members of the former Maoists’ people’s courts into the judiciary.
14. The COAS went ahead with the new recruitment recruiting nearly 2800 persons to fill up existing vacancies in the Army and the PLA retaliated by making fresh recruitment to the PLA in violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, Nepal under Prachanda as the Prime Minister saw the spectre of two parallel armies---- the state Army and the non-State PLA--- strengthening and preparing themselves for a future confrontation should the Maoists’ demand for total integration be turned down.
15. While the Chinese closely monitored the situation by interacting intensely with various political formations, India and the US reportedly cautioned Prachanda against a confrontation on this issue. Prachanda increasingly became unresponsive to the advice for moderation from India and the US and insisted on having his way.
16. It is not clear why Prachanda decided to force a confrontation with the COAS at this stage instead of waiting till September, when Gen.Katawal is due to superannuate. One possible reason for his hasty action is that Gen.Khadka, who is believed to be not opposed to the integration of the PLA into the Army, is due to superannuate in June. It is suspected that Prachanda wanted to make him the chief before his superannuation and give him a two-year tenure so that the integration of the PLA into the Army could be brought about without any further opposition from the Army. His plans were thwarted by the President.
17. What could happen now? The following are the possible scenarios:
SCENARIO 1: A serious political crisis with violent demonstrations by the Maoists which results in one more compromise. The Chinese will try their best to see that the Maoist-led Government, which has effectively put down Tibetan activity in Nepali territory, remains in power.
SCENARIO 2: A violent confrontation between the PLA and the Army leading to an army coup.
SCENARIO 3: A new coalition without the Maoists, which will be unstable.
18. In my article dated April 28,2008, titled “Prachanda: From A Radical Maoist to A Lovable Mascot” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers27/paper2684.html I wrote as follows: “Taking advantage of the popular uprising of 2006 against the widely-detested King, the Maoists entered the coalition Government, which replaced a Government of royalist stooges, and started dictating terms as to how the integration should take place. They themselves became one of the policy-makers to decide on the process of integration. The integration is taking
place not on the basis of negotiations between the Government and the insurgents, but in response to diktats issued from time to time by the Maoists in return for their continued participation in the Government. They are all the time giving out discreet threats that if their
diktats are rejected, they might quit the Government and revert to insurgency. The holding of the elections to the Constituent Assembly before the ground rules for integration were agreed upon and the victory of the Maoists in the elections----significant, but not spectacular as projected by sections of the media--- have led to a situation where the Maoists will be at the head of a Government which will take crucial decisions on the post-facto legitimisation of the terrorist infrastructure raised by the Maoists and on the ground rules for the integration of their ideologically motivated and well-trained cadres. The moment the Maoists assume leadership in the seats of power and decision-making, will it be possible to resist their demands? If the integration of over 3000 ideologically indoctrinated cadres of the insurgent army into the Nepal Army comes about, we will have to the west of us an army ideologically motivated by jihadi doctrines and to the east of us an army ideologically motivated by Marxism,
Leninism and Mao's Thoughts. There are two possible scenarios--- these fears turn out to be baseless and Prachanda turns out to be a genuine democrat and a genuine friend of India or Prachanda after the elections turns out to be different from Prachanda before the elections and takes Nepal on a road, which would be detrimental to our national interests. While hoping for the first scenario, we must be prepared for the second. “
19. In a subsequent article dated August 9, 2008, titled “RISE OF MAOISTS IN NEPAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2802.html I wrote as follows: “Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5, 2008, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said: "Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia." That is the reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us. China is not a South Asian power, but it already has a growing South Asian strategic
presence----- in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is hoping to acquire a similar presence in Nepal with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government.”
20. China would try its best to see that the Maoists stay in power. Their continuance in power in Kathmandu is important for stability in Tibet. In the past, we had supported the Maoists thinking that Prachanda would take a neutral line between India and China. These hopes are elusive. Should we facilitate the Chinese designs in Nepal by bringing about a political compromise which would enable the Maoists to continue in power or has the time come to work for a non-Maoist alternative? This requires serious examination in our policy-making circles. (4-5-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In a televised address to the nation on the afternoon of May 4,2009, the Maoist Prime Minister of Nepal, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, dramatically announced his resignation in the wake of opposition to his decision the previous day to sack the 61-year-old Army Chief Gen Rukmangad Katawal following the General’s opposition to the demand of Prachanda for the integration of the members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) raised by the Maoists during their days in the insurgency into the Army. Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka, the No.2 in the Army, was asked by Prachanda to act as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) until further orders.
2. Before announcing his decision, Prachanda met with Katawal and Khadka separately first, then jointly, before seeking the approval of the Cabinet for sacking the COAS. His decision was opposed by the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) with 108 members in the Constituent Assembly, which decided to quit the ruling coalition Government. “We decided to withdraw our support to protest the Prime Minister’s unilateral decision,” CPN-UML General Secretary Ishwar Pokhrel said.
3.While the Nepali Congress and the Madhesi Peoples Party joined 17 other parties in opposing the sacking of the General , the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) with 51 members in the Assembly and some other smaller parties maintained an ambivalent attitude. The MPRF reportedly submitted a note of dissent disagreeing with Prachanda’s decision, but did not leave the coalition. The CPN-Maoist with 229 seats in the Constituent Assembly needed the crucial support from MPRF and other small parties to continue to enjoy a majority in the 601-member Assembly tasked to frame a new constitution for the country after it abolished its unpopular 240-year-old monarchy last year.
4. Prachanda’s action in unilaterally sacking the Army Chief despite strong opposition in the coalition Cabinet was nullified by the President Ram Baran Yadav, who faxed a special instruction to the Chief of the Army Staff "asking him to continue in his office in the capacity of CoAS as per the Interim Constitution, 2007, and the existing law".
5. The spokesman of the Maoists, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, who is the Minister for Information and Communication, told the media that the President’s order to the COAS to continue in office was tantamount to a "constitutional coup" and said that the Maoists would fight back with street protests. He said: "The President is... violating constitutional norms. The President's move has put the peace process in peril. Our party has taken the President's step as a constitutional coup and we will fight against it. The executive power to sack and appoint an acting army chief lies with the Government and not the President. We will stick to our decision. We don't have any plans to quit the Government."
6. Prachanda called the Attorney General Raghav Lal Baidya and senior Cabinet colleagues early on May 4 to discuss the constitutionality and consequences of the President's intervention. There was speculation that the Maoists might move for the impeachment of the President. After finding that they would not have the required support for such a move in the Constituent Assembly, he decided to resign.
7. It remains to be seen whether his resignation is a purely tactical move to confront the other members of the ruling coalition with the danger of serious political instability if they did not support his sacking of the Army chief or was forced by his realizing that there was no way he could have his way against the Army chief. Both the Army chief and Prajwal, the Commander of the seventh division of the PLA, were reported to have ordered the two forces under their respective command to remain in a state of alert to prevent any disturbance of law and order.
8. The peace accord reached by the various political parties before last year’s election to the Constituent Assembly had provided for the rehabilitation and integration of the members of the PLA and other Maoist cadres, including members of the people’s courts set up by the Maoists during their days in the insurgency. After Prachanda assumed office in August last year as the Prime Minister, differences surfaced over the interpretation of this principle. The Maoists treated rehabilitation and integration as synonymous and insisted that the only of rehabilitating the 19,000 members of the PLA was by integrating them into the Army, barring those physically unfit or unwilling to serve in the Army.
9. The Army and other political parties were strongly opposed to this. They held that rehabilitation and integration were two different processes. According to them, rehabilitation meant enabling the Maoist cadres to be gainfully employed, but not necessarily in the Army. While they were prepared to consider the integration of small numbers of the PLA into the Army if they were found to be professionally suitable, they were not prepared to agree to the wholesale merger of the PLA into the Army. Such an action would have resulted in about one-fourth of the Army consisting of indoctrinated Maoists, with their number steadily increasing with fresh recruitment.
10. Prachanda also wanted that the Maoists, who held officer-equivalent ranks in the PLA, should be given appropriate ranks in the Army. Thus, he reportedly wanted PLA commander Nanda Kishor
Pun “Pasang” to be made a Major General and many others to get the rank of Brigadiers. He also reportedly wanted that there should be no new recruitment to the Army for some years.
11. Neil Horning, an American expert on the Maoist movement of Nepal, who is himself believed to be sympathetic to the Maoists, wrote as follows is his blogspot on the controversy between rehabilitation and integration: “The mainstream parties, as well as the elite in the army, view army integration in an apocalyptic light. While integrating the PLA into the NA was agreed upon time and again in the course of peace negotiations, the Non-Maoist parties made their
agreements under the assumption that the Maoists could not possibly win electoral victory, and would not be in charge of implementing the integration. They counted on returning to the long standing Nepali political habit of agreeing to a demand in negotiation and then reneging
on it later when the opponent is not in a position to make a challenge. They are trying to do the same now by continually insisting that Maoists combatants be “rehabilitated” rather than integrated, but it is they who have lost their bargaining position. Yet, why can’t they let it
happen in the first place? The Maoists don’t have more than 20,000 troops to integrate into the more than 90,000 currently in the Army. This would hardly make the army into a force at the Maoists’ beck and call. It’s not that the army would become the private force of the Maoists, but that it would cease to be a check on them. With at least 25 per cent of troops and officers being former Maoist partisans, the possibility of a reactionary coup becomes impossible. The troops needed to suppress the public would simply turn their weapons on the command. Therefore, the army would cease to be a check and social change would continue unabated.”
12. According to Kanak Mani Dixit, the Nepali political analyst, “at their large National Council conclave in the Kharipati outskirts of Kathmandu in late November 2008, the Maoists came to the conclusion that they were in government but did not control the state, for which the Nepal Army and the independent judiciary were found to be prime obstacles. It decided that the (Maoist) cantonments should not be disbanded until the new constitution is written.”
13. When the Maoists found that whenever they had a dispute with the Army over issues such as the ban on new recruitment which was disregarded by the COAS the judiciary was taking up a position, which was unfavourable to the Maoists, they also started talking of integrating the members of the former Maoists’ people’s courts into the judiciary.
14. The COAS went ahead with the new recruitment recruiting nearly 2800 persons to fill up existing vacancies in the Army and the PLA retaliated by making fresh recruitment to the PLA in violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, Nepal under Prachanda as the Prime Minister saw the spectre of two parallel armies---- the state Army and the non-State PLA--- strengthening and preparing themselves for a future confrontation should the Maoists’ demand for total integration be turned down.
15. While the Chinese closely monitored the situation by interacting intensely with various political formations, India and the US reportedly cautioned Prachanda against a confrontation on this issue. Prachanda increasingly became unresponsive to the advice for moderation from India and the US and insisted on having his way.
16. It is not clear why Prachanda decided to force a confrontation with the COAS at this stage instead of waiting till September, when Gen.Katawal is due to superannuate. One possible reason for his hasty action is that Gen.Khadka, who is believed to be not opposed to the integration of the PLA into the Army, is due to superannuate in June. It is suspected that Prachanda wanted to make him the chief before his superannuation and give him a two-year tenure so that the integration of the PLA into the Army could be brought about without any further opposition from the Army. His plans were thwarted by the President.
17. What could happen now? The following are the possible scenarios:
SCENARIO 1: A serious political crisis with violent demonstrations by the Maoists which results in one more compromise. The Chinese will try their best to see that the Maoist-led Government, which has effectively put down Tibetan activity in Nepali territory, remains in power.
SCENARIO 2: A violent confrontation between the PLA and the Army leading to an army coup.
SCENARIO 3: A new coalition without the Maoists, which will be unstable.
18. In my article dated April 28,2008, titled “Prachanda: From A Radical Maoist to A Lovable Mascot” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers27/paper2684.html I wrote as follows: “Taking advantage of the popular uprising of 2006 against the widely-detested King, the Maoists entered the coalition Government, which replaced a Government of royalist stooges, and started dictating terms as to how the integration should take place. They themselves became one of the policy-makers to decide on the process of integration. The integration is taking
place not on the basis of negotiations between the Government and the insurgents, but in response to diktats issued from time to time by the Maoists in return for their continued participation in the Government. They are all the time giving out discreet threats that if their
diktats are rejected, they might quit the Government and revert to insurgency. The holding of the elections to the Constituent Assembly before the ground rules for integration were agreed upon and the victory of the Maoists in the elections----significant, but not spectacular as projected by sections of the media--- have led to a situation where the Maoists will be at the head of a Government which will take crucial decisions on the post-facto legitimisation of the terrorist infrastructure raised by the Maoists and on the ground rules for the integration of their ideologically motivated and well-trained cadres. The moment the Maoists assume leadership in the seats of power and decision-making, will it be possible to resist their demands? If the integration of over 3000 ideologically indoctrinated cadres of the insurgent army into the Nepal Army comes about, we will have to the west of us an army ideologically motivated by jihadi doctrines and to the east of us an army ideologically motivated by Marxism,
Leninism and Mao's Thoughts. There are two possible scenarios--- these fears turn out to be baseless and Prachanda turns out to be a genuine democrat and a genuine friend of India or Prachanda after the elections turns out to be different from Prachanda before the elections and takes Nepal on a road, which would be detrimental to our national interests. While hoping for the first scenario, we must be prepared for the second. “
19. In a subsequent article dated August 9, 2008, titled “RISE OF MAOISTS IN NEPAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2802.html I wrote as follows: “Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5, 2008, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said: "Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia." That is the reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us. China is not a South Asian power, but it already has a growing South Asian strategic
presence----- in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is hoping to acquire a similar presence in Nepal with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government.”
20. China would try its best to see that the Maoists stay in power. Their continuance in power in Kathmandu is important for stability in Tibet. In the past, we had supported the Maoists thinking that Prachanda would take a neutral line between India and China. These hopes are elusive. Should we facilitate the Chinese designs in Nepal by bringing about a political compromise which would enable the Maoists to continue in power or has the time come to work for a non-Maoist alternative? This requires serious examination in our policy-making circles. (4-5-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
May 04, 2009
Being A Spy; Europe, Iran And The Bomb; How Organized Crime Got Hooked On Drugs -- And Other Interesting Stuff (Fora.tv)
Source : SourcesAndMethods.Blogspot.com
Being A Spy; Europe, Iran And The Bomb; How Organized Crime Got Hooked On Drugs -- And Other Interesting Stuff (Fora.tv)
Fora.tv is a streaming video service that hosts speeches and presentations by world class experts in a variety of areas. A number of their recent offerings should be particularly interesting to intelligence professionals (Note: The descriptions below come directly from Fora but have been lightly edited for length, etc.):Stella Remington on Being A SpyStella Remington says she's had 4 careers. First as a librarian/archivist, then a diplomat's wife, in MI5, and now as an author. She has written four books, her first a memoir titled Open Secret: the Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5. She has published three spy-thriller novels Secret Asset, Illegal Action and Dead Line. She's currently working on a fourth novel.Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009Location: Sydney, Australia, Dymocks Literary LunchProgram and discussion: http://fora.tv/2009/03/27/Stella_Rimington_on_Being_A_SpyUnder a Mushroom Cloud: Europe, Iran, and the BombSince Iran's illicit nuclear program was exposed to a stunned world in 2002, Tehran has defied the international community and continued to pursue its nuclear goals. What drives this seemingly apocalyptic quest? Are Iran's aims rational or not? Under a Mushroom Cloud analyzes this catastrophic and murky situation, and examines Iran's dual-track approach of accelerating its nuclear activities while weaving itself ever more tightly into the fabric of the European economy.Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2009Location: Transatlantic Institute, Brussels, BelgiumProgram and discussion: http://fora.tv/2009/04/01/Under_a_Mushroom_Cloud_Europe_Iran_and_the_BombSmack Express: How Organised Crime Got Hooked on DrugsOne of Australia's most successful detectives, Clive Small's book, Smack Express: How Organised Crime got Hooked on Drugs is an insight into drug trafficking and organised crime on Australia's east coast. Written with journalist Tom Gilling, it features an extraordinary range of colourful characters and situations such as one bloke who thought that throwing someone into the boot of a car and driving it to South Australia wasn't kidnapping, because "he never asked to get out of the boot".Date: Thu, 09 Apr 2009Location: Gleebooks, Sydney, AustraliaProgram and discussion: http://fora.tv/2009/04/09/Smack_Express_How_Organised_Crime_Got_Hooked_on_DrugsBorder Patrol: Pakistan and AfghanistanEight years after 9/11, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is as lawless as ever and Osama bin Laden is still on the loose. Should the U.S. move to secure this region, home to ranks of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders?Date: Sun, 01 Feb 2009Location: Foreign Policy Association, New York, NYProgram and discussion: http://fora.tv/2009/02/01/Border_Patrol_Pakistan_and_Afghanistan
May 03, 2009
Baloch and Sindhi groups to hold public meeting in front of White House
Press release
On May 06, 2009 Baloch International League (for peace & freedom) and Baloch and Sindhi human rights organizations in the United States will hold a public meeting in front of the White House and a protest march from White House to State Department to record their protest and handover a memorandum to the officials at the two places against the genocide of Baloch people in Balochistan, disappearances of Baloch youth, women, intellectuals, political activists by notorious ISI and cold blooded killings of Baloch leaders, and gross violation of human rights in general. The demonstrators will also condemn and protest the plundering of natural resources of Sindh and human rights violation by Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy and secret services.
The protest will coincide with President Barack Obama's meeting with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.
This press release will supersede the earlier press release which was issued under the name of the so-called Sindhi Baloch Diaspora.
Program
When: Wednesday, May o6, 2009
Time: 8:00 AM
Where: White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC
Contact: Baloch International League leaders Dr Tara Chand 954-235-2338 or Razzaq Baloch 305-761-2171
Or leaders of Baloch organizations supporting the event:
Wahid Baloch, Baloch Society of North America: 904-928-0260
Ahmar Mustikhan, American Friends of Baluchistan: 301-957-0008
Allied Sindhi organizations supporting the event:
World Sindhi Institute, former director Munawwar Leghari 202-378-0333
World Sindhi Congress, leader Dr. Safdar Sarki 530-933-6526
On May 06, 2009 Baloch International League (for peace & freedom) and Baloch and Sindhi human rights organizations in the United States will hold a public meeting in front of the White House and a protest march from White House to State Department to record their protest and handover a memorandum to the officials at the two places against the genocide of Baloch people in Balochistan, disappearances of Baloch youth, women, intellectuals, political activists by notorious ISI and cold blooded killings of Baloch leaders, and gross violation of human rights in general. The demonstrators will also condemn and protest the plundering of natural resources of Sindh and human rights violation by Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy and secret services.
The protest will coincide with President Barack Obama's meeting with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.
This press release will supersede the earlier press release which was issued under the name of the so-called Sindhi Baloch Diaspora.
Program
When: Wednesday, May o6, 2009
Time: 8:00 AM
Where: White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC
Contact: Baloch International League leaders Dr Tara Chand 954-235-2338 or Razzaq Baloch 305-761-2171
Or leaders of Baloch organizations supporting the event:
Wahid Baloch, Baloch Society of North America: 904-928-0260
Ahmar Mustikhan, American Friends of Baluchistan: 301-957-0008
Allied Sindhi organizations supporting the event:
World Sindhi Institute, former director Munawwar Leghari 202-378-0333
World Sindhi Congress, leader Dr. Safdar Sarki 530-933-6526
SUSPECTED INDIAN MONEY IN FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS
B.RAMAN
During the current election campaign, there has been a debate initiated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the action taken or not taken to identify the secret overseas bank accounts of Indian nationals and to bring the money back for use in our development projects. The BJP and the Congress (I) have been accusing each other of inaction in this regard.
2. The banking secrecy laws of countries such as Switzerland protect the secrecy of only the accounts of individual account-holders. Nations do not enjoy the protection of secrecy. Thus, while the Swiss Federal Government in Berne protects the secrecy of individual accounts, it has been publishing every year since the 1980s the total value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by residents of different countries.
3. The Government of India became aware of this in the 1980s when a Sindhi nationalist organization of Pakistan got hold of this annual statement, made an analysis of the deposits held by residents in Pakistan and came out with serious allegations against some Pakistani political leaders and military officers. Since then at least till I was in service in 1994, the Government of India was getting a copy of this annual statement giving the total value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by residents in India. The figure, however, did not include the value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by Indians residing abroad. It is my recollection that the total value of the deposits from India used to be much less than that from Pakistan. More money from Pakistan was flowing to secret Swiss bank accounts than from India.
4. The information that the equivalent of billions of rupees was held by residents in India in secret accounts abroad is, therefore, not a secret. What needed to be found out was the identities of the account holders and the modus operandi by which they were sending the money to the secret accounts. Since the Swiss laws protected individuals unless there was strong evidence that the deposits came from criminal proceeds, successive Governments in New Delhi could not make much progress in identifying these individuals.
5.In India, the collection of financial intelligence and the use of such intelligence to deal with organised crime groups, money-launderers and holders of secret overseas accounts were essentially handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Narcotics Control Bureau. There was no mechanism for a co-ordinated assessment of their intelligence, identification of gaps in their coverage and initiation of steps to fill such gaps.
6.This lacuna was sought to be filled up by P.Chidambaram, when he was the Finance Minister under Deva Gowda and Inder Gujral between 1996 and 1998 and his Revenue Secretary, M.R.Sivaraman, through the setting-up of a re-constituted Economic Intelligence Council chaired by the Finance Minister. During its first meeting on July 22,1997, it was reported to have set up a core group to monitor trends in financial crime and keep the Council informed. The Economic Intelligence Council, which used to act as a Joint Intelligence Committee to analyse and assess economic and financial intelligence and initiate follow-up action on it, used to meet regularly under the chairmanship of Chidambaram and Sivaraman was initiating the required follow-up action.
7. The Special Task Force for the revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus, under Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW),which was set up by the Government of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2000, found to its surprise that after Chidambaram and Sivaraman left office in 1998 the EIC and its core group had not met regularly and that many of the senior functionaries of the Government were not even aware of their being set up by Chidambaram. In its report, the Task Force included a separate chapter on economic and financial intelligence and made recommendations for revamping the machinery for the collection, analysis and assessment of the required intelligence.
8. Since the report of the Task Force has not been declassified and made available to the public, the public is not aware of the state of our financial intelligence set-up in 2000, the recommendations made by the Task Force to improve it and the action taken on them.
9. The attached annexure gives my observations on the state of financial intelligence in India as extracted from my book titled “Intelligence: Past, Present & Future” published by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi in 2001. There have been some changes and improvements since then such as India becoming a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) etc. (3-5-2009)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
(Extracts from my book titled “Intelligence: Past, Present & Future” published in 2001 by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi (www.lancerpublishers.com )
In the World Money-Laundering Chart prepared by the Clinton Administration, India was graded as a medium-high priority country, in a sliding scale of six grades ---high, medium high, medium, low medium, low and no priority. Amongst countries graded high were the USA itself, the UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand.
In a report to the Congress on money-laundering in India during 1994, it said: "The Government of India continues to be effective in its effort to reduce currency flows through the underground hawala system, but drug-traffickers, arms smugglers and other criminals continue to use this traditional remittance system to return illicit proceeds to India from all parts of the world, including the US. A new policy on imports has not eliminated the flow of gold into India, a
long-time venue for money-laundering."
It added: " Invoice manipulation is also used to conceal money movements, usually through front companies based in Hong Kong, Singapore or the Middle East. Indian criminals evade their Government's currency restrictions by opening accounts in Nepalese banks and transferring the money into accounts in India or transporting monetary instruments back to India. Some Indian traffickers are also known to have channeled money to Nepal and transferred it to Hong
Kong, Singapore and Switzerland. India has criminalised money-laundering and adopted other controls, but, as the foregoing indicates, enforcement is largely ineffective."
However, the final report on the subject for 2000 prepared by the Clinton Administration and released after Mr.Bush Jr assumed office on January 20,2001, said as follows: "The hawala (or hundi) alternative (or parallel) remittance system continues to be a key factor in money laundering and other financial crimes committed in and associated with South Asia. It is closely related to the "black" or "off the books" economies in the region. The size of the underground economies in South Asia are estimated to be 50 to 100 percent the size of the "white" or "documented" economies.
"Hawala operates on trust and connections ("trust" is one of several meanings associated with the word "hawala"). Customers trust hawala "bankers" or "operators" (known as hawaladars) who use their connections to facilitate money movement worldwide. Hawala transfers take place with little, if any, paper trail; and, when records are kept, they are usually kept in code. Contrary to various media reports, hawala is an ancient system; it was the primary money transfer mechanism used in South Asia prior to the introduction of Western banking. Today, hawala continues to be used for many legitimate transfers for cultural and financial reasons; and it also often operates in conjunction with Western banking operations.
"Dubai, India and Pakistan form a "hawala triangle" responsible for significant international money laundering activities that go far beyond South Asia. While interdiction of non-bank money laundering systems, such as hawala, is difficult enough in itself, this difficulty is sometimes compounded by ineffective money laundering countermeasures in Dubai and the other Emirates."
It further added: "Money laundering is a growing concern in India because of its large population and emergence as a regional financial center. The hawala (or hundi) alternative remittance system reportedly is used by criminals to launder money generated from drug trafficking, alien smuggling, corruption, and financial fraud.
"The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPSA) of 1985,amended in 1988, calls for the tracing and forfeiture of assets that have been acquired through narcotics trafficking, and prohibits attempts to transfer and conceal those assets. This legislation seems to have the effect of criminalizing drug money laundering. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXIV (sections 451-459) establishes India's basic framework for confiscating the proceeds of crime. The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance (CLAO) of 1944 allows for the attachment and forfeiture of money or property obtained through bribery, corruption, criminal breach of trust, or theft, and of assets that are disproportionate to an individual's known sources of income.
"The Indian Parliament continues to consider draft legislation that would explicitly criminalize money laundering, impose reporting requirements on financial institutions and intermediaries, and provide for seizure and confiscation of assets related to the proceeds of crime. The Bill was referred to a select committee of the upper House of India's Parliament, which has made certain recommendations. These are currently under review by the executive branch.
"The GOI does not have a financial intelligence unit (FIU); and legislation currently before the Parliament does not call for the establishment of an FIU. The Central Economic Intelligence Unit (CEIB) is the Government of India's (GOI) lead organization for fighting financial crime. Other organizations such as the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs and Excise, and the Reserve Bank of India also play a role in the enforcement of India's anti-money laundering laws.
"India is a party to the UN 1988 Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The GOI should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, and create an FIU that would analyze suspicious transactions reports and cooperate with FIUs from other countries."
While India is not a member of the FATF, it is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), which has its own Secretariat. Its objective is to ensure the
adoption, implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money laundering standards as set out in the recommendations of the FATF. The other members are: Australia, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, USA and Vanuatu.The following attend its meetings as observers: Brunei, Canada, Cook Islands, Macau, China, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units of the World, the FATF Secretariat, the International Development Law Institute, the IMF, the Interpol, the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, the South Pacific Forum Secretariat, the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the World Bank and the World Customs Organization.
In March, 2000, the APG started a project for establishing a regional Financial Intelligence Unit, which would initially cover Fiji, Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa. The Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa have already set up their own FIUs. Fiji was in the process of doing so.
In India, the collection of financial intelligence and the use of such intelligence to deal with organised crime groups are essentially handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Narcotics Control Bureau. There was no mechanism for a co-ordinated assessment of their intelligence, identification of gaps in their coverage and initiation of steps to fill such gaps.
This lacuna was to be filled through the setting-up of a re-constituted Economic Intelligence Council chaired by the Finance Minister. During its first meeting on July
22,1997, it was reported to have set up a core group to monitor trends in financial crime and keep the Council informed.
The fight against money-laundering in India is complicated by the following factors:
The politician-criminal nexus.
The lack of effective control over contributions to political parties and election expenses. This enables criminal elements to use their contributions to the political process as a safe channel for money-laundering and for gaining political influence to incapacitate the intelligence and investigating agencies so that they cannot effectively act against them.
The flourishing Hawala Triangle constituted by India, Pakistan and Dubai. While the search for an entente cordiale between the States of India and Pakistan has proved elusive since 1947, there is an entente cordiale between the criminal worlds of the two countries, interacting with each other either directly or through the intermediary of their counterparts in Dubai. No study in depth has been made of this entente cordiale or, if it has been, the public has not been told of its conclusions.
There is thus a lack of the required political will to deal with this problem in an effective manner by strengthening the capabilities of the intelligence and investigating agencies and letting them function without any political interference. There has also been a lack of interest on the part of our legislators in this subject, which has a vital bearing on our national security, economic well-being and fight against terrorism and Pakistan's proxy war.
Since the NSC Secretariat is designed to function as the nerve-centre overseeing all aspects relating to our national security, it should have an oversight role in respect of the collection, assessment and utilisation of financial intelligence and evaluation of the performance of the agencies responsible for these tasks too.
During the current election campaign, there has been a debate initiated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the action taken or not taken to identify the secret overseas bank accounts of Indian nationals and to bring the money back for use in our development projects. The BJP and the Congress (I) have been accusing each other of inaction in this regard.
2. The banking secrecy laws of countries such as Switzerland protect the secrecy of only the accounts of individual account-holders. Nations do not enjoy the protection of secrecy. Thus, while the Swiss Federal Government in Berne protects the secrecy of individual accounts, it has been publishing every year since the 1980s the total value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by residents of different countries.
3. The Government of India became aware of this in the 1980s when a Sindhi nationalist organization of Pakistan got hold of this annual statement, made an analysis of the deposits held by residents in Pakistan and came out with serious allegations against some Pakistani political leaders and military officers. Since then at least till I was in service in 1994, the Government of India was getting a copy of this annual statement giving the total value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by residents in India. The figure, however, did not include the value of the deposits held in Swiss banks by Indians residing abroad. It is my recollection that the total value of the deposits from India used to be much less than that from Pakistan. More money from Pakistan was flowing to secret Swiss bank accounts than from India.
4. The information that the equivalent of billions of rupees was held by residents in India in secret accounts abroad is, therefore, not a secret. What needed to be found out was the identities of the account holders and the modus operandi by which they were sending the money to the secret accounts. Since the Swiss laws protected individuals unless there was strong evidence that the deposits came from criminal proceeds, successive Governments in New Delhi could not make much progress in identifying these individuals.
5.In India, the collection of financial intelligence and the use of such intelligence to deal with organised crime groups, money-launderers and holders of secret overseas accounts were essentially handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Narcotics Control Bureau. There was no mechanism for a co-ordinated assessment of their intelligence, identification of gaps in their coverage and initiation of steps to fill such gaps.
6.This lacuna was sought to be filled up by P.Chidambaram, when he was the Finance Minister under Deva Gowda and Inder Gujral between 1996 and 1998 and his Revenue Secretary, M.R.Sivaraman, through the setting-up of a re-constituted Economic Intelligence Council chaired by the Finance Minister. During its first meeting on July 22,1997, it was reported to have set up a core group to monitor trends in financial crime and keep the Council informed. The Economic Intelligence Council, which used to act as a Joint Intelligence Committee to analyse and assess economic and financial intelligence and initiate follow-up action on it, used to meet regularly under the chairmanship of Chidambaram and Sivaraman was initiating the required follow-up action.
7. The Special Task Force for the revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus, under Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW),which was set up by the Government of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2000, found to its surprise that after Chidambaram and Sivaraman left office in 1998 the EIC and its core group had not met regularly and that many of the senior functionaries of the Government were not even aware of their being set up by Chidambaram. In its report, the Task Force included a separate chapter on economic and financial intelligence and made recommendations for revamping the machinery for the collection, analysis and assessment of the required intelligence.
8. Since the report of the Task Force has not been declassified and made available to the public, the public is not aware of the state of our financial intelligence set-up in 2000, the recommendations made by the Task Force to improve it and the action taken on them.
9. The attached annexure gives my observations on the state of financial intelligence in India as extracted from my book titled “Intelligence: Past, Present & Future” published by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi in 2001. There have been some changes and improvements since then such as India becoming a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) etc. (3-5-2009)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
(Extracts from my book titled “Intelligence: Past, Present & Future” published in 2001 by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi (www.lancerpublishers.com )
In the World Money-Laundering Chart prepared by the Clinton Administration, India was graded as a medium-high priority country, in a sliding scale of six grades ---high, medium high, medium, low medium, low and no priority. Amongst countries graded high were the USA itself, the UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand.
In a report to the Congress on money-laundering in India during 1994, it said: "The Government of India continues to be effective in its effort to reduce currency flows through the underground hawala system, but drug-traffickers, arms smugglers and other criminals continue to use this traditional remittance system to return illicit proceeds to India from all parts of the world, including the US. A new policy on imports has not eliminated the flow of gold into India, a
long-time venue for money-laundering."
It added: " Invoice manipulation is also used to conceal money movements, usually through front companies based in Hong Kong, Singapore or the Middle East. Indian criminals evade their Government's currency restrictions by opening accounts in Nepalese banks and transferring the money into accounts in India or transporting monetary instruments back to India. Some Indian traffickers are also known to have channeled money to Nepal and transferred it to Hong
Kong, Singapore and Switzerland. India has criminalised money-laundering and adopted other controls, but, as the foregoing indicates, enforcement is largely ineffective."
However, the final report on the subject for 2000 prepared by the Clinton Administration and released after Mr.Bush Jr assumed office on January 20,2001, said as follows: "The hawala (or hundi) alternative (or parallel) remittance system continues to be a key factor in money laundering and other financial crimes committed in and associated with South Asia. It is closely related to the "black" or "off the books" economies in the region. The size of the underground economies in South Asia are estimated to be 50 to 100 percent the size of the "white" or "documented" economies.
"Hawala operates on trust and connections ("trust" is one of several meanings associated with the word "hawala"). Customers trust hawala "bankers" or "operators" (known as hawaladars) who use their connections to facilitate money movement worldwide. Hawala transfers take place with little, if any, paper trail; and, when records are kept, they are usually kept in code. Contrary to various media reports, hawala is an ancient system; it was the primary money transfer mechanism used in South Asia prior to the introduction of Western banking. Today, hawala continues to be used for many legitimate transfers for cultural and financial reasons; and it also often operates in conjunction with Western banking operations.
"Dubai, India and Pakistan form a "hawala triangle" responsible for significant international money laundering activities that go far beyond South Asia. While interdiction of non-bank money laundering systems, such as hawala, is difficult enough in itself, this difficulty is sometimes compounded by ineffective money laundering countermeasures in Dubai and the other Emirates."
It further added: "Money laundering is a growing concern in India because of its large population and emergence as a regional financial center. The hawala (or hundi) alternative remittance system reportedly is used by criminals to launder money generated from drug trafficking, alien smuggling, corruption, and financial fraud.
"The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPSA) of 1985,amended in 1988, calls for the tracing and forfeiture of assets that have been acquired through narcotics trafficking, and prohibits attempts to transfer and conceal those assets. This legislation seems to have the effect of criminalizing drug money laundering. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXIV (sections 451-459) establishes India's basic framework for confiscating the proceeds of crime. The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance (CLAO) of 1944 allows for the attachment and forfeiture of money or property obtained through bribery, corruption, criminal breach of trust, or theft, and of assets that are disproportionate to an individual's known sources of income.
"The Indian Parliament continues to consider draft legislation that would explicitly criminalize money laundering, impose reporting requirements on financial institutions and intermediaries, and provide for seizure and confiscation of assets related to the proceeds of crime. The Bill was referred to a select committee of the upper House of India's Parliament, which has made certain recommendations. These are currently under review by the executive branch.
"The GOI does not have a financial intelligence unit (FIU); and legislation currently before the Parliament does not call for the establishment of an FIU. The Central Economic Intelligence Unit (CEIB) is the Government of India's (GOI) lead organization for fighting financial crime. Other organizations such as the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs and Excise, and the Reserve Bank of India also play a role in the enforcement of India's anti-money laundering laws.
"India is a party to the UN 1988 Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The GOI should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, and create an FIU that would analyze suspicious transactions reports and cooperate with FIUs from other countries."
While India is not a member of the FATF, it is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), which has its own Secretariat. Its objective is to ensure the
adoption, implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money laundering standards as set out in the recommendations of the FATF. The other members are: Australia, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, USA and Vanuatu.The following attend its meetings as observers: Brunei, Canada, Cook Islands, Macau, China, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units of the World, the FATF Secretariat, the International Development Law Institute, the IMF, the Interpol, the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, the South Pacific Forum Secretariat, the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the World Bank and the World Customs Organization.
In March, 2000, the APG started a project for establishing a regional Financial Intelligence Unit, which would initially cover Fiji, Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa. The Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa have already set up their own FIUs. Fiji was in the process of doing so.
In India, the collection of financial intelligence and the use of such intelligence to deal with organised crime groups are essentially handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Narcotics Control Bureau. There was no mechanism for a co-ordinated assessment of their intelligence, identification of gaps in their coverage and initiation of steps to fill such gaps.
This lacuna was to be filled through the setting-up of a re-constituted Economic Intelligence Council chaired by the Finance Minister. During its first meeting on July
22,1997, it was reported to have set up a core group to monitor trends in financial crime and keep the Council informed.
The fight against money-laundering in India is complicated by the following factors:
The politician-criminal nexus.
The lack of effective control over contributions to political parties and election expenses. This enables criminal elements to use their contributions to the political process as a safe channel for money-laundering and for gaining political influence to incapacitate the intelligence and investigating agencies so that they cannot effectively act against them.
The flourishing Hawala Triangle constituted by India, Pakistan and Dubai. While the search for an entente cordiale between the States of India and Pakistan has proved elusive since 1947, there is an entente cordiale between the criminal worlds of the two countries, interacting with each other either directly or through the intermediary of their counterparts in Dubai. No study in depth has been made of this entente cordiale or, if it has been, the public has not been told of its conclusions.
There is thus a lack of the required political will to deal with this problem in an effective manner by strengthening the capabilities of the intelligence and investigating agencies and letting them function without any political interference. There has also been a lack of interest on the part of our legislators in this subject, which has a vital bearing on our national security, economic well-being and fight against terrorism and Pakistan's proxy war.
Since the NSC Secretariat is designed to function as the nerve-centre overseeing all aspects relating to our national security, it should have an oversight role in respect of the collection, assessment and utilisation of financial intelligence and evaluation of the performance of the agencies responsible for these tasks too.
May 02, 2009
Africa’s growing strategic Relevance
Africa’s Growing Strategic Relevance
72F848B3-BA4E-8B6C-B77F-D18D4BE2119A
Author(s): Jennifer Giroux Editor(s): Daniel Möckli
Publisher(s): Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, Switzerland Date of publication: Jul 2008 Volume number: 3 Issue number: 38 Format: PDF Pages: 3 Publishers URL: www.ssn.ethz.ch/forschung/css_analysen/ Series: CSS Analyses in Security Policy
Description: This paper argues that after decades of marginalization, Africa has now gained in strategic relevance. The author argues that the abundance of natural resources, the proliferation of Muslim extremist groups and increasing South-North migration have prompted external powers to re-engage in Africa. The paper views warnings of an upcoming Sino-American geopolitical confrontation in Africa as premature. Both the external powers and the African countries have a role to play in making sure that the growing inflows of aid and investment become a force for economic growth and political stability in Africa.General note: © 2008 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
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English - Download the full-text document
Can There Be A Terrorist-Caused Chernobyl?
By B. Raman
Most of the writings and debates on possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats arising from Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi organisations have been focussing on the possible danger as a result of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Pakistanis themselves have been dismissing talk of such a danger as unwarranted and asserting that the physical security of their nuclear arsenal is so tight that no terrorist can get hold of it. The Americans too---at least outwardly---give the impression of being satisfied with the physical security measures taken by Pakistan.
2. The writings and debates are too narrowly focussed on the physical security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and on the danger of Al Qaeda benefiting from the expertise of sympathetic Pakistani nuclear scientists----serving and retired. While this aspect should be of equal concern to the US and India, there are other aspects, which should be of greater concern to India and other regional countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) than to the US and the rest of the Western world.
3. The danger of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will arise only if the terrorists capture power in Pakistan after defeating the Army. Despite the recent deterioration in the situation in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as a result of
the increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban, the danger of their defeating the Army and capturing power seems low at present. The Taliban has a capability for making the entire Pashtun tribal belt in the North-West Frontier Province and in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ungovernable and totally under its Wahabi influence and political writ. An embryonic Islamic Caliphate in the Pashtun belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is a worrisome possibility. It also has the capability for organizing spectacular acts of suicide and non-suicide terrorism in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan, including in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore, as it has already demonstrated on many occasions.
4. But it does not have the capability to defeat the Pakistan Army in the non-Pashtun areas and capture power in Islamabad. The Pakistan Army is not like the Afghan Army, which on its own cannot resist the Taliban Army. The Afghan Army of the 1990s, consisting largely of the Mujahideen trained to figth against the Soviet troops in the 1980s, could not resist the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September, 1996. The post-9/11 Afghan National Army (ANA) would not be able to resist on its own a Taliban advance into Kabul should the NATO forces be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
5. The Pakistan Army is different. It is strong, well-trained, well-equipped and well-motivated. It might have closed its eyes to the depredations of the Taliban in the Pashtun belt as it had done in the past to the depredations of various tribal extremist groups in the
areas adjoining the Afghan border so long as they did not threaten the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and were prepared to assist the Army against India, when necessary as in 1947-48 and 1965.
Ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947, no Government in Pakistan has had effective political and military control over the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Successive Pakistani Governments chose to avoid a confrontation with the tribal extremists in the FATA.
6. If the Pakistan Army today does not show the same concern as the rest of the world over the Taliban running amok in the FATA and in the Malakand Division of the NWFP, it should not be a matter for surprise. If, from time to time, it makes a pretense of acting against the Taliban it is more out of concern over the alarming reactions in the West than due to fears over any danger of their overrunning Pakistan.
7. If the Pakistani Taliban tries to overrun the rest of Pakistan and to capture power in Islamabad as its Afghan counterpart did in Kabul in 1996 and is trying to do so again now, the Pakistan Army will ruthlessly crush it. In view of this I would rate as low at present the danger of the Taliban, with or without the help of Al Qaeda, capturing power in Islamabad and taking control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
8. I would divide Pakistan's nuclear capability into three groups and grade the likely threats to them from the Taliban and other jihadi groups as follows:
(a) The Nuclear arsenal consisting of its stockpile of nuclear weapons: Their physical security is very tight with American inputs into strengthening it and with US monitoring of the state of physical security. Threat low unless and until the Taliban captures power in Islamabad.
(b) Sensitive nuclear establishments such as the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and the Khusab plutonium facility. Their physical security is equally tight, but there are no American inputs and monitoring. Threat low to medium.
(c) Other nuclear establishments such as the Chashma nuclear power station constructed with Chinese assistance and the one at Karachi and the various sites in the NWFP and Balochistan where nuclear waste is stored: Their physical security has not received much attention either from the Pakistanis themselves or from the Americans.
Moreover, since the Chinese are associated with some of them, they would not like the US to have any role in their physical security. Threat medium to high.
9. The greatest danger in my view is the Taliban and other jihadi groups attacking one of these less guarded facilities falling in the third group. They have the capability to target them in order to create panic in the Pakistani population and demonstrate their prowess in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
10. India and other regional countries should have strong reasons to be worried over this possibility because the environmental and health hazards arising from a terrorist attack on these facilities would affect not only Pakistan, but also its neighbours. A terrorist-causedChernobyl is a danger of greater possibility than the terrorists capturing the nuclear arsenal.
11. It is in India's interest to nudge the US into taking more interest in the physical security of these establishments in order to prevent such an event. The present counter-terrorism co-operation between India and the US is more tactical than strategic in the form of exchange of intelligence regarding plans for a terrorist strike and extension of mutual legal assistance in the investigation of terrorist attacks as in the case of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008. The only strategic co-operation is in respect of cyber and maritime security. To one's knowledge, there is very little interaction of a substantial nature relating to WMD security as a result of developments in Pakistan.
12. The Barack Obama Administration and whatever Government comes to power in New Delhi after the present elections should realise that the security and welfare of their people are closely tied to developments in Pakistan. There is a need for more intense and sustained interactions on this subject between the political leaderships and the professional experts of the two countries than has been the case at present. Among the various steps that could be considered are the setting-up of a hotline between the political establishments and the intelligence chiefs of the two countries and a joint monitoring group to monitor closely the developments in Pakistan.
13. At present, India's focus has been on making the US co-operate against the activities of the anti-India terrorist groups and their infrastructure in Pakistani territory. This should continue, but this should not be the only subject of co-operation between the two countries. It is necessary to expand it to cover likely threats to Pakistan's nuclear establishments. We should not allow the development of such wider interactions to be inhibited by complexes arising from past unpleasant experiences with the US.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. E- mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Most of the writings and debates on possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats arising from Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi organisations have been focussing on the possible danger as a result of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Pakistanis themselves have been dismissing talk of such a danger as unwarranted and asserting that the physical security of their nuclear arsenal is so tight that no terrorist can get hold of it. The Americans too---at least outwardly---give the impression of being satisfied with the physical security measures taken by Pakistan.
2. The writings and debates are too narrowly focussed on the physical security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and on the danger of Al Qaeda benefiting from the expertise of sympathetic Pakistani nuclear scientists----serving and retired. While this aspect should be of equal concern to the US and India, there are other aspects, which should be of greater concern to India and other regional countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) than to the US and the rest of the Western world.
3. The danger of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will arise only if the terrorists capture power in Pakistan after defeating the Army. Despite the recent deterioration in the situation in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as a result of
the increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban, the danger of their defeating the Army and capturing power seems low at present. The Taliban has a capability for making the entire Pashtun tribal belt in the North-West Frontier Province and in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ungovernable and totally under its Wahabi influence and political writ. An embryonic Islamic Caliphate in the Pashtun belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is a worrisome possibility. It also has the capability for organizing spectacular acts of suicide and non-suicide terrorism in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan, including in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore, as it has already demonstrated on many occasions.
4. But it does not have the capability to defeat the Pakistan Army in the non-Pashtun areas and capture power in Islamabad. The Pakistan Army is not like the Afghan Army, which on its own cannot resist the Taliban Army. The Afghan Army of the 1990s, consisting largely of the Mujahideen trained to figth against the Soviet troops in the 1980s, could not resist the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September, 1996. The post-9/11 Afghan National Army (ANA) would not be able to resist on its own a Taliban advance into Kabul should the NATO forces be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
5. The Pakistan Army is different. It is strong, well-trained, well-equipped and well-motivated. It might have closed its eyes to the depredations of the Taliban in the Pashtun belt as it had done in the past to the depredations of various tribal extremist groups in the
areas adjoining the Afghan border so long as they did not threaten the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and were prepared to assist the Army against India, when necessary as in 1947-48 and 1965.
Ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947, no Government in Pakistan has had effective political and military control over the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Successive Pakistani Governments chose to avoid a confrontation with the tribal extremists in the FATA.
6. If the Pakistan Army today does not show the same concern as the rest of the world over the Taliban running amok in the FATA and in the Malakand Division of the NWFP, it should not be a matter for surprise. If, from time to time, it makes a pretense of acting against the Taliban it is more out of concern over the alarming reactions in the West than due to fears over any danger of their overrunning Pakistan.
7. If the Pakistani Taliban tries to overrun the rest of Pakistan and to capture power in Islamabad as its Afghan counterpart did in Kabul in 1996 and is trying to do so again now, the Pakistan Army will ruthlessly crush it. In view of this I would rate as low at present the danger of the Taliban, with or without the help of Al Qaeda, capturing power in Islamabad and taking control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
8. I would divide Pakistan's nuclear capability into three groups and grade the likely threats to them from the Taliban and other jihadi groups as follows:
(a) The Nuclear arsenal consisting of its stockpile of nuclear weapons: Their physical security is very tight with American inputs into strengthening it and with US monitoring of the state of physical security. Threat low unless and until the Taliban captures power in Islamabad.
(b) Sensitive nuclear establishments such as the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and the Khusab plutonium facility. Their physical security is equally tight, but there are no American inputs and monitoring. Threat low to medium.
(c) Other nuclear establishments such as the Chashma nuclear power station constructed with Chinese assistance and the one at Karachi and the various sites in the NWFP and Balochistan where nuclear waste is stored: Their physical security has not received much attention either from the Pakistanis themselves or from the Americans.
Moreover, since the Chinese are associated with some of them, they would not like the US to have any role in their physical security. Threat medium to high.
9. The greatest danger in my view is the Taliban and other jihadi groups attacking one of these less guarded facilities falling in the third group. They have the capability to target them in order to create panic in the Pakistani population and demonstrate their prowess in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
10. India and other regional countries should have strong reasons to be worried over this possibility because the environmental and health hazards arising from a terrorist attack on these facilities would affect not only Pakistan, but also its neighbours. A terrorist-causedChernobyl is a danger of greater possibility than the terrorists capturing the nuclear arsenal.
11. It is in India's interest to nudge the US into taking more interest in the physical security of these establishments in order to prevent such an event. The present counter-terrorism co-operation between India and the US is more tactical than strategic in the form of exchange of intelligence regarding plans for a terrorist strike and extension of mutual legal assistance in the investigation of terrorist attacks as in the case of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008. The only strategic co-operation is in respect of cyber and maritime security. To one's knowledge, there is very little interaction of a substantial nature relating to WMD security as a result of developments in Pakistan.
12. The Barack Obama Administration and whatever Government comes to power in New Delhi after the present elections should realise that the security and welfare of their people are closely tied to developments in Pakistan. There is a need for more intense and sustained interactions on this subject between the political leaderships and the professional experts of the two countries than has been the case at present. Among the various steps that could be considered are the setting-up of a hotline between the political establishments and the intelligence chiefs of the two countries and a joint monitoring group to monitor closely the developments in Pakistan.
13. At present, India's focus has been on making the US co-operate against the activities of the anti-India terrorist groups and their infrastructure in Pakistani territory. This should continue, but this should not be the only subject of co-operation between the two countries. It is necessary to expand it to cover likely threats to Pakistan's nuclear establishments. We should not allow the development of such wider interactions to be inhibited by complexes arising from past unpleasant experiences with the US.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. E- mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
May 01, 2009
Pakistan In Sharia Quagmaire
http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/17207
Sat, 2009-05-02 00:21
By Sarla Handoo - Syndicate Features
TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN
Al Jazeera's Matt McClure met some Hindus who have crossed the border from Pakistan into India
Fighting in Pakistan has forced thousands to flee their homes. Some of them are members of the country's minority Hindu and Sikh communities, who say they are increasingly becoming targets of religious persecution.
.
Within a day of the National Assembly of Pakistan passing the Nizami- Adl regulation and the president Asif Ali Zardari giving his assent to it, the worst fears have begun coming true. The Tehriki Nifazi- Shariati- Mohammadi has come out with a surprising definition of Nizami- Adl saying that the law will protect militants who are charged with killings and persecution of innocent people of not only swat but the entire Malakand Agency. That is because the Chief of the outfit Maulana Sufi Mohammad says that "past things will be left behind and we will go for a new life in peace."
The outfit has also made it clear that the law will not cover Mullah Fazalullah and his followers and as such the new Sharia courts can not hear complaints against mullah Fazulullah by the residents of Swat.
That being the case, one need not be surprised by the report that the Taliban has forcibly occupied 10 Sikh houses in Orakzai Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They took their leader Sardar Kalyan Singh as hostage and demanded a ransom of Rs. 50 million as Jazia, the religious tax. Since the poor families could not pay the levy, they were forced to leave their homes for other areas. Media reports say there are only 15 Sikh houses in the area and that five households had left earlier for fear of their lives at the hands of Taliban.
The Sharia law provides for cutting off the hands of a thief and stoning and lashing people for different crimes. The area is now out of bounds for the modern civil law. What we will be seeing now is the repeat of the recent case in Afghanistan where a young boy and a girl were made to face bullets publicly. They loved each other and wanted to marry but their parents were against it.
The US has come out with a strong reaction to the move by Pakistani President to approve the law. It both said that the law goes against both Human Rights as well as Democracy. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said the US is deeply concerned about the development. President Asif Ali Zardari is putting up a brave face in trying to make the world believe that he is not capitulating before the militants. But that is something no one, including the people of Pakistan, are going to believe. That Zardari tried to absolve himself of the responsibility by letting the Parliament pass the bill before he signed it is a ruse the people can clearly see through.
Even between the hard-line cleric Sufi Mohammad and the Taliban, there are contradiction. While Sufi Mohammad is clear that the Taliban have to lay down arms after the deal is implemented, the spokesman of Taliban Muslim Khan has said that lying down of arms by the Taliban is not part of the agreement reached between the NWFP government and the Taliban which was brokered by Mullah Sufi Mohammad. How is this contradiction going to be reconciled in the future is still an open question.
One of the ominous facts is that the Taliban of Pakistan, who largely constitute the Pakhtuns, are already in touch with militants in Punjab, the largest province of Pakistan which is home to half of the country’s population. In fact, there are reports that the attack on Marriot Hotel in Islamabad and the recent ones on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the Police Academy near Lahore were carried out jointly by the two militant outfits.
Taliban is now working for strengthening its position in Punjab and extending its tenterhooks to other areas of Pakistan. It has already announced that it is working for extending the Sharia law to entire Pakistan. It has adopted a well calculated strategy to destabilize Pakistan by taking the Punjab route. It seems to have realized hat for destabilizing Pakistan it is important to destabilize Punjab first.
The political leadership does not seem to realize the gravity of the situation. That is why President Zardari has buckled under pressure from the Taliban as well as a section of political parties, including the Awami National Party, which threatened to withdraw support to the PPP government in Islamabad.
It is in this backdrop that the US has warned Pakistan to beware of entering into peace deals with the Taliban and allow the Sharia law to be enforced in the name of Islam and thereby deprive the people of Pakistan of their basic human rights. And some behind the scenes arm-twisting from Washington, has forced President Zardari and Army Chief Gen Kayani to put their act together and checkmate the onward march of Taliban from Swat belt.
The US Administration is committing a mistake in trying to distinguish between the good Taliban and the bad Taliban. The fact is that there are no good Taliban at all and engaging what is perceived to be good Taliban will only worsen the situation. A leading American expert on South Asia Ashley Tellis argues that any effort at reconciliation with the Taliban will "undermine the credibility of American power and the success of the Afghan Mission." He describes it as the "worst possible approach" to deal with the problem.
Undoubtedly, application of Sharia law in Malakand area has been a decision inimical to the interests of Pakistan itself and of course, the rest of the world. It will prompt the US to intensify its drone attacks on the tribal areas, ignoring Islamabad’s protests.
The clouds on the Pakistani horizon are thus getting darker.
- Asian Tribune -
A Taliban outrage
“Jaziya” on Sikhs is unacceptable
The razing of the 11 houses of minority Sikhs in troubled Aurakzai tribal region of Pakistan after they failed to pay “jaziya” (tax levied on non-Muslims) has revived memories of similar unequal treatment that the Hindus and Sikhs had faced in Aurangzeb’s times. The outrage is all the more condemnable now, considering that it is happening in modern times. It is a shame for the Asif Ali Zardari government which signed the February agreement with the Taliban and allowed imposition of Shariah law on Swat’s 1.2 million inhabitants and an object lesson for US President Barack Obama who used this agreement as a model in his stated quest for “moderate Taliban”.
Imposing a tax on the basis of religion militates against all tenets of civility, but what Taliban had enforced was outright blackmail. Sikhs were told to pay Rs 5 crore as tax and when they could not, they were targeted unsparingly. What better can be expected from the marauding killers who think that educating girls is a sin and all non-Muslims are kafirs! This is a strange interpretation of Shariah law indeed.
Pakistan being a theocratic state may not find such treatment as unacceptable, but civilised world must raise its voice against the outrage. Minorities have been systematically targeted in Pakistan all these years but this is the limit. If Taliban are allowed to get away with it, they may come up with even more draconian fatwas in future. International community must intervene effectively to curb this discrimination. India has a special responsibility. Taliban attacks have forced more than 50 Sikh and Hindu families to vacate their homes and take shelter in gurdwaras at Nankana Sahib and Peshawar. Many others have had to bid adieu to their homeland forever and have decided to settle in Amritsar. Those who swear by human rights must raise their voice unitedly against such inhuman acts
Sat, 2009-05-02 00:21
By Sarla Handoo - Syndicate Features
TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN
Al Jazeera's Matt McClure met some Hindus who have crossed the border from Pakistan into India
Fighting in Pakistan has forced thousands to flee their homes. Some of them are members of the country's minority Hindu and Sikh communities, who say they are increasingly becoming targets of religious persecution.
.
Within a day of the National Assembly of Pakistan passing the Nizami- Adl regulation and the president Asif Ali Zardari giving his assent to it, the worst fears have begun coming true. The Tehriki Nifazi- Shariati- Mohammadi has come out with a surprising definition of Nizami- Adl saying that the law will protect militants who are charged with killings and persecution of innocent people of not only swat but the entire Malakand Agency. That is because the Chief of the outfit Maulana Sufi Mohammad says that "past things will be left behind and we will go for a new life in peace."
The outfit has also made it clear that the law will not cover Mullah Fazalullah and his followers and as such the new Sharia courts can not hear complaints against mullah Fazulullah by the residents of Swat.
That being the case, one need not be surprised by the report that the Taliban has forcibly occupied 10 Sikh houses in Orakzai Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They took their leader Sardar Kalyan Singh as hostage and demanded a ransom of Rs. 50 million as Jazia, the religious tax. Since the poor families could not pay the levy, they were forced to leave their homes for other areas. Media reports say there are only 15 Sikh houses in the area and that five households had left earlier for fear of their lives at the hands of Taliban.
The Sharia law provides for cutting off the hands of a thief and stoning and lashing people for different crimes. The area is now out of bounds for the modern civil law. What we will be seeing now is the repeat of the recent case in Afghanistan where a young boy and a girl were made to face bullets publicly. They loved each other and wanted to marry but their parents were against it.
The US has come out with a strong reaction to the move by Pakistani President to approve the law. It both said that the law goes against both Human Rights as well as Democracy. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said the US is deeply concerned about the development. President Asif Ali Zardari is putting up a brave face in trying to make the world believe that he is not capitulating before the militants. But that is something no one, including the people of Pakistan, are going to believe. That Zardari tried to absolve himself of the responsibility by letting the Parliament pass the bill before he signed it is a ruse the people can clearly see through.
Even between the hard-line cleric Sufi Mohammad and the Taliban, there are contradiction. While Sufi Mohammad is clear that the Taliban have to lay down arms after the deal is implemented, the spokesman of Taliban Muslim Khan has said that lying down of arms by the Taliban is not part of the agreement reached between the NWFP government and the Taliban which was brokered by Mullah Sufi Mohammad. How is this contradiction going to be reconciled in the future is still an open question.
One of the ominous facts is that the Taliban of Pakistan, who largely constitute the Pakhtuns, are already in touch with militants in Punjab, the largest province of Pakistan which is home to half of the country’s population. In fact, there are reports that the attack on Marriot Hotel in Islamabad and the recent ones on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the Police Academy near Lahore were carried out jointly by the two militant outfits.
Taliban is now working for strengthening its position in Punjab and extending its tenterhooks to other areas of Pakistan. It has already announced that it is working for extending the Sharia law to entire Pakistan. It has adopted a well calculated strategy to destabilize Pakistan by taking the Punjab route. It seems to have realized hat for destabilizing Pakistan it is important to destabilize Punjab first.
The political leadership does not seem to realize the gravity of the situation. That is why President Zardari has buckled under pressure from the Taliban as well as a section of political parties, including the Awami National Party, which threatened to withdraw support to the PPP government in Islamabad.
It is in this backdrop that the US has warned Pakistan to beware of entering into peace deals with the Taliban and allow the Sharia law to be enforced in the name of Islam and thereby deprive the people of Pakistan of their basic human rights. And some behind the scenes arm-twisting from Washington, has forced President Zardari and Army Chief Gen Kayani to put their act together and checkmate the onward march of Taliban from Swat belt.
The US Administration is committing a mistake in trying to distinguish between the good Taliban and the bad Taliban. The fact is that there are no good Taliban at all and engaging what is perceived to be good Taliban will only worsen the situation. A leading American expert on South Asia Ashley Tellis argues that any effort at reconciliation with the Taliban will "undermine the credibility of American power and the success of the Afghan Mission." He describes it as the "worst possible approach" to deal with the problem.
Undoubtedly, application of Sharia law in Malakand area has been a decision inimical to the interests of Pakistan itself and of course, the rest of the world. It will prompt the US to intensify its drone attacks on the tribal areas, ignoring Islamabad’s protests.
The clouds on the Pakistani horizon are thus getting darker.
- Asian Tribune -
A Taliban outrage
“Jaziya” on Sikhs is unacceptable
The razing of the 11 houses of minority Sikhs in troubled Aurakzai tribal region of Pakistan after they failed to pay “jaziya” (tax levied on non-Muslims) has revived memories of similar unequal treatment that the Hindus and Sikhs had faced in Aurangzeb’s times. The outrage is all the more condemnable now, considering that it is happening in modern times. It is a shame for the Asif Ali Zardari government which signed the February agreement with the Taliban and allowed imposition of Shariah law on Swat’s 1.2 million inhabitants and an object lesson for US President Barack Obama who used this agreement as a model in his stated quest for “moderate Taliban”.
Imposing a tax on the basis of religion militates against all tenets of civility, but what Taliban had enforced was outright blackmail. Sikhs were told to pay Rs 5 crore as tax and when they could not, they were targeted unsparingly. What better can be expected from the marauding killers who think that educating girls is a sin and all non-Muslims are kafirs! This is a strange interpretation of Shariah law indeed.
Pakistan being a theocratic state may not find such treatment as unacceptable, but civilised world must raise its voice against the outrage. Minorities have been systematically targeted in Pakistan all these years but this is the limit. If Taliban are allowed to get away with it, they may come up with even more draconian fatwas in future. International community must intervene effectively to curb this discrimination. India has a special responsibility. Taliban attacks have forced more than 50 Sikh and Hindu families to vacate their homes and take shelter in gurdwaras at Nankana Sahib and Peshawar. Many others have had to bid adieu to their homeland forever and have decided to settle in Amritsar. Those who swear by human rights must raise their voice unitedly against such inhuman acts
Raise voice against terror state, Baloch leader's call
by Ahmar Mustikhan | May 1, 2009
A key leader of the international Baluch movement and founder of Baloch Society of North America has called upon all peace-loving forces to join a historic rally to raise their voice against Pakistan army and I.S.I.'s machinations not only against the people of Baluchistan but entire humanity.
Wahid Baloch, founder of BSO-NA -- one of the the first organizations that gave voice to the Baluch secular movement in North America -- and confidante of self-exiled De Jure Ruler of Baluchistan, Suleman Daud Ahmedzai, urged Baluch, Sindhi, Pashtun and Seraikis in the U.S. to assemble before the White House on May 6 to protest President Asif Ali Zardari's meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama on May 6th, 2009
"In fact anyone who believes Pakistan army is a threat to humanity must attend the rally," he said.
He said thet the rally in front of White House is being organized to register protest against the ongoing killings and disappearances in Balochistan and to ask President Obama and his administration to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state and to stop all military and financial aid to Pakistan and its Jihadi terrorist army that is running a campaign of terror in Balochistan.
"We ask all the peace and freedom loving people to come show their support," Wahid Baloch said.
For nearly four years now, Wahid Baloch has exposed Pakistan army atrocities against the Baloch and other oppressed nationalities and communities, including Hindus and Christians, in Pakistan through his website www.bso-na.org.
"Pakistan government has sponsored state terrorism in Balochistan," he said. "At the same time what is most intriguing is that Pakistan government and its military’s have shown an inability to contain the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Pakistan's dreaded Inter Services Intelligence," he said.
Baloch said he believes the rise in Islamic militancy and extremism within civil society of Pakistan is because of state support.
He said the spread of Talibanization coupled with the ongoing and incessant genocide of the Baluch nation and the oppression against the Sindhi nation must be put on the international agenda.
Baloch said Pakistan's nuclear weapons were a cause of concern for entire humanity and the world must act before it was too late.
Wahid Baloch called upon peace-loving Americans also to show support and assemble at the White House at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC on May 6 at 8.00 a.m. sharp.
In his activism work, Baloch met key U.S. legislators to apprise them about the Pakistani state atrocities against Baluchistan.
Recently, he raised the Baluch issue at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva.
An outspoken critic of the family monopoly of politics in Baluchistan, Wahid Baloch firmly believes in freedom of expression and decries leg-pulling in Baluch politics.
http://my.nowpublic.com/world/raise-voice-against-terror-state-baloch-leaders-call
Tanzania: Beyond Sectarian Interests
Haroub Othman
30 April 2009
opinion
No-one knows whether the 1964 union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika was dictated by cold war considerations first, with pan-African ideals of unity playing second fiddle to ideology and personal survival, writes Haroub Othman. But what is clear, Othman argues, is that despite Tanzania's controversial history, the union brought peace and stability to the region, in contrast with the secessionism and violence seen elsewhere. While corrective measures - supported by the people - are required to ensure that it is fit for purpose, the union is a better option than breaking into a federal structure with Kenya and Uganda, says Othman.
Since the 1920s the countries of East Africa, namely Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, had developed common services and joint institutions. Matters such as posts and telecommunications, harbours, railways and currency were run jointly. There was also a body to coordinate the development of Kiswahili. This, no doubt, was easy in view of the fact that all the four countries were neighbours and under one colonial power. The white settlers in Kenya had at one time pressed the British government for a federation of the East African countries on the lines of that of Central Africa. But people in Tanganyika and Uganda feared that if that was to happen it would throw their countries into the hands of white supremacists in Kenya, in the same way that the peoples of Central Africa found themselves under the white supremacists of Southern Rhodesia at the time of the Central African Federation. And so this idea was opposed at the time.
But as the countries were approaching independence and because of the close cooperation among the nationalist organisations, the idea of federation re-emerged. Nyerere, in a statement made in Addis Ababa when Tanganyika's independence was imminent, said that he was prepared to delay his country's independence if the four countries of East Africa could come to independence at the same time and form a federation. But with independence each country retreated into its own national shell, and what was agreed was the formation of the East African Common Services Organisation that later in December 1967 was transformed into the East African Community.
When, therefore on 26 April, 1964, the People's Republic of Zanzibar and the Republic of Tanganyika announced that they had merged to form a union, the international community felt that Zanzibar and Tanganyika had succeeded where the four East African countries together had failed. But was it the ideals of Pan-Africanism that brought Zanzibar and Tanganyika together? Was the union the result of an African initiative or was it propelled by cold war rivalry? The circumstances in which the union was formed raised a lot of questions, many of which are still unanswered, and some have been at the centre of continuing debates and controversies in Tanzania in the last twenty years. Were the fears of ZNP (Zanzibar Nationalist Party) that Zanzibar would be 'taken over' by Tanganyika had been proven true? In later years, the union was to haunt the Zanzibar politicians for a long time, with each of them playing the 'union card' either for legitimacy on the mainland or for support at home.
Nyerere stated that he casually proposed the idea of the union to Karume when the latter visited him to discuss the fate of John Okello. According to Nyerere, Karume immediately agreed to the idea and suggested that Nyerere should be the president of such a union. In a New Year message to the nation on 2 January 1965, Nyerere implied that even if the ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party) had come into power through constitutional means and not as a result of a revolution, the union would still have taken place. But Amrit Wilson's research has revealed that there was a very strong Western pressure, especially from the United States, for the Zanzibar revolution to be contained because it was felt that it held the threat of the spread of communism in the East African region. The Untied States, Britain and the then West Germany, which Tanganyika was heavily dependent on at the time, viewed the revolutionary government in Zanzibar as either a surrogate of the communist powers or dancing to their tune. The international press had already started to characterise Zanzibar as the 'Cuba of Africa', though to be fair to Duggan, he had referred to Zanzibar as 'Tanganyika's Cuba' far back in July 1963 when he had interviewed Nyerere in Washington during the latter's state visit to the US.
In a cable message to US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed his diplomats to urge Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote to explain to Karume the dangers involved in his dependence on Babu and:
'The danger Babu represents... to the security of Zanzibar and East Africa generally... they should recognise here that the big problem is that Karume himself has great confidence in and dependence on Babu... also that Nyerere has said that Karume needs Babu who, despite his background, can and must be worked with. Kenyatta and Joseph Murumbi on the other hand appear to regard Babu as undesirable and the chief threat to Karume. Would it be useful to raise with Nyerere, despite his previous objection, the idea of a Zanzibar-Tanganyika Federation as a possible way of strengthening Karume and reducing Babu's influence? Such action at this time may also help Nyerere's own position.'
In an interview with Amrit Wilson in 1986, Frank Carlucci, the US consul in Zanzibar at the time of the union who was later thrown out of Zanzibar because of CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) activities (and who later rose to become the director of CIA and US secretary of state for defence), confessed that there was United States' pressure on Nyerere.
Susan Crouch in her book Western Responses to Tanzanian Socialism 1967-1983 reveals that:
'To this end the American Central Intelligence Agency was active in trying to create the conditions for union, fanning antagonisms among Zanzibar's revolutionary leaders, and creating a fear of Zanzibar as a communist threat among East African leaders.'
Was the union then, as is indicated in US state department papers, dictated by cold war considerations first and the questions of pan-African ideals of unity were secondary to ideological factors and questions of personal survival?
It has also been suggested that Karume wanted a union with Tanganyika as a means of warding off his marxist and left wing colleagues. What seems to be the case is that after the electoral defeat of July 1963, Karume's leadership within the ASP parliamentary group was shaky. There was a schism in it, with Karume being challenged by Othman Shariff, and some of the party's MPs calling for a government of national unity that would bring together in government all the political parties in parliament. After the revolution, Umma Party radical elements in the government (Babu, Khamis Abdalla Ameir, Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfoudh, Salim Rashid, Badawi Qullatein, etc) were forging links with the ASP leftists (Abdallah Kassim Hanga. Abdulazizi Ali Twala, Hassan Nassor Moyo, etc.), and this might have scared Karume and other moderate elements within the regime. At the same time, the radical way in which the revolution was surging ahead might have alarmed the regime in Dar es Salaam. It should not be forgotten that within days of the revolution in Zanzibar, an army mutiny took place in Tanganyika (later repeated in Kenya and Uganda); and even though we know now that there was no link between the revolution and those mutinies, it was difficult to see it that way at the time.
As a result of the army mutiny in Dar es Salaam, Tabora and Nachingwea, there was virtually no government in Tanganyika for three days, anarchy prevailed, and Nyerere was forced to request British military intervention to bring the country back to normalcy.
The West, particularly the Untied States, perceived developments in Zanzibar in the context of East-West rivalry, and given the leftist credentials of the Umma Party and some of the ASP leaders that were prominent in the revolutionary council, it was assumed that a Cuba-type situation was evolving. The best way of averting it, short of direct military intervention a la Playa Giron (though this was thought of and preparations made), was to try an 'African initiative'. And it worked.
QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY
Many questions continued to be raised regarding the legal basis of the union: Whether the two presidents on their own had the powers to sign such a union agreement; why the Zanzibar's attorney-general, as the principal legal advisor to the government, was not consulted; why there was no referendum; and whether in joining such a union, Zanzibar was not in fact 'swallowed' and 'annexed' by Tanganyika.
Discussions on the union were conducted very secretively. From the archival materials and the statements of those who were in the 'corridors of power' at the time, it would appear that not many people in the Tanganyika government or the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council knew what was happening. Apart from Nyerere and Karume, the only other people who might have been privy to those discussions were Rashidi Kawawa, Oscar Kambona, Job Lusinde, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdul-Aziz Ali Twala and Salim Rashidi.
When these discussions were at an advanced stage, Nyerere is said to have called in his attorney-general at the time, British expert Roland Brown, and asked him to draft a union agreement without anybody knowing. In the case of Zanzibar, the attorney-general, Wolf Dourado, is said to have been sent on a one-week 'leave' and instead a Ugandan lawyer, Dan Nabudere (according to his own account which was corroborated by Babu), was brought in to advise Karume on the draft submitted by Tanganyika. Both Brown and Nabudere were present in the Karume-Nyerere discussions. One can speculate that one reason why Dourado was not involved was because he was 'inherited' from the previous ZNP/ZPPP (Zanzibar Nationalist Party-Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party) regime and the revolutionary government was hesitant to involve him in such a sensitive matter.
Under both the 1962 Republic of Tanganyika constitution and the Zanzibar presidential decree No.5 quoted above, the two presidents had the powers to enter into international agreements on behalf of their governments. What is also important is that the union agreement was ratified by both the Tanganyika parliament and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. Contrary to what some writers have said, the Nyalali Commission was satisfied that the Revolutionary Council met to ratify the Articles of Union. Both Abdulrahman Babu and Khamis Abdallah Ameir, the two former Umma party leaders who were in the Revolutionary Council at the time, have confirmed that the matter was discussed in the council, and while there were reservations on the part of some members, these were 'quashed' by Abdallah Kassim Hanga who made an emotional intervention to support the union.
Once the Articles of Union had been ratified by the two legislative bodies in Tanganyika and Zanzibar, there was no further requirement in law to make them enforceable. The question of referendum would not have arisen because under the Commonwealth legal tradition, in which the two countries were brought up, the notion of a referendum was unknown. The referendum was introduced as a legal requirement under British law in the 1970s during the heated debate in the United Kingdom on the question of its entry into the European Economic Community. To have also expected the Zanzibar revolutionary government to call a referendum on the union, four months after it came into power through unconstitutional means, was like expecting the French revolutionaries of 1789 to have invited King Louis XVI for dinner after they had overthrown him. Should ASP have conducted a referendum to ask Zanzibaris whether or not to stage a revolution? In law, therefore, the Union Agreement, as both Prof Issa Shivji and Dr Kabudi have pointed out, is valid.
ARTICLES OF UNION: 1 + 1 = 3
The Union Agreement, signed by Karume and Nyerere in Zanzibar on 22 April 1964, is known as the Articles of Union. When this agreement was announced the following day, many people inside the two countries, and outside too, were taken by surprise. The strong feeling was that the West had won in their intention to containing the Zanzibar revolution; in fact there were military preparations by both Britain and the United States in case there was a violent reaction in Zanzibar against the union.
What the Tanganyika leadership wanted at the time was to play down the whole event. In a cable message of 23 April 1964 to the US secretary of state, the US ambassador in Dar es Salaam, William Leonhart, informed:
'Mbwambo, chief protocol, has just telephoned a personal request... that, to the maximum extent, any US public statements on Tangovernment -Zanzibar union be avoided. Situation over the next few days in Zanzibar could be very critical and both the Soviet and Chinese reaction is undetermined.'
In an address later to the National Assembly requesting the ratification of the Articles of Union, Nyerere insisted that the move was inspired by the ideals for an African unity. 'Unity in our continent does not have to come via Moscow or Washington', he insisted.
The Articles of Union have been given different interpretations and characterised as federal, quasi-federal, an interim arrangement towards one government, etc. Some have seen the union as similar to the relationship between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
Those who were close to the scene at the time also differ as to what type of relationship it is. The US ambassador in Dar es Salaam, in a cable message to his government on 22 April 1964, the day the Articles of Union were signed by Karume and Nyerere, stated:
'Like the relationship between Northern Ireland and Britain, the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika gave the island limited regional administrative autonomy... but ensured overall power... was held by the centre at Dar es Salaam'. But Frank Calucci, reporting from Zanzibar the next day, said that Karume was 'still under the impression that he is agreeing to a federation of two autonomous states, not a centralised union envisaged under the present articles'. Attwood, the U.S. Ambassador in Kenya at the time, says he was informed by Dustan Omari, Nyerere's permanent secretary then, 'that the major power would rest in the centre... but that Zanzibar would retain its own internal governmental affairs'.
While I have difficulty in accepting some of the assertions of some of the writers on the character of the union for reasons that I will advance later, I would only want to agree with the notion that the Articles of Union are the Grundnorm, the fundamental law of the United Republic, on which the Constitutions of Tanzania and Zanzibar, and other laws, have to be based and from which they derive their legitimacy. Like any supreme law in any other legal system, no other law or constitutional act can be in conflict with it.
Articles of Union provide for matters that would be under the union arrangement. From the original 11 items in 1964, the list has now expanded to 23. Some people question the validity of such an expansion, though one must admit that there was nothing that was added into the list unconstitutionally. The Articles of Union also provide for the existence of two governments: One for the whole United Republic for all union matters and for non-union matters in Tanganyika, which, under the 1977 Union Constitution is referred to as Tanzania mainland, and one for Zanzibar in all matters that are non-Union. According to Nyerere, Karume wanted a total union, but he (Nyerere) cautioned against it, saying that such a move might be construed by Zanzibaris and others as meaning that Zanzibar had been swallowed up, annexed, incorporated into or taken over by Tanganyika. He insisted that Zanzibar's identity must be maintained.
There is no way one can construe the 'Article of Union' as a basis for a federal set-up. Nor can they be seen as an interim arrangement towards a one government. They intended to create a single state with two authorities, but with one of those authorities having a limited geographical jurisdiction. The intention was to retain the identity of the smaller unit. By this event, Tanganyika has not been lost; in fact it has been enlarged. Even if it is accepted that the union was a Western conspiracy against the Zanzibar revolution, the effect of the intention was to deny Zanzibar the capacity to be an international actor, not to interfere with what was happening inside the country. To be able to change the internal course of events would have entailed changing the regime. What might have confounded some of the law experts looking at the relationship between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania was the fact that no such example existed in the Anglo-Saxon legal system. The closest they could think of then was that of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
CONSOLIDATING THE UNION: POPULAR APPROVAL
At the time of the Union Zanzibar and Tanganyika were ruled by different political parties, ASP and TANU respectively. The Articles of Union did not require the formation of a single political party for the whole United Republic. Thus in the period 1964-1977 each party operated within its own geographical area, though at the approach of every general election, the two parties held a joint congress where they nominated a join presidential candidate for the elections. Only in 1977, after a national survey of members of both parties, did the two parties merge to form the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) with authority over the whole country. But why did Zanzibaris agree to such a merger? Nyerere had always expressed surprise when recalling the radiant faces he saw and the jovial mood of the Zanzibaris the day CCM was proclaimed at the Amaan stadium in Zanzibar. The fact is that Zanzibaris were celebrating not only the birth of CCM but also the demise of ASP. By that time the general feeling in the islands was that the ASP had outlived its usefulness. The revolution which it had championed had stooped so low as to devour its own sons: Most of the leaders were busy amassing wealth; prison and death were the only options open to political dissent; and political thuggery was a virtue.
One matter that was added in 1984 to the list of union items was that of national security. This happened at the time when Ali Hassan Mwinyi was president and Seif Shariff Hamad the chief minister of Zanzibar in 1984-85, commonly known as the Third Phase government. Not having much confidence in the security personnel they inherited, who might have had personal allegiance to Jumbe and Seif Bakari, the new administration sought the extension of the National Security Act of the mainland to Zanzibar. In that case it was possible to transfer the security personnel in Zanzibar to the mainland and vice versa.
So from the above one can see the following: First, Zanzibaris wanted a merger of the parties, and for the united party to have authority all over the country, in the hope that it would rescue them from a regime that was no longer able to inspire confidence and instil enthusiasm; and second, a 'consolidation' of the union in this regard was necessary for one faction of the leadership to ward off any possible challenge by the other.
The long-term effect of the parties' merger was to have matters that were entirely within Zanzibar's jurisdiction, and that were not union matters, decided by a pan-territorial political party where Zanzibari representation was not decisive. This became clear in 1984 when Aboud Jumbe was forced to resign as Zanzibar president: It was the party's NEC which appointed Ali Hassan Mwinyi as an interim president and later nominated him for election as the president of Zanzibar. Since NEC's Zanzibari membership is no more than a third of the total, this means therefore that a Zanzibar president could be chosen by a forum, which is predominantly non-Zanzibari. And this was further evidenced with the nomination by CCM's NEC of the present president of Zanzibar.
A number of other measures were taken to consolidate the union, particularly in the constitutional realm. A permanent constitution was put in place in 1977 instead of an interim one that had been in existence since 1964.
ZANZIBAR'S IDENTITY IN THE UNION
In the Articles of Union, Zanzibar is allowed to retain its autonomy and pursue its own policies in all matters other than those stipulated as Union matters. In this case, the power to decide is left to the Zanzibar organs such as the house of representatives, the revolutionary council and the president of Zanzibar and chairman of the revolutionary council. The union constitution stipulates that constitutional amendments require the approval of two-thirds of Zanzibaris sitting in the union parliament and the same proportion of mainlanders.
In order to avoid a clash in the legislative functions of the two sides of the union, it has been provided that if the house of representatives enacts any law which should be under the jurisdiction of the union parliament that law will be null and void, and also if the union parliament enacts a law on any matter under the jurisdiction of the house of representatives that law will be null and void.
The constitution also provides for effective Zanzibari representation in the union parliament. It also guarantees a separate judiciary system for Zanzibar which has jurisdiction over Zanzibar alone. Even though the court of appeal of the United Republic is a union organ, it has no power to decide on a case involving a dispute between the union government and the Zanzibar revolutionary government.
However one might view the circumstances that made Zanzibar merge with Tanganyika in 1964, the fact of the matter is that Zanzibar was not annexed or forcefully incorporated. It agreed on the union out of its own free will and as a result of decisions made by its own organs. The argument that within the union Tanganyika has lost its identity has no basis. If anything it has enlarged its territory. It is Zanzibar's autonomy and identity that must be maintained lest, as Nyerere himself has pointed out several times, an impression is created that the larger and more populous Tanganyika has swallowed Zanzibar. Such a situation is not new even in the most centralised states. In China, despite the fact that the country has a centralised authority and no federal traces of any kind, yet because of certain historical, political or cultural reasons, certain areas are conferred autonomy, and are constitutionally given the status of autonomous regions. As will be pointed out later there are entities in present-day Europe that enjoy full autonomy within one state. To entertain the thought that the Articles of Union are a temporary arrangement, and that ultimately the intention should be to create one government is to manifest 'big brother chauvinism'
DEBATES ON THE UNION: A POLLUTED ATMOSPHERE
In 1983/84 and 1990/92 extensive political and constitutional debates took place in the country that deeply probed the question of the union. The debates of 1983/84 resulted in major amendments to the 1977 union constitution and the formulation of a new Zanzibar constitution in 1984. But they also resulted in the forced resignation of Aboud Jumbe from all his state and party positions, the sacking of a Zanzibar chief minister and the serious warning given by the ruling party to a number of prominent Zanzibar figures. The debates of the 1990/92 period resulted in the Nyalali Commission making major recommendations on the structure of the Union. In between the two periods also another Zanzibar chief minister was sacked, and several leading Zanzibar politicians were dismissed form the ruling party.
As stated above, the question of Zanzibar being 'sold' to the mainland was an issue in pre-revolutionary Zanzibar. And if one remembers that the political parties were almost evenly divided, then one can assume that almost half of the Zanzibar population was already biased against the mainland even before the union. The post-revolution politics in the islands did not help matters much. Karume went into a union to save himself from his marxist and left-wing colleagues; and since Jumbe was not considered to be the 'heir apparent' before Karume's assassination in 1972, he was not thought of as the natural successor when he took over. It has been speculated that the revolutionary council had Colonel Seif Bakari in mind, but Nyerere advised that since Karume was killed by an army officer, Seif Bakari taking over might be construed as a military coup. Jumbe, feeling that he had not much support within the revolutionary council, depended very much on Nyerere's and mainland's support. It is no wonder then that it was during his presidency that much of the consolidation of the union took place, with the most items added to the union list. It is significant too that the merger of the parties took place then. But this dependency on the mainland was costing him much popular support at home. Either as a way of outflanking his opponents or because of genuine problems he found in the union (after all he was for a long time a minister for union affairs before he became president of Zanzibar), he first raised the question of restructuring the union in a speech seven years before the 1983/84 debates.
Other politicians in Zanzibar too have used the mainland as a trump card either to crush their opponents or to climb the political ladder. Seif Shariff Hamad, Khatib Hassan, Shaaban Mloo and others accused Jumbe in 1984 of planning to break up the union, and thus forced Jumbe to resign from his political posts then. They in turn faced the same accusation from their opponents in 1988 and were dismissed from the party.
The issues that were raised in both the 1983/84 and 1990/92 debates centred on the following:
1. Whether the Articles of Union of 1964 provided for a federation, that is three governments (one of Tanganyika, the other of Zanzibar, and a third a federal one) or only two governments as presently existing;
2. As the union government is also the government for the mainland in non-union matters, does this not give the impression that mainland is the union?
3. Does Zanzibar get a fair share in the distribution of benefits coming form the union?
4. Is Zanzibar well represented in the diplomatic service?
5. Does it get a fair share of foreign aid coming to Tanzania?
6. Since the people of Zanzibar were not consulted at the time of the formation of the union, should there not be a referendum now to ascertain whether the people wanted the union or not?
Most of these questions, as can be seen, were coming from Zanzibar, and what surprised many people at the time of the 1983/84 debate, was that they were being aired in the state-owned-and-controlled official mass media.
No such strong feelings were voiced on the mainland during the debates. Many people who made submissions to the Nyalali Commission said hardly anything about the system of governments that the union should have. It was only after the opening up of the political system and the establishment of more political parties that one began hearing very strong views coming form the mainland on the question of the Union; some of those going even further than anybody in Zanzibar had ever contemplated.
THE NYALALI COMMISSION: AGREED TO DISAGREE
One of the major recommendations of the Nyalali Commission was for the replacement of the present union set-up with a federal one. This was one of the areas that bought about a very heated debate within the commission and which necessitated members of the commission having to vote. Later those who were opposed to the federal idea had to append their own dissenting opinion to the main report to explain their position. But the division in the commission on this issue almost came to a mainland/Zanzibar division.
Of the 11 members from Zanzibar, seven wanted the present union set-up, with some major changes, to remain; three wanted a federal and one was undecided. Of the same number from the Mainland, nine wanted a federal set-up and two wanted the present arrangement to continue. What is important is that both sides agreed that there were problems within the union. Even though at the time the complaints form the mainland were not so loud compared to Zanzibar, it would have been wise if those complaints were addressed and resolved. The majority of members of the commission felt that in a federal set-up, both Tanganyika and Zanzibar would retain their identity, federal areas would be clearly defined and the responsibilities of each would be understood, and the federal entity would be distinct from the national ones.
Those holding the minority opinion, on the other hand, were of the view that there was nothing in the Articles of Union to suggest that their framers had a federal set-up in mind; that a federation would be a step backward and might be a prelude to the dissolution of the union; that corrective measures could be taken, if there is political will, which would define union matters, list union institutions and apportion the responsibility of each side on those matters. Examples were provided from the two Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Finland where entities (Faroe Islands, Aaland Islands and Greenland) have full autonomy in a number of areas that they exercise within a non-federal state. The dissenting opinion in the Nyalali Report pointed out:
'Greenland and Faroe Islands, both of which are part of Denmark, have full autonomy in many matters. For example, a parliament that is not subject to interference form the central government of Denmark, and all political and economic matters agreed upon and even in international relations. The islands of Faroe have their own flag hoisted in all government buildings and on ships registered in Faroe islands. Also Faroe Islands authority issues passports;
Denmark had agreed to join the European Economic Community. So did Greenland. But later, Greenland withdrew from the Community. Therefore, all EEC agreements and conditionality accepted in Denmark did not apply in Greenland. Similarly, the Islands of Faroe are not a member of the EU.
In regard to Finland, the islands of Aaland have their own parliament and government. The islands of Aaland also have their own 'identity' for persons born in the islands and who have not lived abroad consecutively for five years or more. The islands have their own flag, issue their own stamps and its citizens are not subject to military service. The islands of Aaland are a demilitarised zone. The Central Bank of Finland must consult the government of Aaland before it takes measures that might harm the economy of Aaland. This, despite the fact that they share a common currency;
The islands of Aaland, as is the case for Greenland and Faroe, are, on their own right, represented in the Nordic Council that consists of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.'
WHITHER THE UNION?
As pointed out above, there have been historical links between Zanzibar and Tanganyika long before the coming of the colonialists in East Africa; and colonialism did not in fact stop such interactions from continuing. During the struggle for national independence, the two main political parties in the two countries cooperated - though there is nothing to suggest that the two parties were thinking of merging into a union of this kind after they came into power. What they had in mind was to form a federation with Kenya and Uganda. Until the elections of July 1963, ASP still thought that it would win power through the electoral process; and it would appear that their main supporters, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), thought likewise.
Now the union is a fact. Despite a lot of problems, it has brought stability and peace in the region. It is difficult to speculate what would have happened to the Zanzibar revolution without the union: Whether Zanzibar would have advanced faster or whether a counter-revolutionary force would have taken over and embellished a dictatorship worse than anything the islands have actually experienced especially during the first phase government. What is clear though is that the union has brought the two peoples much closer together.
I do not believe that the unity of the two peoples can be strengthened by restructuring the present set-up into a federation. I see movement from the present set-up to a federation as a step towards the dismemberment of the union; and I do not think that that is to the short or long term benefit of the people of Tanzania. The present problems can be resolved if there is a strong political will on the part of our political class and if the people are told the truth about those problems.
Only when corrective measures are taken, would it be possible to sustain and strengthen the union. Otherwise if the difficulties inherent in the Articles of Union and the problems arising from implementation are only emphasised and not resolved, the tendency would be towards the withering away of the union.
In this era of multi-parties and openness, it is even more important that matters are discussed and solutions founded on popular will. Of all the political parties that have been established since the abolition of the one-party system, only one, the Democratic Party led by Reverend Mtikila, has come out strongly against the union and called for its dissolution. Others are prevaricating between 'referendum', 'federation' and modifications within the present set-up. The CCM and its governments which seemed earlier on to strongly accept the dissenting opinion in the Nyalali Report, now seems to be torn apart, with a strong group calling for a federal set-up.
The national language, the ethics of equality and human dignity, and the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar are what overcame the ethnic hatred, religious bigotry, regional parochialism and national differences and forged national cohesion and unity. It is these that have made Tanzania an example in a continent beset with secessionism, ethnic violence and religious pogroms. One hopes that there is capacity, honesty and patriotism within Tanzania that will look beyond the sectarian interests. The alternative is too horrendous to contemplate.
*A full version of this paper was published in 1993 by the Danish Centre for Development Research. It also appeared in the book Zanzibar and the Union Question, edited by Prof Chris Peter and Professor Haroub Othman
and published by the Zanzibar Legal Services Centre.
* Haroub Othman is a professor in development studies at the
University of Dar es Salaam.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/.
30 April 2009
opinion
No-one knows whether the 1964 union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika was dictated by cold war considerations first, with pan-African ideals of unity playing second fiddle to ideology and personal survival, writes Haroub Othman. But what is clear, Othman argues, is that despite Tanzania's controversial history, the union brought peace and stability to the region, in contrast with the secessionism and violence seen elsewhere. While corrective measures - supported by the people - are required to ensure that it is fit for purpose, the union is a better option than breaking into a federal structure with Kenya and Uganda, says Othman.
Since the 1920s the countries of East Africa, namely Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, had developed common services and joint institutions. Matters such as posts and telecommunications, harbours, railways and currency were run jointly. There was also a body to coordinate the development of Kiswahili. This, no doubt, was easy in view of the fact that all the four countries were neighbours and under one colonial power. The white settlers in Kenya had at one time pressed the British government for a federation of the East African countries on the lines of that of Central Africa. But people in Tanganyika and Uganda feared that if that was to happen it would throw their countries into the hands of white supremacists in Kenya, in the same way that the peoples of Central Africa found themselves under the white supremacists of Southern Rhodesia at the time of the Central African Federation. And so this idea was opposed at the time.
But as the countries were approaching independence and because of the close cooperation among the nationalist organisations, the idea of federation re-emerged. Nyerere, in a statement made in Addis Ababa when Tanganyika's independence was imminent, said that he was prepared to delay his country's independence if the four countries of East Africa could come to independence at the same time and form a federation. But with independence each country retreated into its own national shell, and what was agreed was the formation of the East African Common Services Organisation that later in December 1967 was transformed into the East African Community.
When, therefore on 26 April, 1964, the People's Republic of Zanzibar and the Republic of Tanganyika announced that they had merged to form a union, the international community felt that Zanzibar and Tanganyika had succeeded where the four East African countries together had failed. But was it the ideals of Pan-Africanism that brought Zanzibar and Tanganyika together? Was the union the result of an African initiative or was it propelled by cold war rivalry? The circumstances in which the union was formed raised a lot of questions, many of which are still unanswered, and some have been at the centre of continuing debates and controversies in Tanzania in the last twenty years. Were the fears of ZNP (Zanzibar Nationalist Party) that Zanzibar would be 'taken over' by Tanganyika had been proven true? In later years, the union was to haunt the Zanzibar politicians for a long time, with each of them playing the 'union card' either for legitimacy on the mainland or for support at home.
Nyerere stated that he casually proposed the idea of the union to Karume when the latter visited him to discuss the fate of John Okello. According to Nyerere, Karume immediately agreed to the idea and suggested that Nyerere should be the president of such a union. In a New Year message to the nation on 2 January 1965, Nyerere implied that even if the ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party) had come into power through constitutional means and not as a result of a revolution, the union would still have taken place. But Amrit Wilson's research has revealed that there was a very strong Western pressure, especially from the United States, for the Zanzibar revolution to be contained because it was felt that it held the threat of the spread of communism in the East African region. The Untied States, Britain and the then West Germany, which Tanganyika was heavily dependent on at the time, viewed the revolutionary government in Zanzibar as either a surrogate of the communist powers or dancing to their tune. The international press had already started to characterise Zanzibar as the 'Cuba of Africa', though to be fair to Duggan, he had referred to Zanzibar as 'Tanganyika's Cuba' far back in July 1963 when he had interviewed Nyerere in Washington during the latter's state visit to the US.
In a cable message to US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed his diplomats to urge Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote to explain to Karume the dangers involved in his dependence on Babu and:
'The danger Babu represents... to the security of Zanzibar and East Africa generally... they should recognise here that the big problem is that Karume himself has great confidence in and dependence on Babu... also that Nyerere has said that Karume needs Babu who, despite his background, can and must be worked with. Kenyatta and Joseph Murumbi on the other hand appear to regard Babu as undesirable and the chief threat to Karume. Would it be useful to raise with Nyerere, despite his previous objection, the idea of a Zanzibar-Tanganyika Federation as a possible way of strengthening Karume and reducing Babu's influence? Such action at this time may also help Nyerere's own position.'
In an interview with Amrit Wilson in 1986, Frank Carlucci, the US consul in Zanzibar at the time of the union who was later thrown out of Zanzibar because of CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) activities (and who later rose to become the director of CIA and US secretary of state for defence), confessed that there was United States' pressure on Nyerere.
Susan Crouch in her book Western Responses to Tanzanian Socialism 1967-1983 reveals that:
'To this end the American Central Intelligence Agency was active in trying to create the conditions for union, fanning antagonisms among Zanzibar's revolutionary leaders, and creating a fear of Zanzibar as a communist threat among East African leaders.'
Was the union then, as is indicated in US state department papers, dictated by cold war considerations first and the questions of pan-African ideals of unity were secondary to ideological factors and questions of personal survival?
It has also been suggested that Karume wanted a union with Tanganyika as a means of warding off his marxist and left wing colleagues. What seems to be the case is that after the electoral defeat of July 1963, Karume's leadership within the ASP parliamentary group was shaky. There was a schism in it, with Karume being challenged by Othman Shariff, and some of the party's MPs calling for a government of national unity that would bring together in government all the political parties in parliament. After the revolution, Umma Party radical elements in the government (Babu, Khamis Abdalla Ameir, Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfoudh, Salim Rashid, Badawi Qullatein, etc) were forging links with the ASP leftists (Abdallah Kassim Hanga. Abdulazizi Ali Twala, Hassan Nassor Moyo, etc.), and this might have scared Karume and other moderate elements within the regime. At the same time, the radical way in which the revolution was surging ahead might have alarmed the regime in Dar es Salaam. It should not be forgotten that within days of the revolution in Zanzibar, an army mutiny took place in Tanganyika (later repeated in Kenya and Uganda); and even though we know now that there was no link between the revolution and those mutinies, it was difficult to see it that way at the time.
As a result of the army mutiny in Dar es Salaam, Tabora and Nachingwea, there was virtually no government in Tanganyika for three days, anarchy prevailed, and Nyerere was forced to request British military intervention to bring the country back to normalcy.
The West, particularly the Untied States, perceived developments in Zanzibar in the context of East-West rivalry, and given the leftist credentials of the Umma Party and some of the ASP leaders that were prominent in the revolutionary council, it was assumed that a Cuba-type situation was evolving. The best way of averting it, short of direct military intervention a la Playa Giron (though this was thought of and preparations made), was to try an 'African initiative'. And it worked.
QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY
Many questions continued to be raised regarding the legal basis of the union: Whether the two presidents on their own had the powers to sign such a union agreement; why the Zanzibar's attorney-general, as the principal legal advisor to the government, was not consulted; why there was no referendum; and whether in joining such a union, Zanzibar was not in fact 'swallowed' and 'annexed' by Tanganyika.
Discussions on the union were conducted very secretively. From the archival materials and the statements of those who were in the 'corridors of power' at the time, it would appear that not many people in the Tanganyika government or the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council knew what was happening. Apart from Nyerere and Karume, the only other people who might have been privy to those discussions were Rashidi Kawawa, Oscar Kambona, Job Lusinde, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdul-Aziz Ali Twala and Salim Rashidi.
When these discussions were at an advanced stage, Nyerere is said to have called in his attorney-general at the time, British expert Roland Brown, and asked him to draft a union agreement without anybody knowing. In the case of Zanzibar, the attorney-general, Wolf Dourado, is said to have been sent on a one-week 'leave' and instead a Ugandan lawyer, Dan Nabudere (according to his own account which was corroborated by Babu), was brought in to advise Karume on the draft submitted by Tanganyika. Both Brown and Nabudere were present in the Karume-Nyerere discussions. One can speculate that one reason why Dourado was not involved was because he was 'inherited' from the previous ZNP/ZPPP (Zanzibar Nationalist Party-Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party) regime and the revolutionary government was hesitant to involve him in such a sensitive matter.
Under both the 1962 Republic of Tanganyika constitution and the Zanzibar presidential decree No.5 quoted above, the two presidents had the powers to enter into international agreements on behalf of their governments. What is also important is that the union agreement was ratified by both the Tanganyika parliament and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. Contrary to what some writers have said, the Nyalali Commission was satisfied that the Revolutionary Council met to ratify the Articles of Union. Both Abdulrahman Babu and Khamis Abdallah Ameir, the two former Umma party leaders who were in the Revolutionary Council at the time, have confirmed that the matter was discussed in the council, and while there were reservations on the part of some members, these were 'quashed' by Abdallah Kassim Hanga who made an emotional intervention to support the union.
Once the Articles of Union had been ratified by the two legislative bodies in Tanganyika and Zanzibar, there was no further requirement in law to make them enforceable. The question of referendum would not have arisen because under the Commonwealth legal tradition, in which the two countries were brought up, the notion of a referendum was unknown. The referendum was introduced as a legal requirement under British law in the 1970s during the heated debate in the United Kingdom on the question of its entry into the European Economic Community. To have also expected the Zanzibar revolutionary government to call a referendum on the union, four months after it came into power through unconstitutional means, was like expecting the French revolutionaries of 1789 to have invited King Louis XVI for dinner after they had overthrown him. Should ASP have conducted a referendum to ask Zanzibaris whether or not to stage a revolution? In law, therefore, the Union Agreement, as both Prof Issa Shivji and Dr Kabudi have pointed out, is valid.
ARTICLES OF UNION: 1 + 1 = 3
The Union Agreement, signed by Karume and Nyerere in Zanzibar on 22 April 1964, is known as the Articles of Union. When this agreement was announced the following day, many people inside the two countries, and outside too, were taken by surprise. The strong feeling was that the West had won in their intention to containing the Zanzibar revolution; in fact there were military preparations by both Britain and the United States in case there was a violent reaction in Zanzibar against the union.
What the Tanganyika leadership wanted at the time was to play down the whole event. In a cable message of 23 April 1964 to the US secretary of state, the US ambassador in Dar es Salaam, William Leonhart, informed:
'Mbwambo, chief protocol, has just telephoned a personal request... that, to the maximum extent, any US public statements on Tangovernment -Zanzibar union be avoided. Situation over the next few days in Zanzibar could be very critical and both the Soviet and Chinese reaction is undetermined.'
In an address later to the National Assembly requesting the ratification of the Articles of Union, Nyerere insisted that the move was inspired by the ideals for an African unity. 'Unity in our continent does not have to come via Moscow or Washington', he insisted.
The Articles of Union have been given different interpretations and characterised as federal, quasi-federal, an interim arrangement towards one government, etc. Some have seen the union as similar to the relationship between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
Those who were close to the scene at the time also differ as to what type of relationship it is. The US ambassador in Dar es Salaam, in a cable message to his government on 22 April 1964, the day the Articles of Union were signed by Karume and Nyerere, stated:
'Like the relationship between Northern Ireland and Britain, the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika gave the island limited regional administrative autonomy... but ensured overall power... was held by the centre at Dar es Salaam'. But Frank Calucci, reporting from Zanzibar the next day, said that Karume was 'still under the impression that he is agreeing to a federation of two autonomous states, not a centralised union envisaged under the present articles'. Attwood, the U.S. Ambassador in Kenya at the time, says he was informed by Dustan Omari, Nyerere's permanent secretary then, 'that the major power would rest in the centre... but that Zanzibar would retain its own internal governmental affairs'.
While I have difficulty in accepting some of the assertions of some of the writers on the character of the union for reasons that I will advance later, I would only want to agree with the notion that the Articles of Union are the Grundnorm, the fundamental law of the United Republic, on which the Constitutions of Tanzania and Zanzibar, and other laws, have to be based and from which they derive their legitimacy. Like any supreme law in any other legal system, no other law or constitutional act can be in conflict with it.
Articles of Union provide for matters that would be under the union arrangement. From the original 11 items in 1964, the list has now expanded to 23. Some people question the validity of such an expansion, though one must admit that there was nothing that was added into the list unconstitutionally. The Articles of Union also provide for the existence of two governments: One for the whole United Republic for all union matters and for non-union matters in Tanganyika, which, under the 1977 Union Constitution is referred to as Tanzania mainland, and one for Zanzibar in all matters that are non-Union. According to Nyerere, Karume wanted a total union, but he (Nyerere) cautioned against it, saying that such a move might be construed by Zanzibaris and others as meaning that Zanzibar had been swallowed up, annexed, incorporated into or taken over by Tanganyika. He insisted that Zanzibar's identity must be maintained.
There is no way one can construe the 'Article of Union' as a basis for a federal set-up. Nor can they be seen as an interim arrangement towards a one government. They intended to create a single state with two authorities, but with one of those authorities having a limited geographical jurisdiction. The intention was to retain the identity of the smaller unit. By this event, Tanganyika has not been lost; in fact it has been enlarged. Even if it is accepted that the union was a Western conspiracy against the Zanzibar revolution, the effect of the intention was to deny Zanzibar the capacity to be an international actor, not to interfere with what was happening inside the country. To be able to change the internal course of events would have entailed changing the regime. What might have confounded some of the law experts looking at the relationship between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania was the fact that no such example existed in the Anglo-Saxon legal system. The closest they could think of then was that of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
CONSOLIDATING THE UNION: POPULAR APPROVAL
At the time of the Union Zanzibar and Tanganyika were ruled by different political parties, ASP and TANU respectively. The Articles of Union did not require the formation of a single political party for the whole United Republic. Thus in the period 1964-1977 each party operated within its own geographical area, though at the approach of every general election, the two parties held a joint congress where they nominated a join presidential candidate for the elections. Only in 1977, after a national survey of members of both parties, did the two parties merge to form the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) with authority over the whole country. But why did Zanzibaris agree to such a merger? Nyerere had always expressed surprise when recalling the radiant faces he saw and the jovial mood of the Zanzibaris the day CCM was proclaimed at the Amaan stadium in Zanzibar. The fact is that Zanzibaris were celebrating not only the birth of CCM but also the demise of ASP. By that time the general feeling in the islands was that the ASP had outlived its usefulness. The revolution which it had championed had stooped so low as to devour its own sons: Most of the leaders were busy amassing wealth; prison and death were the only options open to political dissent; and political thuggery was a virtue.
One matter that was added in 1984 to the list of union items was that of national security. This happened at the time when Ali Hassan Mwinyi was president and Seif Shariff Hamad the chief minister of Zanzibar in 1984-85, commonly known as the Third Phase government. Not having much confidence in the security personnel they inherited, who might have had personal allegiance to Jumbe and Seif Bakari, the new administration sought the extension of the National Security Act of the mainland to Zanzibar. In that case it was possible to transfer the security personnel in Zanzibar to the mainland and vice versa.
So from the above one can see the following: First, Zanzibaris wanted a merger of the parties, and for the united party to have authority all over the country, in the hope that it would rescue them from a regime that was no longer able to inspire confidence and instil enthusiasm; and second, a 'consolidation' of the union in this regard was necessary for one faction of the leadership to ward off any possible challenge by the other.
The long-term effect of the parties' merger was to have matters that were entirely within Zanzibar's jurisdiction, and that were not union matters, decided by a pan-territorial political party where Zanzibari representation was not decisive. This became clear in 1984 when Aboud Jumbe was forced to resign as Zanzibar president: It was the party's NEC which appointed Ali Hassan Mwinyi as an interim president and later nominated him for election as the president of Zanzibar. Since NEC's Zanzibari membership is no more than a third of the total, this means therefore that a Zanzibar president could be chosen by a forum, which is predominantly non-Zanzibari. And this was further evidenced with the nomination by CCM's NEC of the present president of Zanzibar.
A number of other measures were taken to consolidate the union, particularly in the constitutional realm. A permanent constitution was put in place in 1977 instead of an interim one that had been in existence since 1964.
ZANZIBAR'S IDENTITY IN THE UNION
In the Articles of Union, Zanzibar is allowed to retain its autonomy and pursue its own policies in all matters other than those stipulated as Union matters. In this case, the power to decide is left to the Zanzibar organs such as the house of representatives, the revolutionary council and the president of Zanzibar and chairman of the revolutionary council. The union constitution stipulates that constitutional amendments require the approval of two-thirds of Zanzibaris sitting in the union parliament and the same proportion of mainlanders.
In order to avoid a clash in the legislative functions of the two sides of the union, it has been provided that if the house of representatives enacts any law which should be under the jurisdiction of the union parliament that law will be null and void, and also if the union parliament enacts a law on any matter under the jurisdiction of the house of representatives that law will be null and void.
The constitution also provides for effective Zanzibari representation in the union parliament. It also guarantees a separate judiciary system for Zanzibar which has jurisdiction over Zanzibar alone. Even though the court of appeal of the United Republic is a union organ, it has no power to decide on a case involving a dispute between the union government and the Zanzibar revolutionary government.
However one might view the circumstances that made Zanzibar merge with Tanganyika in 1964, the fact of the matter is that Zanzibar was not annexed or forcefully incorporated. It agreed on the union out of its own free will and as a result of decisions made by its own organs. The argument that within the union Tanganyika has lost its identity has no basis. If anything it has enlarged its territory. It is Zanzibar's autonomy and identity that must be maintained lest, as Nyerere himself has pointed out several times, an impression is created that the larger and more populous Tanganyika has swallowed Zanzibar. Such a situation is not new even in the most centralised states. In China, despite the fact that the country has a centralised authority and no federal traces of any kind, yet because of certain historical, political or cultural reasons, certain areas are conferred autonomy, and are constitutionally given the status of autonomous regions. As will be pointed out later there are entities in present-day Europe that enjoy full autonomy within one state. To entertain the thought that the Articles of Union are a temporary arrangement, and that ultimately the intention should be to create one government is to manifest 'big brother chauvinism'
DEBATES ON THE UNION: A POLLUTED ATMOSPHERE
In 1983/84 and 1990/92 extensive political and constitutional debates took place in the country that deeply probed the question of the union. The debates of 1983/84 resulted in major amendments to the 1977 union constitution and the formulation of a new Zanzibar constitution in 1984. But they also resulted in the forced resignation of Aboud Jumbe from all his state and party positions, the sacking of a Zanzibar chief minister and the serious warning given by the ruling party to a number of prominent Zanzibar figures. The debates of the 1990/92 period resulted in the Nyalali Commission making major recommendations on the structure of the Union. In between the two periods also another Zanzibar chief minister was sacked, and several leading Zanzibar politicians were dismissed form the ruling party.
As stated above, the question of Zanzibar being 'sold' to the mainland was an issue in pre-revolutionary Zanzibar. And if one remembers that the political parties were almost evenly divided, then one can assume that almost half of the Zanzibar population was already biased against the mainland even before the union. The post-revolution politics in the islands did not help matters much. Karume went into a union to save himself from his marxist and left-wing colleagues; and since Jumbe was not considered to be the 'heir apparent' before Karume's assassination in 1972, he was not thought of as the natural successor when he took over. It has been speculated that the revolutionary council had Colonel Seif Bakari in mind, but Nyerere advised that since Karume was killed by an army officer, Seif Bakari taking over might be construed as a military coup. Jumbe, feeling that he had not much support within the revolutionary council, depended very much on Nyerere's and mainland's support. It is no wonder then that it was during his presidency that much of the consolidation of the union took place, with the most items added to the union list. It is significant too that the merger of the parties took place then. But this dependency on the mainland was costing him much popular support at home. Either as a way of outflanking his opponents or because of genuine problems he found in the union (after all he was for a long time a minister for union affairs before he became president of Zanzibar), he first raised the question of restructuring the union in a speech seven years before the 1983/84 debates.
Other politicians in Zanzibar too have used the mainland as a trump card either to crush their opponents or to climb the political ladder. Seif Shariff Hamad, Khatib Hassan, Shaaban Mloo and others accused Jumbe in 1984 of planning to break up the union, and thus forced Jumbe to resign from his political posts then. They in turn faced the same accusation from their opponents in 1988 and were dismissed from the party.
The issues that were raised in both the 1983/84 and 1990/92 debates centred on the following:
1. Whether the Articles of Union of 1964 provided for a federation, that is three governments (one of Tanganyika, the other of Zanzibar, and a third a federal one) or only two governments as presently existing;
2. As the union government is also the government for the mainland in non-union matters, does this not give the impression that mainland is the union?
3. Does Zanzibar get a fair share in the distribution of benefits coming form the union?
4. Is Zanzibar well represented in the diplomatic service?
5. Does it get a fair share of foreign aid coming to Tanzania?
6. Since the people of Zanzibar were not consulted at the time of the formation of the union, should there not be a referendum now to ascertain whether the people wanted the union or not?
Most of these questions, as can be seen, were coming from Zanzibar, and what surprised many people at the time of the 1983/84 debate, was that they were being aired in the state-owned-and-controlled official mass media.
No such strong feelings were voiced on the mainland during the debates. Many people who made submissions to the Nyalali Commission said hardly anything about the system of governments that the union should have. It was only after the opening up of the political system and the establishment of more political parties that one began hearing very strong views coming form the mainland on the question of the Union; some of those going even further than anybody in Zanzibar had ever contemplated.
THE NYALALI COMMISSION: AGREED TO DISAGREE
One of the major recommendations of the Nyalali Commission was for the replacement of the present union set-up with a federal one. This was one of the areas that bought about a very heated debate within the commission and which necessitated members of the commission having to vote. Later those who were opposed to the federal idea had to append their own dissenting opinion to the main report to explain their position. But the division in the commission on this issue almost came to a mainland/Zanzibar division.
Of the 11 members from Zanzibar, seven wanted the present union set-up, with some major changes, to remain; three wanted a federal and one was undecided. Of the same number from the Mainland, nine wanted a federal set-up and two wanted the present arrangement to continue. What is important is that both sides agreed that there were problems within the union. Even though at the time the complaints form the mainland were not so loud compared to Zanzibar, it would have been wise if those complaints were addressed and resolved. The majority of members of the commission felt that in a federal set-up, both Tanganyika and Zanzibar would retain their identity, federal areas would be clearly defined and the responsibilities of each would be understood, and the federal entity would be distinct from the national ones.
Those holding the minority opinion, on the other hand, were of the view that there was nothing in the Articles of Union to suggest that their framers had a federal set-up in mind; that a federation would be a step backward and might be a prelude to the dissolution of the union; that corrective measures could be taken, if there is political will, which would define union matters, list union institutions and apportion the responsibility of each side on those matters. Examples were provided from the two Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Finland where entities (Faroe Islands, Aaland Islands and Greenland) have full autonomy in a number of areas that they exercise within a non-federal state. The dissenting opinion in the Nyalali Report pointed out:
'Greenland and Faroe Islands, both of which are part of Denmark, have full autonomy in many matters. For example, a parliament that is not subject to interference form the central government of Denmark, and all political and economic matters agreed upon and even in international relations. The islands of Faroe have their own flag hoisted in all government buildings and on ships registered in Faroe islands. Also Faroe Islands authority issues passports;
Denmark had agreed to join the European Economic Community. So did Greenland. But later, Greenland withdrew from the Community. Therefore, all EEC agreements and conditionality accepted in Denmark did not apply in Greenland. Similarly, the Islands of Faroe are not a member of the EU.
In regard to Finland, the islands of Aaland have their own parliament and government. The islands of Aaland also have their own 'identity' for persons born in the islands and who have not lived abroad consecutively for five years or more. The islands have their own flag, issue their own stamps and its citizens are not subject to military service. The islands of Aaland are a demilitarised zone. The Central Bank of Finland must consult the government of Aaland before it takes measures that might harm the economy of Aaland. This, despite the fact that they share a common currency;
The islands of Aaland, as is the case for Greenland and Faroe, are, on their own right, represented in the Nordic Council that consists of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.'
WHITHER THE UNION?
As pointed out above, there have been historical links between Zanzibar and Tanganyika long before the coming of the colonialists in East Africa; and colonialism did not in fact stop such interactions from continuing. During the struggle for national independence, the two main political parties in the two countries cooperated - though there is nothing to suggest that the two parties were thinking of merging into a union of this kind after they came into power. What they had in mind was to form a federation with Kenya and Uganda. Until the elections of July 1963, ASP still thought that it would win power through the electoral process; and it would appear that their main supporters, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), thought likewise.
Now the union is a fact. Despite a lot of problems, it has brought stability and peace in the region. It is difficult to speculate what would have happened to the Zanzibar revolution without the union: Whether Zanzibar would have advanced faster or whether a counter-revolutionary force would have taken over and embellished a dictatorship worse than anything the islands have actually experienced especially during the first phase government. What is clear though is that the union has brought the two peoples much closer together.
I do not believe that the unity of the two peoples can be strengthened by restructuring the present set-up into a federation. I see movement from the present set-up to a federation as a step towards the dismemberment of the union; and I do not think that that is to the short or long term benefit of the people of Tanzania. The present problems can be resolved if there is a strong political will on the part of our political class and if the people are told the truth about those problems.
Only when corrective measures are taken, would it be possible to sustain and strengthen the union. Otherwise if the difficulties inherent in the Articles of Union and the problems arising from implementation are only emphasised and not resolved, the tendency would be towards the withering away of the union.
In this era of multi-parties and openness, it is even more important that matters are discussed and solutions founded on popular will. Of all the political parties that have been established since the abolition of the one-party system, only one, the Democratic Party led by Reverend Mtikila, has come out strongly against the union and called for its dissolution. Others are prevaricating between 'referendum', 'federation' and modifications within the present set-up. The CCM and its governments which seemed earlier on to strongly accept the dissenting opinion in the Nyalali Report, now seems to be torn apart, with a strong group calling for a federal set-up.
The national language, the ethics of equality and human dignity, and the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar are what overcame the ethnic hatred, religious bigotry, regional parochialism and national differences and forged national cohesion and unity. It is these that have made Tanzania an example in a continent beset with secessionism, ethnic violence and religious pogroms. One hopes that there is capacity, honesty and patriotism within Tanzania that will look beyond the sectarian interests. The alternative is too horrendous to contemplate.
*A full version of this paper was published in 1993 by the Danish Centre for Development Research. It also appeared in the book Zanzibar and the Union Question, edited by Prof Chris Peter and Professor Haroub Othman
and published by the Zanzibar Legal Services Centre.
* Haroub Othman is a professor in development studies at the
University of Dar es Salaam.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/.
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