Joint Press Conference with President of the United States of America Barack Obama Following Russian-American Talks
July 6, 2009
The Kremlin, Moscow
PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues,
We have just completed our negotiations with the U.S. President. The first visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to Russia was a very busy one. The first day showed that we managed to discuss all the items of our agenda, and it was a very big one.
I would like from the outset to say that there was a very useful and very open business-like conversation. This, no doubt, was a meeting that has been expected, both in this country and the United States of America, and on which not only the future of our two countries depends but also, to a large extent, the trends of world development.
I would like to emphasize again one thing. The first day of negotiations, our meetings one-on-one and in an expanded format were very open and sincere. And this is extremely important. We have agreed that we will continue to communicate in this mode further on. In reality, for our relations, it is both very important and sometimes a bit complicated, because the backlog of problems is quite impressive. But we have enough of mutual wish and will and the principled positions that we have always held and still hold, to discuss these problems in a business-like manner and to achieve mutually beneficial results.
I would like to emphasize that each of our countries understands its role in its own way, but at the same time we realise our role and responsibility for the situation in this world - especially in a period when the level of globalization has reached such dimensions and such parameters that the decisions we make very often determine the situation in general. And such powerful states as the United States of America and the Russian Federation have special responsibility for everything that is happening on our planet.
We have many points of convergence, many mutual interests, and global and economic ones and a variety of other interests. But our desire to discuss these subjects was mutual and this is also one of very important results of our meeting since the work we are doing requires goodwill, mutual respect, and honest understanding of each other's position.
We also came to the conclusion that Russian-American relations and the level achieved today do not correspond to their potential, to the other possibilities of our countries. And the important thing is that the level that we have today does not correspond to the need of the current age, and without active development of our relations on the foreign affairs agenda, in trade and economic, scientific, educational and cultural spheres we will not be able to build the road to the 21st century.
We have spent several hours in very busy negotiations, very specific, and at the same we dwelled on the questions of philosophy of our cooperation. I am grateful to the President of the United States for the understanding he showed on the principles that we put forward and our attention to the proposals made by the American side. So, despite the fact that in several hours we cannot remove the burden of all the problems that have been building up over a rather long period of time, we have agreed that we will go forward without stopping; that we will make the decisions that are needed for the development of relations between our two countries.
We have discussed quite specific problems, and I would like to share some of them with you. We, of course, discussed international subjects. We spoke about such difficult problems as the process of Middle East settlement. We agreed to continue our work, taking into account the visits we had in the Middle East recently, and the plans that we discussed ahead of major events. We discussed the possibility of holding Moscow conference on the Middle East.
We spoke about a very important subject that requires utmost coordination of our activities. This is the problem of Afghanistan. Without our joint work in that area, we would not be able to achieve success in that area, and on that score we have agreed on a special statement.
Our relations will be also consolidated by our links in the humanitarian field, in the field of science. This has to be done by all means, and we'll be dealing with this after this meeting in a very persistent way.
Now, a few specific results of our negotiations. You are aware of them. We have agreed on a very important subject, the new agreement of strategic offensive arms. This is a basic element of our mutual security. The work was very intensive, and I must admit that our teams, our delegations, worked on this subject in a very fruitful way. They have showed reasonable compromise, and I would like to thank everyone who took part in these negotiations or is going to take part in them.
A result of this is that we have reached not only mutual understanding of how we should move forward, but also agreed on the basic levels on which we will advance our cooperation in this area. We agreed on the levels of carriers and warheads, meaning that this is a very concrete subject.
In the Mutual Understanding that we have just signed with the President of the United States it is said that our two countries can have from 500 to 1,100 carriers of strategic arms, and from 1,500 to 1,675 warheads. These are the new parameters within which our dialogue will be going on and where we hope to achieve final agreement that will be part of the new treaty.
We have agreed also that the offensive and defensive systems of both countries should be considered together. We have adopted a joint statement on ABM. And this is also an important result of our work, even taking into account that we have differences on a number of items. Nevertheless, we managed to approve a joint document.
We have discussed measures of cooperation in the nuclear field and the most important is that we will continue our cooperation in every area, and a lot depends on our countries. We have signed an agreement on military transit to Afghanistan. We decided to create a presidential commission on cooperation, which will be coordinating relations among various agencies of the United States and the Russian Federation, respectively, in all priority areas, including economic and military areas.
In the military area, these questions will be dealt by the chiefs of General Staff that have just signed the document, General Makarov and [Admiral] Mullen.
Soon all these documents will be published and you will be able to familiarize yourself with them. On the whole, by characterizing our first day of work and the results of negotiations that we have had, I would like to say that I view them as a first but very important step in the process of improving full-scale cooperation between our two countries, which should go to the benefit of both states. And if both states benefit by it, that means everybody will benefit by it.
I would like to emphasize in conclusion that our country would like to reach such a level of cooperation with the United States which would be realistically worthy of the 21st century, which will ensure international peace and security. This is in our interests, and we are grateful to our American colleagues for the joint work we have done. It is true that the solution of many world problems depends on the joint will of the United States and Russia.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BARACK OBAMA: Good afternoon, everybody, and I want to thank President Medvedev and the Russian people for their hospitality. Michelle and I and our children are pleased to be here in Moscow, and to be here so early in my administration.
We've just concluded a very productive meeting. As President Medvedev just indicated, the President and I agreed that the relationship between Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of drift. We resolved to reset U.S.-Russian relations, so that we can cooperate more effectively in areas of common interest. Today, after less than six months of collaboration, we've done exactly that by taking concrete steps forward on a range of issues, while paving the way for more progress in the future. And I think it's particularly notable that we've addressed the top priorities - these are not second-tier issues, they are fundamental to the security and the prosperity of both countries.
First, we've taken important steps forward to increase nuclear security and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
This starts with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. As the world's two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia must lead by example, and that's what we're doing here today. We have signed a Joint Understanding for a follow-on treaty to the START agreement that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by up to a third from our current treaty limitations. This legally binding treaty will be completed this year.
We've also agreed on a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation that will help us achieve the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years - progress that we can build upon later this week at the G8 summit. Together, these are important steps forward in implementing the agenda that I laid out in Prague.
As we keep our commitments, so we must ensure that other nations keep theirs. To that end, we had constructive discussions about North Korea and Iran. North Korea has abandoned its own commitments and violated international law. And that's why I'm pleased that Russia joined us in passing a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for strong steps to block North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program.
Iran also poses a serious challenge through its failure to live up to international obligations. This is not just a problem for the United States. It raises the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would endanger global security, while Iran's ballistic missile program could also pose a threat to the broader region. That's why I'm pleased that we've agreed on a joint statement on cooperation on missile defence, and a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea.
Second, we have taken important steps forward to strengthen our security through greater cooperation.
President Medvedev and I agreed upon the need to combat the threat of violent extremism, particularly from al Qaeda. And today, we've signed an agreement that will allow the transit of lethal military equipment through Russia to Afghanistan. This is a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort, and it will save the United States time and resources in giving our troops the support that they need.
Thanks to Admiral Mullen and his Russian counterpart, we've also agreed to resume military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Russia. This provides a framework for improved cooperation and interoperability between our armed forces, so that we can better address the threats that we face - from terrorism to privacy. We've also agreed to restore a Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, which will allow our governments to cooperate in our unwavering commitment to our missing servicemen and women.
And third, we've taken important steps forward to broaden our cooperation on a full range of issues that affect the security and prosperity of our people.
President Medvedev and I are creating a U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission to serve as a new foundation for this cooperation. Too often, the United States and Russia only communicate on a narrow range of issues, or let old habits within our bureaucracy stand in the way of progress. And that's why this commission will include working groups on development and the economy; energy and the environment; nuclear energy and security; arms control and international security; defence, foreign policy and counterterrorism; preventing and handling emergencies; civil society; science and technology; space; health; education; and culture. And this work will be coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov, and Secretary Clinton will travel to Russia this fall to carry this effort forward.
Just to give you one example of this cooperation, is the new Memorandum of Understanding on health. We've learned - most recently with the H1N1 virus - that a disease that emerges anywhere can pose a risk to people everywhere. That's why our Department of Health and Human Services will cooperate with its Russian counterparts to combat infectious, chronic, and non-communicable diseases, while promoting prevention and global health.
Finally, I'm pleased that Russia has taken the important step of lifting some restrictions on imports of U.S. livestock. The cost of these restrictions to American business is over 1.3 billion USD, and we've now made important progress towards restoring that commerce.
I won't pretend that the United States and Russia agree on every issue. As President Medvedev indicated, we've had some frank discussions, and there are areas where we still disagree. For instance, we had a frank discussion on Russia - on Georgia, and I reiterated my firm belief that Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. Yet even as we work through our disagreements on Georgia's borders, we do agree that no one has an interest in renewed military conflict. And going forward, we must speak candidly to resolve these differences peacefully and constructively.
President Medvedev and I are committed to leaving behind the suspicion and the rivalry of the past so that we can advance the interests that we hold in common. Today, we've made meaningful progress in demonstrating through deeds and words what a more constructive U.S.-Russian relationship can look like in the 21st century. Tomorrow, I look forward to broadening this effort to include business, civil society, and a dialogue among the American and Russian people.
I believe that all of us have an interest in forging a future in which the United States and Russia partner effectively on behalf of our security and prosperity. That's the purpose of resetting our relations, that is the progress we made today, and I once again want to thank President Medvedev and his entire team for being such wonderful hosts and working so effectively with our teams. Thank you.
QUESTION (Associated Press): Good evening to both presidents.
President Obama, I'd like to ask you about the issue of trust, after this period of rocky relations between the countries, but also with the agreements that you've just laid out today. Having spent time with President Medvedev, do you feel like you have full trust in him, and have you settled in your mind who is really in charge here in Russia - the President or Prime Minister Putin?
And President Medvedev, I'd like to ask you, polling shows that the Russian people have some hard feelings about America. I'm wondering what you think President Obama can do to try to change this?
BARACK OBAMA: Well, first of all, this is now my second lengthy bilateral meeting with President Medvedev, and we've also had a series of telephone calls and other exchanges. And throughout our interactions, I've found him to be straightforward, professional. He is clear about the interests of the Russian people, but he's also interested in finding out what the interests of the United States are. And we have found I think an ability to work together extremely effectively.
So, yes, I trust President Medvedev to not only listen and to negotiate constructively, but also to follow up - follow through on the agreements that are contained here today. And, again, I'm very appreciative not only of the manner in which he's dealt with me, but also the manner in which our teams have worked together. If you think about the short time frame from our meeting in London to today and the fact that we have essentially accomplished all the goals that we had set in London - and these are not insubstantial achievements - I think it's a good sign for progress in the future.
Tomorrow I'll be having breakfast with Prime Minister Putin. I have not met him before. I'm looking forward to that meeting. My understanding is, is that President Medvedev is the President, Prime Minister Putin is the Prime Minister, and they allocate power in accordance with Russia's form of government in the same way that we allocate power in the United States.
And so my interest is in dealing directly with my counterpart, the President, but also to reach out to Prime Minister Putin and all other influential sectors in Russian society so that I can get a full picture of the needs of the Russian people and the concerns of the Russian people.
And my strong impression is, is that President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are working very effectively together. And our interest is dealing with the Russian government as a whole in order to achieve the improved bilateral relationship that I think can be accomplished.
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: First of all, I would like to thank President Obama for the kind words he has just said about the spirit and the level of openness in our personal relationship.I have already spoken about it, and I can say it again.
Good personal relations may not be what’s most important, but without them, it is difficult to build normal intergovernmental relations. It is good when both intergovernmental relations and the personal relations between the states’ leaders are in harmony, so I hope that the relations with my colleague, President Barack Obama, will continue in the same vein.
As far as Russian people’s attitudes toward the American people are concerned, these are normal, friendly attitudes. It is another matter when the political climate grows cool, when there are problems between two states, as this clearly affects the attitudes of people who follow the political developments. This is a given, and thus, a better relationship between two countries leads to more positive attitudes on the part of their people toward one another. We can remember some great periods of time when our countries cooperated with one another and resolved some very complicated problems, including those pertaining to keeping and restoring peace in the world. I am referring to World War II. There have also been some difficult, even dramatic moments in our relations. But today, we clearly understand that a great deal depends on our relationship. And the extent of our progress, our success in making our relationship more considered, more precise, and suitable to fit the modern world, the extent that our relationship can influence the global climate, will determine the attitude of our peoples towards each other, while realising that people in our countries have always had sympathy toward each other.
QUESTION (NTV Television Company): Good evening. I have a question to both presidents.
Russia and the U.S. are the largest nuclear powers in the world, accounting for 95 percent of warheads. You have been working on the documents on the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] for quite some time - in fact, since 1970s. Do you think you will be able to have the situation in the NPT area under control when there are so many negative trends around the globe?
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Well, the non-proliferation problem is very important for our countries because we share the largest burden in the non-proliferation of strategic arms. We do have the major nuclear arsenals and we take full responsibility for those arsenals.
Sadly, I must fully agree with you – negative trends are emerging around the world, and they are partially due to the emergence of new nuclear players, many of whom are not official members of the nuclear club, but who either hold aspirations to have nuclear weapons and declare so openly or do it clandestinely. Naturally, this has a very negative bearing on the world.
For obvious reasons, there are regions around the world where the mere presence of nuclear arms would create enormous problems, and those are the areas where we should concentrate our efforts together with our American partners. These areas are well-known, so there is no need to name them. Still, it is quite clear that the global climate will depend on the situation in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, this is our common, joint responsibility, and we must work on it as thoroughly as possible. The Russian Federation is ready to do so, and today’s talks with President Obama have shown that the United States share this attitude.
BARACK OBAMA: Well, I think President Medvedev said it well. This is an urgent issue and one in which the United States and Russia have to take leadership. It is very difficult for us to exert that leadership unless we are showing ourselves willing to deal with our own nuclear stockpiles in a more rational way. And that's why this post-START agreement is so important, and I'm hopeful that we can reduce our nuclear arsenals by as much as a third and hopefully can move even beyond that in subsequent agreements and treaties.
The critical issue that President Medvedev identified is the fact that we are seeing a pace of potential proliferation that we have not seen in quite some time, and he mentioned two specific areas. In the Middle East, there is deep concern about Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability not simply because of one country wanting nuclear weapons, but the fact that if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, it is an almost - it is almost certain that other countries in the region would then decide to pursue their own programs. And we would then see a nuclear arms race in perhaps the most volatile part of the world.
In the Korean Peninsula, we've already seen North Korea flout its own commitments and international obligations in pursuit of nuclear weapons. And in all of these cases, as you see more proliferation of nuclear weapons, the possibilities not only of state actors targeting populations with nuclear weapons, but the possibility that those nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors, extremist organizations, poses an extraordinary threat to both Russia and the United States.
So I'm pleased on the progress that we've made so far. I think the fact that we got a joint threat assessment in terms of what ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear weapons could pose to our countries, that we will be conducting a review of that and making assessments to find ways that the United States and Russia can cooperate more effectively, that's going to be very important.
I think continuing the pursuit of cooperation that already exists between Russia and the United States on loose nuclear materials and making sure those are secure, I think that's going to be very important. Structuring a new, reinvigorated non-proliferation treaty that applies a set of rules to all countries, allows them to pursue peaceful nuclear energy without having the capacity to weaponize that nuclear capacity, that is going to be very important.
And so we've actually suggested a global nuclear security summit that we intend to host next year, and I discussed with President Medvedev the strong possibility that in a subsequent summit it could be hosted by Russia, where we bring all the countries together around the world to start making progress on this critical issue.
QUESTION: Thank you. Deep divisions over a proposed U.S. missile shield have contributed greatly to the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations in recent years, and it does not seem that you gentlemen have finally resolved that issue either. President Obama, you have said very clearly that you would not accept the linkage between the missile systems and arms control talks. President Medvedev, you and Prime Minister Putin have said that these issues must be linked. Are either of you gentlemen willing to budge or compromise on this issue? And if not, could this also contribute to a blockage or obstacle to reaching a final START II agreement?
And also, President Obama, I wonder if you could give us your reaction to the Chinese government crackdown in the northwest of the country on rioting and unrest that has killed more than 140 people.
BARACK OBAMA: With respect to the China situation, unfortunately I've been travelling all night and in meetings all day, so I have not been fully briefed and I don't want to comment until I actually see all the information. But I assure you that our team will get a statement to you as soon as I've been able to do that.
On missile defence, we have agreed that we are going to continue to discuss this critical issue. That is part of the joint statements that we've signed. I also believe that it is entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapon systems but also defensive weapon systems.
Part of what got us through the Cold War was a sufficient sense of parity and deterrent capability; that both sides during those very difficult times understood that a first strike, the attempt to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict against the other, could result in an extremely heavy price. And so any discussion of nuclear strategy, security, has to include defensive as well as offensive capabilities.
The difference that we've had has been on the specifics of a missile defence system that the United States views as a priority not to deal with Russia, but to deal with a missile coming in from Iran or North Korea or some other state, and that it's important for the United States and its allies to have the capacity to prevent such a strike. There is no scenario from our perspective in which this missile defence system would provide any protection against a mighty Russian arsenal.
And so, in that sense, we have not thought that it is appropriate to link discussions of a missile defence system designed to deal with an entirely different threat unrelated to the kinds of robust capabilities that Russia possesses.
Now, having said that, President Medvedev has been very clear that this is a point of deep concern and sensitivity to the Russian government. I suspect when I speak with President - Prime Minister Putin tomorrow, he will say the same thing. And what we would like to do is to work with Russia to advance a system that ensures that a stray missile, whether it was one or 10 or a handful of missiles coming from a third source, that we have the capabilities to prevent those from doing damage. I think we can arrive at those kinds of understandings, but it's going to take some hard work because it requires breaking down longstanding suspicions.
With respect to this particular configuration that was proposed several years ago, as you know, we're undergoing a thorough review of whether it works or not, what has been proposed. That review should be completed by the end of the summer and I indicated to President Medvedev that as soon as that review is complete, we will provide the Russian government our assessment of how we think we should proceed, and that will be the subject of extensive negotiations.
So, ultimately, I think the more progress we make on some of the issues that I discussed earlier - non-proliferation, being able to track ballistic missiles coming from other sources - to the extent that we are building deeper cooperation on those fronts, I think the more effectively we're going to be able to resolve this issue. I believe that over time we will end up seeing that the U.S.-Russian positions on these issues can be reconciled and that in fact we have a mutual interest in protecting both of our populations from the kinds of dangers that weapons proliferations is posing today.
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: I'll say a couple of words on this subject. Clearly, the issue of anti-ballistic missile defence – or more specifically, the problem of the third region area – is a difficult subject in our discussions.
But I would like to draw your attention to what President Obama said, which I would like to note as well. In the Mutual Understanding that we just signed, we talk about the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons, and this already constitutes a step forward. Just recently, we had nothing but disputes on this issue. Now, this linkage is being stated, and this opens up the opportunity to bring our positions closer to one another.
Secondly, nobody is saying that a ballistic missile defence system is harmful or threatening in and of itself. On the contrary, its aim is to resolve a number of practical tasks. The issue at hand is that of linking this configuration of missile defence with the interests of other countries. I would like to specifically point out that in contrast to what was happening in recent years, our American partners have paused and are now evaluating this situation, and will subsequently formulate their final position.
At the very least, this also represents a step forward in reaching a possible compromise on this fairly difficult subject. Before, we were only hearing that all decisions had been made, that that they do not concern us, but they present no threat to us. Our position is somewhat different – you are quite familiar with it, so I will not repeat it. We feel that these decisions do concern us, and these are the issues where we will most likely need to reach an agreement. At the same time, we are well aware that the number of threats, including those related to the medium-range and ballistic missiles, is not diminishing, but rather, is increasing. Thus, we all need to think about what kind of configuration could be applied overall to the global anti-ballistic missile defence system, which is what I said today to my colleague during our restricted format meeting. So, in my opinion the progress is evident.
QUESTION: Good evening. Yury Lipatov, Channel One. A question to both presidents.
You spoke about your concerns about Afghanistan. Can you be more specific? What do the presidents think about the situation in that country? There is a feeling that the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan is having difficulties. And to what extent can cooperation between U.S. and Russia in transit - and maybe in some other areas - help to improve the situation, in greater detail, please? Thank you.
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: The subject of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Afghanistan is extremely important. This is why we directed so much attention to discussing this problem during our talks, and we have just signed an agreement concerning transit. It is an important subject and we will certainly continue cooperating with our American partners.
As for the current situation, it really is complicated. I am not trying to say that it is deteriorating, but in many areas, progress is either not yet visible or is insignificant. Still, we value the efforts that are being made by the United States, together with the other countries, in order to prevent the terrorist threats that were and continue to emanate from Afghanistan.
In this regard, we are ready for full-scale cooperation with our U.S. and other partners, including in the area of transit. We are prepared to help in various ways. I do not know how quickly the situation will improve. It depends to a large extent on how quickly the political system develops in Afghanistan, and how successful the Afghan government will be in stimulating the economy, which is no simple task. Nevertheless, we are prepared to continue our efforts and our consultations with the Afghan side.
Recently, I met with the President of Afghanistan in Yekaterinburg. In fact, I also met with the President of Pakistan, because both of these problems need to be resolved jointly. I believe that if we can join our efforts both in peaceful economic development and in supporting counterterrorist operations, then we will be successful sooner or later. I would like to emphasise again that ultimately, success will depend on the maturity of the Afghan government and the readiness of Afghan society to change.
BARACK OBAMA: Well, as you may be aware, as soon as I came into office, we undertook a thorough review of our Afghan strategy to that point, in consultation with not only our NATO allies but all the forces internationally that have contributed to the efforts there. And we concluded that we had not made as much progress as we should have, given the duration in which we've been in Afghanistan, and that we can improve it.
So our approach has been to say that we need to have a strong security system in place for the Afghan elections to be completed. We have to train Afghan nationals for the army and police so that they can effectively secure their own country. We have to combine that with more effective diplomatic efforts. And we have to focus on development so that, for example, the people of Afghanistan don't have to grow poppy, but have other crops and goods that they can make a living with.
Now, we have just begun the implementation of this new strategy, and so I think it's too early to gauge its success so far. I think by the time that we've completed the next election and the - either President Karzai or another candidate has taken his seat, then we will be able to I think do an additional review and see what other efforts we can take in order to improve the situation. I will tell you that Russia's participation and contributions to this effort could be extraordinarily important.
Obviously Russia has its own concerns about extremism and terrorism. Russia also has deep concerns about the drug trade and its infiltration into Russia. And Russia has extraordinary capabilities when it comes to training police forces, training armies. And so our hope is, is that as part of the broader presidential commission structure that we've put in place, that we're going to further discuss both the military efforts in Afghanistan but also the development efforts and the diplomatic efforts so that we can make progress.
And President Medvedev is right that this is important for Afghanistan but it's also important with respect to Pakistan. And we're going to have to think regionally in terms of how we approach these problems. Obviously there are countries along the border of Afghanistan and Central Asia that are of deep strategic importance, and it's very important that we also include them in these conversations about how we can move forward.
But I just want to thank again the Russian government for the agreement for military transit. That will save U.S. troops both time and money. And it's I think a gesture that indicates the degree to which, in the future, Russian-U.S. cooperation can be extraordinarily important in solving a whole host of these very important international issues.
DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Thank you very much, everybody.
July 07, 2009
Oil-Final Countdown to a Global Crisis & Its Solutions
A Vedic Prospective on Energy Crisis, Hydrocarbon Dependence and Alternative Living
The problem :
"That is the way of material civilization, too much depending on machine. At any time the whole thing may collapse and therefore we may not be self complacent depending so much on artificial life. The modern life of civilization depends wholly on electricity and petrol and both of them are artificial for man."
-Srila Prabhupada
The solution:
Root of petroleum crisis, or all other man-made crises for that matter, lies in polluted consciousnes. Mind is the place of first creation. All crises in this world, including that of resource and environment are the direct outcome of our polluted desires or contaminated consciousness.
-Sahadeva Dasa
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The problem :
"That is the way of material civilization, too much depending on machine. At any time the whole thing may collapse and therefore we may not be self complacent depending so much on artificial life. The modern life of civilization depends wholly on electricity and petrol and both of them are artificial for man."
-Srila Prabhupada
The solution:
Root of petroleum crisis, or all other man-made crises for that matter, lies in polluted consciousnes. Mind is the place of first creation. All crises in this world, including that of resource and environment are the direct outcome of our polluted desires or contaminated consciousness.
-Sahadeva Dasa
DOWNLOAD
July 06, 2009
Quote of the day: B.Raman
Zardari may write a thousand articles. If articles could defeat terrorism there should be no terrorism in the world today. What will defeat terrorism is sincerity of purpose and action on the ground. I do not find evidence of these in Pakistan . Pakistan will continue to stew in the juice of jihadi terrorism.
B.Raman commenting on Zardari's recent article
B.Raman commenting on Zardari's recent article
World Uyghur Congress : Press Release
The World Uyghur Congress appeals to the people and governments in the free world as well as human rights organizations around the world to take urgent action to stop the ethnic massacre in East Turkistan! - July 6, 2009
The World Uyghur Congress appeals to the people and governments in the free world as well as human rights organizations around the world to take urgent action to stop the ethnic massacre in East Turkistan!
For immediate release
July 06, 2009
Contact:
World Uyghur Congress,
Tel: +49 89 54321999
Fax: 089 54349789
Email: contact@uyghurcongress.org
According to the latest news the World Uyghur Congress obtained directly from East Turkistan, Uyghurs in Urumchi are not only facing brutal massacre at the hands of the Chinese armed forces and police but also from Chinese civilians who have started to engage in a mass slaughter of the Uyghurs.
Chinese civilians, using clubs, bars, knives and machetes, are killing the Uyghurs throughout East Turkistan. They are storming the university dormitories, Uyghur residential homes, workplaces and organizations, and massacring children, women and elderly.
According to the latest news the World Uyghur Congress obtained about one hour ago, one Uighur young man was mutilated on Dongbeilu. A Uighur woman who was carrying a baby in her arms was mutilated along with her infant baby on Huanghelu. Over 1,000 ethnic Han Chinese armed with knives and machetes marched into Xinjiang Medical University and engaged in a mass killing of the Uyghurs. Two Uyghur female students were beheaded; their heads were placed on a stake on the middle of the street. In Railroad factory, Ergong subdivision, ethnic Han Chinese began searching for Uighurs and upon finding them, killed them in mass numbers. The World Uyghur Congress headquarters has received many disturbing news reports stating the above.
Chinese police and security forces are not taking any action against this barbaric and gratuitous violence against the Uyghurs. The Chinese government is not taking any measures or precautions to safeguard Uyghur civilians from this mob violence and these brutal massacres. Uighurs living in residential areas densely-populated by ethnic Han Chinese are in grave danger. Chinese police and security forces are taking no action against such deadly violence against the Uyghur people.
At the moment, ethnic Han Chinese are phoning World Uyghur Congress headquarters in Munich, Germany and voicing threats against the WUC leadership.
We appeal to the United Nations, the United Sates of America, European countries and NATO forces who defend justice and world peace to intervene immediately, send troops and make all efforts to ensure peace and stability in East Turkistan and save the helpless Uyghurs from this violent bloodshed.
The situation in East Turkistan is declining rapidly. Scenes from streets, shops and residential areas are beyond anyone's imagination. With each passing minute another innocent Uyghur life is stolen!!!
The World Uyghur Congress appeals to the people and governments in the free world as well as human rights organizations around the world to take urgent action to stop the ethnic massacre in East Turkistan!
For immediate release
July 06, 2009
Contact:
World Uyghur Congress,
Tel: +49 89 54321999
Fax: 089 54349789
Email: contact@uyghurcongress.org
According to the latest news the World Uyghur Congress obtained directly from East Turkistan, Uyghurs in Urumchi are not only facing brutal massacre at the hands of the Chinese armed forces and police but also from Chinese civilians who have started to engage in a mass slaughter of the Uyghurs.
Chinese civilians, using clubs, bars, knives and machetes, are killing the Uyghurs throughout East Turkistan. They are storming the university dormitories, Uyghur residential homes, workplaces and organizations, and massacring children, women and elderly.
According to the latest news the World Uyghur Congress obtained about one hour ago, one Uighur young man was mutilated on Dongbeilu. A Uighur woman who was carrying a baby in her arms was mutilated along with her infant baby on Huanghelu. Over 1,000 ethnic Han Chinese armed with knives and machetes marched into Xinjiang Medical University and engaged in a mass killing of the Uyghurs. Two Uyghur female students were beheaded; their heads were placed on a stake on the middle of the street. In Railroad factory, Ergong subdivision, ethnic Han Chinese began searching for Uighurs and upon finding them, killed them in mass numbers. The World Uyghur Congress headquarters has received many disturbing news reports stating the above.
Chinese police and security forces are not taking any action against this barbaric and gratuitous violence against the Uyghurs. The Chinese government is not taking any measures or precautions to safeguard Uyghur civilians from this mob violence and these brutal massacres. Uighurs living in residential areas densely-populated by ethnic Han Chinese are in grave danger. Chinese police and security forces are taking no action against such deadly violence against the Uyghur people.
At the moment, ethnic Han Chinese are phoning World Uyghur Congress headquarters in Munich, Germany and voicing threats against the WUC leadership.
We appeal to the United Nations, the United Sates of America, European countries and NATO forces who defend justice and world peace to intervene immediately, send troops and make all efforts to ensure peace and stability in East Turkistan and save the helpless Uyghurs from this violent bloodshed.
The situation in East Turkistan is declining rapidly. Scenes from streets, shops and residential areas are beyond anyone's imagination. With each passing minute another innocent Uyghur life is stolen!!!
Tank force reductions or statistical juggling
16:0203/07/2009
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Russia is currently undergoing a controversial military reform. The entirely new troop structure and tables of organization are being hotly debated. Recent media reports concerning planned tank force reductions have triggered various comments, including panicky predictions.
Media articles quoting Interfax reports involving an anonymous Defense Ministry source say the tank force will be reduced more than ten-fold, namely, from over 20,000 tanks to just 2,000 tanks. The news has sparked off a heated debate.
However, all sensational aspects disappear if we study the situation more closely. Although the tank force will be reduced and overhauled substantially, the reform does not envision ten-fold cuts.
At present the Russian Army has about 22,000 tanks, including more than 15,000 at storehouses. This makes up for just over 6,000 combat-ready tanks. Permanent readiness units have between 1,000 and 1,500 tanks.
In the next ten years, army divisions will be replaced with permanent readiness brigades and battalions operating 2,000 to 2,300 combat-ready main battle tanks whose number will increase somewhat. Training units will have several hundred more tanks. Another 3,000-4,000 tanks will remain at storehouses. Consequently, the Russian Army will have a total of 6,000 to 7,000 tanks.
Although the Russian tank force will be reduced three-fold, the specifications of operational tanks, the qualitative and quantitative gap between Russia and its theoretical enemies and the reform's long-term effect on national defense capability remain unclear.
The Russian industrial situation makes it possible to clarify the first aspect. The T-90 main battle tank, a modified version of the T-72 tank, is currently being manufactured for the Russian Army. The T-72 modernization program will bring these tanks up to the current standard. As a result, T-64 and T-80 tanks featuring numerous Ukrainian-made components will have to be scrapped.
The T-72 and its successor, the T-90, will probably form the mainstay of the Russian tank force. Production of the T-95 tank, due to be unveiled in 2009, could be launched in the next two or three years.
But how will Russia's tank force compare with those of neighboring countries? Virtually all major powers plan to reduce their tank units many times over.
NATO forces in Europe will retain about 2,000 combat-ready tanks and will store another 2,000 by 2020.
China will have about 4,000 to 5,000 tanks, including 2,000 modern tanks, by 2020. Although the Russian tank force will be dwarfed by those of its two most powerful neighbors, NATO and China, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will have to simultaneously fight both of them. Such a hypothetical conflict would inevitably escalate into a nuclear war. Consequently, the role played by tank units would diminish greatly.
Although anti-tank weapons are being improved all the time, tanks still dominate the battlefield due to their firepower, mobility and thick armor. Tanks remain a vital asset enhancing the flexibility, mobility and firepower of army units during local conflicts.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Russia is currently undergoing a controversial military reform. The entirely new troop structure and tables of organization are being hotly debated. Recent media reports concerning planned tank force reductions have triggered various comments, including panicky predictions.
Media articles quoting Interfax reports involving an anonymous Defense Ministry source say the tank force will be reduced more than ten-fold, namely, from over 20,000 tanks to just 2,000 tanks. The news has sparked off a heated debate.
However, all sensational aspects disappear if we study the situation more closely. Although the tank force will be reduced and overhauled substantially, the reform does not envision ten-fold cuts.
At present the Russian Army has about 22,000 tanks, including more than 15,000 at storehouses. This makes up for just over 6,000 combat-ready tanks. Permanent readiness units have between 1,000 and 1,500 tanks.
In the next ten years, army divisions will be replaced with permanent readiness brigades and battalions operating 2,000 to 2,300 combat-ready main battle tanks whose number will increase somewhat. Training units will have several hundred more tanks. Another 3,000-4,000 tanks will remain at storehouses. Consequently, the Russian Army will have a total of 6,000 to 7,000 tanks.
Although the Russian tank force will be reduced three-fold, the specifications of operational tanks, the qualitative and quantitative gap between Russia and its theoretical enemies and the reform's long-term effect on national defense capability remain unclear.
The Russian industrial situation makes it possible to clarify the first aspect. The T-90 main battle tank, a modified version of the T-72 tank, is currently being manufactured for the Russian Army. The T-72 modernization program will bring these tanks up to the current standard. As a result, T-64 and T-80 tanks featuring numerous Ukrainian-made components will have to be scrapped.
The T-72 and its successor, the T-90, will probably form the mainstay of the Russian tank force. Production of the T-95 tank, due to be unveiled in 2009, could be launched in the next two or three years.
But how will Russia's tank force compare with those of neighboring countries? Virtually all major powers plan to reduce their tank units many times over.
NATO forces in Europe will retain about 2,000 combat-ready tanks and will store another 2,000 by 2020.
China will have about 4,000 to 5,000 tanks, including 2,000 modern tanks, by 2020. Although the Russian tank force will be dwarfed by those of its two most powerful neighbors, NATO and China, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will have to simultaneously fight both of them. Such a hypothetical conflict would inevitably escalate into a nuclear war. Consequently, the role played by tank units would diminish greatly.
Although anti-tank weapons are being improved all the time, tanks still dominate the battlefield due to their firepower, mobility and thick armor. Tanks remain a vital asset enhancing the flexibility, mobility and firepower of army units during local conflicts.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Iran Watch: Diplomatic Provocation
A coordinated diplomatic response by European Community countries may frustrate a well-planned Iranian government provocation, Kamal Nazer Yasin comments for ISN Security Watch.
By Kamal Nazer Yasin in Tehran for ISN Security Watch
In his now-famous sermon-com-ultimatum issued to the people of Iran on 3 June, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made a startling comment that took his most seasoned listeners by surprise. While trying hard to establish a link between Iran’s protest movement and various foreign powers, he blurted out several disparaging statements against the United Kingdom, which at first glance may have seemed odd and out of context.
“I recommend to all the gentlemen, old friends and brothers,” he told millions of TV viewers and worshipers, “to…see the hands of the enemy. You must see the stalking hungry wolves which have removed their diplomatic masks and have shown their true face…the most wicked of which is the government of England.”
At that time, most observers attributed this strange outburst to the ayatollah’s well-known penchant for spinning wild tales of conspiracy in his foreign policy statements. It had to take another 14 days before the full import of Khamenei’s threat was finally brought home.
Using the same altar Khamenei had used on 19 June, aytollah Ahmad Jantai, Tehran’s fire-spitting Friday Prayer Leader, announced that some Iranian-born members of the British Embassy staff who had been arrested earlier on conspiracy charges would be placed on trial for fomenting unrest.
In the preceding days, an escalating series of accusations in the hardline media had already whipped up the atmosphere against England to unprecedented new levels. What the newspaper articles and TV programs purported to show was that a nefarious link existed between Iran’s indigenous protest movement and the UK government in conjunction with the BBC.
Beginning on 1 June, groups of young militant Muslim activists have taken to gathering in front of the British embassy in Tehran, screaming insults and throwing rocks at the embassy compound.
As any impartial observers could have freely attested, England’s role in the domestic Iranian dispute is non-existence.
The birth of the protest movement has been as much a surprise to the Iranians as it has been to the British government. Under the circumstances, the arrest and the trial of UK embassy personnel on trumped-up charges is clearly designed to elicit an angry response from London.
According to an Iranian academic familiar with the workings of the Islamic Republic, this was exactly the effect sought by the incident’s plotters.
“In my opinion, this whole anti-British frenzy has been brilliantly conceived,” he told ISN Security Watch. “There is a reservoir of suspicion and mistrust towards Britain by some Iranians going back to the 19th century, which is obviously being tapped into.”
According to the academic, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the government badly needs to find an excuse to justify its violent crackdown. The protest movement, which was triggered by massive voting fraud in the 12 June election, is the hardliners’ worst crisis of legitimacy in 30 years.
What’s more, despite heavy repression, the Green Wave movement of Mir-Hossein Mousavi - President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s main rival in the presidential elections - shows no sign of abating. Mousavi has refused to accept the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government and his supporters have vowed to start an endless campaign of civil disobedience until their demands are realized.
A major diplomatic confrontation with the UK clearly serves the hardliners’ interests by deflecting attention internationally from their domestic abuses.
However, there are other less overt, if more significant, reasons that may explain the motivation behind this latest provocation.
First, as long as nuclear negotiations with the 5+1 are postponed, Iran benefits by increasing the number of its spinning centrifuges and by getting closer to the so-called breakout option - a stage where a country can start building nuclear arms in a short order of time if it so wishes.
Second, presently, the domestic turmoil has clearly robbed the government of the backing of significant portions of the population and the elite. This means that in its foreign parleys, the government would have to negotiate from a position of weakness.
For instance, although US President Barak Obama has all but ruled out the use of the military option in Iran, the fact of the matter is that in the event of a war with a hostile force, the Iranian regime can no longer depend comfortably on its home front for security; a parameter that must have been taken into consideration by Iran’s military and strategic planners.
According to sources in the know, many in the Iranian elite, particularly within the hardline circles, are clinging to the hope that in a few months’ time the crisis will blow over and they can safely return to the negotiation table from an improved position once again.
Therefore, a verbal and diplomatic clash with the UK escalating into a manageable quarrel with the west is clearly in the hardliners’ best short-term interests. (As far as economic fallouts, England is not a major economic partner of Iran and a breakup of commercial ties would have had a tolerable impact on Iran’s own economy.)
Perhaps for the same reasons, many western governments - including the US, Germany and even the UK - have taken a relatively restrained stance toward Iran’s actions. On 3 June, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, while condemning aytollah Janati’s announcement, stopped short of responding in kind to Iran’s actions.
For its part, for the past few weeks and up until now, the Obama administration has studiously avoided giving the Iranian hardliners an excuse to move against the protesters or to call off its upcoming talks with the 5+1.
In a 31 June panel at the conservative Heritage Foundation, Kenneth Katzman, a top Iran expert at the US Congressinal Research Service whose views on Iran are believed to be close to some policy-makers in Washington, said that he believed it was wrong to postpone talks with Iran because at this moment “they [the Iranians] would be negotiating from a weaker position.”
The Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz quotes diplomatic sources in New York as suggesting that in the upcoming G-8 talks, President Obama will try to dissuade other governments from imposing harsh economic sanctions on Iran because of its large-scale human rights violations.
Of course, this doesn’t imply that the world community would remain indifferent to a stage-managed show trial in Tehran of the British embassy personnel. The EU has announced that if Iran did make good on its threat to put the embassy personnel on trial, all 27 EU member states would recall their ambassadors and downgrade ties with the Islamic state.
While there are factions within Iran that would welcome such a dangerous escalation, there are many other factions in the establishment whose economic benefits mitigate against such a rash decision.
At this moment, the ball is clearly in Iran’s court and the next few days will illustrate which conservative faction in Iran has the upper hand in final decision-making.
Kamal Nazer Yasin is the pseudonym of an Iranian journalist reporting for ISN Security Watch from Tehran.
By Kamal Nazer Yasin in Tehran for ISN Security Watch
In his now-famous sermon-com-ultimatum issued to the people of Iran on 3 June, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made a startling comment that took his most seasoned listeners by surprise. While trying hard to establish a link between Iran’s protest movement and various foreign powers, he blurted out several disparaging statements against the United Kingdom, which at first glance may have seemed odd and out of context.
“I recommend to all the gentlemen, old friends and brothers,” he told millions of TV viewers and worshipers, “to…see the hands of the enemy. You must see the stalking hungry wolves which have removed their diplomatic masks and have shown their true face…the most wicked of which is the government of England.”
At that time, most observers attributed this strange outburst to the ayatollah’s well-known penchant for spinning wild tales of conspiracy in his foreign policy statements. It had to take another 14 days before the full import of Khamenei’s threat was finally brought home.
Using the same altar Khamenei had used on 19 June, aytollah Ahmad Jantai, Tehran’s fire-spitting Friday Prayer Leader, announced that some Iranian-born members of the British Embassy staff who had been arrested earlier on conspiracy charges would be placed on trial for fomenting unrest.
In the preceding days, an escalating series of accusations in the hardline media had already whipped up the atmosphere against England to unprecedented new levels. What the newspaper articles and TV programs purported to show was that a nefarious link existed between Iran’s indigenous protest movement and the UK government in conjunction with the BBC.
Beginning on 1 June, groups of young militant Muslim activists have taken to gathering in front of the British embassy in Tehran, screaming insults and throwing rocks at the embassy compound.
As any impartial observers could have freely attested, England’s role in the domestic Iranian dispute is non-existence.
The birth of the protest movement has been as much a surprise to the Iranians as it has been to the British government. Under the circumstances, the arrest and the trial of UK embassy personnel on trumped-up charges is clearly designed to elicit an angry response from London.
According to an Iranian academic familiar with the workings of the Islamic Republic, this was exactly the effect sought by the incident’s plotters.
“In my opinion, this whole anti-British frenzy has been brilliantly conceived,” he told ISN Security Watch. “There is a reservoir of suspicion and mistrust towards Britain by some Iranians going back to the 19th century, which is obviously being tapped into.”
According to the academic, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the government badly needs to find an excuse to justify its violent crackdown. The protest movement, which was triggered by massive voting fraud in the 12 June election, is the hardliners’ worst crisis of legitimacy in 30 years.
What’s more, despite heavy repression, the Green Wave movement of Mir-Hossein Mousavi - President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s main rival in the presidential elections - shows no sign of abating. Mousavi has refused to accept the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government and his supporters have vowed to start an endless campaign of civil disobedience until their demands are realized.
A major diplomatic confrontation with the UK clearly serves the hardliners’ interests by deflecting attention internationally from their domestic abuses.
However, there are other less overt, if more significant, reasons that may explain the motivation behind this latest provocation.
First, as long as nuclear negotiations with the 5+1 are postponed, Iran benefits by increasing the number of its spinning centrifuges and by getting closer to the so-called breakout option - a stage where a country can start building nuclear arms in a short order of time if it so wishes.
Second, presently, the domestic turmoil has clearly robbed the government of the backing of significant portions of the population and the elite. This means that in its foreign parleys, the government would have to negotiate from a position of weakness.
For instance, although US President Barak Obama has all but ruled out the use of the military option in Iran, the fact of the matter is that in the event of a war with a hostile force, the Iranian regime can no longer depend comfortably on its home front for security; a parameter that must have been taken into consideration by Iran’s military and strategic planners.
According to sources in the know, many in the Iranian elite, particularly within the hardline circles, are clinging to the hope that in a few months’ time the crisis will blow over and they can safely return to the negotiation table from an improved position once again.
Therefore, a verbal and diplomatic clash with the UK escalating into a manageable quarrel with the west is clearly in the hardliners’ best short-term interests. (As far as economic fallouts, England is not a major economic partner of Iran and a breakup of commercial ties would have had a tolerable impact on Iran’s own economy.)
Perhaps for the same reasons, many western governments - including the US, Germany and even the UK - have taken a relatively restrained stance toward Iran’s actions. On 3 June, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, while condemning aytollah Janati’s announcement, stopped short of responding in kind to Iran’s actions.
For its part, for the past few weeks and up until now, the Obama administration has studiously avoided giving the Iranian hardliners an excuse to move against the protesters or to call off its upcoming talks with the 5+1.
In a 31 June panel at the conservative Heritage Foundation, Kenneth Katzman, a top Iran expert at the US Congressinal Research Service whose views on Iran are believed to be close to some policy-makers in Washington, said that he believed it was wrong to postpone talks with Iran because at this moment “they [the Iranians] would be negotiating from a weaker position.”
The Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz quotes diplomatic sources in New York as suggesting that in the upcoming G-8 talks, President Obama will try to dissuade other governments from imposing harsh economic sanctions on Iran because of its large-scale human rights violations.
Of course, this doesn’t imply that the world community would remain indifferent to a stage-managed show trial in Tehran of the British embassy personnel. The EU has announced that if Iran did make good on its threat to put the embassy personnel on trial, all 27 EU member states would recall their ambassadors and downgrade ties with the Islamic state.
While there are factions within Iran that would welcome such a dangerous escalation, there are many other factions in the establishment whose economic benefits mitigate against such a rash decision.
At this moment, the ball is clearly in Iran’s court and the next few days will illustrate which conservative faction in Iran has the upper hand in final decision-making.
Kamal Nazer Yasin is the pseudonym of an Iranian journalist reporting for ISN Security Watch from Tehran.
Iraqi Oil Under the Hammer
6 Jul 2009
Iraqi contractors gather around display tables to preview and sign up for reconstruction projects in the Ramadi area during the Ramadi Reconstruction Conference in Ar Ramadi, Iraq.
Iraqi oil contracts draw criticism at home over the alleged alienation of key national resources and failure to prioritize national development in tender planning, Dr Dominic Moran comments for ISN Security Watch.
By Dominic Moran for ISN Security Watch
Last Tuesday's failed Iraqi oil and gas tender has again thrown into question government efforts to promote a central role for foreign interests in exploration, extraction and associated service provision in the face of burgeoning domestic opposition.
A services contract for the giant southern Rumaila oilfield was the only deal signed in last week's round of bidding. Twenty-year technical service and development contracts for six oilfields and two gas fields were up for grabs.
The stakes are high, with Iraq's current identified reserves standing at 112 billion barrels and national governments weighing in on the sides of their major energy interests.
Turned off by the Iraqi insistence on what they saw as unreasonable management and fee demands, most interested oil majors appear prepared to hedge their bets at this point.
The difference between the government offer per barrel on oil over the target production plateau and company bids was substantial, with some showing around a $20 gap in negotiating positions. BP and partner the China National Petroleum Corp agreed to halve their service fee to a low $2 a barrel after remuneration in winning the Rumaila contract.
Last week's failure likely presages a further round of tendering, with the ball now firmly in the court of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, which is seeking to bolster production by 60 percent over the next two decades and requires significant outside investment and support.
The length of the two-decade contracts raises eyebrows. Associated contract stipulations appear to affect the ability of the Oil Ministry to develop, oversee and manage both individual concessions and overall national petroleum strategies, critics allege.
While the relatively united front shown by competing companies in rejecting the Iraqi demands remains, significant pressure will build on the Iraqi government to acquiesce to higher fees and on other demands.
This is something Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is loath to do ahead of national elections next January, given the popular impression in Iraq of past profiteering by foreign energy interests at the expense of Iraqis.
The contracts have drawn flak from the Iraqi oil sector, parliamentarians and the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions, with critiques focusing on the alleged alienation of key national resources and purported failure to prioritize national development in tender planning.
The process is being watched closely by small international oil and gas companies working under contract to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north. Their agreements are viewed as illegitimate by Baghdad.
While most of the northern fields are either in the domain of the KRG or areas claimed by the authority, the key Iraqi-Turkish oil export pipeline is in government hands. Tensions remain high despite the KRG giving Norwegian concessionary DNO the green light in May to pass oil from its new Tawke field via the pipeline.
Aside from political instability and wrangling, the volatility of the security situation is a clear factor preventing energy companies from committing to the development of fields given that the costs of further exploration and development remain largely unknown due to a paucity of reliable, up-to-date field information.
Sadly, the potential boon of large-scale oil and gas development looks set to be squandered through endemic corruption, politically motivated misappropriations and a related, fundamental failure to develop trustworthy management and oversight systems.
Iraqis are right to demand the primary role and reward in developing their crucial national assets.
However, regardless of the stake provided foreign interests, the Iraqi public is unlikely to enjoy the benefits of their country's carbon wealth.
Dr Dominic Moran, based in Tel Aviv, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East and the Director of Operations of ISA Consulting.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
Iraqi contractors gather around display tables to preview and sign up for reconstruction projects in the Ramadi area during the Ramadi Reconstruction Conference in Ar Ramadi, Iraq.
Iraqi oil contracts draw criticism at home over the alleged alienation of key national resources and failure to prioritize national development in tender planning, Dr Dominic Moran comments for ISN Security Watch.
By Dominic Moran for ISN Security Watch
Last Tuesday's failed Iraqi oil and gas tender has again thrown into question government efforts to promote a central role for foreign interests in exploration, extraction and associated service provision in the face of burgeoning domestic opposition.
A services contract for the giant southern Rumaila oilfield was the only deal signed in last week's round of bidding. Twenty-year technical service and development contracts for six oilfields and two gas fields were up for grabs.
The stakes are high, with Iraq's current identified reserves standing at 112 billion barrels and national governments weighing in on the sides of their major energy interests.
Turned off by the Iraqi insistence on what they saw as unreasonable management and fee demands, most interested oil majors appear prepared to hedge their bets at this point.
The difference between the government offer per barrel on oil over the target production plateau and company bids was substantial, with some showing around a $20 gap in negotiating positions. BP and partner the China National Petroleum Corp agreed to halve their service fee to a low $2 a barrel after remuneration in winning the Rumaila contract.
Last week's failure likely presages a further round of tendering, with the ball now firmly in the court of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, which is seeking to bolster production by 60 percent over the next two decades and requires significant outside investment and support.
The length of the two-decade contracts raises eyebrows. Associated contract stipulations appear to affect the ability of the Oil Ministry to develop, oversee and manage both individual concessions and overall national petroleum strategies, critics allege.
While the relatively united front shown by competing companies in rejecting the Iraqi demands remains, significant pressure will build on the Iraqi government to acquiesce to higher fees and on other demands.
This is something Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is loath to do ahead of national elections next January, given the popular impression in Iraq of past profiteering by foreign energy interests at the expense of Iraqis.
The contracts have drawn flak from the Iraqi oil sector, parliamentarians and the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions, with critiques focusing on the alleged alienation of key national resources and purported failure to prioritize national development in tender planning.
The process is being watched closely by small international oil and gas companies working under contract to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north. Their agreements are viewed as illegitimate by Baghdad.
While most of the northern fields are either in the domain of the KRG or areas claimed by the authority, the key Iraqi-Turkish oil export pipeline is in government hands. Tensions remain high despite the KRG giving Norwegian concessionary DNO the green light in May to pass oil from its new Tawke field via the pipeline.
Aside from political instability and wrangling, the volatility of the security situation is a clear factor preventing energy companies from committing to the development of fields given that the costs of further exploration and development remain largely unknown due to a paucity of reliable, up-to-date field information.
Sadly, the potential boon of large-scale oil and gas development looks set to be squandered through endemic corruption, politically motivated misappropriations and a related, fundamental failure to develop trustworthy management and oversight systems.
Iraqis are right to demand the primary role and reward in developing their crucial national assets.
However, regardless of the stake provided foreign interests, the Iraqi public is unlikely to enjoy the benefits of their country's carbon wealth.
Dr Dominic Moran, based in Tel Aviv, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East and the Director of Operations of ISA Consulting.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
CHINESE PERCEPTION OF INDIA IN THE FRAME OF SINO-US STRATEGIC GAME
By Bhaskar Roy
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3287.html
The "China threat" theory which emanated from the west, and China's strategic understanding that the West co-opted India are coming into increasing conflict especially in the Asian frame work. It would not help the stability of this vast and expanding map including the Asia-Pacific region especially when mixed with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sponsored ultra-nationalism campaign.
There is no doubt several theories of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the foreign policy area are being seriously questioned. One of them is Deng's advice to avoid conflict in the neighbourhood.
Looking at developments on the ground, it appears that China's foreign policy in the neighbourhood is being increasingly influenced by the hard line ambitious theories of equally influential senior strategists who advise the government and the CCP. One theory that emanated in 2004 was China's writ should run from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific region. The other is a more recent, 2009, theory that Asia is China's backyard and the country's prime priority. This has to be achieved at any cost with both soft and hard approach.
A recent (June 23, 2009) commentary in the official newspaper, the Global Times, analysing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's observation (June 17, 2009) that the new administration looks at India as one of its few global partners and raises the relationship to level-3, again saw a US move to co-opt a willing India into a China containment strategy. The writer, Zhang Jie, is the Director of the study cell on security and diplomacy in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Assessing level-3 relationship coined by Ms. Clinton in preparation for her India visit in July, Zhang Jie opines that this was because of India's high status in "global strategies". He noted two characteristics India has which are important to the US: one was India's strategic location in the Indian Ocean, highly significant in the USA's energy transhipment; the other is India's huge Muslim population which President Barack Obama could use in his effort to reach out to the Muslim world. But Zhang put an anti-China alliance between the USA and India as the highest priority in USA's India alliance strategy.
China may have reasons to be apprehensive of an US led coalition to limit China's challenge to eventually emerge as the world's leading power if not in 50 years, then in a 100 years. The Chinese sense of history today is seamless through centuries. They have self-hypnotised themselves as the bearers of the mandate of heaven. This has been driven into the minds of the Chinese people through Communist propaganda. Another is the Chinese people have two brains whereas the rest have only one. A third was to teach children in primary schools not to trust foreigners, and foreigners are evil. These and many other psychological manipulations were done to unite people into a dedicated force of nationalists. Today, the country has opened to the outside world, but the basic sense of the Chinese emperor as the son of heaven is still very much there. The Party Central Committee is today's emperor. While the emperor's ruling method is beginning to be questioned inside the country, in external issues there will be little change in the foreseeable future.
China is a large country with a population which should be at least 1.4 billion or more and still growing, with natural resources not commensurate to sustain this burden especially when its global ambition is what it now emphatically projects. Hence, it has to depend on external resources, especially for energy and minerals like iron ore, nickel and aluminium. Hence, building China has to be at the cost of others, and the CCP's view is that the world owes them. Here may lie the roots of the conflict.
The George W. Bush administration from 2001 started with discussions on engaging China economically, and countering China militarily. One of these propositions was a quadrangular co-operative arrangement between the USA, Japan, Australia and India to counter China's aggressive power projection with military backing. Beijing's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to create an information and computer based offensive force was taken into consideration. Japan articulated the proposition obliquely, but it never took off. It neverwould.
The cold war era is past. But alarm bells rang in China. Therefore, a new proposal from Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, considered Beijing's close friend, to create an Asian arrangement of China, India, Japan, Australia and the USA is suspect in China's eyes. Apparently, Beijing feels its inclusion in the arrangement would hinder its independent control of the smaller countries of South East Asia. Inclusion of India in the arrangement is another concern for China, as it is watching the growing interactions between India and Japan as a new inimical development. The recent Indian interest in the potential instability in the Korean peninsula during the South Korean Foreign Minister's visit to India would add to China's calculations about India.
When India signed the 20-year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970 just ahead of the Bangladesh liberation war, the US and its allies saw New Delhi as firmly in the Soviet camp. India's position in the Afghan war further strengthened this. Following US-China breakthrough in 1972 a strong China-Pakistan-US axis emerged to counter the Indo-Soviet partnership.
But the end of the cold war, the 1989 Tien An Men massacre of pro-democracy activists in Beijing and the break-up of the Soviet Union reorganized the global equations, but also the above axis. Unfortunately, many cold warriors in the USA live on with the same old myopic vision of India.
India's self-propelled development under successive governments brought about a change in India's regional and global profile making a rising player which the international community could not ignore. This upset Beijing's calculations to keep India squeezed inside South Asia through its policy of encircling India. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan became its frontline nuclear power state. But there was no stopping India. This is why Prof. Zhang Jie notes that India got a higher status in the US global strategies.
The May 1998 nuclear tests by India forced open de facto the nuclear boundary. India's nuclear status is still not acceptable to Beijing. And it blames the US primarily for it, and sees in it a US-led western agenda to strengthen India against China. The new India-US military and high technology co-operation, the ground, air and sea exercises between the two countries, and the Indo-US nuclear deal are perceived as new steps in an Indo-US alliance. This, in Beijing's strategic perspective would increasingly challenge its domination of an extended Asia. Added to this is the new relationship with Japan especially Japan sidestepping voting against India at Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meet in Vienna in 2008 despite its nuclear policy constraints.
In recent times, in spite of vastly improved bilateral relations, China took two initiatives trying to strike at India's strategic and development efforts. First was its last ditch effort at the NSG meeting to block the Indo-US nuclear deal, knowing very well India's dire need for nuclear energy. The next was the very recent event at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) trying to block a tranche from the bank for some development projects in Arunachal Pradesh. China took the position that the state was a disputed territory between the two countries. China is clearly trying to persuade or force India to accept Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territory, while India has clear sovereignty and control over the region.
At both NSG and the ADB the US played critical roles to counter China. This has made China anxious about the US-India strategic partnership and how it would affect them.
Sino-US relations is a virtual moveable feast, much like Ernest Hemingway's novel based on the literary society in Paris. Neither can give up the relationship nor stay away from conflicts. But there is one difference. China wants a close relationship with the only super power at the exclusion of others. They have always tried to promote a situation of conflict between the US and others to create a situation where Washington may have to opt for non-confrontational and compromising relationship with Beijing. This was successful during the cold war. Increasingly, however, most major powers especially Russia are seeing what is in their respective interests. Moscow has restarted its military sales relation with Vietnam including kilo-class submarines and SU-30 multi-role aircraft. China has already signalled it is not comfortable with such developments.
Therefore, India with its large size, geostrategic location, a comparable knowledge based population can take quantum leaps with US co-operation. Failure to block the ADB loan to India has serious implications on China's territorial claims against India and border negotiations.
Recently, there has been a sharp barrage of Chinese official and semi-official opinion through their state and party controlled media on the border issue. This, particularly, is a development of concern for India. And that India is no longer willing to roll over to China's intransigence is also worrying for China. It may ratchet up more bullying media and official attacks. But if India stands firm as Russian President Vladimir Putin did in the boundary issue in the Eastern Sector with China, especially in the Maritime Region, Beijing may see sense.
The encirclement of India geographically and more is not likely to cease in the forseeable future.
(The author is a China Analyst with many years of experience. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3287.html
The "China threat" theory which emanated from the west, and China's strategic understanding that the West co-opted India are coming into increasing conflict especially in the Asian frame work. It would not help the stability of this vast and expanding map including the Asia-Pacific region especially when mixed with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sponsored ultra-nationalism campaign.
There is no doubt several theories of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the foreign policy area are being seriously questioned. One of them is Deng's advice to avoid conflict in the neighbourhood.
Looking at developments on the ground, it appears that China's foreign policy in the neighbourhood is being increasingly influenced by the hard line ambitious theories of equally influential senior strategists who advise the government and the CCP. One theory that emanated in 2004 was China's writ should run from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific region. The other is a more recent, 2009, theory that Asia is China's backyard and the country's prime priority. This has to be achieved at any cost with both soft and hard approach.
A recent (June 23, 2009) commentary in the official newspaper, the Global Times, analysing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's observation (June 17, 2009) that the new administration looks at India as one of its few global partners and raises the relationship to level-3, again saw a US move to co-opt a willing India into a China containment strategy. The writer, Zhang Jie, is the Director of the study cell on security and diplomacy in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Assessing level-3 relationship coined by Ms. Clinton in preparation for her India visit in July, Zhang Jie opines that this was because of India's high status in "global strategies". He noted two characteristics India has which are important to the US: one was India's strategic location in the Indian Ocean, highly significant in the USA's energy transhipment; the other is India's huge Muslim population which President Barack Obama could use in his effort to reach out to the Muslim world. But Zhang put an anti-China alliance between the USA and India as the highest priority in USA's India alliance strategy.
China may have reasons to be apprehensive of an US led coalition to limit China's challenge to eventually emerge as the world's leading power if not in 50 years, then in a 100 years. The Chinese sense of history today is seamless through centuries. They have self-hypnotised themselves as the bearers of the mandate of heaven. This has been driven into the minds of the Chinese people through Communist propaganda. Another is the Chinese people have two brains whereas the rest have only one. A third was to teach children in primary schools not to trust foreigners, and foreigners are evil. These and many other psychological manipulations were done to unite people into a dedicated force of nationalists. Today, the country has opened to the outside world, but the basic sense of the Chinese emperor as the son of heaven is still very much there. The Party Central Committee is today's emperor. While the emperor's ruling method is beginning to be questioned inside the country, in external issues there will be little change in the foreseeable future.
China is a large country with a population which should be at least 1.4 billion or more and still growing, with natural resources not commensurate to sustain this burden especially when its global ambition is what it now emphatically projects. Hence, it has to depend on external resources, especially for energy and minerals like iron ore, nickel and aluminium. Hence, building China has to be at the cost of others, and the CCP's view is that the world owes them. Here may lie the roots of the conflict.
The George W. Bush administration from 2001 started with discussions on engaging China economically, and countering China militarily. One of these propositions was a quadrangular co-operative arrangement between the USA, Japan, Australia and India to counter China's aggressive power projection with military backing. Beijing's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to create an information and computer based offensive force was taken into consideration. Japan articulated the proposition obliquely, but it never took off. It neverwould.
The cold war era is past. But alarm bells rang in China. Therefore, a new proposal from Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, considered Beijing's close friend, to create an Asian arrangement of China, India, Japan, Australia and the USA is suspect in China's eyes. Apparently, Beijing feels its inclusion in the arrangement would hinder its independent control of the smaller countries of South East Asia. Inclusion of India in the arrangement is another concern for China, as it is watching the growing interactions between India and Japan as a new inimical development. The recent Indian interest in the potential instability in the Korean peninsula during the South Korean Foreign Minister's visit to India would add to China's calculations about India.
When India signed the 20-year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970 just ahead of the Bangladesh liberation war, the US and its allies saw New Delhi as firmly in the Soviet camp. India's position in the Afghan war further strengthened this. Following US-China breakthrough in 1972 a strong China-Pakistan-US axis emerged to counter the Indo-Soviet partnership.
But the end of the cold war, the 1989 Tien An Men massacre of pro-democracy activists in Beijing and the break-up of the Soviet Union reorganized the global equations, but also the above axis. Unfortunately, many cold warriors in the USA live on with the same old myopic vision of India.
India's self-propelled development under successive governments brought about a change in India's regional and global profile making a rising player which the international community could not ignore. This upset Beijing's calculations to keep India squeezed inside South Asia through its policy of encircling India. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan became its frontline nuclear power state. But there was no stopping India. This is why Prof. Zhang Jie notes that India got a higher status in the US global strategies.
The May 1998 nuclear tests by India forced open de facto the nuclear boundary. India's nuclear status is still not acceptable to Beijing. And it blames the US primarily for it, and sees in it a US-led western agenda to strengthen India against China. The new India-US military and high technology co-operation, the ground, air and sea exercises between the two countries, and the Indo-US nuclear deal are perceived as new steps in an Indo-US alliance. This, in Beijing's strategic perspective would increasingly challenge its domination of an extended Asia. Added to this is the new relationship with Japan especially Japan sidestepping voting against India at Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meet in Vienna in 2008 despite its nuclear policy constraints.
In recent times, in spite of vastly improved bilateral relations, China took two initiatives trying to strike at India's strategic and development efforts. First was its last ditch effort at the NSG meeting to block the Indo-US nuclear deal, knowing very well India's dire need for nuclear energy. The next was the very recent event at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) trying to block a tranche from the bank for some development projects in Arunachal Pradesh. China took the position that the state was a disputed territory between the two countries. China is clearly trying to persuade or force India to accept Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territory, while India has clear sovereignty and control over the region.
At both NSG and the ADB the US played critical roles to counter China. This has made China anxious about the US-India strategic partnership and how it would affect them.
Sino-US relations is a virtual moveable feast, much like Ernest Hemingway's novel based on the literary society in Paris. Neither can give up the relationship nor stay away from conflicts. But there is one difference. China wants a close relationship with the only super power at the exclusion of others. They have always tried to promote a situation of conflict between the US and others to create a situation where Washington may have to opt for non-confrontational and compromising relationship with Beijing. This was successful during the cold war. Increasingly, however, most major powers especially Russia are seeing what is in their respective interests. Moscow has restarted its military sales relation with Vietnam including kilo-class submarines and SU-30 multi-role aircraft. China has already signalled it is not comfortable with such developments.
Therefore, India with its large size, geostrategic location, a comparable knowledge based population can take quantum leaps with US co-operation. Failure to block the ADB loan to India has serious implications on China's territorial claims against India and border negotiations.
Recently, there has been a sharp barrage of Chinese official and semi-official opinion through their state and party controlled media on the border issue. This, particularly, is a development of concern for India. And that India is no longer willing to roll over to China's intransigence is also worrying for China. It may ratchet up more bullying media and official attacks. But if India stands firm as Russian President Vladimir Putin did in the boundary issue in the Eastern Sector with China, especially in the Maritime Region, Beijing may see sense.
The encirclement of India geographically and more is not likely to cease in the forseeable future.
(The author is a China Analyst with many years of experience. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
July 04, 2009
Quote of the Day: K P S Gill
"If the Maoists are to be defeated, the state and its agencies will have to develop a detailed understanding of their strategies, tactics and underlying ideology. Such an understanding is now conspicuous by its absence, with the notable exception of the police leadership in Andhra Pradesh and a few officers in the intelligence establishment."
-- K P S Gill
-- K P S Gill
July 03, 2009
US$147/B One Year On : Political Winners and Strategic Losers
This paper examines the political implications of oil prices as high as $147/b in 2008 or as low as $33/b in 2009 on oil producing countries. After a five-year bull run from 2004-2008 oil producers became used to high receipts cementing support at home while buying influence abroad. Thus the political demise of producer regimes was expected to follow the sharp 2009 drop in prices. But amid a sustained economic crisis, the author argues, political resilience became the leitmotif of producer states. He concludes that, with prices and resource nationalism set to rise in tandem, the political impetus could shift back to producers once more, but unless lessons are learned from 2008-2009, all states will lose out.
© 2009 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
Download: English (PDF · 4 pages · 491 KB)
Author: Matthew Hulbert
Series: CSS Analyses in Security Policy
Issue: 58
Publisher: Center for Security Studies (CSS), Zurich, Switzerland
© 2009 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
Download: English (PDF · 4 pages · 491 KB)
Author: Matthew Hulbert
Series: CSS Analyses in Security Policy
Issue: 58
Publisher: Center for Security Studies (CSS), Zurich, Switzerland
Russian Hardliners' Military Doctrine: In Their Own Words
May 30, 1996
Russian Hardliners' Military Doctrine: In Their Own Words
by Cohen, Ariel
FYI #104
SOURCE: http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/fyi104.cfm
(Archived document, may contain errors)
No. 104 May30,1996
RUSSIAN HARDLINERS9 MILITARY DOCTRINE: IN THEIR OWN WORDS
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Senior Policy Analyst
INTRODUCTION
Some Western leaders and policyrnakers are remarkably unconcerned about the prospects of a vic- tory by Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov in the Russian presidential elections on June 16. Thinking that a communist return to power in Russia will be no different than it was in Po- land or Slovakia, these Westerners appear to believe that a communist victory in Russia will not dis- rupt the burgeoning "partnership" between Russia and the West. However, the report translated here paints a different picture. Written by hard-line members of a nationalist-communist coalition that supports Zyuganov for president but maintains close ties with such nationalists as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the document contains advice for Russian military plan- ners that is profoundly disturbing for the United States and the West. No amount of "miffor imag- ing" in the U.S. or Western democracies can obscure the meaning of Russian hardliners as rendered in their own words.
Among the report's main points: X Russia should be moving aggressively to adopt a nuclear deterrence posture for perceived non- nuclear threats. Strategic nuclear forces should be the highest priority. X Russia should be able to fight at least one full-scale regional war, one smaller-scale conflict, and at least three "peacemaking" operations outside its borders. X The U.S. and NATO remain Russia's enemies. Other foes include Turkey and countries of the former Soviet Union such as the Baltic States. X Russia's armed forces should be drastically reorganized on the basis of smaller, highly mobile units. X Russia should be prepared to undertake military operations to reconquer the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. These operations would include seizing conimand-and- control sites, "eliminating" the political-military leadership, and deporting "some categories" of the hostile population, presumably to the Russian hinterland.
The authors of these positions are analysts who advise the president and the Russian General Staff on military and security matters. One author is Lieutenant General Valeriy Dementyev, who was once Deputy Chief of Armaments in the USSR Ministry of defense, and today is an analyst with the Institute for Defense Research (known by its Russian acronym INOBIS, Institut oboronnykh issle- dovaniz) in the town of Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea near the Polish border. The other author is An- ton Surikov, a defense analyst formerly associated with the USA-Canada Institute and also an analyst at the Institute for Defense Research. The secretive INOBIS is financed by the Russian Gen- eral Staff, military-industrial enterprises, and the Atomic Energy Ministry, and conducts classified research. It was founded by senior figures from the KGB and the Russian military-industrial com- plex. Also instrumental in its founding was Yuri Maslyukov, Zyuganov's chief economic policy maker and the former head of the USSR's Central Planning Authority (the all-powerful GosPlan). INOBIS reportedly enjoys an attentive audience at the Ministry of Defense. People like Surikov and Dementyev advise Communist Party leader Zyuganov, radical nationalist Zhirinovsky, and President Boris Yeltsin's Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov. Even if Zyuganov loses the presidential elections, the views expressed in this report will influence Russian military and security policy. Many in the Russian armed forces and security services support a more aggressive stance for Russia-a viewpoint clearly expressed in this document.
The Heritage Foundation thanks Harriet and Bill Scott, leading experts on the Soviet and Russian military, for their kind assistance in translating this report.
2
ARMY REFORM AND SECURITY: Conceptual Theses of the Strategy of Reforming The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
by Valerly Dernentyev, Lieutenant General (Ret.) and Doctor of Technical Sciences, and Anton Surikov, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Deterrence and Defense
The defensive character of the policy of the Russian Federation (RF) in the military area and the absence in Russia of aggressive intentions was proclaimed in the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the RF, unveiled in 1993.1 This thesis, however, is in need of clarification in terms of the precise tasks that the Armed Forces face. Among them, first of all, three basic tasks should be singled out: V The Armed Forces must have the capability to deter effectively the threat of nuclear attack on Russia and on the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which have signed the agreement on collective security. In this, the talk is exclusively about deterrence, be- cause national military thought acknowledges the impossibility of victory in a global nuclear conflict on the strategic level. V The Armed Forces should be aimed both at deterring a large-scale military attack on Russia and the CIS by foreign governments or a coalition thereof using conventional armaments, and deter- ring and repelling military aggression from the outside that has more limited goals. Deterrence of such threats can be nuclear. The Armed Forces must have the capability to conduct local wars and carry out peacemaking op- erations, primarily within the bounds of the former USSR, taking into account that the former Soviet Union is a zone of Russian vital interests and home to 25 million ethnic Russians. Cur- rently, the Russian Federation is conducting two local wars on the territory of the former USSR -in Chechnya and Tajikistan. Besides that, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are ful- filling peacemaking functions that are in fact deterring Georgia and Moldova from commencing aggression towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester.2 Taking into account the prac- tices of 1990-1996, the demand must be put forward, in part, for the capability to wage local wars within the bounds of the former USSR. The Armed Forces should be able to take part si- multaneously in at least one local war of high intensity, at least one "slow" local war, and at least three "frozen" local conflicts and peacemaking operations.
Russia's Enemies
The thesis of the Basic Provisions is that Russia has no outside enemies. Experience has demon- strated the falseness of this thesis. Because of Russia's weak government and the progressive degra- dation of its military and economic potential, outside enemies are making themselves known in a bolder and more open fashion.
1 This is a declassified version of Russia's official military doctrine, adopted after the army helped Boris Yeltsin to crush the rebellion at the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 [editor's note]. 2 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are integral parts of Georgia, while Trans-Dniester is a part of Moldova [editor's note).
3
Currently, Russia's basic probable enemies remain the United States and the NATO countries. The United States has a vast nuclear missile potential which, if used, can destroy Russia as a state. It was created with the goal of nuclear blackmail of the USSR and was oriented mainly at carrying out a first nuclear strike. At present, in spite of ongoing reductions within the framework of START 1, orientation toward a first strike not only has not disappeared, but actually has been increased. This is due primarily to the policy of the [American] authorities, particularly the U.S. Congress, toward re- vision of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and creates the prerequisites for development and subsequent de- ployment of a strategic ABM system by the year 2003. In contrast to the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, not only has NATO, led by the USA, not been dissolved, but the decision already has been made to enlarge it. NATO's infrastructure, despite the reduction of personnel and armaments taking place under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, is still oriented toward actions in an eastern direction. The preservation of its basic military infrastructure gives it an opportunity to build up its troops quickly should such a decision be made. Although, as of today, the potential of NATO conventional forces is not sufficient to conduct a large-scale offensive operation against the Russian Federation similar to Hitler's invasion of 1941, over time these forces can be augmented and advanced to the borders of the Russian Federation. In this light, the plans for NATO eastern expansion look clearly aggressive. Moreover, in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary measures are now being taken to adapt the infrastructure, airport net- work, communications, etc., for NATO use. One Hungarian airport, without prior permission, has been turned into an American military base. It should be noted that the experience of the U.S. and NATO in the Persian Gulf in 199 1, and in the former Yugoslavia in 1995-1996, demonstrates that the tWestem] bloc today has sufficient po- tential to carry out military operations with limited goals on the periphery of post-Soviet territory. In this scenario, the greatest danger is presented by aggression from three possible directions: first, because of Norway's recent decision to expand NATO military activity in the north of the country, from the north against the Russian Federation's Northern Fleet on the Kola peninsula; second, in connection with the discussion about creating a 60,000-strong Baltic Corps from German, Danish, and Polish detachments, from the northwest in the form of military intervention by NATO in case of a conflict between Russia and the Baltic countries; and third, in light of the calls being heard to grant the countries of the Caspian basin NATO security guarantees similar to those given to the countries of the Persian Gulf, from the south, where the key role is assigned to a member of NATO -Turkey. Turkey possesses an army of 600,000. Its navy is already bigger than the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Turkey has unilaterally altered the status of the Black Sea straits, threatening Russia's interests. It has voiced numerous military threats toward Russia's ally Armenia with regard to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is attempting to attract into its sphere of influence the Turkish-speaking and Muslim regions of the former USSR. It has been proven that Turkish officials supported [Presi- dent] Dudaev's illegal military detachments in Chechnya. They also assisted the "Gray Wolves" or- ganization in Azerbaijan and a number of other nationalistic military detachments throughout the cis.
Japan, which is an ally of the United States and has territorial claims against the Russian Federa- tion, might also be considered a potential enemy of Russia. Today, Japan does not have sufficient military power to start an aggressive military operation against Russia in order to take the islands of the Southern Kurils by force, but it does have the necessary potential to expand its Armed Forces quickly.
4
China and Iran Are Not Enemies
Obviously, the fact that Russia and China are neighbors must not be ignored when planning the development of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the military policy of the Russian Federation should be formed with extreme caution with respect to China. The U.S., seeing China as a potential enemy, is interested in creating a military confrontation between Russia and China. Similarly, the U.S. has a clear interest in the confrontation between the Russian Federation and Iran, another American enemy. The "Islamic threat" to the CIS is used as an argument to promote a similar confrontation. After a close examination of this problem, however, it becomes clear that the extremist movements in the CIS that operate under pseudo-Islamic slogans are relying as a rule not on Iran, but on pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world: Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. In light of the above, it is not practical to view Iran and China as probable enemies of Russia, at least in the near future, because there are no objective causes for confrontation between the Russian Federation and those countries.
Recreating the Empire Within the territory of post-Soviet Russia, the main enemies are the forces of aggressive national- ism that operate with support from outside and have armed forces of their own: an-nies, police, and other militarized detachments of the Baltic states; Dudayev's illegal armed forces; Tajik opposition illegal armed forces; and others. The main causes of conflict involving the Armed Forces of the Rus- sian Federation within the territory of the former USSR are the following: V Ethnic discord and genocide of national minorities. Examples of such conflicts where Russian Federation (USSR) Armed Forces were used, directly or indirectly, would be Trans-Dniester in 1992, the Prigorodniy region in Northern Ossetia at the end of 1992, Southern Ossetia in 199 1 - 1992, and Abkhazia in 1992-1993. In the near future, ethnic conflicts probably will have two major causes. First, as a result of the events of 199 1, Russians are a divided people. Therefore, their objective tendency to reunite will become stronger as time goes on. Second, in all former USSR countries, except for Belorus- sia and perhaps Ukraine, ethnic minorities are subjected to discrimination.3 This is most clearly evident in the Baltic countries where, with the encouragement of Western institutions, human rights violations based on ethnic origin are part of official policy. The Baltic countries seem to be the most potentially explosive in terms of the possibility of new areas of conflict that could involve the Russian Federation's Armed Forces. Attempts by nationalist forces to seize power by armed force or to hold power in some republic of the former USSR. Examples include TaJikistan in 1992-1996, Lithuania in January 199 1, Georgia during the winter of 1991-1992 and at the end of 1993, and Azerbaijan in January 1990 and the summer of 1993.
Territorial claims against the Russian Federation and illegal attempts to seize sea and inland water resources that belong to Russia. Up to now, direct Russian participation in such armed conflicts has been avoided. But it is not out of the question, particularly because of the Baku government's policy of annexing part of the Caspian Sea, an inland body of water the rights to which should be shared equally by all countries bordering the region. Another potential source of conflict is the part of the Baltic Sea area that belongs to Russia but is claimed by Lithuania. It
3 The old term "Belorussia" is used for what is now Belarus[editor's note].
5
also is known that the ethnocratic regimes of Tallin and Riga are claiming a part of the Russian Federation's Northwestern territory. V The desire of certain forces in the former USSR, primarily in the Baltic countries, to become a part of the NATO alliance. In such cases, one cannot exclude preemptive use of force by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to stop decisively any practical steps that might be taken by armed nationalist detachments to implement their provocative plans.
Budget Priorities
Obviously, in the near term, reform of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces will be conducted under conditions of deep economic crisis. Thus, the decisive factor in choosing among possible re- forms will be that the budget for the Armed Forces and military-industrial complex is limited. One of the main requirements will be to minimize the country's budget for defense. This, in turn, means that the established practice of allocating funds equally among the existing branches of the Armed Forces will have to be abandoned. It is necessary to determine which programs are crucial to sustaining the Armed Forces' ability to accomplish their main objectives and guarantee their financing. At the same time, it is unavoidable that programs which do not have a high priority will have to be financed from the "leftovers" of the military budget. Despite the importance of the transition to a professional army in the near future, it will be impossible to avoid using the draft to raise manpower. The Armed Forces will have to be re- duced to 1.2 million servicemen.
The Main Deterrent. Strategic Nuclear Forces In resolving the task of nuclear deterrence on the strategic level, the basic role should be played by strategic nuclear forces and systems supporting their combat functioning. Without strategic nu- clear forces, Russia cannot exist as an independent, unified state. The task of sustaining them should be given the highest priority and should be fully financed. As of today, [Russia's] strategic nuclear forces face three major problems: X Degradation of strategic nuclear forces. This concerns primarily the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, in which the scheduled maintenance of weapon systems is constantly be- ing violated and the operational strength of strategic nuclear submarines has gone down drasti- cally. Since 1990, not a single new strategic nuclear submarine has been launched; considering the life cycle of submarines in the naval strategic nuclear forces, this means they could disap- pear within 15 years. It is most important to finish the scientific research and test construction work needed to create strategic nuclear submarines of a new generation which will carry new ballistic missiles by the years 2000-2003, as well as to ensure that these strategic nuclear subma- rines are brought into service at the rate of 2-3 submarines every two years. X Absence of clarity regarding the quantitative framework within which it is planned to de- velop strategic nuclear forces. In 1994, START I was implemented. START Il was signed but is not yet ratified. With regard to the naval and aviation components of the strategic nuclear forces, the existence of uncertainty concerning the fate of the treaty does not affect seriously their future development. According to START II, the naval strategic nuclear forces can be armed with 1,750 warheads after 2003. Roughly the same quantity was to be allowed under START I. Aviation strategic nuclear forces, which historically have played a very insignificant role in the national nuclear triad, will have 93 heavy bombers with approximately 500 cruise missiles, including 19 Tu-95 heavy bombers and several dozen heavy bombers acquired in Ukraine by agreement. The production of additional heavy bombers is very costly and thus is hardly advisable.
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A more complex situation exists in units of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). According to START II, which requires the liquidation of ICBMs with MIRV warheads, the SRF by the year 2003 can rely on approximately 1,000 single-warhead ICBMs. At present, there are 350 mobile SS-25s with single warheads, which are to be replaced in the next few years, as their useful life expires, by "Topol-M" ICBMs. According to the agreement, Russia will have 105 MIRVed ICBMs, which are to be "unloaded" until only one warhead each remains, and 90 single SS- 18 ICBMs placed into refitted silos. To support the START H quota for the number of warheads, Russia will have to form more than 10 additional divisions of mobile ICBMs with approxi- mately 500 "Topol-M" ICBMs by the year 2003-in other words, practically double the num- ber of mobile, single-warhead ICBMs. Another possible option is to build new silos for new ICBMs. Even with priority financing, it is very difficult for the SRF to do this within such a lim- ited time frame.
In general, the START H treaty is'rather paradoxical. It calls for quick liquidation of more than 200 MIRVed Russian ICBMs, part of which could still be used for another 4-5 years. At the same time, in order to maintain quantitative parity with the U.S., several hundred single-war- head ICBMs should be deployed, and possibly placed into newly built silos, even as some of the old silos are to be destroyed under START H. Note that the United States plans to go from START I to START II in a different fashion. It will eliminate only 50 "MX" missiles, 4 "Ohio" strategic nuclear submarines, and 28 heavy bombers with cruise missiles. The main cuts are to be accomplished by "unloading" the missiles and storing the warheads in special storage facili- ties. At any moment, this stockpile, which the United States emphatically refuses to destroy, might be put back into operation on U.S. missiles. As a result, taking into account the potential for "quick loading" of these missiles, the U.S. will surpass Russia by 1,000- 1,500 warheads. Russia's refusal to follow START II will bring onto the agenda the issue of supporting MIRVed ICBMs. Analysis proves that this problem can be solved in principle. Different options are available. For instance, additional SS- l8s can be purchased from Ukraine. Also, purely Rus- sian MIRVed ICBMs can be designed; a 120-ton liquid fueled missile with 10 warheads could be created in 3-5 years after the appropriate decision. In the next 5-7 years, 300 such missiles can be placed into existing silos. Given these facts, in spite of widespread misconceptions, spending for this project could be quite moderate. At the stage of scientific research and test con- struction work, the amount would be several percent less per year than the amount allocated to "rebuild" Chechnya in 1996. At the development stage, given that the warheads would be avail- able, production and installation of 300 of such missiles would be three times cheaper than the cost of constructing in the same period 500 "Topol-M" ICBMs. in their mobile version or in new silos, as discussed above in relation to START 111. X Flaws in the command and control structure of the strategic nuclear forces. It is pro- posed, within the framework of measures for development of the strategic nuclear forces, to de- sign in an organized manner a single, self-contained operational command and control system for all groupings of strategic nuclear forces, including support systems, based on the adn-iinistra- tive structure developed in the Strategic Rocket Forces. Practical implementation of this pro- posal could be achieved within a year after the appropriate decision is made. The main reasons such a step is necessary are the increased demands for combat readiness in the strategic nuclear forces, economy of means, and elimination of parallel structures. It would be advisable to trans- fer the Military Space Forces to the Strategic Rocket Forces to bring under their functional con- trol the Missile Attack Warning System, the Space Control System, the Moscow ABM System, and corresponding testing sites. The naval and aviation strategic nuclear forces (functionally left in the Navy and Air Forces, respectively) also should be transferred to the single operational command and control of the strategic nuclear forces.
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At the present time, several hundred thousand servicemen, a third of them officers, are per- forming their military service in groupings of the strategic nuclear forces. In the Strategic Rocket Forces, for all practical purposes, combat crews of officers carry out in practice 100 per- cent of the direct functional duties connected with exploitation of the weapons. As for the draft- ees, they primarily carTy out functions as guards and perform auxiliary tasks in supporting combat readiness, technical support, etc. A similar situation, as a whole, characterizes the other components of the strategic nuclear forces and their support systems. It is proposed that the ratio between professionals and conscripts be maintained in the future as well. Since the U.S. and NATO possess conventional forces and armaments potentially sufficient to conduct military operations with limited goals on the periphery of post-Soviet territory, it is nec- essary to provide for deterrence of such actions by the probable enemy. Currently, functions for deterring aggression from the most probable directions are given: ow In the north (the naval bases on the Kola peninsula), to forces of the Leningrad Military Dis- trict (MD) and Northern Fleet (NF). vw In the northwest, (the Baltic region), to forces of the Leningrad MD, Kaliningrad special re- gion, and forces of the Baltic Fleet. ew In the south (the Caucasus-Caspian region), to forces of the North Caucasus Military dis- trict; subunits of the Russian Armed Forces on bases in Gyumri and Yerevan (Armenia), Tbilisi and Ahalkalaki (Georgia), Batumi (Adjaria), and Gudauta (Abkhazia); forces of the Caspian Flotilla; and the Black Sea fleet. Analysis shows that the existing deterTence potential of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in these directions might be insufficient to deter aggressive action by the probable enemy. Strengthening these forces by carrying out a long-term buildup in the number of troops and ar- maments in regions of probable conflict could be hard to achieve economically. In light of this, as a priority task facing the Armed Forces, it is proposed to create, within a year after a decision is made, Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces numbering about 10,000 servicemen. Opera- tional-Tactical Deterrent Forces could operate as a reserve of the Supreme High Command and, on a long-term basis, could assume the function of deterring the probable enemy from conduct- ing military operations with local goals. For this proposal to be implemented at the initial stage, it is suggested to supply the Opera- tional-Tactical Deterrent Forces with 10- 12 missile and aviation complexes equipped with con- ventional precision weapons from the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and Air Forces. These missile and aviation complexes, while remaining functionally a part of the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and Air Forces, and based deep within Russian territory during peacetime, would be subordinated operationally, through a Main Directorate of the General Staff specially created for these purposes, to the Supreme High Command of the Russian Armed Forces. Dur- ing a threatening period, Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces, by decision of the Supreme High Command, could be redeployed to the region of possible conflict and aimed on especially important targets deep in the probable enemy's territory. In the event plans for the eastern expansion of NATO are realized or new directions of possi- ble aggression appear (for instance, the Southern Kuril Island), it would be expedient to increase the number of the Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces' missile and aviation complexes to 30- 50 units. At the same time, units of missile artillery and aviation complexes could be armed with nuclear weapons. To demonstrate persuasively to a probable enemy the RF's determination to impede any NATO advancement into the territory of the former USSR, some Operational-Tacti- cal Deterrent Force units also could be moved up to the borders, particularly the Russian-Norwe- gian border; to Russian military bases in Armenia, Georgia, Adzharia, and Abkhazia; to the
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Kaliningrad special region; and into Belorussia, to which President A. G. Lukashenko has agreed in principle.
The Mobile Forces: Mainstay of the Russian Army It is advisable when waging local wars within the former USSR to give the main functions to spe- cial elite units: Mobile Forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which also must have prior- ity designation. Not intended for participation in extended military conflicts, these units could be used on a short-term basis in holding actions and to repel aggression from abroad against Russia and the CIS using conventional weapons. They also could be designated for peacekeeping opera- tions under the aegis of CIS, as well as the UN and other international organizations. It is advisable to form Mobile Forces, up to 90,000 strong, based on Airborne troops and using some units of naval infantry, over a year after a corresponding decision is made. Functionally, naval infantry would stay under Navy command and would be transferred to operational Mobile Forces command only for the conduct of special operations. For five years after forming these Mobile Forces, it is suggested that recruitment be exclusively on a contract basis. After the process of turning them into a professional force is complete, Mobile Forces should be fully staffed and given all kinds of heavy armaments and equipment. Moreover, the number of naval infantry should be increased with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, and Caspian Flotilla, which are located in potential conflict areas of the Caucasus and Baltic countries. Special attention should be paid to the creation of naval infantry in the Caspian region be- cause of the extremely high probability of conflict arising from the unresolved problem of the status of the Caspian shelf. It is important to equip Mobile Forces with military transport aviation (MTA), which will belong functionally to the Air Forces and be operationally subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces but required to carry out orders of the Mobile Forces. The need for MTA aircraft desig- nated to move personnel and military equipment, including heavy military equipment, is estimated at 100 aircraft. Most of the aircraft in MTA available today are not functioning. Therefore, about 30- 40 additional aircraft should be brought into service because of the extreme importance of the tasks performed by the Mobile Forces. A typical special operation involving Mobile Forces and aimed at liberating a large area of the for- mer USSR from nationalists should be based on the following principles. The commander of the op- eration is appointed and should receive a legally valid order. The date and time of the operation then are set. A rigid system of unified command is established so that operational command over all util- ized forces, regardless of departmental subordination and affiliation, is concentrated in the hands of a single person. In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Federal Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out strikes for the purpose of destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and eliminating the enemy's military and po- litical leadership. Then Mobile Forces, with the support of army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate enemy forces and take over their territory. After that, subunits of Ground Forces and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some combat experience, move in. They establish control of the most crucial locations and carry out "cleansing" of the territory. Then, with the help of militia formed out of the pro-Russian part of the local population, they establish control over the territory and ensure the elimination of nationalists and deportation of some categories of citizens from certain locations. It should be emphasized that until the end of the special operation, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military control over the territory.
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Winners and Losers
Military intelligence plays a most important role in achieving the main goals of the Armed Forces. Making the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) and its subunits and structures more effec- tive should be given the highest priority. To implement these proposals, half the personnel of the Armed Forces would have to go to the four most important components of the Armed Forces named above, which also should be given pri- ority in financing. Because the economic situation in the country is difficult, the other half of the Armed Forces would have to exist under tight financial limitations. The Navy is the most expensive of the Armed Forces. A differentiated approach is needed here. Naval strategic nuclear forces cannot be underfinanced. The situation is more complex with respect to providing for the combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces. The system exists and should be preserved, but this does not require building large ships. Aircraft carriers are an exception, since two carriers each are needed in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet to meet military goals. There are only two at present, and the country's economic situation does not allow for two more.
To provide for anti-submarine warfare in oceanic theaters of military operations (TVD), there are in service submarines and ships equipped with special arms. This equipment should be main- tained and ships and submarines currently under construction should be finished, but no new ones should be built for the time being. With respect to combating enemy aircraft carriers, there are no battle groups now in place. Our recommendation is to maintain the status quo and concentrate on retaining existing levels. With reference to landing support for naval infantry, the appropriate infrastructure was built 0 by the USSR. It is important not only to stop its destruction, but also to continue its develop- ment, since costs will not be high but will allow it to perform tasks of the Mobile Forces with great effectiveness. In protecting sea communications, special attention should be paid to protecting lines of com- munication with the Kaliningrad Special Region. At the same time, activities in the remote oce- anic regions should be limited. The existing system for the coastal defense of the Russian Federation should be supported and developed, since no big investments are needed here. Finally, it is necessary to abandon the tasks of combating transatlantic shipments of U.S. forces and combating the enemy's surface ships and submarines armed with cruise missiles. V There are two large groups in the Ground Forces today. One was deployed in the Far East Military District and Trans-Baikal Military District during the time of tense relations with China. In subsequent years, it was degraded less than other groups. Another large group was de- veloped for obvious reasons in the North Caucasus Military District. It is reasonable to continue to support these groups. For the North Caucasus Military District, this means confirn-dng the ex- ception of District units from the treaty on Conventional Forces Reductions in Europe at the May conference of participants. It is unacceptable that the issue of the North Caucasus Military District be linked with the proposal made by a number of countries that the numbers of Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Special Region be cut; in light of Poland's and the Baltic countries' plans to join NATO, the very fact that the issue of the Kaliningrad Special Region has come up seems both ambiguous and a provocation. A limited number of Ground Forces are located in the strategically important Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts. From the west, Moscow is covered by only two army divisions. As there is no danger of a large-scale invasion of Russia similar to the invasion of 1941, the development of forces to the west of Moscow should not be
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hurried. But in the event the Eastern European countries join NATO and the infrastructure for an invasion force appears, Russia will be forced to respond accordingly. One possible response might be to recreate the Belorussian Military District and deploy Ground Forces and frontal avia- tion of the Air Forces there. Also, since it currently is difficult for Russia to maintain parity with NATO in conventional weapons, the primary emphasis should be assigned to tactical nuclear deterrence of the threat of non-nuclear attack by NATO forces. This approach will require arming the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and frontal aviation of the Air Forces with nuclear weapons and will be much less expensive than providing a non-nuclear deterrent force for a non-nuclear invasion. In gen- eral, the present weakness of Russia dictates reliance on nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons. Today, the only possible way to deter NATO is through nuclear deterrence. At the same time, should the relationship between Russia and China change, the same approach can be used in Central Asia and the Far East. An important problem in the Ground Forces is revision of the list of units in military districts and the discovery of units which can be cut. It is advisable to limit the number of divisions to 30- 35, of which 15-20 could be manned with conscripts and work on combat readiness while the other 15, evenly spread around the country, would be cadre and would serve as a base in prepar- ing the mobilization reserve. At the same time, preparation of the mobilization reserve should be conducted within the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Border Guards. V In units of the Air Forces, special attention should be concentrated on maintaining mili- tary transport, frontal aviation, and aviation of the strategic nuclear forces, which could be used by the Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces and Mobile Forces, at the required level. A major task is preserving qualifications of flying personnel. The Air Defense of military districts should be given to the Air Forces from the Troops of Air Defense, disbanding the latter units but retaining their combat readiness requirements. The missile attack warning system, space control system, and Moscow ABM System, as well as their corresponding testing grounds, would be transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Air Defense system that is maintaining CIS perimeter defense also would be transferred to the Air Force. Another possible solution is to give it to the Federal Border Guard Service. This would be logical, because they are not now able to defend against a massive air attack from the probable enemy. The circle of tasks resolved by them, in fact, is limited to early warning of an unsanctioned intrusion of CIS airspace and interception of individual targets. This is more a function of the Border Guard, not the Armed Forces. Moreover, the Federal Border Guard Service looks after the ground and ma- rine border. It would be logical to close the loop by giving them the air component as well.
Legislative Priorities It is proposed that in the immediate future, it is necessary to prepare and confirm in the Federal Assembly (parliament) a national security doctrine and a military doctrine for the Russian Federa- tion. Based on these doctrines, a five-year plan of reform for the Armed Forces of the Russian Fed- eration should be developed and adopted. This current document can be used both to prepare the national security and military doctrines and to prepare the plan of reform for the Armed Forces. Moscow, February 1996
}}
Russian Hardliners' Military Doctrine: In Their Own Words
by Cohen, Ariel
FYI #104
SOURCE: http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/fyi104.cfm
(Archived document, may contain errors)
No. 104 May30,1996
RUSSIAN HARDLINERS9 MILITARY DOCTRINE: IN THEIR OWN WORDS
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Senior Policy Analyst
INTRODUCTION
Some Western leaders and policyrnakers are remarkably unconcerned about the prospects of a vic- tory by Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov in the Russian presidential elections on June 16. Thinking that a communist return to power in Russia will be no different than it was in Po- land or Slovakia, these Westerners appear to believe that a communist victory in Russia will not dis- rupt the burgeoning "partnership" between Russia and the West. However, the report translated here paints a different picture. Written by hard-line members of a nationalist-communist coalition that supports Zyuganov for president but maintains close ties with such nationalists as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the document contains advice for Russian military plan- ners that is profoundly disturbing for the United States and the West. No amount of "miffor imag- ing" in the U.S. or Western democracies can obscure the meaning of Russian hardliners as rendered in their own words.
Among the report's main points: X Russia should be moving aggressively to adopt a nuclear deterrence posture for perceived non- nuclear threats. Strategic nuclear forces should be the highest priority. X Russia should be able to fight at least one full-scale regional war, one smaller-scale conflict, and at least three "peacemaking" operations outside its borders. X The U.S. and NATO remain Russia's enemies. Other foes include Turkey and countries of the former Soviet Union such as the Baltic States. X Russia's armed forces should be drastically reorganized on the basis of smaller, highly mobile units. X Russia should be prepared to undertake military operations to reconquer the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. These operations would include seizing conimand-and- control sites, "eliminating" the political-military leadership, and deporting "some categories" of the hostile population, presumably to the Russian hinterland.
The authors of these positions are analysts who advise the president and the Russian General Staff on military and security matters. One author is Lieutenant General Valeriy Dementyev, who was once Deputy Chief of Armaments in the USSR Ministry of defense, and today is an analyst with the Institute for Defense Research (known by its Russian acronym INOBIS, Institut oboronnykh issle- dovaniz) in the town of Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea near the Polish border. The other author is An- ton Surikov, a defense analyst formerly associated with the USA-Canada Institute and also an analyst at the Institute for Defense Research. The secretive INOBIS is financed by the Russian Gen- eral Staff, military-industrial enterprises, and the Atomic Energy Ministry, and conducts classified research. It was founded by senior figures from the KGB and the Russian military-industrial com- plex. Also instrumental in its founding was Yuri Maslyukov, Zyuganov's chief economic policy maker and the former head of the USSR's Central Planning Authority (the all-powerful GosPlan). INOBIS reportedly enjoys an attentive audience at the Ministry of Defense. People like Surikov and Dementyev advise Communist Party leader Zyuganov, radical nationalist Zhirinovsky, and President Boris Yeltsin's Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov. Even if Zyuganov loses the presidential elections, the views expressed in this report will influence Russian military and security policy. Many in the Russian armed forces and security services support a more aggressive stance for Russia-a viewpoint clearly expressed in this document.
The Heritage Foundation thanks Harriet and Bill Scott, leading experts on the Soviet and Russian military, for their kind assistance in translating this report.
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ARMY REFORM AND SECURITY: Conceptual Theses of the Strategy of Reforming The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
by Valerly Dernentyev, Lieutenant General (Ret.) and Doctor of Technical Sciences, and Anton Surikov, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Deterrence and Defense
The defensive character of the policy of the Russian Federation (RF) in the military area and the absence in Russia of aggressive intentions was proclaimed in the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the RF, unveiled in 1993.1 This thesis, however, is in need of clarification in terms of the precise tasks that the Armed Forces face. Among them, first of all, three basic tasks should be singled out: V The Armed Forces must have the capability to deter effectively the threat of nuclear attack on Russia and on the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which have signed the agreement on collective security. In this, the talk is exclusively about deterrence, be- cause national military thought acknowledges the impossibility of victory in a global nuclear conflict on the strategic level. V The Armed Forces should be aimed both at deterring a large-scale military attack on Russia and the CIS by foreign governments or a coalition thereof using conventional armaments, and deter- ring and repelling military aggression from the outside that has more limited goals. Deterrence of such threats can be nuclear. The Armed Forces must have the capability to conduct local wars and carry out peacemaking op- erations, primarily within the bounds of the former USSR, taking into account that the former Soviet Union is a zone of Russian vital interests and home to 25 million ethnic Russians. Cur- rently, the Russian Federation is conducting two local wars on the territory of the former USSR -in Chechnya and Tajikistan. Besides that, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are ful- filling peacemaking functions that are in fact deterring Georgia and Moldova from commencing aggression towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester.2 Taking into account the prac- tices of 1990-1996, the demand must be put forward, in part, for the capability to wage local wars within the bounds of the former USSR. The Armed Forces should be able to take part si- multaneously in at least one local war of high intensity, at least one "slow" local war, and at least three "frozen" local conflicts and peacemaking operations.
Russia's Enemies
The thesis of the Basic Provisions is that Russia has no outside enemies. Experience has demon- strated the falseness of this thesis. Because of Russia's weak government and the progressive degra- dation of its military and economic potential, outside enemies are making themselves known in a bolder and more open fashion.
1 This is a declassified version of Russia's official military doctrine, adopted after the army helped Boris Yeltsin to crush the rebellion at the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 [editor's note]. 2 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are integral parts of Georgia, while Trans-Dniester is a part of Moldova [editor's note).
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Currently, Russia's basic probable enemies remain the United States and the NATO countries. The United States has a vast nuclear missile potential which, if used, can destroy Russia as a state. It was created with the goal of nuclear blackmail of the USSR and was oriented mainly at carrying out a first nuclear strike. At present, in spite of ongoing reductions within the framework of START 1, orientation toward a first strike not only has not disappeared, but actually has been increased. This is due primarily to the policy of the [American] authorities, particularly the U.S. Congress, toward re- vision of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and creates the prerequisites for development and subsequent de- ployment of a strategic ABM system by the year 2003. In contrast to the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, not only has NATO, led by the USA, not been dissolved, but the decision already has been made to enlarge it. NATO's infrastructure, despite the reduction of personnel and armaments taking place under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, is still oriented toward actions in an eastern direction. The preservation of its basic military infrastructure gives it an opportunity to build up its troops quickly should such a decision be made. Although, as of today, the potential of NATO conventional forces is not sufficient to conduct a large-scale offensive operation against the Russian Federation similar to Hitler's invasion of 1941, over time these forces can be augmented and advanced to the borders of the Russian Federation. In this light, the plans for NATO eastern expansion look clearly aggressive. Moreover, in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary measures are now being taken to adapt the infrastructure, airport net- work, communications, etc., for NATO use. One Hungarian airport, without prior permission, has been turned into an American military base. It should be noted that the experience of the U.S. and NATO in the Persian Gulf in 199 1, and in the former Yugoslavia in 1995-1996, demonstrates that the tWestem] bloc today has sufficient po- tential to carry out military operations with limited goals on the periphery of post-Soviet territory. In this scenario, the greatest danger is presented by aggression from three possible directions: first, because of Norway's recent decision to expand NATO military activity in the north of the country, from the north against the Russian Federation's Northern Fleet on the Kola peninsula; second, in connection with the discussion about creating a 60,000-strong Baltic Corps from German, Danish, and Polish detachments, from the northwest in the form of military intervention by NATO in case of a conflict between Russia and the Baltic countries; and third, in light of the calls being heard to grant the countries of the Caspian basin NATO security guarantees similar to those given to the countries of the Persian Gulf, from the south, where the key role is assigned to a member of NATO -Turkey. Turkey possesses an army of 600,000. Its navy is already bigger than the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Turkey has unilaterally altered the status of the Black Sea straits, threatening Russia's interests. It has voiced numerous military threats toward Russia's ally Armenia with regard to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is attempting to attract into its sphere of influence the Turkish-speaking and Muslim regions of the former USSR. It has been proven that Turkish officials supported [Presi- dent] Dudaev's illegal military detachments in Chechnya. They also assisted the "Gray Wolves" or- ganization in Azerbaijan and a number of other nationalistic military detachments throughout the cis.
Japan, which is an ally of the United States and has territorial claims against the Russian Federa- tion, might also be considered a potential enemy of Russia. Today, Japan does not have sufficient military power to start an aggressive military operation against Russia in order to take the islands of the Southern Kurils by force, but it does have the necessary potential to expand its Armed Forces quickly.
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China and Iran Are Not Enemies
Obviously, the fact that Russia and China are neighbors must not be ignored when planning the development of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the military policy of the Russian Federation should be formed with extreme caution with respect to China. The U.S., seeing China as a potential enemy, is interested in creating a military confrontation between Russia and China. Similarly, the U.S. has a clear interest in the confrontation between the Russian Federation and Iran, another American enemy. The "Islamic threat" to the CIS is used as an argument to promote a similar confrontation. After a close examination of this problem, however, it becomes clear that the extremist movements in the CIS that operate under pseudo-Islamic slogans are relying as a rule not on Iran, but on pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world: Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. In light of the above, it is not practical to view Iran and China as probable enemies of Russia, at least in the near future, because there are no objective causes for confrontation between the Russian Federation and those countries.
Recreating the Empire Within the territory of post-Soviet Russia, the main enemies are the forces of aggressive national- ism that operate with support from outside and have armed forces of their own: an-nies, police, and other militarized detachments of the Baltic states; Dudayev's illegal armed forces; Tajik opposition illegal armed forces; and others. The main causes of conflict involving the Armed Forces of the Rus- sian Federation within the territory of the former USSR are the following: V Ethnic discord and genocide of national minorities. Examples of such conflicts where Russian Federation (USSR) Armed Forces were used, directly or indirectly, would be Trans-Dniester in 1992, the Prigorodniy region in Northern Ossetia at the end of 1992, Southern Ossetia in 199 1 - 1992, and Abkhazia in 1992-1993. In the near future, ethnic conflicts probably will have two major causes. First, as a result of the events of 199 1, Russians are a divided people. Therefore, their objective tendency to reunite will become stronger as time goes on. Second, in all former USSR countries, except for Belorus- sia and perhaps Ukraine, ethnic minorities are subjected to discrimination.3 This is most clearly evident in the Baltic countries where, with the encouragement of Western institutions, human rights violations based on ethnic origin are part of official policy. The Baltic countries seem to be the most potentially explosive in terms of the possibility of new areas of conflict that could involve the Russian Federation's Armed Forces. Attempts by nationalist forces to seize power by armed force or to hold power in some republic of the former USSR. Examples include TaJikistan in 1992-1996, Lithuania in January 199 1, Georgia during the winter of 1991-1992 and at the end of 1993, and Azerbaijan in January 1990 and the summer of 1993.
Territorial claims against the Russian Federation and illegal attempts to seize sea and inland water resources that belong to Russia. Up to now, direct Russian participation in such armed conflicts has been avoided. But it is not out of the question, particularly because of the Baku government's policy of annexing part of the Caspian Sea, an inland body of water the rights to which should be shared equally by all countries bordering the region. Another potential source of conflict is the part of the Baltic Sea area that belongs to Russia but is claimed by Lithuania. It
3 The old term "Belorussia" is used for what is now Belarus[editor's note].
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also is known that the ethnocratic regimes of Tallin and Riga are claiming a part of the Russian Federation's Northwestern territory. V The desire of certain forces in the former USSR, primarily in the Baltic countries, to become a part of the NATO alliance. In such cases, one cannot exclude preemptive use of force by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to stop decisively any practical steps that might be taken by armed nationalist detachments to implement their provocative plans.
Budget Priorities
Obviously, in the near term, reform of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces will be conducted under conditions of deep economic crisis. Thus, the decisive factor in choosing among possible re- forms will be that the budget for the Armed Forces and military-industrial complex is limited. One of the main requirements will be to minimize the country's budget for defense. This, in turn, means that the established practice of allocating funds equally among the existing branches of the Armed Forces will have to be abandoned. It is necessary to determine which programs are crucial to sustaining the Armed Forces' ability to accomplish their main objectives and guarantee their financing. At the same time, it is unavoidable that programs which do not have a high priority will have to be financed from the "leftovers" of the military budget. Despite the importance of the transition to a professional army in the near future, it will be impossible to avoid using the draft to raise manpower. The Armed Forces will have to be re- duced to 1.2 million servicemen.
The Main Deterrent. Strategic Nuclear Forces In resolving the task of nuclear deterrence on the strategic level, the basic role should be played by strategic nuclear forces and systems supporting their combat functioning. Without strategic nu- clear forces, Russia cannot exist as an independent, unified state. The task of sustaining them should be given the highest priority and should be fully financed. As of today, [Russia's] strategic nuclear forces face three major problems: X Degradation of strategic nuclear forces. This concerns primarily the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, in which the scheduled maintenance of weapon systems is constantly be- ing violated and the operational strength of strategic nuclear submarines has gone down drasti- cally. Since 1990, not a single new strategic nuclear submarine has been launched; considering the life cycle of submarines in the naval strategic nuclear forces, this means they could disap- pear within 15 years. It is most important to finish the scientific research and test construction work needed to create strategic nuclear submarines of a new generation which will carry new ballistic missiles by the years 2000-2003, as well as to ensure that these strategic nuclear subma- rines are brought into service at the rate of 2-3 submarines every two years. X Absence of clarity regarding the quantitative framework within which it is planned to de- velop strategic nuclear forces. In 1994, START I was implemented. START Il was signed but is not yet ratified. With regard to the naval and aviation components of the strategic nuclear forces, the existence of uncertainty concerning the fate of the treaty does not affect seriously their future development. According to START II, the naval strategic nuclear forces can be armed with 1,750 warheads after 2003. Roughly the same quantity was to be allowed under START I. Aviation strategic nuclear forces, which historically have played a very insignificant role in the national nuclear triad, will have 93 heavy bombers with approximately 500 cruise missiles, including 19 Tu-95 heavy bombers and several dozen heavy bombers acquired in Ukraine by agreement. The production of additional heavy bombers is very costly and thus is hardly advisable.
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A more complex situation exists in units of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). According to START II, which requires the liquidation of ICBMs with MIRV warheads, the SRF by the year 2003 can rely on approximately 1,000 single-warhead ICBMs. At present, there are 350 mobile SS-25s with single warheads, which are to be replaced in the next few years, as their useful life expires, by "Topol-M" ICBMs. According to the agreement, Russia will have 105 MIRVed ICBMs, which are to be "unloaded" until only one warhead each remains, and 90 single SS- 18 ICBMs placed into refitted silos. To support the START H quota for the number of warheads, Russia will have to form more than 10 additional divisions of mobile ICBMs with approxi- mately 500 "Topol-M" ICBMs by the year 2003-in other words, practically double the num- ber of mobile, single-warhead ICBMs. Another possible option is to build new silos for new ICBMs. Even with priority financing, it is very difficult for the SRF to do this within such a lim- ited time frame.
In general, the START H treaty is'rather paradoxical. It calls for quick liquidation of more than 200 MIRVed Russian ICBMs, part of which could still be used for another 4-5 years. At the same time, in order to maintain quantitative parity with the U.S., several hundred single-war- head ICBMs should be deployed, and possibly placed into newly built silos, even as some of the old silos are to be destroyed under START H. Note that the United States plans to go from START I to START II in a different fashion. It will eliminate only 50 "MX" missiles, 4 "Ohio" strategic nuclear submarines, and 28 heavy bombers with cruise missiles. The main cuts are to be accomplished by "unloading" the missiles and storing the warheads in special storage facili- ties. At any moment, this stockpile, which the United States emphatically refuses to destroy, might be put back into operation on U.S. missiles. As a result, taking into account the potential for "quick loading" of these missiles, the U.S. will surpass Russia by 1,000- 1,500 warheads. Russia's refusal to follow START II will bring onto the agenda the issue of supporting MIRVed ICBMs. Analysis proves that this problem can be solved in principle. Different options are available. For instance, additional SS- l8s can be purchased from Ukraine. Also, purely Rus- sian MIRVed ICBMs can be designed; a 120-ton liquid fueled missile with 10 warheads could be created in 3-5 years after the appropriate decision. In the next 5-7 years, 300 such missiles can be placed into existing silos. Given these facts, in spite of widespread misconceptions, spending for this project could be quite moderate. At the stage of scientific research and test con- struction work, the amount would be several percent less per year than the amount allocated to "rebuild" Chechnya in 1996. At the development stage, given that the warheads would be avail- able, production and installation of 300 of such missiles would be three times cheaper than the cost of constructing in the same period 500 "Topol-M" ICBMs. in their mobile version or in new silos, as discussed above in relation to START 111. X Flaws in the command and control structure of the strategic nuclear forces. It is pro- posed, within the framework of measures for development of the strategic nuclear forces, to de- sign in an organized manner a single, self-contained operational command and control system for all groupings of strategic nuclear forces, including support systems, based on the adn-iinistra- tive structure developed in the Strategic Rocket Forces. Practical implementation of this pro- posal could be achieved within a year after the appropriate decision is made. The main reasons such a step is necessary are the increased demands for combat readiness in the strategic nuclear forces, economy of means, and elimination of parallel structures. It would be advisable to trans- fer the Military Space Forces to the Strategic Rocket Forces to bring under their functional con- trol the Missile Attack Warning System, the Space Control System, the Moscow ABM System, and corresponding testing sites. The naval and aviation strategic nuclear forces (functionally left in the Navy and Air Forces, respectively) also should be transferred to the single operational command and control of the strategic nuclear forces.
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At the present time, several hundred thousand servicemen, a third of them officers, are per- forming their military service in groupings of the strategic nuclear forces. In the Strategic Rocket Forces, for all practical purposes, combat crews of officers carry out in practice 100 per- cent of the direct functional duties connected with exploitation of the weapons. As for the draft- ees, they primarily carTy out functions as guards and perform auxiliary tasks in supporting combat readiness, technical support, etc. A similar situation, as a whole, characterizes the other components of the strategic nuclear forces and their support systems. It is proposed that the ratio between professionals and conscripts be maintained in the future as well. Since the U.S. and NATO possess conventional forces and armaments potentially sufficient to conduct military operations with limited goals on the periphery of post-Soviet territory, it is nec- essary to provide for deterrence of such actions by the probable enemy. Currently, functions for deterring aggression from the most probable directions are given: ow In the north (the naval bases on the Kola peninsula), to forces of the Leningrad Military Dis- trict (MD) and Northern Fleet (NF). vw In the northwest, (the Baltic region), to forces of the Leningrad MD, Kaliningrad special re- gion, and forces of the Baltic Fleet. ew In the south (the Caucasus-Caspian region), to forces of the North Caucasus Military dis- trict; subunits of the Russian Armed Forces on bases in Gyumri and Yerevan (Armenia), Tbilisi and Ahalkalaki (Georgia), Batumi (Adjaria), and Gudauta (Abkhazia); forces of the Caspian Flotilla; and the Black Sea fleet. Analysis shows that the existing deterTence potential of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in these directions might be insufficient to deter aggressive action by the probable enemy. Strengthening these forces by carrying out a long-term buildup in the number of troops and ar- maments in regions of probable conflict could be hard to achieve economically. In light of this, as a priority task facing the Armed Forces, it is proposed to create, within a year after a decision is made, Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces numbering about 10,000 servicemen. Opera- tional-Tactical Deterrent Forces could operate as a reserve of the Supreme High Command and, on a long-term basis, could assume the function of deterring the probable enemy from conduct- ing military operations with local goals. For this proposal to be implemented at the initial stage, it is suggested to supply the Opera- tional-Tactical Deterrent Forces with 10- 12 missile and aviation complexes equipped with con- ventional precision weapons from the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and Air Forces. These missile and aviation complexes, while remaining functionally a part of the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and Air Forces, and based deep within Russian territory during peacetime, would be subordinated operationally, through a Main Directorate of the General Staff specially created for these purposes, to the Supreme High Command of the Russian Armed Forces. Dur- ing a threatening period, Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces, by decision of the Supreme High Command, could be redeployed to the region of possible conflict and aimed on especially important targets deep in the probable enemy's territory. In the event plans for the eastern expansion of NATO are realized or new directions of possi- ble aggression appear (for instance, the Southern Kuril Island), it would be expedient to increase the number of the Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces' missile and aviation complexes to 30- 50 units. At the same time, units of missile artillery and aviation complexes could be armed with nuclear weapons. To demonstrate persuasively to a probable enemy the RF's determination to impede any NATO advancement into the territory of the former USSR, some Operational-Tacti- cal Deterrent Force units also could be moved up to the borders, particularly the Russian-Norwe- gian border; to Russian military bases in Armenia, Georgia, Adzharia, and Abkhazia; to the
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Kaliningrad special region; and into Belorussia, to which President A. G. Lukashenko has agreed in principle.
The Mobile Forces: Mainstay of the Russian Army It is advisable when waging local wars within the former USSR to give the main functions to spe- cial elite units: Mobile Forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which also must have prior- ity designation. Not intended for participation in extended military conflicts, these units could be used on a short-term basis in holding actions and to repel aggression from abroad against Russia and the CIS using conventional weapons. They also could be designated for peacekeeping opera- tions under the aegis of CIS, as well as the UN and other international organizations. It is advisable to form Mobile Forces, up to 90,000 strong, based on Airborne troops and using some units of naval infantry, over a year after a corresponding decision is made. Functionally, naval infantry would stay under Navy command and would be transferred to operational Mobile Forces command only for the conduct of special operations. For five years after forming these Mobile Forces, it is suggested that recruitment be exclusively on a contract basis. After the process of turning them into a professional force is complete, Mobile Forces should be fully staffed and given all kinds of heavy armaments and equipment. Moreover, the number of naval infantry should be increased with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, and Caspian Flotilla, which are located in potential conflict areas of the Caucasus and Baltic countries. Special attention should be paid to the creation of naval infantry in the Caspian region be- cause of the extremely high probability of conflict arising from the unresolved problem of the status of the Caspian shelf. It is important to equip Mobile Forces with military transport aviation (MTA), which will belong functionally to the Air Forces and be operationally subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces but required to carry out orders of the Mobile Forces. The need for MTA aircraft desig- nated to move personnel and military equipment, including heavy military equipment, is estimated at 100 aircraft. Most of the aircraft in MTA available today are not functioning. Therefore, about 30- 40 additional aircraft should be brought into service because of the extreme importance of the tasks performed by the Mobile Forces. A typical special operation involving Mobile Forces and aimed at liberating a large area of the for- mer USSR from nationalists should be based on the following principles. The commander of the op- eration is appointed and should receive a legally valid order. The date and time of the operation then are set. A rigid system of unified command is established so that operational command over all util- ized forces, regardless of departmental subordination and affiliation, is concentrated in the hands of a single person. In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Federal Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out strikes for the purpose of destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and eliminating the enemy's military and po- litical leadership. Then Mobile Forces, with the support of army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate enemy forces and take over their territory. After that, subunits of Ground Forces and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some combat experience, move in. They establish control of the most crucial locations and carry out "cleansing" of the territory. Then, with the help of militia formed out of the pro-Russian part of the local population, they establish control over the territory and ensure the elimination of nationalists and deportation of some categories of citizens from certain locations. It should be emphasized that until the end of the special operation, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military control over the territory.
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Winners and Losers
Military intelligence plays a most important role in achieving the main goals of the Armed Forces. Making the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) and its subunits and structures more effec- tive should be given the highest priority. To implement these proposals, half the personnel of the Armed Forces would have to go to the four most important components of the Armed Forces named above, which also should be given pri- ority in financing. Because the economic situation in the country is difficult, the other half of the Armed Forces would have to exist under tight financial limitations. The Navy is the most expensive of the Armed Forces. A differentiated approach is needed here. Naval strategic nuclear forces cannot be underfinanced. The situation is more complex with respect to providing for the combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces. The system exists and should be preserved, but this does not require building large ships. Aircraft carriers are an exception, since two carriers each are needed in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet to meet military goals. There are only two at present, and the country's economic situation does not allow for two more.
To provide for anti-submarine warfare in oceanic theaters of military operations (TVD), there are in service submarines and ships equipped with special arms. This equipment should be main- tained and ships and submarines currently under construction should be finished, but no new ones should be built for the time being. With respect to combating enemy aircraft carriers, there are no battle groups now in place. Our recommendation is to maintain the status quo and concentrate on retaining existing levels. With reference to landing support for naval infantry, the appropriate infrastructure was built 0 by the USSR. It is important not only to stop its destruction, but also to continue its develop- ment, since costs will not be high but will allow it to perform tasks of the Mobile Forces with great effectiveness. In protecting sea communications, special attention should be paid to protecting lines of com- munication with the Kaliningrad Special Region. At the same time, activities in the remote oce- anic regions should be limited. The existing system for the coastal defense of the Russian Federation should be supported and developed, since no big investments are needed here. Finally, it is necessary to abandon the tasks of combating transatlantic shipments of U.S. forces and combating the enemy's surface ships and submarines armed with cruise missiles. V There are two large groups in the Ground Forces today. One was deployed in the Far East Military District and Trans-Baikal Military District during the time of tense relations with China. In subsequent years, it was degraded less than other groups. Another large group was de- veloped for obvious reasons in the North Caucasus Military District. It is reasonable to continue to support these groups. For the North Caucasus Military District, this means confirn-dng the ex- ception of District units from the treaty on Conventional Forces Reductions in Europe at the May conference of participants. It is unacceptable that the issue of the North Caucasus Military District be linked with the proposal made by a number of countries that the numbers of Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Special Region be cut; in light of Poland's and the Baltic countries' plans to join NATO, the very fact that the issue of the Kaliningrad Special Region has come up seems both ambiguous and a provocation. A limited number of Ground Forces are located in the strategically important Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts. From the west, Moscow is covered by only two army divisions. As there is no danger of a large-scale invasion of Russia similar to the invasion of 1941, the development of forces to the west of Moscow should not be
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hurried. But in the event the Eastern European countries join NATO and the infrastructure for an invasion force appears, Russia will be forced to respond accordingly. One possible response might be to recreate the Belorussian Military District and deploy Ground Forces and frontal avia- tion of the Air Forces there. Also, since it currently is difficult for Russia to maintain parity with NATO in conventional weapons, the primary emphasis should be assigned to tactical nuclear deterrence of the threat of non-nuclear attack by NATO forces. This approach will require arming the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, and frontal aviation of the Air Forces with nuclear weapons and will be much less expensive than providing a non-nuclear deterrent force for a non-nuclear invasion. In gen- eral, the present weakness of Russia dictates reliance on nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons. Today, the only possible way to deter NATO is through nuclear deterrence. At the same time, should the relationship between Russia and China change, the same approach can be used in Central Asia and the Far East. An important problem in the Ground Forces is revision of the list of units in military districts and the discovery of units which can be cut. It is advisable to limit the number of divisions to 30- 35, of which 15-20 could be manned with conscripts and work on combat readiness while the other 15, evenly spread around the country, would be cadre and would serve as a base in prepar- ing the mobilization reserve. At the same time, preparation of the mobilization reserve should be conducted within the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Border Guards. V In units of the Air Forces, special attention should be concentrated on maintaining mili- tary transport, frontal aviation, and aviation of the strategic nuclear forces, which could be used by the Operational-Tactical Deterrent Forces and Mobile Forces, at the required level. A major task is preserving qualifications of flying personnel. The Air Defense of military districts should be given to the Air Forces from the Troops of Air Defense, disbanding the latter units but retaining their combat readiness requirements. The missile attack warning system, space control system, and Moscow ABM System, as well as their corresponding testing grounds, would be transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Air Defense system that is maintaining CIS perimeter defense also would be transferred to the Air Force. Another possible solution is to give it to the Federal Border Guard Service. This would be logical, because they are not now able to defend against a massive air attack from the probable enemy. The circle of tasks resolved by them, in fact, is limited to early warning of an unsanctioned intrusion of CIS airspace and interception of individual targets. This is more a function of the Border Guard, not the Armed Forces. Moreover, the Federal Border Guard Service looks after the ground and ma- rine border. It would be logical to close the loop by giving them the air component as well.
Legislative Priorities It is proposed that in the immediate future, it is necessary to prepare and confirm in the Federal Assembly (parliament) a national security doctrine and a military doctrine for the Russian Federa- tion. Based on these doctrines, a five-year plan of reform for the Armed Forces of the Russian Fed- eration should be developed and adopted. This current document can be used both to prepare the national security and military doctrines and to prepare the plan of reform for the Armed Forces. Moscow, February 1996
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