October 17, 2009

Data Quality in Risk Management and Basel II


An Informatica White Paper

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October 16, 2009

Final Text of the Kerry Lugar Bill

S. 1707
One Hundred Eleventh Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine

An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to promote an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.’
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of principles.

TITLE I—DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
Sec. 101. Authorization of assistance.
Sec. 102. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 103. Auditing.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
Sec. 201. Purposes of assistance.
Sec. 202. Authorization of assistance.
Sec. 203. Limitations on certain assistance.
Sec. 204. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.
Sec. 205. Requirements for civilian control of certain assistance.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER
PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Strategy Reports.
Sec. 302. Monitoring Reports.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations
and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) COUNTERINSURGENCY.—The term ‘counterinsurgency’ means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.
(3) COUNTERTERRORISM.—The term ‘counterterrorism’ means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist
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organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC. 1189), or other individuals and entities
engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.
(4) FATA.—The term ‘FATA’ means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
(5) FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION.—The term ‘Frontier Crimes Regulation’ means the Frontier Crimes Regulation, codified under British law in 1901, and applicable to the FATA.
(6) IMPACT EVALUATION RESEARCH.—The term ‘impact evaluation research’ means the application of research methods and statistical analysis to measure the extent to which change in a population-based outcome can be attributed to program intervention instead of other environmental factors.
(7) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—The term ‘major defense equipment’ has the meaning given the term in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2794(6)).
(8) NWFP.—The term ‘NWFP’ means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.
(9) OPERATIONS RESEARCH.—The term ‘operations research’ means the application of social science research methods, statistical analysis, and other appropriate scientific methods to judge, compare, and improve policies and program outcomes, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programs through their development and implementation, with the objective of the rapid dissemination of conclusions and concrete impact on programming.
(10) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN.—The term ‘security forces of Pakistan’ means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.
(11) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘security related assistance’—
(A) means—
(i) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763); and (ii) assistance under chapter two of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2311 et. seq); but
(B) does not include—
(i) assistance authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available under any provision of law that is funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense); and (ii) amounts appropriated or otherwise available to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32).

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.
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(2) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments.
(3) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian rule, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over military rule and Pakistan’s own democratic reform and political development.
(4) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.
(5) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past seven years.
(6) Despite killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists—including major al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi—the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries.
(7) The security forces of Pakistan have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency, recently taking direct action against those who threaten Pakistan’s security and stability, including military operations in the FATA and the NWFP.
(8) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, ‘Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safehaven in Pakistan..’
(9) According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO–08–622), ‘since 2003, the [A]dministration’s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power— diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA’ and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; 22 USC. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53; 22 USC. 2375 note).
(10) During 2008 and 2009, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with 2⁄3 of the population living on less than $2 a day and 1⁄5 of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.
(11) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with more than 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of two per cent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.
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(12) The 2009 Pakistani military offensive in the NWFP and the FATA displaced millions of residents in one of the gravest humanitarian crises Pakistan has faced, and despite the heroic efforts of Pakistanis to respond to the needs of the displaced millions and facilitate the return of many, it has highlighted the need for Pakistan to develop an effective national counterinsurgency strategy.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.

Congress declares that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan should be based on the following principles:

(1) Pakistan is a critical friend and ally to the United States, both in times of strife and in times of peace, andthe two countries share many common goals, including combating terrorism and violent radicalism, solidifying democracy and rule of law in Pakistan, and promoting the social and economic development of Pakistan.
(2) United States assistance to Pakistan is intended to supplement, not supplant, Pakistan’s own efforts in building a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan.
(3) The United States requires a balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy for Pakistan that provides assistance throughout the country and does not disproportionately focus on security-related assistance or one particular area or province.
(4) The United States supports Pakistan’s struggle against extremist elements and recognizes the profound sacrifice made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, including the loss of more than 1,900 soldiers and police since 2001 in combat with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups.
(5) The United States intends to work with the Government of Pakistan—
(A) to build mutual trust and confidence by actively and consistently pursuing a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship between the two countries, devoted to strengthening the mutual security, stability, and prosperity of both countries;
(B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic government in their efforts to consolidate democracy, including strengthening Pakistan’s parliament, helping Pakistan reestablish an independent and transparent judicial system, and working to extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan;
(C) to promote sustainable long-term development and infrastructure projects, including in healthcare, education, water management, and energy programs, in all areas of Pakistan, that are sustained and supported by each successive democratic government in Pakistan;
(D) to ensure that all the people of Pakistan, including those living in areas governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, have access to public, modernized education and vocational training to enable them to provide for themselves, for their families, and for a more prosperous future for their children;
(E) to support the strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan, including madrassas, in order to improve the prospects for Pakistani children’s futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance;
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(F) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan, including support for institutions of higher learning with international accreditation;
(G) to expand people-to-people engagement between the two countries, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;
(H) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure program effectiveness and progress on an integrated basis, especially across the areas of United States assistance and payments to Pakistan, and increase accountability for how such assistance and payments are being spent;
(I) to assist Pakistan’s efforts to improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering regulatory structure in order to achieve international standards and encourage Pakistan to apply for ‘Financial Action Task Force’ observer status and adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
(J) to strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy to help prevent any territory of Pakistan from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan or elsewhere;
(K) to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement and national defense forces under civilian leadership;
(L) to achieve full cooperation in matters of counter proliferation of nuclear materials and related networks;
(M) to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to gain control of its under-governed areas and address the threat posed by any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other terrorist activities in Pakistan or its neighboring countries; and
(N) to explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.

TITLE I—DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to provide assistance to Pakistan—
(1) to support the consolidation of democratic institutions;
(2) to support the expansion of rule of law, build the capacity of government institutions, and promote respect for internationally-recognized human rights;
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(3) to promote economic freedoms and sustainable economic development;
(4) to support investment in people, including those displaced in on-going counterinsurgency operations; and
(5) to strengthen public diplomacy.
(b) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (a) include the following:
(1) To support democratic institutions in Pakistan in order to strengthen civilian rule and long-term stability, including assistance such as—
(A) support for efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s institutions, including the capacity of the National Parliament of Pakistan, such as enhancing the capacity of committees to oversee government activities, including national security issues, enhancing the ability of members of parliament to respond to constituents, and supporting of parliamentary leadership;
(B) support for voter education and civil society training as well as appropriate support for political party capacity building and responsiveness to the needs of all the people of Pakistan; and
(C) support for strengthening the capacity of the civilian Government of Pakistan to carry out its responsibilities at the national, provincial, and local levels.
(2) To support Pakistan’s efforts to expand rule of law, build the capacity, transparency, and trust in government institutions, and promote internationally recognized human rights, including ssistance such as—
(A) supporting the establishment of frameworks that promote government transparency and criminalize corruption in both the government and private sector;
(B) support for police professionalization, including training regarding use of force, human rights, and community policing;
(C) support for independent, efficient, and effective judicial and criminal justice systems, such as case management, training, and efforts to enhance the rule of law to all areas in Pakistan;
(D) support for the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;
(E) support to counter the narcotics trade;
(F) support for internationally recognized human rights, including strengthening civil society and nongovernmental organizations working in the area of internationally recognized human rights, as well as organizations that focus on protection of women and girls, promotion of freedom of religion and religious tolerance, and protection of ethnic or religious minorities; and
(G) support for promotion of a responsible, capable, and independent media.
(3) To support economic freedom and economic development in Pakistan, including—
(A) programs that support sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources through investments in water resource management systems;
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(B) expansion of agricultural and rural development, such as farm-to-market roads, systems to prevent spoilage and waste, and other small-scale infrastructure improvements;
(C) investments in energy, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;
(D) employment generation, including increasing investment in infrastructure projects, including construction of roads and the continued development of a national aviation industry and aviation infrastructure, as well as support for small and medium enterprises;
(E) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;
(F) access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation, particularly for women; and
(G) countering radicalization by providing economic, social, educational, and vocational opportunities and lifeskills training to at-risk youth.
(4) To support investments in people, particularly women and children, including—
(A) promoting modern, public primary and secondary education and vocational and technical training, including programs to assist in the development of modern, nationwide school curriculums for public, private, and religious schools; support for the proper oversight of all educational institutions, including religious schools, as required by Pakistani law; initiatives to enhance access to education and vocational and technical training for women and girls and to increase women’s literacy, with a special emphasis on helping girls stay in school; and construction and maintenance of libraries and public schools;
(B) programs relating to higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates, including through public-private partnerships;
(C) improving quality public health to eliminate diseases such as hepatitis and to reduce maternal and under five mortality rates;
(D) building capacity for nongovernmental and civil society organizations, particularly organizations with demonstrated experience in delivering services to the people of Pakistan, particularly to women, children, and other vulnerable populations; and
(E) support for refugees and internally displaced persons and long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.
(5) To strengthen public diplomacy to combat militant extremism and promote a better understanding of the United States, including—
(A) encouraging civil society, respected scholars, and other leaders to speak out against militancy and violence;
and
(B) expanded exchange activities under the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program, the Youth Exchange and Study Program, and related programs administered by the Department of State designed to promote mutual understanding and interfaith dialogue and expand sister institution programs between United States and Pakistani schools and universities.
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(c) ADDITIONAL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.—

(1) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR PAKISTANI POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING.—Not less than $150,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2010 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 should be made available for assistance to Pakistan under this section for police professionalization, equipping, and training.
(2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—Up to $10,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations
under section 102 may be made available for administrative expenses of civilian departments and agencies of the United States Government in connection with the provision of assistance under this section. Such amounts shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.
(3) UTILIZING PAKISTANI ORGANIZATIONS.—The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contracts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.
(4) USE OF DIRECT EXPENDITURES.—Amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 or otherwise made available to carry out this section shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible as direct expenditures for projects and programs, subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.
(5) CHIEF OF MISSION FUND.—Of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102, up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary of State to establish a fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2151 et seq.) to address urgent needs or opportunities, consistent with the purposes of this section, or for purposes of humanitarian relief. The fund established pursuant to this paragraph may be referred to as the ‘Chief of Mission Fund.’
(6) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the United States should provide robust assistance to the people of Pakistan who have been displaced as a result of ongoing conflict and violence in Pakistan and support international efforts to coordinate assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons in Pakistan, including by providing support to international and nongovernmental organizations for this purpose;
(B) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should support the development objectives of the Refugee Affected and Host Areas (RAHA) Initiative in Pakistan to address livelihoods, health, education, infrastructure development, and environmental restoration in identified parts of the country where Afghan refugees have lived; and
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(C) the United States should have a coordinated, strategic communications strategy to engage the people of Pakistan and to help ensure the success of the measures authorized by this title.
(d) NOTIFICATION.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before obligating any assistance under this section as budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or any element of the Government of Pakistan and shall include in such notification a description of the purpose and conditions attached to any such budgetary support.

SEC. 102. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under this title and to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2151 et seq.), up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)—
(A) none of the amounts appropriated for assistance to Pakistan may be made available after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to section 301(a); and
(B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan unless the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during such fiscal year—
(i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to date has made or is making reasonable progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; and (ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).
(2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION.—In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification
and memorandum described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.
(c) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.
(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDS.— It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2015 through 2019 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
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SEC. 103. AUDITING.

(a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Inspector General of the Department of State, the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, and the inspectors general of other Federal departments and agencies (other than the Inspector General of the Department of Defense) carrying out programs, projects, and activities using amounts appropriated to carry out this title shall audit, investigate, and oversee the obligation and expenditure of such amounts.
(b) AUTHORIZATION FOR IN-COUNTRY PRESENCE.—The Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, are authorized to establish field offices in Pakistan with sufficient staff from each of the Offices of the Inspector General, respectively, to carry out subsection (a).
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 102 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014, up to $30,000,000 for each fiscal year is authorized to be made available to carry out this section.
(2) RELATION TO OTHER AVAILABLE FUNDS.—Amounts made available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

SEC. 201. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.

The purposes of assistance under this title are—
(1) to support Pakistan’s paramount national security need to fight and win the ongoing counterinsurgency within its borders in accordance with its national security interests;
(2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to improve Pakistan’s border security and control and help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere;
(3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate action against extremist and terrorist targets; and
(4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.

(a) INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for assistance under chapter five of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2347 et seq.; relating to international military education and training) for Pakistan, including expanded international military education and training (commonly known as ‘E–IMET’).
(2) USE OF FUNDS.—It is the sense of Congress that a substantial amount of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used to pay for courses of study and training in counterinsurgency and civil-military relations.
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(b) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program) for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for Pakistan.
(2) USE OF FUNDS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—A significant portion of the amount made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year shall be for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for activities relating to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Pakistan.
(B) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that a significant majority of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used for the purpose described in subparagraph (A).
(3) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—Except as provided in sections three and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, the second section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by Public Law 110–161), and any provision of an Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs that restricts assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree, and except as otherwise provided in this title, amounts authorized to be made available to carry out paragraph (2) for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are authorized to be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law.
(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘defense articles,’ ‘defense services,’ and ‘military education and training’ have the meaning given such terms in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC. 2403).
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should facilitate Pakistan’s establishment of a program to provide reconstruction assistance, including through Pakistan’s military as appropriate, in areas damaged by combat operations.
(d) EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF PAKISTAN AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish an exchange program between—
(A) military and civilian personnel of Pakistan; and
(B)(i) military and civilian personnel of countries determined by the Secretary of State to be in the process of consolidating and strengthening a democratic form of government; or (ii) military and civilian personnel of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries, in order to foster greater mutual respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian rule of the military.
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(2) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM.—The program authorized under paragraph (1) may include conferences, seminars, exchanges, and other events, distribution of publications and reimbursements of expenses of foreign military personnel participating in the program, including transportation, translation and administrative expenses.
(3) ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section for a fiscal year are authorized to be made available for nongovernmental organizations to facilitate the implementation of the program authorized under paragraph (1).
(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to carry out the program established by this subsection.

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) LIMITATION ON SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.
(b) LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS.—For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection
(c) for such fiscal year.
(c) CERTIFICATION.—The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that—
(1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as—
(A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries;
(B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling
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terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and
(C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and
(3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
(d) CERTAIN PAYMENTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to—
(A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006;
(B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and
(C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK–D–SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.
(2) EXCEPTION.—Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).
(e) WAIVER.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.
(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER.—The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010.—
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(1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘Fund,’ shall consist of the following:
(A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).
(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.
(2) PURPOSES OF FUND.—Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorized to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.
(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to transfer amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defense’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.
(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS.—Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defense’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.—The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.
(D) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.
(b) SUBMISSION OF NOTIFICATIONS.—Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
S. 1707—15

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN
ASSISTANCE.

(a) REQUIREMENTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.
(2) DOCUMENTATION.—For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.
(b) WAIVER.—
(1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(c) APPLICATION TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.—Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to—
(1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC. 413 et seq.);
(2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes;
(3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office;
(4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended;
(5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and
(6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4578).

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(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—
(1) the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations
of the Senate; and
(2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.
(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.
(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.
(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.
(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual ‘Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’:
(A) Civil liberties.
(B) Political rights.
(C) Voice and accountability.
(D) Government effectiveness.
(E) Rule of law.
(F) Control of corruption.
(G) Immunization rates.
(H) Public expenditure on health.
(I) Girls’ primary education completion rate.
(J) Public expenditure on primary education.
(K) Natural resource management.
(L) Business start-up.
(M) Land rights and access.
(N) Trade policy.
(O) Regulatory quality.
(P) Inflation control.
(Q) Fiscal policy.
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(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.
(b) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL STRATEGY REPORT.—
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.—The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.
(3) REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).
(B) CONTENTS.— The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.
(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
(i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(c) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.
S. 1707—18

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) SEMI-ANNUAL MONITORING REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—
(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available;
(2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification;
(3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act;
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program;
(5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds;
(6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any;
(7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act;
(8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103;
(9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000;
S. 1707—19
(10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6);
(11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to—
(A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas;
(B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan;
(C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkare- Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed;
(D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups;
(E) prevent attacks into neighboring countries;
(F) increase oversight over curriculum in madrassas, including closing madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and
(G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism;
(12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;
(13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program;
(14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and
(15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.
(b) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS.—
(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT.— Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains—
(A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report;
(B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act;
(C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section
S. 1707—20
23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program); and
(D) an assessment of the impact of the assistance on the security and stability of Pakistan.
(2) CERTIFICATION REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 203(c) for a fiscal year, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an independent analysis of the certification described in such section and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of the independent analysis.
(c) SUBMISSION.—The Secretary of State may submit the reports required by this section in conjunction with other reports relating to Pakistan required under other provisions of law, including sections 1116 and 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111–32; 123 Stat. 1906 and 1907).
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.

Why Pakistan's military hates America's new aid package.

Turf Wars
Why Pakistan's military hates America's new aid package.
BY AYESHA SIDDIQA | OCTOBER 14, 2009



To the surprise of many Americans, Pakistan does not seem too excited at the prospect of receiving U.S. aid. The conditions in the Kerry-Lugar bill, which would provide Pakistan with $7.5 billion in economic aid over the next five years, have been derided by Pakistani opposition parties as "humiliating." The Pakistani daily Dawn even reported that Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, will be replaced due to his role in negotiating the bill. The armed forces are also not too pleased with the assistance package. Last week, the military high command urged the civilian government to review the aid package and the conditions that Islamabad must meet to qualify for receiving financial assistance. The generals would like the government of President Asif Ali Zardari to renegotiate the deal with Washington. If they do not, many in Pakistan think relations between the civilian government and the military might get tense.

The military's discomfort relates to the conditions in the bill that appear to infringe on aspects of government where it has traditionally held sway. Apparently, Pakistan will have to ensure that it provides information on and possible access to people like A.Q. Khan, the infamous nuclear scientist accused of helping countries such as Libya develop their nuclear weapons programs. It will have to show evidence of eliminating all terrorist networks, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which are traditionally considered as part of the war in Kashmir rather than the war in Afghanistan. Finally, Islamabad will have to satisfy Washington regarding civilian control of the military. These conditions are bound to make the military uncomfortable because they are seen as affecting issues in the military's exclusive domain.




The Kerry-Lugar bill contains conditions pertaining to civilian control over senior-level promotions in the armed forces and control of the military budget, which clearly aim at defanging the military of its ability to keep its affairs away from the eyes of civilian leaders. Many from the larger security community argue that such conditions are intrusive and tantamount to U.S. involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs. The generals would certainly be uncomfortable with a situation in which relations between Pakistan and the United States developed into a private affair between Washington and Pakistan's civilian rulers. After all, the only possible mechanism to meet the aforementioned conditionality regarding civilian control will depend on information being provided by Pakistan's civilian government to the U.S. administration.

The discomfort becomes intense also because the military and some segments of civil society are not comfortable with stronger civilian control of the military at a time when the credibility of the top political leadership appears questionable. Some people fear that Zardari, popularly known at home as Mr. Ten Percent because of his alleged penchant for corruption, would use his power to turn the country into his fiefdom. A Pew Research Center poll released in August found that only 32 percent of Pakistanis held a favorable view of Zardari. For the military, the other candidates for political leadership are also no different.

But this is not the only bone of contention. The generals could also be unhappy about the restrictions placed on their ability to manipulate nonstate actors, especially those militant groups that are used against India. Their possible gripe is that the bill represents a reversal of a previous silent understanding, whereby Pakistan aided the United States in rounding up al Qaeda leaders in return for being allowed to handle the Taliban and certain other militant groups on their own. The references to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad indicate an improvement of India-U.S. relations at the expense of the Pakistan-U.S. alliance. Islamabad fears that Washington has allowed India free reign in Afghanistan, which the latter is using to its advantage against Pakistan. There is also a widespread belief that many Taliban, especially those creating terror in Pakistan, are aided by Indian intelligence.

Islamabad has little experience with tough conditions attached to foreign assistance. The last time there was disagreement on this issue between the United States and Pakistan surrounded the Pressler Amendment, which required annual certification that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon in order to receive foreign assistance from the United States. In October 1990, President George H.W. Bush's failure to issue this certification led to a U.S. arms embargo of Pakistan.
The Kerry-Lugar bill has come at a time when relations between the two countries have reached a low point. Especially among Pakistan's military and its allies in civil society, there is already a lot of displeasure over heightened U.S. covert activities in the country. Several incidents have taken place in which U.S. Marines or embassy personnel were allegedly involved in threatening ordinary citizens. In early October, two Dutch citizens who identified themselves as embassy staff were intercepted by the police and weapons were recovered from their car. A U.S. Embassy employee who was in a car trailing the Dutch diplomats subsequently came to their aid. Reportedly, the Central Intelligence Agency has warned the civilian government of heightened covert activities by the United States in Pakistan. To the general public, this appears to be a U.S. bid to treat Pakistan like a banana republic.
In a nutshell, the Kerry-Lugar bill appears to many Pakistanis as a conspiracy between an undependable civilian leader and the United States to minimize the military power of the only Muslim nuclear state. There is an opinion in Pakistan that the "peanuts" offered for Pakistan's services should be turned down in exchange for greater diplomatic freedom. While no one in Pakistan has a road map for how to replace U.S. aid, the disagreement might convince Washington to step more cautiously, and certainly not on the Pakistani military's toes.

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John Moore/Getty Images

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political analyst and writer. She is author of Military Inc.: Inside

Can free broadband be a reality in India?

Thu, Oct 15 02:42 PM
Yahoo India! News

The internet has become an integral part of human life and further validation of this assertion comes from the fact that Finland has become the first country in the world to make broadband Internet access a right for every Finnish citizen.

Yes, Finland has just passed a law that makes access to broadband a legal right for its citizens. Come July 2010, every person in Finland, which has a population of around 5.3 million, will have the guaranteed right to a one-megabit broadband connection.

This law could pave the way for India to start looking at broadband connection or even basic internet connection as its citizens' legal right, just like freedom of speech and expression.

India is emerging as a hub for information technology and global companies invariably looks toward India to meet their research and development needs and software production demands. So should India go ahead and make this a legal right for its citizens?

"While the internet savvy user of India will hail this move, let's not forget that Finland's total population is 5.5 million, which is 5 per cent of ours. Our primary concern right now should not be broadband access being a legal right, but childhood (and education) being the legal right of every child in the country and tougher laws on child labour. Can we please emulate Babar Ali, the world's youngest headmaster, and ensure that children have a right to be children before they're made to be earning members of the family?" says Jayashree S, a child rights activist.

Yes, it sounds true as it would be very unfair to compare India to Finland, given the gross discrepancies.

But not all think of it in the same way. Nancy, an avid netizen, says, "Internet is a way of life in India now. It is not just the youngsters who are hooked - people from all walks of life have started using the net to their benefit and are paying high prices for the same. It would be good if the rates are lesser, and yes, if it's free in Finland, even if it's 1mbps, why not here too?"

A vast majority in India feels that making a broadband connection a legal right is too farfetched a dream. "Broadband connection should not be a legal right as we have more important issues to deal with. We are lagging in providing even the basic amenities like water or electricity, thinking of legalising broadband is still very far," says Tarun, who works with a leading media house.

It might be too early to start a debate on whether broadband internet can be a natural extension to our legal rights in India. But kudos to the Finnish government for this landmark law. Who knows, this might just be the beginning of a new fight for our rights.

UNDERSTANDING CHINA

Prakash Nanda


It has now become quite routine for China to, through its officials in international meets, armed forces near the line of actual control spokespersons and state-controlled media, say and do everything possible to humiliate India. It has just criticised the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh and that too on the very day when as high as 72 percent of people in the state voted in the assembly elections and reaffirmed their identities as proud Indians. All this is besides the facts of engaging in activities in the so-called “string of pearls”, countries surrounding India (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan) that have ominous implications for India.


And yet, one finds in India powerful voices symapthising and justifying the Chinese behaviour. These sympathizers include not only leading communist leaders and powerful media barons but also a former foreign minister such as Natwar Singh. The latter gladdened the hearts of the Chinese the other day by asserting that “India’s claim to Tawang in Arunachal was not a very old one” and that “ in the map of India even in 1953 Tawang was not shown.” Singh, who was dismissed as the foreign minister in the previous UPA regime, then challenged the Prime Minister to visit Tawang: “ If you are convinced it is part of India, why don’t you go?”.


These pro-China elements in India may not be exactly fifth columnists, but one thing is clear. All of them literally hate the United States. They are sure that China is the only country that can challenge the United States and end the so-called unipolar world or American hegemony. They, in the process, underplay the fact that in the name of multipolar world, China is striving for a unipolar Asia, where, true to its theory of middle kingdom, China will not allow another pole, whether it is India or Japan, to make the world truly multipolar. Historically speaking, that has been the Chinese tradition. China throughout ages has done everything possible to halt the growth of Indian influence and dent India’s eminence.


Southeast Asia as a region has always been the battleground for influence by India and China. Many French and Indian scholars once referred to the region as “Farther India” or “Greater India”, L’Inde Exterieure and the Hinduized or “Indianized states”. On the contrary, many Chinese writings identified the region as Kun Lun or Nanyang or “Little China”. It is because of this that many even refer the landmass between India and China as “Indo-China”, which now includes Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In fact, according to a map produced in Chinese text books in 1954, China’s traditional sphere of influence went beyond Southeast Asia to include Mongolia, parts of Central Asia, the entire Himalayan regime including northern Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Illustrating the country’s lost “tributary system”(Chinese mainland the imperial centre and other countries its subordinates paying regular tributes), this map was
intended to create a popular support for Beijing’s efforts to wipe out the “humiliation” of the “territorial losses” in the past at the hands of the Western and Japanese “imperialists”.



Historian K.M. Panikkar described the expansion of Indian culture and influence both in Central Asia and Southeast towards the countries and islands of the Pacific as one of the momentous factors of the period immediately preceding the Christian era. In fact, other historians often describe the concept of “ Farther India”, a geographic area consisting of the present-day Southeast Asia, save, perhaps, the Philippines, because of the fact that this whole region developed under the India’s “cultural influence”[the “Hindu kingdoms” of Sri Vijaya (parts of Malaysia and Indonesia), Funan (Vietnam), Kambuja (Cambodia) and Champa (Thailand)]. No wonder why French historian Coedes was emphatic that but for India this whole region would not have been “civilized”. As he said, “Without India, its past would be almost unknown; we would know scarcely more about it than we know about Australia”.


The “Indianised” Mekong valley, Malay Peninsula and Indonesia in general, and Kambuja and Champa in particular, played a very important role in stemming the growing Chinese influence. Both Kambuja and Champa have exceptional claims to the gratitude of Indian people. If the ever-expanding empire of China did not extend its authority to Singapore and if the Indian Ocean remains today what its name indicates, it is due to the resistance, which Kambuja and Champa put up against the constant pressure of China. Between them they still mark the boundary of Chinese culture and expansion. However, the fact still remains that after the Mongols took over China in the 13th century, they consistently tried to establish hegemony over the countries of the southern seas. Their main tactics in this endeavour was to first split up the old Indian states of Farther India into smaller principalities and then make them constantly fight against each other so as to compel
some of them to become the Chinese protectorates under the Chinese governors.


In fact, this policy of divide and alienate India was repeated in 1950s by Communist China, even though the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in his zeal for “Asian unity”, went out of way to espouse the cause of China’s entry in to the United Nations and then bring the then virtually ostracized Communist China’s Prime Minister Zhou En-lai to the first ever forum of Asian and African leaders at Bandung in 1955. It was at Bandung that emerging trends of tussle for Asian leadership between the independent India and communist China became clearly discernible. Since then Beijing’s policy “anything that diminishes Indian leadership tends to strengthen the Chinese magnetism” has been scrupulously maintained. In fact, Bandung and then the Sino-Indian war in 1962 have been the two most momentous events in eclipsing the Indian influence in Asia

A 1974 poem by Mao Zedong displays the scorn with which China viewed India. The poem is like this:
The tiger avers its head,
The tattered lion grieves,
The bear flaunts its claws,
Riding the back of the cow,
The moon torments the sun,
The pagoda gives forth light,
Disaster comes to birth,
The olive is seen waving.

As John W Garver explains, what Mao meant by this poem was that the tiger was the United states, the lion the Great Britain, the bear the Soviet Union, the moon the Islamic countries of West Asia, the sun the rich countries of the West, the pagoda the Vietnamese revolutionary struggle, and its light the prospect of imminent victory. A pagoda giving forth light is a common Chinese literary smile indicating good fortune. The phrase disaster comes to birth referred to Mao’s dictum that either revolution would prevent war or war would lead to revolution, while the olive branch referred to the people’s desire for peace. The cow was India, which, according to Mao, has no talents and is only food or for people to ride and for pulling carts. The cow could starve to death if its master did not give it grass to eat. And even though this cow may have great ambitions, they are futile.


If anything, these illustrative, not exhaustive, examples expose the limitations of the “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” syndrome.

the author can be contacted at prakash.nanda@hotmail.com

INDIA-CHINA: NEED FOR FRESH THINKING

B.RAMAN

There are welcome indicators of some fresh-thinking in New Delhi on India's relations with China. This fresh-thinking has been reflected in the decision of the Goverment of India to bring on record its unhappiness and concern over the Chinese involvement in the construction or upgradation of some infrastructure projects in the disputed territory of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including the Northern Areas of Jammu & Kashmir (Gilgit & Baltistan). The Chinese, who had earlier helped Pakistan in the construction of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan's Punjab with the Xinjiang province of China through Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan, are now helping it in its upgradation. They have also agreed to help Pakistan in the construction of a hydel project in the Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan.A feasibility study has been undertaken by Pakistan for the construction of a railway line, with Chinese assistance, to connect the Chinese-constructed port of Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Balochistan with Xinjiang through Pakistan-occupied Kashmiri territory.

2. The Chinese action in helping Pakistan in integrating with Pakistan, territory which does not legally belong to Pakistan, amounts to an unfriendly act to India and is detrimental to India's territorial integrity. India was within its rights to have protested and expressed its unhappiness over the Chinese actions, which are contrary to its professions of friendship and goodwill for India. Our past hesitation to bring on record our protests over such Chinese actions has encouraged the Chinese into thinking that they could do anything vis-a-vis India, without provoking any protest from New Delhi. Our protests may not make the Chinese stop their participation in these projects, but it has to be made clear to Beijing that such Chinese actions in disregard of Indian sensitivities could come in the way of further development of the bilateral relations. Beijing should be made to realise that it cannot be business as usual between the two countries if it continues to disregard Indian interests and sensitivities.

3. Another welcome indicator of re-thinking relates to Chinese construction companies, which have won contracts in India and which have been bringing a large number of Chinese workers---skilled and unskilled--- to work in their projects in India without employing Indian workers and engineers. This is a practice which Chinese companies have been following in African countries where there is a severe shortage of manpower, but there is no such shortage in India. It has been reported that the Government of India has taken a decision or is about to take a decision not to issue work visas to unskilled Chinese workers. Even in respect of skilled workers, the issue of work visas should be more an exception than the rule. Work visas should be issued only in those cases where the Chinese companies can demonstrate that recruits in certain skills are not available in India. There are hundreds of Western, Japanese, South Korean and South-East Asian companies which win contracts in India. They don't bring their own labour from their countries. They employ local labour. If the Chinese executives are not able to manage with Indian labour because of their inability to communicate with the Indians in English, they should not bid for contracts in India.

4. There is also a need for a fresh look into our past decisions to allow Chinese companies in sensitive fields such as telecommunications to operate in India as collaborators of Indian companies for expanding our telecommunications network. In view of the increasingly hostile attitude being taken by the Government and party-controlled media in China towards India, the time has come to re-consider these decisions. It would be unwise to allow a Chinese presence in sensitive fields such as telecommunications at a time when Chinese media such as the "Global Times" (October 14), which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, has started threatening India with "dangerous consequences" if it does not concede the Chinese point of view on Arunachal Pradesh. India should not accept threatening language from China---whether it be from the Government or from the Government and party-controlled media.

5.The Government of India should also re-consider its attitude towards His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He and thousands of his Tibetan followers have been our honoured guests for fifty years. We respect him as a Buddhist leader. Their welfare is our responsibility. Till now, in deference to Chinese sensitivities, successive Prime Ministers have been avoiding meeting His Holiness even on occasions such as the Indian festival of Diwali. We do not give him an opportunity to meet Indian leaders to discuss the problems and welfare of the Tibetan refugees. A couple of years ago,a function was held in New Delhi to facilitate His Holiness on the award to him of the US Congressional Medal of Honour. At that time, in an unwise and unwarranted move, the then Cabinet Secretary of the Government of India was reported to have advised the Cabinet members to keep away from the function. This policy has to change. The Prime Minister should meet His Holiness from time to time in New Delhi as well as Dharamsala to discuss about the welfare of the Tibetan refugees.

6.Sino-Indian relations have steadily improved since the visit of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiao-ping. Credit should go to Deng for laying the foundation for this improvement despite the pending border dispute. This improvement continued under President Jiang Zemin. India reciprocated the Chinese desire for better bilateral relations in spite of its unhappiness and concern over the Chinese actions in giving military nuclear and missile capabilities to Pakistan, which wanted them for possible use against India.

7. Ever since Hu Jintao, who won his spurs as a political leader in Tibet, assumed charge as the President the policies of Deng and Jiang have been slowly sought to be reversed---- under pressure from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the hawkish elements in the party. The recent anti-India editorials in the party-controlled " Global Times" and " People's Daily" on October 14 are indicators of anti- India and pro-Pakistan hawks in the party once again influencing the Chinese policy towards India and seeking to reverse the progress made under Deng and Jiang. We have to take note of this and re-fashion our policies accordingly.

8.India and China cannot afford a military conflict or confrontation or even sporadic trans-border incidents. It will damage their aspirations of a better life for their people and a more important role for their countries in the international stage.Misperceptions and misunderstandings over the border issue need to be handled delicately and sought to be removed by continuing the policy of engagement at the official and political levels. A war of words and hysteria and a tendency to demonise each other should be avoided. The gains made so far should be preserved. At the same time, we should not hesitate to articulate our core interests and adhere to them firmly even while trying to strengthen the bilateral relations. ( 17-10-09)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

October 14, 2009

President Obama, an appraisal: Cold on India though Indians remain warm

By OP Gupta IFS (Retd)

http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=313&page=7


So far as India is concerned Obama has continued to behave as a non-proliferation Ayatollah neglecting outstanding self-imposed restraints and non-proliferation roles of all Indian Governments.

The unemployment rate in US is running high and is expected to keep rising to 10 per cent by 2010. This coupled with continued returning of body bags from Iraq and Afghanistan has adversely affected popularity of Obama in opinion polls.



In article ‘Obama makes a welcome History’ in the Organiser of November 16, 2008 this writer had opined that Democratic US Presidents had in general been less friendly to India than Republican Presidents; and, only time would tell whether Barack Hussein Obama would be able to reverse this trend. Actions taken by Obama so far show that he has continued with the democratic trend of tilting against India though we Indians remain warm hearted towards USA.

So far as India is concerned Obama has continued to behave as a non-proliferation Ayatollah neglecting outstanding self imposed restraints and non-proliferation roles of all Indian Governments.

The G-8 nations at their July 10, 2009 meeting held at L’Aquila, Italy adopted a resolution welcoming (vide Para 8) the progress that continues to be made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items and technologies to Non-NPT countries. NPT means Non Proliferation treaty. India is a non-NPT country. No doubt, India was given exemption by NSG but whether this exemption will be applicable to subsequent NSG procedures remains a debatable point.

At its 6191st Meeting held on September 24, 2009 at New York presided over by US President Obama and attended by 14 other Presidents/PMs the Security Council vide Resolution 1887(2009) unanimously decided to end nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure reductions in existing weapons stockpiles as well as control on production of fissile materials for explosion. Para 4 reads: “Calls upon all States that are not parties to NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States” Para 7 of this resolution reads: “calls upon states to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify CTBT.” Para 8 reads: “calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Among others this SC meeting was attended by Presidents of China, France and Russia and British PM. So pressures on India to sign NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and sign CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and FMCT (Fissile Material Control Treaty) are going to build up courtesy our ‘strategic partner’ USA. These multilateral irritants in bilateral Indo-US relations have been created by the Obama Administration. India has been called upon to join NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

India does not find place in the inner financial core of the G-8.

Addressing the Indian-American community in early 2008 Obama had said: “I believe that India is a natural partner for America in the 21st century and that the US should be working with India on a range of critical issues from preventing terrorism to promoting peace and stability in Asia... And that is why I will move forward to build a close strategic partnership between the US and India when I am President of the United States.” Well Obama is seen lacking on his these promises.

Here it is pertinent to recall that Obama has strong views on non-proliferation, which was evidenced by two killer amendments he had moved in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee while approving the infamous Hyde Act. In this Committee he had suggested (Senate Amendment 5169) that supply of nuclear fuel to India should be actual need based of an imported nuclear reactor (Section 103(b) (10) of the Hyde Act) so that India is not able to create its strategic reserves from imported fuel. Obama also suggested ensuring that US should not facilitate nuclear exports by other countries to India if such US exports were terminated. This second Obama amendment is reflected in Section 102(13) of the Hyde Act.

The unemployment rate in US is running high and is expected to keep rising to 10 per cent by 2010. This coupled with continued returning of body bags from Iraq and Afghanistan has adversely affected popularity of Obama in opinion polls.

In his Cairo speech (June 4, 2009) Obama very correctly said that America is not and will never be at war with Islam but will relentlessly confront violent extremists extensively. We did not go (to Afghanistan) by choice; we went because of necessity.

His Pak-Afghan policy has got stalemated with fears of Afghanistan turning into another Vietnam with scenario of exit in disgrace. Re-take of Afghanistan by Taliban secretly supported by Pakistan will weaken India in that part of the world. Pakistan is playing double game with US in war against terror. Obama has followed a wrong policy in Afghanistan which has potential to escalate violence in India sooner than later in case inglorious exit of US and NATO from Afghanistan materialised. Thereafter Taliban and jihadis would be free to deploy all their resources and focus on kafir India. Therefore, it is in long term interest of India to see that USA and NATO are not militarily defeated in Afghanistan. A section of Pakistan establishment wants defeat and exit of US from Afghanistan. Pakistan will not be interested in quick defeat of Al Qaeda as its defeat would dry up flow of US dollars. On Afghanistan, therefore, Obama and India must think out of box solutions.

Obama should not fall in well laid out Pakistani trap of linking Afghanistan with India’s Kashmir as by doing so USA would gain nothing except losing goodwill of Indian people. Merger of J & K into India in 1947 was also supported by its the then local popular leaders. People living in J & K have participated in State Assembly and Indian Parliament elections a number of times since 1947.

Since 2001 about 1442 NATO soldiers have already been killed in Afghanistan including 867 US, 219 British and 131 Canadian casualties with no light in the tunnel. 68 per cent Americans believe war in Afghanistan is a military stalemate. 61 per cent Democrats want to reduce US troops but Republicans want to send more troops. NATO commander US General McCrystal said the war would end in failure without additional troops of 30,000 to 40,000. Vice President Joe Biden is reported to favour narrowing down US role in Afghanistan. There are about 32,000 US troops in Afghanistan.

Obama should explore the possibility of inducting troops from such developing countries where returning body bags do not pose much problem to governments. This option should be explored more vigorously as hilly terrain of Afghanistan demands that for military victory armed strength should be at least four times that of enemy and in this case NATO soldiers in field do not know who is enemy. So even after adding another 40000 US troops the NATO strength would be below this basic military requirement of four times superiority.

The US has approved civilian and economic aid of USD 1.5 billion a year for five years to Pakistan for democratic, economic and social programmes and also such sums as are necessary for military aid. The US claims that aid aims at alleviating poverty and reducing economic allurement of jihadis to unemployed youth. Well attackers of 9/11 were neither poor nor uneducated. Jihad against kafirs is not poverty driven but Qur’an and ideology driven. Senator John Kerry has clarified that there is no conditionality attached to civilian and economic aid. One is not sure whether this Kerry clarification would not further alienate the ethnic groups (Baluch, Pashtuns, and Sindhi) from US as one does not see any US public statement that an equitable part of this aid will be spent in their regions too.

In order to succeed in Afghanistan Obama must make politico-military use of ethnic differences to defeat Al Qaeda as locals know better than NATO soldiers who is their enemy in fields. On one side of Durand line it is Pashtuns vs Hazara etc., and, on the other side, it is Baluch, Pashtuns, Sindhis vs Punjabi elite of Pakistan. Somehow or other USA is seen by respected leaders of these ethnic groups more as friend and protector of Punjabi hegemony.

It may be recalled that Baluchistan and the North West Frontier were merged by force and fraud over ruling local leaders (Nabab of Kalat and Frontier Gandhi) into Pakistan which keeps the pot boiling and is the root cause of unrest in this region.

An assurance by US and the EU to Pashtuns, Baluch and Sindhis that their democratic aspirations shall no more be overlooked by them coupled with stronger military action in Afghanistan as at present may go a long way to decisively defeat Al Qaeda in its den. Victory cannot be achieved only by military divisions of US and NATO as it is not a pure military war. It is two pronged war, military and political.

(The writer retired in the rank of Secretary to the Govt of India in the Indian Foreign Service (1971 batch). He has served as Ambassador to Finland, Estonia, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Tunisia and Tanzania and; as Consul General, Dubai and Birmingham (UK). Contact: www.opgupta.org)

An immoral economic order: Corruption permeates the US political system

By John Kozy

http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=313&page=31

Wealthy Congressmen are not likely to ever run out of money. Why, when criticised for supporting legislation advocated by a special interest they have accepted money from, do Congressmen claim that the money didn't influence their votes?

Since the American Congress can now provide a cure for absolutely no disease, it is time for the American people to assert their right and change the Constitution in ways that will force the Congress to legislate solely for the benefit of the people.

An immoral economic system compels a society's moral decline. Because of Congressional devotion to our traditional economic system, American government seems to have enshrined all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of democracy.

We have a government based on dissent, in which delay is a common tactic and secrecy is regularly employed, and which enacts imbecilic measures that never produce the results predicted. Is it any wonder, then, that the nation stumbles from one calamity to another? We the People can certainly change things, since, in accordance with our Constitution, it is We the People who are Sovereign. All that is required is a few carefully drawn amendments.

Corruption is a moral failure; it is ubiquitous in societies permeated by immorality. So how are such societies formed?

I have long contended that a society's morality devolves from the prevailing economic system rather than early childhood teaching or religious beliefs. An economic system that institutionalises immorality diffuses it throughout society. Empirical evidence for this claim is pervasive; however, providing a demonstration is not easy. The empirical evidence can always be dismissed by claiming that immorality is a personal character fault and not a result of anything systemic. But that dismissal doesn't explain how huge numbers of people in any society acquire nefarious characters.

The common, although perhaps simplistic, view of the American economic system goes something like this: individuals, acting in their own self-interest as economic agents, engage in economic activities that bring them the greatest financial rewards, thereby maximising the economic well-being of society as a whole.

Although experience does not validate this view, it is common and Adam Smith does write, in Chapter II of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." But what does this quotation imply about Congressmen? Let's rewrite the sentence.

It is not from the benevolence of Congressmen that we can expect them to serve the public good, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.

I have never known anyone who did not believe that the Congress was not corrupt, even though Congressmen, like common criminals, regularly plead not guilty. How can they justify their pleas? Simply by saying that what's good for me is good for the country, which is perfectly consistent with the two rewritten sentences shown above. In other words, Congressmen defend the morality of their actions by appealing to the prevailing economic theory. That the results are not beneficial to society as a whole is irrelevant to them. That their actions conflict with commonly held moral values is irrelevant to them. They are merely doing exactly what the economic theory recommends. Of course, businesses can defend their malicious actions in exactly the same way. So can criminals. The result is that commonly held moral values are dismissed as irrelevant and society is imbued with immorality. An immoral economic system compels a society's moral decline. Such declines are systemic and not accidental.

The questions to be answered, then, are what financial rewards do Congressmen receive from promoting the public good? And would they receive greater financial rewards from promoting the gains of private interests? If the answer to the latter question is yes, then Congressmen, in accordance with the prevailing economic theory, are doing exactly what that theory recommends when they promote the aims of private, special interests at the expense of the public. Belief in the prevailing economic system corrupts government, business, and every other activity. It also turns representative democracy into a contentless, meaningless ritual.

I have often wondered why people run for Congress, especially after seeing what they do after getting elected. There are many very wealthy people in the Congress; some are multi-millionaires. Why do they collect their salaries? They certainly do not need the money. Why do they enroll in government subsidised medical care? They certainly can afford to buy care in the open market. Why have they created government subsidised retirement plans for themselves? They are not likely to ever run out of money. Why, when criticised for supporting legislation advocated by a special interest they have accepted money from, do Congressmen claim that the money didn't influence their votes?

Why would special interests give money to people for doing what they claim they would have done anyway? Giving people money for doing what they would have done anyway is not a common practice. When Congressmen claim that special interests do that, the claim requires an explanation, but none is ever forthcoming. If the goal of such giving is not to influence votes, why is it done? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Congressmen are not in it for public service; they are in it for the money, and alas, Jesus was right when he said, "The love of money is the root of all evil" (1 Timothy 6:10).

The vast majority of problems that human beings face are inflicted by humans themselves, and being inflicted by humans, they can be eliminated by humans. James Wilson, a Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention said, in explaining the proposed Constitution to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "Oft have I marked, with silent pleasure and admiration, the force and prevalence, through the United States, of the principle that the supreme power resides in the people, and that they never part with it. It may be called the panacea in politics. There can be no disorder in the community but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution; if in the constitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, therefore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not wanting to themselves."

And during the ratification conventions that took place in 1788, some conferees attempted to address this problem of compensation when they proposed an amendment meant to restrict Congressmen from setting theirs. This proposed amendment was finally ratified in 1992 as the XXVII Amendment which reads:

"No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened."

Unfortunately, 1992 was far too late, for the emergence of career politicians nullified the amendment's original intent. Congress sets its own compensation; Congressmen now merely have to wait some months for their raises to take effect.

The founding fathers did not envision career politicians. In fact, some amendments were proposed to limit the terms of Congressmen, especially Senators. For instance, the New York Ratification Convention proposed "that no person be eligible as a Senator for more than six years in any term of twelve years", which would have prohibited anyone from serving two consecutive terms in the Senate.

So what is needed is a simple amendment that ties Congressional compensation to some objective number, such as per capita income which is a better measure of the wealth of people than GNP/GDP which I have argued elsewhere is a bogus and nefarious measurement. If Congressional compensation were set at say 1.5 times per capita income, Congressional compensation would increase only if the incomes of common people were increasing. Reimbursed Congressional expenses could also be set in the same way, say at 0.5 times per capita income.

And Congressmen should be prohibited from enacting benefits for themselves unless those same benefits are also made available to the general public. Such an amendment would force the Congress to pay attention to promoting the general welfare, as the Preamble of the Constitution requires. Such an amendment would put current Congressmen in an absurd position. If they continued to support special interests, their incomes would stagnate and perhaps even be reduced. Such an amendment could, thus, have the effect of reducing the influence of special interests on the Congress.

Two likely objections to restricting Congressional compensation can be anticipated: the best and the brightest would not be attracted to Congress, and increased corruption would be likely.

First, both of these objections are based on the economic system's maxim that everyone acts in his/her own self-interest as an economic agent. But this maxim is patently false. When a child decides she/he wants to be a police officer, a fireman, a school teacher, a social worker, a nurse, or countless other things, it can hardly be argued that she/he is making that choice in order to maximise his/her earning power. None of these professions is lucrative; yet they are professions that are absolutely necessary for society to function.

Second, the current conditions cannot be shown to attract "the best and the brightest" to political careers. Given the kinds of legislation that the Congress has enacted consistently, one could easily argue that Congress attracts the worst and dullest. Not a single major social problem has been solved in at least a century. What such an amendment might very well do is attract to the Congress people who have a genuine desire to serve the public rather than themselves.

And third, it is true that in underdeveloped countries where civil servants are poorly paid, corruption is endemic. But corruption can be reduced by making the penalties for both the corrupter and corrupted severe. Instead of fines and relatively short prison sentences, the assets of both the corrupter and corrupted could be confiscated and their citizenship revoked. Corruption exists only because society tolerates it.

That government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people is a sentiment that occurs in the deliberations of many of the Ratification Conventions held in 1788. It was explicitly stated in the conventions held in Pennsylvania, in the debates on the Bill of Rights held in the House of Representatives, in the amendments offered in Congress by James Madison, and in the amendments reported by the select committee. Our Congress seems to have forgotten it.

James Wilson also said, while reporting to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "The advantages of democracy are, liberty, equality, cautious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of exciting and producing abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are dissensions, the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the imbecility of public measures." American government seems to have enshrined all these disadvantages and none of the advantages. We have a government based on dissent (the minority party is often referred to as "the opposition"), in which delay is a common tactic and secrecy is regularly employed, and which enacts imbecilic measures that never produce the results predicted.

A surge in wealthy Americans who are prepared to give up their citizenship to avoid the scrutiny of US tax authorities has recently been reported. This not only validates Jefferson's belief that "Merchants have no country." But it also puts the Congress in a precarious position. Currently, the Congress legislates for the benefit of business. Whether this results from business' buying Congressional votes or from an attachment to a misguided economic system is irrelevant. If Jefferson is right, and he appears to be, the Congress is legislating for the benefit of those who have no devotion or attachment to the nation or its people. Is it any wonder, then, that the nation stumbles from one calamity to another, that no problems get solved, or that the society's institutions don't work?

James Wilson believed that "the people of the United States are now in the possession and exercise of their original rights; and while this doctrine is known, and operates, we shall have a cure for every disease." But he also believed, "The consequence is that the people may change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive institution can ever deprive them."

Since the American Congress can now provide a cure for absolutely no disease, it is time for the American people to assert their right and change the Constitution in ways that will force the Congress to legislate solely for the benefit of the people, which We the People can certainly do, since, in accordance with our Constitution, it is We the People who are Sovereign. All that is required is a few carefully drawn amendments.

(The writer is a retired professor of philosophy and logic. After serving in the US Army during the Korean War, he spent 20 years as a university professor and another 20 years as a writer. His on-line pieces can be found on http://www.jkozy.com/(© Copyright John Kozy, Global Research, 2009; Courtesy Global Research [www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15151])