Rising India’s nuclear catalyst

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March.12 : The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal of 2008, which caused so much political turmoil, is now a forgotten footnote in Indian history. Was it a one-off event, or part of a grander strategic vision for “rising India”?

The nuclear deal actually was a very complex process, involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, the American Senate and the Indian Parliament where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, facing opposition from the Left for the deal, put the survival of his government at stake to narrowly survive a “no confidence vote” in 2008 and went on to sign the deal in the United States.

The Indo-US nuclear agreement of July 18, 2005, culminated when the US House of Representatives passed the bill on September 28, 2008, and India became the only nuclear weapons nation which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but could now carry out civil and nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. Within two days, India and France signed a similar nuclear deal which provides for the latest French LWRs (Light Water Reactors), lifetime supply of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel from French LWRs, all under IAEA safeguards. The Indo-US nuclear agreement was finally signed on October 10, 2008, and contracts for American nuclear plants will be signed after the Obama administration goes through its bureaucratic paperwork, given that the India-IAEA’s “India-specific agreement” of February 2, 2009, came into force in February 2010.

As India and the rest of the world are moving ahead, Uncle Sam is still trying to make up its mind about formalising the actual contracts with India for civilian reactors and taking steps to strengthen the so-called “strategic relationship” which appears to be moving in reverse gear, given the latest American military hardware gifts to Pakistan, and its expected withdrawl from AfPak.

In the meantime, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who arrived in Delhi on March 11, is expected to give a further boost to the already strong Indo-Russian ties in the field of defence, space exploration and civilian nuclear energy. Aware of America’s role in pushing the nuclear deal through, India has earmarked a special region (for “nuclear parks”) and financial outlay for American nuclear plants, though the American reactors are likely to come with far more stringent conditions with regard to fuel supply, enrichment, reprocessing, fuel storage etc. In the world of realpolitik, while India does a balancing act with US, Russia, China and others, it will have to ensure that its national interests are not jeopardised.

For once India moved with uncharacteristic speed to secure her civilian nuclear energy future. On January 24, 2009, the Indo-Kazakhstan deal was signed for supply of Kazakh uranium to India. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest exporter of uranium and has the second-largest reserves of uranium ore.

On August 31, 2009, India signed another deal with Namibia for supply of uranium. Namibia is the fifth-largest uranium producer in the world, but this agreement is unique in that India has agreed to help train Namibian personnel and set up civilian nuclear power plants there. Another agreement for uranium supply was signed with Mongolia on September 14, 2009, to be followed by the October 14, 2009, Indo-Argentinian “generic nuclear cooperation” agreement. Even more significant was the Indo-Canadian agreement for supply of uranium and civil nuclear power plant equipment, thus breaking a 34-year “freeze” following India’s 1974 Pokharan-1 nuclear bomb test.
India and Russia signed a very comprehensive agreement on December 7, 2009, along with three other defence agreements. This is significant given that military security, energy security and space exploration are interlinked with national security, and Russia is a close partner of India in all these three strategic fields. This Indo-Russia nuclear deal caters for uranium fuel supply in perpetuity for Russia-built LWRs, building five more LWRs, right to reprocess spent fuel from Russian LWRs, and facilitating transfer of technology for enrichment and reprocessing.

South Korea, which has recently won a contract to build two nuclear reactors in West Asia, signed an agreement with India on January 25, 2010, to “develop a framework for civil nuclear cooperation”. And finally, on February 11, 2010, India and the UK signed a “general umbrella agreement on civil nuclear cooperation”, which gives a legal framework for British companies to supply equipment.

As is well known, the NPT came into force in 1970. So how did India manage to get this unique civilian nuclear deal? The answer lies in a combination of factors which include India’s growing economic clout, enabling it to spend about $150 billion on civilian nuclear reactors by 2030; India’s perfect non-proliferation record, especially when compared with China’s record of proliferating missiles and nuclear weapons to Pakistan and North Korea; the rise of global religious terrorism and secular democratic India’s clean record; and India’s unique geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean region where it can play a stabilising role against piracy and terror, thus enabling free flow of global seaborne commerce (including shipment of oil by sea).
India will be the third-largest global economy by 2050 where nuclear power will barely contribute 10 per cent to the national power grid, but its importance will continue to grow as oil and gas reserves decline. Hence it makes political and economic sense for the great powers of the world to cooperate with India and “be on the right side of history”. Similarly, it makes sense for India to have excellent economic and diplomatic relations with all nations without compromising its core national interest.

The geostrategic and economic factors which ensured the unique civilian nuclear deal for India will continue to be valid as the Indian economy closely follows the rise of the Chinese economy starts narrowing the gap after 2020. It is, therefore, important for India’s political leadership to ensure that India plays its diplomatic cards correctly and agrees to sign the NPT as a nuclear weapons state (NWS).

Despite much talk of India’s new strategic relationships with various countries, the fact remains that in todays world their are only two strategic partnerships: US-UK and China-Pakistan. The Russia of today is primarily focussed on Europe and for the US, India has a “secondary status”. Thus, while Russia can meet some of India’s requirements for military equipment, strategic sytems, space exploitation and energy, India cannot ignore the hard reality of a rising Europen Union and China, and a declining US and Japan. We need the backing of all to get a permanent UN Security Council seat (with veto powers), to be accepted as NWS, and to ensure peace in our subcontinent.

Unlike what was portrayed in the last Indian general elections, the nuclear deal cannot solve all our problems, nor “provide light in every home”. It is merely a symbol of India’s rising economy and a catalyst for moving India to its rightful place in the world.

Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam

Arun Kumar Singh