James Nixey, May 2010
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2024/
The World Today, Volume 66, Number 5
The world wants Iran to give up any aspiration to become a nuclear weapons state and the United Nations has backed sanctions several times. Russia has its doubts. It benefits from trade and nuclear deals with Iran and the Bushehr nuclear plant is finally about to open. If Iran changed, Moscow's influence might wane, if it became more radical it could be a threat. For Moscow, the current balancing act is best.
Basking in the lukewarm glow of the newly re-signed START treaty, further reducing strategic nuclear stockpiles; it is worth remembering that resetting relations with Russia still means different things to different players. For western Europe, it means: 'let's build trust on the basis of economic cooperation'. For Russia, it says: 'accept our primacy in the neighbourhood of the other former Soviet states and treat us as equals, with veto rights, on all major international issues'. And for America, which originated the policy in an attempt to woo Russia while it pursued higher priorities, reset means: 'back us over common interests such as Iran, one such greater priority, and we will be quieter over almost all your grandstanding and other misdemeanours'.
A deal over Iran must be a tempting incentive for Russia, which is also under pressure from the United States finally to offer something back. But is it enough, and is it even possible? Interests such as Iran may not be as common as Washington believes.
In these pages three years ago, Yury Fedorov wrote: 'The Kremlin is interested in neither a nuclear-armed Iran, nor in ending its nuclear programme' (Trump and Trap, February 2007). Iran has since come measurably closer to building that weapon, but little has changed in Russian policy. It is still playing both ends against the middle and putting its national interests first.
A nuclear Iran would likely be more active in Russian spheres of 'privileged interests', such as the Caspian. However, Iran after a US or Israeli attack would be a source of instability in Russia's already volatile southern border regions. Equally, Iran's nuclear efforts divert American and European resources from Russia's self-proclaimed sphere of influence.
Russia does not especially care about or for Iran. And certainly not the current radical leadership. More than once it has spurned Iran's offer of a 'strategic relationship'. It sees Iran as the west often sees Russia: potentially dangerous and unreliable; not least since Iran got close to, but ultimately rejected, a 2006 Kremlin offer to securely enrich or 'reprocess' Tehran's uranium in Russian territory, or, more recently, learnt of a previously undisclosed enrichment facility at Qom.
Despite the extensive ties at working level, there is little trust and much irritation. Russia is frequently, and by turns, angry and disillusioned with Iran. But it still does not share America's view. For one thing, Russia's policy is America centric, rather than Iran-centric. Its post imperial hangover rules out forms of cooperation that would or could strengthen US dominance. Neither Russia nor Iran wish to see western influence grow in the Caspian basin or global energy markets.
But Iran is a potential spoiler in Central Asia, the South Caucasus and possibly Russia itself. The Moscow subway bombings are a reminder of Iran's ability, real or imaginary, to export radical ideology to the North Caucasus.
Though conscious of a large Russian-speaking population and trade agreements in Israel, a more persuasive voice in the Kremlin may now be: 'best not anger President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by siding too much with the "Great Satan"'. Moscow has no reason to welcome a nuclear Iran. But that does not mean it will sacrifice these core interests to obstruct it.
Iran itself has had a consistent policy of not aiding Islam-influenced separatism in Russia: partly out of good-neighbourliness, partly from fear of Russia retaliating by interfering with its minorities. Helping to promote disorder to the north by funding dissidents, as it does Hamas or Iraq's Sadrists, would be a bad strategic move. Moreover, Russian Muslims are largely Sunni so they are not that susceptible to Iran's Shi'a revolution.
BACK AT BUSHEHR
The one thousand-megawatt Russian-built nuclear reactor at Bushehr in south-western Iran clearly illustrates the hierarchy of Moscow's interests. Its long delay, for financial, technological and political reasons, has surely increased leverage in Moscow's relations with Tehran. But to what end?
Russia has announced it will start up the reactor in July, ostensibly to generate of electricity for civilian use. The threat of Iran going nuclear comes just as much from rogue Russian scientists and under-the-radar organisations as from officially authorised contracts. Simply put, it is harder to control Russians' movements than ever before.
Russia's primary defence of its advanced technological involvement in Iran is ingenious if not water-tight. It claims that the Bushehr complex, which is International Atomic Energy Agency-overseen, actually ensures that weaponisation of fissile material does not take place and that Iran complies with its international non-proliferation obligations.
Still, even the US has given up fussing about Bushehr. Since 2003, it has largely conceded that Iran should have a civil nuclear programme: in 2005, with US acquiescence, the E3 - Germany, Britain and France - offered light-water moderated reactors to Iran.
SANCTION-BUSTING
But with the US unconvinced about Iran's nuclear intentions, and pushing for a fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions - and occasionally threatening military action - Moscow is desperately hoping that, in its current talks, Beijing will use its veto, or at least push for a watering down, thus hiding or diluting Moscow's own objection.
Moscow has successfully lessened the impact for Iran of the last three UN resolutions; but being the lone spoiler on the most serious international issues is not to Russia's geopolitical advantage. The more radical Iran gets, the more out of touch Russia looks and the more it is forced to choose sides.
Smart sanctions, aimed at the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the blacklisting of specified people and companies, are still being considered in Moscow.
PROFIT MOTIVE
Economic incentives for the post-Soviet Russian state with Iran, though less than with, say, Turkey, should not be underestimated. The $1 billion plant at Bushehr is potentially just the beginning. Iran wants more, and the income for Russia could be ten times that figure. Overall trade is currently at $3 billion a year and rising.
The incentive for financial profit from Iran is especially prevalent in Russia's strategically important nuclear and defence sectors - which are under increasing pressure - where it has sizeable and influential internal lobbies being asked to spearhead the current drive toward modernisation. Numerous Russian enterprises are neck-deep in lucrative contracts in the Islamic Republic.
Russia's arms relationships elsewhere in the world are in jeopardy; notably from China which is increasingly dubious about Russian technology. So the proposed sale of the S-300 missile defence system to Iran is important. But the transaction is in stasis, reflecting a degree of Russian political concern.
Already delivered, however, are the less sophisticated Tor-M1missile defence systems, also designed to protect Bushehr among other sites from air attack; somewhat optimistically, one would think, if it ever came to it.
Russia's current economic mainstay - energy - is sizable with regards Iran too. Not only is Gazprom assisting in exploring Iran's oil and gas fields - the world's second largest after Russia's own - Iran's shortage of gas for export means that Russia does not even have to compete with Iran in selling gas to the west. Meanwhile, Kremlin Inc. buys up regional energy infrastructure such as the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline.
DELICATE
It is a truism that Russia profits from 'controlled tension'. An anarchic or radical Iran would leave Moscow vulnerable to extremist insertion in its own sovereign territory. A stable and western-friendly Iran would open it up to the west and further marginalise Russia. Moscow loses both ways. It even loses from western or Israeli military intervention in Iran which would destabilise the surrounding area. Russia believes that it can benefit most from its current balancing act: nervously enjoying the attention from both sides.
But the balance depends too much on the continuation of Iran's internal political status quo for Moscow's comfort. Russia's support of Ahmadinejad during the post-election protests last year did not go unnoticed by Iranian protestors who were heard shouting 'death to Russia!' In the longer term, Moscow could pay the price if the internal situation in Iran changes and it finds it has backed the wrong horse.
True, a Russian-brokered deal with Iran would usefully boost Moscow's credentials as a peace-broker cum power-player, as well as being more financially lucrative than any American solution. More likely, however, Russia has few, if any, effective instruments to put pressure on Iran. Moscow knows this by now and so is more likely to try to conceal this lack of leverage.
Ultimately, the Russian national interest is still too different from that of the west: Iran's nuclear ambition is simply not as important to Moscow. Russia's position on Iran could change at any moment, but for now, abandoning its current interests and isolating Iran for a Washington project, which will enforce western and especially US power projection in the region, does not look likely.
But in spite of Russia's financial advantage, so skilfully derived from the current situation, the longer it continues to pursue different interests in Iran, the further its all-important international reputation is diminished. Russia's delicate handling of Iran is surely about to unravel.
James Nixey, Manager and Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
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