Force for lasting peace

Ajey Lele

Flip flops on “dialogue” with Pakistan have almost become part of India's diplomatic tradition. To make this week’s Chidambaram initiative look meaningful, India should persist with a carrot and stick policy.

The two-day visit by Home Minister P Chidambaram to Pakistan this week was for the ostensible purpose of fulfilling a SAARC formality — a routine meeting of member countries’ internal security ministers. But, the fact that New Delhi agreed to a sidelines meeting between Chidambaram and his Pakistani counterpart, Rehman Malik, made it appear as the first “ministerial visit” from the Indian side to Pakistan since 26/11. Therefore, the event was pregnant with possibilities.

Before he set out for Pakistan, Chidambaram had approved the release of four Pakistani prisoners as a goodwill gesture. This created the right atmospherics. Here was the Home Minister of India, the guarantor of law and order, reaching out to Pakistan. And that too even after Pakistan had not honoured a single commitment since the Mumbai carnage, made either to India or to the world community.

India had decided to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended as an aftermath of 26/11. However, the 30-month period that separates that infamous event with Chidambaram’s historic visit was full of disappointment for India. Leave alone Pakistan, none of the world powers, including the United States, had bothered to leverage their clout with Pakistan to force it to at least admit to its role in the massacre, leave alone book the masterminds whose status as free men in Pakistan mocked sensibilities everywhere.

What compelled India, whose Prime Minister had unequivocally linked terrorism to the dialogue process, to abandon that position. India has now returned to the dialogue process to supposedly reduce the alleged ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries, and Chidambaram’s visit could be said to be the first high-level effort in that direction. According to reports, Chidambaram handed over a list of seven operatives who India believes were involved in 26/11, and against whom Pakistan had not taken action so far. They are Sajjid Mir, Abdul Rehman, Pasha, Brigadier Riyaz, Abu Khafa, Al Kama and Abu Hamza. India received the names of the suspects during the interrogation of David Coleman Headley, LeT operative in the US.

India and the world community had expected Pakistan to take some credible action against the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and other agencies involved in 26/11, but received only rebuff. Rehman Malik had claimed that it was “not possible” for either Pakistan or India to control the likes of LeT chief Hafiz Saeed. This had led to grave questions over Pakistan’s seriousness in engaging India. As yet no significant action has been seen from the Pakistani side to demonstrate their commitment to closing down agencies involved in terrorism in India. Since 2001, Pakistan has been pulling wool over world leaders’ eyes by undertaking half-hearted measures, but never cared to rein in the ringleaders of these outfits.

Now, by agreeing to return to the dialogue table, New Delhi has tacitly admitted that its ‘dossier diplomacy’ has failed. This is a repeat of the early 2000s when the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee held firm to a no-talks-without-end-to-terrorism position which ultimately yielded nothing. Vajpayee agreed to hold a summit with Pervez Musharraf in July 2001 and when Pakistan did not make compromises even after that, decided to return to the old stand. After 9/11 and the Parliament attack of December that year, India practically broke off diplomatic links with Pakistan and assembled 8 million troops all along the border. Again, this resolve petered out and India agreed to participate in the 2004 SAARC summit in Islamabad.

This time too, the valid question arises: is it worth the effort for the Indian government to engage Pakistan at a civilised level? The breadth of diplomacy in South Asia has changed dramatically over the past two years. Along with India and Pakistan, the fates of two more nations, the United States and Afghanistan have become inextricably linked to the return of civility in the Indo-Pak track. Barack Obama’s AfPak policy has not yielded the desired results; wave after wave of Western military offensive in Taliban country has produced nothing but body bags bound for America. This is owed in large part to Pakistan’s failure, intention or otherwise, to cut off the Taliban-al-Qaeda’s reservoirs of strength in its territory. Obama tried for a while to suppress the Taliban in Pakistan through Drone attacks, but this proved counter-productive. Traditional means of putting down terrorism was only leading to more terrorism.

Pakistan has been practically blackmailing Washington that unless India is prevailed upon to cease its threatening postures over 26/11, it cannot be counted upon as a 100 per cent ally in the war against the Taliban. Therefore, the United States had no option but to use its best persuasion skills with New Delhi to see if the deadlock could be broken.

India too needed a breakthrough. After Chidambaram took over the reins at the Home Ministry, the stature of the department has grown significantly. Today, it is known as a no-nonsense department. The Home Ministry’s mandate is significant: it has to handle a wide array of issues from internal security to terrorism. India needed to reopen diplomatic engagement while simultaneously hold on to — and even augment —its ‘tough response’ to terrorism of all hues.

The June 29 attack by Maoists on a CRPF detachment in Dhorai in Narayanpur district of Chhattisgarh, which caused 26 deaths, has served as a reminder of the inadequacies of India’s internal security infrastructure. It was the third such incident in the past two months since the infamous Dantewada massacre of April 6. These incidents show that the Maoist threat has acquired a much larger dimension than earlier understood.

In Jammu & Kashmir this week, mobs took over demonstrations against the security forces on the streets of Srinagar and other towns. It has become amply clear that any incident, big or small, would be used by anti-India elements to their advantage. Many of India’s security problems have a long history and they do not have any quick fix solutions.

Most of the internal security problems demand socio-political solutions. However, it is one thing to find an acceptable political solution to internal insurgency and quite another to make it work with a foreign power. It is here that India needs to apply caution. It is a known fact that at least at this point of time, war is not an option to resolve issues against Pakistan. This leaves diplomacy as the only available option. However, India needs to engage Pakistan on its own terms.

While speaking in Pakistan Chidambaram may be politically and diplomatically correct when he mentioned that India is not questioning intentions but are looking for outcomes. However, if Pakistan’s intentions are truthful then the outcomes would automatically be honourable and this is what India needs to boldly project.

-- The author is a Research Fellow at IDSA