By Anand K. Sahay
The approach adopted in relation to Pakistan has not yielded results, Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary and until recently a special envoy of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, tells Anand K. Sahay in an interview. He also says that India should make clear that if there is interference in Afghanistan, and there exists the threat of a fundamentalist takeover, India will take “all countervailing measures needed”.
Q. The recent WikiLeaks disclosures — a cache of some 90,000 classified US military documents — indict Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for plotting with the Taliban in the Afghan battlefield, and also against Indian interests. Where do we go from here? What is likely to be the effect of this development on the US itself?
A. This could make the conduct of the US AfPak policy more complicated and difficult. Congressional support for large-scale assistance to Pakistan, and the Obama administration’s schedule in terms of the military time-table in Afghanistan, can be impacted. Familiar assumptions may be in jeopardy. As you say, these developments confirm to all what we know for a long time. In the US, the real effect is likely to be felt via the opinion in Congress.
Judging by official reactions in Washington, however, it is doubtful if there will be an immediate change in policy.
Q. Where does that leave us? In the light of such extensive public disclosure through documentation, can we continue our Pakistan policy, and our AfPak policy, in the old way?
A. The challenge for us will remain. One good consequence of the disclosures is that there will be far greater questioning of Pakistan’s role than has been the case so far, and much greater pressure on Pakistan to stop playing a double game.
Q. Are there pressures that we can put on the US not to indulge Pakistan politically?
A. US actions in the AfPak region have been a part of our dialogue with them. But we have to recognise that the US sees its interest in the region from a different perspective — namely, any exit strategy from Afghanistan requires the cooperation of Pakistan, and, two, that the crossing of a threshold of coercive pressure on Pakistan can lead to internal destabilisation in that country. This matters as Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state, a haven for Al Qaeda, and a convenient route for logistics and provisioning for the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) in Afghanistan.
We may disagree with the US but have to recognise its compulsions. Therefore, we need our own strategy vis-à-vis Afghanistan which is not an appendage of the US or Western strategy, and not dependent on anyone’s success or presence in Afghanistan.
Q. Are there signs of such a strategy?
A. Our relationship with Afghanistan is an independent relationship. For quite some time now, it is not the US security umbrella that has safeguarded the execution of projects in Afghanistan. Our Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) commandos have a relationship with the Afghans and are present at our construction sites. Unlike the negative perception that many in Afghanistan have of the International Security Assistance Force (Nato troops), our image is positive even in the Pashtun areas (on the border with Pakistan). Therefore, we need to be clear what we need to articulate on Afghanistan. We should reject any notion that any country (Pakistan, in this context) can define its security concerns extraterritorially (control over the affairs of Afghanistan).
If there is interference in Afghanistan, and the chance of a fundamentalist regime in Kabul, we should make it clear that we will take all countervailing measures needed. In this respect, our concerns are shared by a number of neighbours of Afghanistan, such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia. When Putin was last in Delhi, this was a very important item on the agenda. There have been some initiatives by Government of India to engage Iran on shared security concerns.
We are also seeing that within Afghanistan those opposed to the Taliban have come together. Preserving the inter-ethnic alliance should continue to be our message to President Hamid Karzai. Our expectation is that, given the political realities on the ground in Afghanistan, even in the event of a significant drawing down of US troops, neither Pakistan nor Taliban will have a free run of the country.
Q. In the light of the recent disclosures, is there a need for a fresh approach to Pakistan?
A. We have to recognise that the approach adopted so far, by the present government and the Vajpayee government, has not yielded results. A pattern has come to be established. We show our willingness to engage in dialogue. This peace process can go forward in an atmosphere free from violence and cross-border terrorism. The worst attacks have been on our Parliament and on Mumbai. Our response is to interrupt the talks. Then we again justify its resumption on the basis of verbal assurances. This has been the established pattern since the time of General Zia-ul Haq. That is when the strategy of keeping India off-balance — short of going to war — crystallised. Unless you can convince Pakistan that its strategy will no longer be low-risk, low-cost, Pakistan will carry on in the old way. This is our fundamental challenge, and is not especially related to WikiLeaks. For diplomacy, I’d say you should never present your political leadership with a binary choice — either war or appeasement. Therefore, we need to develop a range of options to convince the other side that there is a cost attached.
Just as Pakistan exploits what it sees as vulnerabilities on the Indian side, what are the vulnerabilities you can take into account there? Then convince the Pakistani leadership of the downside. Disrupting dialogue is not a diplomatic tool. Talks should be held to deploy our leverage.
Q. What do you mean by Pakistan’s vulnerabilities?
A. Over time, build negative and positive leverages with Pakistan. Take Kashmir, for instance. We can take the people in PoK (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) and in Gilgit-Baltistan to be our citizens, as we believe that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is ours, and go in for a strong espousal of their case. Why do we not assert our claims in diplomatic terms? Do we have a strategy of engaging people in those territories?
Also, why should we be defensive about our independent Afghanistan policy? If we assert it, we will be building greater pressure on Pakistan. Our self-interest should be made explicit.
At the same time, while dealing with Pakistan, we should seek to expand the positive constituency in that country — say trade and business. This can be an instrument of positive leverage. Islamabad and the people of Pakistan should be made to understand that improving business and economic ties with India is in their own self-interest, and this can grow only if ties with India are positive.
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