B.RAMAN
Mr.Naoto Kan, who takes over as the Prime Minister of Japan on June 8,2010, is an unknown quantity in international relations. As the Finance Minister in the outgoing Cabinet of Mr. Yukio Hatoyama, his time was largely taken up by Japan’s economic problems arising from its massive public debt, sluggish growth and an aging population. Economic problems will continue to take up a lot of his time as the Prime Minister too.
2. In a written statement issued on June 4, he described economic recovery and growth as the biggest challenges that he would face as the Prime Minister. Japan is the slowest growing economy in Asia, and is expected to be overtaken by China later this year. Industrial production and exports are picking up, but this has not had any impact on the unemployment situation and deflation. He said in his statement: “I will tackle and pull Japan out of deflation through comprehensive measures from the Government and the Bank of Japan." He promised fiscal reforms and spoke of possible tax hikes to facilitate a strong social security system for the old people.
3. His remarks on foreign policy as the Finance Minister and now as the Prime Minister-designate have been sparse. It is, however, already evident that like Mr.Hatoyama, he attaches importance to the “Get Closer To Asia” policy. But he will not allow this to weaken Japan’s relations with the US, which he regards as vital. Closer and stronger relations with the rest of Asia, yes, but not at the expense of the existing close and strong relations with the US. The maintenance of close relations with the US have become even more important in view of the increasingly erratic behaviour of North Korea, China’s reluctance to hold North Korea accountable for the March incident in which it allegedly torpedoed a South Korean naval vessel killing many South Korean sailors and the increasingly assertive actions of the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Sea. Japan is not in a position to deal with an assertive China alone without the solidarity of the US.
4. Some significant pre-swearing-in remarks of his on foreign policy give an indication of his mind:
“With the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of our diplomacy, we must also work for the prosperity of the Asian region."
He would honor an agreement to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps. Futenma Air Base on Okinawa, and work to rebuild trust between the two allies.
He would place equal emphasis on improving ties with China.
“Japan is situated at a very advantageous geopolitical position. Asia is currently the most rapidly and widely developing area in the world and its scale (of development) is the most outstanding in history. Japan is located at the corner of such an area. It is true that the situation on development in Japan and in Asia is different, but Japan is still in a position to be able to strike a win-win relationship with such developing powers such as China, India and Vietnam.”
5.With five Prime Ministers in four years, who hardly had any time to work out and implement a national strategy on any issue----whether relating to the economy, national and regional security or foreign policy--- Japan has been drifting from scandal to scandal and crisis to crisis. Mr.Kan’s predecessors as the Prime Minister were hardly able to settle down and find their feet on the ground before they were forced to quit by unfavourable public opinion or inner party pressure or both.
6. Mr. Hatoyama came to office as the Prime Minister eight months ago with three major promises.He failed to implement two of them and the time and energy spent by him in unsuccessfully trying to implement the first two did not give him much time to attend to the third. The two promises which he failed to implement related to the shifting of the US base from Okinawa to which the Barack Obama Administration was strongly opposed and to set up a national strategy bureau to promote habits of long-term strategic thinking. His preoccupation with these two issues and with the usual scandals regarding unaccounted political funding hardly gave him time to give shape to a new foreign policy, which he had promised with a greater focus on Asia than had been the case under his predecessors.
7.Unlike his predecessors, Mr.Kan was not born into an elite political family. He is not from a political dynasty. He said of himself after it became clear that he was likely to be the party’s choice to succeed Mr.Hatoyama: "I grew up in a typical Japanese salaryman's family.I've had no special connections. If I can take on a major role starting from such an ordinary background, that would be a very positive thing for Japanese politics."
8. Comments of others on Mr.Kan:
"He's less dreamy than Hatoyama. He's a common man just like us”---- Mr.Koichi Nakano, a professor at Sophia University in Tokyo.
“Kan is more proactive about fiscal discipline and about raising the consumption tax than any other Cabinet Minister" ---- Mr.Hirokata Kusaba, a senior economist at the Mizuho Research Institute.
“ Kan himself has been cautious of being branded a fiscal hawk. He also has a talent for nuanced remarks that can be interpreted in many ways, and may shift away from his stress on fiscal austerity if needed to win votes in the upper house poll”---- From a Reuters dispatch.
“ He is everything Yukio Hatoyama was not — decisive, outspoken and a populist with common roots. He has a record of acting on the basis of his beliefs and not backing down. Those are good signs for a Prime Minister, and I think those are qualities that Hatoyama did not have”---- Mr. Tobias Harris, a political analyst who once worked as an aide to a Democratic Party lawmaker in Japan.
9.Mr.Kan, who is 63 years old, is the son of a businessman from Yamaguchi in Southern Japan. He has never been a a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had ruled Japan for more than five decades before it was replaced by the Democratic Party last year. He co-founded the Democratic Party along with Mr.Hatoyama in 1996. Before 1996, he belonged to a small opposition party. In September 1997, he was elected as the party President and contined in that post till September 1999. From September 2000 to September 2002, he served as the Secretary-General of the Party. In December 2002, he was elected again as the party President and continued in that post till May 2004. He was named the Deputy Prime Minister in September 2009 in the Hatoyama Cabinet and was appointed as the Finance Minister in January 2010.
10. India views Japan as an important strategic partner. The two countries would benefit from close consultations on China. How to befriend China while at the same time being beware of it? That is a question of common interest to both. At the same time, the utility of this partnership to India will not reach its full potential so long as Japan continues to be in its present state of drift with successive Japanese Prime Ministers being unable to work out and sustain a long-term strategy. ( 8-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat,. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
June 07, 2010
The angst of wayward US partnerships
By M K Bhadrakumar
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LF08Df02.html
As the crow flies, just over a kilometer separates the White House from Foggy Bottom, the home of the United States Department of State, but the travel distance is longer. At any rate, the drive President Barack Obama took last Wednesday from the heart of Washington to the border with Virginia was a rare one.
Obama broke protocol by attending a reception hosted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in honor of her visiting Indian counterpart, S M Krishna, who co-chaired the inaugural United States-India strategic dialogue.
With his personal interjection into the US-India relationship, Obama signaled that India remains a top priority in his foreign policy agenda. There should be no ambiguity on this score. International diplomacy is replete with symbolism and this is doubly so at a time of great volatility in the international system.
Thus, coming a week after the US's strategic dialogue with China and a couple of action-packed months after the US-Pakistan dialogue, comparisons are bound to be drawn. China's People's Daily hastened to react, "The intensity of US-China traffic is in sharp contrast with the lack of high-level exchanges between the Indian leadership and Obama."
Yet, Obama asserted that one third of his cabinet officials had already visited Delhi and he himself would travel to the Indian capital in November.
The Chinese angst surfaced when the daily added, "US officials have repeatedly sought to reassure India that the bilateral relationship remains on a fast track under the Obama administration and that it will not pursue close contacts with China at the expense of strong ties with India."
Beijing is closely watching the "latest US move to affirm the importance of the South Asian country" and the indication that "Obama administration has identified India as a major strategic partner in the new international order". It comes at a time when Obama is choreographing a reset of US-Russia ties. Besides, China's northeast diplomacy has lately run into headwinds, as the impasse over the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan - seemingly by North Korea - highlighted.
Most certainly, compared to his last visit to Japan in 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao was far less exuberant during talks in Tokyo on May 31 about the China-Japan relationship and his discussions were noticeably subdued as regards how China and Japan might shape their future. Indeed, Beijing has reason to be apprehensive.
How far is Beijing's angst warranted? If rhetoric can take wings, the United States-India relationship is all set to fly high into a clear blue sky where the sun shines eternal. Seldom has such high-flown rhetoric resonated the corridors of power in Washington: simply put, the Obama administration is apparently convinced that the US has no future in the 21st century without India's partnership. The rhetoric by far exceeded what it was supposed to serve - to calm Delhi's nerves regarding Obama's perceived lack of commitment to the US-India partnership.
Instead it virtually resuscitated the George W Bush-era paradigm that Washington, in its self-interest, is determined to make India a first-rate global power.
But life is real. And Krishna probably did the right thing to plant his feet firmly on the ground. On balance, the US-India strategic dialogue did not produce any "deliverables" for New Delhi. The heart of the matter is that the Obama administration is not in a position to annoy Pakistan.
Senior US officials not only took care to sequester Pakistan from censuring as a state sponsoring terrorism but instead viewed Pakistan with sympathy - as, like India, a victim - rather than as a perpetrator of terrorism in the region, as Delhi alleges.
Equally, they underscored the centrality of Islamabad's cooperation for reaching an Afghan settlement. US officials, including Clinton, liberally commended India's development assistance for Afghanistan but shied away from inviting Delhi to assist in capacity-building for Afghan security forces, which is the number one challenge.
Washington factors in that Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani has drawn a red line in regard to India's profile in Afghanistan and if the US breaches it, there will be consequences.
So, why such US hype - that India is an "indispensable partner and a trusted friend"; that "a rising India is good for the United States and good for the world"; that the relations with India are "at the highest of priorities" for the Obama administration; that India forms part of the "fundamental pillar" of America's global engagement; that India and the US have "reached the stage where our individual success at home and abroad depends on our cooperation"?
There is an overall belief in Washington, with some considerable justification, that the Indians love flattery. But diplomacy is at once hardball, too. Three main reasons can be attributed to the US statecraft. First, having India on its side becomes a pragmatic need for the US to tackle certain key major foreign policy challenges, especially climate change, the situation around Iran, the endgame in Afghanistan, and nuclear non-proliferation.
The recent "course corrections" in Indian foreign policy seem to have caused disquiet in Washington. The India-China cooperation at the Copenhagen summit on climate change checkmated Western strategy and the two Asian powers put US diplomacy at a disadvantage. Delhi is making a renewed effort to advance the normalization with Beijing - although it needs two hands to clap.
Delhi is lately taking an independent line on Iran and even welcomed the Turkey-Brazil-Iran enriched uranium swap deal, which patently undermines the US's coercive diplomacy. Again, the endgame in Afghanistan is critically dependent on Pakistan's cooperation, which in turn is linked to India-Pakistan tensions and the US's capacity to moderate their historic rivalry.
Second, the US is robustly pushing exports to crank up its economy and the Indian market offers tremendous potential. During the dialogue, US officials demanded easier access to the Indian market for American goods and services across the board, including a big share in military sales and nuclear commerce and in such diverse fields as education, agriculture and energy.
Prospects have indeed brightened for the US to do away with residual restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology to India, which opens up huge prospects of military cooperation. Clearly, Washington senses that the Manmohan Singh era of Indian policymaking will not last forever and would like to accelerate the partnership agenda.
The Indian prime minister has been handed down some tough assignments like legislating on areas facilitating US entry into nuclear commerce and education, signing of a logistics support agreement for the use of Indian military bases by the American military, "more rapid Indian consideration of reforms, including the easing of caps on investment in critical sectors", etc.
Finally, there is unmistakably an international context in which the Obama presidency in its second year is seeking out India as a partner to "work together in Asia" and “build a new global commons - an international system in which other democracies can flourish,” as US William J Burns, the US State Department under secretary for political affairs, put it on June 1.
The Obama administration has dusted up the Bush-era doctrine at a time when new tensions have come to the fore in the US-China relationship. A distinct frostiness has appeared in the air while until recently the prognosis was about a "G-2" in the making.
The US has resuscitated old ideas about joint patrolling of the maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and coordinating South Asian policies where the two countries have "complementary interests" and to build an axis involving India and US with "other large Asia-Pacific democracies - Japan, Australia and South Korea ... [for] cooperating more systematically on security issues."
Burns called on India to participate in the "institutional architecture of the Asia-Pacific region" where "India's voice as a successful democracy is important". He said, "We [US] share with India an interest in regional stability and a geopolitical balance." (Emphasis added.)
He added the US's search for a "healthy relationship" with China in no way becomes a "zero-sum game. Instead we [the US] attach great significance to India's expanding role in East Asia, and welcome our partnership across the region."
Delhi needs to assess what kind of relationship it wants with the US in the 21st century - how far its interests can be dovetailed with US efforts to gain tactical advantages in the exercise of "smart power" vis-a-vis China. Not an easy task considering that the US is a superpower in decline and its policies lack consistency while China is certainly a power on the rise and it is a difficult neighbor, too.
But then, Burns gently underscored that the Americans too have their angst about India - "that India doesn't always see as clearly as others do how vital its role in Asia is becoming. Some Americans worry that India is ambivalent about its own rise in the world ... The further truth is that progress in US-Indian partnership is not automatic ... Realizing the full potential of our partnership in the years ahead will require some important choices from both America and India. Partnership means more than just having shared values and common interests. It also means developing complementary policies and habits of cooperation. "
Put differently, India needs to do a careful cost-benefit analysis of the geostrategy serving its long-term interests within a complex matrix of almost-irreversible US-China interdependency.
Given an option, India probably prefers to pursue its own normalization with China without being hustled by the US. Indeed, Krishna's next port of call is Seoul, which faces somewhat comparable predicaments.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LF08Df02.html
As the crow flies, just over a kilometer separates the White House from Foggy Bottom, the home of the United States Department of State, but the travel distance is longer. At any rate, the drive President Barack Obama took last Wednesday from the heart of Washington to the border with Virginia was a rare one.
Obama broke protocol by attending a reception hosted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in honor of her visiting Indian counterpart, S M Krishna, who co-chaired the inaugural United States-India strategic dialogue.
With his personal interjection into the US-India relationship, Obama signaled that India remains a top priority in his foreign policy agenda. There should be no ambiguity on this score. International diplomacy is replete with symbolism and this is doubly so at a time of great volatility in the international system.
Thus, coming a week after the US's strategic dialogue with China and a couple of action-packed months after the US-Pakistan dialogue, comparisons are bound to be drawn. China's People's Daily hastened to react, "The intensity of US-China traffic is in sharp contrast with the lack of high-level exchanges between the Indian leadership and Obama."
Yet, Obama asserted that one third of his cabinet officials had already visited Delhi and he himself would travel to the Indian capital in November.
The Chinese angst surfaced when the daily added, "US officials have repeatedly sought to reassure India that the bilateral relationship remains on a fast track under the Obama administration and that it will not pursue close contacts with China at the expense of strong ties with India."
Beijing is closely watching the "latest US move to affirm the importance of the South Asian country" and the indication that "Obama administration has identified India as a major strategic partner in the new international order". It comes at a time when Obama is choreographing a reset of US-Russia ties. Besides, China's northeast diplomacy has lately run into headwinds, as the impasse over the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan - seemingly by North Korea - highlighted.
Most certainly, compared to his last visit to Japan in 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao was far less exuberant during talks in Tokyo on May 31 about the China-Japan relationship and his discussions were noticeably subdued as regards how China and Japan might shape their future. Indeed, Beijing has reason to be apprehensive.
How far is Beijing's angst warranted? If rhetoric can take wings, the United States-India relationship is all set to fly high into a clear blue sky where the sun shines eternal. Seldom has such high-flown rhetoric resonated the corridors of power in Washington: simply put, the Obama administration is apparently convinced that the US has no future in the 21st century without India's partnership. The rhetoric by far exceeded what it was supposed to serve - to calm Delhi's nerves regarding Obama's perceived lack of commitment to the US-India partnership.
Instead it virtually resuscitated the George W Bush-era paradigm that Washington, in its self-interest, is determined to make India a first-rate global power.
But life is real. And Krishna probably did the right thing to plant his feet firmly on the ground. On balance, the US-India strategic dialogue did not produce any "deliverables" for New Delhi. The heart of the matter is that the Obama administration is not in a position to annoy Pakistan.
Senior US officials not only took care to sequester Pakistan from censuring as a state sponsoring terrorism but instead viewed Pakistan with sympathy - as, like India, a victim - rather than as a perpetrator of terrorism in the region, as Delhi alleges.
Equally, they underscored the centrality of Islamabad's cooperation for reaching an Afghan settlement. US officials, including Clinton, liberally commended India's development assistance for Afghanistan but shied away from inviting Delhi to assist in capacity-building for Afghan security forces, which is the number one challenge.
Washington factors in that Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani has drawn a red line in regard to India's profile in Afghanistan and if the US breaches it, there will be consequences.
So, why such US hype - that India is an "indispensable partner and a trusted friend"; that "a rising India is good for the United States and good for the world"; that the relations with India are "at the highest of priorities" for the Obama administration; that India forms part of the "fundamental pillar" of America's global engagement; that India and the US have "reached the stage where our individual success at home and abroad depends on our cooperation"?
There is an overall belief in Washington, with some considerable justification, that the Indians love flattery. But diplomacy is at once hardball, too. Three main reasons can be attributed to the US statecraft. First, having India on its side becomes a pragmatic need for the US to tackle certain key major foreign policy challenges, especially climate change, the situation around Iran, the endgame in Afghanistan, and nuclear non-proliferation.
The recent "course corrections" in Indian foreign policy seem to have caused disquiet in Washington. The India-China cooperation at the Copenhagen summit on climate change checkmated Western strategy and the two Asian powers put US diplomacy at a disadvantage. Delhi is making a renewed effort to advance the normalization with Beijing - although it needs two hands to clap.
Delhi is lately taking an independent line on Iran and even welcomed the Turkey-Brazil-Iran enriched uranium swap deal, which patently undermines the US's coercive diplomacy. Again, the endgame in Afghanistan is critically dependent on Pakistan's cooperation, which in turn is linked to India-Pakistan tensions and the US's capacity to moderate their historic rivalry.
Second, the US is robustly pushing exports to crank up its economy and the Indian market offers tremendous potential. During the dialogue, US officials demanded easier access to the Indian market for American goods and services across the board, including a big share in military sales and nuclear commerce and in such diverse fields as education, agriculture and energy.
Prospects have indeed brightened for the US to do away with residual restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology to India, which opens up huge prospects of military cooperation. Clearly, Washington senses that the Manmohan Singh era of Indian policymaking will not last forever and would like to accelerate the partnership agenda.
The Indian prime minister has been handed down some tough assignments like legislating on areas facilitating US entry into nuclear commerce and education, signing of a logistics support agreement for the use of Indian military bases by the American military, "more rapid Indian consideration of reforms, including the easing of caps on investment in critical sectors", etc.
Finally, there is unmistakably an international context in which the Obama presidency in its second year is seeking out India as a partner to "work together in Asia" and “build a new global commons - an international system in which other democracies can flourish,” as US William J Burns, the US State Department under secretary for political affairs, put it on June 1.
The Obama administration has dusted up the Bush-era doctrine at a time when new tensions have come to the fore in the US-China relationship. A distinct frostiness has appeared in the air while until recently the prognosis was about a "G-2" in the making.
The US has resuscitated old ideas about joint patrolling of the maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and coordinating South Asian policies where the two countries have "complementary interests" and to build an axis involving India and US with "other large Asia-Pacific democracies - Japan, Australia and South Korea ... [for] cooperating more systematically on security issues."
Burns called on India to participate in the "institutional architecture of the Asia-Pacific region" where "India's voice as a successful democracy is important". He said, "We [US] share with India an interest in regional stability and a geopolitical balance." (Emphasis added.)
He added the US's search for a "healthy relationship" with China in no way becomes a "zero-sum game. Instead we [the US] attach great significance to India's expanding role in East Asia, and welcome our partnership across the region."
Delhi needs to assess what kind of relationship it wants with the US in the 21st century - how far its interests can be dovetailed with US efforts to gain tactical advantages in the exercise of "smart power" vis-a-vis China. Not an easy task considering that the US is a superpower in decline and its policies lack consistency while China is certainly a power on the rise and it is a difficult neighbor, too.
But then, Burns gently underscored that the Americans too have their angst about India - "that India doesn't always see as clearly as others do how vital its role in Asia is becoming. Some Americans worry that India is ambivalent about its own rise in the world ... The further truth is that progress in US-Indian partnership is not automatic ... Realizing the full potential of our partnership in the years ahead will require some important choices from both America and India. Partnership means more than just having shared values and common interests. It also means developing complementary policies and habits of cooperation. "
Put differently, India needs to do a careful cost-benefit analysis of the geostrategy serving its long-term interests within a complex matrix of almost-irreversible US-China interdependency.
Given an option, India probably prefers to pursue its own normalization with China without being hustled by the US. Indeed, Krishna's next port of call is Seoul, which faces somewhat comparable predicaments.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
NEED FOR A CASE STUDY OF BHOPAL GAS DISASTER
B.RAMAN
A major worry for the international community has been the danger of Al Qaeda using a chemical weapon to indulge in an act of mass casualty terrorism. Studies have been made of the possible scenarios and how to prevent and counter them. Dealing with a chemical disaster---- deliberately caused by terrorists or other criminal elements or due to the criminal negligence of those producing and storing them for industrial and other purposes---- is now an important component of any national disaster management plan.
2. In India too, we have a high-powered national disaster management authority and one understands it has prepared different contingency plans to deal with different types of disasters----a chemical disaster being one of them. One would have thought that a detailed case study of the disaster in Bhopal in 1984 due to the leakage of chemical gases from a plant of the Union Carbide would have been the starting point of any such contingency planning.
3. Do you know what would happen if Al Qaeda manages to get hold of a deadly chemical weapon and uses it to kill people in their hundreds and thousands? People would start dying without knowing what is happening to them. Security and other bureaucrats involved in disaster management would take some time to understand why people are dying and set in motion the drill to deal with situation.
4. Al Qaeda is not going to announce beforehand that it would be using a chemical weapon. It will use it and let the world realise that it has used it from the initially unexplained deaths.
5. That is what happened in Bhopal in 1984. People in their hundreds working in the factory, moving around in the town and living in their homes started falling dead without anyone understanding why they are dying. It took sometime for the authorities to realize that the deaths were due to the leakage of gas from the factory and its spread across the town. They did not know what kind of a gas was it and how to protect people from its effect.
6.No proper study had been made beforehand of the dangers of a leak---- due to negligence or deliberately-caused. There had been no contingency planning to deal with the resulting situation.
7. It goes to the credit of the authorities of Madhya Pradesh and the Government of India and of Rajiv Gandhi, who had just then taken over as the Prime Minister, that without any previous experience of dealing with that kind of situation, they rose to the occasion and did whatever they could to save lives at tremendous risk to themselves. Despite their praise-worthy efforts, over 3500 people died---- as many as during the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US.
8. In many seminars that I have attended since 9/11 on the dangers of an act of mass casualty terrorism using a chemical weapon, there were references to the Bhopal disaster as a forewarning of what could happen if the terrorists manage to get hold of a deadly chemical weapon and use it. Many of those who made the reference, at the same time, expressed their surprise and disappointment over the fact that the Indian authorities had not documented the details of what happened in Bhopal in 1984, how the situation was dealt with by the authorities, what kind of difficulties they faced and how they got over them.
9. In fact, according to them, no proper case study of the Bhopal gas disaster has been made to draw lessons for future contingency planning to deal with similar disasters. If this is true, this does not speak well of us and underlines once again our casual attitude in such matters.
10.Before the officials of Bhopal who dealt with the disaster pass away, their account of the disaster should be documented and a thorough case study done.
11. It goes to the credit of Rajiv Gandhi that he realized the importance of contingency planning to deal with similar disasters in future and set up a special cell in the Ministry of Home Affairs for this purpose. This cell allegedly stopped functioning after he left office as the PM in 1989. Contingency planning for disaster management started receiving the attention it deserved only after 9/11.( 7-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
A major worry for the international community has been the danger of Al Qaeda using a chemical weapon to indulge in an act of mass casualty terrorism. Studies have been made of the possible scenarios and how to prevent and counter them. Dealing with a chemical disaster---- deliberately caused by terrorists or other criminal elements or due to the criminal negligence of those producing and storing them for industrial and other purposes---- is now an important component of any national disaster management plan.
2. In India too, we have a high-powered national disaster management authority and one understands it has prepared different contingency plans to deal with different types of disasters----a chemical disaster being one of them. One would have thought that a detailed case study of the disaster in Bhopal in 1984 due to the leakage of chemical gases from a plant of the Union Carbide would have been the starting point of any such contingency planning.
3. Do you know what would happen if Al Qaeda manages to get hold of a deadly chemical weapon and uses it to kill people in their hundreds and thousands? People would start dying without knowing what is happening to them. Security and other bureaucrats involved in disaster management would take some time to understand why people are dying and set in motion the drill to deal with situation.
4. Al Qaeda is not going to announce beforehand that it would be using a chemical weapon. It will use it and let the world realise that it has used it from the initially unexplained deaths.
5. That is what happened in Bhopal in 1984. People in their hundreds working in the factory, moving around in the town and living in their homes started falling dead without anyone understanding why they are dying. It took sometime for the authorities to realize that the deaths were due to the leakage of gas from the factory and its spread across the town. They did not know what kind of a gas was it and how to protect people from its effect.
6.No proper study had been made beforehand of the dangers of a leak---- due to negligence or deliberately-caused. There had been no contingency planning to deal with the resulting situation.
7. It goes to the credit of the authorities of Madhya Pradesh and the Government of India and of Rajiv Gandhi, who had just then taken over as the Prime Minister, that without any previous experience of dealing with that kind of situation, they rose to the occasion and did whatever they could to save lives at tremendous risk to themselves. Despite their praise-worthy efforts, over 3500 people died---- as many as during the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US.
8. In many seminars that I have attended since 9/11 on the dangers of an act of mass casualty terrorism using a chemical weapon, there were references to the Bhopal disaster as a forewarning of what could happen if the terrorists manage to get hold of a deadly chemical weapon and use it. Many of those who made the reference, at the same time, expressed their surprise and disappointment over the fact that the Indian authorities had not documented the details of what happened in Bhopal in 1984, how the situation was dealt with by the authorities, what kind of difficulties they faced and how they got over them.
9. In fact, according to them, no proper case study of the Bhopal gas disaster has been made to draw lessons for future contingency planning to deal with similar disasters. If this is true, this does not speak well of us and underlines once again our casual attitude in such matters.
10.Before the officials of Bhopal who dealt with the disaster pass away, their account of the disaster should be documented and a thorough case study done.
11. It goes to the credit of Rajiv Gandhi that he realized the importance of contingency planning to deal with similar disasters in future and set up a special cell in the Ministry of Home Affairs for this purpose. This cell allegedly stopped functioning after he left office as the PM in 1989. Contingency planning for disaster management started receiving the attention it deserved only after 9/11.( 7-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
June 06, 2010
SWISS "Banking sector should put its house in order"
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Banking_sector_should_put_its_house_in_order.html?cid=8896624
Switzerland’s banking sector is in the middle of a storm and banks would be well advised to go to the roots of their problems, Swiss journalist Lukas Hässig says.
Hässig tells swissinfo.ch that Swiss bank UBS was mainly responsible for the fall of banking secrecy – in this context a multi-million dollar tax accord with the United States government and the handing over of client data.
In February 2009, UBS agreed to pay $780 million (SFr884.1 million) to avoid legal charges from Washington on criminal charges of aiding tax evasion. UBS also agreed to hand over data on about 250 of its US account holders.
In his book Paradies Perdu – The End of Swiss Banking Secrecy , Hässig also describes the close ties between UBS and those in power in Switzerland.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well as a number of European countries applied pressure on Switzerland in 2009 to abandon its differentiation between tax fraud and tax evasion.
swissinfo.ch: To what extent was UBS the main culprit in the collapse of banking secrecy?
Lukas Hässig: I lean towards the opinion that it really is at the centre of the whole affair. Of course other Swiss banks and the private ones had similar strategies. They went without a licence [to the US] and offered financial services. They should have gone to the Securities and Exchange Commission. But UBS was the biggest player.
swissinfo.ch: Your book also takes the Swiss government to task. Where, in your view, did it fail?
L.H.: They were sleeping and to some extent until recently they were a partner of the Swiss banks instead of keeping a healthy distance. Look at the people sitting in Bern. You have the chairman of the regulator (Eugen Haltiner of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority) who used to be a big UBS manager. Look at the finance minister (Hans-Rudolf Merz) who was also at one point in his career on the payroll of UBS. UBS is a whole system. It’s not only one player in the industry or in the economy of Switzerland. The chief executive of the Swiss Bankers Association (Urs Roth) comes from the bank, so UBS managed to put their people in crucial places.
That Switzerland accepted this connection between the country and UBS was one big mistake.
swissinfo.ch: The Blick tabloid had a headline saying: UBS = Switzerland. To what extent were potential dangers to UBS, whether from being forced to split up by the US authorities or even collapse, also a threat to Switzerland? Did UBS equal Switzerland?
L.H.: It’s hard to say. I think the Swiss government was convinced that the danger was real. I’m not blaming the Swiss government for helping UBS at the most crucial moment of the crisis.
I think it did its best. But after [the collapse of] Lehman Brothers in 2008, it was quite impossible to let another big financial company go bankrupt. I would have argued that some poker game would have been possible. When the Swiss government had to decide in January/February 2009 whether it should give up Swiss banking secrecy by handing about 300 client data to the US, otherwise US would indict UBS as a criminal organisation, it didn’t think hard enough about whether the US would really have indicted UBS. But, of course, I see that it’s hard to play poker with the US.
Lukas Hässig (ZVG)
swissinfo.ch: How far would you say that UBS was let off the hook?
L.H.: Very far. They had to pay a fine of $780 million. They had to exit the US offshore business. They had to say that they made mistakes. They changed the management team completely but on the other hand they can keep on going. We in Switzerland - the politicians and the people – have to adapt to a new world without banking secrecy. It’s a big problem for the Geneva and Zurich private banks but the big banks can just go on. They have such big pockets… For me, there is one winner and many losers in this drama and the one winner is UBS.
swissinfo.ch: One part of your book could almost be comical if it weren’t so serious. I’m thinking about UBS client advisers and their laptops with dual purposes when they travelled to the US. What was going on exactly?
L.H.: It’s a juicy detail. You remember Q in the James Bond films? He had a place where he was developing secret weapons and in UBS you had a similar system. A special IT force prepared laptops for the client advisers a couple of days before they went to the US or to some other markets and there was a hidden system built in so that they could go through the internet and download client data. That was dangerous because if the client data fell into the hands of the US government, the bank would have lost everything. It built a secret self-destructing mechanism inside with the command: xtas for “delete travel access service” and this would delete the hidden system on the disk.
swissinfo.ch: Where does Swiss banking go from here with a lot of pressure on the Swiss to accept an automatic exchange of information on tax matters?
L.H.: If you are in a crisis, either you are desperate or you see it as an opportunity. The old management saying that turning a crisis situation into opportunities is appropriate now. Switzerland has its qualities. We still have a strong political situation, we still have the Swiss franc, we have good education, good infrastructure, we have a financial system with a stock exchange and IT and people who know their business. Let’s use it, but with equal rights when it comes to competition.
We don’t need hidden or black money or tax evasion just to beat the others. We should be strong enough to say we can compete without these tricks.
swissinfo.ch: You’re obviously not a friend of the banking industry, it sounds. So what has been the sector’s reaction?
L.H.: I don’t know whether I’m a friend or not. I’m a journalist and the most important thing is having a critical distance to the object you are writing about.
I think this book about how Switzerland lost its banking secrecy is difficult for some bankers to accept because it’s the end of the good times. It was easy to make a lot of money, not only for the banks but also for the client advisers, the bankers who received big bonus packages without being better than the foreign competitors.
Of course some other countries also use tax evasion instruments but we should have the self-confidence to look ahead and say that this is a new world. It’s not about tax evasion, it’s about being competent and a good competitor in the marketplace.
Robert Brookes, swissinfo.ch
FROM THE AUTHOR
Swiss banking secrecy transformed Switzerland's financial industry into a leader in offshore banking. Once thought as a safe haven for the fortunes of refuges as much as fallen political leaders, Swiss banking secrecy had become the core of a tax evasion machine that brought enormous wealth to Swiss banks and their homeland.
Hardly anyone anticipated its sudden death when a top manager of Swiss financial giant UBS was detained in Spring 2008 by US authorities that marked the start of an intense raid against the small Alpine country.
The book Paradies Perdu – The End of Swiss Banking Secrecy recalls in detail the astonishing UBS system – how it worked and its consequences
Hässig says the book is at the same time a thriller with many new details and offers a precise analysis of an era that has now come to an end.
PARLIAMENT
US tax authorities want data on up to 4,450 UBS accounts held by wealthy US citizens. The deal has to be approved by the Swiss parliament.
Cabinet ministers, in particular Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey and Finance Minister Hans-Rudolf Merz, have warned that rejection would have serious negative consequences in Swiss-US relations.
The Swiss National Bank came in with a rescue package for UBS in October 2008.
The House of Representatives and the Senate are to decide whether there should be a parliamentary investigation into the handling of the financial crisis.
Parliament is also to discuss a controversial double taxation accord with Washington.
FROM THE AUTHOR
Swiss banking secrecy transformed Switzerland's financial industry into a leader in offshore banking. Once thought as a safe haven for the fortunes of refuges as much as fallen political leaders, Swiss banking secrecy had become the core of a tax evasion machine that brought enormous wealth to Swiss banks and their homeland.
Hardly anyone anticipated its sudden death when a top manager of Swiss financial giant UBS was detained in Spring 2008 by US authorities that marked the start of an intense raid against the small Alpine country.
The book Paradies Perdu – The End of Swiss Banking Secrecy recalls in detail the astonishing UBS system – how it worked and its consequences
Hässig says the book is at the same time a thriller with many new details and offers a precise analysis of an era that has now come to an end.
LUKAS HÄSSIG
Since June 2006: Freelance journalist, specialising in finance and economics issues.
Jan 2004 – May 2006: Economics author at the Weltwoche weekly of Zurich and business magazine Bilanz.
Oct 2001 – Dec 2003: Head of economic section at Swiss news magazine Facts.
Jan 1999 – Aug 2001: Head of corporate communications at Zurich Airport.
April 1995 – Dec 1998: Economics editor at SonntagsZeitung in Zurich.
May 1994 – March 1995: Financial editor at Finanz und Wirtschaft, Zurich.
Jan 1991 – April 1993: Radio reporter at Radio 24, Zurich.
What future for SWISS tradition?
Costume from Canton Zug, 1794, painted by Joseph Reinhart (1749-1829)
© Bernisches Historisches Museum
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/feature/What_future_for_tradition.html?cid=8945810
On Friday, the central Swiss town of Schwyz erupted in a blaze of colour as thousands of people descended on it for the national costume festival.
But an exhibition called Traditional Swiss Costumes on the Catwalk at the Swiss history museum in the same town takes a longer term view of Swiss traditional costume.
The festival will reflect most people’s idea of what folk costume is: colourful dresses, often featuring contrasting aprons and bodices, puff sleeves, shawls and kerchiefs, striking headgear, rich embroidery, silver chains and brooches.
There are workday costumes, Sunday costumes, and – in some cases – feast day costumes. Each area has its own, regulated down to the last detail by cantonal folk costume associations.
Traditional costume: unchanging and unchangeable.
But that assumption is overturned in the new exhibition. Traditional costume as it is known today is a child of the 20th century. When it was first worn at the end of the 18th century things were very different.
The rural population was prospering, and as they became better off, people started to imitate urban fashions, and they followed the same general trends – if not quite so quickly – as people in the cities, curator Pia Schubiger explained.
Strikingly presented at the entrance to the exhibition, a selection of ten 19th century costumes from different parts of Switzerland highlight the wide range of materials - satin, damask, taffeta, muslin, printed cotton, wool, linen – colours, shapes, ornaments and techniques used in different regions.
Changing fashion
In the 19th century things certainly didn’t stand still. The late 18th century rococo style, with its narrow waist and full skirt, was very influential at the outset. But the high-waisted Empire style of the early 19th century also had an impact on shape and colour, and the Biedermeier period which came next saw folk dresses become more colourful and voluminous, with more decorative elements.
In the middle of the century the urban fashion for crinolines encouraged rural women to push out their skirts too. When this was overtaken a little later by a slimmer look, wide petticoats went out of fashion, and pointed bodices came in to flatten the stomach.
But by the end of the century, industrialisation had made urban fashions more affordable, and fewer women wore folk dress of whatever style.
Heritage movement
This move away from wearing folk dress at home coincided with the birth of a heritage movement in the cities, aimed at rescuing what the bourgeoisie thought of as traditional Swiss values. This trend led to the establishment of the Swiss National Costume Association in 1926.
The leading light of the association in its early years was the politically conservative Ernst Laur, who described traditional costume as the “dress of the peasantry”, fit for a simple way of life rooted in the soil.
But in fact by his time this was far from being the case. To fit in with this idea, heritage enthusiasts had to radically redesign costume, introducing the “work day” variant, doing away with the floor length skirts and body-hugging bodices, replacing silk with cotton and linen, and banishing rich jewellery from all but the feast day costumes.
“The dictate of this new heritage movement levelled Swiss traditional costumes by means of prescribing a limited formal repertoire that offered little variety, and no potential for change,” writes ethnographer Birgit Langenegger of the Appenzell museum in the catalogue accompanying the exhibition.
Now if you want to wear a Swiss costume, you have to follow the rules, Schubiger told swissinfo.ch.
“And that’s a difference with other countries where costumes were still allowed to follow fashion in the 20th century. In Bavaria, or Austria, for example, fashion and traditional costume were mixed.”
Even if some people think it has had a stultifying impact, the Swiss National Costume Association is alive and well, as evidenced by the Federal Costume Festival. Its 23,400 or so members are obviously happy to follow its dictates, whether or not they fully accept the thinking of its founders.
“For a lot of people their enthusiasm for folk costume has to do with love of their homeland and cultural identity – which isn’t a negative thing. But I think a lot of people who wear these costumes today do so on special occasions to stand out, because they are something special and different,” Schubiger suggested.
Moving on
Nevertheless, an important section of her exhibition is devoted to people who have a very different approach. Among the items on show are a bold red and white striped apron dress, flimsy headdresses made of horsehair and printed textiles whose alpine themes include mountain bikers and chair lifts.
“Since the end of the 1990s there has been renewed interest in folk costume among designers. They have no complexes about using aprons and bodices, and they are quite happy to use parts of folk costumes in their own designs.” Schubiger explained.
“This is something that is happening in different areas, not just fashion but textile and jewellery design – and also in music.”
Indeed, yodeller Nadja Räss is to present a workshop as part of the accompanying programme. As Schubiger explained, she does the same thing as the modern designers: “She revisits tradition, and takes it on further.”
Pro Helvetia, the Swiss Arts Council, recently promoted a two-year programme on the same theme, encouraging some of the designers whose work can be seen at the exhibition.
It’s certainly a far cry from the National Costume Association’s original ideals.
“Some find it exciting and very interesting, others tend to distance themselves from it – there’s really a wide range of reactions,” said Schubiger.
The costume festival will show that tradition has a present. The exhibition shows – to use Pro Helvetia’s expression – that “tradition has a future”.
Julia Slater in Schwyz, swissinfo.ch
Darfur and enhancing India’s peacekeeping profile
June 7, 2010
India had earlier wisely not been proactive in the Darfur crisis, even though it has deployed a brigade in peacekeeping in South Sudan with the UNMIS. Its position on Darfur has been influenced by the fact that the crisis could be characterised as an internal one; that there was a geopolitical angle in the Bush years centred not only on US containment of Islamists then, but also of China; wider Indian interests in the Arab world and in Africa; and lastly, India’s commercial interests in newly discovered oil in Sudan.
However, in the event, Sudan, after much persuasion, has consented to the transition of the earlier African Union peacekeeping force to a ‘hybrid’ UN-AU mission, UNAMID. The mission has been operational in its present form since January 1, 2008, though the conflict has raged since February 2003 and the AU Mission in Sudan dates to 2004. The mission currently faces challenges with implications for its future. This article uses Darfur as an entry point to discussing an expanded UN peacekeeping role for India. It first takes a look at doctrinal developments in peacekeeping and then a closer look at the mission in Darfur. It concludes with suggestions on enhancing India’s peacekeeping profile.
As well known, traditional peacekeeping was overtaken by the consensus that developed in the UN as the Cold War drew to a close. The UN was increasingly relied on to mellow the fallout of the withdrawal of the Cold War from across the globe. Missions became complex, more militarised even as the political, human rights and humanitarian angles increased. However, early activism and resulting overstretch met with a doctrinal challenge in the problems faced by the missions in Somalia and Bosnia.
The doctrinal innovation of the period finds reflection in the Secretary General’sAgenda for Peace of 1994 and its Supplement. He had identified the conceptual framework that remains valid today. Peacekeeping conceptually expanded to include activities such as preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacemaking, wider peacekeeping and peace building. The next major overhaul institutionally and conceptually found reflection in the Brahimi Report issued at the turn of the century. The basic feature of multidimensional operations that the report addressed was, in its words, “United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.” This was essentially ‘robust’ peacekeeping, even if the means to undertake the same have not kept pace.
Progress in this century has largely been in institutionalising change through organisational changes in the UN Secretariat and system. For instance, DPKO has a counterpart in the Department of Field Support. Three landmark efforts require mention, namely the mid-decade paper on Peace Operations 2010: the Capstone Document, which makes for a comprehensive round up; and lastly, the current non-paper A New Partnership Agenda, for charting the course up to the horizon. The issue of late has been how to fulfil the ‘responsibility to protect’ and to end the culture of ‘impunity’.
The brief survey of developments in peacekeeping can now be situated in the field mission as obtains in Darfur. The mission has largely drawn on African peacekeepers. It covers the western portion of Sudan comprising three Darfur provinces, where reportedly 300,000 people had perished and two million were displaced. Its major focus is reaching humanitarian assistance to over two million people. It is only now drawing up to its sanctioned strength. The mission is also expected to address the agreement between Chad and Sudan at Dakar on jointly ending trans-border violations by non-state actors aided by the other.
However, the political aspect of the mission centres on getting the rivals to implement agreements made earlier, including the main Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 and that arrived at earlier this year in Doha. An added dimension has been the progress in the International Criminal Court on the notice of the Security Council regarding the culpability of Sudan’s head of state, Bashir. The Appeals Court has asked for consideration of the charge of ‘genocide’ in the Pre-Trial Court’s verdict which had only accepted lesser charges brought by the Prosecutor of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
What is the future direction of the mission? Two major issues affect the mission. Firstly, as mentioned the progress of the case against Bashir could result in Sudan rethinking its consent for the mission. It has already expressed its anger by ordering several western NGOs to leave. Secondly, the developments in South Sudan after holding of the referendum on separate statehood have portents. In case, as expected, the verdict is for a separate state, there could be repercussions in Darfur. This could be either in case of an unstable aftermath in which Sudan tries to retain control, or in case of successful secession then in terms of ‘demonstration effect’. Presently, the tribes in Darfur want autonomy, wealth and power sharing. They may be emboldened in case of a weakened centre. However, the oil revenues that Sudan now has could be used to retain their allegiance in case these are distributed with wisdom.
What could be India’s role? India has been on the frontline both in UNMIS and MONUC. This indicates that it is not averse to a greater African engagement. The UNAMID offers a similar opportunity for India. India could consider sending troops to the mission, given that Sudan has accepted the mission. Indian troops, known for their skills, would be an asset in returning the area to stability. The multidimensional mission’s non-military aspect of political rapprochement, demilitarisation and reconstruction require being energised. India could help the AU in seeing its venture to success.
It is possible that in light of improvement in the DRC, the MONUC there may wind down. This could witness a progressive return of the blue beret brigade there. Looking out for alternative deployment opportunities makes sense. Spare capacity exists in India’s military since its internal security commitments are winding down and its military is already imbued with the constabulary ethic. Every opportunity for foreign exposure is useful professionally. It is a test and a learning experience, besides the compensation being good for morale. Opportunities for the police and paramilitary and in particular women contingents must be sought after proactively. Presently, it is clubbed with the other South Asian states in terms of numbers contributed. That this is a good thing in itself is undoubted since it opens up opportunity to understand each other. The mutual respect of Pakistani and Indian troops on such missions is well known. However, there is a case for upgrading the Indian contribution, since India seeks a seat at the high table. It should therefore be sharing a larger burden than its smaller neighbours
Additionally, there is a need for heightening India’s intellectual contribution on peacekeeping concepts based on its own experience. In emanating from the CUNPK with USI, it would enhance India’s ‘soft power’ in another dimension as a major contributor country. Doctrinal suggestions that incorporate India’s experience in sub-conventional operations would be useful, particularly in robust peacekeeping situations. Several issues covered by the doctrine dubbed ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ are appropriate, such as quick impact projects, fraternisation and tactical drills. Experience of those having leadership experience in the UN, to include that of former Minister of State Shashi Tharoor and former Director of USI Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar could be captured, perhaps in a book. Currently, the deputy of the UNMIS is a retired general who could likewise be tapped for such an effort.
Peacekeeping is India’s forte, not only because of its military’s professionalism but also due to its political acceptability globally. India’s image as a benign rising power can be exploited and enhanced in raising its peacekeeping profile. A concerted plan involving the military and the UN desk of MEA can help make this area a major military diplomacy endeavour. The fallout would be enhanced UN credibility, given that the alternative of ‘coalition of the willing’ has suffered a mortal blow. India must capitalise on its ‘difference’.
Indian Air Force (IAF) will soon have its first fighter air base in Southern State TN
un 07th, 2010 -- B.R. Srikanth |
The Indian Air Force (IAF) will soon have its first fighter air base and a squadron of combat jets in the peninsular region at Sulur in Tamil Nadu. The base will protect strategic installations and maintain Indian air superiority over the Indian Ocean.
Work is apace at Sulur on an extended runway, test bays for the flight control system, avionics, radar, special hangars and modern radio and navigation aids. These facilities are being built for fighter jets which will embark on patrol missions over the peninsular region and the Indian Ocean.
Such a full-fledged fighter air base and the decision to position a squadron of combat jets has been prompted by “enhanced capabilities of adversaries” in recent days, top sources in IAF told this newspaper. “There is definitely a need to protect strategic assets in the south given the fact that our adversaries have long range missiles and ship-launched cruise missiles,” the sources said. Besides, a combat squadron would help maintain superiority over the Indian Ocean and protect sea routes in that region. “From Sulur it will be easy to do the aerial equivalent of a flag march over Sri Lanka and the Maldives, should the need arise,” the sources added.
The IAF has chosen indigenous Tejas fighters to be positioned at Sulur. These fighter jets are due for induction into the air strike wing in December 2010 and have a flying range of 500 km.“With mid-air refuelling, the range can be stretched up to 1,000 km for enhanced security cover over the region,” sources said. With the airspace south of Sulur being relatively free and far from the prying eyes of neighbours, the squadron of Tejas fighters will be able to work up to operational readiness in peace.
These fighters will also be close to the manufacturing facility, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), here, as well as Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which co-ordinated the indigenous programme, to help tackle maintenance problems. The IAF has ordered 20 Tejas fighters.
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations): An Emerging Geopolitical Force
By , June 4th 2010
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5410
Earlier this month, as the US loudly complained about Venezuela’s decision to purchase arms from Russia, South America’s ministers of defense came together in Guayaquil, Ecuador and put the finishing touches on an agreement to develop common mechanisms of transparency in defense policy and spending. The agreement, which also calls for the creation of a multilateral Center for Strategic Defense Studies, is the most recent example of the growing effectiveness of the Union of South American Nations (Spanish acronym UNASUR) as a forum for addressing the most urgent and sensitive issues on the regional agenda. Though the group remains unknown to most of the US public - and is rarely referred to by US policy makers - it has, in the space of a few years, emerged as one of the Western Hemisphere’s leading multilateral bodies and, in the process, is rapidly undermining the regional clout of the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS).
UNASUR first began to take form in 2004 when South American leaders signed the Cusco Declaration that committed their governments to creating “a politically, socially, economically, environmentally and infrastructurally integrated South American area.” Despite the diverging political agendas of the region’s governments, the leaders agreed on prioritizing the group’s role as a geopolitical actor or, in the words of the declaration, pursuing “concerted and coordinated political and diplomatic efforts that will strengthen the region as a differentiated and dynamic factor in its foreign relations.”
In May 2008 UNASUR was officially established with the signing of a constitutive treaty in Brasilia. In September of the same year the group achieved its first diplomatic milestone when it successfully defused South America’s most serious political crisis of the last five years: the attempted violent destabilization of Evo Morales’ government in Bolivia. President Michele Bachelet of Chile, the pro-tempore president of UNASUR, convened an emergency meeting of South American heads of state in Santiago that quickly issued a unanimous statement strongly condemning the attacks against Bolivian democracy and announcing the creation of a commission of “support and assistance” to the Bolivian government. Soon afterwards, Bolivia’s opposition groups abandoned their violent tactics and agreed to enter negotiations with the Morales government.
Though the US administration has been actively promoting the OAS as a defender of democratic stability in the hemisphere, that organization played no role at all in the peaceful resolution of the 2008 Bolivian crisis, due no doubt in part to the US’ambivalent position towards the opposition’s destabilization campaign. In the nearly two years that have elapsed since UNASUR’s successful diplomatic intervention in Bolivia, the group has continued to demonstrate its ability to take on the region’s thorniest issues, independently of the OAS and Washington.
In August of 2009, a special UNASUR summit was held in Argentina to discuss a highly controversial agreement that expanded the US’ military presence in Colombia and was perceived as threatening to Colombia’s neighbors, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela. Though tensions have continued to flare over the agreement, the summit paved the way for dialogue and gave further impetus to UNASUR’s Defense Council in which Latin American defense ministries engage in open discussions on national and regional defense projects. The Council’s latest achievement was the Guayaquil agreement mentioned above.
UNASUR also adopted a position of staunch opposition to the coup in Honduras,refusing for instance, to recognize the elections held last year under the de facto government. While Peru and Colombia – the two UNASUR governments most closely aligned to the US – eventually joined Washington in recognizing the elections, the rest of the 12-member bloc still refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the new Honduran government despite the US administration’s best efforts to change their minds. Even Chile’s new right-wing president, Sebastian Piñera, has reportedly backed UNASUR’s official position on Honduras. As a result of this collective resolve, Spain was forced to backtrack on its decision to invite the Honduran government to participate in a Latin America-European Union summit held in Madrid on the 17th and 18th of May.
On May 4th, UNASUR sent another clear signal of its intention to continue charting an independent course with the unanimous election of former Argentinean president Nestor Kirchner to the post of Secretary General of the organization. During his presidency, Kirchner opposed the US-sponsored “free trade” agenda in Latin America, rejected the Washington Consensus and International monetary Fund-led economic policies, and successfully steered his country out of the worst economic recession in its history. President Lula da Silva of Brazil welcomed Kirchner’s designation as Secretary General and said that it would lead to a further “stage of transformation” for the regional bloc.
SIPRI: Venezuela Led Latin America in Reducing Military Spending in 200
By APORREA AND VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM
Caracas, June 4th 2010 (Venezuelanalysis.com) – The annual report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on Wednesday revealed that Venezuela is the Latin American country that reduced its military spending the most in 2009, with 25% less than the year before.
In total volume of military spending compared to the rest of Latin America, “Venezuela occupies fifth place with US $3.254 billion, a quarter less than the money it spent toward this end in 2008,” reported EFE in reference to the report.
Brazil increased its military spending more than any other Latin American country, allocating a total of US $27.1 billion in 2009, an increase of 16%. Brazil was followed by Colombia, whose military expenditure increased by 11%.
SIPRI indicated that Colombia is the country in the region that directs the most money toward military spending as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with 3.7%.
Colombia’s spending is two tenths of one percent above Chile, which occupies second place in spending as a percentage of the GDP, ahead of Ecuador with 2.8%, Brazil with 1.5%, Venezuela with 1.4%, and Uruguay with 1.3%.
The Americas was the region which spent the most money on arms in 2009, due to the presence of the United States, which piled up US $661 billion, 43% of the world total.
The data supplied by SIPRI contradicts the matrix of opinion generated by the large, right-wing international media which have insisted that Venezuela “is in an arms race.”
Recently, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, Arturo Valenzuela, said that his country – the biggest buyer and seller of weapons – “is worried about the aggressive discourse and the arms race on the part of the government of Venezuela.”
“We cannot tolerate, at this level, threats of war between countries, meddling between countries that could be support for terrorist groups,” Valenzuela affirmed before a university auditorium in Colombia, a country besieged with seven United States military bases as the result of an accord that has been considered a violation of the nation’s sovereignty.
Translated and expanded by James Suggett for Venezuela Analysis. To view the SIPRI report, click here. To view the EFE report, click here.
Caracas, June 4th 2010 (Venezuelanalysis.com) – The annual report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on Wednesday revealed that Venezuela is the Latin American country that reduced its military spending the most in 2009, with 25% less than the year before.
In total volume of military spending compared to the rest of Latin America, “Venezuela occupies fifth place with US $3.254 billion, a quarter less than the money it spent toward this end in 2008,” reported EFE in reference to the report.
Brazil increased its military spending more than any other Latin American country, allocating a total of US $27.1 billion in 2009, an increase of 16%. Brazil was followed by Colombia, whose military expenditure increased by 11%.
SIPRI indicated that Colombia is the country in the region that directs the most money toward military spending as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with 3.7%.
Colombia’s spending is two tenths of one percent above Chile, which occupies second place in spending as a percentage of the GDP, ahead of Ecuador with 2.8%, Brazil with 1.5%, Venezuela with 1.4%, and Uruguay with 1.3%.
The Americas was the region which spent the most money on arms in 2009, due to the presence of the United States, which piled up US $661 billion, 43% of the world total.
The data supplied by SIPRI contradicts the matrix of opinion generated by the large, right-wing international media which have insisted that Venezuela “is in an arms race.”
Recently, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, Arturo Valenzuela, said that his country – the biggest buyer and seller of weapons – “is worried about the aggressive discourse and the arms race on the part of the government of Venezuela.”
“We cannot tolerate, at this level, threats of war between countries, meddling between countries that could be support for terrorist groups,” Valenzuela affirmed before a university auditorium in Colombia, a country besieged with seven United States military bases as the result of an accord that has been considered a violation of the nation’s sovereignty.
Translated and expanded by James Suggett for Venezuela Analysis. To view the SIPRI report, click here. To view the EFE report, click here.
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