October 07, 2010

Our Foes Cannot Destroy This Nation

I am traveling in India now where concerns are high about the possibility that foreign or homegrown terrorists may attack the country during next week’s Commonwealth Games. Such concerns are understandable where in the past decade, jihadist fanatics have attacked India’s Parliament, blown up trains, and, less than two years ago, launched a three-day suicide assault on Mumbai, in all, killing hundreds and injuring thousands. Added to this is an unfortunate history of communal violence between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities that has, since 2001, produced riots and other clashes that, according to official statistics, have left 2,234 dead and 21,460 injured. This is considered an improvement over the even bloodier 1990s. Tensions are high as people await a high court’s final decision on Ayodha, a holy site claimed by both Hindus and Muslims, and the cause of past bloodshed.

With three shooting wars between mostly Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan since the 1947 partition, several military confrontations between the two nuclear powers, plus an undulant guerrilla war in Kashmir, the threat to security is real. It is from this temporary perspective that I look back upon the current jihadist terrorist threat in the United States.

The global terrorist enterprise inspired by al Qaeda’s and similar ideologies has its own geographies. A map of jihadist terrorist attacks since 9/11 will show that its center lies along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, spreading to Northwest India. Subsidiary and allied movements carry on terrorist campaigns that stain the map in Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Somalia. Beyond these, dark patches appear in the Caucasus, across sub-Saharan Africa, the rest of the Indian subcontinent, Indonesia and the Philippines. Beyond these are outlying spots indicating isolated attacks in Europe. The U.S. gets a few dots.

Concentration does not mean central direction. The situation on the ground is more complex. Parasitic jihadists do better where they can attach themselves to more deeply-rooted local conflicts as in Iraq, Afghanistan—where they ride on the back of the Taliban, where they exploited resistance to the American invasion, in Chechnya where they have exploited Chechen’s historic resistance to Russia, in Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, and the Southern Philippines, but not so well in Palestine where rival extremists see them as competitors.

Al Qaeda’s historic center has been weakened although not wiped out. It inspires a global struggle through the Internet, in recent months espousing a do-it-yourself ethic, exhorting on-line followers to do whatever they can wherever they are. The growth of the Internet, where many jihad terrorists begin their journey, the proliferation of jihadist websites since 9/11, the increase in the number of English-language jihadist websites, the increased volume and sophistication of al Qaeda’s communications, the jihadist sales pitches made by native-born Americans like Adam Gadahn, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Omar Hamami facilitate the message to an American audience. And it has gained some traction among disappointed young men, restless souls, people in personal crisis, those seeking violent adventure. These are one-off responses, not yet an underground movement.

Quantifying terrorism is slippery business. The recent Congressional report indicates that 63 individuals were arrested or convicted of jihadist terrorism this year, but that combines different categories. Some of those convicted were the subjects of investigation and arrests in previous years. Nonetheless, my own analysis of jihadist radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001, which was issued earlier this year by the RAND Corporation asWould-Be Warriors indicates a marked increase in both the number of cases and the number of individuals involved in 2009. Authorities have discovered additional plots and made further arrests in 2010.

The good news is that the numbers continue to be small—I counted 125 out of an American Muslim population of approximately 3 million, evidence of veins of resentment and handfuls of hotheads, but no terrorist underground, which based upon the impressive record of federal and local law enforcement, would be quickly rolled up. Half of the 46 cases uncovered since 9/11 involved a single individual. Only three actually succeeded in getting as far as an attempt, and only two succeeded in causing fatalities, both lone gunmen: Carlos Bledsoe who killed one soldier and wounded another at an Army recruiting station in Arkansas and Major Nidal Hasan, who opened fire on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and wounding 31.

Terrorist recruiting is also affected by events. The American-led invasion of Iraq and American involvement in Afghanistan were portrayed by al Qaeda’s propagandists as evidence of American hostility toward Islam and inspired some. The American-supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 facilitated the recruiting of Somali-Americans. James Elshafoy, one of those arrested in 2004 for plotting to blow up New York’s subway said he was angered by friends who went to school within Staten Island displaying signs that said “God Bless America” on the front and “Kill Arab Babies” on the back. America’s current wave of Islamo-phobia will likely produce new recruits who are unable to distinguish between media-magnified manifestations of anti-Islamic hostility and America’s tradition of religious freedom and tolerance for diversity of beliefs.

It is highly likely that the United States will be the target of further terrorist attacks, abroad and at home. It is not an underestimation of this threat or evidence of substandard zeal in addressing it to say that these attacks will not bring down the republic. We have come through wars, depressions, natural and man-made disasters, indeed higher levels of domestic terrorist violence than that we face today. Our foes cannot destroy this nation. That capability is ours alone.


Rebuilding Kyrgyzstan

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=122140&contextid734=122140&contextid735=122133&tabid=122133


The recent Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes following the second overthrow of the government in five years have not only highlighted the authoritarian state's ineffectiveness in providing enduring stability but also undermined its integrity and sovereignty. Only earnest democratization and nation-building will ensure a stable future.

By Roman Muzalevsky

When the Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes this June threatened to undermine the regional security system, neither the regional security organizations (OSCE, CSTO, SCO) nor regional actors (Russia, the US, China, etc.) intervened militarily in Kyrgyzstan to restore stability. This, despite requests by the Kyrgyz Interim Government, which came to power following the government's overthrow in April, and dismal security conditions that left hundreds dead and led to the displacement of up to 400,000 people. Some2,500 homes, more than 100 commercial buildings and 10 government structures were either destroyed or severely damaged, with the overall financial damage estimated at $71 million.

The rehabilitation of infrastructure and housing may well take years. Inter-ethnic healing and trust-building will take decades. Fresh memories of the 1990 bloodshed between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz – when the Soviet Union was nearing its demise – are a testament to the difficulties that lie ahead. Currently, thousands of people of all ethnic affiliations are leaving either temporarily or permanently to settle in other countries.

Dealing effectively with the humanitarian catastrophe is therefore of paramount importance, not least because deteriorating living conditions will invite more instability, subverting the already weak national security system. Miroslav Niyazov, the former secretary of the Kyrgyz National Security Council, has emphasized the utterinadequacy of the national security system in Kyrgyzstan, where authorities still struggle to exercise full control.

Meanwhile, weak government institutions and daunting sociopolitical problems might yet enable regional terrorist and extremist organizations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, to vigorously promote their radical agenda amidst ongoing uncertainty. About one-third of the population in the country now lives below the poverty line. The already pronounced unemployment in the south is risingfurther following the global economic crisis and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes, expanding the pool of potential recruits.

Defining the Future

In these conditions the people of Kyrgyzstan should answer three questions when pondering the country’s future: how Kyrgyzstan wants to organize itself internally; in what regional environment it wants to live; and what it needs to do to achieve the first two. Failure to do so will put the country’s sovereignty at risk. As Kyrgyzstan seeks to pursue enduring stability, it should concentrate on the following short and long-term tasks.

The alleviation of the humanitarian catastrophe is indispensable, just as rehabilitation of infrastructure and reconstruction of the cities of Osh and Jalalabad is vital, with costs estimated at $230 and $245 million respectively. Ensuring food and energy security, with price tags of $50 and $170 million respectively, represent additional challenges in light of the projected budget deficit of $619 million, external debt of $145million in the next two years and a 30-48 percent reduction of the GDP in the country’s southern areas by the end of this year.

The $1.1 billion in donor’s assistance for humanitarian support and long-term development is therefore timely. Such aid, while tailored to local conditions, should come with strict oversight, to avoid widespread corruption. In 2009, Transparency International placed all Central Asian countries high on their corruption index, including Kyrgyzstan with a rank of 162, close to Somalia – the world’s most corrupt country with the rank of 180.

Ethnic reconciliation should be pursued vigorously as well. Engaging Kyrgyz and Uzbek community leaders, clamping down on abuses of power, relying on the OSCE police advisory group and cooperating with the recently formed international inquiry commission will promote a sense of justice and trust between the ethnic groups on the one hand, and the population and government institutions on the other.

Yet, all these efforts are ultimately for naught without a long-term national development plan and a commitment to democratization. Here, Kyrgyzstan must pursue military and educational reforms, as well as robust national ideology and economic integration programs.

Building the nation-state

Military institutions should not only be made more transparent and accountable to civilian control, they should also be freed from corruption, which leads to under-recruitment of minorities and ethnic Kyrgyz alike. The latter now constitute 95 percentof all military servicemen. The Uzbeks' distrust of military and law-enforcement institutions in general, and during the June clashes in particular, has partially stemmed from the proportionally low presence of Uzbeks within these structures. Yet, the military has traditionally served as a vehicle for promoting state loyalties everywhere. And so has education.

While educational policy is designed to serve the purposes of national development, in Kyrgyzstan it does not do so effectively. Financial constrains, lack of strategic vision and corruption have stood in the way. School textbooks printed in the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan and Russia are still used in many schools, while the ethnic Kyrgyz living in the north and south speak varying dialects of the Kyrgyz language.

Kyrgyz tribalism and weak state loyalties of ethnic minorities have further undermined national cohesion. The former creates north-south tensions both among the Kyrgyz clans struggling for power and the common people, while the latter makes any vision of a modern nation-state a fiction. The Uzbeks, who mostly live in the south and comprise about 14.3 percent, represent the largest minority group, followed by Russians who number around 7.8 percent. Some Uzbeks are even known to adhere to Uzbekistan’s time zone; the one hour time difference might seem a minor issue, but it signals a significant distinction in perceived reality.

People in the south also tend to appeal to Islam as their source of identity, unlike the people in the north who tend to exhibit secular orientations. All of these identity splits further exacerbate and feed on the country’s geographical and economic divisions. The relatively well-off north and poor south have been turned into frameworks distinguishing the advantaged from the disadvantaged.

Pursuing a visionary and constructive national ideology centered on the titular ethnic group and effective educational policy is therefore necessary to ensure national integrity.

Economic integration programs – focusing on trade, infrastructure investments and transportation – should also be utilized to facilitate nation-building. Some of the $1.1 billion in assistance should be used for this purpose where possible. Ironically, despite calls for Central Asian economic integration, no adequate progress has been made, even within Kyrgyzstan’s own borders. Currently, there are only 424.6 km of railways, with separate networks running in the north and south. The overall rail network is one of the smallest in the region and the least dense as well. Plans already exist to expand it, thereby connecting the north and south and opening an additional transit and trade corridor for Eurasian rail traffic. It is time to implement them.

The road system is no better, partly because of the mountainous terrain that extends over 90 percent of the country’s territory, and partly because of corruption, lack of vision and funding. Roads cover merely 34,000 km, with unpaved ones constituting nine percent. Four major roads occupy almost half of all roadways, with transport contributing just two-to-three percent to the country’s GDP.

The north and south are not sufficiently integrated. There is also only one usable yet poorly maintained highway linking the two regions, limiting trade and inter-regional interaction. This makes the country less successful in terms of internal development as a whole, and also highly vulnerable to potential secession. It is no coincidence that Uzbek calls for autonomy have resurfaced from time to time in the south. Yet, roads and economic integration programs – just as military and educational policy – can facilitate much needed national development and cohesion.

The Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes and recent political instability have underlined the imperative of rebuilding Kyrgyzstan. But such urgency is not confined solely to the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure. Nor does it exclusively entail ethnic reconciliation. The task of rebuilding is much bigger, and so are the stakes – the integrity and sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state. Only democratization, the fight against corruption, reforms in the military and educational sectors and strategic initiatives promoting internal economic integration and national cohesion hold the key to Kyrgyzstan’s lasting future.


Roman Muzalevsky is Program Manager of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center’s office in Washington, DC. His publications have appeared in the Yale Journal of International Affairs, Review of International Law and Politics, Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Eurasia Daily Monitor andCentral Asia-Caucasus Analyst.

He holds a Master's in Security and Strategy Studies from Yale University and a Diploma in International Affairs from the International Ataturk Ala-Too University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.


Who Owns America?




Contrary to popular belief, the lion share of wealth does not reside with a broad middle class.

Michael Parenti: Ph.D. in political science from Yale University has taught at several universities, colleges, and other institutions. He is the author of twenty books and many more articles. His works have been translated into at least seventeen languages.

Chinese dragon versus Indian tiger

China's military and diplomatic expansion points to an intensifying arms race between the world's two most populous countries, argues Rajeev Sharma.

China’s resurgence in recent years has jolted the leading powers of the world out of their stupor – and India’s case is no different. Today, forward-looking Indian mandarins are no longer obsessed with Pakistan. New Delhi has started developing strategic plans for dealing with China in 2020 or 2030. Many Indian think tanks are already working on this mission objective and those which are not are gearing up to it.

India is pursuing a China policy that America has practiced for long – emphasising cooperation with China while minimizing competition. It may be the politically correct strategy but it does precious little to counter China’s rapidly increasing military might. Of late, China has become more and more assertive in its diplomatic and military conduct in line with increasingly ambitious global objectives. India, Japan, the US and Russia are indeed mindful of the probable repercussions an increasingly powerful China would have on the international balance of power, particularly when Japan and the US seem unable to maintain their lead.

The Chinese infrastructure drive is an integral part of its “string of pearls” strategy vis-a-vis India. Three ports that China is building in India’s immediate neighbourhood – Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe in Myanmar and Hambantota in Sri Lanka – are important pearls in the Chinese string. China has a vibrant presence across South Asia. Besides Pakistan, with which China has a true strategic partnership, Beijing has emerged as a major player in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives. It has firmly entrenched itself in Myanmar (Burma), Mauritius and the Seychelles.

What transpired last month was an eye opener for China-watchers in the Indian government. On 5 August 2010,
The People’s Daily reported that two days previously “important combat readiness materials” (read missiles) of the Chinese Air Force were transported safely to Tibet via the Qinghai-Tibet Railway – the first time since such materials were transported to Tibet by railway. It is a clear demonstration by China of not just its technological competence but also its capability to mobilise in Tibet in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict. China already has four fully operational airports in Tibet (the last one started operations in July 2010) while the fifth is scheduled to be inaugurated in October 2010.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Navy’s recent seafaring activities and manoeuvres have revealed Beijing’s intention to increase its control of the maritime sea lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The latter is an obvious cause of concern for India. China’s new-found aggressive posturing and maritime territorial claims in South China Sea – which Beijing has begun to describe as an area of its “core interest”, a term that the Chinese have been using for Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang – is of no less concern.

China is building up its naval might in a big way. It is not just India that is confused and concerned about the real intent of Beijing. Japan, the US, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan are equally apprehensive. China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) was recently given a green light by the country’s highest military planning body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), to build two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. One aircraft carrier –
Varyag of the Kuznetsov class – is already under construction. All three aircraft carriers will be available to China by 2017 and will patrol the South China Sea, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. This will give the the Chinese Navy a blue-water capability to rival the US Navy.

India is far behind China's gargantuan defence capabilities. At the same time, New Delhi is not twiddling its thumbs and sitting idly. India has been conscious of rapidly growing Chinese military capabilities for well over a decade. In fact, the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, while speaking in the aftermath of the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests, had gone on record as saying that China was the number one threat for India.

In 1999, the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee approved a 30-year submarine construction plan under which 30 submarines were to be constructed. Construction work on at least four nuclear submarines is in full swing, while the indigenously made Arihant nuclear powered submarine has already been launched. India plans to have at least 30 submarines by 2030, but this target may prove to be too stiff. India’s submarine fleet is currently facing depletion and their number is expected to go down to 16 by 2012 with the decommissioning of two
Foxtrot submarines in the near future.

In March 2009, the Manmohan Singh government cleared Project 15B under which next generation warships are under various stages of construction. Besides, at least three
Kolkata class destroyers are under construction under Project 15A. Two aircraft carriers – INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov of Russia) and INS Vikrant – are under construction.

To strike a harmonious balance, the Indian Navy is in the process of beefing up its fleet of stealth frigates and has initiated several new projects in this regard.
Shivalikwill be India’s first stealth frigate of its class. The Sahyadri and Satpura class of frigates are under advanced stage of construction. All this is as per the government’s plans to maintain a force level of more than 140 warships.

China knows very well that it is not dealing with the India of 1962, when the two countries fought a one-sided war. Then India had deliberately not used its air force against the Chinese to minimize loss of territory and restrict Chinese military gains to the far-flung border areas. Though China retains a decisive lead, New Delhi is determined to stay on Beijing's heals.

Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation

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Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation
Thursday, 30 September 2010
Strategically, Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of the wider world and Australia’s local neighbourhood; what happens there matters to Australia. But the broader Asian security environment is in flux, and an era of strategic quiescence in Southeast Asia may be drawing to a close. Security trends there are increasingly being shaped by a set of global and broader Asian concerns as well as local ones. In consequence, traditional patterns of strategic influence and cooperation are shifting in Southeast Asia.

In this paper, Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defence Force Academy ‘unpacks’ four patterns of strategic influence in the region, assessing the interactions between them and what they mean for Australian strategic interests. Those patterns increasingly overlay in new and complex ways, ways that might undermine the stable, consultative Southeast Asia with which we have become so familiar.
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Carlyle A Thayer

Carlyle A Thayer is Professor of Politics in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University College, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has spent his entire career teaching in a military environment, first in the Faculty of Military Studies at The Royal Military College, Duntroon, (1979–85) and then at the Australian Defence Force Academy (1985–present). He was given leave ‘in the national interest’ to take up a senior post at the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, US Pacific Command, Hawaii (1999–2001). On return to Australia he was seconded to Deakin University as the on-site academic coordinator at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College (2002–04). After that he was appointed coordinator for the Regional Studies (Security) course at the Australian Command and Staff College (2006–07 and 2010). He was honoured by appointment as the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in 2005 and the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Center of International Studies at Ohio University in 2008. In January 2011 he will become an Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales. Professor Thayer is the author of over 400 publications including, most recently, Vietnam People’s Army: development and modernization (2009).

Important disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2010

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First published September 2010

Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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Thayer, Carlyle A.

Southeast Asia: patterns of security cooperation / Carlyle A. Thayer.

ISBN: 9781921302565 (html)

Includes bibliographical references.

Security, international—Southeast Asia.
Asian cooperation.
Southeast Asia—Defenses.

355.0310959

In the shadow of the East

C. Raja Mohan

n Posted: Wed Oct 06 2010, 04:12 hrs

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/in-the-shadow-of-the-east/693173/0

As preparations for US President Barack Obama̢۪s visit to India in early November gather momentum, Asia and its rapidly evolving geopolitics are emerging at the very top of the bilateral agenda.
Amidst the rise of China, Beijing̢۪s new tensions with Japan and the Southeast Asian nations and the search for stronger regional institutions, both Washington and Delhi are redoing their sums on Asian security.

As the conventional wisdom on Asia̢۪s peaceful rise begins to unravel, India and the United States are under some pressure to raise their game in the region. That in turn demands greater cooperation between Delhi and Washington in devising a new Asian order.

In a series of recent conversations with this writer in Washington, senior officials of the Obama administration welcomed India̢۪s expanding profile in East Asia and extended strong support to Delhi̢۪s Look East policy.



Under-Secretary of State William Burns said the US places â€Å“special emphasis on the role India plays in Asia in ensuring order, balance and security.†Contrary to the earlier fears in Delhi that Obama might look at India through the narrow prism of South Asia, his administration sees cooperation with India as important for the political future of East Asia.

â€Å“I think it is fair to say that the US does not characterise the engagement with India as confined to either South Asia or East Asia,†Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell told this writer. â€Å“Our discussion with India now covers the full range of issues relating to South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and global issues as well,†he underscored.

India too believes that the distinctions between East and South Asia can no longer be sustained. â€Å“We have global interests, the Chinese have global interests. All the major powers are not only interdependent on each other, but also are dealing with each other across a whole range of issues, none of which recognises some artificial geographical construct like South Asia or East Asia,†National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon told an audience in Washington last week.

For Delhi, the question can no longer be how to stop China from playing a larger role in the subcontinent, but how India can expand its own footprint in East Asia.

The Obama administration would like to see India step up the pace and scope of its engagement in Asia. â€Å“We fully support India’s Look East strategy. We recognise that all nations in Asia want closer partnerships with India,†Campbell said. â€Å“We would like to see India’s role in Asia manifest itself in terms that go beyond declarations of intent.â€

While China looms large over the new geopolitics of Asia, Washington does not see its engagement with the region in terms of a zero-sum game. The American emphasis, instead, is on deepening old alliances, building new partnerships, engaging China, and creating an enduring Asian security architecture. Similarly, India too wants to strengthen its cooperation with China while improving its own position in the Asian order.

â€Å“Multilateralism in Asia during the ’90s has been essentially trans-Pacific,†Campbell said. â€Å“During the last decade, it has become centred on pan-Asian integration. In the new phase, India, along with the US, must have a much larger role in shaping the Asian economic institutions and its security architecture.â€

ASEAN’s recent invitation to the US and Russia to join the East Asia Summit, the Obama administration believes, will create the â€Å“core of a new map†in Asia that might frame the international relations of the region in the future. The East Asia Summit currently includes the 10 member states of the ASEAN and six others — China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

For its part, India is welcoming the US entry into the East Asia Summit and is eager to engage it in the Asia Pacific. According to Menon, â€Å“Traditionally, India and the US have viewed each other across the Eurasian landmass and the Atlantic Ocean. We get a different perspective if we look across the Pacific, across a space that we share and that is vital to the security and prosperity of our two countries.â€

The Obama administration has already had two rounds of consultation with India on East Asian security issues at the level of senior officials. Both Washington and Delhi are pleased with the tenor and substance of their dialogue on East Asia and hope to institutionalise it.

As they deepen their regional security dialogue, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Obama have a few weeks of intensive diplomatic engagement ahead of them in Asia.

After spending nearly three days in India in early November, Obama will head to Indonesia, where he spent his childhood. Indonesian President Susilo Yudhoyono is expected to be the chief guest at India̢۪s Republic Day celebrations in January.

After Indonesia, Obama will head to South Korea and Japan, the long-standing US allies in Asia. In Seoul he will join the leaders of the G-20, who are gathering for the first time in Asia since the forum was created in 2008 to manage the global financial crisis.

Dr Singh will also travel to the G-20 meeting in Seoul in November and will have a chance to meet Obama. In October, he will participate in the East Asia Summit in Hanoi.

In what is expected to be a consequential bilateral visit to Japan in October, the two sides are likely to announce bilateral measures for trade liberalisation and reaffirm their commitment to deepen the strategic partnership.

A changing Asia, then, will be very much on the minds of President Obama and Prime Minister Singh when they meet in Delhi in a few weeks from now.

raja.mohan@expressindia.com

In the shadow of the East

C. Raja Mohan

n Posted: Wed Oct 06 2010, 04:12 hrs

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/in-the-shadow-of-the-east/693173/0

As preparations for US President Barack Obama̢۪s visit to India in early November gather momentum, Asia and its rapidly evolving geopolitics are emerging at the very top of the bilateral agenda.
Amidst the rise of China, Beijing̢۪s new tensions with Japan and the Southeast Asian nations and the search for stronger regional institutions, both Washington and Delhi are redoing their sums on Asian security.

As the conventional wisdom on Asia̢۪s peaceful rise begins to unravel, India and the United States are under some pressure to raise their game in the region. That in turn demands greater cooperation between Delhi and Washington in devising a new Asian order.

In a series of recent conversations with this writer in Washington, senior officials of the Obama administration welcomed India̢۪s expanding profile in East Asia and extended strong support to Delhi̢۪s Look East policy.



Under-Secretary of State William Burns said the US places â€Å“special emphasis on the role India plays in Asia in ensuring order, balance and security.†Contrary to the earlier fears in Delhi that Obama might look at India through the narrow prism of South Asia, his administration sees cooperation with India as important for the political future of East Asia.

â€Å“I think it is fair to say that the US does not characterise the engagement with India as confined to either South Asia or East Asia,†Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell told this writer. â€Å“Our discussion with India now covers the full range of issues relating to South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and global issues as well,†he underscored.

India too believes that the distinctions between East and South Asia can no longer be sustained. â€Å“We have global interests, the Chinese have global interests. All the major powers are not only interdependent on each other, but also are dealing with each other across a whole range of issues, none of which recognises some artificial geographical construct like South Asia or East Asia,†National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon told an audience in Washington last week.

For Delhi, the question can no longer be how to stop China from playing a larger role in the subcontinent, but how India can expand its own footprint in East Asia.

The Obama administration would like to see India step up the pace and scope of its engagement in Asia. â€Å“We fully support India’s Look East strategy. We recognise that all nations in Asia want closer partnerships with India,†Campbell said. â€Å“We would like to see India’s role in Asia manifest itself in terms that go beyond declarations of intent.â€

While China looms large over the new geopolitics of Asia, Washington does not see its engagement with the region in terms of a zero-sum game. The American emphasis, instead, is on deepening old alliances, building new partnerships, engaging China, and creating an enduring Asian security architecture. Similarly, India too wants to strengthen its cooperation with China while improving its own position in the Asian order.

â€Å“Multilateralism in Asia during the ’90s has been essentially trans-Pacific,†Campbell said. â€Å“During the last decade, it has become centred on pan-Asian integration. In the new phase, India, along with the US, must have a much larger role in shaping the Asian economic institutions and its security architecture.â€

ASEAN’s recent invitation to the US and Russia to join the East Asia Summit, the Obama administration believes, will create the â€Å“core of a new map†in Asia that might frame the international relations of the region in the future. The East Asia Summit currently includes the 10 member states of the ASEAN and six others — China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

For its part, India is welcoming the US entry into the East Asia Summit and is eager to engage it in the Asia Pacific. According to Menon, â€Å“Traditionally, India and the US have viewed each other across the Eurasian landmass and the Atlantic Ocean. We get a different perspective if we look across the Pacific, across a space that we share and that is vital to the security and prosperity of our two countries.â€

The Obama administration has already had two rounds of consultation with India on East Asian security issues at the level of senior officials. Both Washington and Delhi are pleased with the tenor and substance of their dialogue on East Asia and hope to institutionalise it.

As they deepen their regional security dialogue, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Obama have a few weeks of intensive diplomatic engagement ahead of them in Asia.

After spending nearly three days in India in early November, Obama will head to Indonesia, where he spent his childhood. Indonesian President Susilo Yudhoyono is expected to be the chief guest at India̢۪s Republic Day celebrations in January.

After Indonesia, Obama will head to South Korea and Japan, the long-standing US allies in Asia. In Seoul he will join the leaders of the G-20, who are gathering for the first time in Asia since the forum was created in 2008 to manage the global financial crisis.

Dr Singh will also travel to the G-20 meeting in Seoul in November and will have a chance to meet Obama. In October, he will participate in the East Asia Summit in Hanoi.

In what is expected to be a consequential bilateral visit to Japan in October, the two sides are likely to announce bilateral measures for trade liberalisation and reaffirm their commitment to deepen the strategic partnership.

A changing Asia, then, will be very much on the minds of President Obama and Prime Minister Singh when they meet in Delhi in a few weeks from now.

raja.mohan@expressindia.com