November 04, 2017

FreeBalochistan Billboards: Prof.Naela Quadri Baloch

FreeBalochistan Billboards: Prof.Naela Quadri Baloch

FreeBalochistan Campaign: Prof.Naela Quadri Baloch

Picture of the day: Baloch leader Prof.Naela Quadri Baloch

Concerns raised as China launches massive island-making vessel

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/631932/concerns-raised-as-china-launches-massive-island-making-vessel/story/


Published November 4, 2017 6:19pm 

By MARGARET CLAIRE LAYUG, GMA News

China has launched Asia's largest dredging vessel described by local media as a "magic island maker," the South China Morning Post reported on Saturday.

The vessel named Tian Kun Hao has begun its water tests at the coastal province of Jiangsu.

The ship was reported to have a deck the size of nine basketball courts capable of dredging up to 6,000 cubic meters an hour and can dig as deep as 35 meters under the sea floor.

It is also reportedly equipped with an advanced global positioning system.

Measuring 140 meters long and 28 meters wide, Tian Kun Hao replaces Tian Jing Hao as Asia's largest dredging vessel.

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Tian Jing Hao was reported to have been extensively used in building artificial islands in the South China Sea.

A maritime security expert was quoted by the South China Morning Post as saying the vessel could raise concern among nations with rival claims on territories in the South China Sea since it "suggests Beijing is preparing to reassert its dominance in the disputed waters."

“Creating such dredging technology could be part of China’s quest to become a maritime power,” Collin Koh of the Technology University in Singapore said.

According to the report, a Beijing-based military expert had eased concerns by assuring that “China will abide by the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea... and won’t use the dredger to expand its artificial islands.” 

According to Chinese media agency Xinhua, the ship is set to go into service in June next year. — MDM, GMA News

ASEAN's China Shift Puts Vietnam on Coast Guard


Photo Credit: Nguyen Minh / Reuters / 達志影像

Truong-Minh Vu

Truong-Minh Vu is a director of the Center for International Studies (SCIS) and Vice Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. His research interests encompass international and strategic relations of Southeast Asia.

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Why you need to know

China's growing influence in Southeast Asia leaves no country more isolated in terms of maritime strategy than Vietnam, and places increasing importance on the relationship with the United States and its impact on strengthening the Vietnam Coast Guard.

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Less than a year ago, former U.S. president Barack Obama announced his intent to completely lift the arms embargo imposed on Vietnam since 1975. Observers of the relationship have held both strong expectations and some trepidation over the trajectory of U.S.-Vietnam military relations since. Despite the complexities of the regional security environment and the sensitivities of the relationship between two former adversaries, it is fair to say that the current state of military partnership between them is at its highest point since diplomatic normalization in 1995.

This strategic military rapprochement, however, has gone largely unnoticed by the Vietnamese public, as they worry more about a United States less engaged in the Asia Pacific under the Donald Trump administration. A lack of faith in the administration to shape a sound and coherent Asia-Pacific strategy has shakennot only Vietnam, but also other alliances of the United States in the region.

For many Asian countries including Vietnam, the post-World War II system of laws and norms has ushered in a period of prosperity and stability previously unknown, and working together to protect that system is worth the challenges. The rise of an aggressive and powerful China (in both the military and economic senses), accompanied by Trump’s “America First” doctrine, have the potential to undermine the current regional structure and threaten the interests of smaller states, including U.S. regional allies and partners.

Recently, Vietnam’s strategy of delicately balancing the two superpowers has become more difficult to pull off, as several of its ASEAN neighbors have eagerly joined Chinese-led trade blocs and dispute-settling mechanisms. The balance of power in Southeast Asia has been quietly and gradually shifting in China’s favor, and perhaps no country feels it more than Vietnam. It is in this turbulent context that people seem to forget—or, more precisely, overlook—the rising significance of the military partnership between Vietnam and the United States.

U.S. Pacific Command laid out key areas of cooperation within the Vietnamese security architecture even before the arms embargo was lifted. The cooperation framework agreed upon in the September 2011 memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation includes security assistance and educational exchange between the U.S. and Vietnamese militaries. Unsurprisingly, much of the focus is on capacity building. Two distinctive areas stand out: strengthening the capacities of the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) and improving Vietnam’s readiness in participating international peacekeeping operations. On May 22, U.S. ambassador to Vietnam Ted Osius officially delivered six 45-foot Metal Shark patrol boats to the VCG. Four days later, just before Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc arrived in Washington for an official visit, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) transferred a high-endurance cutter to the VCG during a ceremony in Honolulu.

The former Hamilton-class cutter "Morgenthau" now named CBS-8020, became the largest coast guard vessel currently in the VCG’s service. There are also rumors that more vessels of this type will be transferred to the VCG in the future. Several training programs run by the USCG have commenced, improving and strengthening the VCG’s capabilities in search and rescue missions and other maneuverability procedures.

On peacekeeping operations, on Aug. 28, a dedication ceremony in Hanoi marked the transfer of a peacekeeping training centerfrom U.S. ownership to Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense. Along with the center, the U.S government also provided support setting up Vietnam’s first level-two field hospital. Soon after, Vietnamese peacekeeping forces conducted a running exercise of the field hospital to evaluate readiness before deployment to South Sudan.

How does all of this factor into the security partnership between Vietnam and the U.S.? We have long pointed out that the VCG has become an important element of Vietnam’s maritime strategy in light of the growing naval asymmetries with China in the South China Sea. The VCG was initially established as a means of alleviating the burden put on the navy in peacetime, but in current use also enables routine enforcement of the maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction rights granted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Vietnam is, therefore, trying to mimic the Chinese use of “white-hull” forces as a method of resisting encroachment into Vietnamese waters.

Utilizing the VCG in this way also minimizes the military and political costs of direct confrontation, should such incidents spiral up into crises. This opens the way for the government, and the party, to negotiate directly with China or other involved parties. The VCG also helps defend Vietnamese fishermen against China’s maritime militia forces masquerading as fishermen. This approach has proven successful in maintaining Vietnam’s effective control in the disputed waters and dealing with unexpected incidents at sea under pressure from China’s maritime forces.

Accordingly, most military and security cooperation between Vietnam and the U.S. has focused on those non-traditional areas. With Vietnam’s increased investment in its coast guard and need to establish a cohesive maritime strategy with the VCG at its heart, the United States is poised to play a decisive supporting role. Vietnam’s strategic trajectory thus far fits closely with the 2011 MoU on defense cooperation, leaving the door open to continued, enhanced guidance. Vietnamese elites supporting stronger Vietnam-U.S. military cooperation seek to establish a more determined and concrete presence in U.S. policy planning circles through the strategic partnership established in 2013. Pragmatists pushing for the relationship to focus more on practical, less sensitive areas like non-traditional security issues are similarly open to greater cooperation along those lines.

Though the public is not privy to such discussions, Vietnamese naval and strategic experts continue to debate Vietnam’s naval strategy, and maritime coordination strategy, extensively. In order for these aforementioned points to be realized, however, inclusive and active participation of the public—and civilian experts—is needed. Early results can be seen in Vietnam’s ambitious plans to massively upgrade its coast guard and to build up a coherent code of conduct to integrate the operation of the VCG and its counterpart in the armed forces.

The News Lens has been authorized to republish this article from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, an interactive, regularly-updated source for information, analysis, and policy exchange on maritime security issues in Asia. The original can be found here.

November 03, 2017

Oil losses could bankrupt the Iraqi Kurds

https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB225469/Oil-losses-could-bankrupt-the-Iraqi-Kurds

Tuesday, October 31, 2017

The resignation of Kurdish President Masoud Barzani underlines the extent of the post-referendum debacle

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim today announced that Iraqi government forces had taken control of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Turkey -- although Kurdish officials deny this. The border crossing is close to the vital oil pipeline tie-in at Fish-Khabur, where the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil export pipeline meets the federal pipeline (currently not operational) and continues through Turkey to the Ceyhan export terminal. Controlling this has been a key prize in recent fighting near Rabia, as well as in the US-mediated negotiations that followed a October 27 ceasefire.

What next

The fallout from the KRI's September 25 referendum will be devastating for the economy of the autonomous region, which is heavily oil-dependent. After losing most fields near Kirkuk (with another, Khurmala, still potentially under threat), the KRI will struggle to maintain production at current levels of 350,000 barrels/day (b/d). Control of Fish-Khabur could enable Baghdad to block Kurdish pipeline exports altogether, or set harsh conditions on their continuance. Expansion of gas production and exports, which had been looking more promising recently, will stall again. Even in the best-case scenario, revenues will be insufficient to cover public sector and military salaries, let alone debt payments to foreign oil companies.

Subsidiary Impacts

The KRG will urgently seek a revenue-sharing deal with Baghdad to avoid economic collapse, but it is in a very weak negotiating position.If Baghdad takes control of the pipeline, covert ‘trucking’ of oil exports by various parties in the KRI will likely increase.Federal Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will gain strength ahead of April’s parliamentary elections.

Analysis

Despite a 93% vote in favour, the secession referendum attracted near-universal condemnation, not only from Baghdad and regional players Ankara and Tehran, but also from Washington. Only Moscow was ambiguous in its attitude, perhaps reflecting planned hydrocarbons investments, but more likely as part of a wider bargaining game with Iraq and Turkey.

Domestically, the aftermath weakened Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), forcing his resignation on October 29 (see IRAQ: New offensive may crush Kurdish hopes - October 26, 2017). It also opened deep divisions with the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and other political groupings, which he accused of "high treason" in his resignation speech, resulting in attacks on party offices and journalists.

Oil grab

Abadi took advantage of KDP-PUK tensions to move military forces into Kirkuk on October 16, retaking the city and oilfields that had been controlled by the KRG since its peshmerga fighters moved in ahead of Islamic State (IS) in June 2014 (see IRAQ: Kirkuk clashes could spread - October 16, 2017).

ZOOM 

On October 25, the Iraqi army and allied Shia militias also began to move towards Khurmala (the northern part of the Kirkuk field, operated by Kurdish company KAR) and the pipeline tie-in at the border point of Fish-Khabur. The peshmerga put up fierce resistance, aware of the economic significance of these two locations.

65%

Loss of former KRI oil output

The KRI has lost access to 440,000 b/d of oil production from Kirkuk and surrounding fields. If Khurmala is also taken by federal forces, the KRI will lose a further 115,000 b/d from its remaining 350,000 b/d. Moreover, all its remaining exports are under threat if Baghdad takes full control of Fish-Khabur and either cuts the pipeline or demands that it should control and distribute all of Iraq's oil revenue as a condition of keeping it flowing.

ZOOM 

The KRI's own fields and Khurmala provide an estimated 400 million dollars/month of oil revenues. This is not sufficient to meet KRG budget commitments of 700 million dollars, on top of which the government must pay oil company costs and reimburse pre-payments by oil traders as well as other debts. The KRG's total debt is now about 23 billion dollars.

Kurdish hydrocarbons outlook

There had been some positive developments for KRI oil and gas in mid-2017.

In July, the Atrush field started production with an initial target of 30,000 b/d.In August, the KRG reached arbitration and restructuring deals ending disputes with former partners, encouraging the Pearl Petroleum consortium to agree to reinvest in the KRI.The government boosted cooperation with Rosneft, borrowing up to 3 billion dollars in oil pre-payments, and in September signing a deal for the Russian company to take an interest in five exploration blocks, purchase 60% of the region's oil export pipeline and build a 30-billion-cubic-metre/year gas pipeline to Turkey (see TURKEY/IRAQ: Kurdish ambitions could benefit Russia - July 24, 2017).

There is no money to repay oil-related debts

However, this hopeful outlook has evaporated following the loss of Kirkuk. Even if it retains control of remaining fields, the KRI will be unable to make payments due to Rosneft and other hydrocarbons firms.

This will prevent any further expansion of production and deter new investments. The gas export project, which could have been worth around 300 million dollars/month by 2022, now looks extremely unlikely, given new Turkish hostility to the KRG.

International oil firms are unsurprisingly losing enthusiasm.

Production was already collapsing at Genel/Sinopec's Taq Taq field, once the region's flagship, because of overestimated reserves (see IRAQ: Wary investors will limit Kurdish oil output - February 20, 2017).Gazprom Neft had also left the Halabja block for geological reasons.ExxonMobil has relinquished another, while the Bashiqa block held by DNO and ExxonMobil is in disputed territories that are now lost to the KRI.Chevron has ceased drilling over security concerns.

Iraqi Kirkuk oil outlook

Production stopped when KAR left the Kirkuk fields; federal engineers need information and new equipment before they can restart. Moreover, Baghdad needs an agreement for these fields safely to resume exports via the pipeline through KRI territory.

In the short term, it has few alternatives. Iraq's Baiji refinery is too badly damaged to take the oil. Federal Oil Minister Jabar Ali al-Luaibi has announced plans to reopen Iraq's Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, but this also needs major repair work after repeated attacks by IS.

However, the federal government is confident. Luaibi unexpectedly asked oil major BP to return to working on increasing output from Kirkuk, which they had previously studied in 2013 for the federal oil ministry. As operator (with CNPC) of Iraq's largest producing field, Rumaila, in the south, the company is likely to consider the request favourably.

The federal government has most leverage in oil negotiations

Iraq has already increased its large southern production of over 4 billion barrels/day to make up for Kirkuk losses. It is therefore under no great pressure to reach a deal with the KRI, particularly as this would mean breaching its OPEC commitments by even more than currently.

With the Kurds under pressure, Baghdad is likely to drive a hard bargain, seeking:

federal regulation of exports;a return of the State Oil Marketing Organisation's control over exports from the Ceyhan terminal; anda favourable revenue-sharing deal where Baghdad receives the money for oil sales and then disburses the agreed share to the KRI.

Such a deal would be highly problematic for the oil companies that have been making deals with the KRI. Baghdad might agree to reimburse their costs, but not to pay their profits or settle debts, because it considers the production-sharing contracts they work under illegal. The KRI, for its part, would be unlikely to be able to pay them from its reduced allocation.

The massive loss of oil revenue could also destabilise the KRI by disrupting patronage networks on which the main political parties -- especially, in recent years, the dominant KDP -- heavily depend

October 31, 2017

India :Ease of Doing Business ranking 100

* Ease of Doing Business ranking improved from 130 during last year to 100 this year. Mind you, GST is not yet factored in this ranking.

* India's 30-place elevation is the highest jump that any country has ever made in this index

* The country improved its ranking on six out of the 10 parameters used to judge ease of doing business, becoming the only large economy to do so this year

* India is seeking to reach the 90th rank in 2017-18 and 30th by 2020

* Since the Modi government assumed power in 2014, Ease of Doing Business ranking improved from 142 to 100 today.

* China's rank did not improve, even though its Distance to Frontier (DTF) score increased by 0.40 points. India's DTF score is at 60.76, a mega jump of 4.71 points from last year

* This result is no reason for complacency as the govt already recognised the areas of improvement

*This is only possible with Modi's Juggernaut*

Congress, it's time you stop all your rallies for elections and rally behind Modi to save your face.

http://www.livemint.com/Companies/icjVbgr3PteKYupZlzwOtN/India-jumps-to-100th-spot-in-World-Banks-ease-of-doing-busi.html

October 30, 2017

Pakistani Millitary abduct Dr.Allah Nazar Wife and Daughter

#Baloch leader @DrAllahNizar’s.wife, Fazeela and adopted daughter PopalJan were abducted by Pakistani forces today from Quetta. Baloch Diplomacy strongly condemn this dastardly act by Pakistani Millitary and Establishment for violating international law , it is the responsibility of Pakistan to ensure Safety and Security of all.

The Twists and Turns along China’s Belt and Road

30/10/2017 Michael Kovrig Economy

Image courtesy of Pilar Rubio Remiro/Flickr. (CC BY 2.0)

This article was originally published by International Crisis Group on 2 October 2017.

“The project of the century” is how Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi touted the Belt and Road Initiative to the world when addressing the UN General Assembly on 21 September. It was only the latest in a series of pronouncements and events, including a Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May and the ninth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit in Xiamen in early September, choreographed to position China at the vanguard of a new stage of globalisation. Step by step, China is demonstrating that the Belt and Road is now the guiding framework for its international economic statecraft.

Formally launched in 2013, the vision combines a Silk Road Economic Belt along the ancient Eurasian routes, a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean, and other Asian transportation corridors, logistics hubs and investments. China hopes to construct a network that will connect remote economies and drive renewed prosperity. Collectively dubbed the Belt and Road, these existing and proposed projects leverage China’s strengths—vast reserves of capital, business savvy, engineering expertise, and production and construction capacity—to generate geopolitical influence and reshape trade patterns.

The Belt and Road is conceived of as a multipurpose umbrella for foreign policy and domestic development. It is both a means to open markets, export overcapacity, generate employment, reduce regional inequalities, promote political stability and security through prosperity, as well as ultimately restore China’s spheres of influence to their historic highs. It is estimated to involve a trillion dollars in projected financing.

Many observers are understandably sceptical of such an ambitious, expensive and risky vision. While China’s remote borderlands showcase world-class domestic transportation infrastructure and special trade and economic zones, the condition of roads and other structures declines abruptly beyond China’s frontiers. Such situations frustrate a China that has depended on international trade for its stunning rise and is now facing slowing GDP and diminishing returns on investment at home. There is a sense of ambition and economic dynamism – or at least a slowing simulacrum of it based on state-financed fixed asset investment – bursting at China’s seams. The hope is that by exporting its economic model to over 60 countries across Eurasia, Africa and beyond, and fostering alternate routes to Europe, it can rekindle global and domestic growth.

Navigating Regional Relations

To put its vision into practice, China will have to reckon with many twists in the Belt and turns in the Road. It will take more than public relations, propaganda and public pronouncements to persuade many participants that the economic benefits outweigh their apprehensions about China’s expanding geopolitical footprint.

The starkest example is China’s border with North Korea, where a recent Crisis Group research trip was rattled when it coincided with Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test at Punggye-ri on 3 September. China has set up trade and processing zones around the border cities of Dandong, Yanji and Hunchun and linked them to the provincial capitals with high-speed rail. The missing link is access to the sea through North Korea’s Rason port. For now, these plans are stalled by international sanctions and increasingly frosty relations between Beijing and a truculent Pyongyang that seems to loathe China while paradoxically depending on it for survival.

While North Korea marches to its own drumbeat, frictions elsewhere are a direct result of China’s own growing power and presence. Beijing has often struck an assertive, even aggressive tone that is discordant with the Belt and Road’s peaceful message. This has manifested through a growing strategic rivalry with the U.S. and its allies, maritime sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and pressure on South Korea over the deployment of America’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. At home, China’s increasingly restrictive national security laws and persistent barriers to market entry have cooled the ardour of many foreign companies to do business in China. Together, these policies stoke tension, fear and mistrust that undercut China’s Belt and Road overtures.

The recent Himalayan border standoff with India in Doklam, a contested territory on the border between China and Bhutan, is but the latest illustration that while roads can connect, they can also divide. Although the spat was hastily patched up ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at the September BRICS summit, it underlined how Beijing’s new ambitions on land and sea have unnerved India with fears it could be encircled while its neighbours are co-opted – even as many in New Delhi say that the economic relationship with China is valuable. India’s challenge is to balance the geopolitical and economic aspects of the relationship. As in the South China Sea, Chinese construction activities in the Himalayas have acquired an ominous strategic shadow for its neighbours.

Relations with another BRICS representative, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, are much warmer thanks to good personal chemistry with President Xi Jinping, a regular schedule of bilateral meetings, and increasingly aligned interests due to Russia’s estrangement from Europe and simmering disputes with Washington. But despite the friendly optics, Xi and Putin have complicated issues to manage, particularly in Central Asia where their two initiatives – China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union– have divergent purposes and priorities and face many obstacles. Despite having committed to cooperating in principle, China and Russia could see increased rivalry due to competing visions.

Still, the example of Russia and Central Asia suggests the BRICS and other participants in the Belt and Road have an opportunity to shape China’s rise along a path of mutual benefits. This will require governments to take the initiative seriously and be strategic about their responses, weighing both economic and political implications. While each country pursues its own interests on the Belt and Road, they may also find it helpful to share insights and best practices on engaging with increasingly influential Chinese actors.

Expertise First, Development Second

Applied wisely, the Belt and Road and supporting institutions could be vehicles for China to play an increasingly important, cooperative and beneficial role in the international system. The bulk of financing is likely to come from the China Development Bank, China Exim Bank, New Silk Road Fund and state banks. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank can add global expertise and legitimacy as well as funding. Together, they could enable China to deploy capital, technology and engineering capacity to help millions escape poverty, just as it has done at home. But this will have to be balanced with factors at the country and local level. Belt and Road projects will have to contend with a myriad of complex political, security and social situations. These include terrorism, violent extremism, inter-ethnic tensions, xenophobia, brittle authoritarian regimes, and political systems and behaviours that perpetuate high levels of corruption and inequality.

China’s basic premise is that economic development will alleviate these problems. In some ways it may, but if prosperity is unequally shared, local communities are not consulted on projects that affect them, and reforms of institutions and systems of governance fail to keep pace with inflows of investment, then the Belt and Road could make fragile situations worse. Some Chinese analysts argue that so long as the interests of ruling elites in Belt and Road countries are aligned with China’s, problems can be managed. History suggests otherwise. No wonder many of China’s own enterprises are cautious about putting costly and uncertain Belt and Road projects on their balance sheets. As illustrated in our report, China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan, Beijing’s investments in insecure places come with complex risks and dilemmas that challenge its traditional aversion to intervention.

To mitigate those risks, China and its partners will need to deepen their understanding of neighbouring countries and situations, and be more transparent, inclusive and accountable in implementing projects. This could include: consistently engaging with affected communities; taking their interests into account; assessing the political as well as economic implications of projects; and ensuring that benefits are not simply divided as spoils among unaccountable elites in backroom deals. Just as necessary will be to study the drivers of terrorism and appeal of extremist ideologies, and investing in more nuanced policy responses. Crisis Group’s research illuminates many of these challenges in Belt and Road countries across South East AsiaSouth AsiaCentral Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Our research on Jihad in Modern Conflict also has relevant insights for counter-terrorism across much of the Belt and Road.

Companies, financial institutions and other organisations involved in Belt and Road projects will have to be more rigorous in assessing and addressing political and security risks. Quantitative metrics and vague strategic frameworks are not enough. It requires extensive field research, engaging on the ground and making qualitative judgements. China’s own capacity to assess political and country risk is not keeping pace with its sprinting ambitions. To rectify that, Beijing should empower its policymakers, universities and think-tanks to engage freely with foreign counterparts and provide frank assessments of pitfalls and policy flaws.

Through his vision of a new Silk Road, President Xi has invoked the potent historical imagery of China as a pole of commerce, prosperity and stability. He and his advisers would do well to also draw inspiration from another high point in China’s long history – the Tang Dynasty, which flourished in large part because of its cultural and intellectual openness to the world. By ensuring that its policies and actions live up to the lofty rhetoric, China has a chance to truly foster the soft power, influence and admiration that it clearly seeks.

About the Author

Michael Kovrig is a Senior Advisor on North East Asia at International Crisis Group.

56 Baloch abducted by Pakistan army in Balochistan and Sindh

 بلوچ سرمچار

4 mins ago

Reports from Balochistan and Sindh confirm 56 Baloch abducted and forcible disappeared in a few days. The detailed report is as follows:

On 28 October 2017Nawaz Atta, the information secretary of Baloch Human Rights Organization (BHRO), a Balochistan based human rights group was abducted along with eight others from Karachi. The abductees include eight years old Aftab Younis, 17 years old Abid Ashraf, 17 years old Farhad Anwar, 18 years old Sajjad Yar Jan, Ulfat Altaf, Rawat Taj Muhammad, Muhammad Arif Muhammad Younis and Ilyas Faiz Muhammad.

On 28 October 2017, security forces abducted six persons from Chitkan and Airport road Panjgur district Panjgur. Abductees are Murshid Muhammed Baksh resident of Chitkan Panjgur, Salim Khuda Bakhsh, Pir Bakhsh Issa, Khaliq Dad Mengal, Asad Jamal and Issa Raza, residents of Gichk Panjgur. Khan Muhammad was abducted by security forces from Faqir Colony district Gwadar and Khalil Faiz Mihammad was abducted from Teerandask area of Dasht district Kech on the same day.

Waris Baloch

On 27 October 2017, Waris Baloch, resident of Kohad Tump district Kech was abducted from Naval Colony Karachi.

On 27 October 2017, Sadiq Misteri Khan Muhammad was abducted by security forces from Faqir Colony district Gwadar.

On 27 October 2017, ten persons were abducted by security forces from Balgatar District Kech. Abductees are Amin Bahad, Muhammed Jan Abdullah, Hatum Abdullah, Sakhi Dad Shambay, Jumma Karim Bakhsh, Dad Jan Sakhi Dad, Imran Mayar, Riaz Mayar, Saleh Muhammad Mubarak and Abdullah Mubarak.

On 26 October 2017, Zain Babu, a shopkeeper was abducted by security forces from Nizar Abad Tump district Kech.

On 25 October 2017, two brothers, Ahmed and Muhammad Haibtan were abducted by security forces from Malir Karachi, the capital city of Sindh.

On 23 October 2017, Security forces abducted Yousuf Mula Dawood from a playground in Mand district Kech.

On 22 October 2017, security forces from Mundi Gwadar district Gwadar abducted three brothers, Masdak, Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Jan Assa. While Wahag Baiyan and Zahid Gorich, residents of Shapkol Kolwah district Kech were abducted by the security forces in Askani Bazar Aapsar district kech.

On 20 October 2017, seven persons were abducted by security forces from Kark-e-Dal, Gichk district Panjgur. Abductees are Khuda Bakhsh Arz Muhammad, Aslam Khuda Bakhsh, Issa Lashkaran, Mubarak Gul Muhammad, Muhammad Jan Dawood, Mazar Mir Khan and Hussain Mir Khan.

Shah Nawaz Jalal Khan

On 20 October 2017, two teenagers, Qadir Bakhsh Khair Muhammed and Shah Nawaz Jalal Khan, residents of Shuli District Dasht were abducted during a house to house search operation in Bilal Mosque area of district Gwadar.

On 19 October 2017, Manzor Gulam Qadir was abducted by security forces in Balgatar district kech, when he was traveling from Kech to Panjgur.

On 19 October 2017, a 70 years old man, Karim Bakhsh Jumma was abducted by security forces from Thank Shardoui Mashkay district Awaran.

On 18 October 2017, Ghani Master Liaqat resident of Surag Damb bazar, Bal Negwar Dasht district Kech was abducted by security forces from Zero point Pasni district Gwadar and Yousuf Sarwar and Dad Shah Munir were abducted from during another military operation on same day.

Javed Akhtar

On 17 October 2017, security forces abducted Javed Akhtar, residents of Paroom District Panjgur from Malant, Tump district Kech during house to house search operation while the Frontier Corps abducted Arif Rasool Bakhsh from Bostan Pullabad Tump district Kech, during a same kind of military operation on the same day.

On 16 October 2017, as per received reports from Jinnani Bazar in Gadduki-Koh area of Bal Negwar, Dasht district Kech, two teenagers, Saghir Hasil and Nadim Ali Akbar were abducted by security forces.

All the abductees are forcibly disappeared by the powerful Pakistan army and their whereabouts are still undisclosed.

Courtesy: hakkpaan.org