IntelliBriefs

From the Other Media: What Path Are We Going to Follow

2012-01-27T07:49:00.000-08:00

http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/93/bodyView/1897304/From.the.Other.Media:.What.Path.Are.We.Going.to.Follow.html

From the Other Media: What Path Are We Going to Follow To improve its economy, Iran should avoid moving in the path trodden during the past two decades. Mohsen Rezaee.

Twenty-three years ago, when war with Saddam Hussein finally came to an end, I asked myself this question: is our challenge with the West finally over, or is it going to resume? But for me, the more consequential question was that in case of resumption, what form would it take?. It did not take long to find the answer to both questions: our challenge with the West would go on, in both the economic and cultural domains.

The Reconstruction Era

Immediately after the end of the war, the reconstruction venture was initiated, and my friends and I [in the Revolutionary Guards] rendered full-scale assistance to the government. Hundreds of highways, dams and bridges were constructed across the country; but I found out that our economy would not reach a desirable point, even if thousands of projects were accomplished. The Iranian economy’s problems could not be solved with the prescribed models of Reza Shah (1), Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami or Ahmadinejad.

I was thinking then what would happen if we failed in our economic endeavor and faced an economic war afterwards. Such worries encouraged me to return to the university and change my major from mechanical engineering in the Iranian University of Science and Technology to economic studies in the University of Tehran, so that I could be of more effective help to the country’s officials.

Thanks to the détente policy [of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami], the economic war was deferred for years; nonetheless, I was still engrossed with Iran's economic plans. I saw how South Korean workers and Indian physicians were leaving Iran, as the economies of their own countries were outpacing ours. It did not take long before the corrupt culture and value system of the Pahlavi regime –either rooted out or oppressed by the Islamic Revolution- resurfaced. It was not the time for me to stay in the Sepah anymore. I left the organization [in 1997], but to date, I have been unable to achieve what we had, with support from revolutionary forces, in the domains of security and defense [during the 8-year war with Iraq]. Following the ouster of revolutionary groups from administrative affairs, citizens were also all but barred from politics. Even during the heyday of the “civil society” discourse [in Khatami's era], citizens were merely engaged in politics. But this is no time to rake up the old arguments. So let’s get to the core of the issue:

What should be done?

Today, despite sixteen years of détente policy, an economic war between Tehran and Washington has broken out. As the third confrontation between Iran and the West, this war began its development in the days of George W. Bush, and moved on to a more adverse pitch during Obama's tenure, particularly since two years ago.

After a four-year moratorium, Iran’s political establishment and the Supreme Leadership picked up the gauntlet and inaugurated an era of proactive, resistance-based policy via Ahmadinejad's administration, after a period of endurance. In this struggle, both Iran and the US have pressed each other for compromise, though Iran has –inadvertently- helped the Americans by self-boycotting itself economically [by sidelining the citizens], and inflicting harm on itself politically.

Despite all the squandered opportunities, the Iranian nation has yet the chance to come out of this war as the victorious side, provided that the officials and political parties dispense with their sweet dreams and think of a strategic plan. This plan should zero in on certain objectives including:

1. An economic leap, sustained employment and the eradication of unemployment;
2. Neutralization of the economic war and the West’s sanctions;
3. Reinforcement of ties with the Islamic Awakening movement and the new regimes coming to power in the region;
4. Active, constructive and effective diplomacy.

This strategy, however, calls for returning citizens back onto the stage. Problems will pile up as long as reconstruction and economic war remain out of the citizens’ zone of activity. The state of gold and foreign exchange markets that we are witnessing today is just a product [of our economic conduct], impossible to be cured by short-lived painkillers. It has been twenty years now that except for politics, citizens have been sidelined in economic and cultural domains. Two possible means to return citizens to the scene are worth pondering:

1. The first model follows what took place in South Korea, China and Japan: administration of economic affairs is assigned to a seven-man strong team. This team should be qualified for carrying out this transformation, and should have a viable plan.

2. The second model patterns itself on Iranians’ participation during the Islamic Revolution and the Sacred Defense [against Saddam Hussein’s invasion.] This model calls for a genuine, not cosmetic, economic jihad and the return of the spirit of devotion instead of power- or wealth-mongering.

I want to know which model Iranian statesmen are willing to adopt, since there lies no benefit in following the methods applied during the past two decades, however effective they were in their own time.

(1) The first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty who followed an authoritarian model of modernizing Iran.

* Mohsen Rezaee is former chief commander of IRGC and the current Secretary of the Council of Expediency Discernment, where he serves as Hashemi Rafsanjani’s aide. He holds a doctorate degree in economics from the University of Tehran. This piece was originally published in Persian on Rezaee’s official website.

23 Monday January 2012 13:28

Taliban diplomats arrive in Qatar

2012-01-27T07:44:00.000-08:00

By Ben Farmer, Kabul9:00PM GMT 26 Jan 2012
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9041544/Taliban-diplomats-arrive-in-Qatar.html

A team of senior Taliban diplomats has arrived in Qatar in preparation for the opening of a political office to host negotiations between America, the insurgents and the Afghan government.

The envoys from the former regime have assembled in the past month and the first tentative talks could begin within weeks according to former Taliban officials now part of Hamid Karzai's peace council.

A Taliban declaration earlier this month that the movement would open an office "to come to an understanding with other nations" is seen as the most significant political breakthrough in ten years of conflict.

The delegation was apparently granted safe passage to the Gulf state despite several members still being on a United Nations' sanctions blacklist banning international travel.

It includes Tayeb Agha, former secretary to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, who has acted as go-between with American and German diplomats for more than a year.
He is joined by Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, a former deputy foreign minister, and Shahabuddin Delawar, a former envoy to Riyadh, according to Mohammed Qalamuddin.

Mr Qalamuddin, once chief of the Taliban's "vice and virtue" police, told The Daily Telegraph the envoys were all well-educated, fluent in English and considered moderate, but committed to the movement.

He suggested all had travelled with the knowledge of Nato and the United States, though added Taliban figures were also able to flout travel sanctions easily by using counterfeit passports.

Abdul Hakim Mujahid, deputy leader of the peace council and the Taliban's envoy to the UN at the time of the September 11 attacks, said one of his secretaries from New York, Sohail Shaheen, was also in Qatar.

The delegation was completed by Hafiz Aziz Rahman, the Taliban's third secretary in Abu Dhabi before 2001, who has lived in Qatar for several years.
"He played a very important role in this process," said Mr Mujahid. "They have all moved there," he added.

Western sources confirmed the men were believed to be either in Qatar, or heading there, and the delegation made a "plausible" negotiating team.

Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban, would not comment on the names, but confirmed a "preliminary" delegation was in Qatar.

Diplomats in Kabul have stressed the office is not finally agreed and any resulting talks would likely take years, but have expressed cautious optimism that it may pave the way to a peace process.

By opening the movement to face-to-face scrutiny, they argue it will force the Taliban to articulate their demands and make it harder for them to continue an indiscriminate bombing campaign.

However deep mistrust remains on all sides.Marc Grossman, American special envoy to the region, this week said during a visit to Kabul that he wanted clear statements from the Taliban that they had distanced themselves from international terrorism and were committed to a political settlement.

Others fear the Taliban still calculate they can defeat Nato by simply waiting for troops to withdraw. They argue the office is a ploy to buy time, or that it will only be used for fund-raising in the Gulf.

Davood Moradian, professor of political science at the American University of Afghanistan and a former aide to Mr Karzai, said the West and Afghans "had scored three own goals" by agreeing to it.

"We have given them political space, we have provided them with another source of funding and undermined the anti-Taliban forces," he said.

Mr Karzai's inner circle are suspicious the office is an American attempt to cut a secret deal behind their backs and Kabul withdrew its ambassador to Doha in protest at the lack of consultation.

The Taliban also doubt America is genuine about negotiation, Mr Mujahid said, and have demanded the release of five senior leaders from Guantanamo Bay as a confidence-building measure.

Bloodshed is likely to continue even if the office opens as both Nato and the militants first continue their military campaigns to try and strengthen their bargaining positions.Mr Mujahid said: "I think this is natural. Each side will try to show their superiority on the battlefield. This is the nature of the battlefield and the conflict, that each side try and show itself stronger."

The West’s All-Out Economic War on Iran

2012-01-26T08:37:00.000-08:00

IRD discusses toughening sanctions against Iran in an interview with Head of the World Trade Center of Iran

http://irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/20/bodyView/1897247/The.West%E2%80%99s.All.Out.Economic.War.on.Iran.html

The age of wars on battlefields is over. In the last decade, the US and its European allies instigated two unfruitful wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, leading them to apprehend their wars’ ineffectiveness. “Soft” wars like cyber attacks as well as economic and political sanctions have found a special place in the American creed.

Due to its nuclear program, Iran has been subject to economic sanctions both from the East and the West. Nevertheless, during the last year Tehran has seen even tougher sanctions that could be interpreted as a form of invisible war on the country. IRD discusses the problem with Mohammad-Reza Sabzalipour:

IRD: Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran relentlessly faced sections imposed by Western countries. In your opinion, how are the recent sanctions different from before? And can we agree that the recent sanctions have taken a new form?

MS: Yes. Since its establishment, due to differences between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the US, the Senate has passed laws on sanctions on Iran that were approved and signed by US presidents. Since then, this has turned into a routine event and every year sanctions get reapproved and re-signed by members of the US government.

During the past couple of years however, particularly in recent months, new differences between the two countries resulted in unprecedented sanctions and resolutions from the US, Europe and even the UN Security Council. By taking a closer look and a careful analysis of the flow of recent events, we discover new realities and hidden agendas within the recent sanctions imposed on Iran.

Closely considering the events that have taken place during the past 30 years regarding Iran, I personally believe what really has occurred are not sanctions but political and economic pressures from the US on Iran. These pressures were solely a sign of US unfriendliness and anger toward Iran.

The majority of Iran’s high-level political figures however, agree that foreign pressure on Iran did not significantly delay Iran’s economic and political growth, and in a way it is a blessing in disguise as it reinforces Iran’s independence, industrial innovation, and growth. Even throughout the Iran-Iraq War sanctions did not greatly affect the average person’s livelihood. Therefore, pressures were not notable and would not be mentioned in Iranian media more than once or twice a month.

I believe pressures on Iran could be put into two phases:

The first phase is from the beginning of the Islamic Revolution until close to the end of Bush’s presidency in 2009.

The second phase began 3 years ago following the events that took place after Iran’s presidential elections, which intensified Iran’s problems with the West. Since then conflict and misunderstanding between Iran and the West has picked up pace, becoming bigger, similar to a snowball effect.

Therefore, I can say with conviction that an all-out war against Iran is currently taking place that is disguised in the form of sanctions, which makes us simply overlook it and not notice it as much as a real war.

IRD: Therefore you believe the word “sanctions” diverts attention from what actually is taking place?

MS: Yes. If we label recent pressures as “sanctions” then we must consider previous boycotts simply as mild difficulties. Conversely, if we deem that we were facing sanctions during the past 30 years, then what is currently happening is nothing short of an all out economic war on Iran.

Unfortunately many politicians in Iran still view a war as military expedition with guns, missiles and casualties. Modern warfare has changed form; one form of which is economic war. It is now possible to weaken a country to its breaking point without declaring military action; followed by cyber attacks to paralyze a whole nation.

Economic war on Iran began about 2 years ago and has been intensified in the past few months by the international community which finds it even more fatal than physical military action against the country. You can clearly differentiate between the two different phases of Western pressure on Iran that have had profound effects on the country.

IRD: What are the main differences between the old and new sanctions on Iran?

During what I call phase one, or mild sanctions, Iran still was not facing many restrictions. To give you a few clear examples, except with Israel, Iran previously had economic and financial relations with almost every country in the world including the US. American business firms actually took part in fairs and exhibitions in Iran. The majority of the world’s oil companies operated in Iran. Most international airlines flew to Iran and no person or company was directly sanctioned and could freely travel to anywhere in the world and do business.

Currently however, the pressure has increased to the point that most dealings are not possible anymore: namely, currency and banking restrictions; the oil embargo, sanctions on specific people and companies as well as restrictions on international financial investment in the oil and other industries. I believe this will give you an idea of the severity of the recent pressures. We cannot simply take the current situation lightly as an aftermath of sanctions on Iran.

IRD: What is Iran’s approach in the face of sanctions?

As I have mentioned before, I firmly believe that these conflicts will eventually resolve themselves even if it takes a century. Similarly, there are countries that have solved deep and timeworn issues between themselves after years of conflicts and wars.

It is in Iran’s interest to swiftly solve current political turmoil through diplomacy and dialogue to avoid wasting so much energy and tens of billions of dollars on sustaining the running dispute. In a practical strategy to halt sanctions, Iran could turn to diplomacy and avoid harsh rhetoric and slogans. Additionally, Iran has to be more realistic and avoid making statements that could cause further stress and irritation. Moreover, Iran could prevent making impractical threats. It could avoid division within Iran’s central government, and having only one official spokesperson who announces the country’s official position on different issues. Otherwise, the country will continue to struggle with little progress.

IRD: Who are Iran’s current trading partners? Could the West also put pressure on these partners?

Not many countries are currently willing to do any type of trade with Iran. The ones that still have economic ties with Iran are Russia, India, China, Vietnam, a number of South American countries, as well as some minor relations with Belarus and Syria. Except for two or three of the named countries, the rest suffer from weak economies where in this relationship they’re more dependent on Iran than the other way around.

There is no doubt that the West will also put the named countries under pressure to cut economic relations with Iran. The US will do all it can to increase pressure, even on its own allies, in order to push Iran further into isolation. Whether these countries will yield under pressure to change tactics and policies is not known. But everyone has a price, and different things have different melting points. And every government puts its own interests first.

In their mission to introduce division between Iran and its partners, the West will resort to any possible tactic. While pressure might work on some countries, others will respond to financial or other incentives. Two of Iran’s biggest partners are China and Russia. During the past years Russia has proven to be an unreliable friend to Iran.

Including Russia in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been a valuable gift to Russia from the West; now only time can tell what they want in return from Russia. Currently, the West is also in negotiations with China to untie it from its links to Iran in its campaign against us.

IRD: The UAE is regarded as a gateway to many of Iran’s business interactions. Do you predict any divergences in the two countries’ relations?

As I mentioned before, every government put its interests first. While the UAE’s businesses relations with Iran have been significant for both sides, if a better opportunity arises from recent events, the UAE will not hesitate to take advantage of it.

Of course we’ve experienced alteration in countries’ relations, especially during the past few days following some issues. Iran faced some delays in opening credit in UAE’s financial centers; a problem that was immediately solved after swift interventions of some Iranian officials.

Therefore, Iran has to be cautious to avoid using provocative language that could cause a separation between the UAE and Iran.

*Mohammad-Reza Sabzalipour is the head of Iran World Trade Center

The Beach Boys: Surfing U.....MVs (Unmanned Maritime Vehicles)

2012-01-26T08:33:00.000-08:00

Contributor: Andrew Elwell
Posted: 01/23/2012 12:00:00 AM EST
SOURCE: Defence IQ

Liquid Robotics Inc. is a Sunnyvale, California-based company that has developed the Wave Glider, a self-propelled and continuous Unmanned Maritime Vehicle (UMV). Bill Vass, President and CEO at Liquid Robotics, recently spoke with Defence IQ to discuss the company’s technology and how it can be utilised for military applications.

The company’s Wave Glider uses wave and solar energy to power itself for long periods of time, with some deployments having lasted years at a time.

“Our big innovation is converting the vertical motion of a wave directly into forward thrust … all the other autonomous platforms out there use their energy to move; we get our movement for free and we use all our energy to do computing and sensing,” Vass said.

The Wave Glider can be used for a range of different missions, but primarily the technology is a sensing platform.

“It can be used for battlespace softening … it can be used for protecting a fleet by listening for submarines or torpedoes, it can be used for anti-mine, it can be used for obviously reconnaissance, for providing security for specific areas, to patrol a specific location and provide an alarm if an acoustic, video or radar event occurs,” Vass explained.

The company is currently working with a number of customers in the military space and the sector accounts for a significant part of its revenue. Looking ahead, Vass expects countries Like Canada and India to increase their reliance on autonomous vehicles to enhance border security.

“Any country like Canada that has a small Navy and a large shoreline, or Australia or New Zealand or India or South Africa, are all great targets for us … it’s a lot cheaper having robots patrolling your coastline than it is to have ships, from an economic perspective they can have many more points of presence at a much lower cost.”
And in this era of budget cuts, cost, along with operational efficiency, will be a big selling point for Liquid Robotics. “We don’t need a support vessel to do long range missions over very large distances for long periods of time,” said Vass. He continued, “Robots don’t get bored, they do the same course over and over again 24 hours a day 365 days a year, they don’t care about bad weather.”

The rise and rise of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is patent for everyone to see. According to a Congressional Research Service report produced earlier this month, 31% of all U.S. military aircraft are now UAVs; in 2005 this was just 5%. Asked if the UMV could go the same way, Vass was unequivocal.

“Yes, I definitely think so, in fact I see them being the same sort of size market and them working together in the future,” said Vass. But there was a caveat: “Cultural changes have to occur in the military both for the aerial vehicles and surface and sub-surface vehicles to be widely accepted.”

Vass expects the Wave Glider to be a useful addition to the Navy’s fleet, one that can be used in combination with other ships, such as offshore patrol vessels.
“It’s always going to be in conjunction with ships like offshore patrol vessels … if you have a country like New Zealand you’d have to have hundreds of ships out there to ensure proper coastline coverage but you could have hundreds of robots at a much lower cost. The robots will pick things up and then you’d have high-speed patrol boats come along to investigate further, so I think they’d work as a team in the future.”

The company is still small, but it’s growing fast and has some weighty backers. Not least is Vass himself who has a significant government and military background. “I was the Chief Information Officer for the Pentagon and responsible for all the software systems for the Department of Defense and before that I was the Chief Technology Officer for the Army for their personnel systems,” he said. Previously, Vass was also President and COO of Sun Microsystems Federal and Chief Security Officer for Sun IT. In addition, the company's strategic advisory board includes, among others: Marv Langston, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, USDOD and former Deputy Secretary of the Navy, Space and Electronic Warfare; Albert Baciocco, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.); former Commander Submarine Group SIX, former Chief of Naval Research and former Director of Navy RDT&E; as well as Archie Clemins, Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), the former Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
The company has a solid base to grow from, but how does Vass see the technology evolving in the military sector?

“There are a number of areas where we see future growth and future development. One is to build a larger Wave Glider with the ability to travel as fast as 20 knots for a period of time with a huge amount of power generation from wave and sun energy generation … I’m talking about a four tonne unit that can carry lots of platforms. The other area that we’re doing research on is a deep-diving Wave Glider, you can imagine them operating in fleets where there are five of them on the surface recharging while one is deep-diving 3,000 metres below. Quick deployment versions, things that can be launched in the operating space quickly either from air or other types of sea deployment are other areas we’re also working on.”

Vass concluded, “If we get the right funding in place, diving Wave Gliders and larger platform Wave Gliders could do a whole range of the Navy’s required mission areas.”

Who are the most central members of the China’s leadership as we enter 2012?

2012-01-26T08:28:00.000-08:00

By Drew Conway, on January 3rd, 2012

http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=2825#more-2825

As the United States gears up for what appears to be a long and grueling 2012 presidential campaign, China will also undergo its decennial turnover in presidential power in 2012. Unlike the United States, however, this shift will not involve any campaigning or voting—at least not with the people of China. Instead, this shift is one that is formalized within he Chinese Communist party; but that doesn’t mean that there won’t be interesting shifts and reallocations of power.

This leads naturally to many questions; perhaps most importantly that of this post’s title: Who are the most central members of the China’s leadership as we enter 2012?

Germany begins cutting troops in Afghanistan

2012-01-26T07:52:00.000-08:00

Germany is already taking hundreds of troops out of Afghanistan

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15690049,00.html

The German parliament is starting to lower the number of soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Two years ahead of the planned complete withdrawal of troops, many questions remain unresolved.

One thing is certain: by the end of 2014, international combat troops are supposed to be completely pulled out of Afghanistan. Germany's Bundeswehr is therefore already reducing the ceiling of its mandate from the current 5,350 to 4,900 soldiers. The extended mandate, which the German parliament, the Bundestag, will finalize on Thursday, will be valid until January 2013.

Johannes Pflug, spokesman for the "Task Force Afghanistan/Pakistan" in the Social Democrats' parliamentary group, does not believe that the deployment of German soldiers will be completed at that time.

"We want our combat troops to have left Afghanistan by 2013/2014," Pflug said. "But I assume that we will see at least two more extensions of the mandate."

The German government's goal is to reduce the number of German soldiers to 4,400 by January 2013. Whether this will be successful is also dependent on how the security situation in Afghanistan continues to develop.

Crucial security training

International troops are intensely training Afghan security forces

There are a number of clear priorities derived from the international community's withdrawal plans by 2014 that apply to the German deployment. In the remaining period, the Bundeswehr is supposed to speed up the development of Afghan security forces and help them to limit the Taliban's mobility as much as possible.

In total, NATO wants to train 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police. But the killing of four French troops by an Afghan soldier last week shows how massive the problems can be in the process. According to a report in the New York Times, Afghan security forces killed 58 soldiers of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the period between May 2007 and May 2011 alone.

The military training of the ANA, the Afghan national army, is only one side of the story. The soldiers also want to be paid. Figures show how dependent the army is on western funds and support: in 2012 alone, Afghanistan received eight billion euros ($10.4 billion) for troop training. But even after 2014, the military costs are estimated to reach at least six billion euros a year. If the United States and other donor countries reduce their financing as planned, a situation could develop that could leave over 100,000 of these security forces unemployed, said Pflug. This is an enormous risk.

"You don't need a vivid imagination to envision what would happen if they all run over to the other side," he said.

A dwindling economic factor

Timo Christians, Afghanistan expert for the German aid agency Welthungerhilfe, said he believes that the Afghan economy will experience an economic shock after international forces withdraw. The withdrawal, he said, would have serious implications for security policy.

"Also, the income source 'international community' will significantly decline in the next few years," Christians said. "That will not remain without consequences."

The Welthungerhilfe, which has been active in Afghanistan since 1992, wants to remain involved in the country beyond 2014. It is focusing its work on food security projects in the northern and eastern regions of the country. This involvement is not affected by the planned withdrawal of the Bundeswehr.

However, the aid workers do expect that the conflict will intensify after foreign troops pull out. In addition, there will also be fewer contracts for the Afghan economy.

"Old and new divides will open up because everyone will have to come to terms with the lesser resources available," Christians said. "Everyone is positioning themselves for the day that the foreign troops leave the country."

Diplomatic support from Germany

The extension of the Bundeswehr mandate puts the deployment in its 11th year. In the meantime, hardly anyone still believes in a military solution. In the US, but also in Germany, great hope is being placed in negotiations with the Taliban. Western diplomats consider the opening of a liaison office for the Taliban in the Qatari capital of Doha a positive signal - especially since President Hamid Karzai has meanwhile grudgingly given up his resistance to talks with the Taliban.

Negotiations with the Taliban are considered the only solution

"That took some doing," said Pflug and points out the significant role which the German special representative Michael Steiner played in the process.

With the liaison office, Qatar wants to become the leading mediator in the conflict between the West and the Taliban. But for a successful course of negotiations, Afghanistan's direct neighbor Pakistan plays an even more significant role.

"Nothing will work without Pakistan," Pflug said. He said he hopes that China, which played "a very constructive role" at the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn in December, will exert pressure accordingly on its ally. Pakistan boycotted the Bonn conference after a deadly NATO air strike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in November.

Difficult negotiations

The negotiations with the Taliban will also deal with constitutional issues, for example women's rights. The right to unhindered schooling for girls is a thorn in the Taliban's side, but essential for the West. Everything that has been achieved in Afghanistan so far, however, is by no means only being put into question by the Taliban, said Christians.

"The current people in power are also putting many freedoms and human rights under pressure," he said.

An entirely different question will be who specifically will take part in the negotiations. For example: who will be representing Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader living in exile who has been repeatedly declared dead, but who still controls many Taliban-related activities.

One option is the Taliban representative Tayeb Agha, with whom the German intelligence service BND has established contact. Participation by the longtime Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is also disputed. Pflug said the Hizb-i-Islami leader - the perhaps most significant radical Islamic group after the Taliban - was an "evil war criminal."

But German parliamentary circles would be happy if negotiations even got off the ground in the near future. In fall 2013, Germany elects a new lower house of parliament. This could lead to higher hurdles for a renewal of the Bundeswehr mandate again, Pflug said.

"Extending the mandate has already not always gone smoothly until now and the new members of the Bundestag will find it very difficult, as well," he said.

Author: Daniel Scheschkewitz / sac
Editor: Rob Mudge

INTERVIEW: Saudi Arabia’s Unprecedented Maneuver in OPEC

2012-01-26T07:42:00.000-08:00

http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/20/bodyView/1897283/Saudi.Arabia%E2%80%99s.Unprecedented.Maneuver.in.OPEC.html

Saudi Arabia’s Unprecedented Maneuver in OPEC

Riyadh is breaking the tradition, collaborating with the West to bring tougher days for Iran. Interview with Nersi Qorban.

IRD: The Saudis have found a new tool to express hatred and political hostility toward Iran: oil, the black treasure that has become the topic of conversation in Arab circles as well as in the European Union.

The West is reinforcing pressure on Iran due to its nuclear program, while it depends on Iran’s oil supply. Additionally, countries like China see no reason to cut ties with Iran as an oil partner because of the West’s false accusations against Iran.

These days, diplomatic activities and visits to Riyadh have increased. The US is aiming to encourage the Saudi family to increase daily oil production, offsetting Iran’s oil and avoiding a rise in global oil prices.

As a member of OPEC, will Saudi Arabia be able to ignore Iran’s interests and deprive Iran by replacing its oil?

In an interview with IRD, Nersi Ghorban, General Director of Narkangan Co., an oil and gas affairs expert, discusses the particular consequences of a 12 million barrel a day oil production in Saudi Arabia.

IRD: As a member of OPEC, Saudi Arabia has commented on increasing its oil production to offset a potential embargo on Iran’s oil. How do you evaluate this?

NG: There are two ways to speculate on Saudi Arabia’s comments. Firstly, if Saudi Arabia announced that it would balance the reduced oil in the market in order to keep markets level, that is understandable. Secondly, if Saudi Arabia announces that it wants to replace Iran in the oil market, that will be an absurd announcement.

IRD: Are such announcements in line with OPEC regulations?

NG: OPEC is an organization that was created to resist the international oil companies’ pressure on oil exporters, and so far it has been successful. Yet during times of peace one member replacing another’s oil production is unprecedented.

During the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq War, both Iran and Iraq, which were among the biggest OPEC members, employed various methods to eliminate enemy oil sites. Similarly, during the Iraq-Kuwait war, one member of OPEC occupied another. However, during times of peace, when one member is facing sanctions, no other member has officially proposed to replace the sanctioned country’s production.

Currently there are no problems between the Iranian and Saudi government. Therefore the Saudi proposal is merely helping the Western countries that impose sanctions on Iran.

IRD: Does Saudi Arabia have the capacity to wholly replace Iran in the oil market?

NG: In a way, Saudi Arabia’s claim to increase production to 12 million barrels a day is a measure to level global oil prices. Yet, whether the country has the capability or not is unknown.

Additionally, the type of the oil produced is significant. For instance, its richness and level of sulfide are factors that have to be taken into consideration. Saudi’s oil is not identical to Iran’s and therefore with Iran’s absence the global oil system will change as each refinery produces a certain type of oil.

As a Muslim country however, the recent statement of Saudi’s oil minister regarding Iran’s oil is considered unfriendly.

IRD: How would Saudi Arabia’s intervention affect OPEC and the oil market?

NG: It all depends on the global economy in the next six months. In the case of a global economic decline, overall demand for oil will automatically drop in which case Saudi Arabia won’t need to substitute Iran’s oil. With a weak global economy, demand for Iran’s oil will decrease. For instance, if Japan decides to reduce its oil consumption by 300 thousand barrels, 150 thousand of that will be cut from Iran and the rest from all the other suppliers combined. If this process also occurs with other countries, Iran will experience a significant drop in demand for its oil. Conversely, with a healthy global economy there is always demand for Iran’s oil.

IRD: Will countries like China profit from an embargo on Iran’s oil?

NG: At any given time every country aims to benefit from significant events or fluctuations in the oil market. China has announced that it is willing to continue trade with Iran, by paying Iran in goods instead of dollars. This will be to China’s advantage.
22 Sunday January 2012 14:16

IRAN: Do You Really Want to Pull at That Thread

2012-01-26T07:40:00.000-08:00

Framing the regional power struggle as a Sunni-Shi’a confrontation could have dire consequences for the Middle East.

http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/27/bodyView/1897273/Do.You.Really.Want.to.Pull.at.That.Thread.html

If you are a Tehran-based media correspondent, or a tourist having had the courage to defy anti-Iran stereotypes and visit our country; kindly take a walk in downtown Tehran, engage in a small talk with pious Iranians and give them a snippet of a general knowledge quiz: what Islamic denomination does the Assad family follow? Fearless of the skyrocketing USD exchange rate in Tehran, I’ll bet one hundred bucks that they identify the family as Sunnis. Should they be more informed, and know of Assads’ Alawite background, ask them if Alawites are Shi’as; two hundred bucks says that their answer is a no, and at that moment you may also observe a look of surprise on their face; despite the fact that Damascus is one of the most popular pilgrimage destination for the religious Iranians (as it hosts the tomb of Zeinab, daughter of the first Shi’a imam, Ali, and an iconic figure in the Shi’a history).

I’m not surprised if the Western media label the Syrian government as Shi’a. Their lack of knowledge on the Middle East fabric is sort of a given (even the Bush administration seemed to have no idea of Islamic sects until it saw Iraq slide into a sectarian war.) But why has the BBC Persian, or the Turkish Today’s Zaman, taken a liking in equating Alawites and Shi’as? They could not be pardoned with this mistake. Or is it really a mistake? Noticing how this polarized framing could pay dividends for some regional actors, one has every reason to hesitate when calling it a mistake. After all, this narrative easily puts the struggle between the regional powers to take helm of the Arab Spring in their hands, and their fierce battle over Syria, into the age-old context of the Sunni-Shi’a schism. It gives substance to ferocious anti-Assad policies of Ankara, Riyadh and the biting off-more-than-it-can-chew Doha. Things turn painfully funny when even the Israeli Ha’aretz tries to aggrandize the rift, reporting of Hamas crackdown on Shi’a community in Gaza.

But does one really want to pull at that thread? After all, the consequences of this divisive policy may happen to be less than beneficial for its propagators, at its best turning their Middle East conquest into a pyrrhic victory. A quick glance at demographics of the region won’t do us any harm: Iran, holds a substantial 89% of Shi’as, this figures amounts to (minimums estimations cited) 65% for the Republic of Azerbaijan (deeply secularized under the Soviet rule –and later the Aliyevs, but showing a burgeoning interest in its ancestors’ faith), 65% in Iraq (as a de facto rule, the prime minister, the most powerful authority in the country, is always Shi’a), 30% in Lebanon (largely represented by Amal and Hezbollah), 60% in Bahrain (whose uprising against institutionalized discrimination suffers media blackout, simply because they have committed the unforgivable sin of following the wrong denomination) and 30% in Kuwait.

To make it a clearer picture, let’s remind ourselves that these numbers only represent the mainstream branch of Shi’as, namely the Twelvers, which is a narrow definition of who is qualified to be known as a Shi’a. Bringing into the circle other lesser known Shi’a factions dictates a second thought before portraying this turbulent situation of the Middle East as a Shi’a-Sunni rift: more than one-third of Yemen’s population are Zaydi; including the Yemeni tyrant Ali Abdullah Saleh (though he hardly fits as a loyal Zaydi, for with the help of his Saudi patrons, the man ruthlessly massacred the Zaydi Houthis in northwestern Yemen.) And then consider Alawites who form an un-ignorable 15-million strong population in Turkey itself –and they are already complaining about the denial of their rights, along with 3 million of their Twelver brethren. So think of how Iran could turn the propaganda right back at those beating on the drums of sectarian war in the region before talking of a Shi’a-ruled Syria.

One is left with nothing but sad reminders of those happy days when the Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the Ashoura rituals of the Shi’a community in Istanbul, calling the Karbala event a source of Shi’a-Sunni unity, as the former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati stood by his side. Those pictures are washed away now, sadly to be replaced by Turkey’s assertive support for Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni Vice President of Iraq, who is charged of terrorism including plotting to assassinate PM Nuri al-Maliki, or to see Erdogan threaten Bashar al-Assad and show the green light for an Al Qaeda sympathizer, Abdul Karim Belhaj, to set camp in the Turkish soil and prepare for a war to overthrow Bashar. The prospect becomes ever more gloomy knowing that even the Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoglu -who has theorized the AKP’s neo-Ottoman agenda- seems to have forgotten how the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi’a Safavids fought decades of futile wars (I, II, III), only to the benefit of the Europe.
21 Saturday January 2012 0:17

Nirupama Rao meets Hillary Clinton, discusses range of bilateral issues

2012-01-26T07:39:00.001-08:00

PTI | Jan 26, 2012, 08.32AM IST

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Nirupama-Rao-meets-Hillary-Clinton-discusses-range-of-bilateral-issues/articleshow/11636577.cms

WASHINGTON: A wide range of bilateral and regional issues, including the importance of civil nuclear cooperation, were discussed during the first meeting of Indian Ambassador to the USNirupama Rao with the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here.

"They talked about maintaining the momentum in our bilateral relationship and our strategic dialogue," State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland told reporters.

"They also talked about the full range of bilateral issues, including the importance of our civil nuclear cooperation and our continued efforts to chart a way forward that'll bring India the benefits of American nuclear technology," she said.

This was Rao's first meeting with Clinton after she took over as Indian Ambassador to the US in Washington late last year.

Rao, who has already done a lot of travel around the US and been to a lot of US universities, gave the secretary some flavour for that, the Spokesperson said.

"They talked about Afghanistan and the important role that India plays in supporting the newSilk Road Initiative, and private sector capacity building in Afghanistan," Nuland said, adding that they also discussed about Burma.

Responding to questions, she said the two countries are still working through the legal and regulatory issues that the US has with India.

Clinton and Rao also talked about Iran and how New Delhi and Washington can work together on the issue of US and EU sanctions against Tehran, she said.

US is urging India to decrease its dependence on Iranian oil, which New Delhi insists that was very difficult to achieve.

"As we have said a number of times over the last week and a half, we have had intensive conversations with the government of India in Delhi about this legislation, and we are continuing to work with them on how we can implement it together in a phased and managed way," Nuland said.

"I am not going to give you an up-and-down scorecard on our consultations with each of these countries as they happen, and I am not in a position to comment on stray Israeli media reports," the spokesperson said.

Nigeria's Boko Haram Militants Remain a Regional Threat

2012-01-26T07:38:00.001-08:00

January 26, 2012 | 1206 GMT

http://www.stratfor.com

By Scott Stewart

The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram conducted a series of bombing attacks and armed assaults Jan. 20 in the northern city of Kano, the capital of Kano state and second-largest city in Nigeria. The attacks, which reportedly included the employment of at least two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted a series of police facilities in Kano. These included the regional police headquarters, which directs police operations in Kano, Katsina and Jigawa states, as well as the State Security Service office and the Nigerian Immigration Service office. At least 211 people died in the Kano attacks, according to media reports.

The group carried out a second wave of attacks in Bauchi state on Jan. 22, bombing two unoccupied churches in the Bauchi metropolitan area and attacking a police station in the Tafawa Balewa local government area. Militants reportedly also tried to rob a bank in Tafawa Balewa the same day. Though security forces thwarted the robbery attempt, 10 people reportedly died in the clash, including two soldiers and a deputy police superintendent.

In a third attack, Boko Haram militants attacked a police sub-station in Kano on Jan. 24 with small arms and improvised hand grenades. A tally of causalities in the assault, which reportedly lasted some 25 minutes, was not available. This armed assault stands out tactically from the Jan. 20 suicide attacks against police stations in Kano. The operation could have been an attempt to liberate some of the Boko Haram militants the government arrested following the Jan. 20 and Jan. 22 attacks.

Stratfor has followed Boko Haram carefully to assess its intent -- and ability -- to become more transnational. As we noted after the U.S. State Department issued warnings in early November 2011 about Boko Haram's alleged plans to strike Western-owned hotels in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, the group made significant leaps in its operational capability during 2011. During that time, it transitioned from very simple attacks to successfully employing suicide VBIEDS. An examination of the recent attacks in Kano and Bauchi states, however, does not reveal further advances in the group's operational tradecraft and does not display any new ability or intent to project power beyond its traditional areas of operation.

Boko Haram's Tactical Evolution

Boko Haram, Hausa for "Western Education is Sinful," is an Islamist militant group established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria's Borno state. It has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. It is officially known as "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad," Arabic for "Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad."

At first, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fomenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. Boko Haram came to international attention following serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousands of deaths.

By late 2010, Boko Haram had added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This tactical advancement was reflected in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau state, on Christmas Eve 2010.

Boko Haram conducted a number of other armed assaults and small IED attacks in early 2011. The IEDs involved in these attacks were either improvised hand grenades constructed by filling soft drink cans with explosives -- which were frequently thrown from motorcycles -- or slightly larger devices left at the target.

This attack paradigm was shattered June 16, 2011, when Boko Haram launched a suicide VBIED attack against the headquarters of the Nigerian national police in Abuja. Though not overly spectacular (security measures kept the device away from the headquarters building and it exploded in a parking lot), the successful deployment of a large VBIED and a suicide operative represented a dramatic leap in Boko Haram's capability. An organization does not normally develop such a capability internally without some signs of progressive advancement in its bombmaking capability. For example, a group would be expected to employ medium-sized IEDs before it employed large VBIEDS. That it skipped a step prompted us to believe reports of Boko Haram members receiving training from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa or from al Shabaab in Somalia (or some other outside group).

Boko Haram conducted its second suicide VBIED attack in Abuja on Aug. 26, 2011, this time targeting a U.N. compound in the city's diplomatic district. This attack proved far more deadly because the driver was able to enter the compound and reach a parking garage before detonating his device near the building's entrance. The attack against the U.N. compound also marked a break from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government and Christian facilities.

If the intelligence that triggered the warnings of hotel attacks in November 2011 is accurate, it appears the group may also have considered transnational targets -- at least to the extent of seeking to eliminate involvement by the international community in Nigeria in order to undercut Abuja. This shift in targeting raised concerns that the group's contacts with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and/or al Shabaab had influenced it. It also raised fears that due to its rapidly evolving attack capability, Boko Haram now was on a trajectory to become the next jihadist franchise group to become a transnational terrorist threat, following in the steps of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based al Qaeda franchise group. The January attacks provide us an opportunity to evaluate this theory.

What the January Attacks Tell Us

First, the group appears to have no shortage of explosive material. In addition to the devices the group employed in the attacks, the police reportedly seized some 300 improvised grenades and 10 VBIEDs. It also appears Boko Haram has access to large quantities of commercial explosives, rather than being forced to rely on less reliable and less stable improvised explosive mixtures. A good deal of mining occurs in central Nigeria, and it seems that the group is either stealing commercial explosives from mining companies, extorting mining companies for explosives or has somehow been able to purchase commercial explosives using a front company or companies. The Nigerian government has sought to tighten controls on commercial explosives in response, but its efforts so far do not seem to have affected the group's ability to procure large quantities of explosives.

Boko Haram also appears to have competent bombmakers. While the improvised hand grenades the group is issuing are quite rudimentary, being made by inserting a non-electric detonator with a short piece of time fuse in a soda can filled with high explosives, their devices are functioning as designed. The same can be said for their suicide vests and VBIEDS: They are simple yet functional. This stands out, since IEDs commonly malfunction. Bombmaking is an art that normally follows a significant learning curve absent outside instruction from a more experienced bombmaker. Boko Haram's proficiency suggests the group's bombmaker(s) indeed received training from experienced militants elsewhere.

The group also appears to have had no problems recruiting militants, including suicide bombers. The Jan. 20 attacks alone involved dozens of militants. Two people served as suicide bombers for the VBIEDs while perhaps two other suicide bombers worked on foot; others threw IEDs from motorcycles and conducted armed assaults.

That said, the group's operational planners do not appear to be as advanced as their bombmakers and recruiters. Though they have proved fairly successful in attacking soft targets, they have not had much success in their attacks against harder targets. For example, the attacker in the Jan. 20 strike on the State Security Service office in Kano was shot and killed before he could approach the building. Likewise, security forces were able to repel the attackers in the Jan. 22 attempted bank robbery in Tafawa Balewa.

All three January attacks also occurred in Boko Haram's traditional area of operations in the northern and central regions of Nigeria. These areas are both familiar and accessible to the group and it has strong support there. (It also has significant support in the area around Abuja.) The group has yet to display an ability to project power outside its traditional operational area into less familiar and more hostile environments.

Some ask whether Boko Haram is merely a political tool used by northern politicians to pressure the Nigerian federal government in much the same way politicians from the Niger Delta have used militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta to ensure what they believe is their fair share of Nigeria's oil revenue. While undoubtedly some connections between some northern politicians and Boko Haram exist, it would be simplistic to suggest such politicians completely control Boko Haram. Indeed, the Nigerian newspaper Vanguard reported Jan. 24 that senior Boko Haram figures said Jan. 21 that they were retaliating against northern governors who had refused to pay the group previously agreed-upon monthly sums of cash not to conduct operations in their state and for allowing security forces to arrest groups of their members, as they did Jan. 18 when six Boko Haram leaders were detained in Maiduguri. (One of the arrested leaders, Kabiru Sokoto, escaped later when gunmen likely affiliated with Boko Haram attacked the police vehicles transporting him.)

At the very least, however, these recent attacks tell us that before the group can become an existential threat to the Nigerian government -- or a legitimate transnational threat -- it will need to develop the ability to deploy its IEDs and suicide operatives to the point that it successfully can attack hardened targets. It will also need to develop the ability to work beyond its traditional areas of operation. Until it can master those skills (and display an intent to use such skills), it will remain a regional, albeit deadly, threat.

Asia Overreacts to U.S. Military Pivot

2012-01-26T07:34:00.000-08:00

http://the-diplomat.com/2012/01/25/asia-overreacts-to-u-s-military-pivot/?all=true

By Richard Weitz

Despite the warnings from China, the Pentagon’s Defense Strategic Guidance offers few surprises. Change has been coming for a while.

Asian countries have reacted strongly to the Pentagon’s new “Defense Strategic Guidance” issued earlier this month. Arguing that the United States finds itself at a “strategic turning point” with the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the end of the defense buildup that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the report calls for rebalancing U.S. military capabilities by functional and geographic areas, including by “pivoting” U.S. national security efforts eastward toward Asia.

“U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia,” the Guidance affirms, “creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities” that will lead the U.S. military to “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”

More colorfully, Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained during the briefing marking the Guidance’s roll out: “All of the trends, demographic trends, geopolitical trends, economic trends and military trends are shifting toward the Pacific. So our strategic challenges in the future will largely emanate out of the Pacific region, but also the littorals of the Indian Ocean.”

The Guidance therefore advocates a lasting “strategic partnership” with India, reaffirms U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea, and declares U.S. intent to invest in the capabilities required to ensure U.S. access to the global commons and freedom of maritime movement despite efforts by some countries (i.e. China and Iran) to deny the United States access to these areas.

The Asian allies of the United States welcomed the Pentagon’s new Guidance. At a Seoul news briefing, Kim Kwan-bin, South Korean Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy, said that “The U.S. defense ministry will put boosting economic and security benefit of the Asia-Pacific region as its first priority, and will recognize South Korea and other allies as the core nations for security in the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen security cooperation.”

Chinese analysts received the new strategy less warmly. A commentary in the English-language Global Times said that the new Strategic Guidance indicated that China was “a firm strategic target of the U.S.” and that Beijing’s “efforts to improve Sino-US relations have proved incapable of offsetting U.S. worries over its rise.”

A Xinhua commentary warned against U.S. “muscle flexing” in Asian regional disputes: “the United States is welcome to make more contribution to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, but it’s possible militarism will cause a lot of ill will and meet with strong opposition in the world's most dynamic region.” In elaborating, the commentary explained that “the United States has the greatest potential to secure world peace and stability, but it also has the greatest power to create chaos. With power comes responsibility, so the United States should exercise the utmost caution in the use of its military forces.”

Asian readers of these texts need to bear certain facts in mind. These national security documents, issued regularly by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government agencies, have multiple audiences within the United States (government agencies, the Congress, and analysts) as well as abroad (foreign allies, partners, and adversaries). They serve both formal and informal functions. Within the United States, they offer official policy and program guidance as well as unofficial tools for bureaucratic infighting by providing documents from which actors can cite supporting statements in their speeches and other statements in budget battles with other agencies. Overseas, they communicate implicit messages to foreign audiences. When they appear in a presidential election year, like this one, you can be fairly certain that White House political advisers had some impact on its drafting as well.

In essence, the Guidance reflects three main developments: the U.S. defense budget is stabilizing due budgetary constraints; the major U.S. wars of the past decade, Afghanistan and Iraq, have or are winding down; and Asia is rising in relative importance in the world, and therefore for the United States, due to its growing share of global population, trade, GDP and other assets.

Given this context, Asian governments shouldn’t overreact to the new document. The Guidance doesn’t describe any new missions, capabilities, or defense initiatives. The Pentagon will simply do the same things it’s currently doing, with some adjustments, mostly downward, in the scale of its activities. The most significant proposed change from current U.S. defense policy is to de-emphasize large-scale, counterinsurgency campaigns, but the reluctance of the Pentagon to engage in further Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s has been evident for a long time now.

If anything, the Strategic Guidance and the accompanying public briefings make evident that the document and the thinking behind it represent not revolutionary change, but a retrospective doctrinal blessing of the strategic approach that has guided U.S. national security policy since the end of the Cold War and, arguably, even earlier.

For example, the U.S. National Military Strategy released last year also spoke of the global security environment reaching “a strategic inflection point.” It, too, noted the need to realign U.S. defense resources released by the military’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan to address to other priority regions, especially Asia.

The Navy has already been moving nuclear attack submarines, Aegis missile defense vessels, and other ships to bases in Guam and Japan. Developing strategic bonds with Asia has been a recurring U.S. objective, never fully realized, for decades.

The Pentagon, like other U.S. and foreign government agencies, has joined with the private sector in recognizing rising relative global importance of the Asia-Pacific region in terms of human, economic, and military potential. Asia contains two large rising powers (China, India), several especially dangerous states (North Korea and Iran), close U.S. allies (Japan, South Korea) ,many other important countries, and the globe’s most vibrant economic region whose growing wealth enables its nation states to field ever more powerful militaries armed with advanced foreign weaponry.

Managing Asian security would be a challenge even for a reinforced Pentagon due to the region’s disruptive demographic trends (Chinese growth vs. Japanese and Russian stagnation), natural resource competition (especially over underwater energy reserves), diffusion of advanced military technologies, and the complexity and fluidity of regional alignments and security institutions.

U.S. policy makers aren’t assuming an inevitable a war with China, but managing China’s rising economic and military strength is an obvious preoccupation of U.S. policymakers. “Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways,” the Guidance maintains. “Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.”

Panetta and other U.S. officials have cited economic interdependence as the general reason for the United States to avoid war with China, but they also saw specific areas where the two countries’ national security interests overlap sufficiently to envisage opportunities for collaboration: the Korean Peninsula, freedom of maritime navigation, nuclear proliferation, as well as humanitarian crises and disasters.

Like previous DoD documents, the Guidance cautions that “the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.” But this construct is merely to justify renewed efforts at defense diplomacy and other forms of bilateral military engagement.

Although Chinese commentators warned of a U.S. military buildup in the Pacific, Asia’s elevated strategic priority won’t necessarily result in an increase in number of U.S. troops stationed in the region.

Thanks to a budget deal reached last August, the Pentagon has half a trillion dollars less to spend than it originally planned. Far deeper cuts will occur should the congressional sequestration (mandatory cuts to all U.S. government programs) take effect in January 2013, as envisaged in the Budget Control Act, though such an outcome will probably be averted since such arbitrary cuts fail to discriminate among U.S. programs. And even the modest projected nominal increase that will remain after the August 2011 reductions will be negated by the typically higher inflation rates of defense items resulting from rising operations and maintenance costs, unanticipated high tempo of operations, procurement process inefficiency, and expanding entitlements for military personnel and their families (growing cost of military health care, pay and retirement benefits).

In addition, few opportunities exist to base more forces in Japan and South Korea due to popular opposition to hosting more American soldiers, as well as other constraints. If anything, the United States expects that these traditional U.S. security allies will use their own expanding military power to assume more regional security responsibilities.

For example, in the case of South Korea, the anticipated overall reductions in the size of the U.S. armed forces will make it even less likely that the United States could execute its plan to deploy 690,000 troops in South Korea within 90 days of a war’s breaking out. But South Korea has already been building up its own forces in preparation for assuming full operational control of its own troops, a responsibility Washington had already planned to transfer to Seoul by December 2015.

The Pentagon will most likely shield its Pacific-oriented forces better from planned budget cuts rather than increase them even further. The U.S. Navy and Air Force, which have already been partnering to develop an “AirSea Battle Concept” designed at negating anti-access tactics and weapons, will receive disproportionally smaller cuts because they are needed to operate across the vast Asia-Pacific domain. For example, the Navy will keep all 11 aircraft carriers primarily because of their value in the vast Pacific.

In contrast, Army and Marine strength will be less well protected, and these reductions will be most evident in Europe and the Middle East rather than Asia. Even there, the United States will rely less on permanent bases and more on rotating forces through the region on a temporary basis, especially to countries that don’t host a permanent U.S. military presence such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Singapore. These rotations will allow the Pentagon to strengthen the capabilities of local military forces through enhanced training opportunities. Furthermore, the United States will pursue “expanded military cooperation with India on non-proliferation, safeguarding the global commons, countering terrorism, and elsewhere.” In addition to building the military capacity of regional allies, U.S. arms sales to these countries might also reinforce the rotations and exercises in developing security ties with Asian states.

But the recent agreement to rotate more troops through Australia for training shouldn’t obscure the fact that such large semi-permanent training opportunities are limited. Most Asian-Pacific countries wouldn’t welcome a large U.S. troop presence on their soil, even on a rotational basis. And even Australians have punished their leaders when they described their role as serving as Washington’s regional proxy.

At the end of the day, recent history has made clear that, even if the U.S. national security establishment would like to concentrate its resources on one theater or against one enemy, history can throw up obstacles in this path. During the Cold War, the United States had to dissipate its military power through endless side conflicts in developing countries.

More recently, what looked to be a new Pentagon focus on China’s growing military strength by the incoming George W. Bush administration in 2001 was aborted by the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks, which forced the U.S. government and its allies to pivot into a campaign against global terrorism, in which China was seen as a necessary if not ideal partner. The reality is that the Middle East still looks primed to generate further problems in the coming years – and that could have a similar Asia-diverting effect in the future.

All over the Strait of Hormuz

2012-01-26T07:33:00.000-08:00

Iranian crisis taking a turn for worse

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120126/edit.htm#4

by S. Nihal Singh

THE danger in the United States, and now Europe, raising the stakes on Iran is that, without intending to, it could escalate into a new regional war even as President Barack Obama is winding down the Afghanistan war after declaring the American military misadventure in Iraq officially over. With the European Union having come on board in ending oil imports from Japan by July, the Western intention is to box Iran in until it cries uncle.

As it is, the payment ban for Iranian oil under pain of attracting sanctions is making the lives of Asian countries, including India, difficult. And as the US and Western Europe increase the pressure on Iran to its next level, it resembles more a game of Russian roulette rather than a well-thought-out rational policy. Tehran, for its part, shows no sign of backing off on its nuclear programme and has threatened to close the vital international oil export route of the Strait of Hormuz, which would harm Iran more than the rest of the world.

What has led the US to reach this impasse because the last thing America and the rest of the world need is another war in the region? Many factors are involved but the weightiest reason is a simple one — Israel. Israel is tied to the US by an umbilical cord. Washington’s continuing efforts are to coax Tel Aviv and its right-wing government into refraining from bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. Overwhelmingly dependent as Israel is on the United States for its survival and prosperity, it has proved that it can act on its own against American advice and still bank on US bounty and support.

And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it plain that irrespective of the preference of his mentor, he is quite prepared to try to take Iranian nuclear facilities out because Tel Aviv believes that Tehran is closer to making the bomb than the US or the rest of the world. Recent feverish discussions between the highest American military official with Israel’s military and civilian establishment are an indication of the seriousness with which Washington is taking Israeli moves.

Obviously, the US and most countries believe that Iran going nuclear would vastly complicate the region’s strategic picture. Iran, of course, declares that its nuclear exertions are only for peaceful purposes. For one thing, other Middle-East states will want nuclear status as well. Psychologically, there is a sense of grievance in the region that while Israel can have nuclear weapons (with American and French assistance), the Arab world is barred. Pakistan, for one, won kudos for calling its nuclear arsenal the Muslim bomb. Apparently, attempts at hacking into Iranian nuclear computers or assassinating a string of Iranian nuclear scientists have failed to stop Tehran’s endeavours.

The tragedy is that while American efforts are directed at appeasing Israel by tightening the noose around Iran, Washington is leaving itself less and less room for manoeuvre. What happens if increasingly onerous sanctions choke off Iran’s ability to survive economically? Will its reaction be to take the path of surrender or will it strike out by closing Hormuz, irrespective of the harm it will cause itself? America has already warned that it will take counter-measures to keep the choke point open. Merely to pose these questions is to highlight the incredible dangers surrounding the present play.

While most Asian importers of Iranian oil – Japan, China, South Korea and India – will seek to reduce the quantity of Iranian oil they import, the spike in oil prices, given the new tensions in the region, will be particularly unwelcome. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has been exerting its bit, together with Russia, to stall the matter coming to the United Nations, but Washington has demonstrated that it has other means to exert pressure on many countries to side with it.

This growing crisis comes at a time of great regional tension and upheaval. The Arab League has been trying to grapple with events in Syria, which is lurching towards a civil war while its proposal to ask President Bashar al-Assad to resign in favour of his vice-president and talk to the opposition on an interim unity government has been dismissed by Damascus with contempt. No outside party seems to have a solution to the Syrian imbroglio, with more Syrian lives being lost each day.

The crisis in Iraq after the departure of US troops is getting worse, with the Shia Prime Minister, Mr Nuri al-Maliki, ostracising the Sunnis, the country’s traditional rulers, though a minority. Indeed, the Shia-Sunni divide has come to the fore surprisingly quickly. The only quiet part of Iraq is the autonomous Kurdish region which is counting its blessing. Egypt, on the other hand, is at the beginning of its new experiment with the Islamist-dominated new Parliament in place, charged with writing a new constitution.

The Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extremist Salafis – control over 70 per cent of the seats. But the essential power play is taking place between the Brotherhood and the Military Council, the post-Mubarak rulers. Reliable reports suggest that the two might make a deal for their mutual benefit. The key question will be the measure of supervision a future civilian government will have over the military’s affairs. The armed forces have many lucrative economic enterprises and had no civilian supervision of its budget, vastly stiffened with US assistance of some $ 1.3 billion a year.

Against this backdrop, the looming Iranian crisis is something the world could have done without. To compound the problem for President Obama, America has already slipped into the presidential election mode. In other words, Israel’s wishes and inclinations become even more important to the incumbent and his Republican challengers because Jews exercise much influence not only in funding election campaigns but also in the support they have of the evangelical Right.

With the developed world suffering from severer economic problems, the Iranian crisis can only add to the general gloom. Will the US find a way out of the crisis? That remains the $ 64,000 question.

Does General V K Singh know what he's up against?

2012-01-26T07:32:00.000-08:00

January 25, 2012 20:58 IST

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/does-general-v-k-singh-know-what-hes-up-against/20120125.htm

A petty government has pushed the army chief into a corner, feels Seema Mustafa.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] does not want to comment on the controversy over army chief General V K Singh's age because it is a 'sensitive issue.'

Union Defence Minister A K Antony is 'very sorry' about what is happening. Then why don't these two gentlemen at least ensure that the issue is settled with dignity, and the army chief's birth date is recognised as 1951 as per the official records?

For the government this was a small issue that should have been settled a long time ago, when General Singh wrote his first official letter urging the army and defence ministry to settle the discrepancy and recognise 1951, and not 1950, as his birth year.

It is clearly not a small matter for General Singh, as it calls into question his integrity and challenges his honesty.

There are no two views in the army about General Singh's integrity and capability. But despite not wanting to he was left with no choice by a determined government, but to approach the Supreme Court for a final decision.

There has been a major canard against the army chief, provoked by sections of the political and bureaucratic establishment. But the reasons for this remain unclear, not being touched upon even by the concerned media.

Lieutenant General Bikram Singh, who will likely succeed as the army chief if General Singh retires according to the 1950 date, has many supporters within the government and amongst retired army chiefs, a couple of whom have formed a bloc against the present incumbent.

There is widespread support within the army for Lieutenant General K T Parnaik of the Northern Command who has a chance of becoming the army chief if the 1951 birth date is accepted by the government.

The government is using the media to blame the army chief for the ongoing controversy, but the fact remains that it found its way into the public eye through deliberate leaks, and misinformation, by hyperactive, vested, interests.

No one in the army is happy about the manner in which the controversy was stoked and kept burning, and all would have preferred a quiet settlement of the issue between General Singh and the government.

But given the government's refusal to accept the general's school leaving records, and recognise his many attempts to get the discrepancy corrected, the choices before him became limited.

One was to resign and leave, and the other was to approach the courts in the hope that at least his name and reputation would be cleared.

Unfortunately, despite efforts to the contrary, the politician has managed to politicise the Indian Army [ Images ] leadership by embracing certain officers and working to install them in the top post.

The public might or might not know, but most officers in the army are well aware of the interests at work, and the kind of lobbying that is going on to ensure that General Singh is removed from the post.

Stories that the government might sack him appeared mysteriously in the newspapers and as all of us in the business know, these are usually deliberate leaks given out from time to time by so-called sources to keep the pressure alive.

Political governments have decimated all institutions, one by one. The police force, through the sheer political power of transfers and postings, has become corrupt and communal; the legislatures are packed with criminals; the media has lost its independence to the government and corporate nexus; with the defence forces surviving the disastrous consequences of politicisation to some extent.

It is unfortunate that here too issues are being made of non issues, to bring in officers more favourable to the political dispensation of the day.

The government could have easily, given the facts on the table, recognised 1951 as the birth year, saved face for the army chief, while giving him and the institution due respect.

General Singh does not have the reputation of a greedy, grasping, man. Far from it, and his word along with the records should have carried weight with the government.

Unfortunately, the pettiness of the ruling class has pushed the senior officer to a corner where not wanting to, he has had to approach the civilian courts as a last resort. It can only be hoped that he finds justice there, and can at least retire from the force with his respect and dignity intact.

There is a certain intolerance creeping into government that sees a contrary view as dissent, and reacts to it with a heavy hand. Any officer who does not agree with the often blinkered views emanating from the corridors of power is axed, as many will testify, with the result that most now hesitate to speak their minds.

This might make the politicians happy, but the fact of the matter is that they now rarely benefit from informed and impartial opinion.

In this particular case, however, it is more to do with getting a chief of their choice into government.

The poor army chief does not know what he is up against, as it is difficult to box at shadows and conspiracies that do not reveal themselves.

Seema Mustafa

Our Balochistan blindspot

2012-01-25T19:46:00.000-08:00

By:Nazir Naji Wednesday, 18 Jan 2012 10:08 pm

We have eyes but fail to see
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/01/our-balochistan-blindspot/

It doesn’t seem that in the power games between the parliament, judiciary, commanders and the media, the people busy making this move and that manoeuvre have noticed what is coming to pass in Balochistan. Kabul, Washington, the Emirates, Tehran and Delhi are paying close attention to what is happening in Balochistan but Islamabad has its head buried deep in the sand. The Pakistani government and political leadership has tried to understand the problems of the Baloch but it has amounted to naught.

The government did present the Aghaz-e-Haqooq package initially but its status is akin to a message that was rubbished by the recipient even without opening the envelope. From the opposition’s side, Nawaz Sharif toured the area and reached out with sincerity. But he could only gain access to veteran Ataullah Mengal who himself admits that ‘the youth don’t listen to (him) anymore.’

Sardar Mengal has the experience of dealing with Pakistan. If any leader could become a bridge between Islamabad and Balochistan, it would be him. Twenty-five years ago, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Sardar Khair Bux Marri, Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and Sardar Mengal were all there and desirous of solving matters with Islamabad. I remember what all of them used to say. Mir Ghaus Bux said that we’ve lived 50 years with Pakistan and Islamabad has come to know a lot about us and we’ve come to know a lot about Islamabad. He also said that it should not be difficult to talk matter out and it must be understood by those who call us ‘Indian agents’ that our politics has organically developed here in Pakistan and we know nothing of Delhi. He said that being approving from a distance was a different thing than sitting together and fleshing things out. Why would the Baloch, he added, abandon the known (Pakistani rulers) for the unknown (Indian ones) as they had no idea what Delhi would want and do if they did indeed gain independence and tried to contact it. He said that there is no substantive difference between Delhi and Islamabad in how they mete out treatment to ethnic minorities. So why would the Baloch prefer Delhi over Islamabad. He said that Islamabad should trust us when we say that we want to work with them. He warned that they should not set up obstacles in their (these leaders’) path as what progress could be achieved during their lives would not be possible after.

Nawab Akbar Bugti used to say openly in gatherings in Lahore that ‘(they) had no other gripe with Islamabad. They could just keep the pounds as long as they give the Baloch their deserved pennies and put an end to all the oppression. Sardar Khair Bux Marri also talked of justice and regional parity but he was the first amongst the four aforementioned leaders who made up his mind that attaching hopes with Islamabad was an exercise in futility. The most enthusiastic about establishing contacts with Islamabad was Mir Bizenjo and this earned him the epithet of ‘the father of negotiations’ sarcastically from Sardar Marri.

Sardar Mengal was the one who was the keenest on living with Pakistan. It was his magnanimity that he did not hate Pakistan despite the martyrdom of his young son Asad Mengal and allowed his son Akhtar Mengal to become CM at a time when the Baloch leadership was not ready to be part of the government given the federation’s conditions. If the process of reaching out had started during Akhtar Mengal’s tenure, we would have been reaping its fruit by now. It is unfortunate that we arrested Mengal ignominiously and put him through hell and he was the one in whose tenure Pakistan was able to clandestinely conduct nuclear tests.

Now the situation is such that there is no Baloch leader left who has both the experience of dealing with Islamabad and also has the respect of the young and active nationalists. Mir Bizenjo is no more. Nawab Bugti was martyred. Sardar Marri has disassociated himself from politics and Sardar Mengal himself admits that the young nationalist aren’t ready to listen to him.

It won’t be wrong to say that those Islamabad picks to sit in the Balochistan assembly have no association with the people’s sentiments. Neither do their interests lie in Balochistan. Whatever money and resources they get from Islamabad, they divvy among themselves. Even the resources that the military tries to get to the Baloch public through them do not reach its intended recipients. The reality is that the supposedly ‘elected’ representation of Balochistan, comprising of those that Islamabad ‘trusts’; is the one that is to blame for keeping this distance.

So should we abandon Balochistan as a ‘lost cause’ and wipe our hands clean of it? Can any region and its people be forced into stagnation? If those that oversee the workings of the state are not working for change, will the process of change be interred as well? This cannot and does not happen. The unrest and unrelenting bloodshed is cause for concern in the entire region. A few days ago, a representative of the US state department revealed online that they were getting constant queries from Balochistan and its adjoining areas about what the US was doing to deal with the atrocities being committed in Balochistan. The representative officially stated that the US is deeply worried about the situation and are talking to Pakistan authorities about it.

In present day Balochistan, unlike Balochistan of yesteryear, there is no leader who can or wants to talk to Islamabad. The youth that has taken up arms is moving farther away from Islamabad with each passing day. The attacks on the security forces in Balochistan show that they now have greater expertise and better training. Now they target people after proper political planning. Energy sources are being picked out one by one. Even Al-Jazeera covered the activities of these insurgents the other day which showed that the areas where the security forces are not in control are becoming hotbeds of resistance. Nobody has the guts to bring out the flag of Pakistan in rallies there as flags of Balochistan fly high. The commander of an insurgent group said clearly on TV that they would increase the scope of their armed activities to Lahore and Islamabad.

Those grappling for power in Islamabad are not looking to Balochistan. Will they do so when the deafening sound of blast reaches their own ears? Will Islamabad open its eyes and reach out when there will be no one left to talk with in Balochistan?

The writer is one of Pakistan’s most widely read columnists.

Carve Out Balochistan From Ally Pakistan To Beat Taliban

2012-01-25T19:34:00.000-08:00

Louie Gohmert Afghan Strategy: Carve Out Balochistan From Ally Pakistan To Beat Taliban

Posted: 01/25/2012 6:26 pm

Michael McAuliff mike.mcauliff@huffingtonpost.com

WASHINGTON -- President Obama is losing the war in Afghanistan to the Taliban, argued Rep. Louie Gohmert after listening to Tuesday's State of the Union address. So he proposed one way to win: create a new, friendly state within the borders of neighboring Pakistan.

The Texas Republican took issue with Obama's assertion that "the Taliban's momentum has been broken." He said he had just visited Afghanistan and came away with a very different sense from talking to members of the Northern Alliance, a multiethnic confederation of warlords and other forces who led the U.S.-backed ouster of the Taliban in 2001.

Gohmert argued that, far from being broken, the Taliban are feeling powerful enough to demand that members of the Northern Alliance apologize before the United States leaves in 2013. "If you look at the objective facts ... they're not on the run," Gohmert said.

His solution was first to supply more arms to the Northern Alliance. But then, he said, the Afghan border with Pakistan needs to be shored up.

"Let's talk about creating a Balochistan in the southern part of Pakistan," Gohmert told The Huffington Post, referring to a region of Pakistan that constitutes nearly half that vital if troublesome ally.

"They love us. They'll stop the IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and all the weaponry coming into Afghanistan, and we got a shot to win over there," said Gohmert, who accused Obama's national security advisers of giving the president bad intel on Afghanistan.

"His strategy of working from ignorance and thinking we have them on the run is no way to go through life, son," Gohmert said. "I'm about to borrow from an 'Animal House' line, but anyway, that's no way to go through life when you're that ignorant of what's really going on."

The White House did not answer a request for comment, and Gohmert's office did not elaborate on how the United States could even discuss carving off Balochistan from a country that is both an ally and a nuclear power.

The United States recently has been talking about a truce with the Taliban. Gohmert, a member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, characterized such efforts as begging, backed by an offer to "let all these Taliban murderers" go free.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/25/louie-gohmert-afghan-strategy-balochistan-pakistan-taliban_n_1232250.html?ref=mostpopular

FRANCE: Regulating Internet filter exports

2012-01-25T19:22:00.000-08:00

With France’s presidential elections only three months away, defence and intelligence specialists at both the Socialist Party and the ruling UMP agree on at least one thing – the need to regulate the exportation of Internet monitoring technology. To date, French companies in this field have had total latitude to sell their equipment abroad, and the only controls that exist are informal ones( INTELLIGENCE ONLINE)

India to pay gold for Iran oil, China may follow

2012-01-24T23:50:00.001-08:00

Russian TV carried the news that India has decided to pay for Iranian oil in gold .This was also carried by an Indian website Rediff based on Israeli website Debkafile ;

This is really breaking news .The two rogue states US and Israel are holding the world to ransom .Washington has obstructed all Indian attempts to organise energy security .It even got minister Mani Shankar Aiyar dismissed .

US is bankrupt with its debt as much as its GDP .It is surviving because of over three trillion dollars stimulus created based on nothing . The last IMF chief had allegedly indicated that US does not even have the gold it claims to have!

China might follow the Indian line .It will encourage many other countries of Asia like Japan and S Korea who buy Iran oil. Enough of US highhandedness .Some Gulf states are ready to sell oil to China for Chinese currency.

India's is the first major step to weaken position of US dollar as the reserve currency .The dollar will thus weaken .Under US pressure EU which has issued sanctions against Iran , a collection of bankrupt nations ,they will suffer too .They are welcome to be even more reliant on Russia for its energy .

http://www.rediff.com/business/report/india-to-pay-for-irans-oil-in-gold/20120124.htm
India to pay for Iran's oil in gold
January 24, 2012 18:27 IST
India has decided to pay Iran in gold for its oil purchases, writes Faisal Kidwai

India has decided to pay Iran in gold for the oil it purchases, according to a report carried by an Israeli news website DEBKAfile.

The move is an attempt to work around the sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe over Iran's alleged nuclear programme.

India had earlier indicated that it was in talks with Iran to pay for the oil in either rupees or in yen, but now it seems that India has decided to switch to gold.

An Indian delegation visited Tehran last week to discuss payment options in view of the new sanctions.

The two sides were reported to have agreed that payment for the oil purchased would be partly in yen and partly in rupees. Plan to make the payment in gold was apparently kept a secret.

India has been looking at ways to switch from dollar as the US and EU have imposed sanctions on Iran's oil industry and financial institutions.

The embargo means any bank dealing with Iran would be banned from transacting with American and European financial institutions.

India has refused to join the sanctions, saying it will only support United Nations-backed embargo. The move by India, if true, will have other unintended consequences: it will bring down the value of dollar.

If India does decide to pay Iran in gold, the decision will certainly push the price of gold high, especially as vast sums are involved in such transactions, and that would hurt the value of the dollar.

India buys around $12 billion a year's worth of Iranian crude, or about 12 per cent of its total requirements. It will manage the deal through UCO Bank [ Get Quote ], an Indian bank [ Get Quote ] which has no financial links with the US, and Halk Bankasi, a Turkey-based bank, according to reports.

Sanctions dodge: India to pay gold for Iran oil, China may follow
Published: 24 January, 2012, 12:53
http://rt.com/news/iran-india-gold-oil-543/
India has reportedly agreed to pay Tehran in gold for the oil it buys, in a move aimed at protecting Delhi from US-sanctions targeting countries who trade with Iran. China, another buyer of Iranian oil, may follow Delhi’s lead.
The report, by the Israeli-based news website DEBKAfile, states that Iran and India are negotiating backup alternatives with China and Russia, should the US and EU find a way to block the gold payment mechanism.
Delhi’s move is seen as surprising, as earlier India and Iran said they would switch to yen and rupees. China, another major importer of Iranian oil, may follow Delhi’s lead, the report adds.
India and China need to switch from the dollar in bilateral trade, since the US and EU have issued unilateral sanctions against the Iranian oil industry and financial institutions. The sanctions would ban any bank involved in oil trade with Iran from dealing with American and European counterparts.
Both India and China, two major buyers of Iranian oil accounting for 22 and 13 percent of its total export respectively, have refused to join such sanctions. This means they have to establish a reliable way of paying for crude, independently of the parts of the global financial system controlled by New York and London.
Delhi’s current plan is to effect payments through two state-owned banks, India’s UCO Bank and Turkey’s Halk Bankasi, Turkey being another country refusing to join the sanction spree.
The US issued sanctions against Iran in December, aiming to put pressure on the Islamic Republic and make its controversial nuclear program more transparent. The EU joined the initiative on Monday, banning new oil contracts with Iran, but allowing current ones to be fulfilled.
Australia on Tuesday became the latest country to voice plans for such an embargo, although the move would be more symbolic than practical, considering the country’s small share in Iran’s oil export.
Japan and South Korea, two other major buyers of Iranian crude, are in talks with Washington over the issue, although both Seoul and Tokyo are worried that stopping their imports could hurt their economies.
Iran, which is highly dependent on its sales of oil, is reacting to the sanction campaign nervously. Tehran says it will not yield to pressure, and threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil tanker route in the Persian Gulf.
German political analyst Christoph R. Horstel told RT that amid the economic crisis the embargo on Iranian oil imports could backfire on the EU, while Iran “will do quite well even under the embargo.”
“All the present faithful customers to Iran oil are set to continue buying this oil, and they will find a way, rest assured,” he said. “This is the signal I get from Tehran.”
“I was personally present when the deputy economics minister of Iran was talking to a foreign society in Berlin,” he added.“And the gentleman said very openly to the shocked audience ‘OK. You don’t want to buy our goods. Well, the Chinese do.”

CURFEW IN WESTERN SICHUAN: 11 TIBETANS DIE IN POLICE FIRING

2012-01-24T23:45:00.000-08:00

B.RAMAN

A curfew has been imposed and a shoot-at-sight order has been given to the police following two days of violent protests by Tibetans in certain parts of Western Sichuan, which has seen 14 instances of self-immolation since March last year following the arrests of a large number of Tibetan monks of the well-known Kirti monastery and their forcible detention in a military camp.

2.The protests by the monks of the Kirti monastery started in support of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in opposition to the suppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese authorities. It has since spread to the general population of the area in protest against the arrest and prosecution of many bystanders, who were present at thescenes of self-immolation, on charges of abetment of suicide.

3. The anger has been aggravated by the refusal of the Chinese authorities to hand over the bodies of those who committed self-immolation to their relatives for funeral ceremonies in accordance with Tibetan traditions and by the disposal of the dead bodies by the police without allowing the relatives to be present.

4.The protests, which were peaceful till December, have since assumed a violent form with at least two attacks on police stations where, the local residents suspected, the dead bodies were kept.

5.An outbreak of widespread violence involving about 6000 Tibetans was reported on January 23,2012, from theDraggo county in Sichuan province's Kardze prefecture . According to reliable sources, the local police opened fire on the protesting Tibetans, resulting in the death of five Tibetans and injuries to 40 others.

6. The news of deaths in the police firings led to the spread of the violence the next day to the Serthar (in Chinese Seda) area of the same prefecture.The police again opened fire resulting in six more deaths.

7. Reports of demonstrations have also been received from the Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba prefecture) area where several thousand Tibetans have reportedly blocked a local road. The police forcibly dispersed Tibetans who tried to hold a special prayer meeting in the Kirti monastery in homage to those who died in the police firings.

8.It is reliably learnt that the latest violence started when the police beat up and arrested Tibetans in the affected areas who refused to celebrate the Chinese New Year’s Day in protest against the Chinese suppression. They also observed the Chinese New Year’s Day as a day of mourning in memory of all those who have committed self-immolation since March last.

9.The US , which will be hosting China's Vice President Xi Jinping at the White House next month, has expressed grave concern over the latest violence, and called upon Beijing to review its "counterproductive policies" in Tibetan areas that have created tensions and threatened Tibetans' religious, cultural and linguistic identity.

10.A statement issued by Maria Otero, US Special Co-ordinator for Tibetan issues, said: “China should resume talks with the Dalai Lama or his representatives over Tibetan grievances.We urge Chinese security forces to exercise restraint, and we renew our call to allow access to Tibetan areas of China for journalists, diplomats and other observers." (25-1-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

DEALING WITH BREAKING TWEETS & BLOGS

2012-01-23T02:19:00.001-08:00

B.RAMAN

The buzzword is no longer "Breaking News". It is "Breaking Tweets" and "Breaking Blogs", which have started disseminating news and comments faster than the TV channels.

2. Journalists no longer first rush to policy and opinion makers to find out their views on important developments. They rush to the Twitter sites of important personalities to find out what they have tweeted about such developments. Personal interactions continue to be important for journalists, but twitter and other microblog interactions are assuming increasing importance in assessing public opinion.

3. Between the first Gulf War of 1991 when satellite TV became the first source of news and interpretation and President Barack Obama's election campaign of 2008 when microblogs started competing with TV channels for catching public attention the "Breaking News" syndrome held sway.

4. Now, "Breaking Tweets" and "Breaking Blogs" are becoming as important as "Breaking News" for keeping oneself informed instantaneously of what is happening around us.

5.At an interaction on Media and the Internet held at Beijing on January 19,2012, officials of the Chinese Government admitted that microblogs have become an important platform for disseminating news and views and an important bridge between the State and the public.

6. There is now a recognition that public opinion is increasingly and better reflected in the TV news channels and microblogs than in the print media. For the traditional, old generation elite, the print media continues to be an important source of reliable news and in-depth analysis.But, for GenNext of the civil society and the Internet-bred elite, which have no time or patience for esoteric analyses, the TV news channels and microblogs have become the preferred tools for knowing and thinking.

7. 2011 was a turning point in the evolution of our media strategies. Those who realised the importance of TV news channels and microblogs in reaching out to the public and mobilising public opinion did better as political and social activists than those who continued to be stuck to the print media.

8. We saw dramatic evidence of this in the waves made by the Anna Hazare Movement Against Corruption. The skilful use of the new media and the TV channels by the advisers of Anna contributed in no small measure to the initial success of the movement. The movement might have since lost support on the ground, but it continues to be as popular and as vibrant in the virtual world as it was before.

9.While the non-governmental world is now making good use of the TV channels and the social media networks, of which microblogs are an important component, Governmental policy-makers still treat the growing community of TV journos and netizens with suspicion and disdain. There has been no re-thinking of media strategies appropriate to the mix of the real and virtual worlds in which we live. Even China has realised that a turning point has arrived in the evolution of the media strategies and is trying to re-shape its media strategies to make them appropriate to the rapidly changing media landscape. It has realised that the virtual public (netizens) is as important as the real public ( the man in the street) and is brain-storming on ways of dealing with this. A report disseminated by the State-owned Xinhua news agency on this subject is annexed.

10. The realisation that the media strategies of our Prime Minister's office have become archaic in a media world which has already changed beyond recognition and continues to change is reflected in the resignation of Shri Harish Khare as the media advisor to our PM on January 19 and the appointment of ShriPankajPachauri as Director (Communications) in the PMO with the task of proposing suitable media strategies to deal with the print media, the TV news channels and social media networks.

11. Any media strategy, to be effective, has to be proactive. ShriKhare was widely viewed as essentially a reactive person who was slow to take off---if he took off at all--- in crisis situations which tended to reflect negatively on the credibility of the Prime Minister.We saw this dramatically during the ill-fated debate on the Lokpal Bill in the RajyaSabha on December 28 last.

12. There was a lively media interest in this debate--- in the real as well as the virtual worlds. There were reports flashed by TV channels of a Government stratagem to disrupt the debate by injecting controversial issues in order to avoid a vote on the amendments. After the fiasco of the debate, the TV channels went hammer and tongs at the Government for not being sincere on the Lokpal issue.

13. These charges and the resulting public perceptions had a damaging effect on the credibility of the Government and the leadership of the Prime Minister. One would have expected a senior journalist like ShriKhare to have bestirred himself and interacted vigorously with the TV channels to correct the perceptions. He did not do so. He just watched helplessly as the TV channels and the world of the microblogs went to town with one sensational report after another and with one sensational Tweet after another.

14.Unhappiness over his perceived lethargy is believed to have been one of the reasons for the induction of ShriPachauri. But will he be any the better? One has to wait for the results.ShriPachauri has the reputation of being a good TV professional and an excellent News Editor and anchor.

15.But to be effective as media adviser to the PM, the incumbent must have the stature that will compel attention and respect from the PM himself and the public and a vision to modernise media strategies. Does ShriPachauri have that kind of stature and vision? It remains to be seen.

16. To be fair to ShriPachauri, it has to be underlined that however brilliant ShriPachauri may be, he cannot succeed unless the PM rids himself of his media-shyness, comes out of his shell and takes the lead in interacting with the media.

17. The leadership in media relations has to come from the PM. In the absence of such leadership, the role of the media adviser will remain restricted and problematic. ( 20-1-12)

ANNEXURE

Government "must utilize blogs better"

(Source: Xinhua) 20-1-12

　　By Zhao Yinan and Wang Huazhong

　　Minister stresses importance of keeping public fully informed

　　BEIJING, Jan. 19 (Xinhuanet) --The government should better utilize micro blogs to provide information and improve transparency, a senior official said.

　　In the latest call for Party and government agencies to reach an increasingly Internet-savvy population, Wang Chen, minister of the State Council Information Office, said on Wednesday that agencies should open micro blog accounts to better understand public opinion and to respond to issues of public concern.

　　Wang Chen, minister of the State Council Information Office, talks to reporters at a news conference in Beijing on Wednesday. The coming year will see an enhancement of China's engagement with the international community so that the world can have a better understanding of the country, Wang said. [Photo/China Daily]

　　Describing micro blogs as an "important platform" for information and "a bridge" between the government and the public, Wang urged officials to keep their blogs up to date.

　　"Government micro blogs should provide information useful to the people, such as information about commerce, daily life and education," he said.

　　Micro blogs are increasingly popular in China, which has more than 500 million Internet users, more than any other country and far greater than the total population of the European Union.

　　More than 330 million Chinese people are registered micro blog users and at least 150 million entries are made daily.

　　Government agencies and Party departments at all levels have opened more than 50,000 micro blog accounts, and many of them help officials communicate with the general public.

　　Wang cited one particular micro blog as an example.

　　Chen Shiqu, head of the Ministry of Public Security's anti-trafficking task force, "has done tangible things for the public", Wang said.

　　Chen opened a micro blog on Dec 12, 2010 after being told that it would help authorities combat human trafficking, and this turned out to be true, he said. More than 2,000 tip-offs have been submitted to the blog, he said.

　　Chen also used the platform to raise public awareness of various legislation and show how his office can help reunite families.

　　Chen's micro blog has 1.36 million followers. These are people that he could not reach by conventional means, he said.

　　Zhang Jianshu, director of information service at the Beijing Municipal Health Bureau, however, said making a government micro blog popular is not easy.

　　The bureau opened its micro blog in November 2010 and has so far posted about 170 articles of information and has 48,000 followers.

　　Netizens don't respond much to our postings and we are trying to overcome this problem, Zhang told China Daily earlier.

　　An industry expert said government agencies should not open micro blogs just for show.

　　"The government should make full use of existing communication channels, while keeping pace with the latest technology," said Zhu Lijia, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance.

　　Internet supervision

　　With the growing popularity of micro blogs, Wang said regulations, such as registration, are needed to ensure the "rapid and healthy growth of the Internet".

　　A policy was introduced in Beijing last month requiring the names of micro bloggers to be registered. This was later extended to other major cities, including Shanghai and Guangzhou.

　　Wang said the policy now only requires that new micro blog users register "backstage" with their real name. This means that website administrators will see their names instead of Net users.

　　"The micro blog has changed the way we exchange information," but irrational, negative and harmful opinions can also be expressed, he said.

　　"Pornography, fraud and rumors" can be found on the Net and this can harm society, he said.

　　China established the State Internet Information Office in May last year to oversee cyberspace. The office, headed by Wang, aims to coordinate and supervise online content as well as investigate and punish websites violating laws and regulations.

　　Zhang Yan contributed to this story.

　　(Source: China Daily)

China's White Papers on Space: An Analysis

2012-01-23T02:05:00.001-08:00

Ajey Lele and Gunjan Singh

January 20, 2012

The three White Papers provide overall, basic information about the Chinese Space agenda. They highlight the fact that China has achieved important breakthroughs in a relatively short time and can be viewed as a rapidly rising Space power. The emphasis in the White Papers is on the civilian aspects of the Chinese Space programme. This could, in a sense, be regarded as the tip of the iceberg, focusing on the civilian aspects of the Space agenda while hiding deeper strategic intentions. China's international alignments and cooperation in the Space arena indicates that it views Space technology as an instrument to boost its soft power status.

It is important not to view the Chinese Space programme in a limited sense as an attempt to demonstrate technological or military superiority. It is as much about showing visionary leadership as an attempt to achieve great power status by putting a Chinese on the Moon, the first country envisaged to do so in the 21st century.

Download Issue Brief

Analysing the failed Coup in Bangladesh

2012-01-23T02:03:00.001-08:00

Smruti S. Pattanaik

IDSA.IN

http://idsa.in/idsacomments/AnalysingthefailedCoupinBangladesh_SmrutiPattanaik_230112

January 23, 2012

The news of a coup attempt by 'fanatic' mid-level officers instigated and supported by some Bangladeshi expatriates and retired Army officials that was foiled by the Bangladesh Army did not come as a major surprise. There have been whispers about such a conspiracy in Dhaka's power corridors for quite some time. The fear that such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out re-emerged after the 2009 mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles, in which 59 Army officers were killed. There were indications that the BDR mutiny might have been instigated by Islamists who feared reprisals from the secular forces that had come to power in the December 2008 general elections. The Awami League government's reluctance to allow an immediate Army operation against the mutineers was touted as a major source of anger among many army officers. Even though there were three inquiry commissions into the 2009 incident, the reason and motivations behind that mutiny have not been established in any conclusive manner.

There are reports that some officers involved in the recent plot were linked to the urban radical Islamist group -- the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) -- which was banned by the Bangladesh government in 2009. HuT has been active in Bangladesh since 2001 and had been campaigning against the Awami League. Its activists were seen distributing pamphlets in various mosques during the military-backed caretaker regime. In spite of the crackdown on them during that period, they had remained active. It needs to be emphasised that like the Jamaat, the Hizbut Tahrir has strong links with Bangladeshi expatriates in the UK, who subscribe to its views. The HuT Bangladesh website reads "O Army Officers! Remove Hasina, the killer of your brothers and establish the Khilafah to save yourselves and the Ummah from subjugation to US-India" (http://www.khilafat.org/index.php).

After assuming office in January 2009, Hasina has taken steps to deal with Islamic radicals. Regular raids, arrests of radicals and seizure of arms and ammunition have paralysed the Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and other terrorist groups. The war crime trial for the purpose of which five Jamaat-i-Islami leaders and two BNP leaders were arrested is also in progress. Coupled with these efforts to address the rise of radicalism, the Bangladesh Supreme court declared the 5th and 8th amendments to the country's Constitution as illegal and termed military coups as unconstitutional, thus facilitating the Awami League's objective of restoring the 1972 constitution. The government, keeping in mind the present political reality, has restored the four foundational principles of liberation and Article 12 which dealt with secularism, while retaining Article 2 (b) pertaining to Islam as the state religion. It also retained the article that allowed religious political parties to operate on a non-communal basis.

All this has angered many Islamists who feel that their electoral base will shrink if Hasina continues in power. The Islamists hope that the Army will come to their rescue as they have openly supported military rule in the past.

The Army has always been politically divided along party lines, although traditionally its sympathies have been with the BNP. Nevertheless, in the past, the tussle between officers who fought for the liberation and those who did not has led to as many as 19 coup attempts; the previous unsuccessful attempt came in 1996 and was led by General Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim, a freedom fighter.

Interestingly, the latest arrests of Army officials plotting a coup was made public against the backdrop of Begum Zia, Chairperson of the BNP, alleging at a rally held in Chittagong on January 9 that the government had a role in the disappearance of Army officers and is engaged in confining and torturing them. While Khaleda's statement was publicly refuted by the Inter Service Public Relation (ISPR), the Army admitted that it was indeed trying some officers for dereliction of duty as per its rules. Perhaps, the Army felt compelled to admit to the coup attempt after various media reports revealed the arrest of some Army officials.

According to the ISPR statement, the coup was unearthed in December 2011 when some middle level officers numbering around 16, whom the Army termed as 'religious fanatics', were attempting to recruit sympathizers for carrying out a coup. Some of these officers who were approached informed senior Army officials about it.

At the centre of the controversy is a Lieutenant Colonel who has been arrested and a Major who is absconding. According to media reports, the Facebook profile of the main conspirator, Major Zia, noted that "Army is soon going to bring change". This has to be seen against the backdrop of fears raised by certain quarters in Bangladesh that some cadres of religious parties recruited into the Army during the BNP-led coalition government rule may act as supporters in such a coup.

The coup attempt was not just aimed at derailing democracy but at stopping the ongoing war crimes trial. The BNP, which initially supported the trial, has come out openly against it. It has questioned the objectives of the trial and has been pressing the government to stop it. Initially, some Muslim countries had tried to dissuade Bangladesh from opening the cases in this regard. However, in the face of popular demand to try the people involved in war crimes, the government refused to buckle under such pressure from foreign countries.

To bring about any political change in the country which is currently ruled by a party that has overwhelming majority, it was imperative for the Islamists to enlist the support of the Army. But the fact remains that the Army itself is struggling to wriggle out of its historical legacy of military coups and the resulting stigma. The latest coup attempt by radicals within the army indicates the penetration of Islamists and more specifically that of the Hizb ut-Tahrir whose main support base is among the educated youth, who are highly motivated and belong to affluent families in urban areas. The coup attempt is also an indication of the nature as well as future direction of radicalism whose fulcrum lies in the relatively more affluent urban space rather than in the impoverished madrassas that are generally believed to be a source of fundamentalism in Bangladesh.

Japan's strategic outlook

2012-01-23T02:01:00.000-08:00

Rod Lyon Australian Strategic Policy Institute
http://apo.org.au/research/japans-strategic-outlook

READ THE FULL TEXT

HTML	Japan's strategic outlook

19 December 2011Japan will remain an introverted strategic player during the next decade, and for Australia, the challenge is how to partner with that inward-looking Japan.

Japan has endured a difficult couple of decades, but probably confronts another. With its economy stalled, its political system still evolving towards a genuine multiparty system, and its population ageing and shrinking, it confronts a daunting array of domestic challenges. The great East Asian earthquake of March has only added to its problems. The after-effects will be felt for years, not least in the continuing nuclear problems at Fukushima. Those challenges mean Japan will probably remain an introverted strategic player during the next decade or so. Arguments made by a range of commentators about five years ago, that Japan had entered a critical 'turning point' in its strategic policy, now seem less compelling.

For Australia, the challenge is how to partner with that inward-looking Japan over the next ten-to-fifteen years. The pace of change in Asian strategic settings is such that much may change during that period. And there aren't many Japan-sized players in the regional system, so we have to work to ensure that the one we already have remains committed to shared objectives to the greatest extent possible. We need to 'work with' Japan, perhaps bringing more ourselves to the relationship to offset Japan's period of hesitancy. But we might also need a 'work around' strategy—accepting that we need to do more with others to compensate for Japan's strategic hesitancy. Australia wants an Asia with a range of engaged great powers—and Japan is an important part of that future Asia.'

Dr Rod Lyon, Director of ASPI's Strategy and International Program, is the author of this report.

Image: Josh Liba / flickr

PUBLICATION TYPE	Report
PUBLISHER TYPE	APO Member, Think tank
COVERAGE	Australia, Asia and the Pacific
PERMANENT URL	http://apo.org.au/node/27513
VIEWS	427

Is the East Asia Summit Rudd’s gift to the world?

2012-01-23T01:59:00.001-08:00

by Thom Woodroofe
http://www.aiia.asn.au/qa/762-is-the-east-asia-summit-rudds-gift-to-the-world

Barack Obama's first official visit to Australia in November was a
short stop on the way to the main event. The 2011 East Asia Summit was
about to be held in Bali and it was the first time the United States,
and Russia, would be included.

This expansion of the Summit is in large part a result of Australian
diplomacy, but this remains underappreciated.

In June 2008, on the eve of his first official visit to Asia as Prime
Minister, Kevin Rudd announced the desire to create an Asia Pacific
Community. Greg Sheridan suggested in The Australian that this was
designed to provide a wider narrative for the regional tour, dubbing
Rudd the "Mad Hatter" for his desire to centralise control over
Australia's diplomatic efforts and constantly announce new
initiatives.

The revelation that no other countries were briefed prior to the
announcement, and that his Special Envoy Richard Woolcott was briefed
with only two hours notice, further undermined the possibility of
pragmatic evaluation of the idea.

However, Rudd's speech clearly established two "building blocks" of
how an Asia Pacific community (APc) would look. These were the
inclusion of the United States, Japan, China, India and Indonesia in a
forum with a wide ranging agenda across economic, political and
security issues. But Rudd's speech also featured a heavy focus on the
comparative evolution of the European Union (EU) and a timeframe of
2020, both of which plagued the debate from the beginning by creating
a grandiose sense of what he was trying to achieve.

This ensured that Rudd's idea would never be decoupled from the notion
of the establishment of an EU-style body for the region, and the
continued heavy reliance on 2020 timelines by the Rudd Government
provided easy cannon fodder for critics. The tactically amateurish use
of a capital 'C' for community also fuelled the belief that Rudd was
contemplating such a union rather than simply a broader discussion, as
was implied when the capital was dropped months later. Not doing so
from the outset was a mistake.

In addition, the role of the all powerful ASEAN bloc (Association of
South East Asian Nations) was omitted in Rudd's announcement. While
Rudd has subsequently said he has been "a longstanding fan of ASEAN",
its initial exclusion signalled to many that Rudd was either proposing
a possible competitor to ASEAN or something that could potentially
sideline ASEAN altogether. However, Rudd said from the outset that
"APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus
Three and ASEAN itself will continue to play important roles, and
longer-term may continue in their own right or embody the building
blocks of an Asia Pacific Community."

While Rudd's idea may have been met with a heavy dose of scepticism
and criticism, it was not without basis. For many years, the Asia
Pacific has been home to what many have called an "alphabet soup with
numerical croutons" of regional institutions without any clear and
inclusive big brother.

Besides the 21 member economy grouping of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the ten member country grouping of ASEAN, there
is also: ASEAN+3 (APT) which brings China, Japan and South Korea into
the fold; the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which widens it to 27 member
countries; the pre-existing East Asia Summit which was effectively APT
with the further inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India; and
even the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. Unsurprisingly, the original
report from Woolcott concluded that the existing architecture was
unwieldy.

Woolcott's report certainly indicated that the East Asia Summit
provided the easiest model to satisfy the prerequisites of an APc with
the inclusion of the United States, and potentially other countries
such as Russia. However, this seemed unlikely as it would require the
commitment of the United States' President to two regional forums in
Asia annually. Moreover, ASEAN was sceptical about further its their
regional forums, having just added India, Australia and New Zealand.
Many were also sceptical as to what the EAS achieved with some
labelling it "dinner followed by sixteen speeches".

Another logical option would have been expanding APEC's agenda from
economic matters, but this featured little in Woolcott's report. This
was surprising given Woolcott's role in establishing APEC and also
given his consultations only included the existing 21 APEC members.

This idea would have required expanding APEC membership to include
India, but this had been a long simmering debate within the forum
itself. While India's inclusion in APEC has long been supported by
Australia, Japan and the United States, it has been met with fierce
opposition from others, such as the Philippines. China would have also
likely been uncomfortable with the inclusion of Taiwan at any forum
relating to regional security rather than economics. Therefore, the
difficulties of membership in APEC seemed to suggest that, even with
the existing buy-in of the White House, the East Asia Summit proved a
better vehicle through which to progress the possibility of an APc.

Aside from existing architecture, the debate also brought to the
surface a much deeper discussion of what would constitute the 'Asia
Pacific' in itself. As mentioned, Woolcott's consultations were only
extended to APEC economies, which are presently defined largely by
those with a border lapping the Pacific Ocean. However, aside from
India there are many other pending applications for membership of
APEC, including from Mongolia, Pakistan, Laos, Bangladesh, Costa Rica,
Colombia, Panama and Ecuador largely on the basis of their heavy
business activities in the region. As Australia's Shadow Foreign
Minister Julie Bishop said at the time "If all the Pacific states are
included that must include all the countries with a border on the
Pacific Ocean including the United States. Then you get to Latin
America and South America, are they to be included? If you look on the
other side of Asia, is Taiwan to be included? Is Burma to be included?
If India is to be in it would Saudi Arabia? Iran? Iraq?"

Woolcott's report concluded that while there was interest in Rudd's
idea for a more all encompassing agenda for dialogue within the
region, there was "little appetite" for a new institution. Many
commentators, including Bernard Keane from Crikey! suggested this was
the "death knell" for the idea, but Rudd only redoubled his efforts
convening a one-and-a-half track dialogue in Sydney in December 2009
for the region's leading thinkers and diplomats. In the months leading
up to the conference, Rudd continued to press the idea to regional
leaders, including through the rare honour of being the keynote
speaker to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore, and having
his idea included briefly in the Communiqué of the 2009 APEC Summit
and discussed at the accompanying CEO Summit which Rudd addressed.
Rudd also used his address at the East Asia Summit in Thailand that
year to brief regional leaders on the idea. However, he was
overshadowed by the Japanese Prime Minister floating a competing idea
for an East Asian Community or trade bloc based on the East Asia
Summit or the APT, which seemed to deliver more tangible outcomes to
member states.

Throughout, Rudd's idea was continually beset by heavy criticism from
both domestic and regional constituencies. The Australian newspaper
sought to undermine the idea at every opportunity, focussing on the
seemingly unachievable concept of creating an "Asian-EU" as one
headline read. Front-page column space was dedicated to menial
details on whether visiting heads of government supported the idea or
not, regardless of whether it was on the agenda for their discussions.
The coverage also failed to mention the support of countries such as
the United States and Thailand for Rudd's idea. Regionally, critics
such as Barry Desker, the head of Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, described the idea as "dead in the water" and
members of the ASEAN Studies Centre at Singapore's Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies called it "a dangerous concept" in an opinion
piece for The Bangkok Post and the Singapore Strait Times. Rudd also
came under heavy criticism for not meeting regularly with Woolcott; a
subsequent essay released by Australian journalist David Marr in
mid-2010 quoted Woolcott as saying "there comes a point when big ideas
need prime ministerial time, and it isn't there. It's a disjunction."
All this distracted from the bigger picture.

However, Rudd's idea was buoyed by the announcement in late 2009 by
the United States Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell that the
United States would "hang back a little bit" and wait and see how the
regional architecture evolved before taking a position. With the
election of the self-described "first Pacific President" a year
earlier, this seemed the first definitive statement that there was
interest from Washington in heightening their involvement in the
region's architecture. Diplomatic cables released subsequently by
WikiLeaks reveal this was in large part a consequence of Rudd's
sustained advocacy. This signal from Washington cannot be
understated, and provided the catalyst for ASEAN to seriously
contemplate ways the United States could be brought into the region's
institutions. An invitation to join the East Asia Summit was the
logical response. Sinagapore also floated an idea to establish an
ASEAN+8 grouping that would meet every three years on the back of APEC
with effectively the same membership of the East Asia Summit but with
the inclusion of Russia and the United States.

By the April ASEAN Meeting in Hanoi in 2010, the United States
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had made clear the United States'
interest in joining an expanded East Asia Summit, calling it the
"foundational security and political institution for Asia". A model
suggested by Stanford University's Donald K. Emmerson was adopted by
Clinton whereby the United States would "ease into" the East Asia
Summit by dispatching the Vice President or herself in 2010, to be
followed by the President in 2011. ASEAN responded positively but
ensured its centrality was on display by stating in the Forum's
communiqué that "any new regional framework or process should be
complementary to and built upon existing regional mechanisms and the
principle of ASEAN's centrality".

While Rudd's original announcement seemed predicated on the
establishment of a broader regional union, there is little doubt the
ensuing debate provided the framework for the Obama Administration's
decision to heighten their engagement in Asia's regional architecture.
Rudd quickly seized on the ASEAN and US announcements, saying "the
inclusion of the United States and Russia in our region's emerging
architecture is fundamental to the evolution of what I call an
Asia-Pacific community. In fact, so much of Australia's diplomacy has
been driven by this core concern - how to integrate in particular the
role of the United States in the future broad architecture of our
region."

After his demise as Prime Minister, his successor Julia Gillard also
reiterated this stance, saying that the United States' involvement in
the East Asia Summit would achieve what she called "the practical
objectives" of Rudd's plan. However, Australia's role in helping
establish the environment for an expanded EAS to become a reality is
unlikely to ever be fully recognised, given the political
mismanagement and ensuing opposition to Rudd's original announcement.

Either way, the inclusion of the United States and Russia in the
annual heads of government level East Asia Summit signals an important
step in the development of the region's architecture. Furthermore, it
signals an important step in ensuring the commitment and time of the
United States' presidency to the region through two annual gatherings.
As Hilary Clinton has said "half of diplomacy is showing up."

Thom Woodroofe is an associate fellow of the Asia Society based in
Australia. He has interviewed both Australian Foreign Minister Kevin
Rudd & Shadow Foreign Minister Julie Bishop on the Asia Pacific
Community.

Photo: The White House President Barack Obama – Photo of the Day
November 2011 -
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photogallery/november-2011-photo-day

Escaping Afghanistan, the graveyard of empires

2012-01-23T01:57:00.001-08:00

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120121bc.html

NEW DELHI — Since coming to office, President Barack Obama has pursued
an Afghan war strategy summed up in just four words: "surge, bribe and
run." The U.S.-led military mission has now entered the "run" part, or
what euphemistically is being called the "transition to 2014" — the
year Obama arbitrarily chose as the deadline to wind down all NATO
combat operations.
The central aim is to cut a deal with the Taliban — even if
Afghanistan and the region pay a heavy price — so that the United
States and its NATO partners exit the "Graveyard of Empires" without
losing face. This effort to withdraw as part of a political settlement
without admitting defeat is being dressed up as a "reconciliation"
process, with Qatar, Germany and Britain getting lead roles to help
facilitate a U.S.-Taliban deal.

Yet what stands out is how little the U.S. has learned from past
mistakes. In some critical respects, it is actually beginning to
repeat past mistakes, whether by creating or funding new local
militias in Afghanistan or striving to cut a deal with the Taliban. As
in the covert war it waged against the nearly nine-year Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan, so too in the current overt war,
U.S. policy has been driven by short-term considerations, without much
regard for the interests of friends in the wider region.

To be sure, Obama was right to seek an end to this protracted war. But
he blundered by laying out his cards in public and emboldening the
enemy.

Within weeks of assuming office, Obama publicly declared his intent to
exit Afghanistan, before he even asked his team to work out a
strategy. He quickly moved from the Bush-initiated counterinsurgency
strategy to limited war objectives centered on finding a face-saving
exit. A troop surge that lasted up to 2010 was designed not to
militarily rout the Taliban but to strike a political deal with the
enemy from a position of strength. But even before a deal could be
negotiated, rising U.S. casualties and war fatigue prompted him to
publicly unveil a troop draw down, stretching from 2011 to 2014. If
the surge failed to militarily contain the Taliban, it was largely
because its purpose had been undermined by Obama at the very outset.
A withdrawing power that first announces a phased exit and then
pursues deal-making with the enemy undermines its regional leverage.
It speaks for itself that the sharp deterioration in U.S. ties with
the Pakistani military has occurred in the period after the draw-down
timetable was unveiled. The phased exit has encouraged the Pakistani
generals to play hardball.
Worse, there is still no clear U.S. strategy on how to ensure that the
endgame does not undermine the interests of the free world or further
destabilize the region. It is also unclear whether the U.S. after 2014
will be willing to rely on its air power and special forces to keep
Afghanistan in the hands of a friendly government and army — or
whether it will do what it has just done in Iraq: pull out completely
and wash its hands off the country.

Think of a scenario where Obama had not played his cards in public.
Immediately after coming to office, Obama could have used his
predecessor's diversion of resources to the Iraq war to justify a
troop surge in Afghanistan while exerting full pressure on the
Pakistani generals to tear down insurgent sanctuaries. Had that
happened without the intent to exit being made public, not only would
many Afghan and American lives have been saved, but also the side
desperate for a deal today would have been the Taliban, not the U.S.

The outcome of the current effort to clinch a deal with a resurgent
Taliban is uncertain. Even if a deal materializes and is honored by
the Taliban on the ground, it cannot by itself pacify Afghanistan.

Although Afghanistan historically was designed as a buffer state, it
does not today separate empires and conflicts. Rather, it is the
center of not one but multiple conflicts with cross-border dimensions.
Given Afghanistan's major ethnic and political divides, genuine
national reintegration and reconciliation would make a lot of sense.

However, instead of opening parallel negotiating tracks with all key
actors, with the aim of eventually bringing them together at the same
table, the U.S. is pursuing a single-track approach focused on
achieving a deal with the Taliban. Such is its single-mindedness that
a conscious effort is under way to keep out representatives of the
National Front (formerly Northern Alliance) from even international
conferences on Afghanistan.

In fact, the choice of Doha, Qatar, as the seat of U.S.-Taliban
negotiations has been made with the intent to cut out the
still-skeptical Afghan government and to insulate the Taliban
negotiators from Pakistani and Saudi pressures. The choice also meshes
with U.S. efforts to build Qatar as a major promoter of Western
interests in the Arab world, on the lines of Saudi Arabia.

Just as oil wealth has propelled the Saudi role, gas wealth is driving
the Qatari role — best illustrated by Qatar's military and financial
contributions to regime change in Libya and its current involvement in
fomenting a Sunni insurrection in Alawite-ruled Syria, the last
remaining beacon of secularism in an increasingly Islamist-oriented
Arab world.
Meanwhile, the new U.S. containment push against Iran threatens to
compound the internal situation in Afghanistan. Iran's nuclear program
is a factor behind the new containment drive. But a bigger factor is
the intent not to allow Iran to be the main beneficiary of the end of
U.S. military operations in Iraq and the planned NATO exit from
Afghanistan. Yet, without getting Iran on board, building a stable
Iraq or Afghanistan will be difficult.

In truth, U.S. policy is coming full circle again on the
Pakistan-fathered Afghan Taliban, in whose birth the CIA had played
midwife. President Bill Clinton's administration acquiesced in the
Taliban's ascension to power in Kabul in 1996 and turned a blind eye
as that thuggish militia, in league with Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence, fostered narco-terrorism and swelled the ranks of the
Afghan war alumni waging transnational terrorism. With 9/11, however,
the chickens came home to roost. In declaring war on the Taliban in
October 2001, U.S. policy came full circle.

Now, U.S. policy is coming another full circle on the Taliban in its
frantic search for a deal. This has been underscored by a series of
secret U.S. meetings with the Taliban last year and the current moves
to restart talks in Qatar by meeting the Taliban's demand for the
release of five of its officials who are held at Guantánamo Bay.
Mohammed Tayeb al-Agha, an aide to the one-eyed Taliban chief Mohammad
Omar, has emerged as the Taliban's chief negotiator with Marc
Grossman, America's Afghanistan-Pakistan (Afpak) envoy.

The Qatar-based negotiations serve as another reminder why the U.S.
political leadership has refrained from decapitating the Taliban's top
command-and-control. The U.S. military has had ample opportunities to
eliminate the Taliban's Rahbari Shura, or leadership council, often
called the Quetta Shura because it relocated to the Pakistani city in
2002.

Yet, tellingly, the U.S. military has not carried out a single drone,
air or ground strike against the shura. All the U.S. strikes have
occurred farther north in Pakistan's tribal Waziristan region,
although the leadership of the Afghan Taliban or its allied groups
like the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar band is not holed up there.

The sanctity of existing borders has become a powerful norm in world
politics. Border fixity is seen as essential for peace and stability.
Yet, paradoxically, the norm has allowed the emergence of weak states,
whose internal wars spill over and create wider regional tensions and
insecurities. In other words, a norm intended to build peace and
stability may be creating conditions for greater regional conflict and
instability. This norm is likely to come under challenge in the Afpak
belt, where the dangers of political fragmentation cannot be lightly
dismissed.

When history is written, the legacy of the NATO war in Afghanistan
will mirror the legacy of the U.S. occupation of Iraq — to leave an
ethnically fractured nation. Just as Iraq today stands ethnically
partitioned in a de facto sense, it will be difficult to establish a
government in Kabul post-2014 whose writ runs across Afghanistan.

More important, Afghanistan is not Vietnam. An end to NATO combat
operations will not mean the end of the war because the enemy will
target Western interests wherever they may be. The U.S. hope to
regionally contain terrorism is nothing more than self-delusion. If
anything, this objective promises to keep the Afpak belt as a
festering threat to regional and global security.

Brahma Chellaney is an Asian geostrategist and the author of six books.
__._,_.___

Space Code: Potential for US-India Cooperation

2012-01-23T01:56:00.001-08:00

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

http://www.irgamag.com/members.pl?page=space_20120120

As outer space becomes increasingly crowded, it has become clear that
there needs to be some clear rules for regulating activities of
different nation-states in space. Instituting such a code of conduct
on outer space activities has been at the centre stage for the past
few months. The United Nations took the lead in this regard in 2008,
with the General Assembly adopting resolution 62/217, endorsing the
"Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The European Union (EU) also proposed a
code of conduct on space, but it has run into rough waters for a
variety of reasons and the EU has not managed to muster much support
for their initiative outside the EU capitals. While the EU needs to be
complimented for its initiative, unfortunately the EU did not
institute a consultative mechanism, which could have brought together
all the major space-faring countries. This has hurt the prospects of
the EU Code.

While India has not taken a formal position on the EU Code,
discussions at informal parleys suggest that India too has concerns.
To start with, India has been concerned with the fact that the EU did
not engage major space-faring powers, including India, in this
exercise. The exclusive approach adopted by the EU in this regard has
made this exercise futile. Second, while the EU Code is a voluntary
and non-binding arrangement, it expects states to establish national
policies that are in sync with the EU guidelines, which may or may not
be in the interests of India. Such measures have been seen as
affecting the legitimate national security interests of other
countries.

Similar concerns have been expressed in Washington as well. Most
recently, the US rejected the EU Code on the grounds that it is "too
restrictive." On January 12, Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, made the US position
quite clear on the EU Code saying that "it's been clear from the very
beginning that we're not going along with the code of conduct."
However, she also went on to say that "what we haven't announced is
what we're going to do."

American concerns have ranged from the fact that this non-binding,
voluntary arrangement could restrict the US military's options in
space to the issue of a non-ownership of the code, the document having
been produced by the EU. For instance, in a Senate hearing in May,
Senator Jeff Sessions said, "we've advanced further technologically in
development and actual deployment of these systems than anyone else,
and agreements [and] codes of conduct tend to … constrain our
military." An assessment by the Pentagon's Joint Staff supported this
assessment, stating that the US becoming a party to the EU Code "would
hurt the US military's space operations in several areas." Similarly,
a State Department cable on the subject noted that the US "continues
to have significant concerns about the widespread use of language
connoting binding obligations, such as 'shall' and 'will,' in the
proposed non-binding Code of Conduct."

Having junked the EU Code as too restrictive, the US is now in the
process of working on a new draft, of course, with the EU draft "as a
promising basis for an international Code." US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton in a Press Statement made amply clear the importance
of instituting a code that "will help maintain the long-term
sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by
establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space." The US
intends to join the EU and other countries in developing a code as a
way of strengthening international cooperation while constraining
irresponsible behaviour. However, the US move in this direction has
already come in for criticism from Republicans on the ground that this
is a typical Liberal arms control measure. John R. Bolton, former
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
criticised the new move saying, "the last thing the United States
needs is a space code of conduct. The idea of arms control has already
failed in the Russian 'reset' policy, and it is sure to fail here as
well." Among other criticism, two national security officials
condemned the administration's national security policies as arms
control-driven, which emphasise on concluding international pacts
rather than building its military capabilities.

In sum, while the Obama Administration's interests in instituting a
code for a safe and workable outer space environment is legitimate,
this is an election year and neither the Obama Administration nor any
of the other Presidential candidates will want to commit themselves to
a code, especially when it has not been produced by the US.

Can the new US proposal to write the rules of the road on space be an
area of interest for India? India clearly has interests in laying out
the rules of the road for space conduct but it also has an interest in
being recognised as a major space-faring power whose voice should form
an intrinsic part in creating these rules. India cannot come on board
as a latecomer. In a sense, the "Not Made Here" syndrome probably best
characterises the Indian position on the EU Code. Indian interests are
driven by several factors including the geopolitics of Asia and the
Indian neighbourhood, which is rather hostile. Therefore, it has an
interest in a normative exercise that will reduce China's aggressive
and unregulated behaviour in outer space, best illustrated by their
irresponsible Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test in 2007 that left behind a
huge amount of space debris. Given that space debris, traffic
management and orbital frequency are issues that concern both India
and the US, this ideally should be on the agenda in future US-India
endeavours. New Delhi's broader approach has been to institute an
inclusive and comprehensive approach in addressing space security.

How should India shape the discourse in this regard? As a first step,
it will be in India's interest to produce a backgrounder or white
paper outlining the importance of space in India's developmental and
security calculus. This in turn should lead to identifying what kind
of a space future it would like to see and thereafter identify areas
that would contribute to such an environment while putting in place
measures that would constrain India's ability to help generate such a
future. It might be good for both India and the US if they can engage
in shaping this debate that would give them ownership of the issue.

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi. She was at the National Security
Council Secretariat, Government of India, from 2003 to 2007.
By Arrangement with Observer Research Foundation(www.orfonline.org)
19 January 2012

L’AFFAIRE SALMAN RUSHDIE

2012-01-23T01:55:00.001-08:00

B.RAMAN

1962: There were intelligence reports of likely threats to the life of
John F.Kennedy, the then US President, if he visited Dallas. The US
Secret Service advised him not to go. He decided to go despite the
reports. He was assassinated.

1984: There were intelligence assessments of likely threats to Indira
Gandhi from her Sikh security guards following the military raid in
the Golden Temple. Those responsible for her security quietly removed
all Sikh security guards from her house. She noticed it and ordered
that they should be reposted. She said: " How can I call myself the
Prime Minister of secular India if I distrust my Sikh guards?" Her
security set-up was told to ensure that no Sikh would be alone by her
side. There was negligence in implementing this. She was killed by two
of her Sikh guards who managed to have the duty roaster manipulated in
such a manner as to ensure that they would be alone by her side.

1991: There were intelligence assessments of likely threats to Rajiv
Gandhi from the LTTE during his election campaign in Tamil Nadu. The
intelligence agencies and the Tamil Nadu Police failed to strengthen
security for him. He was killed by a LTTE suicide bomber.

2004: There were intelligence assessments of likely threats to the
security of ShriAtalBehari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister, if he
went to Islamabad for the SAARC summit. Despite this, he decided to
go. The intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan strengthened his
security. Nothing happened.

2. Shri Salman Rushdie is a well-known literary personality--- loved
and admired by many non-Muslims and hated by many Muslims whose
feelings were hurt by his Satanic Verses. He was and is a highly
threatened non-Government personality in the world. The threats to his
life arose from individual Muslims angered by his book and from the
intelligence agencies of Iran where religious clerics had announced a
handsome reward for his assassination.

3.The British security agencies and Police strengthened his security
and he was advised to cut down his public exposure.He complied with
their advisory and had practically no social life for some years till
the fatwa was withdrawn in Iran. The threat to him from the Iranian
intelligence subsided, but the threats from individual Muslims
remained as high as ever. Intelligence and security agencies of the
world felt confident of being able to protect him from potential
individual assassins with no State sponsorship. He increasingly became
more active socially and started interacting with the civil society
and the media in different countries. He started travelling
frequently.He developed a love relationship with a woman of Tamil
origin in New York and was often seen with her in public in NY. He
visited Chennai with her to meet her relatives and friends. He
participated in the inaugural session of the Jaipur Literary Festival
in 2007.

4. Though the threats to him remained high, the intelligence and
security agencies of different countries, including India, had no
difficulty in ensuring his security. He and his hosts also facilitated
their task by maintaining a low profile about his visits and by
avoiding advance publicity. Many of us came to know of his visit to
Chennai along with his Tamil woman-companion only after he had come
and gone.

5. Ensuring his security for his participation in the Jaipur Literary
Festival that started on January 20 became a complicated affair
because the fundamentalist Deobandi group came to know of his planned
visit much in advance and made a public issue of it. Statements and
comments emanating from the Deobandi office-bearers and some sections
of the Muslim community amounted to open, verbal intimidation meant to
intimidate the Government of India into not allowing him to come and
intimidate him into not coming.
6. The situation became sensitive and complex. One would have expected
the Government of India to stop this intimidatory campaign initiated
by the Deobandis in the bud and make it clear to them that the
Government of India was determined to protect him and would not
succumb to the intimidatory campaign.

7. The Government of India did nothing of the sort. It adopted what
seemed to many as a deliberately ambivalent attitude by highlighting
his right to visit to India as a person of Indian origin , but
maintaining a political silence on the intimidatory campaign against
him. The Government and the Congress seem to have seen political
advantages in such an ambivalent attitude on the eve of the
forthcoming elections in UP.

8. As it normally happens in such an increasingly-charged atmosphere,
reports started flowing to intelligence agencies of alleged plans of
some elements to assassinate him when he came to India. The open
intimidatory campaign of the Deobandis was compounded by the flow of
reports about the alleged clandestine plans of the Mumbai underworld
to assassinate him. The reports were of a general and not specific
nature.

9. These clandestine reports called for three actions by the
Government of India:
(a). The Government of India taking over the responsibility for
strengthening and co-ordinating his security.

( b ).Informing Rushdie of the clandestine intelligence reports.

(c ). A formal assurance to him that security for him would be
strengthened and that he need not cancel his visit just because of
these reports.

10. It is apparent that the Government of India only informed him of
these clandestine intelligence reports. It did not take any other
action to give him confidence that it would do everything necessary to
protect him. The Government of India's deliberately ambivalent
attitude continued.

11. Apart from odd statements and remarks by individual spokesmen of
the Government of India and the Congress Party that Rushdie would be
protected, nothing was done to strengthen his confidence in the
Government of India. In the face of this ambivalence of the Government
of India, he decided to cancel his visit. I felt disappointed and let
down by his decision which will give fresh oxygen to extremists of any
persuasion. But I can understand his decision. Many of us would have
probably reacted in the same manner in the face of the ambivalent
attitude of the Government of India which was marked by a mix of
partisan opportunism and State cowardice.

12. The ill-advised actions of some of the participants in the Jaipur
festival such as reading out extracts from Satanic Verses have added
to the confusion. Certain things need to be clearly stated and
understood.L'Affaire Rushdie is not a moral issue. It is not a
question of the right of Rushdie to freedom of expression.

13. It is pure and simple an issue of the obligation of the State to
protect a highly-threatened person by whatever means possible and not
to let itself be intimidated by extremists. The way the whole affair
has been handled by the Government of India would legitimately
strengthen the suspicion that the handling of the affair was vitiated
by partisan opportunism, which encouraged the creation of a crisis in
the hope of reaping electoral dividends.

14. January 20,2012, was a day of tragedy, shame and disquiet.Tragedy
because the events were manipulated in such a manner as to discourage
Rushdie from coming.Shame because of the opportunism and cowardice of
the Indian State and political leadership. Disquiet because it showed
once again that for our political class partisan interests come before
national interests. ( 21-1-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat,
Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For
China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

RATTLING CRUMBLING PAKISTAN

2012-01-21T20:52:00.000-08:00

Posted on | January 19, 2012 | 3 Comments

http://maloykrishnadhar.com/

A writer and journalist friend residing in Lahore called from Dubai to inform that he had escaped the country temporarily to avoid kidnapping by the ISI goons and final evaporation. He was haunted for writing against the army after Osama bin Laden’s assassination by the US Marines at Abbotabad. He had raised questions about the incredibility of official claims that the ISI and army had no knowledge of Osama hideout near an army training camp in Abbotabad. He had also exposed that Osama; an ailing person had escaped from Afghanistan soon after US attack and destruction of his Tora Bora hideout. His followers tried to settle him near Peshawar, Quetta and in North Waziristan for better treatment of his kidney failure and heart complications. Finally, through a trusted person the land near Abbotabad was purchased and the house was constructed within two years. As the Pakhtun sardars of the area are known to build big houses and high-rise walls for privacy, no one doubted the new occupant. My friend trashed the government stories and concluded that the ISI and IB detachments were located near OBL compound; army officers lived within 150 yds of the suspect house and Musharraf government had full knowledge of OBL hiding in Pakistan. The journalist asserted that both the ISI and Pakistan IB had knowledge of OBL’s stay in Pakistan and they were actually giving him protection. He did not rule out the possibility of Pakistan government collaborating on the sly with US as an old, ailing and almost immobile Osama had become a burden on the authorities. This was probably done against the wishes of the ISI and the Army chief.

Soon after the assassination of OBL on May 2, 2011 a contingent of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al Qaeda forces attacked the naval airbase in Karachi on May 21, destroying prestigious assets. Army intervention finally brought the situation under control. In addition to these there had been several attacks on army and ISI establishments. My journalist friend had declared Pakistan army as the most discredited and humiliated force in the world.

Indeed, the assassination of OBL has initiated avalanches of political tremor in Pakistan. The present epicenters revolve around three erupted volcanoes: Memogate Scandal, Supreme Court’s direction to act against corrupt politicians who were given amnesty by National Reconciliation Ordinance of President Musharraf, which exempted the president from any legal action for any action taken by him. Chief Justice Ifitkhar Chaudhry in a constitutional judgment has nullified that ordinance and directed the federal government to initiate action against corrupt politicians like president Zardari. Zardari-Gilani duo’s efforts to assert supremacy of the elected government and targeting ISI chief General Shuja Pasha and Chief of Staff Pervez Kayani added to political uncertainty and open expression of fears of military takeover of the reins of the government. The Army/ISI are capable of staging a coup; a natural event in Pakistan. But it appears that four pillars of Pakistan are not yet ready for another protracted stint of army rule. The political class are keen to cling to jamhooriyat (democracy), the judiciary is not keen to send democracy to hibernation by playing into the hands of the Generals, the Army is not yet willing for a putsch as the country is in financial doldrums, its relationship with the USA is at all time nadir and internal terrorist forces have firmed up grip on the Pakistani polity. Peoples of all sections of Pakistan are poised against Army rule; though they want tainted regime of Zardari to go. The fate of Pakistan hangs in balance.

To understand the scenario it is necessary to understand the Memogate affairs. The Memogate controversy revolves around a memorandum (addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen) seeking help of the Obama administration in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid to avert a military takeover of the civilian government in Pakistan and conversely to assist in a civilian takeover of the military apparatus. Central actors in the plot included American-Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz, who alleged that former Pakistan Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani asked him to deliver a confidential memo asking for US assistance. The memo is alleged to have been drafted by Haqqani at the behest of President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari.

The US-Pakistan relationship was at an all-time low before the assault on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad on May 2, 2011. Civilians and the media blamed the Pakistani armed forces for being unable to locate bin Laden’s whereabouts and further criticized them for letting the United States conduct a unilateral operation on Pakistani soil, thereby prompting a furor over violation of Pakistani sovereignty by the United States. The incident put the civilian government and military officials at loggerheads. A meeting of the president, prime minister and the chief of army staff was called to discuss the issue in detail. The memorandum was allegedly written less than two days after the meeting was called, and a few days after the raid on the bin Laden compound.

According to messages leaked online from Mansoor Ijaz, Ambassador Husain Haqqani sent him a BlackBerry message on May 9, 2011, asking him to return a call to London, where the ambassador was on visit. The message further asked him to deliver a prompt proposal, initially verbally, for assistance to Admiral Mike Mullen. Ijaz, whose BlackBerry exchanges with Haqqani indicate he was in Monaco at the time, claims Haqqani had dictated the contents of what was to be relayed verbally in that first telephone call. Ijaz has further stated that his US interlocutors insisted on a written memorandum because of consistent problems in the recent past with Pakistani officials making verbal offers and later not honoring the same. Ijaz then drafted, on the basis of the Haqqani instructions, the memorandum in question and confirmed the contents by telephone and over numerous BlackBerry Messenger conversations with the Pakistani ambassador.

The following morning, Ijaz emailed a copy of the memo draft to the ambassador for proofreading and asked for assurances that the memo had the approval of the president of Pakistan. Shortly after a meeting with British delegates at 10 Downing Street, Haqqani read the proof for the final proposal and asked for it to be delivered immediately to Michael Mullen through a US interlocutor, James L. Jones, former NATO commander and US national security adviser to President Barack Obama. Prior to delivering the memorandum, Ijaz made clear that his military-go-between Jones, who would deliver the memorandum to Mullen, required assurances that the document had clearance from the highest office in Pakistan, upon which Haqqani allegedly responded by telephone “he had the boss’ approval”.

Content of the confidential memo were published in its entirety on Foreign Policy magazine’s website on November 17. The memo was addressed to Michael Mullen, and requested the Obama administration to convey a “strong, urgent and direct message to General Kayani and General Pasha” to “end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus”. The memo then makes certain explicit offers to the United States government in exchange for their support. These include the following quoted from the memo:

“In the event Washington’s direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:

A. President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example.

B. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan s Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military). It is certain that the OBL Commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting OBL.

C. The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil, including Ayman Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or giving US military forces a green signal to conduct the necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil. This “carte blanche” guarantee is not without political risks, but should demonstrate the new group s commitment to rooting out bad elements on our soil. This commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house, and we will insure necessary collateral support.

D. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government – initially civilian but eventually all three power centers – to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan s nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

E. The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.
F. We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team s guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.

On October 10, 2011, Ijaz wrote a column in the Financial Times revealing and confirming that he had helped deliver to Admiral Mullen a memorandum drafted by a Pakistani official stationed in the United States at the behest of President Zardari. The op-ed did not explicitly name Haqqani as being the author of the memo. This disclosure fueled frenzy in the Pakistani media. The affair became the buzz of front pages in local newspapers in Pakistan when Mullen admitted that he had received the confidential memorandum soon after the raid on the bin Laden compound. Local media speculated as to the identity of the memo’s author. When asked whether he received the memo in May, Admiral Mullen said he had no knowledge of the memo but later changed his statement, saying he knew of the memo but “thought nothing of it”. Pentagon spokesman Captain John Kirby revealed in a press briefing that Mullen did not know and had never communicated with Mr. Ijaz.

The memo reached Mullen without any government seal or signature but the contents indicate that the memo was allegedly prepared by the civilian government in Pakistan. Kirby suggested that nothing about the letter had the approval of the Pakistani government and Mullen never acknowledged its relevance despite leaked BlackBerry messages between Haqqani and Ijaz indicated otherwise. On November 22, 2011, an official meeting took place at the Prime Minister House in Islamabad between President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Director General of ISI Ahmad Shuja Pasha, and Ambassador Haqqani over the affairs of the alleged memorandum. Soon after, Haqqani tendered his resignation, which was duly accepted by the Prime Minister.

Several senior Pakistani government officials denied that the memo was written at the behest of the civilian leadership, either the Pakistani president or the prime minister. Multiple meetings were called regarding the contents of the memorandum between the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Army Staff. The results and proceedings of the meetings have not been made public. President Asif Ali Zardari termed the allegations as a conspiracy against the government, further stating that he did not need intermediaries to convey messages since he had “direct access” to the President of the United States.

Several Pakistani opposition politicians saw opportunity in turning the scandal into a major political issue, accusing the Pakistani government of compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty and conspiring against the Armed Forces of Pakistan. At a major political rally, Pakistan Muslim League (N) leader and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif demanded an urgent inquiry into the matter. He also threatened to petition the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and resign from the National Assembly if the Zardari government did not satisfactorily investigate the matter. TIP leader Imran Khan has also made strident demands for adequate investigation into the scandal.

While several people presently and formerly associated with the US Government have acknowledged the existence of the memo, the Obama administration has relatively distanced itself from the controversy in the public eye. When asked about the matter, US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon declined to comment. Similarly, at a daily press briefing on November 18, 2011, US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Mark Toner stated “this is – I understand this is a big story in Pakistan. It’s partly a domestic story. We – and we’ll all treat it as such. I mean, our – we remain in contact with Ambassador Haqqani”. Admiral Mike Mullen’s former spokesman, captain John Kirby, acknowledged the existence of the memo, but clarified that “neither the contents of the memo nor the proof of its existence altered or affected in any way the manner in which Admiral Mullen conducted himself in his relationship with General Kayani and the Pakistani government. He took no note of it”. Later, Kirby also stated that Admiral Mullen was confident the memo did not originate from President Zardari. In an email to Pakistani media, former National Security Advisor James L. Jones acknowledged that he personally delivered the memo to admiral Mullen, but clarified that he was not a serving government official at the time he forwarded the message.

Many of Pakistan’s civilian leadership fear that the military is on the cusp of seizing control of the country once again, in the wake of the memogate scandal that has accused President Zardari of conspiring to plot a coup against the military. General Kayani and General Pasha have submitted their affidavit before the SC appointed enquiry body through the defense secretary, who forwarded these without approval of the government. He was removed by the Prime Minister and replaced by a loyalist. Many in Pakistan believe that the investigation is a sign of the democratic process actually working. Allegations of requesting a foreign government to remove the highest-ranking military officials of the country are matters of national security, and as such, it is imperative that these matters be thoroughly investigated. Pakistan has long become victim to the executive branch enjoying unquestionable authority, and for too long this authority has been granted by the courts. Whether or not Justice Chaudhry’s emphasis on a more involved and proactive judiciary – one that truly balances the clout of the ruling party and military – is sustainable, remains to be seen. Regardless, for this particular incident, perhaps the first time that the judiciary has been challenged on issues of national security, he has reinvigorated the belief that democracy in Pakistan can indeed work.

However, a comical situation has gripped Pakistan. At the height of rising tension between the PM and the army chief, Zardari flies to Dubai to attend a marriage, kicking up speculation that a coup was imminent. If Pakistan were not home to the largest collection of terrorists in the world, possessor of a nuclear weapons arsenal and right next door to India, its present political contortions could almost pass as comical.

Unfortunately, Pakistani politics is no laughing matter because it is the most visible symptom of the deeper malaise that afflicts the country. The present crisis has revealed all the known flaws in the Pakistani political system, but in greater relief than before. There is a military that refuses to allow any civilian leadership to genuinely run the country; a polity where institutions are so weak that personalities and personality clashes are all that matters. In this case, the character of the Supreme Court justice is arguably the most decisive issue. The leadership lacks the internal coherence to find compromises. Hence the propensity of Pakistani interest groups to seek the interference of outside powers, whether the United States, Saudi Arabia and increasingly China. Pak authorities have developed the habit of reclining on Saudi Arabia before any major is taken. To top it all the electorate is dominated by feudal interests in most parts of the country.

There can be little argument that the Pakistan military is largely responsible for this state of affairs. The military has worked assiduously to ensure that the civilian political leadership is weakened and that the institutions of government remain ineffective. It has intervened so often that Pakistan has never been able to have two civilian governments hand power to each other through an election. The men in khaki have a single motive: to ensure that they are the final authority in all matters in Pakistan. The present crisis shows that this policy is now delivering decreasing returns.

The army may be unhappy with the present civilian leadership, but it is also unable and unwilling to take over itself. The civilians, on the other hand, are using tricks taken from the army’s own shelf including trying to divide the corps commanders, use foreign governments and claiming the military is too close to America. The result is the present chaos where the military is trying to stage a constitutional coup through the courts. The President is trying to stage a coup within the military. And the Supreme Court is simply out to settle scores on behalf of its chief justice. In all probability the Army will side with the judiciary. The Prime Minister is making frenetic efforts to hide behind the Parliament, stressing on resolution in support democracy and validity of the stand taken by his government. President Asif Ali Zardari knows well that after revocation of the NRO by the SC, he stands naked before the law of the country. The PM cannot delay anymore initiating action against the President (Swiss bank enquiry) and other politicians. The final tragedy is that there are few things going right in Pakistan: its western provinces are in flames, terrorist of different denominations are active inside the country, its exchequer is empty, it is still reeling from the effects of last year’s floods and its internal social problems are mounting. But its leadership is playing musical chairs to a tune solely of their own making.

As we compose this essay the Supreme Court has held PM Gilani guilty of contempt of court and asked him to appear in person on January 19th. Law Minister Maula Bux Chandio said that the government would consult lawyers with respect to the court’s notice and that whatever would be done would be done in accordance with the law and constitution. On the other hand, the Memogate case is also being heard in the SC. Mansoor Ijaz is yet to arrive in Pakistan to depose in the case. The Blackberry phone of Hussain Haqqani has not been found in his office and residence. It is simply missing. Ijaz is yet to produce his phone. Blackberry authorities are reluctant to share data without valid and legal request from Pakistan.

Another PIL is being heard in Lahore High Court which requested the judiciary to ban for all time to come, military takeover of Pakistan. The outcome will be intently followed by pro-democracy people of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif is inclining more towards the Army-SC entente, visibly gravitating away from his earlier stand of protection of Parliamentary Democracy.

The National Assembly gave the PPP led coalition government a major morale boost on January 16, in the face of perceived challenges with a resolution passed with a big majority reposing trust in the political leadership and urging all state institutions to strictly remain within their constitutional limits. A jubilant Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani called the vote a `historic moment` in support of democracy and parliament and declared amid cheers from the house that he would appear before Supreme Court on Thursday to comply with summons to answer a contempt show-cause notice.

So far the triple tango in Pakistan that started after US raid on OBL at Abbotabad and exacerbated with the Memogate, has neared the peak. Coming days should determine if Zardari and Gilani will become victims of judicial activism and pro-active Army-judiciary alliance. The dangerously instable nuclear power is threatened from within and can pose threat to neighbors. Let’s count the moments.

Gen VK Singh; Age Controversy

2012-01-20T19:26:00.000-08:00

This chart, below , has been doing the rounds .On one of the celebrity/trivia obsessed channels , a former lady diplomat spoke about the dates without any correct back ground of various dates and facts .Another ,a Sikh, who comes often, has little idea of facts or figures and is repeated for plugging in gvt line ( which keeps them employed after retirement on petty missions) . It is being alleged that the line of succession was decided by Gen JJ Singh for Gen Bikram Singh to succeed .

Incidentally Adm Vishnu Bhagvat was also removed to fit in a Sikh Naval officer .

http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1607/16070170.htm

I spent a year , 1976 at NDC , hosted Gen Vaidya in 1983 and two NDC delegations in Ankara and have maintained contact with NDC and officers . I have some idea about groupism , favouritsm ,eccentricism etc in our defense forces .

The cancer of political malaise has entered the defense services too .Look at Gen Kapoor and others .What a disgrace . This group is too powerful and politicians love black sheep.

An honest and courageous officer ( few can now survive in most services , specially in IAS and IPS) reaches the pinnacle of career after great effort .It should not be the gvt sweet will , right or wrong that some one could be just jettisoned .The brazen corrupt political class has done enough damage to the country . Why an honest officer who is cleaning up the mess is being pressurised to leave before his time.

The current struggle is also a symptom of civilian vs defense officers turf battles , with IAS and IPS types , now reduced to obedient clerks by politicians ( ask the current generation ; not so much ours ) treating the latter with disdain .

Let me add the obscurantist and backward Thakurs have built up no lobby , unlike the rest of caste and other groups people and are neglected barring some ex king and landlord types .What a galaxy of leaders Rajputs have produced!? And look at BJP Brahmins , using non-Yadav OBC knights like Uma Bharatis. Modis and others , but the power rests mostly with the Brahmins .

An SMS going round ;in Indiia the GVT dcides the age of the army chief , in Pakistan the army chief decides tha age of the govt .

Mera Desh Mahan

This is a forward that I received. I cannot verify the authenticity of the statements. However I presume they are correct.

GEN. V. K. SINGH, COAS: AGE CONTROVERSY;

SOME MYTHS AND HARD FACTS

Sr No. (a)	SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (b)	DATE (c)	REMARKS (d)
1.	Ancestral Village: BAPORA in Bhiwani Distt (Haryana)
2.	Father: Late Lt. Col Jagat of Rajput Regiment (14 Rajput)
3.	Date & Place of Birth	10 May 1951 at MH, Pune	Father’s record of service and 14 Rajput records refer.
4.	Schooling: Birla Public School, Pilani (Rajasthan) up to Class X	MARCH 1966
5.	Date of Birth Recorded in School Register and School Leaving Certificate	10 May, 1951
6.	Applied for written entrance exam for National Defence Academy (ND) Khargwasla as Air Force Entry Cadet for 36 NDA Course commencing 13 July 1966	1966 MARCH	DOB wrongly filled in the UPSC entrance form by BS Bhatnagar, erstwhile. English teacher at Birla Public School, Pilani as 10 May 1950 instead of 10 May 1951.
7.	Eligible age for entry for 36 NDA course as on 01 July 1966	15 Years to 17-1/2 years	Gen. VK Singh eligible for both the ages i.e. 10 May 1951 and 10 May 1950
8.	Matriculation Certificate or Certificate of Date of Birth from his father not attached with the application form pending receipt from Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan/Lt. Col. Jagat Singh (Father)		At the time of filling the UPSC application form, Gen. VK Singh wasMINOR (14 years Plus) and had possibly signed the form without checking the details within the confidence that all details filled- in by his teacher would be correct.
9.	Before facing Service Selection Board and entry to NDA, a Certificate from his Father’s Unit (14 Rajput) and School Leaving Certificate giving correct Date of Birth (i.e. 10 May 1951) was forwarded to UPSC/appropriate authorities	03 AUG 1966

10.	UPSC, then, queried the Officer as to the anomaly between DOB filled in the UPSC application form and the two certificates subsequently forwarded as the serial 9 above.		The query was replied to with confirmation that correct Date of Birth is 10 May 1951, as recorded in School Leaving Certificate and his Father’s service records maintained by his unit (14 Rajput) – Receipt for above correspondence with UPSC available.
11.	Based on the facts mentioned at Serial 10 above and having convinced on the correct DOB (10 May 1051) the Officer was given a call for Service Selection Board (SSB) and allowed to join NDA as “PROVISIONAL” candidate pending receipt/submission of MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE. The UPSC, thereafter, never queried on the issue of DOB confirming that issue has been laid to rest.		The Matric Certificate was not submitted at this time since though the results were declared on 13 June 1966, but the Certificate was not issued. However, school had issued Provisional School Leaving Certificate, which mentioned his passing X^th class and DOB as 10 May 1951. The Certificate was accordingly forwarded to appropriate authorities.
12.	The Officer filed a Record of Service particulars form while joining NDA which reflects his DOB as 10 May 1951.		Even his Medical Examination form as an Air Force Candidate reflects 10 May 1951 as his DOB.
13.	The Officer joined Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun after passing out from NDA and was commissioned in Indian Army on 14 June 1970 in Infantry (2 RAJPUT)	14 June 1970	All records maintained by NDA/IMA reflected DOB as 10 May 1951.
14.	Based on Service Records maintained at IMA, it issued officer Identity Card to the Officer reflecting this Date of Birth as 10 May 1951 (based on School Leaving Certificate) since Matric Certificate was not submitted by them.		This endorsement could not have been made if IMA records would not have had 10 May 1951 in the officer’s records of service particulars maintained by them.
15.	The officer on Commissioning joined 2 RAJPUT on 1970 and filled form No.IAFZ-2041 on joining the Unit, which is forwarded to Army HQ AG’s Branch (the official Record Holders of all Officers). Even IMA forwarded IAFZ-2041 to AG Branch (10 May 51)	14 June 1970	Here, once again, at Para/Serial 6 of the Form the officer Officer fills-in his DOB as 10 MAY 1951.
16.	The Officer attends Infantry Young Officers Course(YO-COURCE-2) at Mhow and returns to the Unit (2 RAJPUT) on April 1971	Sep 1970 to March 1971
17.	Before reporting back to his Unit, he visits his village and finds the Matric Certificate there.		The Matric Certificate was issued by Rajasthan Secondary Board of Education on 13 June 1966 and forwarded to Birla Public School.
18.	Birla Public School forwarded the Matric Certificate at his father’s Unit address (14 RAJPUT)		But his father had been posted out of the Unit by then to :- Branch Recruiting office REWA, then to NCC Narnaul
19.	14 Rajput had accordingly dispatched the certificate to Rewa Rectg Office, who then dispatched to NCC Narnaul, who then forwarded to the Officers ancestral village since his father had moved out from there on retirement.		Obviously the Matric Certificate kept lying at his village unattended since no one was residing at his ancestral house since his father had moved out to Bhiwani where he expired in the year ____________
20.	The officer instantly submitted the Original matriculation certificate late to Army HQ (AG’s Branch) through his Unit (4 RAJPUT).	April 1971	The Unit had sent the certificate to Army HQ (AG’s Branch) who after due verification and updating their records returned the original certificate to the Officer and changed “Provisional” status to “Permanent”
21.	Meanwhile, without checking and confirming detailed record of service from Army HQ (AG’s Branch) who are the Official record holder and authority on all such matters) Military Secretary Branch (MS) got ARMY LIST published on ____________ reflecting wrong Date of Birth of the Officer as 10 MAY 1950, instead of 1951.		Though the Orders on the subject are very clear on the subject, MS Branch failed to verify the Date of Birth of the Officer from official record holder (AGs Branch) and the CGDA (the paying authority) and erroneously and carelessly endorsed 10 May 1950 as the officer’s DOB in the Army List.
22.	Even when Matric Certificate was received by AG’s Branch at Army HQ in April 1971 (within two years of Commissioning of the officer, no effort was made by MS Branch to either correct its records nor verify the same from AG’s Branch annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971.		The seeds of MAIN controversy of DOB of Gen VK Singh was sworn by the careless attitude and erroneous actions by the MS Branch at this stage which was allowed to persist till 2006when they first queried the officer on the anomaly in his DOB. (30 years after commissioning -?) Why at this belated stage- ??
23.	The mistake was even never rectified till date by the MS Branch even when they were in receipt of the Record of Service annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971
24.	The officer is required to endorse Form cechklist on completion of 20 years of service, para ________ of the Forms asks “have you ever asked for a change in DOB, if so what is your correct DOB?”.	30 Nov 1990	The officer has reflected “NO, my correct DOB is 10 MAY 1951”. Even then no cognizance of this report was taken to correct records by MS Branch
25.	The FIRST ever query on the anomaly on the officer’s DOB as reflected by him in his Annual Record of Service as 10 May 1951 and in Army List as 10 May 1950, was made by, then, Military Secretary on 3rd May 2006.	3rd May 2006	The officer has clearly replied that his correct DOB as endorsed in the AG’s Branch records and all other service records is 10 May 1951, which is maintained till date.
26.	The officer was issued with a certificate by AG MP (5&6) on 17 Oct, 2007 that his correct DOB as recorded with them was 10 May 1951.	17 Oct 2007	The letter signed by AAG of concerned Branch refers
27.	Once again, Additional General (Manpower Planning and Personnel (MP&P) reflected entire details on record of service if the officer confirming DOB at each stage as 10 MAY 1951. The ADG in his letter has concluded that all recorded endorsements in the documents stated above the DOB of Gen VK Singh is 10 MAY 1951.	January 2008	- The letter clearly states that “Record of Service (IAFZ-2041) of every officer on commissioning is forwarded by IMA/OTA to AG Branch (MP-5/6) at Army HQ. It includes all occurrences during office service. - Part-I (Personal Particular) of this documents is filled-up by IMA/OTA to the extent applicable at the time of commissioning. Para 5 of Part-I states “Date of Birth” (as recorded by UPSC or in Sheet Roll). - Interestingly Date of Birth recorded in this Para 5 of Part I is 10 MAY 1951.
	Even DOB recorded in all Annual and other Medical Examination Boards is 10 MAY 1951.
28.	Once again DG (MP&PS) at Army HQ Lt. Gen. KR Rao in his Inter Office Note dt 30 Jan 2008 in reply to MS Branch service note dt 28 Jan 2008 mentions correct DOB of the Officer as 10 MAY 1951.	30 Jan 2008	Even then MS Branch failed to correct/reconcile its erroneous records of DOB.
29.	As per Para 136 of Defence Services Regulations (DSR), DOB recorded in Matric certificate is to be taken as correct DOB and the aberration if any in the Record of Service are to be corrected by the concerned record holding authority.		In the instant case the MS Branch failed to rectify their records.
30.	The officer replied to MS Branch query of 3rd May 2006 as at ser 24 above on 10th May 2006	10 May 2006	Officer clarified that:- - SSC certificate is the authority of his DOB (10MAY 1951) - Had forwarded the SSC certificate to Org 3 (AGs Branch) in April 1971. - Consequently his “Provisional” status of Commission was changed to “Permanent” - Made efforts in 1985 to correct the Record of DOB in the Army List to MP-5 and was informed that needful would be done. - Had made another effort in 2002 with MS Branch by sending a photocopy of Matric Certificate to MISO. However, no correction was made in the said DOB erroneously recorded at their end.
31.	MS Branch, vide their letter of 21 Aug 2006 replied that no change in the DOB is possible as the Rules only permit to do so with in first two years of Service.	21 Aug 2006	MS Branch grossly erred here and misinterpreted the “Reconciliation DOB” in their Records to “Change in DOB”
32.	The whole controversy emanates from this misinterpretation of the Rules on the subject and has been allowed to willy nilly or otherwise continue till dates.	October 2007	Even when AG’s Branch in October 2007 had clarified and confirmed to MS Branch on the correct DOB and 10 MAY 1951, no action was taken by the latter to rectify the mistake committed by them earlier.
33.	In Dec 2007 Min. of Defence asked MS Branch to indicate reasons of recording 10 MAY 1950 as been VK Singh’s DOB when he had himself indicated 10 MAY 1951 in his Annual Confidential Records.	14 Dec 2007	MOD queries MS Branch for reasons of recording DOB as 10 May 1950 and asks for conduct of inquiry.
34.	MS Branch replied that they had relied upon UPSC application form in which the officer had filled 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB. They also claimed to rely on Army List which they had themselves endorsed with 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB without checking from AG’s Branch (Official Record Holder)	20 Dec 2007	The MS Branch once again quoted GOI Office memorandum 21 April 1964 and MoD Memorandum 23 June 1954, under which no change in DOB is to be made after 2 years of commissioning of the officers. Again misinterpretation of Orders since officer was not asking for “CHANGE” but “RECTIFICATION” of mistakes committed by them.
35.	Once again MS Branch asked officer to send all correspondence relating to his earlier requests for “CHANGE” of his DOB.	19 Dec 2007	The officer once again replied that he had never asked for a “CHANGE” in DOB, but “CORRECTION” of erroneous records at their end based on Matric Certificate submitted to AG’s Branch and other related documents/reports (ACRs)
36.	Again AG Branch verified that Record of Service received by them from IMA at the time of Commissioning of the officer his DOB recorded is 10 MAY 1951.	Dec 2007
37.	Subsequently on 21 Jan 2008, MS Branch sticking to its previous stand replied that the DOB mentioned in Army List (10 May 1950) will remain to be correct and no change will be affected	21 Jan 2008	Once again the Rule of 2 years restriction in change of DOB was quoted – continuous case of misinterpretation of the issue at Hand and Rules on the subject.
38.	The Officer was pressurized by Gen Deepak Kapoor, the then COAS, to admit 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB and accept it in the interest f Service and other officers whose promotion case files are pending in the Min. of Defence for clearance		Through telephonic conversation with COAS he was also assured that once the needful is done the fresh case for correcting his DOB could be effected later.
39.	The Officer accordingly gave this undertaking especially highlighting the same in the “Interest of Service”, hoping for due justice as the matter would be settled as promised.	24 Jan 2008	MS Branch later in their letter dt 28 Jan 2008 made reference of the officer letter saying doubts on the DOB still remain unanswered. It also referred MOD request to carry out detailed inquiry to find out correct DOB in consultation with AG’s Branch. HOWEVER, NO INQUIRY WAS CONDUCTED AND NOTING ON THE CASE WAS FOUND SAYING, “INQUIRY NOT TO BE CONDUCTED”.
40.	Subsequently the Officer in his letter dt 01 July 2008 addressed to COAS, Gen. Deepak Kapoor requesting for Justice to be done in his case and enquired as the constraints by MS Branch which compelled them to maintain his DOB as 10 MAY 1950 despite submitting SSC Certificate in 1974 which recorded 10 MAY 1951 as his DOB.	01 July 2008	It was mentioned in the officers letter that when he met Lt. Gen. Khare and Gen. Gangadharan of the MS Brnach in 2006 and 2007 respectively, he was assured that all necessary reconciliations with regard to the clarification his DOB would be carried out.
41.	The officer then issued letter dt Feb 2009 to MS Branch in response to their letter dt. 15 Jan 2009 to him which had quoted their letter ratified that verification process of DOB by MS Branch did not required Matriculation Certificate, while the same is an accepted authority for the same	Feb 2009 03 June 2009	The officer pointed out that whereas Matric Certificate was an authority, then what is the procedure for MS Branch to verify the DOB? -MS Branch asserted that it was not responsible to verify the age (DOB) as it was the duty of AG Branch - Why not reconciled?
42.	Subsequently the officer sent a letter to MS Branch that it was clear from the earlier letter of MS Branch (letter dt 15 Jan 2009)	06 May 2009 15 Jan 2009	To be made with regard to the Omission.
43.	On 25th May 2011 AG’s Branch, once again, certified the DOB of the officer as 10 MAY 1951.	25 May 11
46.	RTI dt 25 Oct 2010 filed by Dr. Kamal Tiwari in MOD for obtaining information on the subject.	25 Oct 2010 14 Feb 2011	Min. Of Law provided opinion on DOB confirming as 10 MAY 1951 (on 14 Feb 2011).
47.	Min. of Def vide their letter dt. 8 May 2011 informed the RTI Querist that DOB of the officer in High School Certificate and Records of AG Brach at Army HQ was same (10 MAY 1951)	08 May 2011	In the same reply Law Ministry informed that there was Omission in Core Branch (MS Branch) and the Ministry of Law & Justice had advised for the necessary corrections.
44.	But, surprisingly the matter was once again referred to Attorney General of India and the Law Ministry.		The News Media has since reported that now Attorney General and Law & Justice Minister have reversed their earlier opinion saying that now the DOB of Gen. VK Singh is 10 MAY 1950.
45.	The entire case smacks of a deeper plot to malign the image of Chief of Indian Army. In spite of solid and legal proof of his DOB the persons behind the scene are not permitting the corrections be made in his DOB that MS Branch had no system for verification of the DOB. He also intimated that he had given acceptance to the DOB (!0 MAY 1950) in good faith at the behest of COAS and not in agreement with the conclusion of the said MS Branch.		Surprisingly MS Branch responded vide their letter dt 03 June 2009 that “THEY WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFICATION OF DOB AS THE SAME WAS CHARTERED AS THE DUTIES OF AG’s BRANCH”

48. May be it is an indirect effort to malign both the Government, Party in Power as well as to tarnish the image of this fine institution “INDIAN ARMY”. Ramifications of not taking the issue to rightful conclusion based on justified action are grave, especially when our enemies are eagerly waiting to dismantle and demoralize our Armed Forces.

49. The Print Media and Electronic Media, so far, have reflected the issue in bits and pieces without giving the complete picture,which has left the masses in doubt so serious that some of them have even raised eyebrows on the personal integrity of the Army Chief.

50. Instant effort, towards clearing all such misunderstandings and doubts and to let the people judge the case on the merits of the case and to know from the facts enumerated above that there are some vested Powers, who are hell bent to destroy the image of our Army Chief and promote some gullible and pliable personalities for the post, are required.

51. Important to Note:-

a) The aberration in DOB was first racked- up when Gen. J.J. Singh was COAS (2006). Interestingly planning for “TWO DOWN COAS” commences when a Maj. Gen. is approved for Lt. Gen. (So called “LINE OF SUCCESSION” after Gen. V.K. Singh drawn then, and has since been talked about and quoted today officially.

b) General Deepak Kapoor, the previous COAS followed the line for vested interests and vigorously pursued the issue at each stage and made allout efforts to malign and belittle Gen. V.K. Singh before his being considered as COAS, and now when so called “LINE OF SUCCESSION” is being firmed-in, the matter has hit the headlines.

c) Lt. Gen. Avdesh Prakash, the then, Military Secretary vehemently pursued the agenda of his Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor. He is now involved in Sukhna Land Scam and found gilty and dismissed from service without any pension and benefits by a Court Martial.

TAIWAN: 'At a time of swift growth, China isn't inclined to conflict'

2012-01-20T19:21:00.000-08:00

Jan 20, 2012, 12.00AM IST
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-20/edit-page/30643649_1_taiwan-and-china-cross-strait-relations-democratic-progressive-party

Since their stormy separation in 1949, Taiwan has resisted China's stated goal of taking over the small island state. Former member of Taiwan's National Assembly, professor Tang Shaocheng spoke with Rudroneel Ghosh about China's dramatic rise, Taiwan's recent presidential elections and why the new regime's policy of engagement seems to work:

How do Taiwanese view mainland China's rise?

Taiwanese view China with very mixed feelings. On the one hand, people fear China's rise could harm the status quo between the two sides, namely no unification, no indepen-dence and no use of force. Due to a lack of mutual trust, confidence-building measures are necessary to improve the situation. On the other hand, some Taiwanese judge the rise of China in a more positive way. They cite Beijing's insistence on unification through peaceful means. The 2008 global financial tsunami is still vivid in the memory of many Taiwanese. Taiwan's swift economic reco-very must be attributed to President Ma Ying-jeou's policy of reconciliation with mainland China while the US itself was the epicentre of the crisis - trade and financial injections from China, the influx of Chinese tourists and the procurement of Taiwanese commodities by Chinese provincial governments were vital to the recovery of Taiwan's economy.

Taiwan is an example of Chinese democracy - aren't there fears Beijing could stifle this through a tight economic embrace?

Taiwan's democracy is deep-rooted enough not to be rever-sed. Beijing can only win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people to reach its goal of unification. Even then, the Taiwanese would have the last say. We must also realise a chaotic Taiwan with constant unrest will not be an acceptable option for Beijing.

President Ma's re-election vindicated his pro-China economic policies. But is any form of unification between Taiwan and China realistically possible in the near future?

No. There is no such plan of unification - the time is not ripe. The two sides are now preparing for dialogue on a peace accord... without the precondition of a renunciation of violence, there will be no foundation for further negotiations. However, if severe external factors were to affect cross-strait relations, anything is possible. If another financial crisis affects both sides, why can't they work together to face the challenge? Germany was reunited in 1990 - but nobody expected that, even in 1989.

If President Ma had lost his re-election bid, how would cross-strait relations be affected?

This would have meant uncertainties because the opposition Democratic Progressive Party doesn't accept the 1992 Consensus, which is 'One China with different interpretations'. This is Beijing's prerequisite for bilateral negotiations, accepted by the ruling Kuomintang.

China insists its ambi-tions are peaceful - but its actions can be aggressive. How should countries res-pond to emerging disputes?

According to the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, the best strategy to win a war is to adopt non-war measures - win the hearts and minds of the opponents or make clear to them the serious consequences of confrontation. Such tactics are commonly used by Chinese authorities. But at a time of swift domestic growth, China isn't inclined to conflict with others.

Also, its rise has enabled Beijing to be much more influential in the international arena. Therefore, next to the realist approach - the use of power and interests - the liberal and social constructivist approaches through the use of trade, cooperation and cul-ture are all relevant means to negotiate with China and settle disputes.

MILITARY BASES WITH “CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”

2012-01-17T21:42:00.001-08:00

BY DR. ADITYANJEE

http://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2012/01/military-bases-with-chinese.html

December 2011 was the epochal month during which the Chinese
neo-imperialistic ambitions were un-peeled very predictably like the
layers of an onion. It started with a Chinese military delegation,
headed by the Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie quietly
visiting the Seychelles on December 1st 2011. He signed a bilateral
agreement to set up a Chinese naval base in the Seychelles for
counter-piracy operations. This was followed by Hu Jintao's December
6th pronouncement; while addressing the PLA Navy (PLAN) he said that
PLAN should make "extended preparations for warfare in order to make
greater contributions to safeguard national security". The statement
was immediately denounced by the US that demanded more transparency on
Chinese intentions. Chinese claimed misinterpretation of the original
statement. Apparently, there is no equivalent word for transparency in
Mandarin. Concept of transparency is "Greek" to the Chinese political
& military establishment. Ridiculing the Western criticism, one
Chinese analyst Mao Xiaogang made a bellicose statement: "It is common
to see some irresponsible hype and smears around the world aimed at
China's military development, especially the so-called transparency
matter. China's announcement at such an opportune moment is
transparent enough".

The "outing" of the Chinese naval base by the Indian press on December
12th forced China to issue a "non-denial" denial. China acknowledged
the establishment of a "supply and recuperation facility" in the
Seychelles. The Seychelles comprises of 115 islands and is the
smallest African country with a population of 85,000 and an army of
only 500. The Seychelles government acknowledged the establishment of
a Chinese naval base ostensibly to crack down on piracy. The Chinese
Ministry of Defense tried to sanitize this in a statement:
"According to escort needs and the needs of other long-range missions,
China will consider seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbors
in the Seychelles or other countries". China acknowledged that it
already has "re-supply facilities" at harbors in Dijbouti, Oman &
Yemen since 2008 when China sent its first naval convoy to Gulf of
Aden apparently in an anti-piracy measure.

China repeatedly stressed that this move did not equate to
establishing overseas military bases. China has used a fig-leaf of
anti-piracy operations to cover the nakedness its strategic ambitions.
It is not going to stop at the Seychelles alone. China plans to
establish military bases in other countries also. Despite Chinese
insistence that China would not station its troops abroad, we see a
pattern of China expressing commercial or economic interests in a
territory (land, sea, air, space) as Chinese asset, sending PLA
soldiers there to safeguard its commercial interests and claiming
sovereignty subsequently. Professor Shen Dingli from Fudan University
has openly advocated the need for China to establish military bases
overseas.

Analogous to the Japanese euphemism of "comfort women" for Korean sex
slaves during the World War II, China calls its military bases as
"supply and recuperation facilities". Of Course, Chinese overseas
military bases are very different from the US or Russian military
bases because they are indeed part of "extended preparations for
warfare in order to make greater contributions to safeguard national
security". Per Chinese rhetoric these supply facilities will never be
used for aggression because they have the essential "Chinese
characteristic" of serving the Chinese core interests of safeguarding
the "divine" Chinese Ocean sovereignty in the Indian Ocean!
String of Pearls is not fervent imagination of delirious minds of
hypercritical analysts. It is a long-term strategy that is
sequentially unfolding. The façade of trade-oriented commercial ports
will be replaced by loud, vociferous and triumphant announcements of
China's core interests requiring conversion to naval bases. There was
no "objective evidence" that the China's first aircraft carrier when
purchased in 1998 from Ukraine would be deployed as a naval asset.
China had deceptively and fraudulently claimed that it would be
converted into a floating casino! Currently the Chinese aircraft
carrier is undergoing sea trials. So much for the "so-called
transparency issues". Although China has rejected Pakistani
exhortations to "please develop a naval base at the Gwadar port"; that
is bound to happen in next few years. Chinese "peace and harmony"
rhetoric and its strategic actions are always diametrically opposite.
The predictable pattern is that of initial stonewalling, hostile
denials, indignant & abusive comments followed by gradual but late
triumphant proclamations of Chinese core interests demanding strong
action against the enemies.

Pursuing modernization, China has become de facto number two naval
power. The PLA navy's goal is to have a "Thousand Ships Navy". This
stated "TSN" Goal is to further Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific
region and exploit the mineral & hydrocarbon wealth in the
international seabeds. China has already signed an agreement with the
UN backed International Seabed Authority to gain exclusive rights to
explore poly-metallic sulfide ore deposits in 10,000 square-kilometers
of international seabed in Indian Ocean for the next 15 years. China
will use its naval base in the Seychelles to claim sovereignty over
the Indian Ocean using this contract as the legal basis. If Chinese
creeping pattern of expanding its sovereign territory is genuinely
understood, it would not be surprising if in the year 2112, China
claims the entire Indian Ocean as its sovereign territory and may
rename it as "South Tibet Sea" analogous to China's characterization
of Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet.

China is a rising hegemon that is no longer ashamed of asserting its
imperialistic ambitions. China's list of core interests is rapidly
expanding. Assertion of China's Ocean sovereignty as a new core
interest issue has been vociferously advocated in last few years.
China has disputes with the ASEAN countries about the ownership
various atolls and islands and their hydrocarbon and mineral
potential. It refuses to deal with these claims in multi-lateral fora
and wants to bully the smaller countries bilaterally. China also
warned India against exploring hydrocarbon drilling in collaboration
with Vietnam in South China Sea. China's blockade of Taiwan strait in
1996 and raining missiles across the strait is an indicator of Chinese
strategic response pattern. In a belligerent article published in
the Beijing Daily, Mao Xiaogang articulates this: The PLA Navy will
forever act in accordance with its duty in regard to China's Ocean
sovereignty and interests with no fear and flinch upon any
interference and will ensure the safety of national interests by
virtue of its own distinct views and powerful strength".

Historically, India never shared land border with the middle kingdom
till 1949. In ancient and medieval times, Indo-Tibetan border was very
porous and was part of the great Indic religious civilization. While
Tibetan Buddhist monks and lamas visited northern India for spiritual
enlightenment in the Land of Buddha, Hindus never needed Chinese visa
for pilgrimage to Mouth Kailash & Man Sarovar Lake. Tibet once was
under the suzerainty of the Dogra Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir whose
official title included the "Deshaadhipati of Tibet". Since the
Chinese occupation and annexation of Tibet in the nineteen fifties,
entire Tibet has become a vast Chinese military garrison.

Indo-Tibetan Border has been heavily fortified and militarized by
China. China has built permanent military-cum-civilian infrastructure
in the so-called Autonomous Tibetan Region (ATR) which should be aptly
called China-Occupied Tibet (COT). While India foolishly chose to
leave Indo-Tibetan border undeveloped in both eastern and western
sectors to "deter" aggression, China has constructed military barracks
and motorable roads that can move tanks and heavy armored vehicles
along the entire Into-Tibetan border. All this so-called civilian
infrastructure development in the occupied Tibet has military
applications. China has built five air ports along the Indo-Tibetan
borders. The Beijing-Lhasa rail-road connects the Chinese heartland
with the Occupied Tibet and has military significance besides being a
tourist attraction. In the event of hostilities, this rail-road would
not be carrying tourists or the western war correspondents. China
further plans to extend this Beijing-Lhasa rail-road into Nepal and
indeed very close to Indian borders. PLA routinely conducts high
altitude military exercises in the occupied Tibet. There are frequent
incursions of the PLA soldiers inside Indian territory across the Line
of Actual Control (LAC) with repeated damage to Indian civilian &
military infra-structure in both Eastern and Western sectors.

Since Pakistan ceded part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to
China in 1961, it has built the Korrakoram highway to facilitate
Chinese access to warm water port of Karachi. Though China has denied
it consistently, PLA has at least 10,000 troops stationed in the
Pak-Occupied Kashmir (POK) in the northern territories. These
developments amount to China de facto establishing an army base in the
POK. Presence of Chinese troops in POK indeed poses a military and
security threat to India as POK is an illegally occupied territory by
Pakistan.

India is going through internal political turmoil, uncertainty and
leadership crisis that is not conducive to long-term strategic
planning. India's current political leadership has been in deep
slumber and has been totally unresponsive to China's persistent and
purposeful hegemonic behavior in India's sphere of influence. A
situation has developed whereby India is forced to react to Chinese
aggressive postures by adopting an ostrich like approach. India has
either denied strategic significance to Chinese moves or tried to
minimize the significance by buying the Chinese fibs for explanation.
The Prime Minister denied last year the possibility of China attacking
India under any conceivable circumstance. Ministry of External affairs
has become an excellent spokesperson for mouthing Chinese core
interests. Indian Defense Ministry has repeated denied about the
Chinese incursions into Indian territory. This defeatist mindset was
amply demonstrated by yet another Pavlovian denial of geo-political
reality that India and China are strategic adversaries by Shiv Shankar
Menon, the NSA, who claimed that such determinism is "misplaced".

Admittedly, in the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic dances with
the Dragon, India's political leadership and bureaucratic mandarins
may be forced to indulge in verbal hyper-gymnastics; India's security
establishment & non-governmental strategic community must not allow
the repetition of the strategic blindness India suffered from in the
nineteen fifties and sixties. Owing to India's vulnerabilities and
current strategic weakness, the Government of India continues to
appease China while secretly hoping that the numerous strategic
threats posed by an aggressive and expansionist China will somehow
disappear. Some strategic experts have rightly cautioned that the
carefully choreographed Dragonese Dance may culminate in a
full-fledged attack on India while India's political leadership and
Defense Ministry establishment are doing their level best to
purposefully humiliate India's Chief of Army and thereby demoralize
the Indian soldiers. The public display of the "dirty linen" about the
Army chief's date of birth issue by the Indian defense ministry will
embolden China to strike at India, yet again, at an opportune moment
just like in 1962.

For the last several years the Indian Defense Ministry has been in a
persistent vegetative state leading to strategic asymmetry with China.
Future Governments of India will have to rectify this inertia and take
corrective measures to increase India's comprehensive national power.
The self-induced coma of the Indian defense establishment needs
emergency interventions on "war footings". Future Governments of India
will have to make tough decisions and increase the budgetary
allocation for the defense sector by many-folds. Military
modernization must be accelerated despite the pernicious and
ever-hanging issue of corruption in defense procurements. India must
leapfrog the military preparedness and indigenous weapons design and
production. We do need long-term strategic planning and prepare the
nation for the multi-dimensional strategic challenges posed by China
in the Indian Ocean, in the POK, on the Indo-Tibetan border, in
Myanmar, in South China Sea, in the Indo-Pacific region, in the air,
in the field of long-range ballistic missiles, in cyberspace, and in
militarization of the space.

WE FOCUS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES PERTAINING TO INDIA'S RISE AS A GLOBAL SUPER-POWER.
Posted by Dr. Adityanjee at 12:25 PM

The US Pivots to the East: Implications for India

2012-01-16T22:49:00.001-08:00

Abhijit Singh

January 16, 2012

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheUSPivotstotheEastImplicationsforIndia_asingh_160112

The release of the US' new strategy guidance review on January 3, 2012
is a development of far-reaching strategic consequence for South-East
Asia and its immediate neighbourhood, including India. Entitled
'Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense', the document outlines the revised US defence posture with
regard to its force deployment in future operations. While making a
strong case for "rebalancing towards the East", it proposes a
realignment of US force structure away from Europe, towards the
Asia-Pacific – a region it characterizes as being "inextricably"
connected with US economic and security interests.

A review of the US' strategic posture has been in the offing for some
time. The first signs of a shift in strategy came in November 2011
when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in an essay published in the
Foreign Policy magazine, listed five focus-areas for a renewed US
strategic thrust in the Pacific: bilateral security, deepening working
relationships, multilateralism, trade, and human rights and democracy.
This was exactly the pitch a month later, when President Obama
declared the US' intention of forging a trans-Pacific trade zone at
the Asia Pacific Economic Summit (APEC) and announced a strategic
tie-up with Australia. But it was the East Asia summit (EAS) a few
days later, and the dissonance on display during the US President's
discussions with the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, that provided proof
(if any was needed) that the US had indeed decided to shift its gaze
to the East. The review merely formalizes a popular strand of thinking
within the US political establishment that the time has come for
Washington to follow its own economic interests. More significantly,
it indicates a departure from the present US strategy of preparing for
war simultaneously on two fronts, instead opting for credible
second-region deterrence while already engaged in large-scale
operations against the principal adversary.

The review acknowledges upfront that the US must revitalize its trade
relations with Southeast Asia. But significantly, there is an
underlying assumption that for nations in the Pacific Rim, the promise
of American 'security guarantees' which accompanies increased
cooperation in trade and other spheres, is an assurance much sought
after. Indeed, as China marches on relentlessly, there is
consternation among nations in South-East Asia over Beijing's growing
military and economic clout. But these countries are also quite happy
to feed-off China's economic growth. Even so, the review presumes that
for China's neighbours, the option of aligning with American interests
may be too tempting an 'insurance policy' to resist.

To be sure, the document does not hint at any overt confrontation with
China. All it purports to do is to give new direction to the US'
strategic vision. That the adversary happens to be China is made to
appear as a 'deductive conclusion'. In keeping with its 'mild' tenor,
the language used in articulating deep-held fears concerning China is
'calibrated' and the tone 'measured'. There is a conscious attempt at
sounding 'reasonable' and 'fair-minded' in laying out the new
imperatives necessitating a dramatic change in the US strategic
posture. So even as the review recognizes the criticality of shifting
focus to East Asia, it sets out clearly the rationale for the
significant downgrade in the US military presence in Europe – a
region, that the review professes, is now in itself a net provider of
security.

But the biggest indication of the dilution in the US' overall
geo-strategic posture is the lack of fervour in articulating the
policy position in the Middle East. The review enunciates the US'
strategic stance in the region in an unimaginative and pro-forma way,
suggesting a reduced American military involvement in the region. In
light of the recent developments in the Persian Gulf and Washington's
litany of problems with the regime in Tehran, a more 'nuanced' and
'qualified' position on Iran would have helped in a clear delineation
of US' strategic intent in the region. Alas, the review only repeats
the long-held position on countering Iran's nuclear programme and
challenging the Iranian Navy's strident posturing in the Persian Gulf.
Conceivably, Iran is that 'second front' that the US plans only to
deter in the future.

The review acknowledges the imprudence of entering into costly
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and proposes a course-reversal.
Creditably, some of its propositions on reducing military presence are
"bold" in thought and expression. More importantly, perhaps, they are
reflective of serious introspection among US policy-makers over the
needlessly high commitment shown by America in its wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Clearly, the US policy elite now feel that the
Afghanistan and Iraq type of engagements are extravagances that their
nation can no longer afford to indulge in. The new thinking in
Washington appears to be that the Taliban and Haqqani group are not
adversaries worthy of full-spectrum engagement by the US, and that
American diplomatic and military assets must in the future only be
deployed in regions where the country stands to gain economically.

It has been clear for some time that in light of the prevailing bleak
fiscal environment, the American military's external presence will be
reduced to significantly lower levels. The Obama administration is set
to inflict $500 billion worth of cutbacks on the US defence budget in
the next five years. The review suggests that much of this austerity
would be directed at the US Army and the Marine Corps. Not
surprisingly, the review proposes a leaner, fitter and better-prepared
military. But even as it places emphasis on coalition operations,
Special Forces deployments and streamlined capabilities, there are
tantalizing clues that point to a radical shift away from large-scale
operations. In other words, the US' 'nation-building' and 'stabilizing
operations' will soon be a thing of the past, and its military will
conceivably shift focus to a 'counter-terrorism' approach - more
focused on 'neutralising hostiles' and 'political point-scoring', than
bringing about any long-term change on the ground.

To its credit, the Pentagon team that drafted the document has come up
with an honest appraisal of the prevailing geo-strategic dynamic by
recognising two fundamental truths; the unstoppable rise of China and
the perceptible decline in US economic power. The 'pivot' towards East
Asia is candidly described as an 'imperative' for America, as it is
just that region where the high-trajectory of economic growth lies. It
is also, quite simply put, a place too strategically significant for
the US to leave to the whims of the regional superpower, China.

The review documents key features that would allow for a decrease in
the size of the US overseas deployments, even while laying greater
emphasis on future technologies and R&D. This is perhaps driven by the
fear of being severely impacted by China's A2/AD capabilities, a key
theme in the US defence discourse. So there are proposals to invest in
emerging technologies like autonomous vehicles and cyber security to
ensure a more flexible response to emerging threats. This may also be
one reason why the US Air Force and Navy may be spared the ill-effects
of the budgetary cut-backs as they shoulder many of the cutting-edge
technology that the US now proposes to heavily invest in.

For India, the implications of this document are 'too stark' and 'too
serious' to miss. The document is replete with signs of a dramatic
change in the balance-of-power in the region – a re-alignment of
forces that would demand of India to take sides. One of the clearest
signs of the US' pitch for a strategic compact with India came early
this month when Admiral Robert Willard, the US Pacific Fleet
Commander, in a keynote address at the Hawaii Military Partnership
Conference, spoke about the review and noted that it stressed on
building a comprehensive strategic and economic relationship with
India. With a long-term strategic partnership with India, he said, the
US also wanted New Delhi to support its ability to serve as an
"economic anchor" in the Asia Pacific region.

India's policy elite have surely not been 'oblivious' of the tectonic
changes occurring in the region. But they have been rather
'impervious' to the rapidly emerging equations. For too long, India's
political and diplomatic establishment has been wary of getting into a
comprehensive strategic pact with the US. But New Delhi's inability to
figure out China's long term strategic intent in the region too has
been striking.

Needless to say, now is the time for India to undertake a
comprehensive appraisal of its strategic options.

Burmese spring

2012-01-16T20:51:00.001-08:00

Jan 16, 2012, 12.00AM IST

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Burmese-spring/articleshow/11500968.cms

Here's a genuine feel-good story coming out of our neighbourhood. Twenty years after its military rulers annulled the results of the 1990 elections, Myanmar appears ready to embracedemocratic reform and shed its diplomatic and economic isolation. Rewarding this effort is the US's move to restore full diplomatic relations. Washington's decision to exchange ambassadorswith Naypyidaw came after Myanmar's new nominally civilian government freed hundreds of political prisoners in an unexpected gesture last week.

In fact, the dispensation headed by PresidentThein Sein is credited with a slew of reforms aimed at transforming Myanmar's image. This includes a measured rapprochement with pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi. She was released sometime ago after years of house arrest and is gearing up to contest by-elections in April. Her inclusion in the new parliament - or even government - would give further legitimacy to Myanmar's democratic renaissance.

What's surprised Myanmar-watchers is the speed of the changes taking place. For example, the recent ceasefire between Naypyidaw and ethnic Karen rebels would have been unthinkable a year ago. It's in stark contrast to the junta's stand during 2007's anti-government protests. Although western sanctions on Myanmar are yet to be lifted, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's visit there in December indicated a shift in attitudes.

If anything, the latest developments vindicate India's long-held policy of engaging Myanmar, a country of major strategic and economic importance whether from the point of view of trade, transport and energy links or security. Myanmar can now slowly be encouraged to make democratic reforms irreversible. That way, it would not only address the aspirations of the Burmese people but also serve as a vital link between South and East Asia. That'll be good for the region - and for India.

Nuclear weapons only for strategic deterrence: Army chief

2012-01-16T20:50:00.000-08:00

Rajat Pandit, TNN Jan 16, 2012, 12.02AM IST
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-16/india/30631202_1_nuclear-arsenal-nuclear-retaliation-nuclear-weapons

(Let's be quite clear on it… Nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting. They have got a strategic significance and that is where it should end," said VK Singh.)
NEW DELHI: India has rejected Pakistan's continuing veiled threats of using tactical nuclear missiles in the battlefield to deter Indian forces, holding that no one should be foolish enough to think of nuclear weapons as war-waging weapons.

"Let's be quite clear on it... Nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting. They have got a strategic significance and that is where it should end," said Army chief General V K Singh, speaking on the sidelines of the 64th Army Day on Sunday.

Asked about reports that both Pakistan and China were fast bolstering their nuclear arsenals, Gen Singh said, "I and my Army are not bothered about who has nuclear weapons. We have our task cut out and we will progress along that."

The "task" is to "transform" the 1.13-million strong force into "an agile, lethal and networked force", which can rapidly mobilize and then launch and sustain multiple armoured thrusts across the border, even as India maintains a credible minimum nuclear deterrent.

The largely futile Operation Parakram, the massive forward troop mobilization along the western front after the Parliament attack in December 2001, taught the Army harsh lessons since it took almost a month for it to amass strike formations at the borders. By then, the US had prevailed on the then NDA regime to back down, and Pakistan had shored up its defences.

"A lot has changed since the days of Op Parakram. If we did something in 15 days then, we can do it in seven days now. After two years, we may be able to do it in three days," Gen Singh said.

In other words, the Army's three "strike" corps -- 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal), each with their three to four self-contained, highly-mobile "battle groups" centered around T-90S and T-72 M1 tanks - can now be ready at their border launch points within a week of the government directive.

The Army is now working towards further cutting down this mobilization timeframe to 72 to 96 hours, even as its 10 "pivot corps" undergo "structural changes", operational logistics are reorganized and "theatrisation of combat support" tested.

Gen Singh did admit the Army was fine-tuning its "Pro-Active Strategy", sometimes dubbed the "Cold Start" doctrine, to achieve desired politico-military results. The unstated aim is to punish Pakistan in a limited manner, not invade or occupy its territory, in the event of a terror strike.

The strategy to launch multiple blitzkrieg thrusts across the border, tested in two major exercises Vijayee Bhava and Sudarshan Shakti last year, has certainly got Pakistan worried.

Having already boosted its nuclear arsenal to around 90-110 warheads, compared to India's 80-100, Pakistan has also taken to projecting its 60-km Nasr (Hatf-IX) nuclear missile as a fitting riposte to thwart any such Indian move.

But while India has a declared commitment of "no first-use", its nuclear doctrine does hold that "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage". India even retains the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons if its forces "anywhere" are attacked with biological or chemical weapons.

Implications of Chinese base in Seychelles

2012-01-16T20:49:00.002-08:00

Radhakrishna Rao
http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=1045&u_id=159
E-Mail- rkrao01@rediffmail.com

Quietly and efficiently, China is expanding and augmenting its presence in the strategically located Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In a deft move that could be a cause of concern for New Delhi, China recently revealed that the island nation of Seychelles has invited its navy to set up an overseas base with the facilities meant for “seeking supplies or recuperating at appropriate harbours in Seychelles”.

The decision to set up China’s first naval base in Seychelles was taken during the December 2011 goodwill visit to Victoria (the Seychelles capital) by China’s defence Minister Gen Lian Guanglie. “We have invited the Chinese government to set up a military presence in Mahe to fight the pirate attacks that Seychelles face on a regular basis. For the time being it is studying this possibility because she has economic interests in the region and Beijing is also involved in the fight against piracy,” said Jean Paul Adam, Foreign Minister of Seychelles. Seychelles maintains a strong military relationship with China. Under a defence cooperation treaty signed between the two countries in 2004, China has not only given two light aircraft to the defence forces of Seychelles but also has trained 50 Seychelles soldiers.

Strategic experts hold the view that in the context of China’s plan to operationalise its first aircraft carrier which is now said to be under the final leg of sea trials, the Seychelles base would assume an added significance. As it is, China has already forged strong trade and maritime links with a number of countries in the region. The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka has drawn heavily from Chinese expertise in the area of harbour engineering. Similarly, China will be building a deep sea port in Sonadia near Chittagong in Bangladesh. And of course, China has a long standing presence in Myanmar where it has helped set up rail and road transport networks, oil and gas pipelines as well as ports and naval facilities.

The Chinese plan is to have at least three aircraft carriers before the end of this decade. Aircraft carriers are critical to the Chinese Navy’s plan to challenge US supremacy across the global oceanic waters. Incidentally, the Seychelles also hosts a US drone base.

But Beijing has strongly denied the suggestion that its plan for a base in Seychelles has military implications. Beijing has downplayed the importance of this base saying, “it is international practice for naval fleets to resupply at the closest port of a nearby state during long distance missions.” A report appearing in the state-owned China Daily says, “Chinese navy is considering taking on supplies in the Seychelles while conducting escort missions to tackle piracy. Military experts stressed that the move did not equate to establishing a military base”.

On the other hand, Li Qinggong, Deputy Secretary of China Council of National Security Policy Studies made a point that any arrangements over the use of facilities will be mutually beneficial with jobs provided for people in Seychelles and the navy better able to protect China’s growing overseas interest.

The official view in New Delhi is that the Chinese base in Seychelles cannot be projected as a threat to Indian security. “The world has mutual concerns about piracy going on in the region. They are also trying to play a major role in that. I think they are augmenting their anti piracy efforts. I do not see anything wrong in this,” stated India’s Minister of State for Defence M M Pallam Raju.

Yet, there is no denying the fact that Seychelles which occupies a strategic position between Asia and Africa in the IOR has its own importance for the Indian strategic scheme of things. Seychelles has a large Indian population. The Indian Navy has actively been guarding the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of this island nation since 2009 following a request from the Seychelles government. Warships and maritime aircraft of the Indian Navy stationed in this island country have also been spearheading anti-piracy operations in the IOR.

On another front, as part of its long term vision of dominating the IOR, the Chinese Navy has also unveiled plan to launch anti-piracy operations in association with Thailand and Myanmar. Clearly and apparently, this well thought out move could cause unease in several countries including Vietnam, Japan and Philippines which have disputes with China. Asian strategic analysts consider the Chinese moves in the IOR as significant steps towards strengthening its policy of encirclement under its “string of pearls” strategy.

Meanwhile, the argument that India should join hands with Vietnam to counter the growing Chinese muscle flexing in the commercially and strategically important IOR, is gathering momentum. Vietnam happens to be the only military power in the South China Sea region which has the robustness to withstand Chinese “blackmailing and bullying”. The Vietnamese Army has behind it a long and exciting history of having faced the might of American forces. Rightly and appropriately, New Delhi has held its ground, against Chinese objections on the question of Indian prospecting for oil in Vietnamese waters. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh (ONGCV) is actively assisting Vietnam in exploring energy resources in the South China Sea falling under Vietnamese control. Against this backdrop, there is a growing clamour to accede to the Vietnamese request for Indian assistance in the area of maritime defence.

One more reason for New Delhi to get worried over the fast expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean is the recent permission granted to China by the UN-backed International Sea Bed Authority to explore poly-metallic sulphide ore deposits in the depths of the IOR for a period of fifteen years. This commercially significant contract gives China exclusive rights to explore a 10,000 sq km of the oceanic expanse in the south-west Indian Ocean close to Africa. And China’s expansionist ambitions in the IOR seems to be unstoppable.

Radhakrishna Rao is a freelancer specializing in defence and aerospace issues

US AND PAKISTAN: LIKELY AMERICAN STRATEGY IN 2012

2012-01-16T20:49:00.001-08:00

Aryaman Bhatnagar
Research Intern, IPCS
email: aryaman.bhatnagar@gmail.com

http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/us-and-pakistan-likely-american-strategy-in-2012-3552.html

Relations between the US and Pakistan were frayed throughout 2011, however, it was the NATO strikes at the Salala check-posts in November that forced Pakistan to reassess its alliance with the US. Pakistan is expected to put forward new terms of engagement with the US later this month. Against this background, this commentary seeks to examine the likely American approach towards Pakistan in 2012. Would the US reconcile with Pakistan? What would be the nature of this reconciliation?

Pakistan is still viewed as a partner that Washington may not trust but cannot afford to lose, especially because of its objectives in Afghanistan. Improved relations with Pakistan are essential for ending the blockade imposed by Pakistan on the NATO supply trucks since December 2011. Moreover, Washington’s battlefield strategy to break the momentum of the Taliban in order to improve its negotiating position at the table cannot be realized without Pakistan’s assistance (The Washington Post, 2 January 2012).

What is the likely American approach towards Pakistan in 2012?
In 2012, Washington will definitely reconcile with Pakistan. Ever since the November NATO strikes, Obama’s administration has attempted to mend fences with Pakistan. The US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said “We want to get back to normal and get into full counterterrorism relationship again.” (The Express Tribune, 4 January 2012). However, Pakistan insists on changing the equation between the two countries and urges for relations based on mutual respect, with clearly drawn lines. It is clear that in order to ensure that relations with Pakistan normalize Washington would have to accept certain demands put forth by Islamabad.

This may include a reduction in the number of US military personnel in Pakistan, additional tolls or taxes on NATO supply trucks and possible charges for the use of Pakistani airspace, reassurance to Islamabad that unilateral Abbottabad-style raids would not occur in the future, and also accept responsibility for the NATO strikes.

Will the US now toe Pakistan’s line?
While the above measures may be important to ensure that the strategic alliance with Pakistan endures, it is unlikely that Washington would toe Islamabad’s line. There would be ample space even in the new US-Pakistan equation for Washington to maintain the pressure on Islamabad to safeguard its own interests. For instance, while the NATO supply routes through Pakistan are important, they account only for one-third of the cargo that enters Afghanistan, and NATO has repeatedly claimed that it has sufficient alternate routes to supply its forces. The efforts to build up the Northern Distribution Network, the supply route that passes through Russia and Central Asia, have made considerable progress. Moreover, increased taxes on the Pakistani supply routes would decrease their attraction as cheaper options for NATO. In light of this, the threat of closing such routes again in the future can hardly be a deterrent for the US, in case it decides to increase pressure on Pakistan.

The US continues to remain one of the major financial backers of Pakistan and its military, a role that even China is neither capable nor willing to fulfil. As a result, the tactic of withholding aid to Pakistan will be a definite leverage for Washington to maintain pressure. Already, Obama has signed the national defence authorization bill, which seeks to suspend 60 per cent of the US$ 1.1 billion military aid to Pakistan. Any unconditional US aid in the future is unlikely and there are growing demands in the US to penalize Pakistan by reducing the aid further unless it steps up its campaign against the militants on its soil. The reduction in aid has undoubtedly had an adverse affect on Pakistan’s crumbling economy. Moreover, there is increasing fear in Pakistan that antagonizing Washington could lead the latter to use its influence with international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank to hurt the country’s economic interests.

Finally, as the defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates continues to remain a high priority for the US, Islamabad’s efforts to curb the activities and presence of such militants in the region would be closely monitored by Washington. This suggests that in addition to suspending aid to Pakistan, the drone programme - considered by many American officials as the most effective way of fighting militancy in Pakistan - is going to remain a vital strategy option. Reports are already suggesting that NATO may resume its drone programme, especially with the looming threat of the newly formed Taliban shura, which has vowed to attack American troops in Afghanistan and was allowed to be formed due to the temporary halt in drone strikes following the Salala incident.

Given that this is the US presidential election year, both the Democrats and the Republicans would be keen to demonstrate that they are willing to take such stern steps against Pakistan. Despite any pacification of Pakistan, the US is unlikely to reduce its pressure or demands on Islamabad to ‘do more’.

Of course Scotland can stand on its own two feet. And here's how

2012-01-16T20:46:00.000-08:00

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/hamish-mcrae/hamish-mcrae-of-course-scotland-can-stand-on-its-own-two-feet-and-heres-how-6289505.html

Scotland's voters will be asked to make a political decision in its referendum on independence, but it will be a decision coloured inevitably by economics – or at least economic perceptions, for the long-term economic impact of independence is far from clear. But such is the nature of politics that economic arguments will be used by both sides to support their case.

To caricature, there will be those on one side who argue that Scotland would be too small to "go it alone" and that there would be a flight of capital to the south, while others will say that the flexibility for Scotland to make appropriate policy decisions will bring greater prosperity than the union can provide.

So what do we know about the economic impact of break-ups of country unions? The answer seems to be that the policies that a country adopts post-separation are much more important than the act of separation itself. The experience of the Czech Republic separating from Slovakia in 1993, and that of Ireland leaving the UK in 1922, throws up contrasting evidence. Both parts of the former Czechoslovakia have prospered. The Czech Republic has been cited as the first Soviet satellite to achieve full developed country status; Slovakia has managed from a rather lower base to be one of the region's fastest growing countries, thanks in part to developing a big car assembly industry.

Ireland's path has been more difficult, partly because from the 1920s onwards it deliberately cut its economy off from Britain's by bringing in import and other economic controls, and partly as a principally agrarian economy, it started from a long way back. But after the 1987 economic reforms that triggered the "Celtic Tiger" years, it has largely managed to catch up, notwithstanding present troubles. (Disclosure: I am part-Scottish, part-English and was brought up mostly in Ireland.)

Apply this experience to Scotland and what lessons emerge? Well, the first is that it is important to have an amicable separation rather than a hostile one. Trade ties will continue irrespective of political union and even of currency union. Britain remains Ireland's largest export market even now, while Ireland is Britain's fifth largest. So Scotland's economy would remain closely integrated with England's unless it was in some way pulled apart by political feuding.

A second point is about scale. Scotland has 5.2 million people, against 62.3 million for the UK as a whole. So there is a huge disparity of size. But in an open trading environment, countries of about five million people can function very well. Ireland has 4.6 million, Slovakia 5.5 million, Denmark 5.5 million, Norway 4.7 million, Finland 5.3 million, and so on.

Leading on from this, the third point is that there would, despite this disparity in size, have to be a deal crystallising the separation. On paper, this does not look too difficult. GDP per head is very similar, with Scotland within a percentage point or so of the UK average. While Scotland is poorer than London and the South East, it is richer than the whole of the north of England and much richer than Wales. So there would be no question of Scotland needing some form of continuing subsidy from a richer England, though the apportioning of assets and liabilities would be a difficult negotiation.

The reason for that is two-fold. You could split national debt in proportion to GDP but there would have to be an agreement as to the apportioning of the revenues of North Sea oil. And there would have to be some adjustment for the fact that public spending per head in Scotland is higher than that in the UK as a whole.

Each country believes it subsidises the other, and clever people can cite a ream of arguments supporting their side of the case. For example, there is the argument that Scotland should not be responsible for the debts of Royal Bank of Scotland; or that because the development costs of North Sea oil were funded under the UK, some of the revenues should continue to accrue to the UK as a whole and not just to Scotland.

There are other things that would have to be settled. These would include the future of defence installations and whether or not to maintain a currency union with the UK, as Ireland did until 1979. In the longer term, Scotland might choose to join the euro – if the euro still existed. But provided there was goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to strike a deal. The much bigger issue – the issue that would determine Scotland's economic future – would be the policies the country adopted after the split. Put at its simplest, would an independent Scotland be more or less supportive of economic growth?

It is quite impossible to predict the direction any country will take at any particular time. The Irish turnabout of policies from 1987 onwards was not foreshadowed at the election that year. There seems to be a presumption in some quarters that an independent Scottish government would lean towards a high spending and high taxation economy. That is possible and it would certainly scare the business community were it to head in that direction. But it is not at all sure that this would be the case.

For example, the Scottish government commissioned a report on public spending, led by Crawford Beveridge, that called for a complete rethink of public services in Scotland. It was published 18 months ago and was more radical and more forward looking than anything Westminster has considered. Thus it argued that there would be a continuing squeeze on spending right through to the mid-2020s. The message was that a Scottish government, whatever its precise constitutional status, would have to learn to do more with less.

If we cannot know what direction Scotland will take, we can at least be sure on one thing. The two economies would remain closely integrated. Scotland would have to compete with the rest of Britain, with Ireland and to some extent with the rest of the EU for investment funds, and for human capital. Ireland has been extremely successful at attracting inward investment, and England has been extremely successful at attracting talented human beings. So Scotland would have to remain competitive on both counts; there would, for example, be a strong case for Scotland following the Irish model and creating a particularly attractive corporate tax regime. That would affect policy south of the border, too.

That leads to the most intriguing question of all: how much could an independent Scotland affect – indeed, improve – economic management in England? Might more competition within these islands lift overall performance? That would be a prize worth chasing.

h.mcrae@independent.co.uk

Scottish independence: a chance to build a modern, confident state

2012-01-16T20:45:00.001-08:00

This is also an opportunity to consider the possible continuing evolution of the United Kingdom

The Observer, Sunday 15 January 2012

Article history
In dealing with matters of national sensitivity, it is advisable for politicians to tread carefully or reap consequences that may mark them down in history in ways they would not wish. In the seven days since David Cameron called on Alex Salmond, Scotland's first minister and leader of the SNP, to hold a quick and clean referendum on home rule for Scotland, he appears to have fuelled rather than neutralised the desire for greater freedom on the part of a growing number of Scots. Where this ends may yet mean that David Cameron, "passionate" abut the 300-year-old Union, is nevertheless the prime minister on whose watch it begins to sunder.

Two years hence, 2014, promises to be an eventful year for Scotland. It hosts the Commonwealth Games, the Ryder Cup and celebrates the 700th anniversary of Bannockburn, the battle in the first war for Scottish independence in which Robert the Bruce won a significant victory against Edward II. Alex Salmond also intends that, in 2014, the Scots will have a referendum, "made, built and organised in Scotland", that gives the choice of full independence.

What the polls indicate is that a majority of Scots would prefer a second option, known as "devo max". So far, it is ruled out by the coalition and Labour. Devo max would give Scotland fiscal autonomy. Holyrood would set, raise and keep all taxes, remitting to London Scotland's shares of common costs on foreign affairs and defence. As David Steel, former leader of the Liberal party and knight of the Order of the Thistle has said, in support of greater fiscal independence, and the responsibility that comes with it: "No self-respecting parliament can exist permanently on a grant from another parliament."

Last week, Cameron attempted to seize the initiative by demanding a yes/no referendum within 18 months. Backed by Ed Miliband, he argued that the United Kingdom is "stronger together than it is apart". On Tuesday, Michael Moore, the coalition's Scottish secretary, said the referendum should be "legal, fair, decisive" but he also pointed out that the Scottish parliament could not legislate on matters only reserved for Westminster. In doing so, he reminded many Scots precisely why there is a shift in ever larger numbers in favour of renegotiating the relationship.

Since then, the insults have flowed to no great advantage. Salmond has accused Westminster of "bullying" and has ill-advisedly compared the SNP's bid for independence with Ireland's violent struggle against the British (in which many Scots supported the British writ). In turn, he has been called "a bandit" and accused of "showing his vanity", hardly a vice restricted to one Scottish politician. Lord Ashdown has also waded in reducing an issue of huge import to four countries, to a "High Noon" between Cameron and Salmond. Salmond has invited Nick Clegg and Cameron to talks; they say, address yourself to Michael Moore, another barbed reminder of Scotland's position in the UK. So where is the clarity for which Moore has called?

Scotland is a relatively small country of 5.2 million. Under the Barnett Formula, devised in the 1970s, public spending is accorded to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland according to population size rather than need. It has served Scotland well. According to research by the University of Stirling, England "loses" £4.5bn of public money to Scotland annually. In counterbalance, in 2011-12, Scotland's oil and gas revenue will amount to £11bn (halved since 1999), 0.7% of UK national income and eventually due to run out.

As Neal Ascherson writes opposite, Scotland is a deeply conservative country. Paradoxically, that means it has resisted the neo-liberal agenda in England, and hung on to the consensus that resists privatisation and holds faith with the power of the welfare state to stoke social mobility.

Adopting a "social democratic" agenda, since it came to power the SNP has invested in transport infrastructure and early years development. Council tax is frozen, the NHS budget is protected in "real terms", universities are free as is social care for older people. But there are rocks ahead. Greater fiscal independence will also require less popular accounting decisions. Scotland, for instance, has a higher proportion of older people. As Paul Johnson of the Institute for Fiscal Studies points out, should separation come: "Even if you have a happy year one, year 10 may look more difficult."

Independence, at this stage, appears unlikely but a route that begins with a "social union" and possibly moves on to devo max isn't far from the final destination of a clean break. We are, after all, living in an era of such journeys. Estonia seceded from the Soviet Union in the 1990s; Montenegro seceded from Serbia in 2006. The EU is overflowing with small states, drawing strength in healthier financial times from a federation. They uphold a basic principle in international law that a country has a right to self determination.

Now, a Westminster-based tartan posse including Alistair Darling and Charles Kennedy, is intent on persuading would-be separatists that the status quo is best. They will warn that Scottish independence demands a radical reconfiguration of the UK constitution. As Carwyn Jones, first minister for Wales has said, minus the Scottish MPs, parliament would consist of 550 MPs, 510 from England. Should that happen, he is calling for plans for a senate and fair representation of the three remaining countries in the then less united kingdom.

Such ramifications need to be aired. Intransigence on the part of Mr Cameron isn't helpful. To coerce the SNP into holding a referendum at a time it resists is to be avoided at all costs. So, the sooner a grown-up debate commences, home truths heard and the name-calling ceases, the better. What is also welcome is the opportunity this might offer to consider the possible continuing evolution of the United Kingdom. Could it become a loose federation in which, for instance, Scotland has "secure autonomy", independent in all but name and minus the shadow of assumed English superiority?

Scotland is about to participate in the greatest democratic exercise in its history. It is important that others in the United Kingdom are active participants and their voices are heard too. If that happens, we may yet forge a stronger set of institutions from which a modernised version of the UK can be built of which we are all proud to be called citizens.

Paris: Balochistan issues raised at "Raw Materials and International Relations" conference-debate

2012-01-16T20:43:00.001-08:00

CrisisBalochistan | January 16, 2012

Left: Mr. Christophe Alexandre Paillard, a lecturer at the Institute
of Political Studies in Paris and ENA

Balochistan has a very important geo-strategic location as it is
situated between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and what makes it even
more valuable is its extreme richness in mineral resources –
Christophe-Alexandre Paillard

The Balochistan issue is a test case for the international community –
Munir Mengal

(compiled from Paris-France Asia Reporter, The News and other sources)
On January 10, 2012, a conference-debate titled "Raw Materials and
International Relations" was held at Kiron Espace, Paris, on the
occasion of the publication of issue No. 84 "La Revue internationale
et stratégique (Quarterly International and Strategic Review)" by
IRIS/Armand Colin (Institute Des Relations Internationales Et
Strategiques). IRIS is regarded as one of the top think tank
institutes in both France and Europe.

During the debate, Munir Mengal, president of the Baloch Voice
Association, drew attention to the fact that mineral-rich Balochistan
is located in a very important geo-strategic region, finding itself
distributed between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. "By capitalizing
on this given opportunity, I am directing your attention towards
Balochistan, South Asia," Mr. Mengal said. He noted that in relation
to raw materials, there are two issues that affect Balochistan and the
region: 1) the availability and exploration of raw materials within
Balochistan and 2) the transportation of raw materials across Baloch
land. Mr. Mengal added that "Balochistan has a coastal belt of more
than 700 nautical miles and the port of Gwadar is one of the deepest
natural ports of the world. Gwadar Port lies on the straits of Hurmoz,
through which nearly 20% of the world's oil passes. China has already
consulted with Pakistan over plans to build a naval base at Gwadar."

Mr. Mengal said that international experts and think tanks have termed
Balochistan a "mouth-watering" piece of land and that the Geological
survey of Pakistan (GSP) 2007 report states that Pakistan is exploring
40 out of 50 of its minerals from Balochistan. Additionally, plans for
regional and international energy pipelines to cross Balochistan have
already been drawn up, i.e., TAPI, IPI and the extension of those to
China etc. "China has already started implementing her designs and is
heavily involved in the exploration of mineral resources from
Balochistan, i.e., gold and copper projects."

Mr. Mengal took the opportunity to address the political conflict in
Balochistan, as well. "Balochistan was annexed to Pakistan on 27th
March, 1948, by force. Since then its people have suffered under
continuous military operations, suppression, subjugation and are being
marginalized economically, socially, and culturally by Pakistan. The
greed for land and for resources has led Pakistan to commit a
systematic genocide of the Baloch people. The condition of the Baloch
people under Iran also presents a worst case picture of
neo-colonization. The Baloch on either side of the Pakistan/Iran
border have never accepted the illegal occupation of their land and
are resisting the occupation to gain their sovereignty."

Mr. Mengal closed his statement by calling for a response from the
international community, "I would like to say that the issue of
Balochistan is a test case for the International community."

Mr. Christophe Alexandre Paillard, a lecturer at the Institute of
Political Studies in Paris and ENA, added that Balochistan has a very
important geo-strategic location and is rich in mineral resources. He
said that with respect to international relations, right now, at this
time, "There are no immediate plans for Balochistan right now, but in
20 years time it will certainly be on the table."

* * *

Excerpt from TheNews, January 13, 2012, London edition (print version):

"Balochistan has gained international importance"
PARIS: Balochistan has become a very important region internationally
mainly because of its geo-strategic location and mouth-watering
natural resources, scholars and political experts have said.

They told a conference organized by the Institute Des Relations
Internationales Et Strategiques (IRIS) in the French capital that...
"There are no immediate plans for Balochistan right now, but in 20
years time it will certainly be on the table," said Christopher
Alexander Paillard, a lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies
in Paris...

"Balochistan has a very important geo-strategic location as it is
situated between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and what makes it even
more valuable is its extreme richness in mineral resources," he added.

Speaking on the occasion, Baloch Voice Association president Munir
Mengal said that Balochistan had been termed a "mouth-watering" piece
of land by international experts, therefore, the province is of "so
much importance."

"The Geological Survey of Pakistan 2007 report states that Pakistan is
exploring 40 out of 50 of its minerals in Balochistan," he said.
However, he laments that the Baloch people had continuously been
marginalised by the authorities there.

Iran warns of consequences if Arabs back oil sanctions

2012-01-16T00:19:00.001-08:00

By Ramin Mostafavi | Reuters – 8 hrs ago

Iran's Oil Minister Rostam Qasemi attends the opening of the 20th
World Petroleum Congress in Doha December 5, 2011. REUTERS/Mohammed
Dabbous

Photo By MOHAMMED DABBOUS/Reuters 11 hrs ago

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran warned Gulf Arab neighbors on Sunday they
would suffer consequences if they raised oil output to replace Iranian
crude facing an international ban.

In signs of Tehran's deepening isolation over its
refusal to halt nuclear activity that could yield atomic bombs,
China's premier was in Saudi Arabia probing for greater access to its
huge oil and gas reserves and Britain voiced confidence a once
hesitant European Union would soon ban oil imports from Iran.

Major importers of Iranian oil were long loath to
embargo the lifeblood of Iran's economy because of fears this would
send oil prices rocketing at a time - amidst debt and deficit crises
and high unemployment - when they could least afford it.

But strong momentum for oil sanctions has been created
by a U.N. watchdog report saying Iran appeared to have worked on
designing an atom bomb.

A new U.S. law signed by President Barack Obama on New
Year's Eve would freeze out of the U.S. financial system any
institution dealing with Iran's central bank - which processes its oil
revenues.

If fully applied, the law would make it impossible for
most countries to buy Iranian oil. Washington is offering waivers to
countries to let them keep buying Iranian oil for now, but demanding
they gradually cut their imports back.

Leaders from some of the Asian countries that buy the
most Iranian oil have begun touring the Middle East to secure
alternative supply lines from Arab states. European buyers suggest
they will also lean more heavily on Arab oil producers should an EU
ban come into effect.

Feeling increasingly encircled, Iran's hardline Islamic
clerical elite has lashed back by threatening to block the main Middle
East oil shipping route. Since the New Year, Tehran also began to
enrich uranium in an underground bunker and sentenced an
Iranian-American citizen to death on espionage charges.

Tensions in the Gulf have caused occasional spikes in
oil prices in recent weeks. The sanctions are also having a real
impact on Iran's domestic economy, causing prices of imported staples
to soar and the rial currency to tumble.

Iran holds a parliamentary election in March, its first
since a presidential vote in 2009 led to eight months of street
protests. Those demonstrations were put down by force, but since then
the "Arab Spring" has shown the vulnerability of states in the region
to public anger fueled by economic hardship.

IRAN WARNS GULF ARABS

Iranian OPEC Governor Mohammad Ali Khatibi said Tehran
would regard as an unfriendly act any move by neighboring Gulf Arab
oil exporters to make up for Iranian crude.

"If (they) give the green light to replacing Iran's oil
these countries would be the main culprits for whatever happens in the
region - including the Strait of Hormuz," Khatibi told the Sharq daily
newspaper, referring to the narrow sea channel through which a third
of the world's oil tanker traffic passes.

"Our Arab neighbor countries should not cooperate with
these (U.S. and European) adventurers... These measures will not be
perceived as friendly," he said.

Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said on Saturday the
world's No. 1 oil exporter - the only one in OPEC with significant
unused capacity - was ready and able to meet any increase in demand.
He made no direct reference to sanctions on Iran.

Iran's navy commander Habibollah Sayyari said Tehran
could exert control over the Strait of Hormuz. The United States,
whose warships patrol the region, says it will not tolerate any
attempt to disrupt shipping through the strait.

Military experts say Iran could not challenge the huge
U.S.-led fleet that guards the strait for long, but its threats raise
the risk of miscalculation that could flare into a clash.

The United States and Israel postponed military
exercises scheduled to take place in coming weeks to later in the
year. Officials in both countries denied the postponement was
connected with the increasing tension over Iran.

Oil prices were down at the end of last week as
anticipation of downgrades by Standard & Poor's of several indebted
euro zone economies countered the buoyant effect of anxiety about
Iranian threats to shipping. But the standoff over Iran pointed to
continued support for higher prices, brokers and analysts said.

Iran's foreign ministry said on Sunday it had received a
letter from Washington about the Strait of Hormuz and there was no
decision yet on whether to reply. A ministry spokesman did not divulge
the contents of the letter.

Tehran had said on Saturday it had written to Washington
with evidence the CIA was involved in the assassination of a nuclear
scientist, blown up by a bomb attached to his car last week, the
latest of several such killings.

Western countries suspect Iran is trying to develop
nuclear weapons capability. Iran says it is only interested in nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes such as generating electricity.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Iran oil sales by country: http://link.reuters.com/pyw35s

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

CHINA SEEKS OIL OPTIONS IN GULF

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was pressing Saudi Arabia to
open its oil and gas wealth to more Chinese investment, Chinese media
said on Sunday. China has been Iran's biggest oil buyer.

Although Beijing opposes further international sanctions
on Iran, it has already cut its purchases of Iranian oil by more than
half for the first two months of this year.

"China and Saudi Arabia are both in important stages of
development and there are broad prospects for enhancing cooperation,"
Wen told Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Nayef on Saturday, according to
Xinhua news agency.

Michal Meidan, an analyst with London's Eurasia Group,
said: "Beijing is concerned with the potential response to bellicose
Iranian statements and the spike in oil prices that would ensue from
greater turmoil in Syria and Iran."

Wen was also scheduled to visit the United Arab Emirates
and Qatar, two other big OPEC exporters across the Gulf from Iran.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague said on Sunday
he was "confident" the 27-member European Union would impose
resounding sanctions on Iran's oil industry and possibly other sectors
at an EU foreign ministers meeting on January 23.

After protracted reluctance to act arising from the
dependence of some debt-ridden EU economies on Iranian oil, member
states have agreed in principle to ban it and have been working on
details of how this will be implemented.

Last year EU countries collectively bought about a fifth
of Iranian exports, roughly on par with China.

Any EU-wide prohibition of Iranian oil would probably
take effect gradually. "Grace periods" on existing contracts of one to
12 months have been proposed to allow importers to find other
suppliers before implementing an embargo.

Hague said: "Our sanctions are part of trying to get
Iran to change course and to enter negotiations and we should not be
deterred from implementing those. We will continue to intensify our
own sanctions and those of the European Union."

IRANIAN DEFIANCE

Some analysts say Iran's leadership, which has thrived
on defiance of the West since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, is more
likely to dig in rather than back off in response to sanctions aimed
at stopping a nuclear program many Iranians regard as a matter of
national sovereignty and modernization.

A year after the collapse of the last big power talks
with Iran, its deepening nuclear defiance has raised concern of war if
harsher sanctions do not change its course.

Israel, reputed to have the Middle East's only nuclear
arsenal, sees Iran's nuclear and missile projects as a mortal threat
which it will resort to force as a last resort to stop.

The risk of Israel triggering Middle East upheaval with
a unilateral strike has the war-weary United States worried.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin
Dempsey is to make his first visit to Israel on Thursday. Israeli
media say he will try to persuade his hosts not to "surprise"
Washington on Iran.

Israel's vice prime minister voiced disappointment that
the new U.S. legislation gives Obama leeway to allow sanctions waivers
to countries to keep buying Iranian crude.

"The (U.S.) Senate passed a resolution, by a majority of
100-to-one, to impose these sanctions, and in the U.S. administration
there is hesitation for fear of oil prices rising this year, out of
election-year considerations," Moshe Yaalon told Israel Radio.

Obama has said he is determined to deny Tehran the means
to develop an atom bomb. His aides cast their sanctions strategy as a
bid to work collaboratively with foreign powers and win over states
that import Iranian oil without shocking energy markets.

(Additional reporting by Robin Pomeroy in Tehran, Daniel
Fineren in London, Dan Williams in Jerusalem, Adrian Croft in London,
Chris Buckley in Beijing; Writing by Mark Heinrich; Editing by Peter
Graff)